Energy and the process of securitization

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Energy and the process of securitization

A case study of energy and security in the European Commission

and the Nordic EU countries

Hanna Uronen

Master thesis, International Relations and International Organization 24 July 2015

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DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that this thesis, “Energy and the process of securitization: A case study of energy and security in the European Commission and the Nordic EU countries”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.

Name Hanna Uronen

Signature

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Abbreviations

ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations ECSC European Coal and Steel Community

EU European Union

Euratom European Atomic Energy Community

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GHG Greenhouse gas

IEA International Energy Agency

IR International Relations

OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

TEU Treaty on European Union

TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

List of figures

Figure 1. The amount of securitization attempts found in the documents according to 38 year and securitizing actor.

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An executive summary in Finnish / Lyhennelmä lopputyöstä suomeksi

Vuonna 2015 energiasta on tullut yhä tärkeämpi poliittisen ja muun yhteiskunnallisen keskustelun kohde. Energiaa on välttämätön lähes kaikille modernin yhteiskunnan jokapäiväisille toiminnoille, ja yhteys energian saatavuuden ja elämänlaadun välillä on laajalti tunnustettu. Lisäksi energiaturvallisuus on noussut poliittisen keskustelun keskiöön niin Euroopan Unionissa (EU) kuin sen ulkopuolellakin.1Tämän lopputyön aiheena on energia ja turvallisuus. Tarkemmin ottaen lopputyössä tutkitaan, millä tavoin neljä valittua toimijaa (Euroopan komissio sekä pohjoismaiset EU-maat eli Suomi, Ruotsi ja Tanska) ovat turvallistaneet energiaa aikavälillä 2005-2015 ja ovatko toimijoiden turvallistamisnäkemykset muuttuneet. Tässä lopputyössä tehtyjen päätelmien perusteella energiaa ei kuluneena kymmenenä vuotena ole merkittävissä määrin turvallistettu, ja toimijoiden turvallistamisnäkemykset poikkeavat jonkin verran toisistaan. Ympäristöasiat ja erityisesti ilmastonmuutos nousevat yhteiseksi teemaksi, jonka kaikki toimijat näkevät turvallisuusuhkana.

Tutkimuskysymys

Tämän lopputyön päätutkimuskysymyksenä on, kuinka paljon Euroopan komissio, Suomi, Ruotsi ja Tanska ovat yrittäneet turvallistaa energiaa vuosien 2005 ja 2015 välillä. Turvallistamisen (securitization) prosessia on tässä lopputyössä käytetty Kööpenhaminan koulukunnan teoreettisen viitekehyksen mukaisesti. Näin ollen turvallistaminen viittaa prosessiin, jossa toimija nostaa tietyn aiheen tai ongelman normaalista poliittisesta ympäristöstä turvallisuuden ”korkeaan” ympäristöön esittämällä tämän aiheen tai ongelman turvallisuuden kontekstissa puheaktin avulla. Käytännössä tämä aihe tai ongelma kuvataan eksistentiaaliseksi uhaksi tietylle objektille.2

Päätutkimuskysymys jakautuu kolmeen alakysymykseen. Ensin, lopputyössä määritellään, mitkä asiat nähdään (eksistentiaalisina) uhkina energiaan liittyen ja mitä asioita uhataan eli esitetään objektina. Uhkiksi luetaan asiat joiden esitetään uhkaavan jotain tiettyä objektia. Lisäksi tässä lopputyössä tehdään ero ”eksistentiaalisten uhkien” (uhkat jotka tuhoaisivat objektin kokonaan ja/tai uhkat jotka vaativat hätätoimenpiteitä) ja ”muiden uhkien” välille. Objektiksi taasen luokitellaan asiat, joita uhataan ja joiden selviytyminen nähdään tarpeelliseksi. Toinen alakysymys keskittyy siihen, mille sektoreille ja tasoille uhat ja objektit

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jakautuvat. Sektorit ja tasot ovat Kööpenhaminan koulukunnan välineitä analysoida turvallistamisprosessia. Sektoreita on viisi: sotilaallinen, taloudellinen, ympäristö-, yhteiskunnallinen ja poliittinen sektori. Tasoja on myös viisi: kansainvälinen järjestelmä, kansainvälinen alajärjestelmä, yksikkö, alayksikkö sekä yksilö. Luokittelemalla uhat ja objektit näille tasoille ja sektoreille on mahdollista demonstroida toimijoiden turvallistamispyrkimyksiä sekä turvallistamisen muutoksia 10 vuoden aikavälillä. Viimeinen alakysymys onkin millä tavoin energian turvallistamispyrkimykset ovat muuttuneet 10 vuoden aikana. Vastaamalla näihin kolmeen alakysymykseen on mahdollista määritellä voidaanko toimijoiden välillä löytää jotakin yhteisiä malleja joiden mukaan energiaa on turvallistettu tai joiden mukaan turvallistaminen on muuttunut. 3

Tutkimusmetodologia

Tässä lopputyössä käytettävä metodi on vertaileva tapaustutkimus, jossa suhteellisen pientä tapausmäärää vertaillaan laadullisesti. Tutkimuskysymysten prosessiorientoituneisuuden ja teorian konstruktiivisuuden vuoksi laadullinen metodi sopii tähän lopputyöhön parhaiten. Tutkimukseen on valittu 17 ensikäden dokumenttia mainituilta neljältä toimijalta, ja nämä dokumentit on analysoitu diskurssianalyysin ja tekstuaalisen analyysin keinoin jotta uhat ja objektit on voitu tunnistaa, ja näin ollen turvallistamispyrkimyksiä on pystytty ”mittaamaan”. Tutkimusmateriaaliksi on valittu 3–5 tärkeintä energiastrategiaa ja –dokumenttia jokaiselta toimijalta; materiaali on tuotettu ja julkaistu joko Euroopan komission tai pohjoismaisten EU-maiden hallitusten toimesta. Aikaväli (2005–2015) on valittu jotta muutoksia turvallistamisen prosessissa ja turvallistamisen kehittymistä päästään analysoimaan. Pohjoismaiset EU-maat on valittu tutkimuskohteeksi niiden mittavan energiayhteistyön sekä niiden yhteisen historian vuoksi. On mielenkiintoista tutkia, tarkoittaako mittava yhteistyö sitä että maat jakavat myös samankaltaiset uhkakuvat energiaan liittyen. Koska EU:n sananvalta energiaan liittyvissä asioissa on kasvanut viime vuosina merkittävästi ja koska tutkimukseen valitut kolme maata kuuluvat EU:hun, on Euroopan komissio valittu neljänneksi tutkittavaksi toimijaksi.

