Effect of country culture and environment on different types of ownership and their performance: A comparison of different countries

Effect of country culture and environment on

different types of ownership and their performance:

A comparison of different countries

By

Gerben Groeneveld

University of Groningen

Faculty of Economics and Business

2 Abstract

In this paper research is done on family owned firms and state-owned firms and the effect of a country’s culture and environment on their performance. The inconclusiveness of previous studies on the performance of family owned firms and state-owned firms, is expected to be caused by differences between a country’s culture and environment. This assumption was tested by comparing the return on assets of family owned firms and state-owned firms in China with family owned firms in Germany. A One-Way Analysis of Variance test showed that there was no significant difference between family owned firms in China and family owned firms in Germany. Another One-Way Analysis of Variance showed that there was a significant difference between Chinese state-owned firms and German state-owned firms. The Chinese state-owned firms performed significantly better. The results are discussed and explanations are given. Furthermore, suggestions for future research are given as well as the limitations of the research.

Key words: Family owned firm, State-owned firm, Performance, China,

Germany.

Research Theme: Drivers for success in international business.

3 Table of contents

1. Introduction and Central Research Question ...4

2. Literature review...7

Performance ...7

Types of ownership ...7

Family owned firm ...8

State-owned firm ... 10

Country analysis ... 12

Germany ... 12

China ... 13

Family ownership and the cultural and environmental effect ... 15

State ownership and the cultural and environmental effect ... 16

3. Data and Methodology ... 17

Sample and Design ... 17

Performance ... 18

Ownership ... 18

Family ownership ... 18

State ownership ... 18

Environment and Culture of the Country ... 18

Chinese culture and environment ... 18

German culture and environment ... 19

4. Results ... 20

Results one-way analysis of variance ... 20

5. Discussion and limitations ... 23

Theoretical implications ... 23

Practical implications ... 25

Limitations and Future Research ... 26

6. Conclusion ... 28

References ... 29

Printed Sources: ... 29

Online Sources: ... 33

4

1. Introduction and Central Research Question

A good performance is probably one of the most important aspects of a firm; the type of performance which is important, will differ per firm. Some firms will focus purely on financial performance, while others may find it important to have good performance on public services or a good performance on green energy for the environment.

The performance of a firm can be influenced by a large amount of different factors. The type of ownership is one such possible factor. Research on the effects of ownership on performance has been done for years beginning as early as the 30s of the 20th century. Berle and Means (1932) first started the debate with their thesis and since then a lot of research has be done concerning this topic. Different types of ownership like family-owned private firms, state-owned private firms and others have been investigated in different countries by different researchers.

Family-owned private firms have for example been researched by Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Filatotchev, Lien, and Piesse, (2005). Both come to different conclusions to whether or not family ownership has a positive or negative effect on the performance of the firm. Anderson and Reeb (2003) find a positive effect on performance if a firm is owned by a family. Using profitability-based measures of firm performance, they find that family firms are significantly better performers than nonfamily firms (Anderson et al., 2003). The second research finds the opposite; institutional owners have a better performance and family ownership has a negative effect. The results of Filatotchev et al. (2005) confirm a positive and significant relationship between institutional share ownership and all performance proxies after controlling for possible endogeneity. Secondly, their findings suggest that family control over the executive board is detrimental to performance. This inconsistency is the same with other research concerning family-owned private firms.

5 although most of them find a negative effect on performance (Alfaraih, Alanezi, & Almujamed, 2012).

The inconsistency between studies that focus on the effect of ownership on performance is remarkable. As such, it becomes likely that the inconsistency may be caused by other factors, factors that impact the relation of ownership on performance. In this research I argue that the culture and environment of a country are such a factor. I expect the culture and environmental context to have an effect on how the type of ownership will affect the performance of a firm. Some research already assumed that the inconclusive results are attributed to the environment of the firms (Chizema, 2011). For example, the inconclusive findings of previous research on state-owned firms is assumed to be attributed to the different institutional contexts of the studies (Chizema, 2011). For illustration, the Chinese government has a lot more control over businesses compared to European governments; this is likely to have a great impact on the performance of a state-owned firm (Whang, Zhang, & Goodfellow, 1998). The Chinese government has easier taxation rules and other regulations for state-owned firms, this goes especially for state-owned firms that they find most important. Also, there is a difference in family relations for collectivist (Chinese) and individualistic (German) countries (Hofstede, 2014), possibly explaining the differences in performance between family-owned private firms. And although studies have been conducted in different cultural contexts (eg. the United States of America (Ben‐Amar & André, 2006; Chrisman et al., 2004), Europe (Maury, 2006), or even Asia (Heugens, van Essen, & van Oosterhout, 2009)), none - that I have found - have compared different cultures or countries with each other concerning the topic of a certain type of ownership. This paper aims to answer the question why the past research has not produced a definite answer to what effect different types of ownership have on the performance of firms.

