Introduction
Peter Jonkers and Oliver Wiertz
The overall aim of this book is to discuss the profound theoretical and practical effects of the rise of (religious) plurality for the traditional idea of religious truth, and their impact on socio-cultural identity. The main perspective of this volume is a philosophical one, but it is also fully alive to the theological, societal and empirical aspects of this topic. In this introduction, we want to give an initial idea of the multiple connections between the three key terms, viz., religious truth, plurality and socio-cultural identity. First, these terms will be placed in a broader, societal context, since it is important to know why they have become the subject of a vivid public debate and a matter of concern to many people. Hence, it comes as no surprise that these terms are also cutting-edge topics in contemporary theology, religious studies and philosophy of religion. In order to illustrate this, we will present, in the second section, an overview of the main topics in the
ongoing discussion of religious diversity in these disciplines and link them to the ways in which these questions are discussed in this volume. Given that the focus of this volume is on different aspects of religious diversity, it has to be noted that contemporary
philosophy itself uses different approaches to discuss this question, commonly characterized as continental and analytical. Section three discusses this division and how this volume intends to deal with it in a constructive way. The final section pays attention to the strong theistic, Christian focus of the philosophical dealings with religious diversity hitherto, and to the relation between philosophy of religion, theology and religious studies. It is the hope of the contributors to this volume that these insights may inspire theologians and philosophers of religion with a non-Christian background to develop their own ideas on religious truth and identity in a context of plurality.
1. Religious Truth, Plurality and Cultural Identity
religious identity, as well as a justification to fence off different religious and cultural communities from each other.
In order to introduce this complex problem, it is helpful to start by contrasting these recent developments with the assumptions of so-called modernization theory.1 This
influential sociological theory predicted the diffusion of an ethos of individualism and instrumentalism in all modern societies, in combination with a procedural, rational and universalist ethics, and an attitude of (almost) unlimited tolerance toward the socio-cultural other. As Taylor phrases it, “the developing power of disengaged,
self-responsible reason has tended to accredit a view of the subject as an unsituated, even punctual self”,2 which has set itself free from substantial ideals of the good life by
disqualifying them as parochial and dependent on one’s assent with a particular
(religious) worldview. Hence, the assumption of the modernization theory was that, with the spread of modernity, the societal impact of these substantial but also culture-specific moral ideals would fade away and gradually be replaced by a global conception of humankind and an ethics of universal justice and equality, and by the universal ideals of individual freedom and self-determination.
However, many people have discovered that the replacement of their attachment to all kinds of substantial values by the procedural, formal and individualist ethics of
modernity has fallen short of expectations, and that their attitude of unlimited tolerance, or rather indifference, toward the other is not sustainable. Especially when they are confronted with intricate, existential dilemmas, it turns out that a procedural, formal ethics is unable to offer them a prudent life-orientation. In a similar vein, when confronted with the practical consequences of the strange, and sometimes even repulsive, behaviour of the socio-cultural other, their initial tolerance often turns unexpectedly into a militant intolerance against the other and a rigid defence of their own cultural identity. In other words, people’s attachment to their local socio-cultural identities remains much stronger than the modernization theory predicted. The term socio-cultural identity covers a wide range of culture-specific ideas and activities of individuals and communities, like a gamut of mostly implicit (moral) dos and don’ts, ways of social interaction, patterns of solidarity, language and, of course, also religious traditions. Together they form a general horizon of meaning, against which people define who they are and where they belong; it frames their thinking and inspires their practices.
because there is something morally corrupting, even dangerous, in sustaining the demand simply on the feeling of undischarged obligation, or guilt, or its obverse, self-satisfaction”.3
Yet, besides the fact that socio-cultural identities have an enduring impact on the lives of people and societies, they have also lost their self-evidence and stability, since they have become plural, fragile and conflictual. There are several explanations for this evolution. A first one is that there are profound rifts when it comes to the constitutive goods and, hence, the moral sources, which underpin the universal moral standards of modernity.4 Almost everyone supports the (typically modern) standard of universal and
equal human dignity,5 but the implementation of this standard in individual societies is
very diverse, and sometimes even contradictory because, in order to be effective at all, it has to be linked with culture-specific moral sources and traditions. As such, this problem is nothing new, but it shows again that the modernization process, which was supposed to result in superseding these rifts by making constitutive goods and moral sources subordinate to a procedural, rational and universal ethics, has not had the intended effect. A second explanation is the fact that people show their socio-cultural identity far more individually and explicitly than before. This phenomenon is a result of the culture of expressive individualism, which means that people strive for an intimate contact with their deeper (emotional) selves, and prefer listening to their inner voice, instead of following existing socio-cultural patterns. They also express their individual identity far more explicitly through their behaviour, way of dressing, social interaction, etc.6 The inevitable flipside of this development is that identities are far less embedded
in stable societal structures, so that they have become more fragile. A final explanation is that socio-cultural identities have become the outcome of a complex process of social recognition, which makes them dependent on contingencies of all kinds. Moreover, this striving for recognition is not only a matter of universal and equal recognition (e.g., human dignity), but, increasingly, also of the recognition of differences (ethnic, linguistic, religious, etc.), thus making socio-cultural identity even more fragile and conflictual.7
It is precisely the combination of the enduring importance of cultural identities, their increasing diversity and, hence, their fragility that can produce disturbing
The idea of religious truth typically plays an exacerbating role in this problematic process, particularly if it is used as a justification for an exclusivist idea of identity. In essence, this is because the tension between the experience of contingency and the demand for absolute commitment is much stronger in the case of religion than for other socio-cultural “identity-markers”. To give an example, language can also be used to exclude the (linguistic) other, but it does not require an absolute commitment; more importantly, it does not have the same justificatory power as the idea of religious truth: people are attached to their native language not because it is better than other
languages, but simply because it is theirs, because they are familiar with it. By contrast, when people proclaim that their religion is the only way to salvation and that “error has no rights” or say that the religion of the other is outdated or even foolish, they implicitly rely on an idea of (religious) truth to underpin their convictions. Because of the
omnivalence of religion, these kinds of exclusivist (religious) truth claims and their related attitudes of militant intolerance can easily spill over into other dimensions of socio-cultural identity, thus further jeopardizing the possibilities for peaceful coexistence of different religious and secular communities.8 That is the reason why many people,
including prominent political philosophers like Rawls and Habermas, argue that the notion of religious truth has no place in the public, in particular political, sphere. These authors brand religious truth as intrinsically authoritarian and resulting in oppressing the essential pluralist character of modern societies.9 Therefore, they think that this idea
needs to be replaced by notions like an (overlapping) consensus or a post-metaphysical justification of political rule.10
2. Religious Truth and Diversity in Theology and Philosophy of Religion
Against this background of these developments, it is no wonder that the relation between identity, religious plurality and truth has become a cutting-edge topic in theology and philosophy of religion. At the same time, these developments have also laid bare the limits of the traditional idea of religious truth. Religious truth is the
cornerstone of classical theism, which can be defined as a philosophical theory about God’s existence and his essential attributes.11 The most important feature of theism is
as soon as theology and philosophy of religion were confronted with more radical expressions of religious plurality and started to pay more attention to the existential dimension of religions.