Teoreettinen viitekehys

Turvallisuus on yksi kansainvälisen politiikan tutkituimpia aiheita, ja lähes jokaisella koulukunnalla on teoriansa siitä, mitä turvallisuus on ja mikä on sen merkitys kansainväliselle yhteisölle. Realistit alleviivaavat kansainvälisen yhteisön anarkistisen luonteen sekä vallan tai voiman merkitystä, kun taas liberalistit näkevät yhteistyön mahdollisena ja toivottavana, eivätkä näe kansainvälistä yhteisöä staattisena, anarkistisena kollektiivina. Konstruktivistit,

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joihin Kööpenhaminan koulukuntakin lukeutuu, painottavat toimijoiden ideoiden ja normatiivisten rakenteiden merkitystä, ja näkevät että toimijat rakentavat maailmaa ja samanaikaisesti ympäröivä maailma vaikuttaa toimijoihin.4

Kööpenhaminan koulukunta näkee turvallisuuden laajana ilmiönä, joka ei rajoitu vain sotilaalliseen tai poliittiseen turvallisuuteen. Turvallistaminen prosessina viittaa siihen, miten eri toimijat voivat luoda turvallisuutta puheaktien kautta. Kööpenhaminan koulukunnalle ei ole olemassa ”todellista” tai ”epätodellista” turvallisuutta, vaan turvallisuus riippuu aina toimijan tavasta ymmärtää maailmaa ja tavasta tuottaa sitä. Kuten mainittu, turvallistamisen prosessissa toimija nostaa tietyn asian pois normaalista poliittisesta ympäristöstä turvallisuuden kontekstiin, ja tällä tavoin oikeuttaa tiettyjä hätätoimenpiteitä tämän turvallisuusuhan ratkaisemiseksi. Turvallistamisen kääntöpuoli on vastaturvallistaminen (desecuritization), jossa toimija tuo asian turvallisuuden hätätilakontekstista takaisin normaaliin poliittiseen ympäristöön. Mikäli tietyt toimijat tai ryhmät jakavat samat uhkakuvat eivätkä näe toisiaan uhkina, voidaan sanoa näiden toimijoiden tai ryhmien muodostavan turvallisuuskompleksin.5

Analyysi

Tässä lopputyössä analysoiduissa dokumenteissa ei kokonaisuudessaan ole merkittävää määrää turvallistamisyrityksiä. Dokumenteista löytyi yhteensä 20 turvallistamisyritystä, joista kahdessa uhka esitettiin eksistentiaalisena. Eri toimijoiden välillä ei ollut suurta eroa turvallistamisyritysten määrässä, paitsi että ruotsalaisissa dokumenteissa turvallistamisyrityksiä oli kokonaisuudessaan vain yksi, kun muiden toimijoiden tuottamissa dokumenteissa oli 0–3 turvallistamisyritystä kussakin. Koska turvallistamista ei merkittävissä määrän tapahtunut, voidaan sanoa etteivät toimijat tässä lopputyössä käytetyn teoreettisen viitekehyksen mukaisesti näe energian olevan merkittävän uhan alaisena.

Viidestä sektorista yksi – ympäristösektori – nousi esiin kaikkien toimijoiden yhteisenä huolena. Kaikki neljä toimijaa näkivät ympäristöasiat ja erityisesti ilmastonmuutoksen vakavana uhkana, ja yleensä objektiksi katsottiin koko maapallo. Näin ollen voidaan sanoa, että energiaan liittyen toimijoiden suurimpana turvallisuushuolena näyttää olevan ilmastonmuutos, ja ympäristön suojeleminen ilmastonmuutokselta näyttää olevan yksi suurimpia ja tärkeimpiä poliittisia tavoitteita niin pohjoismaisissa EU-maissa kuin Euroopan komissiossakin. Ilmastonmuutoksen lisäksi kansainvälinen talouskriisi heijastuu toimijoiden

4_{Glaser 2010, 16–22; Morgan 2010, 34–43; Agius 2010, 49–59.}

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näkemiin uhkakuviin. Kaikki neljä toimijat konstruktoivat taloudellisia uhkia energiaan liittyen vuosina 2007–2011. Nämä uhkat kuitenkin väistyivät muun muassa ilmastonmuutoksen tieltä vuoden 2011 jälkeen, mikä korreloi esimerkiksi Euroopan taloustilanteen kanssa; vuoden 2011 jälkeen Euroopan talous alkoi elpyä.

Ympäristö- ja talousasioita lukuunottamatta toimijoiden näkemät uhkakuvat rakentuvat melko eri tavoin. Kaiken kaikkiaan lähdemateriaalin perusteella voidaan sanoa ettei energiaa ole merkittävissä määrin yritetty turvallistaa, sillä energiaa koskevat turvallisuusasiat on esitetty ennemminkin ongelmina kuin uhkina. Näin ollen suurin osa asioista esitetään sellaisina, että ne voidaan ratkaista tavallisten poliittisten toimenpiteiden voimin, eikä toimijoilla ole suurta tarvetta siirtää niitä turvallistamisen hätätilakontekstiin ja tällä tavoin oikeuttaa hätätoimenpiteitä. Neljän toimijan välillä voidaan myös havaita hienoinen ero: Suomi ja Euroopan komissio näyttävät aktiivisemmin yrittävän turvallistaa energiaan liittyviä asioita, ja Ruotsi sekä Tanska käyttävät neutraalimpaa kieltä eivätkä juurikaan esitä asioita uhkina. Suurin osa uhkista nähdään tutkituissa dokumenteissa tulevan ympäristösektorilta ja globaalilta tasolta; lisäksi suurin osa objekteista sijoittuu ympäristösektorille ja ovat globaaleja. Tämä demostroi, kuinka toimijat näkevät ilmastonmuutoksen suurimpana uhkana energiaan liittyen. Toimijat konstruktoivat sekä uhkiksi että objekteiksi asioita kaikilta viideltä sektorilta. Teorian viidestä tasosta puolestaan uhkina ja objekteina nähtiin pääasiassa vain kansainvälisen järjestelmän, kansainvälisen alajärjestelmän ja yksikkötason asioita; yksilötaso jäi puuttumaan kokonaan ja alayksikkötaso esiintyi objektina kerran. Voidaankin sanoa, että toimijat näkevät uhkakuvien tulevan lähinnä valtio-, kansainvälinen alajärjestelmä-(esimerkiksi EU-) tai globaalilta tasolta sekä näiden tasojen olevan uhattuna. Yksilötasoa ei nähdä uhkana eikä objektina, mikä tarkoittaa sitä että pohjoismaiset EU-maat ja Euroopan komissio keskittyvät korkempiin poliittisiin yksiköihin uhkina ja objekteina yrityksissään turvallistaa energiaa.

