AVAILABILITY OF A SELF-JUSTIFICATION AND MORAL IDENTITY
Master thesis, MscHRM
University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
ABSTRACT
Even though there is widespread belief that power corrupts, extant theory indicates that power increases immoral behavior in some situations, while it decreases immoral behavior in other situations (e.g., DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis & Ceranic, 2012; Keltner, Gruenfeld & Anderson, 2003). Therefore, I aim to provide two moderating factors on the complex relationship between power and immoral behavior. That is, I aim to show that power increases immoral behavior when a self-justification to behave immorally is available, but only for powerful individuals low (vs. high) in moral identity. An experiment was conducted, in which power and the availability of a self-justification were manipulated. As expected, results revealed a marginally significant three-way interaction between power, availability of a self-justification, and moral identity on immoral behavior. However, surprisingly, results suggest that powerful individuals high (vs. low) in moral identity behave immorally when a self-justification to behave immorally is available.
INTRODUCTION
Imagine two managers, who have to decide whether to accept hospitality (a weekend to Paris) from an organization, which is aspiring to become a supplier of their company. For both managers it is a tuff decision. Eventually, the first manager decides to accept the offer, whereas the second manager decides to reject the offer. The first manager states that the weekend to Paris would not affect his or her judgment when allocating a contract, and that everyone engages in hospitality. However, the second manager judges this kind of activity as bribery, which is illegal and immoral (Lowell, 2012). This example illustrates that powerful individuals, managers in this case, behave differently with regards to moral issues. While the first manager behaves immorally and justifies his or her behavior, the second manager does not engage in immoral behavior and emphasizes the moral aspect of the decision. This suggests that power could either increase, or decrease immoral behavior, dependent on the availability of a self-justification and the individuals’ moral identity. Therefore, the purpose of this research is to investigate the influences of the availability of a self-justification and moral identity on the complex relationship between power and immoral behavior.
Power is defined as asymmetric outcome control over valued resources (Emerson, 1962; Fast, Halevy & Galinsky, 2013; Galinsky, Magee & Gruenfeld, 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Low-power individuals are dependent on high-power individuals to obtain valued resources (Emerson, 1962; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). Valued resources can be either positive or negative. Power holders possess positively valued resources if they are able to reward other people, whereas negatively valued resources exist when power holders are able to withhold rewards or punish other people (Keltner et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008). This type of power is referred to as social power, since the extent of power is dependent upon the relationship between two parties (Emerson, 1962; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2003; Magee & Galinsky, 2008).
A considerable amount of research has shown that power increases various sorts of immoral behavior (Fast et al., 2012; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972; Konovsky & Jaster, 1989; Lammers, Stapel & Galinsky, 2010). For instance, Keltner and colleagues (2003) argue that power increases self-interested behavior, because powerful individuals are less motivated to attend to others and more likely to approach potential rewards that satisfy the self. Hence, they should act more frequently on their desires in socially inappropriate ways (Keltner et al., 2003). Furthermore, Kipnis (1972) found that power holders are more likely to influence, manipulate, and denigrate the less powerful. Fast and colleagues (2012) further argue that power is related to demeaning and aggressive tendencies. Finally, powerful individuals are more likely to stereotype others in comparison with low power individuals and tend to judge others unsystematically (Fiske, 1993). Overall then, it is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore the corrupting effects of power.
immoral behavior, dependent on the relationship orientation of individuals. Chen and colleagues (2001) distinguish a communal and an exchange relationship orientation. Communal oriented individuals are primarily focused on responding to the needs of others, whereas exchange oriented individuals expect benefits in return, when they benefit another individual. Research revealed that communal oriented power holders act more socially responsible compared to exchangers, whereas exchange oriented power holders act more in line with their self-interest compared to communals (Chen et al., 2001). Furthermore, DeCelles and colleagues (2012) showed that the relationship between power and immoral behavior is dependent on moral identity. Here, power corrupts in case of low moral identity, whereas power enables in case of high moral identity. In sum, these two studies demonstrate that power increases immoral behavior in some situations, while it decreases immoral behavior in other situations. Thus, even though many authors agree that power increases immoral behavior, it remains unclear when powerful individuals behave immorally versus morally.