These justified critiques of the theistic notion of religious truth present a challenge to theology and philosophy of religion, and, hence, also to the authors of this book: in particular, they saw themselves confronted with the task to redefine the idea of religious truth in such a way that it can continue to play a vital role in a context of religious
plurality. For all the authors of this volume, it is no option to abandon this notion
altogether, since not only Christianity but also other religions claim that their teachings are true and that their faithful should believe in this truth and testify to it in their lives. Moreover, not only religions, but secular worldviews, too, claim to show their adherents the way to “true” human flourishing and “true” fulfilment of life. Obviously, these claims need to be critically examined, not only by means of an internal, theological reflection, but also through an external examination, which is the task of philosophy of religion. In sum, the theologians and philosophers of religion involved in this project feel the need to develop a broader definition of religious truth in the light of recent manifestations of radical plurality and an enhanced focus on the existential dimension of religion, in particular, because it is part and parcel of the religious identity of a person or community.
In order to introduce the main discussion-points regarding philosophy of religion’s dealing with religious diversity, it is helpful to start with the now classical tripartite scheme of positions concerning the relationship between religions, i.e., exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. This division has recently been intensively criticized, but it is still widely used. Originally developed for classifying Christian attitudes to other
religions, it is nowadays widely used as a model for framing interreligious approaches in general.12 As a rough characterization, it may suffice to say that exclusivist positions
deny the truth claims of (all) other religions, i.e., their veritistic, epistemic or salvific value. The less radical this denial is formulated, the less clear and stable the distinction is between exclusivism and inclusivism. Inclusivism does not flatly deny other religions any value or truth, but only maintains that the value and truth of one’s own religion are unrivalled, since inclusivism considers itself to be able to “include” (all) other religions. Finally, pluralists deny any singular outstanding value or truth of a particular religion; they view all religions, or at least all world-religions, as equally valuable instruments of gaining religious insight and salvation – or claim that we do not have any good reason to think otherwise. Recently, a fourth position, particularism, has emerged, which emphasizes the radical differences between religions to such an extent that it thwarts any attempt at comparing religions or filing them in a common scale of value.
Despite the huge amount of critique pluralism has drawn, it is still safe to say that the “agenda for the contemporary theology of religions is being set by the so-called pluralist school”.13 Yet, the usefulness of this threefold scheme has been questioned by the
emergence of so-called comparative theology, which can be seen as an attempt to keep one’s particular tradition without foreclosing the possibility of learning from other
religions beyond the well-trodden paths of exclusivism, inclusivism or pluralism. These developments in the philosophical and theological discussion of religious
diversity have produced a host of epistemological questions. At least since the days of the Enlightenment and up to present day, the diversity of seemingly incompatible
religious beliefs has been used to undermine the rationality of religious belief in different ways. The problem of the contingency of one’s religious identity, for example, implies that one’s religious affiliation largely depends on accidental factors, like the place and time of one’s birth. This view seems to favour a view of religious beliefs as merely a matter of good or bad luck and therefore as something irrational. This argument, which is also proposed by pluralistic theists, is sometimes not only less convincing than it
prima facie appears, but also fires back to the one who proposes it because the position
of the person who proposes this contingency argument itself seems to be the product of contingent factors in the history of this person. Another strand of the debate on the apparent negative epistemic consequences of religious diversity dwells on the fact that, due to their incompatible truth claims, not all religions can be true. Hence, as we have no good reason for viewing one religion as more likely true than others, religious believers should retreat to an agnostic stance.
The discussion of the epistemic consequences of religious diversity in analytic
philosophy has gained momentum since the recent development of social epistemology and especially its discussion of peer disagreement, i.e., disagreement between people who are epistemically on a par concerning the topic of their disagreement. The question of the rational reaction to peer disagreement becomes relevant for the discussion of religious diversity when one accepts the possibility that religious Others may be potential epistemic peers. If persistent rational peer disagreements were impossible, this would mean that religious doctrines, which in most cases seem to be objects of persistent disagreement, fall outside the purview of human reason.
The problem of the accidental character of one’s belonging to a particular tradition, and its consequence for the rational status of religious beliefs and identity in general, also becomes manifest in the hotly debated question of the criteria for the discernment of religions other than one’s own. Some even call it the crucial question of contemporary theology of religion.14 One can roughly distinguish two positions: universalists who claim
Universalists have to face the problem that, apart from rather formal criteria (like the principle of non-contradiction), there are only few criteria that may earn near-universal acceptance in religious matters. Moreover, it seems that even the application of more or less universally accepted formal criteria is “coloured” by a particular religious tradition. Hence, the problem of universal criteria re-emerges on the practical level of their
application. Nevertheless, that should not divert from the fact that there are some formal near-universal criteria which – even if not guaranteeing strict agreement – at least limit the range of possible rational disagreement about the outcome of interreligious
discernment (e.g., the criteria of consistency and coherence).
On the other hand, particularists face the threat of relativism and the problem of self-defeat (or self-weakening). Furthermore, the question arises how interreligious dialogue, which includes dialogue about doctrinal matters, would be possible when different religions persistently use different (kinds of) criteria or apply them in hugely different ways. However, particularism offers the opportunity to develop criteria that are accepted by the respective religions because these criteria have their base in these religious traditions themselves. So attempts to justify values like tolerance in the respective traditions have the merit and advantage that these values will not be seen as imposed from outside and, therefore, have better chances of acceptance by the members of the respective tradition.16 Yet, in extreme situations, particularism is liable to the risk that
people become encapsulated in their own tradition, so that they are not able or willing to deal critically with their own tradition and to expand their horizon – a threat that is especially pertinent in the field of religion. In order to avoid this risk, philosophy of religion points to the need for religious humility and a critical reflection on one’s own religious tradition. Welcoming religious diversity may even prove to be cognitively and religiously fruitful, since it helps us to highlight our unquestioned assumptions and biases and delivers evidence we would otherwise likely have missed.
