Questioning the hunt? The morality of human-animal interactions in Pseudo-Oppian’s

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Questioning the hunt? The morality of

human-animal interactions in

Pseudo-Oppian’s

Cynegetica

Sean E. McGrath

sean.e.mcgrath@gmail.com s2348667

Classical, Medieval and Renaissance Studies Track: Classics

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Introduction

Are we allowed to kill an animal?1_{In the case of pre-modern societies, we commonly believe that this}

question would not even have been raised except by perhaps a very select group of eccentrics. Our consciousness regarding the treatment of animals would find its origin in the later part of the twentieth century, due to the development of environmentalism and advances in the cognitive sciences. In the further past, humans could do whatever they wished to wild and domestic animals, which includes eating them, using them for domestic labor or even slaughtering entire species for mere entertainment, such as during the venationes in the Roman gladiatorial games. In broad terms, I would agree that in the past, people were much less scrupulous in their behavior towards animals. Yet this does not mean that our ancestors did not reflect on the place of humans and animals in the world and therefore on their relationship to one another. In fact, they did reflect on the question whether we have any moral obligations towards non-human life forms and, if the answer to this question is positive, due to which ethical principles.

There are many sources in which one can discover evidence for the existence of pre-modern reflection on the treatment of animals. In this thesis, I will discuss how the relationship between humans and animals is evaluated in one specific literary text, the Cynegetica, a didactic epic poem which has been falsely ascribed to Oppian of Cilicia.2 I will argue that the Cynegetica for the most part shows that animals as well as humans in their encounters with each other are subject to the a set of universal norms and that their adherence to these values can be evaluated regardless of the species they belong to. Animals provide both positive and negative examples for us to follow, but human behavior can also be chastised when it falls short in respect to these norms during interactions with animals. While humans are certainly portrayed as extraordinarily beings, the Cynegetica does not suggest that they can be fundamentally distinguished from animals and it does not legitimize just any behavior towards animals. This depiction of animals is at odds with the most important schools of philosophical thought during this period, in which animals cannot be recognized as subjects of morality.

This is the interpretation of the poem for which I will argue in this thesis. To demonstrate this, I will analyze six passages from the poem, ordered in five chapters. In these analyses, more traditional approaches to ancient literature will be combined with modern insights from the historical and literary studies. My main focus will be on close reading and especially the use of intertextuality, but I have also taken into account some insights from contemporary animal studies and a little bit of narratology as tools for interpretation. The specific passages have been selected because they provide, in my eyes at least, the most insightful reflections on the relationship between humans and animals. I am aware that such a selection is necessarily highly subjective and that I may have unconsciously favored certain

1_{In modern literature from the animal studies, these beings are often referred to as non-human animals. I would}

fully agree with Tiffin (2007) 245, who writes that “our selective group of an animal other is a peculiar one: there is, after all, a far greater distance in terms of form, anatomy, physiology and function between a bee and a pig than between a pig and a human”, and that this distinction is ideologically charged. For the sake of legibility, however, I will use animals as a synonym for non-human animals throughout this essay.

2

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attitudes while overlooking others. This is somewhat inevitable, because I have not been able to compare my own insights with those of other readers – the questions I have posed have never been answered in the extant literature. I therefore hope that my pioneering work can serve as a basic starting point for more research in the future.

The aim of this thesis could therefore be considered threefold: first of all, I will provide interpretations for separate scenes in the Cynegetica, many of which have, to my knowledge, never been subjected to literary analysis. Secondly, I want to provide a satisfactory interpretation for the moral outlook of the Cynegetica in its entirety. And finally, I hope that my work can contribute towards a more nuanced view of the various attitudes towards animals that existed during the Imperial period.

Before moving on to the discussion of individual passages, I will briefly discuss some broader topics which will be relevant to the interpretation of the Cynegetica. First, I will give an overview of the philosophical attitude towards animals that was current in the imperial period, an attitude which differs substantially from the position taken in the Cynegetica. After that, I will mention contemporary animal studies and the so-called animal turn, from which I have taken some insights. Finally, I will introduce the Cynegetica itself, treating topics such as its dating, contents, structure and the literary position it claims for itself.

Denying morality to animals in Greek philosophy

If we were to look at the philosophical literature from the Hellenistic and Imperial periods, one would be likely to conclude that questions regarding the proper behavior towards animals were not much debated by the people living in these periods. In an influential work, Richard Sorabji has argued that Aristotle initiated a ‘crisis’ for both philosophy of mind and issues of morality by denying animals reason (λόγος). This stance was subsequently taken over by other philosophical schools and had far-stretching implications for, using an anachronism, issues of animal justice. Through an absence of λόγος, these animals were not conceived as rational beings. This was also used to argue that an animal could not be considered a moral agent and therefore terms as justice and injustice do not apply to it. In other words, one could, according to most thinkers of the Hellenistic and Imperial period, treat animals however one wanted.3

Of the Greek philosophers, Aristotle was the first who made a systematic distinction between humans and animals, based on (the absence of) reason,4_{a decisive conceptualization in the history of}

animal justice during antiquity. Throughout Aristotle’s metaphysical and ethical works, he denies animals not only reason (λόγος), but also other similar intellectual concepts such as διάνοια (thought), λογισμός (reasoning), νοῦς (intellect) and δόξα (belief). An animal is of course capable of sensations and can react to its sensory experiences, but the difference from humans is that it cannot reflect on these experiences or draw conclusions based on its sensory input. One example of Aristotle denying animals reason is found in De Anima:5

3_{Sorabji (1993).} 4

Steiner (2008) 27.

5_{This sentiment is also expressed in EE. 2.8 1224a27; Pol. 7.3 1332b5; EN. 1.7 1098a3-4. See for this topic}

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ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις (οὐκ ἐνδέχεται γὰρ δοξάζοντα οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὶ ὑπάρχει πίστις, φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς. ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκολουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ λόγος· τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει, λόγος δ᾿ οὔ.6

(Arist. An. 3.3 428a22-24)

But opinion follows from belief (since it is not possible to have an opinion about things one does not believe in), but none of the wild animals form belief, even though many have imagination. Furthermore, belief is necessary for every opinion, conviction is necessary for belief, and reason is necessary to form a conviction. Some of the wild animals have imagination, but none have reason. Because animals lack λόγος, they are not able to form judgments (δόξα) about the world around them. This metaphysical position has great ethical implications: if an animal does not have the capacity to reflect on the outside world or on its own actions, it cannot conceive of an action as ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ and therefore cannot be held accountable for its own deeds. In his Politica, Aristotle also explicitly states that only humans have concepts of justice.7 Animals, therefore, have no inherent sense of morality within Aristotelian philosophy.

It is a different question, however, whether humans, the only beings who have this capacity, are required to treat these irrational animals justly. Again, Aristotle’s answer to this question in his Nicomachean Ethics is negative. In its eighth book, he discusses the concept of friendship. For Aristotle, friendship is only possible between people who have something in common. In an unequal relationship, such as that between master and slave, friendship is not possible, because justice is absent between them. To illustrate this, he compares slaves to animals and writes:

φιλία δ᾿ οὐκ ἔστι πρὸς τὰ ἄψυχα οὐδὲ δίκαιον. ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ πρὸς ἵππον ἢ βοῦν, οὐδὲ πρὸς δοῦλον ᾗ δοῦλος. οὐδὲν γὰρ κοινόν ἐστιν.