This research has been organised in the following way: first, I will discuss the relationship between power and immoral behavior and the moderating roles of the availability of a self-justification and moral identity. Second, I will describe the participants, research design, and procedures of the experiment. Hereafter, the research will continue with elaborating on the data analysis and results, and finally, it will provide a discussion and a conclusion.
THEORY
The moderating role of the opportunity for a self-justification
The use of self-justifications is the phenomenon by which people provide accounts for their immoral behavior (Konovsky & Jaster, 1989). These accounts are fair procedures to justify self-benefiting outcomes while appearing moral at the same time (Shalvi, Dana, Handgraaf & De Dreu, 2011). Shalvi and colleagues (2011) argue that people not only find value in that they appear fair and moral in the eyes of others, but also find value in maintaining an honest concept (i.e., feeling honest). Therefore, people use self-justifications to maintain their honest self-concepts, so that an immoral act feels less immoral compared to the same act without a self-justification (Konovsky & Jaster, 1989; Shalvi et al., 2011). This is even the case if the self-justification will never be available to others (Shalvi et al., 2011).
condition, people were asked to roll the dice once and report their roll outcome. In the justification condition, however, people were asked to roll the dice, report their roll outcome, and then roll the dice two more times to verify its legitimacy. Results showed that the opportunity to roll the dice three times in stead of once, increases lying. Moreover, results showed that participants in the justification condition evaluated a lie as less immoral, due to the opportunity to observe a higher roll outcome on the second or third roll (Shalvi et al., 2011).
to feel and appear moral (Batson & Thompson, 2001; Lowell, 2012). Cognitive dissonance is such an uncomfortable state, that individuals try to reduce it, often by means of self-justifications (Lowell, 2012). This drive to reduce cognitive dissonance is especially activated when individuals have done something morally wrong (Lowell, 2012).
On the contrary, low power is related to inhibition-related tendencies (Keltner et al., 2003). The behavioral inhibition system is activated by punishments, threats, and uncertainty, and includes focus on safety and protection, increased anxiety and heightened inspection of punishment contingencies (Keltner, 2003; Shah & Higgins, 2001). As a consequence of the behavioral inhibition system, low power individuals are more sensitive to evaluations and constraints of others (Keltner et al., 2003). Consequently, they devote attention to others and their actions are likely to be contingent to the situation (Keltner et al., 2003). In other words, low power individuals are likely to follow the norms imposed by power holders (Keltner et al., 2003; Lammers et al., 2010). Therefore, low power individuals are unlikely to experience states of cognitive dissonance, because their behavior is consistent with their cognitions (Lowell, 2012). Subsequently, there is no need to reduce cognitive dissonance by means of a justification (Lowell, 2012). Thus, power increases immoral behavior, when a self-justification is available.
Abovementioned suggests that power combined with a self-justification increases immoral behavior. However, powerful individuals with high moral identity are likely to behave morally, even though a self-justification is available (Aquino & Reed, 2002; DeCelles et al., 2012; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). This will be elaborated on in the next section.
The moderating role of moral identity
identity are not likely to behave immorally, even though a self-justification to behave immorally is available (Aquino & Reed, 2002; DeCelles et al., 2012; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007).
Moral identity is defined as the extent to which morality is part of an individual’s self-concept (Aquino et al., 2009; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007), and influences the degree to which people emphasize their own versus others’ needs (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009;
DeCelles et al., 2012). A person’s moral identity is stored as a knowledge structure consisting of moral values, goals, traits and behavioral scripts (Aquino et al., 2009). This knowledge structure is acquired through life experiences, which differ from person to person (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009). One’s overall self-concept consists of several knowledge structures, so the centrality of moral identity as one of these structures differs across individuals (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Aquino et al., 2009). People balance multiple identities and only a few can be held in consciousness at any given time (Aquino & Reed, 2002). When a powerful individual has a high moral identity, this moral identity will activate more strongly in comparison with other identities or knowledge structures (Aquino et al., 2009). In other words, individuals high in moral identity are likely to have greater moral awareness (DeCelles et al., 2012). Moral awareness is defined as a person’s determination that a situation contains moral content and can be considered from a moral point of view (Reynolds, 2006).