The question of particularity also emerges in connection with interreligious hermeneutics, which deals with the effects of interreligious encounters on one’s understanding of one’s own and the other’s religious traditions, as well as on the
hermeneutical principles needed to realize this double understanding. Should a tradition only be interpreted according to its own explicit or implicit hermeneutic rules or
practices, or is it possible to interpret it on the basis of alien hermeneutic principles? The latter hermeneutical attitude is a condition of possibility for a positive attitude toward the beliefs of the religious other and dialogical openness.
corporeal and practical aspects of religions and their cultural contexts. Important
questions in this respect concern the possibility to communicate existential experiences like those of suffering across the borders of particular religious traditions, the role of bodily and ritual aspects of religious identity, and the legitimacy of missionary activity and “church planting” in a context of religious diversity. Against this background, one of the most urgent practical challenges for philosophy of religion is to understand and respond to the rise of religiously motivated violence and intolerance. Are there concrete forms of interreligious encounter that allow a really dialogical and peaceful attitude toward other religions without sacrificing one’s religious identity? Is it more effective to deal with religious extremism from an external or rather from an internal perspective? After this general overview of how religious diversity raises a host of new questions to contemporary philosophy of religion, let us turn to how the authors of this volume respond to these challenges. As the title of this volume already indicates, the focus of their answers is on the consequences of religious diversity for religious truth and the identity of a community of faith. The three-partite division of this book already shows how these answers are arranged: (1) the concept of religious truth needs to be redefined in the light of the rise of religious diversity; (2) religious diversity has major consequences for the epistemic status of religious truth-claims; (3) the ways in which religious truth and diversity interact have far-reaching consequences for the possibility of multiple religious belonging, the legitimacy of missionary activity, and the peaceful co-existence of different religious communities. This means that the issues of religious exclusivism/inclusivism/pluralism, the contingency of religious beliefs, the possibility of peer disagreement in religious matters, universalism versus particularism regarding criteria for religious discernment and hermeneutic principles for interreligious
understanding and, finally, the many practical questions that religious diversity raises will be addressed in various ways throughout the three parts of this volume.
The leading question of the first part is a metaphysical one: assuming that one cannot do without the concept of religious truth, but also that this concept needs to be redefined in order to avoid exclusivism, what would an alternative idea of religious truth look like? Sami Pihlström argues that philosophical pragmatism can offer an idea of religious truth that welcomes religious diversity, thus showing a way out of the deadlock of
practical level. This practical focus of pragmatism ensures that the brute reality of pain, suffering, evil and death has to be acknowledged, since our metaphysical
categorizations of reality depend not only on our theoretical, but also on our ethical and political perspectives. Moreover, the practical dimension of pragmatism and the
contextual realism it implies prevents that the acceptance of multiple religious contexts leads to a particularism, which holds that there are no normative standards for our ethical and political choices for rival perspectives insofar as they transcend individual religious traditions. A concrete way to make these two new insights regarding religious truth more concrete is the notion of acknowledgement, in particular, the
acknowledgement of the other’s suffering as something real. This leads to a broader, non-foundationalist notion of religious truth, which enables us to communicate suffering and other existential experiences across the borders of particular religious traditions. In sum, in comparison to classical theism, the innovative character of pragmatism consists in its success to contextualize the idea of religious truth without abandoning it
altogether, and to link a metaphysical account of religious truth with the ethical pursuit of truthfulness.
Åke Wahlberg proposes a different way out of the deadlock of universalism versus particularism by defending an objective understanding of religious truth. He argues that this approach does not inevitably lead to religious exclusivism, but rather makes
communities can jointly find the common ground on which mutual understanding is possible and, hence, make room for new conceptualisations.
Elena Kalmykova develops a concrete, non-exclusivist approach of the idea of religious truth from the perspective of religious studies. She proposes to treat central doctrinal statements, like “God is triune”, not as theoretical propositions but, rather, as sacred artefacts. She underpins this hypothesis by pointing to the empirical fact that even the most fervent believers are rather ignorant of the doctrines of their religion and certainly do not attribute the same central role to them as philosophers of religion and
theologians. Yet, ordinary believers cherish these doctrines as an important part of their religious identity and defend them if they come under attack. This also applies to the role that the idea of religious truth has for these believers. In order to solve this
discrepancy, Kalmykova argues that a religious attitude is not only directed towards the contents of a doctrinal statement, but also towards the statement itself. This attitude is reached as a result of embodied action rather than through mental comprehension. This insight leads her to propose that believers often hold doctrinal statements not only as (cognitive) representations, but also and even primarily as sacred artefacts. In order to explain this idea, Kalmykova compares doctrinal beliefs with icons in Orthodox
Christianity. In particular, icons are set apart from profane counterparts and prohibited from being changed by lay people. They are accepted because of their proper origin and the authority of the person who transmits them, and they are used to scaffold religious actions and thinking. Obviously, these insights have far-reaching implications for religious truth and identity in an age of plurality. One implication is that, in
interreligious dialogue, religious doctrines should be treated with due respect and without attempts to challenge them, just like religious artefacts. Another is that doctrinal beliefs comprise truth claims, but they are not contained in the doctrinal propositions only. Rather, they are reached in the embodied and experiential treatment of the world, where religious artefacts are used as stepping stones for religious action.
Nehama Verbin explores yet another way to transcend religious exclusivism and the opposition between universalism and particularism. She employs the notion of religious fictionalism. It is important to note that this notion is not rooted in scepticism or
agnosticism, but in a deeply religious conception of divine hiddenness and radical transcendence, and in a personal commitment to the truth of that insight in a life of faith. For Verbin, this insight offers a fruitful way to develop a hermeneutical strategy for interreligious dialogue. She substantiates her views by means of an interpretation of the work of Maimonides, according to whom it is not possible to know God’s nature, nor to entertain thoughts and utter statements about Him. Instead, there is only a content-less, mystical apprehension of the divine name. Since the apprehension of this divine truth does not involve any propositional component, one can safely state that, for
God. Phrased positively, Maimonides’ idea of truth as subjectivity implies that all the denominational distinctions, which rest on cognitive differences of opinion about objective doctrines, are dissolved. The result is a genuine mystical fellowship across denominational borders around the mystical apprehension of the name of the divine as a “subjective truth”. In a similar vein, Kierkegaard insists that there is no direct transition from any observable, objective religious truth to the inwardness of faith, but only a leap. In contrast to an objective approach, the believer has to involve oneself in a subjective, imaginative way in the truth of the God-man; through this participation, one becomes subjectively contemporaneous with Christ. So, in a similar vein as Maimonides, Kierkegaard’s radical, subjective redefinition of religious truth is able to cross
denominational boarders, as non-Christians, too, can involve themselves imaginatively in the subjective truth of the gospel narratives.
