UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN
Faculty of Arts
Conflict prevention in the EU way
(Master Thesis)
Dr. Frank Gaenssmantel Anita Šujanová
Assistant Professor s2174251
J. Kačku 1173/8
957 01 Bánovce nad Bebravou Slovakia
DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE
I hereby declare that this thesis, “Conflict prevention in the EU way”, is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.
Name
Signature
Content
1 INTRODUCTION 4
1.1A SHORT DESCRIPTION OF THE TOPIC 4
1.2RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUBDIVISIONS OF THE THESIS 5
1.3RELEVANCE OF THE THESIS 6
2 PRESENTATION OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACH 7
2.1POWER AS AN ATTRIBUTE 8 2.2POWER AS A RELATIONSHIP 10 2.3CIVILIAN POWER 12 2.4MILITARY POWER 15 2.5NORMATIVE POWER 16 3 METHODOLOGY 19
4 THE EU POLICY ON CONFLICT PREVENTION 24
4.1FORMATION OF THE EU’S CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY 25
4.2EU’S CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE SCHOLARLY LITERATURE 27
4.3EU’S CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY ON THE PAPER 31
4.3.1SHORT-TERM/OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 32
4.3.2LONG-TERM/STRUCTURAL INSTRUMENTS 36
4.4CIVILIAN, MILITARY, NORMATIVE? 42
5 EU’S CONFLICT PREVENTION IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 45 5.1PRINCIPLE OF CONDITIONALITY, REGIONALISM AND EUROPEAN PERSPECTIVE 46
5.2SHORT-TERM/OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 49
5.2.1EUPM 49
5.2.2EUFORALTHEA 50
5.2.3EUSR 51
5.2.5OTHER SHORT-TERM TOOLS 53
5.3LONG-TERM/STRUCTURAL INSTRUMENTS 54
5.3.1STABILISATION AND ASSOCIATION PROCESS 54
5.3.2ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE 56
5.4CIVILIAN, MILITARY, NORMATIVE? 58
6 CONCLUSION 63
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 A short description of the topic
The role and the position of the EU have been evolving gradually since its establishment. The EU has been perceived differently throughout its existence; at the beginning as an organization of a group of states to prevent further conflicts between Germany and France, which later on developed into a very powerful economic actor on the international scene. The EU’s gained economic power and strong position required that the EU had to start to play a role also as an international actor in terms of political and security issues. In order to do so, the EU had to develop its own foreign policy. By designing the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU gained a capability to respond to different political issues within the international arena. The EU had to consider incorporating the military component after the missed ‘hour of Europe’ when it failed to react to the Balkan wars in the 1990s and therefore, the European Security and Defence Policy was agreed. However, the EU acted more in response to the already ongoing conflicts. Since to prevent a conflict is less costly than tackling or ending an enduring conflict, the conflict prevention started to gain importance.
The EU has become gradually engaged in conflict prevention recently (Fraser, 2012; Keukeleire, MacNaughtan, 2008; Faleg, Blockmans, 2012). It was in the year 2001 when the EU adopted the Communication on Conflict Prevention and the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, which officially formulated the EU’s policy on conflict prevention. However, the concept of conflict prevention is still regarded in formation and as a ‘new international norm attaining more legitimacy’ (Lund, 2002, 102; Mason, Quinn, 2006). The not yet mature conflict prevention and its malleable definitions allow the EU to adjust this concept to the needs, capabilities, and resources of the EU.
5 objectives of the EU’s foreign policy (Fraser, 2012; Smith, 2008; Emerson, Gross, 2007). Any external relations’ action should take the conflict prevention purpose into consideration. It demonstrates the importance given to this policy by the EU. Although the EU has reached some success in terms of conflict prevention, its reactive character, insufficient coherence, and its lack of political will remain at the centre of criticism (Schunemann, 2011; Faleg, Blockmans, 2012).
Essential by conflict prevention is that it should be done by some third party whose identity and preventing actions should be recognized by all conflicting parties. This permission by the conflict parties for the EU to interfere in the conflict implies that the EU has to be perceived as being capable to do so. In order to prevent conflicts successfully and to use the appropriate economic, diplomatic, military and other tools effectively, the EU has to exert its power based on its attributes and express its political will. There are different types of power that are ascribed to the EU due to its capabilities or character. Subsequently, the type of the EU’s power is reflected in its actions and policies. To ascertain which types of power can be recognized in the EU’s conflict prevention will be the purpose of this thesis.
1.2 Research question and subdivisions of the thesis
6 on their objectives and characteristics. It contains a justification for choosing the case study method.
In line with the distinction between power-as-attribute and power-as-relation, I draw a distinction between the EU’s conflict prevention on the paper and on the ground. The third section deals with the EU’s conflict prevention policy on the paper in order to discuss the EU’s power-as- attribute. I detect the EU’s capabilities in conflict prevention based on treaties that give the EU the potential to exert power. This means that I look at the documents and reports of the EU concerning conflict prevention. By doing so, I can find out all the official tools that the EU has at its disposal. Besides, I trace the objectives and purposes of these instruments. The fourth part concerns the conflict prevention on the ground, namely in Bosnia and Herzegovina, so that I can reveal the EU’s ability of exercising its influence over the other actors in conflict prevention. I scrutinize the way how the EU has been trying to prevent a conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina since 2001. In this part, power is seen not as a simple attribute but as a relationship.
I will argue that in the EU’s conflict prevention policies, several types of power are being deployed but the normative dimension is mostly visible when the EU pursues its own interests of internal security. In addition, I will argue that there is discrepancy between the EU’s power as an attribute and the EU’s power as a relationship because although the EU has the whole array of different tools at its disposal coming from different types of power, it deploys only some of them.
1.3 Relevance of the thesis
7 By asking which types of power are visible in conflict prevention, and by distinguishing power-as-attribute and power-as-relationship, I circumvent getting into the discussion over which single type of power can be attributed to the EU, as led by many authors. The concepts of civilian, normative, ethical, and other types of power overlap each other and their distinctions from each other and the differences between these concepts are blurred. In addition, clearly set criteria based on which it would be possible to claim that the EU is one or another type of power is generally missing in the literature. Moreover, by separating the EU’s conflict prevention into the policy on the paper (to detect the types of power as an attribute/ EU’s capabilities) and the conflict prevention on the ground (to ascertain the visible types of power as a relationship), this paper supports the discussion on distinguishing between being a power and exercising power.