(Ar. EN. 8.11 1161b2-3)

There is no friendship nor justice possible with lifeless objects. It is not even possible with a horse or a cow and not with a slave in its position as a slave, for there is nothing in common between them.

These passages make it seem clear enough: Aristotle does not see animals as moral actors and does not believe that they are entitled to justice from human beings.

More recent scholarship has, however, demonstrated that Aristotle’s opinion on λόγος among animals may be more complex than it is depicted above. Gary Steiner has argued that there are more nuances in the writings of Aristotle if we consider his biological works. While his ethical and

6_{This section is bracketed by certain editors, most recently Ross (1961) in his edition of De Anima, because the}

argument has been considered identical to that in the passage before. I have chosen to cite this passage due to its persuasive defense in Hicks (1965) 464, who rightly states that it in fact does provide an additional argument and besides demonstrates that all the ancient commentators read this passage. On the argumentation in this passage see also Polansky (2007) 421.

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metaphysical writings are rather dismissive towards the rationality of animals, in the biological works Aristotle does observe reason in at least some living beings. In these he does not seem to perceive of reason among humans and animals as an absolute distinction but rather as a gradual scale. Steiner states that this is not a matter of inconsistency on Aristotle’s part:8

“Deshalb kann die volle Bedeutung von Aristoteles' Verständnis vom Tier nur begriffen werden, wenn wir die Spanning zwischen den zwei Seiten seiner Auffassung anerkennen: Auf der einen Seite gibt es eine natürliche Kontinuität zwischen Tier und Mensch, auf der anderen sind die Tiere von der Polis unbedingt ausgeschlossen.”9

Yet this is only the beginning of a denial of justice to animals in the philosophy of the Hellenistic and Imperial period. The work that was begun by Aristotle would be taken up by the Stoics, who exclude animals even more systematically from the realms of morality. There is a clear hierarchy among the beings living in the Stoic universe. Just as in Aristotle, animals are incapable of reflection on the world around them. This results in the conclusion that they are therefore unable to attain virtue, because their actions are not voluntary but rather based on what we would nowadays call instinct.10 Because Stoics believe that the good can only be grasped through reason, as Seneca points out in one of his Epistles, animals cannot partake in what this school considers to be the greatest good:

quaeritur utrum sensu conprendatur an intellectu bonum; huic adiunctumest in mutis animalibus et infantibus non esse. quicumque uoluptatem in summo ponunt sensibile iudicant bonum, nos contra intellegibile, qui illud animo damus.

(Sen. Ep. 126.1-2)

One may ask whether the good is understood by the senses or by the intellect. To this can be added that it is not present in the mute animals and in children. Those who make pleasure the highest good judge that the good is in the senses, we however, who place it in the mind, believe that the good is perceived intellectually.

The denial of reason to animals, again, leads to the conclusion that justice does not apply to them.11_The

ambiguity which is present in Aristotle’s biological works has been solved by the Stoics, however, by grounding this denial of reason to animals in their cosmic principles. In the highly anthropocentric Stoic universe, all other living beings were ultimately created for the sake of mankind. This idea is famously articulated by the Stoic Balbus in Cicero’s De Natura Deorum, who states that creation would have been wasted on irrational beings and therefore the world was providentially created with man at its center:12

8_{Steiner (2008) 33-36.} 9_{Steiner (2008) 36.} 10

Steiner (2008) 36-38.

11_{Sources for this position are listed in Sorabji (1993) 124 n.14.}

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hic quaeret quispiam, cuiusnam causa tantarum rerum molitio facta sit? arborumne et herbarum, quae, quamquam sine sensu sunt, tamen a natura sustinentur? at id quidem absurdum est. an bestiarum? nihilo probabilius deos mutarum et nihil intellegentium causa tantum laborasse. quorum igitur causa quis dixerit effectum esse mundum? eorum scilicet animantium, quae ratione utuntur; hi sunt di et homines, quibus profecto nihil est meIius, ratio est enim quae praestet omnibus. ita fit credibile deorum et hominum causa factum esse mundum, quaeque in eo [mundo] sint omnia.

(Cic. N.D. 2.133)

If someone were to ask for whose sake the creation of all these things was intended[, what would you say]? For the sake of the trees and plants, who, despite lacking sensation, are supported by nature? This, however, is certainly absurd. For the wild animals? It is no more likely that the gods labored so much for dumb and unintelligent beings. For whose sake can one then say that the world has been created? Of course for those living beings who can use reason; these are gods and humans, compared to whom there is certainly nothing superior, since it is reason which places them above every other being. Therefore it is plausible that the world is created for the sake of gods and humans, theirs is everything in this world.

If the natural world, including the animals inhabiting it, is providentially created for humans, it is also implied that man has the authority to act as he pleases in regard to the rest of the world. In De Natura Deorum, Balbus also expresses the idea that mankind has actually been appointed by nature as a kind of caretaker of the natural world.13 A Stoic philosopher can therefore legitimize any behavior towards animals by arguing that the human is acting in accordance with nature.

The Aristotelian and Stoic attitude on the topics of morality and justice towards animals are clearly the outcome of sophisticated and coherent reflections on metaphysics and ethics. Especially the Stoic arguments result from an elaborate view on nature and divine providence. Yet one cannot help but wonder about the practical applicability of these rather harsh conclusions. In everyday life, people did intuitively feel that certain behavior towards animals was in fact unacceptable, even if they did not possess a theoretical foundation for their convictions. Various sources tell of people being convicted for unnecessary animal cruelty in ancient Greece and Rome, even though there were no official laws forbidding this conduct.14_{In the end, despite all the philosophical underpinnings that the great thinkers}

of the Hellenistic and Imperial periods produced, I believe that Sorabji’s observation on the clash tension between human feelings and ethical theories contains a more important principle to work with: “if theory clashes too much with intuitions, this will be so much the worse for the theory.”15

13_{Cic. D.N. 2.98-99, also Glacken (1967) 59-60.} 14

Bodson (1983) 314-5. Some examples she mentions are found in Plin. N.H. 8.180 and Plut. Mor. 12.68 (The

Eating of Flesh) 1.7.

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Animal studies and othering

After looking at the status of the animal in the intellectual culture of the Roman empire, I will fast-forward through history to contemporary academic discussions. During the past decades, research in the humanities and social sciences has shown increasing interest in non-human animals. This development is called the animal turn, on the analogy of the other so-called turns that the humanities have experienced throughout the past century, such as the linguistic and cultural turns.16_{One of the}

impetuses for this development comes from the cognitive sciences which increasingly challenge the binary distinction between human and animal upon which many attitudes towards animals depend, including those held by most ancient philosophers (as discussed above). There are multiple approaches towards animals current in the humanities: one can look at the impact which non-human beings had on (human and non-human) history and on the role of animals in society. Many writers are also concerned with issues of animal and environmental justice, on the manner in which we ought to treat the natural world. Another angle that has been used is to study the manner in which animals are portrayed by humans. The representation of animals, so it has been argued, can often expose the ideologies and values of a certain society. This final approach is the one which is most important for this study.