The second part discusses the far-reaching epistemic consequences of religious diversity for the idea of religious truth. Many religious believers have only recently become aware of how deeply the encounter with other religious traditions and communities affects their belief in the truth of their own creed, in particular, the epistemic status of religious beliefs. The questions that arise in the wake of this
awareness are: Are religious beliefs nothing but contingent social constructions? Does peer disagreement in religious matters make any sense? Are there are universal criteria for religious discernment and hermeneutic principles for interreligious understanding? John Cottingham asks whether religious diversity is a potential threat to the epistemic respectability of religious belief. The existence of many religions, and especially the inconsistencies between their truth claims, are often taken as a proof that all of them must be false. Yet, believers would object that adopting a religion is to adopt a framework of interpretation, which enables the world to be seen in a certain light as having a meaning and value that cannot be derived from its material properties. However, this is hardly a solution to the problem of the epistemic respectability, since different (religious) frameworks of interpretation are so incommensurable that an
epistemic convergence of their different truth claims seems hardly realistic. A viable way to answer this question is to accept the inevitable epistemic finitude of human existence, leading to an attitude of epistemic humility regarding the truth claims of one’s own and the other’s religious convictions. For reflective religious believers, this means that their faith is based on glimpses or intimations of the divine, but also that they should
believers to claim the epistemic respectability of their religious truth, but also
encourages them not to claim this respectability only for their own religion, but to extend it to the truth claims of other religions. This approach enables believers to move beyond the traditional views of religious exclusivism, inclusivism and unqualified pluralism. It also has the great advantage of bringing the question of epistemic respectability closer to the existential dimension of religion, so that it may be more promising for finding convergence rather than divergence.
Like Cottingham, Oliver Wiertz starts with examining the question of whether believers, having no good reasons for viewing their own religion as more likely true than others, should retreat to an agnostic position. In his discussion of this problem, Wiertz proposes that, instead of focusing on the problem of the justification of religious truth itself, one should rather examine the less far-reaching question of the desiderata that should be fulfilled in order to have true beliefs. He shows that religious plurality renders the
fulfilment of these desiderata more difficult, although it nevertheless remains possible to hold them without violating essential intellectual obligations. In other words, religious plurality does not fatally undermine the epistemic reliability of religious truth claims. At the same time, it is clear that the challenge of religious diversity confronts us with the need for an alternative approach of religious truth claims than traditional theism, which is prone to exclusivism. According to this alternative approach, Wiertz scrutinizes whether other religious traditions are epistemically comparable and how they, in fact, epistemically compare. Such an intellectual and moral attitude also results in a deeper understanding of one’s own tradition. On a meta-epistemological level, religious plurality confronts philosophy of religion with the fact that the diversity of religious traditions is irreducible, thus avoiding inclusivism. It also shows that religious traditions have an existential depth, thus avoiding the intellectualist bias that typically characterizes some forms of traditional theism.
Katherine Dormandy balances an often prevailing view of religious diversity as something negative from an epistemological perspective by pointing out beneficial epistemic aspects of religious dissent. In particular, religious diversity makes it possible to engage in foundational-worldview disagreement, which can challenge our
unquestioned assumptions, deliver evidence we would likely have missed, and expose us to new epistemic alternatives. It can also combat the epistemically limiting groupthink prevalent in secular and religious communities alike. Engaging in worldview
risk of circular reasoning and distortion of reality. This risk is exacerbated by the fact that belief-systems are deeply embedded in people’s personal and social existence. In situations like these, engaging in foundational disagreement across worldviews yields a number of epistemic advantages that are greater than disagreement within a worldview: external criticism can draw our attention to weaknesses in our own belief-systems, provide us with additional evidence and offer epistemic alternatives.
On the basis of a similar, positive attitude toward the fact of religious diversity, Dirk-Martin Grube examines whether this plurality offers a new epistemic approach to respect the Otherness of the religious Other, which would make it possible to move beyond the traditional views of religious exclusivism, inclusivism and pluralism. If successful, such an approach stimulates a robust interreligious dialogue between potential religious peers, resulting in a meaningful disagreement between the
participants. Grube asks which epistemic conditions have to be fulfilled in order to make such a dialogue possible. He basically agrees with Wiertz’s realist theory of truth, but also points to the problem that such a realism tends toward an exclusivist stance (if proposition A is true and B differs from A in relevant ways, B cannot also be true), and is therefore unable to accept the religious Other as a (potential) peer. As a way out of this impasse, Grube proposes that the bivalence or tertium non datur principle is not
applicable in the case of religious truth, since religion belongs to the realm of human existence, which is characterized by a fundamental undecidability. This position allows us to make a shift from a bivalent idea of truth to the concept of justification. Justification is geared towards portraying reality adequately, but, unlike epistemological realism, it shifts the grounds from semantics to pragmatics. Rather than focusing on beliefs, justification focuses on the question of whether the person holding a belief is entitled to do so. The epistemic advantages of this approach are that it allows for the possibility of peer disagreement in religious matters. It also allows for including non-cognitivist factors into our deliberations, so that it comes closer to the way in which religion functions in real life; and this approach allows for plurality, since justification is perspectival and context-dependent. From this, Grube concludes that the “justified religious difference approach” is the key to dealing with religious diversity in a constructive way: it takes religious Otherness seriously and does not reduce it to some underlying unity.