6 The objective of this paper is to answer the central research question. The central research question for this paper is:

How does ownership influence performance and how is this relation impacted by a countries’ culture and environment?

Family Owned Firm

Country Culture and Environment

State-Owned Firm Performance

Performance

7

2. Literature review

Performance

Performance is how firms measure how they function as a firm, it gives the information on how well everything goes. Different types of performance give different types of information on the functionality of that particular part of the firm. Performance of a firm can be measured in a lot of different ways, for instance accounting measures of profitability, the Lerner index, sales per input and total factor productivity (De Loecker and Goldberg, 2013). In the business policy literature there are two major streams of research on the subject of performance, one being based upon economic tradition and the other builds on the behavioral and sociological paradigm (Hansen and Wernerfelt, 1989). The literature that focuses on ownership and performance focuses mainly on the economic tradition of measuring performance, one of the most used performance indicator is the profitability based Return on Assets (ROA) (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Return on Assets is defined as the net income divided by the total assets. In this research, return on assets will also be used to measure performance.

Performance can be influenced by a lot of different things, like turnover, male to female ratio, and also the type of ownership. Owners can have very different objectives for their firm as well as different levels of dedication and motivation to the firm. The research on ownership and performance goes back to the 1930s with the article of Berle and Means (1932) and since then a lot of research has been done on the subject with a lot of different outcomes. Family owned firms and state-owned firms are just two examples of ownership that show very different results. Because of the previous research I think that ownership will be an important predictor of performance.

Types of ownership

There are many different types of ownership for firms. There are family-owned private firms where one or more family members are the ultimate shareholder. Some examples of family-owned private firms: BMW, Samsung and the Wal-Mart Stores (Caspar, 2010). There are also state-owned firms, where the state is the ultimate shareholder, such as the British

8 company, this can be both a financial and a non-financial institution. Examples are the

Association of British Insurers (ABI, 2014) and the Alberta Investment Management

Corporation (Aimco, 2014). Finally there are widely held firms, where there is not an ultimate shareholder. Examples are IBM (Nasdaq, 2014) and Mcdonald’s (Nasdaq, 2014).

To determine a certain type of ownership a shareholder will have to own a certain amount of the shares of the company to be the so called ultimate shareholder. For the two different types of ownership which are discussed in this paper the same amount of shares is used. The

shareholder will have to have a share of 10 percent or more, to be the so called ultimate shareholder. This is the same definition as La Porta, Lopez de Silanes and Shleifer (1999) use, this definition is also used in a lot of other literature such as Maury (2005) and Chung (2012). The main reason for using the 10 percent threshold is that it is mostly enough, to have

effective control over a firm (La Porta et al., 1999).

Family owned firm

A firm is considered a family owned private firm when a member or several members of one family own at least 10% of the shares of the firm. This will make them the so called ultimate owner. Family owned firms comprise a large part of the total firms operating in the world. For example in the United States they represent one third of the total firms (Maury, 2005). With the exception of Japan, almost all large publicly traded firms in Asia are family businesses (Chung, 2012). Besides consisting of smaller firms, there are also very large family owned firms such as BMW, Samsung and the Wal-Mart Stores (Caspar, 2010). In emerging countries the concentration of family ownership is even higher compared to developed countries (Silva, 2008). Therefore, family owned firms play an important part in the different economies of the world.

9 The most mentioned positive effect of family ownership concerns agency costs which arises from the agency problem. Family ownership in listed firms operating in well-regulated and transparent markets reduces agency costs (Anderson, 2003). The main reason for the positive effect of reduced agency costs is that there is mostly moretrust within a family firm compared to a non-family firm. Family affiliation has a positive effect because of trust between family members (Silva, 2008).Family businesses are better than non-family firms at aligning the objectives of owners and managers (because they are either the same individual or they have a kin relationship). Also, James (1999) posits that families have longer investments horizons, which according to him leads to greater investment efficiency. This horizon is longer

compared to other firms, because the expectation is that the firm stays in the family after the retirement of the current owner. It also mitigates the incentive for myopic investment

decisions by managers (Stein, 1988).