To be clear on this issue, I would not in the first place classify my research as work in the field of animal studies. My primary intention is to provide an interpretation of the Cynegetica as a work of literature, for which I use the representation and evaluation of animals as a means, whereas an animal scholar would be more interested in using the Cynegetica as a source to answer questions about, for example, the position of animals in society. Nevertheless, approaches from animal studies can provide fruitful ways of thinking to uncover meaning and terminology to accurately describe phenomena in a work of literature.

The most important contribution that animal studies have made to my thinking comes from an article by Sune Borkfelt.17_{He argues that insights from postcolonial studies, especially Edward Saïd’s}

notion of othering, can be successfully applied to the study of animals in the humanities as well. While we generally consider an other to be human, Borkfelt makes a strong point that animals are “embedded in an otherness which is deeper than that of marginalized or stereotyped humans.”18 Humanity is often defined against the animal and thereby the definition of an animal becomes entirely negative. Animals are, in other words, often presented as that which humans are not. We also define the notion of culture in opposition to nature and therefore the degree of culture which a society has achieved has, especially further in the past, been measured by its distance from nature.

This othering of animals is a notion that is of interest regarding the animals in the Cynegetica. I will show in my discussions of individual episodes that the degree of otherness greatly differs among the various animals in the poem. Some animals are indeed fundamentally opposed to human characteristics and therefore confirm the exceptionalism of mankind. In most cases, however, the poet seems to place more emphasis on the similarities between the human and the animal or to impose the same set of

16_{I will not attempt to provide an overview of the vast literature of the animal turn. I will only mention Deen}

(2015); Weil (2010); Ritvo (2007) which I have personally used to orientate myself within this field and upon which I have based this section.

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values and rules on both. Animals can provide positive and negative examples for human behavior and some of them even question the fundamental justice of the human domination over nature.

The Cynegetica

In this section I shall give a brief introduction to the Cynegetica, a work which is not exactly well-known even to many specialists in Greek poetry. The reason for this is that the Cynegetica has been mostly neglected in modern scholarship, along with most of the Greek poetry from the Imperial period. The Cynegetica is a didactic epic poem in four books from the early third century AD on the topic of hunting and, more broadly, mammals living on dry land. It is generally dated between 212 and 217, where 215 seems to be the most likely year of publication.19

In his proem, the poet already announces that his animals will be presented in rather anthropomorphic terms. After a dedication to the emperor Caracalla, the poem features a dialogue between the poet and the goddess Artemis which echoes the prologue of Callimachus’ Aetia,20

in which Artemis orders the poet to treat the following topics:

μέλπε μόθους θηρῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀγρευτήρων· μέλπε γένη σκυλάκων τε καὶ ἵππων αἰόλα φῦλα, βουλὰς ὠκυνόους, στιβίης ἐϋκερδέα ἔργα· ἔχθεά μοι θήρεια λέγειν, φιλότητας ἀείδειν καὶ θαλάμους ἐν ὄρεσσιν ἀδακρύτοιο Κυθήρης καὶ τοκετοὺς ἐνὶ θηρσὶν ἀμαυρωτοῖο λοχείης.21 (Cyn. 1.35-40)

Sing of the battles between wild beasts and hunters. Sing of the races of dogs and the nimble races of horses, the quickly taken decisions, the profitable acts of tracking. Tell me about the hates of animals, sing of their loves and their bedrooms in the mountains filled with tearless love and the childbirths among beasts from which a midwife is absent.22

The two main subjects of his work, as Artemis orders him, are hunting (35-37) and the behavior of wild animals (38-40). What is already striking here is the anthropomorphic presentation of animals: they love (φιλότητας) and hate (ἔχθεα), their bedrooms are filled with tearless love (ἀδακρύτοιο Κυθήρης). This motive does not only occur in the proem of the poem. Throughout the Cynegetica, animals are often described in terms usually reserved for human emotions.

19_{On the date of the poem see Keydell (1937) 704; Whitby (2007) 133; Bartley (2003) 4. See also some other notes}

about the dating in Mair (1928) xvii-xix.

20_{On the relationship between the prologue of the Cynegetica and the Aetia see Constanza (1991) and Harder}

(2007: 28).

21

The text of the Cynegetica is taken from the most recent critical edition by Papathomopoulos (2003). The text from the Halieutica is taken from Fajen (1999).

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This poem is transmitted under the name of Oppian, a poet from about a generation earlier, who wrote a didactic epic on salt water fishing23 in five books (the Halieutica). The poet of the Cynegetica clearly used the Halieutica as the primary model for his own poem, but there is no doubt that these poems are written by two different authors.24 There are four main arguments for distinguishing the authorship of these two works. First of all, the Halieutica is about forty years older than the Cynegetica. The Halieutica can be dated to the period of Marcus Aurelius and was written sometime between 176 and 180.25_{The second argument is the use of the hexameter. Oppian is generally quite careful to adhere}

to the strict Alexandrian norms,26 while in the case of the Cynegetica, Keydell expresses his deep dissatisfaction with its technique:

“In der Metrik gestattet Ps.-Oppian sich Freiheiten, wie sie bei keinem gebildeten Dichter erhört sind. Die Cäsurregeln beachtet er so wenig, daß er sogar den Einschnitt nach dem vierten Trochaeus nicht scheut. Schlechte Technik ist es, wenn er in den Spondiaci, die er der Klangwirkung wegen gern verwendet [...] auch dreisilbige Slußwörter zuläßt”.27

These judgments have been highly influential in branding the Cynegetica as an inferior and derivative poem, whereas most critics have written least some positive remarks regarding Oppian’s work.

The Cynegetica is also written in a much more rhetorical style compared to the Halieutica, which has often been judged excessive.28_{The final, and in my eyes most important, argument for the}

distinction in authorship between the two poems is that the author of the Cynegetica alludes to the Halieutica at numerous instances throughout his work, which will also become a central theme throughout this study. I shall here provide one example of a deliberate allusion to the Halieutica and this engagement with Oppian. In Hal. 2.289-294, in a description of the battle between the eel and the octopus, the two ‘combatants’ are compared to a deer which lures out and subsequently devours a serpent. The author of the Cynegetica alludes to this simile during his description of the deer: he tells us that deer catch a serpent using the same technique as in the simile in the Halieutica (Cyn. 2.233-252). The two passages also have exactly the same structure with the only difference being the much more elaborate treatment in the Cynegetica: the second version of this tale is about twenty lines long, four times the length of the passage in the Halieutica. The author of the Cynegetica therefore turns a simile

23_{Oppian also treats mammals living in the sea, such as dolphins and whales, and certain kinds of crustaceans in}

the Halieutica. His subject matter is therefore not what we would refer to as fish in biological terms, but rather more broadly animals living in the sea. For the sake of legibility I will refer to his subject matter as fish and fishing, even though not all his ‘fish’ are in fact fish in the biological sense.