Obviously, the intricate relation between religious diversity, truth and identity is anything but a purely theoretical matter; it also raises a lot of important practical consequences, three of which will be discussed in this volume. First, there is the question of whether it makes sense to speak of multiple religious belonging. If religious faith is indeed an encompassing form of life, this seems to preclude the possibility of belonging to another religious tradition at the same time. Is there a balance between identifying with a
Löffler examines this problem from a theological perspective, asking whether it is possible to integrate the practice of Zen in a legitimate and authentic way into Christian faith, so that this practice becomes part of Christian identity. He argues that the
Buddhist tradition of Zen owes its existence to the loving work of divine providence, so that one has to expect that Buddhism indeed contains God-derived elements of truth and grace, which Christians cannot simply ignore. This positive attitude does not only apply to those elements of Buddhism that can easily be integrated into Christian
identity, but also to the treasures of Buddhism that appear to be quite “unchristian” and incapable of reception. This means that Christians do not practice Zen in a Christian-adapted way, but in a way that fully respects the original Buddhist distinctiveness of Zen and understands it as a God-given challenge and opportunity, which enables Christian practitioners to re-explore previously unimagined facets of the Absolute Mystery. The aim of such a Zen practice among Christians could then be seen in the formation of a truly dialogical spirituality, i.e., a spirituality that allows itself to be catered and shaped not just by one, but by two religious traditions. Such a dialogical spirituality does not only refuse to assimilate the other but is actually interested in the irreducible and
impregnable elements of one’s otherness. Eventually, this process initiates a process of spiritual transformation that liberates us from false idols and self-images and thus provides an opportunity for purification and greater openness to the divine and the religious other. The actual movens of this process is the mutual discovery of the spirit in the dialogue partner as well as the concomitant recognition and realization that the truth is greater than our heart and even greater than our theological systems. Hence, what is demanded from Zen-practicing Christians is nothing less than a proficiency of living in both religious worlds.
A second practical matter that needs theological reconsideration as a consequence of the challenge that religious plurality means to religious truth is the idea of mission. Although this idea has a bad reputation in the Western world today, Klaus von Stosch argues that missionary work is an ethical duty for Christians, since they have to proclaim to the whole world that God loves every human unconditionally. Such an approach means that missionary work is a service to all people, irrespective of whether they are Christian or not. Therefore, the Church cooperates with the whole world in working for the kingdom of God, which is always greater than religious traditions can conceive. Yet, besides this attitude of epistemic humility, a Christian missionary
dialogue with the world also has to witness Christ explicitly, since he is the foundation of the belief in God’s unconditional love. Von Stosch then discusses the implications of this insight for Christianity’s relations with Judaism and Islam, respectively. First, God’s lasting election of the people of Israel shows that, at the end of times, Christians and Jews will equally recognize in Christ sides that correspond to their own shape of hope (and thus prove them right), and sides that surpass their own shape of hope in
For Christian missionary work, this means that it has to realize that Christians can learn from the permanent challenge that Jewish life poses to them. Second, the question is whether this special relationship between Christianity and Judaism can be applied to Islam, too. Von Stosch argues that the Qur’an offers a foreign prophecy for Jesus Christ, thus representing a lasting enrichment for the Church. For their part, many Muslims explore today whether they can reinterpret the Qur’an in such a way that it overcomes their traditional supersessionism with regard to Christians and Jews. The final and perhaps most urgent issue that crops up in the wake of the rise of religious diversity concerns the link between religious truth claims, identity and religiously inspired violence. The primary question in this respect is whether religions themselves are prone to inciting violence or to justifying its use. If so, to what extent does the concept of religious truth and the view on other religions play a role in actualizing this predisposition? Peter Jonkers starts with stating that one of the most important characteristics of religious identity is that it often rests on transcendently guaranteed and justified truth claims, so that a strong attachment to one’s religious identity can easily lead to superiority, exclusivism and even violence. This attitude can give the faithful both the legitimation and the motivational potential to enforce their religious truth claims upon others, and this can indeed lead to religious violence. On the face of it, the most obvious solution to this problem is that religions should drop their truth-claims, especially when entering the public sphere, and translate them into the universal language of public reason. Yet, one can ask whether such a translation is not inevitably reductionist, and whether it is possible to make a sharp distinction between a supposedly universal rational core of all religions and their specific doctrines, parochial ethical norms and peculiar ritual practices. Instead, Jonkers proposes scriptural
reasoning as a more promising way to hold on to the idea of religious truth, while avoiding that it becomes exclusivist and violence-inciting. Scriptural reasoning asks all participants to recognize the sacredness or the truth of others’ scriptures to them, but also requires them not to claim an exclusive ownership of their sacred scriptures. Such a polyphonic and non-exclusivist discourse results in a respectful understanding of different religious truth-claims and identities in their own right, and thus helps to prevent religiously motivated violence. Another way to break the ill-fated bond between truth-claims and violence is offered by the idea of religious hospitality. Just like scriptural reasoning, religious hospitality manages to avoid the homogenizing tendency of
Enlightenment rationality by recognizing the irreducible otherness of the religious other. Religious hospitality accepts the heterogeneity of religions but is, at the same time, convinced that communicating with other religions about their most precious truth-claims not only broadens our understanding of the religious other, but also enriches our religious self-understanding.
namely, fundamentalist Protestantism in the USA. Religious fundamentalists interpret the present conflictual relationship between Christian faith and the dominant culture and society exclusively through the prism of the apocalyptic language of the Bible. Their justification strategy typically rests on the so-called dominion theology, which claims that Christians should assert control over the whole of God’s creation. From this perspective, acts of violence are justified if they serve to hasten Christ’s second coming. Although these fundamentalist beliefs seem irrational or psychologically disturbed, Harrison thinks it is important not to discard them, but to treat them as rational relative to
fundamentalist worldviews. In order to be effective, one has to criticize these extremist beliefs from the perspective of a worldview with which they have enough in common. Hence, a healthy diversity of inter-religious and, especially, intra-religious views can be a vital resource for effectively responding to fundamentalist perspectives. In other words, a pluralist society might do well to encourage theological debate between those religious groups that, at least to some extent, speak each other’s language. This means that intra- and inter-religious pluralism not only incites religiously motivated violence but can also serve as an effective way to criticize it.