However, usually management and governance bodies in these firms are less effective and have a lower level of professionalism (Martinez, 2007). Chrisman et al. (2007) find that because there is lopsided altruism towards family members, sometimes family members who are inferior or more opportunistic compared to non-family members get management

positions, which creates a negative effect for the firm. Morck et al. (1988) find that generally performance is highest at the start of the family business; descendants of the owners

sometimes reduce the value of the firm because of a lack of motivation and dedication.The descendants are the children or grandchildren of the founders of the firm, or other family members other than the original founders like nephews or nieces.

An investigation of the S&P 500 by Anderson et al. (2003) shows that the ROA were higher at family firms compared to non-family firms. Contrary to the research by Anderson et al. (2003) a study in Taiwan by Filatotchev et al. (2005) finds that the ROA of family-owned private firms is lower compared to other types of firms (0.03 versus 0.09).

10 or dedication of the original owners, which will have negative effects on the performance of the firm and will reduce its value.

State-owned firm

A state-owned firm is either partly or totally owned by the government of a country. In this study I argue that at least ten percent of the shares should belong to the state to call it a state-owned firm. The number of firms that are state-owned by the state have declined in certain countries in the last years; this is both in developed countries and transitional countries (Chizema, 2011). This is because most studies find a negative effect on performance from state ownership and also the general idea that state-firms are less efficient compared to privately owned firms. There are however still a lot of firms that fall under the term state-owned. Some state-owned firm may be existing purely to provide services, such as hospitals or prisons, but in this study the focus is on firms that may be profitable like telephone providing services or mines.

As with the other types of ownership, state ownership may have both positive and negative effects on performance. There are several positive effects of state ownership. Some states grand certain privileges to “their” firms. Some governments of countries provide certain resources or grant certain privileges to state-owned firms, a certain ‘helping hand’ (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The Chinese government helped state-owned firms of China with taxation rules that favored state-owned firms, easier market entry regulations and easier access to loans for these firms (Gordon and Li, 2003). Another point that may enhance firm performance of state-owned firms is that they do not need to uphold to strict accounting standards and rules, at least not as much as compared to private firms. This is either because this certain state-owned firm is so important that the state has great interest in it performing well or that the state trusts state-owned firms better because they are monitored by the state itself. In some situations this may allow the management of the firm to choose a more advantageous accounting structure that will benefit the firm and the firms’ performance (Aljifri and Moustafa, 2007).

11 the required skills and information to guide a firm in an always-changing economic

environment. Also the monitoring of state-owned firms may pose a problem. Often, the monitoring of a state-owned firm is done by a local monitor, who does not have the required knowledge to do so. Secondly, local monitors do not always have the same interests compared to the central government, which also has a negative effect on monitoring if there is a conflict of interest between the central government which sets basic rules and the local monitor who does the monitoring (Clarke, 2003). Local monitors care for the province or state they are located, while the central government looks at the country as a whole. For example at a mine, the local monitor may find local employment important while the central government finds the profits it produces most important.

To summarize, state-owned firms have both positive and negative effects. The main negative effects are lack of skills and information of managers to guide a firm in an always changing economic environment, focus on different objectives and less monitoring. The main positive effects originate of the certain ‘helping hand’; state-owned firms may get certain favors or more profitable regulations. A less strict accounting standard compared to private firms may also have positive effects on performance if handled correctly.

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Country analysis

As mentioned before, laws and regulations, economic environment and culture/family relations may be an important factor influencing the performance of the different types of ownership. This may be the answer to why the existing research on ownership and

performance is mostly inconclusive. To name a few examples, the Chinese government exerts a lot more control over businesses compared to European governments (Whang, Zhang and Goodfellow, 1998). Also, family ties are much stronger in collectivist countries compared to individualist countries (Hofstede, 2014), because in these societies family is one of the most important aspects of life and the family comes before an individual’s ambition.

Therefore two different countries in two different regions of the world will be examined. Here Germany and China will be analyzed using three factors; laws and regulations, economic environment and culture/family relations. Germany and China have been selected because of their cultural and institutional differences. Germany is a democracy and China has a planned economy. Furthermore, China has a collectivistic society and Germany an individualistic.