24_{White (2001) 173-5 argues, in my opinion unsuccessfully, that the two poems were written by the same Oppian.}

In this, she does not take into account the difference in meter and intertextual references to the Halieutica while downplaying the stylistic differences between the two poems. This is, however, a lone voice among a scholarly consensus on the issue from the past 200 years. Toohey (1996) 199-200 also does not distinguish the two authors and talks about these works as if there is no difference in their outlook on the world, a view which in my opinion ignores the substantial differences between the Halieutica and the Cynegetica.

25_{Mair (1928) xx-xxi.} 26

Wifstrand (1933) 41-3; Keydell (1937) 702; James (1966) 28.

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from the Halieutica into a full-fledged account of an animal in its own right, a technique which we will also see again in the fifth chapter.29

The subject, as stated in the proem, is hunting, but also more broadly the behavior of wild animals. The poem is divided into four books. The first book introduces the subject and contains remarks about the equipment of a hunter and the dogs and horses that he should use. Book 2 contains a catalogue of land mammals with hooves, book 3 continues the catalogue with the other types of mammals.30_The

animals mentioned are common prey for hunters such as deer and hares as well as more exotic beasts, for instance lions, tigers and elephants. Not every animal described in the Cynegetica is likely prey for hunters: the second book contains, for instance, descriptions of mice (2.570-585) and moles (2.612-628). There is very little material in these two books that is related to what is usually considered the main subject of the work, hunting. When treating an animal, the author generally first describes its appearance, followed by some interesting fact about its behavior. Yet the author does not worry about deviating from this formula: some animals receive more attention (deer are, for example, discussed in great detail in lines 2.176-292) whereas others are only briefly mentioned.

The real hunting starts only in book 4. The author vividly relates methods to hunt some of the animals discussed in the previous books. The book begins with three methods for capturing lions, followed by two methods for leopards and one for bears. The audience which the narrator addresses is obviously not the common folk, which would profit more from the instructions for hunting hares found in Xenophon’s Cynegeticon, but rather the elite of the Roman empire for which hunting exotic beasts was a form of sport. The elite nature of the Cynegetica is confirmed by its dedication to the most powerful man of his time, the emperor Caracalla.31 After these larger animals, the Cynegetica mentions some smaller prey, until he poem suddenly breaks off.

It is clear that we are missing the intended end of the poem. But how much have we exactly lost? It has been suggested that there might have been five books, the same amount as the Halieutica.32_Mary

Whitby has vouched for four books, a number modeled on Callimachus’ Aetia rather than the Halieutica.33 We are likely missing a passage about hunting porcupines, which is announced in Cyn. 3.406: τὸν μετέπειτ’ ἐρέω, θηρῶν φόνον ὁππότ’ ἀείδω (I shall speak about this later, when I sing of the slaying of wild animals).34 I do not wish to discuss this issue in great lengths, but personally I tend

29_{On this simile, see Bartley (2003) 264-6. An important factor he also notes is that the battle between the deer}

and snake was first described in Nic. Ther. 139-44. The story in the Cynegetica therefore relies on two models, both of which are engaged with extensively throughout the poem.

30_{The only exceptions to this division are the smaller animals in book 2, starting at 2.586, and the wild horse in}

3.251-61.

31_{Cyn. 1.1-15; 4.20-21. On the Cynegetica as court poetry see Błaśkiewicz (2014) and Hollis (1994) 156-7; Whitby}

(2007) 134 on the elite audience of the Cynegetica. See also Cyn. 2.31-42, which portrays hunting as a pleasant hobby rather than a means of subsistence: this too implies an elite audience for the work.

32_{Hopkinson (1994) 197.}

33_{Whitby (2007) 126-7, who follows Bartley (2003) 20 n.56.} _{Keydell (1933) 704 also assumes four books, as a}

reaction to one of the Vitae which speaks of five books. This is not, however, argued on the basis of the text itself, but by referring to the Suda, where only four books are mentioned. Effe (1977) 182 does not seem to acknowledge that any material was lost when he argues that structurally, the three small animals at the end of book 4 are presented as a contrast to the three larger animals which take up most of this final book.

34_{I believe that the author did intend to write about this. There is an earlier announcement that he will sing about}

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towards five books of which the final two were left unfinished for some reason. Aside from the porcupine, it is strange that the more common prey is only briefly mentioned (hares)35 or, in the case of the deer, which is treated with much attention in book 2, completely neglected. The fourth book is not significantly shorter than the other three (book 4 contains 453 lines, the other books 538, 628 and 525 lines respectively) and if there must have been at least two more lengthy episodes followed by a short epilogue, it seems likely that he would have exceeded the size of book 2. The final episodes in book 4 (starting from line 424) also feel unfinished compared to the well-structured material of the previous books and the rest of book 4.36

An issue that is often touched upon is the reliability of the Cynegetica: are the descriptions of the behavior of animals and of hunting techniques accurate? Did the author have any personal experience hunting and, if so, is this experience reflected in his poetry? And, if the material presented is unreliable, was this done out of ignorance or did the poet knowingly decide to include falsehoods? Many critics have judged the Cynegetica quite negatively in this aspect as well.37_{This is not entirely unfair, because}

there are many passages in the work which are simply false: for instance, one cannot apply patterns to a foal by painting his father before conception (1.333-348)38 and hounds with venomous tusks (1.476) do not exist. At other times, however, the poet accurately describes exotic animals or gives informed opinions on the nature of certain animals.39_{From this, I draw the conclusion that accurately relating}

information was not the author’s prime intention: like in the case of much earlier didactic poetry, he is first and foremost a poet rather than a specialist in the field.40_{In that sense, the debate about the}

accuracy of the Cynegetica resemble those surrounding the practical applicability of Nicander’s poetry. While it has been argued that Nicander was a genuine doctor, a closer examination of his work shows that it is more fruitful to approach his works as poetry rather than as a practical remedy for someone

Nicander’s claim in Ther. 805-36 that he knows about various animals. To my knowledge, the Cynegetica is the first Greek didactic poem using this primitive version of cross-references.

35_{Even among the elite of this period, chasing hares was one of the most popular forms of hunting, as becomes}

clear from Arrian’s Cynegeticus.

36_{To my knowledge, this has not yet been argued. I disagree with Effe (1977) 182 here, who believes that the three}

minor animals at the end are intended as a parallel to the three major animals in the beginning. To me, this is no more than a coincidence, as nothing in the next shows that the poet intended to contrast the two groups of prey.

37_{Anderson (1985) 129 writes that “Oppian’s work contains more curious, and sometimes absurd, book-learning}

than actual information about country sports.” Guichard (2014) 87 characterizes the poet of the Cynegetica in comparison with Oppian as “undoubtedly more credulous and more enthusiastic about paradoxography, and he does not hesitate to quote a number of incredible stories to increase the pathos of his poem.”