It goes without saying that this book is not the first one of its kind. We will show this in the following overview of some recent publications, and we will also point out in which ways this volume complements the already existing ones. Dirk-Martin Grube’s and Walter Van Herck’s Philosophical Perspectives on Religious Diversity17 focuses on
replacing the idea of bivalent truth with the concept of justification. In comparison, in the present volume this issue is embedded in a wider context and showcased as one among a number of related ways to deal with religious diversity. An additional reason why the present volume is a fitting complement to the Grube/Van Herck anthology is that some discussions in this volume are a continuation and deepening of the above anthology (most notable in the chapter by Grube). Chad V. Meister’s Oxford Handbook
of Religious Diversity18 is a useful handbook, covering a wide-ranging area of topics in a
general overview. In this way, Meister’s handbook serves as an excellent background for the present book, as it sketches the broader context of the questions and problems discussed in this volume. Roger Trigg’s monograph Religious Diversity. Philosophical
and Political Dimension19 displays a plurality of subjects and aspects of the topic of
religious diversity and therefore points to the multifarious character of the discussion concerning religious diversity, which is also acknowledged in the present volume. Although Trigg’s book offers an instructive overview, the papers in the present volume deal with religious diversity through in-depth studies of specific aspects of it. Meanwhile, Philip Quinn’s and Kevin Meeker’s classical anthology, The Philosophical Challenge of
Religious Diversity,20 is a collection of important essays on the epistemology of religious
updates some of the discussions of the Quinn/Meeker anthology. Catherine Cornille’s
Interreligious Dialogue Series21 focuses on theological questions and positions.
Philosophical aspects do not feature as prominently as in the present volume and are dealt with mainly from a hermeneutical-continental perspective within the framework of comparative theology and, above all, includes voices from different religious traditions. This series is a highly valuable indicator of the current hot topics in the academic discussion of religious diversity.
3. The Divide Between Analytic and Continental Philosophy
All these ongoing discussions resulting from the rise of religious diversity bear multifarious relations of interdependence, and the different positions in the
contemporary discourse have presuppositions that also influence one another. It seems that a philosophical perspective with its acute sense for hidden presuppositions and complex conceptual relationships is especially apt as a basis for dealing with these intricate matters and as a basis for further theological reflections. But, unfortunately, philosophy itself suffers from a radical form of diversity, the much-discussed split into continental and analytic ways of doing philosophy, which threatens the usefulness of philosophy for intellectually coming to grips with the problems and opportunities that religious diversity poses. This book is an attempt to overcome this divide, since authors from both philosophical traditions have contributed to this volume and interact with each other’s insights. Another important dividing line is a disciplinary one. Obviously, religious diversity is a multifaceted reality, so that it needs to be discussed from various scholarly disciplines to get a nuanced view of the problems and opportunities involved. This book is a modest contribution to just that: although the majority of the authors are
philosophers of religion, this volume also comprises contributions from (Christian) theologians and social scientists, in particular, from religious studies; furthermore, several papers discuss insights from these disciplines.
The existence of a deep rift between analytic and continental philosophy is as much discussed and bemoaned as it is questioned. The difficulty of spelling out the difference between so-called analytic and continental ways of doing philosophy is well known. It is obvious that these two designations allow no neat definitions because each term refers to plural and varied, if not heterogeneous, philosophical traditions, especially in the case of continental philosophy. But that does not preclude the possibility of family
Instead of an abstract enumeration of the differences between analytic and continental ways of doing philosophy of religion, let us exemplify these differences by comparing the views of two renowned (even if not uncontroversial) representatives of these traditions: Merold Westphal and Richard Swinburne. Westphal’s point of departure to characterize continental philosophy of religion is not an intellectual conundrum, such as the logical relation between propositions affirming the existence of evil and the
existence of the theistic God, or a theoretical problem, like the compatibility of divine omniscience and human freedom; rather, it is an existential one: the contemporary spiritual crisis.22 If philosophy of religion is to offer some spiritual medicine, it has to
abandon its orientation toward / linkage with science and detached objectivity, and orientate itself according to the model of the Hebrew prophets. This need for a new orientation is strengthened by the uneasiness about a scientific approach of religion, since religion is at odds with a detached observation, and rather demands the
acceptance of a “desperate need alleviated only by some gift of grace”.23 Westphal
enumerates four characteristics of prophetic speech, which have to be transferred to philosophy of religion to make it also prophetic. These are, first, the personal character, which means that a particular person addresses particular people under particular circumstances in particular ways. Hence, prophetic speech is tantamount to the denial of the old philosophical striving for universality and objectivity, as well as of the view of theism as a theoretical hypothesis argued for or criticized with the help of objective arguments; instead, prophetic speech favours ad hominem arguments. The second characteristic is untimeliness, which means a philosophy of religion “conspicuously out of step with the spirit of its times”.24 This leads to the third characteristic, which is the
political character of this new kind of philosophy of religion. The question of God is political in character; therefore, a neat distinction between religious and socio-political questions cannot be upheld. The last is the eschatological character of prophetic speech, which means taking seriously the “priority of God’s future”25 over the past and
present. Such a new kind of philosophy of religion will not view truth claims or moral claims as decisive criteria of discerning the right religion, but rather focuses on the right condition of the heart: an unconditional love of God.
When one compares this plea for a prophetic philosophy of religion with Richard Swinburne’s sketch of the programme of analytic philosophy of religion and the criteria of good philosophy in several of his publications, profound differences with Westphal’s approach emerge. While Westphal stresses the personal character of philosophy of religion and rejects the scientific ideal of detached observation, Swinburne claims to argue his philosophical issues “with considerable rigour and thoroughness”, since this is also necessary in the context of theological reflection. Swinburne bemoans the flirtation of theology with “continental philosophy” with its “very loose and sloppy style of
argument” as “one of the intellectual tragedies of our age”.26 These claims are backed
scientific theories”27 – exactly the opposite of Westphal’s view of religion.28 Furthermore,
Swinburne’s stress of the necessity of precise concepts, rigorous and cogent arguments and a coherent account of God29 flatly contradicts Westphal’s proposal of ad hominem
arguments. Swinburne remains silent about the spiritual character or consequences of philosophy of religion, let alone about its political aspects.30
Without claiming that this volume constitutes an ideal synthesis of the analytic and the continental approaches in philosophy of religion, one can safely say that this book tries to combine the positive aspects of both philosophical traditions. Almost all contributors, regardless of their philosophical background, agree with Westphal that philosophers of religion should recognize the existential and sometimes even personal character of religion and integrate this in their thinking. Moreover, the very fact that the focus of this book is on religious diversity implies that the authors do not treat religion as if it were a universal category, but instead acknowledge the irreducible particularity of religious traditions. The ‘untimeliness’ of this volume consists in the fact that, contrary to the popular idea that religions are nothing but contingent, parochial convictions making it pointless to argue about their truth, all authors hold on to religious truth as an essential characteristic of all religions, even though they also recognize that this idea has to be redefined in a non-exclusivist way in order to allow for religious diversity. Furthermore, many essays of this volume express, explicitly or implicitly, the idea that religion is not a purely theoretical affair, but has profound political implications, which have to be taken into account by philosophy of religion. Last but not least, most authors take an attitude of epistemic humility with regard to their own religion, and even more toward other religious traditions, because of the inexhaustible character of the divine.
