Cover Page The handle

(1)

Cover Page

The handle http://hdl.handle.net/1887/19885 holds various files of this Leiden University dissertation.

Author: Pohl, Benjamin

Title: "But We Have To Do Something" : the drivers behind EU crisis management operations

Date: 2012-09-27

(2)

´But We Have To Do Something´

The Drivers behind EU Crisis Management Operations

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging van

de graad van Doctor aan de Universiteit Leiden, op gezag van rector magnificus prof. mr. P.F. van der Heijden,

volgens het besluit van het College voor Promoties te verdedigen op donderdag 27 september 2012

klokke 16:15

door Benjamin Pohl Geboren te Dresden in 1979

(3)

Promotiecommissie:

Promotor: Prof. dr. R. de Wijk

Co-promotor: Dr. T. Aalberts

Overige Leden: Prof. dr. J.S. van der Meulen, Universiteit Leiden Prof. dr. J.H. de Wilde, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen Prof. dr. S. Biscop, Universiteit Ghent

ISBN: 978-94-6203-074-9

Print: WÖHRMANN PRINT SERVICE

© 2012 Benjamin Pohl. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission in writing from the proprietor.

© 2012 Benjamin Pohl. Alle rechten voorbehouden. Niets uit deze uitgave mag worden verveelvoudigd, opgeslagen in een geautomatiseerd gegevensbestand, of openbaar gemaakt, in enige vorm of op enige wijze, hetzij elektronisch, mechanisch, door fotokopieën, opnamen, of op enig andere manier, zonder voorafgaande schriftelijke toestemming van de rechthebbende.

(4)

iii

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Potential Purposes of Foreign Policy ... 15

Table 2. Potential Purposes of ESDP ... 18

Table 3. Overview of Propositions Regarding Drivers behind ESDP ... 39

Table 4. Overview of ESDP Operations ... 50

Table 5. ESDP Operations by Type and Location ... 59

Table 6. National Contributions to Althea ... 89

Table 7. National Contributions to EUPOL Afghanistan ... 158

(7)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFP Agence France-Presse

ALTHEA EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan

Artemis EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of

Congo (2003)

‘Berlin Plus’ (agreements) Set of agreements between NATO and the EU concerning the Union’s use of NATO assets and capabilities for EU crisis management operations

BiH Bosnia and Herzegovina

BMI Bundesministerium des Innern (German Federal

Ministry of the Interior)

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

COM European Commission

CPCC Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability

CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

CSU Christlich-Soziale Union

CGS Council General Secretariat

CIVCOM Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis

Management

Concordia EU Military Operation in Macedonia

DSACEUR Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe

EC European Community

ECJ European Court of Justice

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

EUFOR European Union Force

EUFOR RD Congo EU Military Operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2006)

EUFOR Tchad/RCA EU Military Operation in Chad / Central African Republic

EULEX (Kosovo) EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo

EUMC EU Military Committee

EUMS EU Military Staff

EUPM EU Police Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina

EUPOL (Afghanistan) EU Police Mission in Afghanistan

(8)

vii

EUPT European Union Planning Team in Kosovo

EUSR EU Special Representative

F.A.Z. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (German daily)

FFM Fact-Finding Mission

FRA France / French

FYROM Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

G8 Group of 8 (major economies)

GAO Government Accountability Office (US)

GER Germany / German

GFA General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia

and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement)

GPPO German Police Project Office (in Afghanistan)

ICG International Crisis Group

ICJ International Court of Justice

IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies

ICR / ICO International Civilian Representative in Kosovo /

International Civilian Office (headed by ICR)

IFOR Implementation Force (NATO Operation in

Bosnia)

IPOS Institut fuer praxisorientierte Sozialforschung

IPTF International Police Task Force (UN Police

Mission in Bosnia)

IPU Integrated Police Unit

ISAF International Security Assistance Force (NATO

Operation in Afghanistan)

IR International relations

ISG International Steering Group for Kosovo

ISIS (Europe) International Security Information Service

JAM Joint Assessment Mission (Afghanistan)

KFOR Kosovo Force (NATO Operation)