Germany

Laws and regulations

Germany is a very democratic country, with a corresponding setup. The three administrative powers are shared between the legislative, judiciary and executive. The elections are

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Economic environment

Germany has a very rich and advanced economy; it is the fifth largest economy in the world and the largest of Europe. It is a mature and developed market and is a leading exporter of machinery, vehicles, chemicals, and household equipment and benefits from a highly skilled labor force (CIA, 2014). It is the largest economy of Europe with a GDP value of 2.644 billion euro in 2012. Although in 2009 there was a shrink of 5.1%, the last few years GDP growth has been positive. The German Landesbanks have large exposure to crisis-stricken countries, which still poses a threat. To address this issue, German parliament approved the EU-wide CRD IV directive in April 2013 (Marketline, 2013).

Culture and Family relations

Germany is very individualistic, people have few children and parent-child relationship is much more important compared to the whole-family relationship. Loyalty is mostly based on personal preference and there is a strong belief of self-actualization. In the working

environment there is a sense of duty and responsibility (Hofstede, 2014). Personal

achievements and individual rights are stressed a lot in Germany, it is expected that people fulfill their own needs. Working in groups is still important, but each individual opinion is valued and people are expected to reflect those. People tend to have more loose relationships with their extended families in comparison to more collectivist countries (Clearlycultural, 2014). The individualistic German culture and family relations are not likely to support family owned firms more compared to other firms.

China

Laws and regulations

For the last 60 years the Communist Party of China (CPC) has governed China and it is the single political party of the country. Because it is the single party in the country it has great influence on all different aspects of the country, ranging from the policy framework to the implementation of policies. It is able to impose its decisions without going through the grind of democratic deliberations and negotiations. The ruling party follows an ideology, which is a mix of communism and democracy; any Chinese above the age of 18 should accept its

14 In a study of Gordon and Li (2003) on Chinese government owned firms recognized the “helping hand” from the state to Chinese firm in the form of market entry regulations, taxation rules that favored state-owned firms over others and making it more easy to loan money for firms that were owned by the state. Furthermore, the state still regulates large parts of the economy and rules still exist to protect national firms. This ‘helping hand’ is likely to benefit Chinese state-owned firms.

Economic environment

China has become the second largest economy of the world in February 2011, and is still maintaining development and growth. Its GDP has been growing with more than 10 % in the past 10 years; only the last 3 years saw a drop to around 8 percent, which is largely due to the debt crisis in the Euro zone that hampers the Chinese exports (Marketline, 2013). China’s economy has long been a centrally planned, closed system, since the late 1970’s it has started to reform to a more market-oriented system. In recent years it has started to play a global role in the world economy, since 2010 it is the largest exporter in the world. Reforms in

liberalization, phasing out of collectivized agriculture, development of stock markets and opening to foreign trade have all been done in the last years. In recent years some firms have been put under state control, for economic security and fostering of the so-called national champions (CIA, 2014).

Culture and Family relations

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Family ownership and the cultural and environmental effect

Family ownership will have both positive and negative effects on performance. It is hard to tell whether or not family ownership has an overall positive effect on performance. This will also differ per environment, some effects may be amplified by the environment and some may be weakened by the environment. In this section the effect of the environment on family ownership is discussed for both China and Germany.

Subsequently, the benefits of family owned firms will be amplified by the collectivist nature of China. The whole family is extremely important in China. The family owned firms will have the benefit of trust within a family and thereby a reduction of the agency problem of a firm and the families will have longer investment horizons. And although German family owned firms will also benefit from the trust and longer investment horizons, this effect will be less strong compared to China because of the individualistic nature of Germany.

The great importance of the whole family in China will also reduce the lack of motivation of descendants. The family members feel obligated to the family to perform at their best to support the family, and since the firm is family owned, they will also feel similar about the firm. Decidedly, the collectivistic nature of the Chinese will cause the descendants to be well aware of the importance of keeping the family business going, because this is a part of the family. This is in contrast to German family firms. The German family owned firms will suffer from lack of commitment from descendants, they will not feel committed to family members that they scarcely or did not know. Also, in German culture the entire family is not of central importance, only direct members like the children or parents are important to them. Because there is a larger amount of positive effects of family ownership on performance ,the expectancy is that Chinese family owned firms will outperform the German ones.

Therefore I hypothesize:

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State ownership and the cultural and environmental effect

State ownership, like family ownership, will have both positive and negative effects on performance. It is likely that the overall effect of state ownership will have a negative effect on performance. Most other studies concerning state-owned firms a find a negative effect on performance (Alfaraih, et al. 2012). But some of these negative effects may be weakened by the environment and there are also positive effects that may be amplified by the environment. In this section the effect of the environment on state ownership is discussed for both China and Germany.