However, this does not mean that the contributors to this volume have given up the rigour and thoroughness that characterize analytic philosophy. Many of them unravel the complexities of religious diversity with the help of logic and rigorous argumentation, draw comparisons between religious and scientific disagreements and try to define religious and theological concepts as precisely as possible. It goes without saying that the conceptual and intellectual rigor of analytic philosophy contributes substantively to the clarity of the debate about religious diversity, and to a clear view of the nature of religious truth. In general, although all authors are aware of the potentially reductionist character of a scientific approach of religious diversity and religious truth, none of them accepts the more extreme viewpoint of continental philosophy that religion is the
opposite of reason, that truth is completely perspectivistic so that the idea of religious truth makes no sense or that a metaphysical approach to God necessarily amounts to idolatry.
communicate at all across it”.31 Rather, conversation and collaboration are important
and may lead to unexpected insights. Let us give some hints how this is realized in this volume.
Analytic philosophy’s stress on the cognitive dimension of religion and religious faith, which sometimes threatens to suppress all non-cognitive aspects of religion, must be counterbalanced by the continental thinker’s vivid awareness of the multifarious nature of religious faith and even of religious truth, as Elena Kalmykova does in her paper. When an analytical philosopher is open to this richness, he or she must incorporate non-cognitive factors into his/her epistemological deliberations on religious belief, as is done, for example, in Sami Pihlström’s and Dirk-Martin Grube’s contributions. On the other hand, it is not useful to completely ignore the cognitive dimensions of religion because religions themselves claim that their teachings are true and demand their faithful to believe them, as Jonkers argues in his paper.
Analytic philosophy’s moderately optimistic view of our capacity to discuss religious matters like the nature of God in a rational way and in agreement with the
methodological standards and values of analytic philosophy must not obliterate the fact that sometimes we are dealing with objects or topics, especially in the religious realm, that pose real challenges for our cognitive faculty and human language. Thus, they call for the humble confession that our logical and epistemological apparatus reaches its limits, so that we have to look for other means of cognition, like literature or arts.32
Therefore, at least a moderate dose of negative theology would be useful for many analytic philosophers of religion, while more linguistic and epistemological optimism would befit some continental thinkers (because such optimism is the presupposition of any self-critical philosophical reflection). Such a middle course is steered in John
Cottingham’s text, whose stress on the tentative character of religious assertions nicely counterbalances the epistemically more optimistic stance in the paper by Wiertz.
counterbalance, but, at the same time, the above-raised suspicions highlight the
difficulties and dangers of misunderstanding in interreligious dialogue, and the threat of a Western bias of hermeneutical principles, which may foster domination instead of mutual enrichment. These threats to an authentic dialogue are arguably fewer in the focus of analytic philosophers of religion. Peter Jonkers’ dealing with scriptural
reasoning and religious hospitability is an answer to these threats without succumbing to the contrary threat of making other traditions unintelligible.
Also concerning the socio-political aspects of religion, there are characteristic differences between analytic and continental philosophy of religion. The work in the tradition of analytic philosophy of religion often does not pay due tribute to the fact that religions are shaped by cultures and vice versa and are, therefore, cultural phenomena with socio-political aspects and consequences. It is correct that philosophers need not deal with all aspects of their topic (if only for the reason of limits of time and
competence). Yet, the meaning of religious phenomena and the conceptions of God are constituted inter alia by their pragmatic-societal effects, so that reflecting on these phenomena means that one has also to take into account these political-cultural aspects. The papers of Klaus von Stosch and Victoria Harrison are a case in point in this respect. On the other hand, the old-fashioned metaphysical way of dealing with God, which dominates analytic philosophy of religion, is a rich resource for discussing practical problems in connection with religion. So, taking seriously the Anselmian insight that God is a being greater than which nothing can be conceived, gives the plea for religious humility a metaphysical-theological underpinning, as can be seen in John Cottingham’s and Klaus von Stosch’s contributions. An example of a blending of metaphysical and societal questions can be found in Jonkers’ argument against religiously inspired violence, an argument that is based on the assertion of the absoluteness of God. Also, the analytic view of faith as a possible object of rational criticism or justification has important socio-political consequences because it may help to prevent the shielding of religious beliefs from public discussion and, therefore,
prevents religious convictions from being conversation-stoppers in the public realm, as Katherine Dormandy argues in her paper. Rather, the analytic approach motivates a rational public discussion of religious claims in the case of societal conflicts (about head-scarfs, female circumcision, etc.).
4. Normative Christian Perspectives on Religious Plurality
A rather unfortunate characteristic of philosophy of religion, which has drawn more and more critique over the last years, is that it has a Christian bias, resulting in an undue narrowness, which prevents this branch of philosophy from performing its full task.33 As
majority are Christian theologians, philosophers of religion and religious scientists. Therefore, it is no surprise that most of them approach the topics of this volume from a Christian perspective, asking how a Christian-theistic view on religious truth and its robust idea of identity can be reconciled with (religious) plurality. When quoting examples from particular religions, they mostly refer to Christianity (which itself is multifarious). This has mainly to do with their personal experience and professional expertise. It may be desirable that philosophers or theologians overcome their religious one-sightedness, and the chapters by Verbin, Von Stosch and Löffler in the present volume show the fruitfulness of such a “multireligious approach”. Yet, for philosophers and theologians without multi-religious expertise, it is more appropriate to deal with the religion they are familiar with. Furthermore, referring to one’s familiar religion minimizes the need to take recourse to a generic concept of religion, which recently has been treated with suspicion and disapproval, especially by scholars of religious studies. But what may seem at least as controversial as the focus on Christianity is that all authors in the present volume are united in their explicit aim to deal with questions of religious diversity from a normative perspective and to give also normative answers to these questions, which they underpin rationally. This focus on normative questions is characteristic of a philosophical and theological approach of religious diversity – a characteristic that distinguishes this volume from the bulk of work in the field of religious studies. This brings up the question of interdisciplinarity.