2 Presentation of the theoretical approach
This section will introduce a used theoretical approach in the thesis. It provides a brief discussion of the concept of conflict prevention. It then moves to different concepts of power – firstly, the theoretical notions of power in the international relations theory and then the concepts of different types of power ascribed to the EU.
There are many definitions of conflict prevention emphasizing different components: coercive and non-coercive measures (Clement, 1997); length of the process (Carment, Schnabel, 2003); third party agency (Wallensteen, 2002). There is one definition broad enough to include all substantial characteristics of conflict prevention. Lund defines conflict prevention as ‘any structural or intercessory means to keep intrastate or interstate tensions and disputes from escalating into significant violence and use of armed forces, to strengthen the capabilities of potential parties to violent conflict for resolving such disputes peacefully and to progressively reduce the underlying problems that produce these issues and disputes’ (ibid, 117; Ackermann, 2003).
8 Still, there is a broad consensus that conflict prevention incorporates an operational and a structural part (Ackermann, 2003; Tardy, 2007). Operational or direct conflict prevention tackles the ‘imminent violence’ (Carnegie Commission, 1997) and imminent crises (Ackermann, 2003) and is a short-term strategy. Structural conflict prevention is of medium or long-term character and it deals with the root/underlying causes of conflict (Ackermann, 2003; Carment, Schnabel, 2003; Aggestam, 2003). It aims at ‘transformation of conflictual behaviour over time’ (Carment, Schnabel, 2003, 27). As they have to tackle different type of conflict’s causes, both operational and structural prevention ask for different tools to be deployed. However, the relationship between structural and operational prevention is not that clear and it cannot be easily concluded that structural prevention follows operational one (Ackermann, 2003). Both of them deal with different actors ot matters; and ask for different solutions due to a different time period they are in play (Wallensteen, 2002, 214; Ackermann, 2003). It is the need to cover such a broad range of issues that allows the EU for exerting its power and capabilities. The main steps of a conflict prevention strategy includes firstly, identification of causes (Clement, 1997) or information gathering (Carment, Schnabel, 2003); secondly, evaluation of those causes or analyzing the gathered information, and thirdly, defining the tools that will be incorporated together with developing a strategy that will be deployed. In the end, what matters is the fact that the actor has to decide the final strategy based on the instruments at his disposal.
2.1 Power as an attribute
9 national power included ‘population, territory, wealth, armies’ (Baldwin, 2012). However, the developments in the international relations brought a wider list of attributes that counted as elements of power – e.g. military expenditure, GDP or economic strength (Hart, 1976). Deutsch (1978) defines aggregate power resources as a power base. The power base comprises ‘opportunities, acts, or objects’ that an actor can deploy (Dahl, 1969). Baldwin (2002) adds an introduction of political power resources – respect, rectitude, affection, enlightment, information, friendship, social standing, right to make laws, threats of force. Furthermore, the power base is ‘passive’ and must be exploited in some fashion’ (ibid) and allocated (Puchala, 1971) in order to exercise power and conduct any action. Exploitation is conducted by the use of means/instruments.
Tangible or intangible attributes or capabilities1 of an actor allow him for exercising power (Evans, Newnham, 1998; Baldwin, 1989, 2002, 2012; Wrong, 1979; Couloumbis, Wolfe, 1990; Puchala, 1971; Viotti, Kauppi, 2007). They are ‘the raw materials out of which power relations’ are devised (Baldwin, 2002). An actor must first and foremost have the resources under control if he wants to have control over actors/events (Hart, 1976). The possession of resources conditions and determines the ‘capacity to act (Ouchala, 1971). The capabilities imply actor’s potential power (Evans, 1998; Couloumbis, Wolfe, 1990) or putative power (Knorr, 1975) that needs to be converted into actual/actualized power. Baldwin (2002) notices the fact that actor’s power is contingent on his power base creates a supposition that the actor’s power can be equalled with his resources. However, problems arisen in this case are twofold. Firstly, the capability that is counted as power in one situation does not necessarily have to be perceived as power in another situation (Baldwin, 1989, 2002, 2012). Secondly, an actor is not always able to employ all his resources under control (Wrong, 1979), especially because of the lack of political will.2 In general, the selection and usage of the means depend on availability, cost, their efficiency and
1 Goldstein and Pevehouse (2006) differentiate between power resources and power capabilities. Power resources are
in general those elements that can be used over the long-term. Tangible resources include – population, territory, geography, natural resources; intangible ones – political culture, patriotism, education of population, credibility of the government’s commitments, culture and values. Power capabilities are the elements that can be drawn upon over the short-term. Tangible capabilities are military forces, military industrial capacity, state’s bureaucracy; intangible capabilities comprise support, legitimacy, loyalty.
2 It relates to the problem of converting potential power into actualized power. The problematic conversion can be
10 character of previous relations between two actors (Knorr, 1975). To overcome this obstacle requires looking at the end of power-as-attribute. Baldwin (2002) suggests deploying the categories of scope and domain of power, so that the accuracy of estimation of actor’s power can increase. It means that by defining the scope and domain of actor’s power-as-resources, it will be known for what an actor wants to use his power and if his resources are adequate to reach a specified goal.
Concerning the topic of this thesis, the end of the EU’s power is conflict prevention (as the scope) in the Western Balkans (as the domain). Supposing that the EU has power-as-attribute within the conflict prevention scope, it has some resources in possession – military, economic, political - which the EU can exploit and thus exercise its power. It is therefore necessary to look at the EU’s power base. In order to ascertain the EU’s power base, I will look at the conflict prevention means and capabilities that the EU possesses. The reasons for tracing these particular means are twofold. Firstly, following the Knorr’s logic (1975, 18) which says that capabilities have to be turned ‘into forms (e.g. military forces and foreign aid funds) that make them directly usable for the exercise of power, and eventually to use the transformed resources in actual power plays’. Secondly, Hart (1976) points out the ambiguity of assessing the power base in case of a bloc of states – it can be just a simple aggregate amount of all member states’ power bases or it can be something more than their sum up.
2.2 Power as a relationship
11 view, power is not ‘simply equivalent to possession of resources’ because the actor needs to be willing to demonstrate an interest over the conflicting issue and thus to exercise power (Bueno de Mesquita, 2006). Consequently, power can be measured ‘only in action, in the effect one state has on another’ (Brown, Ainley, 2009, 92). Power-as-relationship then indicates the notion of causation. An act of actor A causes certain behaviour of actor B.