The negative effects of state-owned firms are not influenced a lot by the country institutions, economy or culture. The ‘helping hand’ however is present in China. The more favorable market entry regulations, taxation rules and less strict accounting standards together with the easier access to loans make that Chinese state-owned firms have big advantages compared to widely held firms. These advantages are likely to outweigh the negative effects of state-owned firms, also because the Chinese government has high priority to these state firms and will do a lot to give them high performance. German state-owned firms do not get the ‘helping hand’ from their government. The democratic government focuses on property rights, business freedom, monetary freedom, freedom from corruption, investment freedom and trade freedom. Therefore it would not fit their regime to favor state-owned firms. The negative effects of state-owned firms that were mentioned earlier will however still have an effect; they are not nullified by other aspects of the German environment. Because China has more positive effects and the same amount of negative effects, the expectancy is that Chinese state-owned firms will have a better performance than German state-owned firms.

Therefore I hypothesize:

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3. Data and Methodology

Sample and Design

For this study data is retrieved from the Orbis database. Orbis contains information on more than 120 million firms worldwide; it contains information on both unlisted and listed firms. There is information on firm financials, financial strength indicators, ratings, directors and contacts, research on industries and a lot more (Bureau van Dijk, 2014). For this study the data that is used is mainly focused on financials and ratings. The total sample contained 400 firms; 200 family owned firms and 200 state-owned firms. 100 of the family owned private firms were Chinese and 100 of the family owned private firms were German. The same division is done for the state-owned firms; 100 Chinese firms and 100 German firms.

The firms have been chosen while keeping in mind that their type of ultimate shareholder did not change in the years that are examined. So no firms were privatized in the years that were researched. Following La Porta et al. (1999), the identification of the ultimate shareholder is done using the ten percent threshold. Other studies use the number of family members in top positions (Silva et al., 2007) or shareholder percentages ranging from everything above 0% (Chizema et al, 2011). In those studies even the smallest amount of ownership may still count. But for this study the ten percent threshold is used. So this means that either a family or the state owns at least ten percent of the total shares of the firm. Owning ten percent of the shares is usually enough to effectively control a firm (La Porta et al., 1999). The collected firm data includes the year 2006. The reason for this time period is that a single year gives enough data to examine all the different firms and give an accurate answer on the performance per firm. Also, the year 2006 is before the financial crisis, therefore there is no influence of this crisis on the data that could cause unreliable results.

For this study and for both hypotheses, an analysis of variance (ANOVA) will be conducted. The one-way ANOVA test will assess whether or not the means of the two groups

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Performance

In this study the dependent variable is performance. Performance serves as an indicator on how well the firm functions in a certain area. The literature that focuses on ownership and performance focuses mainly on the economic tradition of measuring performance. One of the most used performance indicators is the profitability based Return on Assets (ROA) (Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001). Hereby, Return on Assets is defined as the net income divided by the total assets. This economic focus will also be used in this paper, because it is a tested and working manner of measuring performance and for comparability with other research papers.

Ownership

In this study the first independent variable is ownership identity. There are two different types of this identity; family ownership and state ownership.

Family ownership

In this study family ownership is defined as an individual or a family, which owns at least ten percent of the shares in a firm. The assumption is that every family owns its shares

collectively, thereby following Porta et al. (1999).

State ownership

In this study state ownership is defined as a firm where the government of a country owns at least ten percent of the shares. In this variable it assumed that the government owns these firms for the full length of time of the research year. Within this time the firm has not been privatized till below ten percent ownership of the state.

Environment and Culture of the Country

The second independent variable is the environment and culture of the country where the firm is located. This variable also has two different identities; the Chinese culture and environment and the German culture and environment. For the tests in SPSS, Germany was coded 1 and China was coded 2.

Chinese culture and environment

19 people (Oxford dictionary, 2014). Secondly, the systems of formal laws, regulations, and procedures, and informal conventions, customs, and norms, that broaden, mould, and restrain socio-economic activity and behavior in China (Oxford dictionary of geography, 2014). These two aspects together define the Chinese culture and environment in this study. There will be no further distinction between different groups within the country itself.

German culture and environment

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4. Results

Results one-way analysis of variance

Table one gives the descriptive results of the family owned firms and table two gives the descriptive results of the state-owned firms. In the appendix the total sample of firms can be found that is used for the analysis.