38_{This episode will be treated in greater detail below.}

39_{An example of this can be found in the section on elephants, especially Cyn. 2.489-539. The poet describes the}

animal and enters what seems to be a contemporary debate, whether an elephant’s tusks are to be classified as horns or teeth. Błaśkiewicz (2014) 34 expresses a more nuanced view on the poet’s (who she refers to as ‘Oppian’ here) credentials: “Although some scholars who have researched this poem jointly claim that Oppian's work contains more absurd witticisms about hunting than factual information, one must admit that some details - for instance, of the rhinoceros - surprise us with a wealth of detail. The author meticulously describes this animal: its size, color and temperament. These types of descriptions prove Oppian's relatively deep knowledge of the wildlife, possibly derived from stories of natural historians and zoologists.”

40_{Effe (1977) 174 writes on the intentions of the poet: “Jedenfalls finden sich in den Aussagen des Dichters keine}

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bitten by a venomous snake.41_{I believe that this is the case for the Cynegetica as well: it is not primarily}

intended to actually instruct fledgling hunters but rather as the product of a poet desiring his own place within an age-old poetic tradition.

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Chapter 1: “When alien desires distress wild beasts”

42

The first episode that I will discuss, about an animal which is called the subus, contains a remarkable reworking of the Halieutica, challenging the assumptions made by Oppian on the relationship between man and animal, both of which I believe are representative for the outlook of the Cynegetica as a whole. The Cynegetica, I will argue, makes two significant changes to the Oppiantic Weltanschauung: first of all, it attributes certain characteristics which Oppian considers unique to humans to an animal and thereby questions the fundamental distinction made in the Halieutica. The second change is that the Cynegetica rearranges the portrayal of mankind as a destructive presence into a corrective force to punish the injustice of the natural world, imposing human values on wild animals.

I will first give a brief overview of the source in the Halieutica, on which the description of the subus greatly depends. The greater part of the fourth book of the Halieutica is concerned with the ‘loves’ of fish and how fisherman can exploit these to capture the fish. Within this, there is a section on fish who suffer from “strange love which is foreign to the sea”.43_{The second example of this type of love}

is given in Hal. 4.308-373, in which we are told of the passions which the sargue (σαργός) has for goats: σαργοὶ δ’ αἰγείοισι πόθοις ἐπὶ θυμὸν ἔχουσιν,

αἰγῶν δ’ ἱμείρουσιν, ὀρειαύλοις δὲ βοτοῖσιν ἐκπάγλως χαίρουσι καὶ εἰνάλιοί περ ἐόντες. (Opp. Hal. 4.308-10)

Sargues have their hearts filled with passions for goats. They desire goats and they delight in these beasts of the mountains exceedingly, even though they live in the sea.

In the following lines, Oppian describes how the sargues swarm around goats whenever they enter the sea and are filled with happiness as long as they can be close to the goats, to the amazement of the goats’ shepherds.44_{This love is represented through two Homeric similes. First, we are told that the}

sargue is even happier than a lamb when its mother returns home to the stable in the evening (4.325-30). Once the goats are brought back to the land, moreover, the sargues follow them until the very last and, shedding tears, they are compared to a mother or a wife who looks upon the ship on which her son or husband is departing (4.331-40).

After this general description of the strange behavior of these animals, Oppian tells us how fisherman use these passions to their advantage (4.345-73): they figure out where the sargues dwell,

42_{My chapter titles are all translations of parts of the episode taken from the Loeb edition by Mair (1928), which}

are for the most part rather outdated. Yet I cannot help but appreciate the poetic grandeur it imparts on the subject, for which reason I have used it for my chapter names as a tribute to the work through which I first came to know this fascinating poem.

43_{ἄλλους δὲ ξεῖνός τε καὶ οὐκ ἐνδήμιος ἅλμης | εἷλεν ἔρως (4.264-5)}

44_{Lytle (2011) has argued that this strange episode can be accounted for through the regional context of Cilicia. On}

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dress themselves in goatskins, head into the sea and toss barley mixed with goats’ meat into the sea as bait. The sargues, of course, all approach these false goats and happily crowd around it. The fishermen then toss their hook into the water and pull up the sargues. Oppian tells us that there can be two possible outcomes to this situation:

εἰ γάρ τις ὀίσσεται ἔργα δόλοιο, οὐκ ἄν ἔτ’ ἐμπελάσειε καὶ εἰ λασιότριχας αυτὰς 370 αἶγας ἄγοι, φεύγουσι δ’ ἀποστύξαντες ὁμαρτῇ καὶ μορφὴν καὶ δαῖτα καὶ αὐτῆς ἔνδια πέτρης. εἰ δὲ λάθοι καὶ κραιπνὸν ἔχοι πόνον, οὔ κέ τις ἄγρης λειφθείη, πάντας δὲ δαμάσσεται αἰγὸς ὀπωπή. (Opp. Hal. 4.368-73)

For if one of them [the sargues] suspects deceitful deeds, it will never approach again, even if one would bring the shaggy goats themselves, and they leave together, abhorring the appearance of goats and the meal and the grotto itself. If, however, he [the fisherman] does his work in secret and finishes the job quickly, not one of the prey will remain and the sight of the goat will subdue them all.

If the fishermen succeed in their plans, they will eradicate the entire population of sargues inhabiting that specific shore. The other possibility is that the sargues notice that they are being captured and they decide to escape. Oppian seems to suggest, however, that even in this case something significant would be lost from this world: the beautiful friendship between fish and goat will disappear forever because of the betrayal experienced by the sargues. The tragedy is that the sargue cannot grasp the distinction between an actual goats and the humans in disguise and therefore loses access to the intense happiness which it used to experience in its encounters with goats. Already in 4.345, Oppian appears to align his sympathies with the fish, calling them σαργὲ τάλαν, as they become victims regardless of the outcome.

Yet the Halieutica is more complex than a simple condemnation of human behavior. Paradoxically, Oppian as a didactic poet is teaching the reader how to commit the acts which he seems to despise. He may have submitted to the inevitability of its occurrence, regardless of his endorsement. To me, this is an attitude which is typical for the Halieutica: we are given the impression that humans can essentially act however they wish, even if their deeds have a highly destructive effect on the natural world. Man is all-powerful, but the reader is left with rather ambivalent feelings regarding his own species.45

Now I shall discuss the reception of this episode in the Cynegetica. In Cyn. 2.382-444, the poet treats a different animal with a similar the ability to attract fish, which he calls the subus (σοῦβος). The subus seems to be some kind of sheep, as it is described immediately after the section on sheep in the Cynegetica. All we are told about it is that it has a yellow coat (ξανθωπόν, 382), is not shaggy like the previously discussed sheep (οὐκέτι λαχνήεσσαν, 383) and that it has two horns on top of its head (385). The subus is most likely the product of the poet’s imagination, as there are no other references to this

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animal in other Greek sources from antiquity.46_{The scarce information on its appearance that the poet}

provides seems to confirm these suspicions. While the Cynegetica is not always a source of scientifically accurate facts, this is the only creature that the poet has invented himself. His subus is, I believe, a literary creation in order to contend with Oppian’s goats.