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kaikki neljä toimijaa näkevät energian ja siihen liittyvät uhat samankaltaisesti, eikä dokumenteista löydy yhden toimijan esittämiä uhkia tai objekteja jotka olisivat täysin ristiriidassa toisten toimijoiden näkemien uhkien ja objektien kanssa. Näin ollen tämän lopputyön perusteella voidaan päätellä että on mahdollista että tutkitut neljä toimijaa muodostaisivat turvallisuuskompleksin energiaan liittyen. Asia kuitenkin vaatii lisätutkimusta. Johtopäätökset

Vastauksena tämän lopputyön päätutkimuskysymykseen voidaan sanoa, etteivät Euroopan komissio ja pohjoismaiset EU-maat ole merkittävissä määrin turvallistaneet energiaa aikavälillä 2005–2015, tarkoittaen teoriaan pohjautuen ettei energia-asioiden nähdä olevan niin suuressa vaarassa tai niin suuri uhka että niitä olisi tarvetta turvallistaa. Analysoitujen dokumenttien perusteella energian nähdään ennemminkin kuuluvan normaalin poliittisen päätöksenteon kuin hätätoimenpiteiden viitoittamaan turvallisuuden piiriin. Turvallistamisyrityksiä löytyi analysoiduista dokumenteista pienehkö määrä, ja ne erosivat toisistaan niin uhkien kuin objektienkin osalta melko paljon. Yksi uhkakuva, ilmastonmuutos ja sen vaikutukset, nousi esiin tutkitussa materiaalissa usein: kaikki toimijat näkevät sen uhkana energiaan liittyen. Toimijoiden luomien uhkakuvien erilaisuuden vuoksi materiaalista ei myöskään löydetty mitään yhteisiä malleja tai kaavoja joiden mukaan turvallistamisyritykset kehittyivät.

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1 Introduction

In the global world of 2015, energy has gained perhaps more importance than ever before. Long gone are the times when it was seen as an independent issue from other matters such as politics. The fear of running out of energy has been around for decades, if not centuries, because energy is essential for the basic functions of the human life. Additionally, the connection between and interdependence of the availability of energy and the high standards of living is acknowledged, and because of the increasing demand for higher living standards in the world, the demand for energy is growing. Next to this, energy is increasingly seen as having security implications to for instance governments and business, and to individuals. This is well demonstrated by the gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine that have left European countries suffering from cut-offs of gas, causing problems and even a complete stop for the production of certain industries in some countries. These disputes have occurred in the winter, which meant that people were freezing to death in for instance Poland due to the lack of gas to warm up their houses with. 1

Security is in the heart of International Relations (IR). In this paper the main question revolves around the process of creating security in the context of energy. Security is in this paper seen as a broader than just a military phenomenon, and since energy in itself is a broad matter touching upon various aspects of the human life, it fits this broad approach to security. This thesis is also not about energy security in the traditional sense, since energy security is traditionally linked with national security2 and in this paper security is understood in larger than merely national terms. This paper is inspired by the theoretical framework and the process of “securitization” created by the Copenhagen School theorists: Ole Waever, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde3. Their realist-constructivist ideas of how actors create security through speech acts are used as the framework to analyze how security is created in energy policy. Since their theory is multi-dimensional and its view on security is wide, it suits analyzing a broad phenomenon such as energy very well. The variables of security and securitization in this thesis are the threats and referent objects constructed by the actors, and will be further introduced in chapter 5.3.1.

1_{Harding and McLaughlin 2009; Yergin 2011, 2–8; Youngs 2009, 1–3.} 2_{Trombetta 2008, 597.}

3_{Throughout this thesis, Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan and Jaap de Wilde as the scholars who are seen as having created}

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This paper analyzes both the European Union (EU) and Member State level regarding energy policy. The European Commission (Commission) has been for at least ten years a spokesperson for more energy cooperation and it is currently proposing to form an integrated Energy Union in Europe. However, since the competences regarding energy policy are shared, the Member States can still decide on various energy matters independently. Therefore in this research these both the EU- and the Member State levels are taken into account and it is researched how the Commission and three EU Member States – Finland, Sweden and Denmark – view energy and security. These three Member States together form a group of the Nordic EU Countries. Because of the Copenhagen School’s ideas of the importance of regionalization and regional units in security4, choosing a regional group as the actors to be researched is rational.

In this paper, the purpose is to find out how the relationship of energy and security is perceived by the three Nordic EU countries and by the Commission and how it has changed in the past 10 years. In other words, this paper concentrates on to what extent these actors have tried to securitize energy, and on how these securitization attempts differ with each other according to the sectors and levels which are presented in the next chapter. The purpose is not to evaluate whether certain issues are actual threats to energy, to the EU or to the countries, but to research – according to the Copenhagen School framework – which issues are perceived as threats by certain actors, to what, and in which ways. This brings us to the research question of this paper.

2 Research Question

The main research question of this paper is to what extent the Commission and the Nordic EU

countries have attempted to securitize energy from 2005 to 2015. Securitization is in this paper

understood according to the Copenhagen School framework, which is adjusted to fit the purposes of this research. Here, following the Copenhagen School, securitization refers to a process in which an actor “raises” a question from the normal political sphere into a higher sphere of securitization by framing the question into a security one through a speech act, and by articulating an issue as being an existential threat to a referent object. The main research question is split into sub-questions, which consist of the indicators and variables according to which the changes are measured. In short, security, for the Copenhagen School, is about survival of whichever entity

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whose security is in question. Security should also be seen as a wide phenomenon and not merely as military security.5 This theoretical standpoint forms in short the perspective which this thesis uses to explain the relationship between energy and security.

The first sub-question of this thesis is to research which issues are seen as (existential) threats

relating to energy and which matters are being threatened, thus which are the referent objects. Threats, according to Buzan et al., are of danger to someone or something and his or its

existence. This variable is translated into indicators, the first of which is to determine if there is something under a threat. This does not need to be said literally (for instance, that “energy supply is being threatened”) but there does need to be an utterance according to which an issue is in danger. Here, for analytical reasons, there is a distinction between existential threats and other types of threats. If an issue is found to be threatened, it will be analyzed whether its existence is endangered, meaning that it would be destroyed or disappeared if the threat would come into being, or whether it would merely be harmed if the threat would come true. Another indicator for whether something is an existential threat is whether or not it requires emergency measures: meaning the measures outside of normal politics to handle it. If the threat requires emergency measures, it is existential, and if it does not, it is an other type. Both the existential and non-existential threats are taken into account in this research, to illustrate the process and change of the relationship between energy and security in more detail. A threat also means that something needs to be in danger: the referent object.6

The Copenhagen School has likewise not created a universal definition for a referent object. A referent object refers to something that is (existentially) threatened (according to the previous definition) and that has a legitimate claim to survive.7 Because of the Copenhagen School’s wider understanding of security, it can be in principle anything. There are two indicators for a referent object. Firstly, the issue needs to be threatened and secondly, it needs to have a legitimate claim to survival. Issues that are threatened, but not presented as having a legitimate claim to survival, cannot be referent objects. For an illustration on the operationalization of threats and referent objects, see Appendix 1.

