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Famine and Democracy in Mauritania

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(1)Islam, Society & the State. Famine and Democracy in Mauritania. ISIM REVIEW 17 / SPRING 2006. 33. S TA C Y E. H O L D E N. Distribution of food at a village nearby Nouakchott, 9 June 2002. P H O T O B Y G E O R G E S G O B E T / © A F P, 2 0 0 2. Mauritania’s military and the internaIn August 2005, a military junta engaged in took place in 1991, and the President was a bloodless coup in Mauritania that ousted tional community are at loggerheads re-elected with an implausible 90% of over the recent coup in this Sahelian President Maaouya Sid’ Ahmed Ould Taya. the vote. In both 1997 and 2003, the inSupporters and critics of this coup both country. In response to the coup, Nouakcumbent’s margin of victory was a more realistic percentage, but Taya jailed his chott’s residents engaged in a joyful explain this event in terms of a struggle for democracy. According to the author this principal opponent in the latter election. street celebration. Despite this sign of If Mauritanians loathe authoritarianism popular support for the new junta, foranalysis can neither explain the coup nor the and aspire instead to representative inpopular support of it. Instead, she argues that eign governments denounced the military’s confiscation of political power. environmental catastrophe has long acted as a stitutions, then a popularly supported military coup should have taken place catalyst for political change in Mauritania, just Both the Mauritanian military and as in other countries in North Africa. Political well before August 2005. its international critics present themIt was only at the end of pitiful harvest selves as champions of democracy, so instability in other countries will surely follow in the wake of more bad harvests. season, as Mauritanians faced a second these outwardly opposing sides are in year of poor crops, that military officers fact interchangeable in regard to their mutual endorsement of an inaccurate explanation of this political cri- ousted Taya. Even in the best of times, most people in this country hardly sis. President Taya held power for twenty-one years. The seventeen earn enough to feed their families. The US State Department estimates members of the ruling junta insist that Mauritanians could no longer that the average annual income of the 2.5 million people in Mauritania resupport his harsh rule, and they promise to set up democratic insti- mains close to only $380 a year. Now, locusts and droughts have destroyed tutions by 2007. Foreign leaders, however, insist that the junta must this region’s crops, so food is costly or, even worse, unavailable. Only three respect the existing constitution and reinstall President Taya. The op- days after the coup, the United Nations World Food Programme pointed posing sides offer different interpretations of the rule of law and fair to Mauritania as one country that has been most affected by the current electoral process, but they do not advance contrasting explanations environmental crisis in the Sahel. If there is one issue that obsesses most Mauritanians right now, it is the cost and availability of staple food. either for the coup or for the popular support of it. The reporting on this coup did not take into consideration the agriculThough journalists and pundits do not give credence to arguments that the coup centres on the struggle for democracy, they too offer faulty tural foundation of Mauritania’s political life. At present, the UN estimates analyses. In some cases, they conclude that an Islamic movement gener- that famine threatens more than one million people in North and West ated unrest in this North African country. This argument is based on Taya’s Africa. Environmental catastrophe has long acted as a catalyst for political decision to open diplomatic relations with Israel six years ago, which an- change in North Africa, and this coup perpetuates traditional patterns of gered politicized Muslims. In other cases, they conclude that this coup power transfer in these arid lands. Ensuring public access to food is a basic represents an effort to control the resources of an emerging rentier state. task of any government, so famine in the Sahara’s borderlands contributes This argument focuses on Taya’s decision to eventually engage in offshore to the rise and fall of empires. Political instability in other countries will oil production. My criticism hinges on the chronological understanding of surely follow in the wake of more bad harvests. But unmistakably, future cause and effect. Both arguments look either to the past or to the future demonstrators, much like the Mauritanians who danced in the streets last to explain the present crisis. And right now, today, in a country depend- August to celebrate the military coup, want food, not democracy. ent on rain-fed agriculture, drought and locusts have destroyed its crops. The Mauritanian coup builds upon the Sahel’s long history of environmental crisis as a catalyst for political change. Taya himself organized a Stacy E. Holden is Assistant Professor of History, Purdue University. military coup in 1984, the third year of a severe drought. By that time, Email: sholden@purdue.edu hungry nomads had set up shantytowns on the capital’s outskirts, and their arrival doubled the Nouakchott’s population. Mauritania is now in the second year of a similar food crisis, and the military, just as Taya and his cohorts once did, deposed a ruler who could not prevent famine. In this instance, the military’s action sustains the environmental logic dictating this region’s event history. I worked at the US Embassy in Nouakchott in 1998, and I observed Taya’s efforts to care for his country’s marginalized masses. I came to Mauritania two months after a visit by the Under Secretary of State for Human Rights, who took this country off the US list of human rights abusers. When I travelled inland through Atar, I saw no evidence that Taya abused his power to enrich himself or his supporters. His hometown was just as run-down as other villages in the region. And Taya’s government cared for displaced migrants. In showing me Nouakchott, an Embassy official drove a 4 X 4 along a network of paved roads that led to the shantytowns. As a public work, these roads allowed the capital’s poorest residents to take buses downtown and to receive barrels of fresh water. Though Taya’s policies exhibited concern for the lot of ordinary people, his efforts to institute democracy were superficial. The first presidential election after Taya’s coup.

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