Accordingly, power holders high in moral identity would reduce their cognitive dissonance with taking into account the moral consequences of their actions (DeCelles et al., 2012; Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007), instead of justifying immoral actions, because they experience a need to act consistently with their identity (Reynolds & Ceranic, 2007). Therefore, a self-justification does not influence the relationship between power and immoral behavior for powerful individuals high in moral identity.
However, low moral identity, which decreases moral awareness, increases the engagement of powerful individuals in immoral behavior (DeCelles et al., 2012). Hence, powerful individuals low in moral identity are likely to put more weight on the attainment of rewards and goals (Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003), instead of the moral consequences of their actions (DeCelles et al., 2012). Consequently, they reduce their cognitive dissonance with justifying immoral behavior (Lowell, 2012).
Therefore,
Hypothesis 1. Power increases immoral behavior when a self-justification to behave immorally is available, but only for powerful individuals low in moral identity.
METHODS
Participants and Design
Concerning the monthly income of all participants, 37 participants earned between €0 and €200 a month, 34 participants earned between €200 and €400 a month, 28 participants earned between €400 and €600 a month, 24 participants earned between €600 and €800 a month, 13 participants earned between €800 and €1000 a month, and finally 8 participants earned more than €1000 a month.1
Individuals from different education directions participated in the
experiment, such as Business Administration, Accounting and Controlling, Human Resource Management and Marketing. Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions: 2 (low power vs. high power) x 2 (justification vs. no justification).
Procedure, Measures and Manipulations
Participants signed up to participate in the experiment individually. Upon arrival in the lab, participants were asked to sign an informed consent form. Hereafter, they were seated behind personal computers in a cubicle and were told that the experiment would consist of three unrelated parts: a questionnaire which measured moral identity, a word-search task including a power prime, and a justification manipulation followed by a dictator game which measured immoral behavior.
Moral identity. First, the five-item measure of Aquino and Reed (2002) was used to
measure moral identity. This measure is the subscale determining whether an individual’s moral identity is central to his or her self-concept (Aquino & Reed, 2002). Participants were asked to imagine a person who is caring, compassionate, fair, friendly, generous, hardworking, helpful, honest, and kind. Subsequently, five statements followed, to which respondents could indicate to what extent they agreed, namely: ‘It would make me feel good to be a person who has these characteristics’, ‘Being someone who has these characteristics is an important part of who I am’, ‘I would be ashamed to be a person who has these characteristics’, ‘Having
these characteristics is not really important to me’, and ‘I strongly desire to have these
characteristics’ (α = .77). All items were rated on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree).
Power. The experiment continued with a word-search task including a power prime
(Chen et al., 2001). According to Chen and colleagues (2001), exposure to power-related words will unobtrusively prime the concept of power. Therefore, we used two different word-search tasks with power-related words in order to manipulate a feeling of high versus low power.
Participants were asked to find and mark eight words. These words were embedded in a grid of letters laid out vertically, horizontally, forward, and diagonally. In the high-power condition, four words were related to high power (i.e., control, influence, power, and authority). In the low-power condition, four words were related to low power (i.e., secondary, powerless, dependent, and submissive). For both conditions, the other four words were unrelated to power (i.e., house, clock, water, green). All participants were provided with a stopwatch, so that they were able to track and write down their time needed to finish the word-search task. This was a filler task in order to prevent suspicion among participants regarding the inclusion of the word-search task.
Availability of a self-justification and immoral behavior. Finally, the experiment
allowed to determine the amount of lottery tickets they wanted to keep, and that the other participant would not have this opportunity. Thus, immoral behavior was operationalized as the amount of lottery tickets participants kept for themselves (1 = decreased immoral behavior; 6 = increased immoral behavior).