5_{Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 21–26.} 6_{Ibid., 21–23.}

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The second sub-question is to analyze on which sector(s) and level(s) the threats and referent

objects can be placed. This means that the sectors and levels are not analyzed as an apart

phenomena, away from the referent objects and threats, but instead that they are analyzed by using the sectors and the levels. As, according to Buzan et al., the levels and sectors should be used as analytical devices and not as outcomes as such, it is indeed fruitful to use them as a device in analyzing the referent objects and threats. Here the five sectors of security (military, economic, environmental, societal and political) defined by the Copenhagen School will be used. By classifying the threats and referent objects into the sectors, it is easier to demonstrate the changes regarding energy and security. For instance, if in 2005 most of the threats regarding energy could be classified as threats of the economic sector and in 2015 most threats would occur in the environmental sector, we could say that the actors’ threat perception has shifted accordingly. Secondly, a comparison between the levels of the securitization attempts will be made, similarly to the sectors. There are five levels in total in the theoretical framework, differing from the global to the individual. Similarly to the sectors, the threats and referent objects will be placed on the levels and thereby compared. With the help of this second sub-question a comprehensive picture of the securitization attempts of the four actors within past 10 years will be drawn.

Lastly, combining the previous two sub-questions, the goal is to analyze to what extent the

energy securitization has changed over 10 years. With this sub-question, the changes in the

threats and referent objects is illustrated, by using the sectors and levels. It will be compared whether there are similar patterns of securitization attempts between the actors and also chronologically, and whether the actors have viewed the relationship between energy and security in a similar way in the past 10 years. This sub-question demonstrates the securitization and desecuritization processes of the actors. Desecuritization is the reverse phenomenon of securitization: whereas in securitization issues are brought from normal political sphere into the sphere of security, in desecuritization the issues are brought from the security sphere back to the political one. 8

These three sub-questions will provide a coherent illustration of how, when and in which ways securitization attempts have been made by the four actors. Further, by comparing the differences and the similarities in the securitization processes between actors and across time, it gives us a

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chance to identify if there are any patterns according to which energy and security are connected. The securitizing actors, which are the actors performing the securitization attempt (the Commission and the governments of Finland, Sweden and Denmark), remain the same throughout the whole thesis in order to allow us to concentrate especially on the viewpoints of these actors and on the process of securitization. Furthermore, this enables us to concentrate more on the threats and the referent objects instead of having to take into account the limitations and differences between multiple securitizing actors with different roles.

3 Social and Scientific Significance of the Research Question

In the 21st century energy is more or less fundamental to all Europeans and to most people on the global scale as well. Energy is used for the most basic functions of the human life, such as warming a house, cooking food or putting on a light in the evening. Furthermore, energy is of crucial importance in transportation and industry. It would be very difficult to imagine how the global economy would work without energy. Hence, energy as a research object is something that already as such includes major social significance to individuals, societies, countries and for the whole world.

Energy is especially important to Europe. The cooperation between countries, which eventually was to become the EU, started after the Second World War as a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and even before the ECSC there was cooperation in the form of European Coal Organisation and the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation. It has been argued that energy is not only deeply rooted in the European cooperation, but that it also has been a facilitator of integration – sometimes more successfully and sometimes less so. However, Common Energy Policy was, and arguably still is one of the weakest policy areas in the EU. Only rather recently energy matters have been brought into the center of the attention on the EU’s agenda. 9

In this paper energy is connected with security. There are undeniably several actual threats to energy and the security of energy: the political disputes in the EU’s relations with Russia, climate change which has an inseparable connection to the use of energy, and running out of fossil fuels – just to name a few. However, the topic of this paper are the issues that are perceived as threats by

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different actors. If these issues can be tracked down, the choices and behavior of the actors can be explained in a more fruitful way. This is because knowing what the actors are perceiving as threats and in which ways gives explanatory power and might even help to predict the actors’ future choices. If an issue is seen as a threat and especially if it is perceived as an existential one, the actor will likely try to solve it, since it is very high on the priority list and therefore very urgent. This would have policy implications for the present and for the future.

Because of the plans and proposals for an Energy Union by the Commission, it is very topical to research whether the three countries with extensive cooperation perceive threats in a similar way, despite of the differences in their energy profiles. If actors have similar threat perceptions and hence similar priorities, cooperation is much easier than if their priority lists differ remarkably from each other. Furthermore, identifying patterns in the actors’ perceptions to the relationship of energy and security might have important implications for the future both in theory and practice. This is because energy markets are estimated to remain unstable and since energy policy is facing some turbulence, firstly because of the new technologies and energy forms developed, secondly because of the global awareness of the implications of energy to for instance climate change, and thirdly because of the changing role of fossil fuels.

The Copenhagen School ideas of securitization and security are rather new and controversial, making it interesting to apply them to various case studies. The issue of energy fits the theory’s framework very well, since energy can have implications to every sector (military, economic, environmental, social and political) depicted by the theory. As no separate sector for energy exists (although this might very well be developed in the future), researching it in a sectoral way, taking into account all sectors, is logical. Adding the levels to the sectoral view complements the research and since both “axes” are taken into account, it is possible to say something about the theory’s explanatory power as well.

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specific attention to smaller Member States, since the attention is often targeted at the bigger actors; specifically the Big Three10 because of their size and power.11 Additionally, researching whether the sectors and levels of the theory can cover all issues coming up from the documents researched in this thesis gives an indication as to whether the sectors and levels should be adjusted. If certain topics or issues fall outside of the scope of the sectors and levels, it can be suggested that the theory should be adjusted accordingly.

The Copenhagen School framework has previously often been used to research for instance speeches of high political actors, who are trying to securitize certain issues in order to legitimize radical action12. In this paper the theory is used rather differently since it is applied to institutions and to their official documents, in order to research what kinds of matters they have tried to securitize and what is portrayed as the referent object. The Copenhagen School theorists do not state that the theory could only be used for analyzing speeches; instead, they have used for instance the Commission’s Work Programme for 1995 as source material for their research of securitization13. Therefore it is theoretically interesting to use the theory to analyze this type of source material, since it will give another indication on the theory’s explanatory power.

The literature on energy policy in Europe has been described as “scarce”14, which encourages more research, such as this paper, to be conducted on the topic. Additionally, the Copenhagen School securitization theory has previously been widely discussed in the context of (amongst others) democratization15, human rights16 and especially (im)migration17 and sexual violence in wars18.