Philosophers of religion, just like all philosophers, make normative claims (e.g., religious truth claims, but also claims concerning the compatibility of determinism and freedom or the good life). The normative character of these claims lies in the fact that they are claims to truth, and thus are a condition for the different philosophical positions to claim intellectual respectability. Most philosophers do not merely describe or assess the discussions on such normative claims from an external perspective, but are themselves involved in these discussions, i.e., they take a stand in them. Sami Pihlström, for
example, argues in his contribution for a particular position (pragmatic realism) against its contenders (metaphysical realism and anti-realism). With this, philosophers (of religion) are not violating philosophical-academic standards, but just fulfilling their task as philosophers. However, it is also their job to give a fair account of contrary positions and to weigh the pro and cons as objectively as possible. In this way, philosophy
demonstrates its aim to synthesize commitment and detachment, to conjoin insider and outsider perspectives and to show that commitment and normativity do not necessarily vitiate academic standards or are irrational, but rather are a precondition for fruitful and rational academic discussions. This makes philosophy of religion a suitable perspective to deal with religious diversity and a basis to further theological explorations and
scientific-empirical studies of the topic. Above all, with regard to the discipline of
with religious topics can be rational at the same time.34 With regard to theology,
philosophy of religion points out the inevitable philosophical presuppositions of theology, and offers ways for a clear understanding and a critical discussion of them. Therefore, the mainly philosophical character of this volume on religious diversity is not meant as a denial of the valuable insights about religion in general and religious plurality in
particular offered by theologians. Philosophical insights may lead, for example, to a deepened sensitivity to the important role of non-doxastic elements in religion, or to the hermeneutical challenges for a good understanding of religious doctrines and their often entwined historical developments. A focus on philosophical-normative questions does not mean a denial of the relevance of empirical findings for normative reflections on religions either. Interdisciplinary openness is evinced explicitly in different ways in this volume by the contributions of Victoria Harrison, Peter Jonkers and Katherine
Dormandy, which draw on insights from social and cognitive sciences. Quite a lot of the texts in this volume have gained much profit from the collaboration with colleagues beyond the narrow confines of their own discipline or school of thought. This shows up in the view of religions as multifaceted and multi-layered phenomena with metaphysical, epistemic but also practical-societal aspects, which has inspired the set-up of this volume. Our volume is intended as an invitation to philosophers, theologians and scholars of religious studies to join and enrich the discussion on religious diversity.
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1 For a further development of this contrast see: Peter Jonkers, “How to Respond to Conflicts over Value Pluralism?” Journal of Nationalism, Memory, and Language-Politics (forthcoming, 2019).
2 Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 514.
3 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 516. 4 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 495.
5 For an interdisciplinary and intercultural study of the evolution and the complexities of this idea see Marcus Düwell, Jens Braavig, Roger Brownsword, Diethmar Mieth, eds., The Cambridge Handbook of Human
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6 Taylor, Sources of the Self, 374–381; Charles Taylor, “The Politics of Recognition,” in Multiculturalism.
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Press,1994), 30f.; Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 475. 7 See Taylor, “Politics of Recognition,” 25–27, 31f., 34f. For a further analysis of the implications of recognition for religious diversity, see the chapter by Sami Pihlström, “Religious Truth and Religious Diversity,” in this volume.
8 For a detailed analysis of this relation see Peter Jonkers, “Religion as a Source of Evil,” International
Journal of Philosophy and Theology 78, nos. 4–5 (2017): 424–5.
9 See John Rawls, Political Liberalism: Expanded Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 129, 135. Jürgen Habermas, “Pre-political Foundations of a Democratic State,” in The Dialectics of
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2006), 24f.
10 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 147, Jürgen Habermas, “Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive
Presuppositions for the ‘Public Use of Reason’ by Religious and Secular Citizens,” in Between Naturalism
and Religion. Philosophical Essays, Jürgen Habermas (New York, Polity Press, 2008), 143.
11 For a general overview of theism and its problems see Svend Andersen, ed., Traditional Theism and its
Modern Alternatives (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 1994); see also Peter Jonkers, “Redefining Religious
Truth as a Challenge for Philosophy of Religion,” European Journal of Philosophy of Religion 4, no. 4 (winter 2012): 141–146.
12 For an overview of the discussion cf. Perry Schmidt–Leukel, “Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism. The Tripolar Typology – Clarified and Reaffirmed,” in The Myth of Christian Superiority. A Multifaith Exploration, ed. Paul F. Knitter (Maryknoll: Orbis, 2005), 13–27.
13 Terrence Merrigan, “Religious Knowledge in the Pluralist Theology of Religions,” Theological Studies 58 (1997): 686–707; compare as a recent example Keith Rose’s recent claim “that theological and philosophical stances espousing religious pluralism are the only responsible bases for comparative thought about religion. … [T]he call to move forward into a more promising, religiously pluralist future is … an unavoidable step guaranteed by religious change and the passage of time”; Kenneth Rose, Pluralism: The Future of Religion (New York, London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 1
14 Klaus von Stosch, “Das Problem der Kriterien als Gretchenfrage jeder Theologie der Religionen. Untersuchungen zu ihrer philosophischen Begründbarkeit,” in Kriterien religiöser Urteilsbildung, eds. Reinhold Bernhardt, Perry Schmidt–Leukel (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 2005), 37–57, 37. 15 This is only a rough classification; for a more differentiated distinction of diverse kinds of critique in the field of political philosophy, which can be transferred to the field of theology/philosophy of religious diversity see Antti Kauppinen, “Reason, Recognition, and Internal Critique,” Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of
Philosophy, 45 (2002): 479–498.
16 See for example Christoph Schwöbel’s concept of a religiously motivated concept of tolerance; Christoph Schwöbel, Die religiöse Wurzeln der Toleranz (Freiburg, Basel, Wien: Herder 2002).
17 Dirk-Martin Grube and Walter Van Herck, eds., Philosophical Perspectives on Religious Diversity:
Bivalent Truth, Tolerance and Personhood (London: Routledge, 2018).
18 Chad V. Meister, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).
19 Roger Trigg, Religious Diversity. Philosophical and Political Dimension (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
20 Philip Quinn and Kevin Meeker, eds., The Philosophical Challenge of Religious Diversity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000).
21 Catherine Cornille, ed., Interreligious Dialogue Series (Eugene,OR: Cascade Books, 2009f).
22 Merold Westphal, “Prolegomena to any Future Philosophy of Religion which will be able to come forth as Prophecy,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 4 (1973): 140.
23 Westphal, “Prolegomena,” 139. 24 Westphal, “Prolegomena,” 144. 25 Westphal, “Prolegomena,” 148.