The opportunity for self-justification was created by manipulating the monthly income of the individual to whom participants were matched. More specifically, participants were asked to disclose personal information (i.e., gender, age, monthly income, nationality and education direction). They were led to believe that this information would be sent to the person to whom they were matched. In exchange, participants received the same information from the other person. In order to make the fictitious match more realistic, participants were instructed to wait for one minute to obtain the personal information from the other person. Hereafter, participants in the justification condition were told that the other person earned more than €1000 a month. However, participants in the non-justification condition were told
that the other individual earned less than €200 a month. Except for monthly income, all personal information of the other person was equal in both conditions.
The monthly income of the other person served as a justification either non-justification. In the justification condition, participants were provided with a self-justification to keep all the lottery tickets, since the other person had a high monthly income. In the non-justification condition, participants were not provided with a self-non-justification to keep all the lottery tickets, because the other person had a low monthly income.
Manipulation checks. At the end of the session, participants were asked to answer
were asked to select the monthly income of the other person out of seven options, in order to assess whether they had accurately perceived the self-justification.
RESULTS
Preliminary data analysis
Prior to the main data analysis, all variables were checked for missing values, outliers, and deviations from the normal distribution. In addition, an overview of all correlations, means, and standard deviations is provided.
Manipulation checks. No participant was suspicious about the experiment, procedure,
or word-search task. In addition, all participants understood the procedure. However, two participants were excluded, because they were sure that the other participant was fictitious. Furthermore, eleven participants were excluded, since they could not correctly reproduce the monthly income of the other person. Finally, one respondent was excluded, because this respondent revealed that he or she filled in ‘some nonsense’ during the experiment. Overall, fourteen participants were excluded and 132 participants remained.
Outliers. There were two outliers concerning the amount of lottery tickets participants
kept (> three SD’s below the mean). Furthermore, there were three outliers with regards to
moral identity (> three SD’s below the mean). However, these participants were not excluded from the analysis, because their answers to the manipulation checks revealed that they understood the procedure and answered the questions seriously. Hence, these were valid cases.
Normality. A Shapiro-Wilk test was performed in order to determine the normality
the dependent variable considerably (Skewness = -.71 (.21), Kurtosis = .84 (.42), p = 00). However, the Shapiro-Wilk normality test for the amount of lottery tickets participants kept was still significant, despite the transformation. However, since regression analyses are quite robust for small deviations from normality (Maas & Hox, 2004), the log variable of immoral behavior was used for the main data analysis.
Correlations, means, and standard deviations. The correlations, means, and standard
deviations of age, gender (0 = female, 1 = male), monthly income, power condition (0 = low power, 1 = high power), justification condition (0 = no justification, 1 = justification), moral identity, and immoral behavior can be seen in Table 1.
Table 1
Correlations and Descriptive Statistics of all variables (N = 132)
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 1. Age 21.16 2.14 - 2. Gender .58 .50 .12 - 3. Monthly income 2.70 1.49 .23** .05 - 4. Power condition .52 .50 -.08 .10 -.07 - 5. Justification condition .48 .50 .11 -.23** .06 .00 - 6. Moral identity 5.82 .81 .03 -.17 .03 .07 .19* - 7. Immoral behavior 4.18 1.44 -.01 .12 -.15 -.03 .07 -.07 -
often assigned to the justification condition. Third, a significant positive relation was found between justification condition and moral identity (R = .19, p = .03), which means that participants in the justification condition had higher moral identity than participants in a non-justification condition. Fourth, there was a marginally significant negative relation between gender and moral identity (R = -.17, p = .05), which indicates that women have a higher moral identity than men. Finally, there was a marginally significant negative relation between monthly income and immoral behavior (R = -.15, p = .10), which indicates that people with a higher monthly income keep less lottery tickets than people with a lower monthly income. All other relationships were not significant (all Rs < .13, all ps > .10).