The subus easily surpasses the goats of the Halieutica in sheer quantity of fish which it attracts. While the goat only has a friendship with the sargue, in the Cynegetica we are given the impression that the entire sea flocks around the subus:

ὁππότε γὰρ ποτὶ βυσσὸν ἶῃ θοὰ κύματα τέμνων, δὴ τότε πουλὺς ὅμιλος ὁμαρτῇ ποντοπορεύων ἰχθυόεις ἕπεται, κατὰ δ’ ἄψεα λιχμάζονται, 390 τερπόμενοι κερόεντι φίλῳ, τερενόχροϊ σούβῳ. ἔξοχα δ’ αὖ φάγροι τε καὶ οὐτιδανοὶ μελάνουροι καὶ ῥαφίδες καὶ τρίγλαι καὶ ἀστακὸς ἀμφὶς ἕπονται. (Cyn. 2.387-92)

For when it enters the depth of the sea, dividing the swift waves, a great crowd of sea-crossing fish follows it in a group. They lick its limbs, delighting in their horned friend, the subus with its tender skin. Especially sea-breams and the weak melanura and garfish and red mullets and the lobster crowd around it.

The poet goes on to stress the uniqueness of this situation: θάμβος ἔφυ τόδε, θάμβος ἀθέσφατον, ὁππότε θῆρας ἀλλοδαποὶ τείρουσι πόθοι καὶ ὑπείροχα φίλτρα. (Cyn. 2.393-4)

This is a wonder, an unspeakable wonder, when foreign desires and mighty loves distress wild animals.

Note that the adjective ἀθέσφατος often carries negative associations:47_{this unnatural attraction for the}

subus is, unlike in the Halieutica, intended to unsettle us. After this the poet digresses, calling attention

46_{Timotheus of Gaza (who wrote during the late fifth and early sixth century) mentions the subus in his Περὶ ζώων}

τετραπόδων καὶ φυσικῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεργείων θαυμαζομένων ποιητηκῶς αὐτοῦ καλλιεποῦντος, giving a description which is clearly taken from the Cynegetica. This absence of other sources also confirms the claim that the subus was invented by the poet of the Cynegetica. The account is as follows, taken from Cramer (1963) 4.267: Περὶ Σούβου. Ὅτι ὁ σοῦβος, ὡς πρόβατόν ἐστι ξανθὸν καὶ λίον· φιλεῖται δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν ἰχθύων ἀμφίβιος ὤν· καὶ νηχόμενος αὐτοὺς κατεσθίει περὶ αὐτὸν συναγομένους· ἀγρεύεται δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ὑπὸ τῶν ἁλιέων.

47_{It is often used of rain and the sea (e.g. Hom. Il. 3.4, 10.6; A.R. 2.1115) and seems to imply that these are}

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to interspecial love in general (Cyn. 2.395-433).48_{In order to ensure that the Halieutica is recalled as the}

primary intertext, he ends his list of species with ‘foreign loves’ with the example of the sargue and the goat (433). This entire discussion of the friendship or love between unrelated species, however, turns out to be a red herring, as the poet reveals the true intensions of the subus:

ἀμφὶ δὲ σούβῳ φῦλον ἅπαν νεπόδων τὸ πολύπλανον ἐπτοίηται, 435 ἕσπονται δ’ ἅμα πάντες, ὅτ’ ἄγρια κύματα τέμνει, στείνονται δ’ ἑκάτερθε γεγηθότες, ἀμφὶ δὲ πόντος ἀφριάᾳ λευκῇσι τινασσόμενος πτερύγεσσιν· αὐτὰρ ὅγ’ οὐκ ἀλέγων ξείνης φιλίης πανάθεσμος εἰναλίους ἑτάρους δάπτει στομάτεσσι δαφοινοῖς 440 δαινύμενος· τοὶ δ’ αἶσαν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρόωντες, οὐδ’ ὣς ἐχθαίρουσι καὶ οὐ λείπουσι φονῆα. σοῦβε τάλαν, κακοεργέ, καὶ αὐτῷ σοι μετόπισθε πόντιον ἀγρευτῆρες ἐπαρτύνουσιν ὄλεθρον καὶ δολερῷ περ ἐόντι καὶ ἰχθυφόνῳ τελέθοντι. (Cyn. 2.433-444)

The entire race of far-roaming fish flutters around the subus and they all follow it together when it crosses through the wild waves and they crowd around it from every side rejoicing. The sea around them is stirred with white foam by their fins. Yet the utterly lawless subus, without regard for their strange love, devours his fishy friends, feasting with its fangs stained with blood. The fish, however, see their fate in their eyes, yet they do not hate their murderer nor leave him. Terrible subus, criminal beast, hunters will one day grant you yourself a death at sea, even though you are treacherous and a murderer of fish.

This might well be the most shocking revelation in the Cynegetica: the swimming sheep-like animal turns out to be a carnivore, killing all the ecstatic fish which approach it with no worries for their own life. While there is much to be said on this episode, I will limit myself to the aspects which are relevant to the discussion on the relationship between man and animal in the Cynegetica. If we compare this passage with that by Oppian, we notice that the subus has taken over the role of the humans in the Halieutica. This does not only have to do with the fact that the subus, like Oppian’s humans, capture fish: this is far from the only carnivorous animal in the Cynegetica. The striking similarity between the two lies in their methodology. What Oppian does in the greater part of the ‘instructive’ passages of the Halieutica is teach people how to manipulate the natural behavior of fish in order to capture them. The ideal fisherman in Oppian is a kind of Odysseus, a not entirely unproblematic role model.49_{The fish’s negative}

48_{This digression on the power of love is inspired by the proem of book 4 of the Halieutica, 4.9-39. Despite the}

notable influence of the Halieutica, Bartley (2003) 48-55 argues that this discussion of ἔρως in the Cynegetica is highly innovative.

49_{Bartley (2003) 66-7 argues that Odysseus is both a model for the qualities Oppian looks for in his fisherman but}

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traits such as lust and gluttony inevitably become their downfall as fishermen use these specific weaknesses to lure them into their nets. Whereas most animals capture their prey due to a superiority in power, speed or sensatory perception, the subus has somehow acquired the human, moreover even Oppiantic, capacity to deceive its victims.50 It is characterized as δολερῷ (444), treacherous, a notion that could apply equally to the fishermen of the Halieutica. Another factor which makes the subus more similar to the humans of the Halieutica than to the goats is its versatility. The goat can only attract one kind of fish, the sargue, and seems to do this unintentionally. The subus on the other hand has a humanlike capacity to capture every fish in the sea, just as how Oppian teaches his addressee different methods to capture the fish mentioned in his poem. In fact, the subus is portrayed as the greatest possible fisher, as it does not need the various devices of humans but can attract them all just by being in the water.

In the apostrophe at the end of the passage, the poet himself is quick to condemn the subus’ actions. δολερῷ is clearly pejorative, being placed on the same level as its status as an ἰχθυφόνῳ, a murderer of fish (a term coined in the Cynegetica). Through his disapproval of the subus, the poet is also more implicitly disapproving of the methods employed by Oppian’s fishermen. He predicts, moreover, that the subus will one day suffer death itself by the arms of hunters. Hunters are presented as the avengers of natural injustice, as if instructed by divine commands.