The implication of power-as-relationship is that it is necessary to specify the same scope and domain, as it was in the case of power-as-attribute. Baldwin (2012, 275) defines the scope, domain and means as ‘dimensions of power-as-relationship’. Scope is understood as ‘the aspect of B’s behaviour affected by A’, which means that A’s power varies accordingly ‘from one issue to another.’ Domain ‘refers to the number or importance of other actors subject to its influence’ causing that A can have bigger influence in one region than in another. Means are the tools for exercising power and he distinguishes symbolic, economic, military and diplomatic means. Power-as-relationship has three ingredients – force, influence and authority34 (Couloumbis, Wolfe, 1990). Wrong (1979) identifies four forms of this power – force, manipulation, persuasion and authority.
Applied to conflict prevention, through the will of an actor (in our case of the EU) to prevent conflict, the options of conflicting parties for escalating or continuing the conflict become restricted, transformed and brought into the line with the EU’s preferences to avoid a conflict, to stop it from escalation or to bring it to the end. It is therefore inevitable to look at the EU’s conflict prevention on the ground, i.e. in action. How the EU will exercise its will towards the conflicting parties depends in part on the tools it has ‘at hand to deploy’. Via the EU’s attributes, or capabilities, as some authors (Couloumbis, Wolfe, 1990; Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2006; Bretherton, Vogler, 2006) call them, the EU is capable of exercising its power. This means that in
3 Couloumbis and Wolfe (1990, 86-87) define force as ‘explicit threat or the use of military, economic and other
instruments of coercion by A against B in pursuit of A’s political objectives’; influence as ‘the use of instruments of persuasion, short of force by A in order to maintain/alter behavior of B in a fashion suitable to the preferences of A’; and authority as ‘B’s voluntary compliance with directives issued by A, nurtured by B’s perceptions regarding A – such as respect, solidarity, affection, affinity, leadership, knowledge, expertise.’
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12 conflict prevention the EU’s power-as-relation depends partially on its power-as-attribute. Nevertheless, it cannot be equalized and taken as the same, as suggested above by the scholars.
2.3 Civilian power
Depending on the particular power base, different types of power are distinguished in international relations – military, economic or political- penetrative power (Knorr, 1975, 6). Concerning the EU, there are numerous efforts to determine which type of power it is or it has - civilian, normative, ethical, military to lesser extent, force for good power and others. For the purpose of my research related to the EU, I will use the civilian, military and normative power types. The reasons are manifold. Firstly, civilian power is the oldest notion of power ascribed to the EU and is still contested in the literature with regard to the current developing and EU’s character. Secondly, military power is at the opposite side of the spectrum of power types. There have occurred some questions if the EU wants to be a military power due to the established Common Security and Defence Police (CSDP) and created military capabilities. Thirdly, the normative power concept is a recent concept that came into consideration when the EU’s civilian power was considered dead.
13 actor. Civilian end is first and foremost to civilize the international relations and therefore the norms of international cooperation, solidarity, strengthening of rule of law, responsibility for the global environment and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance are of civilian power (Smith, 2005, 67). These ends are ‘milieu goals’ that are aimed at shaping the environment within which the other actors have to operate. Smith (2005) acknowledges the fact that foreign policy tools can be deployed in different manners5, meaning that the civilian means may get deployed in a coercive way. In order to distinguish civilian power, he thus suggests the ideal type of civilian power that uses only persuasion, attraction and negotiation, and prefers the carrots (Orbie, 2008). Persuasion and attraction can be linked with the influence as an ingredient of power-as-relation and attraction relates to authority.
However, militarization and the development of the EU’s military capabilities pose a serious challenge to the concept of civilian power. It is reflected in an academic discussion as to whether the EU is still civilian power or not (Smith, 2005; Orbie, 2008; Nunes, 2011). Some authors argue that the military means are intended to back up the civilian means and the EU’s capabilities, and goals within the defence realm are limited. They hence do not present any obstacles to being civilian power (Orbie, 2008) because the ends that an actor pursues are important. It means that as far as the actor pursues the civilian goals and prefers the civilian means and uses the non-civilian ones only as a last resort, he can be considered of civilian power. Other scholars regard the EU to be ‘definitively dead’ as a civilian power (Smith, 2000, 2005, 76) because of the strict division between civilian and military power. The evolution during the 1990s - development of Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Petersberg tasks and the establishment of corresponding bodies are viewed as a development and contribution to the EU’s military capabilities. Nevertheless, since the purpose of this thesis is not to assess which type of power the EU is, it is not necessary to scrutinize deeply this direction of the scholarly debate. For my purposes, Smith provided the ideal type of civilian power that I will use and further elaborate on.
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With regard to the conflict prevention, the civilian power concept can be useful especially for the structural conflict prevention. Civilian power can be involved in the reconstruction process of a conflict country by its civilian means and thus it can make the sustaining of peace more attractive to the conflicting parties. Besides, civilian power can be deployed in the process of new institution-building in a conflict country, renovation of infrastructure, financial and humanitarian assistance, economic inducements, non-coercive preventive diplomacy of persuasion and incentives (Carment, Schnabel, 2003; Mason, Quinn, 2006). Thus the civilian economic, diplomatic, cultural means are equally required and can be successful. It corresponds with the notion of a changed character of conflict that requires to be approached by civilian and not only military means. Moreover, the civilian approach as non-coercive one can be even more welcomed by conflicting parties.
In order to link civilian power and power-as-attribute, an actor should be in possession of a power base and capabilities that are of civilian character. If civilian power is taken from the power-as-relationship point of view, actor A causes the changes in the B’s behaviour by exploitation its civilian capabilities via persuasion, attraction, negotiation and offering carrots.
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2.4 Military power
For military power, it is characteristic the ‘usage of military means, relying on coercion to influence other actors, and unilaterally pursuing military or militarized ends (such as territorial conquest and acquisition of more military power) (Smith, 2005, 69). Military means include military force – ‘its size, composition and preparedness’ (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2006, 60). Military forces can accomplish different tasks – ‘defending national territory to invading other states, hunting down terrorists, coercing concessions, countering insurgencies, keeping the peace, enforcing economic sanctions, showing the flag, or maintaining domestic order’ (Biddle, 2004 , 5). Military power-as-attribute can be derived from the military expenditures or the size of armed forces that are regarded as power resources (Hart, 1976). Military power-as-relation needs to exploit the military power base, so that it can exercise its influence over the others in coercive way by deploying military means. Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the exercising of power depends on political will, support, legitimacy and other factors.