Main data analysis
To test the hypothesis, immoral behavior was first regressed on age, gender, monthly income, power condition, justification condition, all two-way interactions, and the three-way interaction. In step one, age (standardized), gender (0 = female, 1 = male), and monthly income (standardized) were entered. In step two, power condition (0 = low power, 1 = high power), justification condition (0 = no justification, 1 = justification), and moral identity (standardized) were added. In step three, all two-way interactions (power condition * justification condition, power condition * moral identity, justification condition * moral identity) were entered. Finally, in step four, the three-way interaction (power condition * justification condition * moral identity) was included. The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis: Effects on immoral behavior (N = 132)
Immoral behavior β t p r2 change 1. Age .00 0.03 .98 - 2. Gender .04 1.25 .22 - 3. Monthly income -.03 -2.23 .03 .04 4. Power condition -.03 -0.72 .47 - 5. Justification condition .03 0.74 .46 - 6. Moral identity -.00 -0.04 .97 .02 7. Power condition X justification condition .01 0.11 .92 - 8. Power condition X moral identity -.05 -1.38 .17 - 9. Justification condition X moral identity -.02 -0.42 .68 .02 10. Power cond. X justification cond. X moral identity .11 1.80 .07 .02
0.75, all ps > .45). Furthermore, as expected, none of the two-way interactions reached significance (all ts < 1.40, all ps > .15). Finally and more importantly, in support of the hypothesis, analysis revealed a marginally significant three-way interaction between power condition, justification condition, and moral identity on immoral behavior (β = .11, t = 1.80, p
= .07).
In order to interpret the perceived marginally significant three-way interaction between power condition, justification condition, and moral identity on immoral behavior, separate regression analyses were conducted for high (+1 SD) and low (-1 SD) moral identity.
condition (0 = no justification, 1 = justification) were added. Finally, in step three, the two-way interaction (power condition * justification condition) was included. The results can be seen in Table 3.
Table 3
Results of the Multiple Regression Analysis: Effects on immoral behavior for low moral identity (N = 20) and high moral identity (N = 20)2
Low moral identity High moral identity Immoral behavior β t p r2 change β t p r2 change 1. Age .04 0.80 .44 - -.02 -0.20 .84 - 2. Gender -.09 -0.80 .44 - -.05 -0.40 .69 - 3. Monthly income .01 0.24 .82 .08 -.06 -1.40 .18 .10 4. Power condition .05 0.45 .66 - -.15 -0.81 .44 - 5. Justification condition -.05 -0.31 .76 .08 -.03 -0.16 .88 .09 6. Power cond. X justification cond. -.07 -0.40 .69 .01 .34 1.59 .14 .13
As shown in Table 3, in case of low moral identity, analysis revealed no significant main effects of age, gender, or monthly income (all ts < 0.85, all ps > .40). Likewise, no main effects of power condition or justification condition were observed (all ts < 0.50, all ps > .65). Finally, and surprisingly, analysis did not reveal the expected two-way interaction between power condition and justification condition on immoral behavior (β = -.07, t = -0.40, p = .69). Therefore, the hypothesis that power increases immoral behavior when a self-justification to behave immorally is available, but only for individuals with low moral identity, is not confirmed.
With regards to high moral identity, no significant main effects of age, gender, or monthly income were observed (all ts < 1.50, all ps > .15). Furthermore, analysis revealed no significant main effects of power condition or justification condition (all ts < 0.85, all ps
> .40). Finally, the two-way interaction between power condition and justification condition on immoral behavior was not significant. Surprisingly, however, the two-way interaction approximated marginal significance on immoral behavior (β = .34, t = 1.59, p = .14; see Figure 1).
Figure 1: Amount of lottery tickets people keep (LOG transformation) as a function of power and justification condition for participants high in moral identity (+1 SD).
DISCUSSION
Throughout recent research on the relationship between power and immoral behavior, there has been disagreement when power increases versus decreases immoral behavior (Chen et al., 2001; DeCelles et al., 2012; Fiske, 1993; Galinsky et al., 2003; Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972; Konovsky & Jaster, 1989; Lammers et al., 2010). The current research investigated the complex relationship between power and immoral behavior, in order to provide another insight when power increases immoral behavior. More specifically, the current research assessed whether power increases immoral behavior when a self-justification to behave immorally is available, only for powerful individuals low in moral identity.