10_{With the Big Three of the EU, the author is referring to Germany, France and Great Britain.}

11_{See for example Moravcsik, Andrew 1998. The choice for Europe: social purpose and state power from Messina}

to Maastricht. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press; Janning, Josef 2005. ‘Leadership Coalitions and Change: The Roles of States in the European Union.’ International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 81:4 (2005), p. 821–833.

12_{See for instance Donnelly, Faye 2015. ‘The Queen’s speech: Desecuritizing the past, present and future of}

Anglo-Irish relations.’ European Journal of International Relations (March 2015), p. 1–24; van Muster, Rens 2009.

Securitizing immigration: The politics of risk in the EU. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 13_{Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 191.}

14_{Bechberger 2012, xvi.}

15_{See Stefan, Adina Marina 2009. Democratization and Securitization: The Case of Romania. Leiden: Brill.} 16_{See Kim, Mikyoung 2012. Securitization of human rights: North Korean refugees in East Asia. Santa Barbara,}

California: Praeger Security International.

17_{See Khory, Kavita R. (ed.) 2012. Global migration: Challenges in the twenty-first century. New York: Palgrave}

MacMillan; Chebel d’Appollonia, Ariane 2012. Frontiers of fear: Immigration and insecurity in the United States

and Europe. Ithaca: Cornell University Press; van Muster, Rens 2009. Securitizing immigration: The politics of risk in the EU. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

18_{See Hirschauer, Sabine 2014. The securitization of rape: women, war and sexual violence. Hampshire and New}

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The focus in the previous research that has used the securitization theory does not seem to be in energy, which is why this thesis will give its input on how the theory can be applied in the energy field.

4 Research Design and Methodology

The Copenhagen School theoretical framework is chosen to be used in this paper since it allows to research security as a process and not only as an outcome, which suits the setting of this thesis very well. Buzan et al. label themselves as constructivists regarding both social relations and security, meaning that they do not see the world as an independent objective structure as objectivists19 do.20 Since the author of this thesis is interested in the Commission’s and in the three countries’ ideas of energy and security, the actor-centered theoretical framework of Buzan et al. suits this thesis very well. Because of the broadness and inclusiveness of energy issues and since this thesis brings together energy and security, it is necessary to use a theory that can combine security with the constructivist way of interpreting the world and IR. The Copenhagen School theoretical framework is constructive, broad and inclusive, which is why it was chosen as the most useful theory for the purposes of this paper. Most of the theoretical literature used in this paper is conducted by either Barry Buzan, Ole Waever or Jaap de Wilde.

The method used in this paper will be a comparative case study, in which a relatively small number of cases will be compared in a qualitative way. Since the interpretation of energy and security by the actors lays in the heart of this thesis, a qualitative method suits the research better than a quantitative one since it, and especially the comparative method chosen, allows to operationalize qualitative variables and to test them, and to examine the phenomenon in-depth and therefore to create detailed explanations of the cases.21 Further, because according to the theory there are no universal variables or indicators of the threats and referent objects and because the theory and the research questions of this thesis are process-oriented, quantitative research and especially a quantitative discourse analysis would be a less suitable option. Since quantitative discourse

19_{Objectivism, in short, refers to the IR school of thought that sees the world as existing independently regardless of}

its relationship to any observers, meaning that the world and its objects are identical to everyone who observes them. Objectivism is often seen as the “counter-theory” of constructivism. Hazelrigg 1986, S1–S3.

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analysis concentrates mostly on how often something happens and qualitative discourse analysis concentrates on why and how something happens22, the qualitative option is more fruitful for this research.

The qualitative method will be used in a form of a discourse and textual analysis on first-hand policy documents. The analysis is complemented with background information on energy policy developments in order to provide a context to the findings and to identify the patterns of the actors’ securitization attempts as comprehensively as possible. Discourse analysis is used in this thesis in the same way that Buzan et al. have used it in their research: discourse is researched not as an indicator of something else but as an end itself. The way of conducting research is to read 17 first-hand documents and to identify the threats and referent objects in these documents, and to place the findings in the sectors and levels according to the theoretical framework23. The phenomena searched for are the specific structures (threats and referent objects) through which securitization can be “measured”. The units of analysis in this paper are from one sentence to a paragraph, since they need to be long enough to include a threat and a referent object, but concise enough to be treated as individual cases. It should also be noted that on the one hand, securitizing actors do not necessarily use the term “security” in their speech acts and on the other hand, using the word “security” does not always constitute a security act. Therefore the analysis goes deeper than just finding certain words (such as “security”) in the documents and straightforwardly labeling it as a securitization attempt. The analysis needs to be able to find threats and referent objects in the text even though the text itself would not explicitly state “issue X is threatening the existence of an object Y”. For an illustration of the operationalization, see Appendix 1. 24

Buzan et al. encourage to choose a limited set of texts and a complete representation of securitization instances instead of taking a large set from which the analyst picks certain ones freely.25 Therefore a limited amount of texts is chosen from specific securitizing actors. The countries and the Commission tend to revise their energy policies every few years, which is why the time frame being 10 years means that the empirical material consists of approximately 3–5

22_{Lazaraton 2002, 33.}

23_{The theoretical framework of this paper is introduced in more detail in chapter 5.} 24_{Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 33; 176.}

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most important26 energy strategies and documents produced and published by either the governments of the countries researched, or by the Commission. The time frame of 10 years (from approximately 200527 to 2015) was selected to illustrate changes in the energy policy and the

process, and not only the outcomes of securitization. Due to the length of the thesis a full

comprehensive analysis of for instance 50 years would not have been possible to do; thus, the author decided to restrict the time frame and allow for more in-depth analysis. The versions of the first-hand documents written in English are chosen if possible, to avoid translation mistakes and in order to be able to compare the material as objectively as possible. However, not all material was available in English, in which case these documents are read in the language available, and the translation has been conducted by the author of this thesis.

There were certain restrictions for the research posed by the available material. For example in the case of Finland and Sweden there were no energy strategies available in the period before the beginning of the 21st century. This was either because before the 21st century energy policy was made together with other issues (often together with industry or trade) and therefore there were no separate energy strategies, or because the material is not available. This made the decision to choose the time period of 2005 to 2015 to be analyzed all the more logical. Next to this, in all Nordic EU countries and in the Commission the climate policies and energy policies are integrated or overlap to some extent, since the climate is seen as having a close relationship with energy. It was not always possible to find documents that concentrate only on energy policy, since for instance the energy strategy of Finland from 2005 is actually the “Outline of the Energy and Climate Policy for the Near Future” – including both energy and climate aspects. This might cause bias in the results since the concentration of the documents is, due to the integration of the climate policy, perhaps more on the environmental sector. However, merely because climate policy is politically integrated with energy policy does not straightforwardly mean the threats perceived by

26_{These documents are chosen as the most important since they are either classified as the cornerstones of the}

countries’ or the Commission’s energy policy by the actors themselves, or because they are the documents regarding energy, created to guide the actors’ policy, which is mentioned in the introduction or abstract of the documents. To be as comprehensive as possible, in this thesis short-, middle term and long term strategies are analyzed, since it is possible that actors perceive different issues as threats depending on the time frame.