The process of creating military capabilities of the EU has its supporters and justification (Nunes, 2011). Primarily, it was the necessity of strengthening the CFSP that could have been ineffective without having military instruments (Smith, 2000). Secondly, the EU as the only actor pursuing civilian power among other actors deploying non-civilian instruments and approaches would have been of ‘limited utility’ (ibid, 18). Moreover, Smith (2000) presents the idea that due to the developed military capabilities and possible military intervention or military threat, the EU may be capable of tackling more tangible crises and genuine conflict prevention. The military instruments are mostly discussed with regard to crisis management. Another group of authors presents the opinion that the enhanced military capabilities, CFSP, and ESDP offer only limited opportunity and do not imply any obstacles to the civilian power (Nunes, 2011; Smith, 2000). Nevertheless, even the term militarization itself and its meaning can be perceived as securitization (Bailes, 2002) or preferring military means and ends to the civilian ones (Manners, 2006).
16 operational conflict prevention and prevention that needs to resort to the coercive measures once the non-coercive means failed. They can serve to guarantee the negotiated agreement, disarming the conflicting parties and provide them with security after they agree to lay down arms, temporarily taking over the hard security tasks in a country, training the security personnel (Mason, Quinn, 2006), coercive preventive diplomacy backed by operational threats (Carment, Schnabel, 2006), security sector reform, arms control and trafficking. Besides, they can also serve as back up for increasing the influence in terms of structural conflict prevention of the EU over other actors. The questions whether the EU uses the military means to coerce the others, and whether it exercises its military power remain a subject of later sections.
I will conceive of military power-as-attribute in conflict prevention, if the EU is in possession of military means that can be deployed within the conflict prevention scope. It means that if the EU has military tools as a part of its conflict prevention policy, I will interpret is as a military dimension of power-as-attribute. If the EU uses these means on the ground in order to exercise its influence over the others in order to prevent the conflict, I will classify it as military dimension of power-as-relation in conflict prevention action.
2.5 Normative power
17 (Manners, 2006b). It ‘predisposes it to act in a normative way’ (ibid, 242). Zutter (2010, 1121) provides a differentiation between normative and civilian power – ‘a civilian power wants to civilize international relations, a normative power seeks to project its norms into the international system’.6
The concept of normative power is mostly based on what the EU is rather than what the EU does. Normative power in Manners’ terms is an ‘ability to shape the conceptions of normal’ (Manners, 2002, 239) meaning that ‘the EU promotes a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged, within the UN system, to be universally applicable (Manners, 2008, 46). Zutter however opposes the idea that the EU’s norms are universal when saying that they ‘are not universal by definition’ (2010, 1107) but characteristic for the EU; they change over time as the EU enacts them. They become universal during the norm-diffusion process itself. This process is then a ‘legitimate course of action’ (Zutter, 2010, 1116). Moreover, the distinctive feature is the ‘relative absence of physical force in the imposition of the norms’ (Manners, 2006, 184) that nevertheless does not mean that the normative power cannot use coercive or ‘despotic’ forms of power to spread its norms (ibid). Zutter (2010, 1118) identifies the basic instruments for shaping the conceptions of normal by coercion (threat or use of force to diffuse the norms), manipulation, utility calculation (positive or negative incentives – these are regarded as coercive as well because actor B is pressured to accept the diffused norm), socialization, persuasion and emulation. By doing so, the EU follows ‘three procedural normative ethics – living by example, duty of its actions in being reasonable and consequence of its impact in doing least harm’ (Manners, 2008, 46).
Furthermore, the diffusion of norms is always an interest or an end of normative power that according to Zutter (2010) contribute to the actor’s security and better position. The EU diffuses the norms within the international relations in six different ways (Manners, 2002, 244-245): contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, overt diffusion and cultural filter. Contagion stands for ‘unintentional diffusion of ideas from the EU to other political actors.
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18 Informational diffusion is conducted via ‘strategic communications’ or ‘new policy initiatives’. Procedural diffusion comes when the EU institutionalize its relationship with the third party via e.g. agreements, membership. Diffusion of norms via transference happens ‘when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely substantive or financial means’. Transference and procedural diffusion are accompanied by the EU’s conditionality. Overt diffusion of norms is pursued by the ‘physical presence of the EU in third states’, e.g. presence of the Commission, the troika or monitoring missions. A cultural filter works to ‘affect the impact of international norms and political learning in third states and organizations leading to learning, adaptation or rejection of norms.’
Being consistent with the previous discussion of power-as-attribute and power-as-relation, ‘the EU’s power base lies in the above mentioned norms, on which the EU is based and seeks to promote (Manners, 2008, 45). The EU’s power-as-attribute results from the fact that the EU’s roles, tasks and actions are framed by the ‘principles of international law, including humanitarian law and liberal democratic ideals’ and not from ‘ruling out the use of coercive power’ (Ibid, 12). Power-as-relation with regard to the normative power is the recognition and confirmation by the others of the actor’s power and its norms (Zutter, 2010) and can be observed by assessing the practices of the actors in the international arena instead of their material bases.
19 Furthermore, normative power as a power to change the norms within the international relations can contribute to recognize the norm of conflict prevention and relevant policies as more legitimate (Lund, 2002b) because the concept and policy of conflict prevention is still malleable (Carment, Schnabel, 2003; Mason, Quinn, 2006). The conviction that to prevent a conflict should be more legitimate and perceived as a ‘moral obligation’ derives from the assumption that violent conflict is not inevitable and possible to prevent (Lund, 2002a).
If the norms of the EU’s normative base can be recognized in the EU’s conflict prevention policy, I will interpret it as a pointing towards the normative dimension of the EU’s power-as-attribute in conflict prevention policy. It will mean that the EU has some norms embedded in its conflict prevention policy that it wants to diffuse. A normative dimension of power-as-relation in conflict prevention practice can be observed in the case that the EU tries to prevent the conflict by coercive or non-coercive deployment of these tools that are aimed at diffusion of the EU’s norms. In the end, the conflicting parties will be influenced and will accept them.
3 METHODOLOGY
The methodology part begins with the research question and its further explanation. It then continues with a created table where I combined the two discussed theoretical concepts – conflict prevention and the types of power. Last but not least, there is a case-study discussion and justification of choosing the case-study.
20 capabilities should be reflected in the conflict prevention tools that the EU agreed to create. Furthermore, the types of power are expected to be seen in the EU’s actions when the EU turns its potential (power resources) into actions.