The experiment did not detect any evidence for the predicted three-way interaction. Therefore, the hypothesis is not confirmed. However, contrary to expectations, the experiment did find initial evidence for a different three-way interaction: power tends to increase immoral behavior when a self-justification to behave immorally is available, but only for powerful individuals high in moral identity. In addition, power tends to decrease immoral behavior when a self-justification to behave immorally is not available, but only for powerful individuals high in moral identity. Due to a small sample size and only a marginally significant effect of this three-way interaction, these results should be interpreted with caution. Therefore, the results only provide a first suggestion.
Theoretical and practical implications
immoral behavior in some situations (i.e., when a self-justification is available, for powerful individuals high in moral identity), but decreases immoral behavior in other situations (when a self-justification is not available, for individuals high in moral identity), and thereby extends earlier research that power corrupts in some situations, but enables in other situations (Chen et al., 2001; DeCelles et al., 2012). Second, the current research has important implications for research on the role of self-justifications on immoral behavior. That is, it suggests that the role of self-justifications on immoral behavior is influenced by the roles of power and moral identity. It extends the notion that self-justifications are used to reduce cognitive dissonance concerning immoral behavior (Lowell, 2012), however, only in case of powerful individuals with a high moral identity. The current research further extends existing literature which argues that power increases immoral behavior, by means of self-justifications (Konovsky & Jaster, 1989; Lowell, 2012), by indicating that this is only the case when the powerful have a high moral identity. Third, the current research has important implications for research on the role of moral identity on immoral behavior. More specifically, it indicates that the role of moral identity on immoral behavior is influenced by the roles of power and the availability of a self-justification. It extends the finding of DeCelles and colleagues (2012) that power enables in case of high moral identity, by suggesting that power enables when a justification to behave immorally is not available, and that power corrupts when a self-justification to behave immorally is available, in case of high moral identity.
organizations should institutionalize moral behavior as a core value within their strategy. This would constantly motivate managers to incorporate morality into their decisions. By establishing morality as a core value, the concept of morality will be held in consciousness constantly, which reduces the chance that a self-justification to behave immorally seduces leaders to behave immorally. This emphasis on moral behavior helps managers to prioritize their moral identity over other identities. Second, organizations could set up an ethical commission by which decisions concerning moral issues must be approved. This forces managers to consider the moral consequences of their actions, which reduces the chance that managers engage in immoral behavior when they are provided with a self-justification.
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research
This study has several noteworthy strengths. First, power and the availability of a self-justification were both experimentally manipulated, which establishes causality. Furthermore, both manipulations were in written form. There was no need for the experimenters to provide a low-power prime, high-power prime, justification, or non-justification orally. Therefore, the power prime and justification manipulation were identically for each participant in one of the four conditions, which increases reliability.
is defined as actions that benefit the self at the expense of others, by indulging harm on others or violating behavioral norms. Even though keeping all the lottery tickets benefits the self at the expense of other, it remains unclear whether others are harmed or behavioral norms are violated. Therefore, it is possible that the operationalization of immoral behavior inadequately captures the concept of immoral behavior. Third, the sample size of the experiment was small (only 132 valid cases). The small sample size led to trouble interpreting the three-way interaction, since only 20 participants were high in moral identity. Therefore, results need to be interpreted cautiously. Moreover, this result was only marginally significant, which requires more caution. Fourth, the generalizability of results to wider society is subject to a limitation, because the experiment was predominantly attended by Dutch students. Therefore, results obtained from the experiment could be biased by age, level of education, and culture.
availability of a self-justification, and moral identity on the relationship between power and immoral behavior, in order to assess whether powerful individuals high in moral identity display increased immoral behavior, when a self-justification is available and the victim is present.
Conclusion
The current research shed another light on the paradoxical relationship between power and immoral behavior, which brings us one step closer to a world in which individuals, organizations, and even wider society are better able to take into account the moral consequences of decisions. A world in which managers do not engage in hospitality, because managers acknowledge that hospitality does affect their judgment when allocating a contract. A world in which managers acknowledge that not every manager engages in hospitality. A world in which organizations do not suffer from immoral decisions of managers, which eventually lead to bankruptcy. A world in which Enron would have still existed.
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