KLA Kosovo Liberation Army

MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African

Republic and Chad

MoD Ministry of Defence

MoI Ministry of Interior

MS Member state

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

(9)

OHR Office of the High Representative in Bosnia

OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

PIC Peace Implementation Council (International body

charged with implementing the GFA)

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team

PSC Political and Security Committee

SAA Stabilization and Association Agreement

SFOR Stabilization Force (NATO Operation in Bosnia)

SG/HR Secretary-General/High Representative of the

Council of the EU (sometimes also HR/SG)

SHAPE Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe

SWP Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

UK United Kingdom / British

UN United Nations

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

UNAMID African Union / United Nations Hybrid Operation in

Darfur

UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo

UNSC United Nations Security Council

UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force (Croatia and

Bosnia)

UNSG United Nations Secretary-General

US United States

USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

WEU Western European Union

(10)

ix

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It was in one of my very first interviews that, when asked how ESDP operations come about, an EU official explained to me that they were typically preceded by an outcry in the media, ‘and then Solana says his famous words, “but we have to do something”’. In heeding his advice to put that phrase on this study’s cover, I am also paying homage to the many officials who made their precious time available in order to help me put together a history of what happened behind the scenes. Because they were promised anonymity, their names do not feature, but I would like to express my gratitude to all those who agreed to talk to me. Whereas their testimonies were indispensable to this study, they bear no fault for the false conclusions that I may have drawn from their collective (and at times mutually contradictory) recollections.

I am especially indebted to many of my former colleagues at the German Foreign Office who not only helped me survive in the bureaucratic machinery that is ESDP, but also assisted me during my research.

While this book owes a lot to my interview partners, it would never have seen the light of day without the encouragement and support of numerous colleagues at university. Although it is difficult if not dangerous to single out individuals, special thanks go to my roommates over the years – Tom Louwerse, Marc Uriot, Sergiu Gherghina, Kavita Ziemann, Floris Mansvelt Beck, Veerle van Doeveren, Mohammed Pervez and Cris Boonen. Many others also went beyond the call of duty in taking the time to read and comment on various drafts of this study, and in never tiring of encouraging me. I am particularly indebted to Niels van Willigen, Jan Erk, Hans Vollaard, Huib Pellikaan and Lee Seymour. Hans Vollaard deserves special mention for making this study’s Dutch summary comprehensible. Moreover, a number of friends and colleagues beyond Leiden were very helpful by contributing ideas, giving feedback on my work, and supporting me in identifying crucial interview partner:

special thanks to Christian Burckhardt, Hadewych Hazelzet, Hylke Dijkstra, Alexander Mattelaer, Sven Biscop, and Guillaume de Rougé. This study furthermore owes a lot to Henk Wagenaar and Bertjan Verbeek, who both counseled and encouraged me at crucial stages of my research. Particular gratitude also goes to Michael E. Smith. The generous conditions of my postdoctoral research fellowship with Michael at the University of Aberdeen allowed me to finish this project during daylight hours. Most significantly, this project would not have succeeded were it not for my ‘promotores’: Rob de Wijk, who gave me all the freedom I needed to pursue my ideas while intermittently pushing me back on a path towards finishing my project; and Tanja Aalberts, who reliably provided detailed and thoughtful comments on one overly verbose draft after another.

(11)

I am grateful for the funding which I received from the Netherlands Institute of Government (NIG) for my ‘field research’ in various EU capitals. What made this field research experience particularly enjoyable however were the many friends who were willing to share their apartments so that I could stay for weeks in expensive cities and interview officials. Special thanks in that regard go to Perrine and Guillaume, Caecilia, Kareen and Christoph, Katrine and Anna, Kasia, Amanda, Miguel and Frederik, as well as Julia and Sebastiaan. I am moreover very grateful to Markus for designing a beautiful cover for this book. More generally, I could not have succeeded without the support of my friends and family who patiently encouraged, consoled and distracted me, and who helped me keep in perspective any intermittent discontent with research and writing. Their support shielded me from being consumed by this task; the greatest debt however I owe to Constanze, without whom this project would never have started, much less finished.