27_{For Sweden, the only general governmental energy strategy or document before 2009 was found from 2002. It was}

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the actors are necessarily environment-related and the results would accordingly be biased. Hence, these documents have been used as source material as well.

It also needs to be said that the securitizing actors, or in other words the producers of the documents, are not consistently the same throughout the documents. Obviously the voice heard in official EU-level or government documents is not merely the voice of the actor publishing the document, but has been influenced by other actors and interest groups. The purpose of this thesis, however, is not to research the power and voice of these actors, which is why they and their importance are not further explored but instead their existence is acknowledged here. In this thesis the concentration is instead of this on how threats and referent objects are constructed in the official documents of the actors. Furthermore, the securitizing actors28 of the documents, responsible for energy policy, vary a bit from country to country29 and throughout the documents. Depending on the country, the securitizing actors are the government, a ministry or a committee set up by the government. However, since all of the documents have been approved by the governments of the countries or by a ministry which are subordinate to the government in all Nordic EU countries, they can be treated as government documents and seen as reflecting the position of the country in question.

The amount and content of the referent objects and threats is researched in the empirical material, and it is analyzed whether the various actors perceive same things as threats and whether they use the same referent objects. By researching both the quality and the quantity of the threats and the referent objects, the author hopes to be able to give a comprehensive view of the threats and referent objects portrayed and to offer a fruitful comparison of the different actors’ threat perceptions. The sectors and levels in which the issues can be placed will also be analyzed in a

28_{Throughout this thesis, the words “Finland”, “Sweden” and “Denmark” are used to refer to the governments of the}

respective countries.

29_{For the Commission documents the securitizing actor remains the same: it is the Commission throughout the}

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qualitative way. Next to this, a comparison of the number of issues in each sector and level will be done. The purpose of this thesis is not to normatively judge any findings or to suggest which threats might be “more real” or which referent objects might be more important than the others. According to the so called guillotine of David Hume, there is no ought from is. This thesis concentrates on the is instead of the ought and hence rather observes the phenomena put forward by the actors. Although according to the Copenhagen School framework a successful securitization can only occur when issues are portrayed as existential threats that require emergency measures, in this thesis non-existential threats too are taken into account and there is a distinction made between “existential” and “non-existential” threats. This is because by taking both types of threats into account, the analysis is more inclusive and richer in nuances. Further, since the source material in this thesis consists of official governmental or Commission documentation, the language is likely used in a more careful way than it would be used in speeches and other material that is not to the same extent created with the help of a large bureaucratic machinery. As mentioned, the Copenhagen School securitization theory is to a large extent used to analyze for instance the speeches of high political leaders30. In this thesis the theory is applied to official and often longer-term energy strategies and documents, which as source material differ from speeches; meaning that the theory needs to be shaped accordingly. Because of these reasons, in this paper the theory is used in a way that allows for more distinction between the types of threats, and takes into account the “lesser” threats.

Nordic EU countries are chosen to be researched because the process of securitization is arguably very context-dependent, since it relies on speech acts which can change from culture to culture and according to the language or be interpreted differently in different cultural contexts. The three countries chosen have a rather similar culture and share much cultural and historical background, hence their speech acts can be compared without needing to add major additional, culture-bound filters. There would be a bigger risk of the analysis being biased due to extensive cultural differences if the countries would be culturally (and for instance socially and politically) very far away from each other, such as Finland, Greece and Ireland within Europe, or Sweden, Peru and

30_{See for instance Donnelly, Faye 2015. ‘The Queen’s speech: Desecuritizing the past, present and future of}

Anglo-Irish relations.’ European Journal of International Relations (March 2015), p. 1–24; van Muster, Rens 2009.

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Kyrgyzstan outside of Europe. The governments of the three countries have been chosen as securitizing actors especially because they have the authority to speak on behalf of certain group, namely for the state. Furthermore, in all three countries the central government is responsible for developing energy policy31, which justifies the decision to analyze the governmental documents in this paper.

Besides that the Nordic EU countries share cultural and historical background, they are all members of the EU: Finland and Sweden since 1995 and Denmark since 1973. Therefore it can also be said that since the countries share a significant amount of cultural, societal and political background in the EU context, the speech acts can be compared between the Commission and the countries without adding extra filters. The EU and especially the Commission have in the past decade extended their influence in the energy field, proposing an Energy Union to be established and proposing an amount of legislation regarding energy policy. In general it can be said that while energy matters still fall mainly under national competences within the EU, they are to a growing extent decided upon within the framework of the Union. Because of the growing influence of the Commission regarding energy matters during the time frame of the thesis and because of its right of initiative to propose laws on the EU level, it is necessary to involve the Commission as the fourth actor to be researched. Although it could be argued that Norway should be included as an actor here based on its role as a Nordic country, it is excluded since the thesis’ context is strongly the EU, and since Norway is not a member of the Union, it cannot directly be compared with Finland, Sweden and Denmark.

31_{Regeringskansliet (Government Offices of Sweden) website on ‘The new Government’s environment and energy}

policy; Transportministeriet website on ‘Tidligere ministre’ and Klima- Energi og Bygningsministeriet website on ‘Klima-, Energi- og Bygningsministeriets baggrund’; Ministry of Employment and the Economy website on ‘History of the Ministry’.

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Potential problems with the methodology chosen is that the case selection is biased, for instance that not the most relevant documents are researched. The author has recognized this issue and hence concentrated on the documents that are described as the cornerstones of the energy policy of the various actors by the actors themselves in the documents or on the websites of the actors. Another possible methodological problem is that since the case selection is narrow since there are 17 documents to be analyzed, the results cannot be generalized to a full extent. In addition to this research, a more far-reaching analysis would be needed to include a wider selection of explanations, in order to generalize the results fully. In that case, additional variables, such as the role of various stakeholders and interest groups could be taken into account and researched what kind of effect these actors have on the perceptions of the relationship between energy and security. Another potential problem is that the results of this thesis cannot be generalized (without further research) outside of the Nordic EU countries and the Commission, since it is plausible that for example cultural factors play a major role in interpreting issues as security issues. However, because single cases as such are not that interesting for the wider research agenda of IR, the author will make some generalizations and identify certain patterns or trends that can be further tested in future research. It is still useful to keep in mind that the goal of this paper is not to make definitive generalizations on the global level.

5 Theoretical Framework

Security is one of the most discussed, if not the most popular topic of IR. It has been said that there “is no neutrality in the meaning of the concept of security because all definitions are theory-dependent and all definitions reflect normative commitments”32. Therefore the theoretical section will begin with an overview of the concept of security in the field of IR by the most known IR theories.