I believe that this is one of the most significant and programmatic episodes in the Cynegetica, yet its interpretation is also quite complex. The poet seems quite keen to differentiate himself from Oppian. First of all, he condemns the trickery which is represented by Oppian and his fisherman, arguing that his own hunters represent a higher form of justice. The Halieutica can be read to propagate that might is right, piscis piscem edit.51 In the Cynegetica on the other hand such behavior does not go unpunished: an animal which performs such immoral actions must face the consequences. The world of the Cynegetica therefore seems to include universal notions of right and wrong and all animals, at least, must submit to these.52_{This makes one wonder whether humans are also subjected to these values.}

Would the fisherman of the Halieutica be punished for his behavior in the universe of the Cynegetica? If we take the subus as a proxy for Oppian’s humans, it seems rather likely. Yet it is not explicitly stated and we are therefore left behind with a different kind of ambiguity than in the Halieutica. Oppian may have asked us to consider whether our behavior is correct, even if we can get away with it. The

50_{The Halieutica contains one animal which also uses its cunning as a means to secure food. In Hal. 5.425-47, it is}

said to aid the fishermen and receives some of their catch in return for the favor. The dolphin, however, is an exception to the distinction between man and fish in the Halieutica because it was originally human and therefore can be classified as a type of hybrid with some human capacities. On the dolphin as a ‘boundary-crosser’ see Kneebone (2008) 37. The dolphin shall be discussed in more detail below in chapter 3.

51_{On this notion see especially Hal. 2.656-60, in which the poet tells us that all fish except for the κεστρεύς suffer}

from eternal sleeplessness because they live in perpetual fear for their life.

52_{Yet it is somewhat difficult to align this denouncement of trickery with the subject of hunting. If we look at book}

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Cynegetica does not lead to moral reflection but rather delivers a permanent state of anxiety in which we wonder whether we will be held accountable for our deeds.

At the same time, we can see the subus as a metapoetic metaphor of the relationship between the poems on hunting and fishing. The author of the Cynegetica affirms the superiority of hunters against fisherman: the Oppiantic fisher, as represented by the subus, is literally defeated by the Cynegetica’s hunters, perhaps as the poet of the Cynegetica intended to surpass his predecessor. This can be read in the light of the earlier (albeit playful) polemics on the superiority of hunting and fishing respectively in the two poems.53

In any case, this episode introduces principles for the interactions between man and animal which will also occur during real encounters between man and animal in the in the following chapters.

53_{The Halieutica opens with the assertion that fishing is a more difficult and therefore superior form of hunting}

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Chapter 2: “A union most abhorred of horses”

The first animal portrayed in detail in the Cynegetica is the horse. The first book contains instructions for the preparations necessary before one starts hunting. As themes it includes inter alia a description of the ideal hunter’s body type and summaries of equipment such as nets. A large portion of the book is dedicated to horses and hounds, which are also considered as ‘tools’ for hunting and therefore structurally belong in this book.54_{Horses are discussed in lines 1.158-367. The parts preceding the}

episode which I will discuss in the following chapter can be subdivided into an introductory section which advocates the use of stallions and not mares (158-65), a catalogue of breeds of horses (166-72), instructions on the best types of horses (173-220), an account of their intelligence and bravery (221-35), including exempla of notable mythical and historical horses, such as Achilles’ talking horses from the Iliad and Alexander’s Boucephalus.

Following this, the poet tells us a story which illustrates the noble nature of horses (239-70). This episode is the first extensive anthropomorphic account of an animal of the type found especially in the next three books. Strikingly, the first portrayal of an animal in the Cynegetica insinuates that animals can demonstrate behavior that is clearly morally superior to that of humans. Our poet tells a story of a greedy prince who tricks his two horses, a mother and a son, to mate with each other. Once the horses find out the truth, they curse their master and commit suicide. The poet explicitly relates this episode to the (Sophoclean) tragedies dealing with the house of Thebes, with of course the Oedipus Tyrannus as the primary model for the tale of unknowingly committed incest.

This story is not unique to the Cynegetica. It is first told by Aristotle, and later by other authors including Varro, Pliny the Elder, and Aelian.55_{The are significant differences between these accounts}

both in the length and in many of the details. The core of the story is always that the horses were tricked and discover the treachery; the authors disagree in the method of trickery and the consequences. Of these five sources, the Cynegetica and Aelian’s Historia Animalium are the most elaborate and also the most dramatic, in the sense that only these two sources provide moral commentary on the events. Aelian speaks of ἔκνομόν τε καὶ ἔκδικον ἐκεῖνο ἔργον (this unlawful and unjust deed) and of an ἀσέβημα (act of sacrilege). It seems likely that one of the two accounts influenced the other, but we have no means of knowing whose work was earlier.56

54_{In book 3 the poet mentions a certain wild horse (ἱππαγρος), which Mair identifies as the nilgai (boselaphus}

tragocamelus). I regard this as an example of the poet’s systematic approach to the natural world, wherein he distinguishes between the two types of horses, tame and wild, and therefore assigns them to different portions of his poem: the domestic horse among the hunting necessities in the first book, the wild horse with the other wild animals in books 2 and 3.

55_{Arist. HA. 631a1-7 (book 8 or 9, depending on the edition of the text); Varr. Rust. 2.7.9; Plin. HN. 8.156; Ael. NA.}

4.8 García Valdés et al. = 4.7 Scholfield. I have not taken into account any other version of the tale postdating the

Cynegetica.

56_{Smith (2014) 49: “it remains unsettled to what degree, if any, Aelian and the poet of the Kunegetika,}

contemporaries of one another, influenced each other”. Scholfield (1958) 1.xii reckons that Aelian was included in a circle of Julia Domna together with i.e. Oppian (but it is unclear if he distinguishes between the author of the

Halieutica and the Cynegetica, but based on chronology the ‘Oppian’ of the Cynegetica seems more likely), but

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This version of the tale in the Cynegetica begins with a more general statement on the exemplary nature of a horse’s sexual conduct:

ἔξοχα δ’ αὖ τίουσι φύσιν· τὸ δὲ πάμπαν ἄπιστον ἐς φιλότητα μολεῖν, τὴν οὐ θέμις· ἀλλὰ μένουσιν ἄχραντοι μυσῶν, καθαρῆς δ’ ἐράουσι Κυθήρης. (Cyn. 1.236-8)

Above others, then, they [horses] respect nature: it is entirely unheard of that they make unlawful love. No, they remain untouched from impurities, but rather desire chaste love.

The motives of purity and defilement are a common theme in Greek tragedy. μύσος is a term which is especially frequent in tragic texts. The poet is therefore already preparing a tragic setting for this episode in general and in particular one recalling Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus. When Creon returns from the oracle of Delphi, he announces that the god has told him that the plague of Thebes is the result of pollution (μίασμα) in Thebes, caused by the unresolved murder of their former king Laeus: 57

ἄνωγεν ἡμᾶς Φοῖβος ἐμφανῶς ἄναξ μίασμα χώρας ὡς τεθραμμένον χθονὶ ἐν τῇδ’ ἐλαύνειν μηδ’ ἀνήκεστον τρέφειν. (S. O.T. 96-8)

Lord Phoebus clearly commanded us to drive the pollution, which is being nourished in this land, from our country and to stop feeding it before it is beyond cure.