I decided to divide the EU’s conflict prevention into the policy on the paper and the policy on the ground based on the discussion on power-as-attribute and power-as-relationship and their mutual relation. Power as attribute and power as relationship cannot be perceived as excluding each other. Neither can they be viewed as the same. Although the matter of measurement of the EU’s power is not a subject of the thesis, its discussion helps to clarify why I differentiate between conflict prevention policy on the paper and on the ground. Brown and Ainley (2009) warn of incorrectness to measure the ability to influence as equalled to the comparison of attributes or resources of actors. Any measurement of influence can be problematic because ‘what we are looking for are changes in the behaviour of an actor that are caused by the attempt to exert power’ and the changes in the behaviour of the second actor are often caused by more variables, not only the exercise of the first actor’s power (Steglich, 2012). Although the capabilities allow for exercising the power, they do so only ‘to the extent that political leaders can mobilize and deploy them strategically and effectively’ (Goldstein, Pevehouse, 2006, 58). It depends on ‘national will, diplomatic skills, population support for the government,’ etc. (ibid). So it cannot be supposed that the EU will automatically turn its civilian/military/normative power base into civilian/military/normative power actions.
21 prevention was formulated). After comprising the EU’s conflict prevention tools in BiH, I will try to infer which dimensions of power types are visible on the ground.
The key according to which I matched the particular tools with the type of power is based on the goals of civilian/military/normative power and the respective attributes. The category of goals is relevant because the type of power is determined not only how but also what an actor wants to achieve on the international arena. The category of attributes is applicable because they determine actions of an actor due to the fact that the attributes are not fully fungible, e.g. the civilian power base can only hardly be deployed in order to gain the military ends. I will recall the objectives of civilian/military/normative power from the previous section.
The civilian power aims at ‘civilizing the international relations,’ and at reaching the goals such as ‘international cooperation, solidarity, strengthening of rule of law, responsibility for the global environment and the diffusion of equality, justice and tolerance that will contribute to civilizing of the international relations’. The civilian power uses the way of persuasion, attraction, negotiation and carrots, and does not make use of any coercive tools or ways. Therefore all the categories of sanctions, withdrawal of investments and military were excluded. Structural and operational (with the exception of those related to the sanctions) economic needs tools can be linked with the goal of international cooperation and I hence related them with the civilian power. Out of political needs and legal protection needs tools, I selected those that concern human/minority rights as related to equality, justice and tolerance; the others can be linked with solidarity, rule of law goal.
The military ends of territorial conquest and acquisition of more military power can be linked with the objectives of ‘defending national territory to invading other states, hunting down terrorists, coercing concessions, countering insurgencies, keeping the peace, enforcing economic sanctions, showing the flag, or maintaining domestic order’. The military power can deploy equally coercive as well as non-coercive tools and ways of conducting its tasks. I linked military power with those conflict prevention tools, which character is military.
non-22 coercive instruments and therefore all the sanctions and negative measures can be linked with normative power. Almost all the tools (with the exception of few military tools) can be related to the normative power. The political needs and legal protection tools relate to the norms of liberty, rule of law, and good governance. The economic needs tools correspond with the norm of sustainable development. The military needs tools link with the norm of rule of law.
Table 1- Structural and operational conflict prevention tools according to the types of power
Structural conflict prevention
Political needs:
democratic institution and capacity building
NP, CP constitutional power sharing, power-alternating and redistribution arrangements NP, CP confidence building measures between different communities or groups NP, CP support for press freedom and the rule of law NP, CP
promotion of civil society NP
Economic needs:
development assistance and cooperation to address inequities in the distribution of resources or opportunities
NP, CP
promotion of economic growth and opportunity NP,CP better terms of trade and permitting greater access to external markets for developing economies NP, CP encouraging necessary economic and structural reform NP, CP technical assistance for strengthening regulatory instruments and institutions NP, CP
Legal protection:
supporting efforts to strengthen the rule of law
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enhancing protections for vulnerable groups, especially minorities NP, CP providing support to local institutions and organizations working to advance human rights NP, CP
Military needs:
enhanced education and training for military forces
NP, MP
reintegration of ex-combatants NP
strengthening civilian control mechanisms, including budget control NP, MP encouraging efforts to ensure that security services are accountable for their actions and operate within
the law
NP, MP promoting adherence to arms control and disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, including control
over the transfer of light weapons and small arms, and the prohibition of landmines
NP, MP
Operational conflict prevention tools
Political and diplomatic direct prevention measures :
the direct involvement of the UN Secretary-General, as well as fact-finding missions, friends groups, eminent persons commissions, dialogue and mediation through good offices, international appeals, and non-official “second track” dialogue and problem-solving workshops
CP, NP
At the negative end of the scale, political and diplomatic direct prevention might encompass the threat or application of political sanctions, diplomatic isolation, suspension of organization membership, travel and asset restrictions on targeted persons, “naming and shaming”
NP
Economic measures
promises of new funding or investment, or the promise of more favourable trade terms
CP, NP developmental and humanitarian assistance programmes CP, NP threats of trade and financial sanctions NP
withdrawal of investment NP
threats to withdraw IMF or World Bank support NP the curtailment of aid and other assistance CP, NP
Legal measures
offers of mediation, or arbitration, or perhaps adjudication
24
the deployment of monitors to observe compliance with human rights standards, and help reassure
communities or groups feeling themselves at risk
CP, NP
international legal sanctions NP
Military measures
stand-off reconnaissance
MP a consensual preventive deployment NP, MP
threat to use force MP
NP – normative power, CP – civilian power, MP – military power
The justification of choosing Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) as a case study results from the fact that BiH and the Western Balkans in general still remain in the major focus of the EU’s policy and it represents the ‘test case’ for many EU’s policies. Moreover, BiH is the country where the EU made use of both types of conflict prevention (structural and operational; including civilian as well as military tools). It therefore will allow for complex analysis of the EU’s conflict prevention policy on the paper as well as of the policy on the ground. The EU has been involved here not only in the 1990s but also after 2001 when it established the official conflict prevention tools. It means this region offers a continuous and also recent case-study. The Western Balkans also represents the region where the EU is highly involved in military terms (Bailes, 2008). Furthermore, BiH is in a very close neighbourhood of the EU and the happenings within this region have many direct or indirect implications and consequences for the EU itself. That implies that the EU has high interest and motivation of turning this area into stable and peaceful countries. In order to do so, the EU has stepped beyond its rhetoric and policy on the paper, and it has been an indeed an active actor deploying many conflict prevention instruments.