5.1 Literature review: Security in International Relations

Since security is such a central topic in IR, almost every theory and school of thought has some kind of a definition to it and also ideas about its role and meaning to the world. The traditional approaches to IR and security are realism and liberalism. Realism is arguably the approach concentrating mostly on security within IR. Within the realist family there are multiple approaches, such as structural realism (neorealism) developed by Kenneth Waltz, but there are some elements

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regarding security which the various approaches share. For example, realists in general emphasize the anarchical structure of the international system and the lack of authority. Because of this, power is for most realists the defining feature of the international system and it plays a fundamental role when states try to acquire enough capacity to achieve their (international) goals. Further, in the realist point of view, states are the most important actors in IR and they are seen as both unitary and rational actors, making strategic decisions.33

Liberalism, then again, can be described as a more optimistic approach to IR and to security. Liberalism sees that peace is achievable and that states and societies can truly cooperate without constantly having to think about the power of the other or fear for conflict and violence. Liberalism, like realism, includes various approaches and subcategories such as neoliberalism, developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye. Some characteristic features of liberalism are that although it sees states as the central actors in IR, it concentrates strongly on the role of other actors such as international organizations and domestic actors too. For liberalists, the behavior of a state consists of multiple factors such as the perceptions and decisions of elites. This means that there is no “basic” structure of the international system but rather its character can change as the nature and preferences of its members change. Furthermore, liberalists are often seen as supporters of democracy, human rights and building international organizations.34

All in all, both realists and liberalists can be seen as traditionalists regarding security in the sense that they concentrate strongly on the traditional, state-centric and military conception of security. They concentrate much on the material factors of states and other entities in the international system and regarding security. Social constructivism, on the other hand, sees that actors of the international system construct the world and security. For constructivists, normative (or ideational) structures matter at least as much as material ones in the international system. Additionally, the identities of the actors matter and can explain the actions of actors. Furthermore, agents and structures are seen as mutually constituted, meaning that the relationship goes both ways; actors shape the world and the world shapes actors. Actors create the world and system they are living in, and the same system influences them. There is no given structure of the international system, but it is constructed and can be anarchic but only because it is constructed that way by the actors.

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Accordingly, for constructivists security is constructed and depends on how actors see the world, other actors’ identities, and collective ideas and norms.35

One ongoing debate in the security field of IR, which is in close connection to this thesis, is the one between traditionalists and wideners of security. The traditionalist approaches concentrate on military and sometimes political security regarding threats and international order. However, the “wideners” want to include a broader conception of security in terms of for example economic and environmental issues. Additionally, they seek to deepen the agenda of security so that it not only concentrates on the state level but can include levels from the individual up to the global security.36

The wideners, or non-traditionalists, have brought the agenda of security to include matters such as gender37, health38 or globalization39 as well. The theoretical framework of this paper can theoretically be placed amongst the wideners, because it includes five different sectors of security, thus not only the military or political ones, and it also distinguishes between five different levels which are important for security. The Copenhagen School leans towards neorealism in the sense that it sees international security as having its basis in power politics, and that security is about survival. Security for them as a speech act often refers to or declares an emergency condition which justifies the use of all means to handle it. However, for the Copenhagen School security should not be treated as a positive value to be maximized, but instead the concentration and preference should be in treating issues in a way that they could be handled within normal political procedures – thus not in the context of security. All in all, for the Copenhagen School security is not a direct consequence of threat, as it perhaps is to neorealists, but instead security is created by the actors through securitization. The Copenhagen School, therefore, treats security as an intersubjective social construct, which makes the theory first and foremost constructivist. 40

35_{Agius 2010, 49–59.}

36_{Krause and Williams 1996, 229–230.}

37_{See Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline 2010. ‘Gender and Security’ in Collins, Alan 2010. Contemporary Security Studies,}

New York: Oxford, p. 106–120; Hirschauer, Sabine 2014. The securitization of rape: women, war and sexual

violence. Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

38_{See Elbe, Stefan 2010. ’Health and Security’ in Collins, Alan 2010. Contemporary Security Studies. New York:}

Oxford, p. 413–427.

39_{See Khory, Kavita R. (ed.) 2012. Global migration: Challenges in the twenty-first century. New York: Palgrave}

MacMillan; Poku, Nana K. 2010. ‘Globalization, Development and Security’ in Collins, Alan 2010. Contemporary

Security Studies. New York: Oxford, p. 256–273.

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5.2 The Copenhagen School and the process of securitization

This section will concentrate on introducing the main theoretical framework of this paper: the Copenhagen School and its concept of securitization, as well as the operationalization of the theory for the purposes of this paper. As mentioned, the Copenhagen School has concentrated on widening the concept of security further and deeper than the traditional military state security. According to the main Copenhagen School theorists, Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, threats and vulnerabilities can arise in various, both military and nonmilitary areas, and on different levels from the individual to the global one. Buzan et al. see security, as argued, both in a neorealist way in the sense that they define security as being about survival and in a constructivist way in that they concentrate strongly on how threats and security are socially constructed.

The whole point of studying securitization for the Copenhagen School is to gain “an increasingly precise understanding of who securitizes, on what issues [threats], for whom [referent objects], why, with what results, and, not least, under what conditions (i.e., what explains when securitization is successful”41_{. Additionally, in order for anything to count as security issue, it}

needs to meet a criteria that distinguish these issues from the normal run of the merely political issues. This process is called securitization. In the process of securitization, the main issue is for

whom security becomes a consideration in relation to whom. Hence, the idea behind securitization

is not whether something is “in reality” a threat or not, but how it is perceived and portrayed, which reflects the constructivist nature of the theory. As a result, the process receives more attention than the qualities of the particular issue. The outcome of a securitization process is also a result of politics, and the size of the political security constellation formed around the issue is the defining feature. 42

The spectrum of all issues is threefold: nonpoliticized issues are not dealt by the state or put in the centrum of public debate and decision; politicized issues are a part of public policy and require either government decision and resource allocations or in specific cases other forms of communal governance; and lastly, securitized issues are presented as being existential threats which require emergency measures and justify actions outside the normal bounds of political procedures. Any issue can become nonpoliticized, politicized or securitized depending upon circumstances, and

41_{Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 32.}

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issues can move in both ways across the spectrum (from nonpoliticized to politicized to securitized and other way around). Securitization does not always go through the state: also other social entities can securitize issues.43

Saying that the issues can move in both ways across the spectrum means that next to securitization, a phenomenon called desecuritization exists. This means the “shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere”44_{. Thus, if an issue has been}

brought into the security sphere, it can be brought back in the to “normal” policy sphere. Here the Copenhagen School makes a normative argument in suggesting that optimally politics should be functioning according to routine procedures and therefore desecuritization is the ideal long-range option, and accordingly handling matters in the ordinary public sphere should be preferred. This means that security should not be something that one should chase or something that should be seen as positive per se. Ole Waever, one of the founding fathers of the Copenhagen School even suspects that desecuritizing politics “would be more effective than securitizing problems”45_.46

However, since this thesis does not take a normative stance towards energy and security, it will not be weighed whether securitization or desecuritization is a better option.