After this general introduction, the poet begins his anecdote. An ancient ruler (πολυκτεάνων τις ἀνάκτων, 239), who is specifically called a Scythian in Aristotle, Pliny, and Aelian, once owned a large herd of horses, until all but two died from a disease. The Cynegetica is the only account in which his herd is nearly wiped out, while the other writers state that the prince simply wished to breed two excellent horses or do not give a reason at all. Such a deliberate change is intriguing, since it suggests that the poet had a reason to depart from the established plot. Most likely, the disease in the Cynegetica is an adaption of the plague of Thebes which sets the events of the Oedipus Tyrannus in motion, the first element of the miniature tragedy in the Cynegetica.58

Animalium; Scholfield (1958) 1.xx-xxiii argues convincingly that Aelian was familiar with the Halieutica and used it

as a source, yet Smith (2014) 49 writes that “it is generally believed that all three works relied on common sources, though it is chronologically possible that Aelian relied on the Halieutika”. I find Scholfield’s view more plausible, however, for example in the case of the sargue and the goats (see the previous chapter), which displays so many similarities with the account in the Halieutica that I cannot believe that Aelian had not read this work.

57_{See Parker (1996) for the topic of defilement and pollution in archaic and classical Greek literature in general,}

including tragedy. Dawe (1982) 95-6 also discusses μίασμα for specifically the O.T.

58

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These two horses which had survived the disease were a mother and its newborn foal. This causes problems for the ruler:

αὐτὰρ ἐπεὶ μέγας ἦν, πειρᾶτο σχέτλιος ἀνὴρ μητέρα παιδὸς ἑοῖο παρ’ ἀγκοίνῃσι βαλέσθαι. τοὺς δ’ ὡς οὖν ἐνόησεν ἀναινομένους φιλότητα καὶ γάμον ἀμφοτέροισιν ἀπώμοτον, αὐτίκ’ ἔπειτα αἰνὰ τιτυσκόμενος δολίην ἐπὶ μῆτιν ὕφαινεν, ἐλπόμενος καλέειν γένος ἵπποισιν παλίνορσον. (Cyn. 1.244-9)

But when it [the foal] had grown up, the cruel man tried to mate the mother with her child. When he thus noticed that they refused the love and the wedding that was forsworn by both, he immediately, preparing dreadful deeds, invented a treacherous plan, hoping to call back his race of horses.

This passage contains a high amount of evaluative terms: the man is called σχέτλιος (cruel), the ‘marriage’ ἀπώμοτον (forsworn) and his plans are αἰνὰ and δολίην (dreadful, treacherous). All these passages already clearly indicate that we should favor the horses and disapprove of their evil owner’s activities.

The horses are then tricked by a somewhat absurd plot: their owner covers them with hides and rubs olive oil onto their bodies (in that sequence), in order to deceive both their eyes and their sense of smell. His plan succeeds, after which a tragic anagnorisis occurs:

καὶ λάθεν, ὦ μάκαρες, ῥέζων κακά· καὶ τετέλεστο 255 ξυνός, ἀπόπτυστος θάλαμος, στυγερώτατος ἵπποις, οἷος ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἐνυμφεύθη προπάροιθε Καδμεῖος γάμος αἰνὸς ἀλήμονος Οἰδιπόδαο. οἱ δ’ ὅτε γυμνωθέντες ἑὴν ἄτην ἐνόησαν, λοξῇσιν δ’ ἄθρησαν ἀνιάζοντες ὀπωπαῖς 260 ἡ μὲν ἄρα τλήμων ἀγονον γόνον, αὐτὰρ ὅγ’ αἶψα αἰνόγαμος, κακόλεκτρος ἀμήτορα μητέρα δειλήν. (Cyn. 1.254-62)

And he succeeded in his evil deeds, blessed gods, without their knowledge: and a common, detested marriage was accomplished, most hated by horses, such as when long ago among humans the terrible Cadmean wedding of the wanderer Oedipus was fulfilled. But when, after they had become undressed, they understood their sin, they looked at each other distressed with downcast

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eyes, the miserable mother upon her son who was no longer her son, and he, with his horrible marriage and evil wedding-bed, shortly upon his poor mother who was a mother no more.

Lines 256-7 explicitly compare this story to the myth of Oedipus. Such a direct comparison of an animal with mythological tales is rare for the Cynegetica, but it confirms that this episode must be read in the light of tragedy and especially those centered around Thebes. As before, the poet employs evaluative terms through which we see the man as cruel, his deed as a great evil and the horses as innocent victims of a horrible crime. αἰνόγαμος is also used in Euripides’ Helen in reference to Paris,59 another example of someone whose wedding had deadly consequences. Sophocles’ Electra calls Clytaemnestra a μήτηρ ἀμήτωρ,60 but in Sophocles the term ἀμήτωρ is used simply as a negative evaluation of Clytaemnestra rather than in the more paradoxical sense of the Cynegetica, in which the horses are called ἀγονον γόνον and ἀμήτορα μητέρα when they have become more to each other than just mother and son.61

Once the horses have realized the severity of the crime they have committed, they break out of their stable (or wherever they are located) and start running:

ὕψι μάλ’ ἠέρθησαν, ἀμείλιχα φυσιόωντες, δεσμά τ’ ἀπορρήξαντες ἴτην μεγάλα χρεμέθοντες, οἷα θεοὺς μάκαρας μαρτυρόμενοι κακότητος, 265 ἀράς τ’ εὐχόμενοι πολυπήμονι νυμφευτῆρι· ὀψὲ δὲ μυρόμενοί τε καὶ ἄσχετον ἀΐσσοντες, ἀντιπέρην πέτρῃσιν ἑὰς κεφαλὰς ἐλόωντες, ὀστὰ συνηλοίησαν, ἑὸν δ’ ἀπὸ φέγγος ἄμερσαν αὐτοφόνοι, κλίναντες ἐπ’ ἀλλήλοισι κάρηνα. 270 ὧδε φάτις προτέρη κλέος ἵπποισιν μέγ’ ἀείδει. (Cyn. 1.263-70)

They jumped up high, snorting relentlessly, and having broken free from their bonds, they ran accompanied by loud neighing, as if they were calling upon the happy gods as witnesses of the evil and cursing the matchmaker who had been the cause of their suffering. Weeping for a long time and rushing forth so wildly that they could not be stopped, they drove their heads straight against the rocks, they shatter their bones, and they deprive themselves of their light. Slain by their own hand, their heads lean on each other. So do reports of former times sing of the great fame of horses.

Schmitt rightly observes the intensity of the motion in this episode:

59_{E. Hel. 1120: Πάρις αἰνόγαμος.} 60

S. El. 1154.

61_{Schmitt (1969) 139 finds these phrases very tragic when he writes that “[d]as Widernatürliche der Tat wird – wie}

Questioning the hunt? The morality of human-animal interactions in Pseudo-Oppian’s