4 The EU policy on conflict prevention
25 EU realized these new facts and started to promote conflict prevention in its actions and policies. It resulted in a stage when conflict prevention is ‘one of the EU’s main objectives of the EU’s external relations’ (Stewart, 2006, 93; 2008; Fraser, 2012, Smith, 2008; Tardy, 2007). The EU’s conflict prevention ‘combines the EU’s external economic competences with high politics of CFSP and Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)’ (Stewart, 2006, 92) meaning that the EU has civilian as well as military components of its conflict prevention. Military components are under CFSP and respectively under ESDP; civilian part under CFSP, CSDP and the Commission policies.
4.1 Formation of the EU’s conflict prevention policy
26 The Petersberg tasks were further elaborated on by the Helsinki and Nice European Councils establishing military dimensions of the EU’s crisis management and making it operational when designing the first bodies that will be in charge of the crisis management together with ‘an EU rapid reaction force of 50 000-60 000 troops’ (Stewart, 2008a, 233). The Goteborg European Council Conclusions in 2001 solidified conflict prevention when it finally received the first coherent strategy. This Council Conclusions heavily relied on the Commission Communication on Conflict Prevention that is discussed below and the same Council Conclusions ‘endorsed the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts’ (Council, 2001a, 12). The Conclusions state that the EU ‘is committed to develop and refine its capabilities to improve its ability to undertake full range of conflict prevention and crisis management tasks’ (ibid, 11). Since the conflict prevention and crisis management tasks may include the tasks with necessary military component, this perception of being committed together with the determination to expand the capabilities collide with the ideal type of civilian power. Both, the Council Conclusion as well as the EU Programme refer to the development of ESDP as to be meant to strengthen the EU’s capacity for conflict prevention action and also to contribute to international peace and stability (ibid).
The same EU Programme is a rather short document but however it contains some crucial parts and still remains a basis for the EU’s conflict prevention policy (ibid). The Programme says that the action of prevention needs to rely on the EU’s preparedness, clear political priorities and directions (2001b, 2). It furthermore distinguishes between short-term (diplomatic and humanitarian instruments) and long-term (development co-operation, trade, arms control, human rights and environment policies, political dialogue) instruments. Conflict prevention was intended to complement the ESDP, trade as well as development policies. Later on, the integration of conflict prevention was further endorsed by the European Security Strategy and European Neighbourhood Policy and resulted in the EU’s involvement in conflicts of different character all around the world.
27 prevention policy with ‘short-term crisis management at the expense of long-term structural solutions’ by many EU officials and outside observers (Stewart, 2008a, 239). The conflict prevention policy suffered from being viewed in terms of ‘operational ESDP issues’ instead of regarding it as a broad and complex policy that could aim to tackle operational as well as structural causes of the conflict (Stewart, 2008a, 239).
Consequently, the operational conflict prevention started to be detached from the structural conflict prevention despite repeated linkage of ESDP to conflict prevention. Conflict prevention under ESDP and conflict prevention of the Commission have been approached differently, due to their different nature (Stewart, 2008), different decision-making and financing (Gourlay, 2004), and can complement each other only if their coordination is pursued. It reflects the turf wars mostly between the Commission and the Council, the coordination and communication problems within the EU among different involved bodies and actors, and the overall problem of the EU’s foreign policy. It causes the EU’s approach to conflict prevention to be incoherent, non-integrated and inactive many times (Stewart, 2008a; Gourlay, 2004). The same misbalancing has been noticed between civilian and military crisis components when the former ones are regarded as neglected and underresourced compared to the latter ones (Stewart, 2008a; 2008b; Smith, 2008; Perez, 2005; ICG, 2001, 2005).
4.2 EU’s conflict prevention in the scholarly literature
28 (Smith, 2000, 2008; Assenburg, Kempin, 2011; Brigadier, 2004; Shepherd, 2003; Malesic, 2011; Howorth, 2008; Bailes, 2008; Stewart, 2008a), and enhancing the normative or civilian goals of the EU.
The mixture of civilian and military means is viewed as giving the EU advantage and uniqueness to its conflict prevention (Fraser, 2012; Smith, 2008, Nunes, 2011; Stewart, 2006). Any use of force or deployment of any form of military capabilities are conducted in accordance with principles of the international law and the UN, as a last resort and submitted to the democratic control (Juncos, 2005, Stewart, 2006). Nevertheless, the fact remains that the EU’s deployment of the CSDP’s military tools is limited and far from its potential.
29 Orbie (2008) sees conflict prevention as one of the normative objectives of the EU that form the milieu goals of the EU’s external actions. He keeps the idea of the EU being a civilian power with lack of military power capabilities. According to him, the EU’s conflict prevention is based on desecuritisation rather than solving a problem. It means that the EU seeks to avoid an issue to even become a security problem rather than to tackle hard security issues with military tools. Nunes (2011) sees the new conflict prevention policies as a response to the shifted nature of conflict. The ongoing militarization is ‘justified on normative and functional grounds’ (Nunes, 2011, 15). It is the functional grounds that are disrupting when civilian together with military capabilities result from the need to match the EU’s political needs. Based on, firstly, the EU’s preference of civilian instruments to the use of force and, secondly, on the fact that the EU’s use of force is deployed in compliance with the international law, Nunes concludes that the EU’s approach and militarization ‘are consistent with a normative and ethical approach to security problems’ (2011, 17) rather than of civilian power. Due to the missing standing army, the EU cannot be considered a military power.
30 identifies normative power in the EU’s conflict prevention on the basis of the EU’s preference of negotiations, aid and economic incentives rather than use of force.
Manners (2006a) conceives of conflict prevention as linked with the sustainable peace norm that is one of the norms composing the EU’s normative base and one of the norms the EU promotes in its external actions. Connecting conflict prevention and the sustainable peace norm allows the EU to join long-term and short-term conflict prevention. The normative power character predisposes the EU to prefer long-term structural conflict prevention with the notion of conditionality towards the target countries. However, the ongoing militarisation could tempt to prefer military capabilities as a solution and it could consequently result in making the EU more similar to state actors. Manners hence warns of the EU’s militarisation as possibly hampering the normative power concept, and of turning the EU ‘away from the path of sustainable peace and towards an emphasis on ‘martial potency’ (2006a, 193).