The Copenhagen School is not very clear on what “normal politics” or “normal political procedures” include. They describe issues outside of normal politics as being “secrecy, levying taxes or conscription, placing limitations on otherwise inviolable rights, or focusing society’s energy and resources on a specific task”47. However, since normal political procedures may differ between actors, the Copenhagen School has not offered a clear description of them. In this thesis normal political procedures are understood as the procedures according to which political decisions are made: for instance, in the Nordic EU countries the government proposes legislation which the parliament approves, or on the EU-level the Commission it proposes legislation which the European Council (Council) and European Parliament (Parliament) approve. If measures outside of the normal scope of politics are found in the source material, it will for each case will be argued why this is the case and how these measures differ from normal political procedures.

43_{Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde 1998, 23–24.} 44_{Ibid., 4.}

45_{Wæver 1995, 57.}

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All in all, the Copenhagen School theorists do not see securitization as being a tool of measuring whether an issue is a “real threat” according to certain analytical or philosophical indicators. The meaning of a concept or an issue lies in its usage, and in how people implicitly use it in some ways and not in others. For security this means that an issue needs to be presented as an existential threat; hence, it cannot be weighed against other issues as in normal politics, since if that threat is not solved, everything else will be irrelevant. This means that the measures used to solve the problem can be extraordinary and are justified as such – by securitizing an issue, the actor claims a right to use extraordinary measures. Again, this specific issue does not objectively need to be a “real” existential threat; instead because it is presented as a threat, it becomes one. 48

There are no set rules for when an issue becomes securitized, since it always depends on the context and its exact definition and criteria are constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency which is enough to have considerable political effects. For the Copenhagen School it is not possible to study security scientifically or to apply objective standards of securityness since society is not a closed, mechanical and deterministic system in which actors always act in the same way. Accordingly, the theory about security and securitization needs to be flexible and constructive. Buzan et al. have even stated that that security does not need indicators but can instead be studied directly. However, since this thesis does not research the role of the audience and thus does not include the whole process of securitization, and because it is very challenging to demonstrate the differences between the securitization attempts between different actors on a 10-year time frame without having indicators or variables to measure the changes with, the author of this paper has operationalized the theory. The operationalization is done according to the Copenhagen School framework. 49

5.3 Operationalization of the theory

In general, according to the Copenhagen School, the essential quality of security is the staging of existential issues in politics to bring them above politics. By labeling an issue as security, an agent claims a need for and a right to treat it by extraordinary means. In order to be able to analyze these acts, an analyst needs to “understand the processes of constructing a shared understanding of what is to be considered and collectively responded to as a threat”50_{. This process is in language theory}

48_{Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 24.} 49_{Ibid., 24–25.}

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called a speech act, and it does not concentrate on whether the issues are threats if objectively viewed, but instead on the utterance itself, and how it portrays issues. In other words, the utterance is the primary reality, and the utterance is the act in itself. 51 These speech acts are the target of the research in this thesis.

In a securitization speech act, three different types of units can be defined. The first is the referent

object: things that are seen to be existentially threatened and at the same time have a legitimate

claim to survival. The second is securitizing actor, which is an actor who securitizes issues by declaring something (namely, the referent object) existentially threatened and is thus performing the security speech act. The third is functional actor, which are the actors who affect the dynamics of a sector. They need to be distinguished from referent objects or securitizing actors since they are actors who significantly influence decisions in the field of security.52 In this research the concentration is on the referent objects. The securitizing actors remain the same throughout the thesis; they are the Commission and the governments of Finland, Sweden and Denmark. The role of the functional actors is not researched since the concentration is on how the securitizing actors’ point of views on energy and security.

In addition to these units, the audience of a security speech act points to those who the securitizing act attempts to convince to accept exceptional means because of the security nature of an issue. The audience decides whether the securitization is accepted or not. If an issue is presented as an existential threat to a referent object, it is not yet securitization but a securitizing move or a securitization attempt, since an issue becomes securitized only when an audience accepts it as such. For an issue to become securitized, emergency measures do not need to be adopted, but the existential threat needs to be argued and it needs to gain enough resonance so that it becomes possible to legitimize emergency measures or similar steps which otherwise cannot be taken. Since it is possible to have securitization without having emergency measures proposed, in this thesis the issues not claiming emergency measures (meaning the non-existential threats) are also taken into account. Additionally, in this paper the role of the audience is not researched due to the length of this thesis and since the concentration is on the securitization attempts of the four securitizing actors. Thus, it needs to be remembered that in this thesis not the full securitization process but the

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securitization attempts are researched. If one was to research whether the securitization attempts have been successful, the audience’s role would need to be taken into account. 53

According to the Copenhagen School, securitizations are sometimes bounded together positively, which means that actors or certain groups share at least partly a perception of threat and referent object and can be called a regional security complex, and sometimes they are bounded together negatively, meaning that the actors or group see each other as threats. In this paper, it can without much further research be said that the Nordic EU countries and the Commission do not see each other as existential threats, because of their extensive official and unofficial cooperation and because there have been no indicators for such views by any of the actors. However, there might be issues that originate on the state level and are viewed as threats by the Commission – such as not complying with the environmental goals – or other way around, for instance that the Commission is intervening to a threatening extent in the energy policy of the countries’. Therefore it is researched whether the perceptions of threats are shared between the four actors, and whether they thus form a so called regional security complex. 54

Since the securitization process described by Buzan et al. is very complex and involves multiple sectors, actors, threats referent objects and levels, the author of this paper has chosen a few variables from the theory that can most efficiently be used in order to answer the research question and the sub-questions. The variables are the threats, referent objects, sectors and levels which will be explained in more detail in the next two chapters.

5.3.1 Referent objects and threats

A referent object refers to something that is (existentially) threatened and has a legitimate claim to survive. Traditionally a referent object is the state, but because of the Copenhagen School’s wider understanding of security, it can be in principle anything. Two indicators, according to which it can be determined whether something is a referent object are used in this paper. Firstly, is the issue being threatened? Secondly, does it have a legitimate claim to survival? Issues that are threatened, but not presented as having a legitimate claim to survival, cannot be referent objects. This means that a company who is going bankrupt but does not have a huge impact on for example a state’s economy, most likely will not be presented as having a legitimate claim to survival (except by

Energy and the process of securitization