The creation of normative power is ‘an open-ended and forward-looking process’ and can be perceived ‘as institutional articulations of the EU principles’ (Pace, 2007, 1047). The EU’s normative power presupposes the ‘transformation of a conflict (based on EU-level norms) and is observable ‘through tangible and intangible rewards’ (ibid). This is allowed by ‘an ethos of impartiality’ that results from the process of construction of normative power (ibid). In order to be impartial, this process however needs to be of ‘common security’ and not identified interchangeably with the liberal values, as it is very often in the case of the EU. Furthermore, the concept of normative power and the discourse of being a normative power put some limitations what an actor should do. Therefore, in the case of conflict, the EU sometimes chooses not to act. Or the EU’s actions on the ground collide with the rhetoric of international law and of normative power meaning the EU can contradict some of its norms when enhancing the other norms.7
7
31
4.3 EU’s conflict prevention policy on the paper
The EU’s conflict prevention consists of the structural and operational part including civilian as well as military components, so that the EU can tackle not only the imminent causes of conflict but also the root causes of it. The EU is nonetheless presupposed to be called to carry out mostly non-military crisis management duties and the long-term conflict prevention based on its represented civilian nature. The distinction between long-term and short-term prevention is of the Commission when the former refers to ‘the projection of stability’ and the latter to ‘quick reaction of conflict prevention’ (Smith, 2008, 180; ICG, 2001). The Council distinguishes the conflict prevention as an activity targeting ‘the direct causes (trigger factors) and more structural root causes of violent conflict; crisis management as addressing acute phases of conflicts, supporting efforts to end violence; peace-building as supporting initiatives to contain violent conflicts and preparations for and sustaining peaceful solutions’ (Smith, 2008, 180). The practice nevertheless shows that these separate definitions do not hold such clarity; they overlap, and get confused on the policy statements (Rummel, 2004). The term crisis management, regardless if civilian or military one, is used for the conflict prevention or peacebuilding actions (Smith, 2008). On the contrary, some define crisis management as the tools for the EU’s short-term or operational conflict prevention (Stewart, 2006). Besides, the creation of military crisis management capabilities is very often justified by their contribution to the EU’s conflict prevention. However, as Hill (2001) notices that the link between conflict prevention and Petersberg tasks as the main framework for the military capacities is somehow blurred. They can be better associated with crisis management and conflict resolution rather than conflict prevention. I would add that it depends on the definition of these terms and which actions are relevant for them.
32 meet less resistance by the target country. The Commission further recognizes that tackling the conflict includes ‘creating, restoring or consolidating structural stability.’ Structural stability is composed of ‘sustainable economic development, democracy and respect for human rights, viable political structures and healthy environmental and social conditions, with the capacity to manage change without to resort to conflict.’
In the same document, the Commission sets the list of the EU’s conflict prevention tools as follows: development co-operation and external assistance, economic co-operation and trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation, as well as economic or other sanctions, and ultimately the new instruments of ESDP (including information gathering for anticipating potential conflicts situations and monitoring international agreements) (Commission, 2001a, 6). The means are later divided into two groups, into long-term instruments that are meant to project the above mentioned stability and short-term instruments created to ‘react quickly to nascent conflicts.’ The conflict prevention instruments are classified with some differences by scholars with differing emphasis on either structural or operational instruments. This reflects the fact that an unambiguous classification of tools may not be fully possible, as the instruments may be suitable to fall under more categories, depending on the situation and context of the deployment. Besides, the impact of the tools’ efficiency depends on the type of conflict and the relations of the concerned countries with the EU (Commission, 2003a). Stewart (2006) counts development cooperation, political conditionality and humanitarian aid as structural tools and preventive diplomacy, civilian and military crisis management as operational conflict prevention tools. Perez’s classification (2005) of long-term instruments is identical to the one of the Commission.
4.3.1 Short-term/operational instruments
33 local government officials) and at the military end, protection of civilian personnel and peacekeeping’ (2006, 120). The operational tools can shortly be characterized as preventive diplomacy, sanctions and preventive deployment (Vanheusden, 2010; Perez, 2005). Perez’s list of short-term instruments is nevertheless more complex - diplomatic, economic and humanitarian instruments for short-term prevention. These include: political dialogue, sanctions, advocacy of specific measures and/or solutions, deployment of observers, preventive military intervention, support for peace initiatives, peace enforcement, demobilisation and disarmament, repatriation and reintegration, de-mining, post-conflict relief and humanitarian aid, confidence-building measures, conflict resolution initiatives, rebuilding government structures, etc. Question of humanitarian aid as a conflict prevention tool is questioned because on the one hand, this type of aid is perceived as apolitical and thus cannot be considered as a part of crisis management. On the other, Stewart (2006, 113) makes a point when saying that it is’ apart of the response to man-made crisis’ and therefore it cannot be separated from the concept of operational conflict management.
Diplomatic and political instruments at the EU’s disposal are mostly derived from CFSP and ESDP. They represent formal statements or diplomatic demarches, declarations, common strategy, common positions, the political dialogue procedure, high level visits, recognition, mediation, the dispatch of a fact-finding mission or a team of EU observers and the appointment of the Special Representative. The political dialogue regarding the political situation in a third country, or the list of other security relevant issue is another very powerful EU instrument, as they ‘constitute an essential part of the EU’s overall strategy’ (Council, 2006, 10). They can serve also as an early warning mechanism predicting the occurrence or deterioration of a situation in the country. It allows the EU to express its opinion and to present a solution to the troublesome issue. They touch upon human rights, rule of law, good governance and democratization (Vanheusden, 2010, 19). However, it is mostly deployed in the countries where the EU has cooperation or association agreements (ibid).
34 sanctions8, restrictions on cultural contacts and transport9 or commercial/economic and financial sanctions.10 The Commission describes them as follows - ‘arm and other war materials, export earnings, foreign capital, other imported goods and technology, or travel facilities, visa ban, reduction of diplomatic representation, and export control (Commission, 2001a, 24). The objectives of the sanctions are consolidation and support of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law, to safeguard own values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity (Vanheusden, 2010, 23). Due to mixed results of the reactive use of sanctions, they started to be viewed rather as preventive tools, so that the parties are denied access to the tools to start conflict (ibid).
Although the crisis-management tools were designed to deal with crisis management tasks, they can play a ‘pre-crisis role’ according to the Communication (reaffirmed in the Council report from 2006), as a part of preventive deployment that will precede long-term conflict prevention and peace-building. They consist of civilian and military crisis management. However, this division derives more from institutional patters than from the reality on the ground (Keohane, 2011). With regards to military crisis management, the milestone was the Headline Goal when creating the EU Rapid Reaction Force, development of battle groups and the establishment of European Defence Agency (Stewart, 2008, 243). It was first Helsinki Headline Goal that made it possible to cooperate ‘voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States had to be able to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks’. 2010 Headline Goal extended possibilities of the mission’s deployment to the joint disarmament mission and ‘to supporting third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform’ (Keukeleire, MacNaughtan, 2008, 178). It implied some degree of uncertainty because of confusing nature of joint disarmament operation that could possibly mean ‘full-scale invasion a la Iraq’ (Stewart, 2008a, 243).
ESDP was created with the intention of ‘strengthening the EU’s capacity to contribute to international peace and stability in accordance with the EU principles’ and should integrate the
8 Political and diplomatic sanctions may take the form of reduction of the scale of diplomatic representation, the
severance of all diplomatic relations, suspension of official visits and reduction/suspension of cultural and sports contacts or scientific co-operation (Perez, 2005).
9 E.g. flight bans and visa restrictions.
10 These include embargoes, the freezing of funds, restrictions on payments and capital movements and import and
35 conflict prevention (Council, 2001a). The Lisbon Treaty (Commission, 2010c) extends the Petersberg tasks and presupposes the ESDP to provide ‘operational capacity’ consisting of civilian as well as military capabilities, so that the EU can deploy the mission ‘for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter.’ Nonetheless, ESDP deployment is still rather reactive (Malesic, 2011; Assenburg, Kempin, 2011; Stewart, 2008a, 2008b) and acting in response to the current crisis, depending on the region and countries involved in the conflict and on the EU’s interests. Furthermore, the established missions miss the goals related to conflict prevention and the way how they should be reached (Assenburg, Kempin, 2011). They rather relate to peace-keeping and peace-making and their deployment as a conflict prevention tool or preventive deployment have not reached its potential (Woollard, 2011; ICG, 2001; Smith, 2008), although missions with the aim of conflict prevention would be feasible within the ESDP framework.
Reaction Rapid Mechanism was created as a tool to tackle the crisis situations. It had financial resources at the disposal that would have been immediately available after the conflict’s outbreak. In 2007, RRM was replaced by the Instrument for Stability which aims at ‘a timely response in situations of political crisis, violent conflict or disasters’ (Vanheusden, 2010, 37) by providing rapid financial sources that will be followed from other funds at the later stage. In addition, the financial sources can be used for long-term assistance dealing with global or regional security threats, e.g. security sector reform, peace process, reconciliation, electoral support, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (Council, 2007a). Since the Instrument falls under ‘development cooperation measures’ and ‘financial, economic and technical cooperation measures’ (Commission, 2006d, 2), its objective is primarily eradication of poverty (Vanheusden, 2010, 37).
36 law, civilian administration and civil protection, broadened to monitoring capability and generic support capabilities are perceived as complementing the Commission’s tools that should be viewed ‘in the context of wider conflict-prevention, relief and long-term stabilization and development assistance’ because of being exceptional and transitional measures in terms of their nature (Commission, 2003a, 5). With regard to the police capabilities, the objectives vary from advisory, assistance and training tasks to substitution of local police. As to the rule of law, the aim is to strengthen or temporarily substitute the judiciary or legal system in the target country (Keukeleire, MacNaughtan, 2008). Civilian administration’s purpose is to ‘assign ‘basic services, such as elections, taxation or social services’ (ibid, 183). The objective of monitoring capabilities, among others are ‘border monitoring, human rights monitoring or observing the general political situation’ (ibid, 183) Generic support capabilities aim at supporting the EU Special Representative or they generate a part ‘of multifaceted ESDP missions’ (ibid, 184).
The civilian crisis capabilities’ development is meant as being a part of ‘overall approach to respond coherently’ to the Petersberg tasks (Council, 2004f). Besides, they can be active in security sector reform and support to disarmament, demobilization/reintegration processes (ibid). The EU’s interest in increasing its civilian capabilities is driven by rising demand for the EU’s civilian missions. The EU concentrates on ‘advisory, training, monitoring capacities and executive tasks’ within these areas (Nowak, 2006, 19). Civilian missions are preferred because the decisions on their deployment take much less time than political decision for military operations deployment (Vanheusden, 2010).11
4.3.2 Long-term/structural instruments
The instrument mentioned first in the Commission’s Communication is promoting integration within the EU’s neighbourhood as well on the international level. The EU tries to diminish the possibility of any conflict by ‘the strength and attraction’ of its own model as the EU itself is viewed as an example of successful conflict prevention. The idea behind this is that ‘interaction with the Union on a regional basis can also encourage greater cooperation between countries on
11 Most of civilian missions have been deployed during the phase of ongoing crisis or after, while most of military
37 the borders of the Union and act as a stabilizing factor within and between countries’ (Commission, 2001a, 7). Concerning the co-operation on the global level, the EU ‘can serve as an example’ when the economic interdependence works to lessen any tensions and to contribute to the development of mutual trust and good relations. The EU can moreover support these regional initiatives by setting the relations with them and by different types of contractual support.
Another way how to project stability is through trade links. Here again the EU relies on its own experience when the economic co-operation was in the centre of all integration and the motor of strengthening the ties between countries. In relation with the third countries, the EU attempts to help their integration into the global economy, so that their economy can boost and their poverty level can decrease, and thus they will find themselves in smaller probability for the conflict. It reflects the EU’s perceived nexus between development and security. The EU can also offer the access to its attractive market in exchange for applying the reforms or measures in the targeted country to avoid conflict.
The Commission proposed mainstreaming of conflict prevention into all co-operation programmes as another method how to contribute to projecting stability. Development policy and cooperation programmes are considered the most influential tools for long-term conflict prevention, especially when connected to a political framework (Commission, 2003a; Perez, 2005). This is the case because the EU is the largest development aid donor and it incorporates political conditionality into development cooperation. The objectives of the development policy and cooperation are eradication of poverty, promotion of democracy, good governance and respect for human rights (Vanheusden, 2010, 54). Stewart (2006) notices that the conflict prevention aims do not drive the development cooperation very often. They are overridden by the economic or strategic purpose. Nevertheless, the Commission wants the cooperation programmes to incorporate all possible components of development and conflict prevention so that all missing aspects of structural stability are covered and the long-term conflict prevention in a targeted country can be guaranteed.