Table 1: Descriptives Family Owned firms using Return on Assets

Country M SD N

Germany 6,89 8,59 100

China 7,33 6,32 100

Total 7,11 7,53 200

Table 2: Descriptives State-owned Firms using Return on Assets

Country M SD N

Germany 1,58 6,60 100

China 5,12 6,12 100

Total 3,35 6,59 200

For the hypotheses to be tested, for both the state-owned firms and the family owned firms, the annual return on assets based on the net income are analyzed in Germany and in China for the year 2006. The values for the return on assets per firm come from the Orbis database and can be found in the appendix. The values of the return on assets were all entered into SPSS.

The one-way ANOVA is used two times. Firstly, we conducted a one-way ANOVA to determine if there is any significant difference between the family owned firms in China and the family owned firms in Germany with regard to performance. The second ANOVA did the same, only this one focused on Chinese and German state-owned firms. The first ANOVA test for family owned firms shows us that there is no significant difference between the firms included in the sample of family owned firms (F (1,198) = 0.17, p = 0.68). Although the German ROA average is lower (M = 6.89, SD = 8.59) compared to the Chinese ROA (M =

7.33, SD = 6.32), the p- value is too low to proclaim a noteworthy difference. We can

21 included in the sample of family owned firms. The results of the one-way ANOVA test on family owned firms can be found in table 3.

Table 3: One-Way Analysis of Variance of Family Owned Firms using Return on Assets

Source df MS F p

Return on Assets 1 9,71 0,17 0,68*

Error 198 56,91

*Significant if p < .05

The second ANOVA test for state-owned firms shows us that there is a significant difference between the German and Chinese state-owned firms (F (1,198) = 15.51, p < 0.01). The Chinese state-owned firms have on average a higher return on assets (M = 5.12, SD = 6.12) compared to German state-owned firms (M = 1.58, SD = 6.60). The results of the one-way ANOVA test on family owned firms can be found in table 4.

Table 4: One-Way Analysis of Variance of State-owned Firms using Return on Assets

Source df MS F p

Return on Assets 1 627,96 15,52 0.00*

Error 198 40,47

*Significant if p < .05

22 Chart 1: Average return on assets

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Family owned firms State owned firms

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5. Discussion and limitations

The main idea of this paper was to answer the research question: How does ownership

influence performance and how is this relation impacted by a countries’ culture? Previous

articles showed that there was no definite answer to the effect of ownership on performance, concerning the family owned firms and state-owned firms. Some studies examined the effect of family ownership on firm performance like Anderson et al. (2003) and Filatotchev et al. (2005). While others focused on state-owned firms like Megginson et al. (2001) and Aljifri et al. (2007), or several types of ownership in one study like Alfaraih et al. (2012). But almost all of these studies focused purely on the effect of the type of ownership on performance in a single country. Therefore, we argued that the inconclusiveness of the previous studies is likely to be contributed to differences between countries. Hence, this research compared family owned firms and state-owned firms in two different countries. The first hypothesis concerning family owned firms was not supported and the second hypothesis concerning state-owned firms was supported.

Theoretical implications

The test on family owned firms showed no significant difference between German and Chinese family owned firms. Therefore the first hypothesis is not supported. The reason why there is no difference between German and Chinese family owned firms with regard to return on assets may be because of several reasons.

First of all, the importance of family in China also has a downside. Because family members are expected to give jobs to other family members, chances are that these members do not have the required skills and knowledge for the jobs they get. This effect may be so strong that it cancels out some of the positive effects of the ‘family’ culture in China.

24 who are not qualified for a job, get the job in Germany. Thereby weakening the effect of family members filling in positions they are not qualified to fulfill.

Thirdly, environmental aspects in laws and regulations and economic environment might have additional effects on the performance of family owned firms. According to the information, both the countries were among the largest in the world in 2006 and had about similar levels of education, so according to the theory this would not affect the outcome. However, China has only recently become one of the largest economies in the world. A recent study of July 2014 by Yang, Huang and Liu (2014) however finds that China has had an educational expansion policy in the last decades, but that there are still a lot of inequalities. Before the education expansion, education was only for the elite. This might have a substantial effect on the

performance of family owned firms. Some employees might have lower levels of education. If the Chinese employees of the family owned firms have a lower level of education compared to their German counterparts, it might help explain why the family owned firms in China do not outperform the family owned firms in Germany.

So although the hypothesis is not supported that Chinese family owned firms perform better on ROA compared to German family owned firms, I still believe that the culture and

environment of a country has an effect on family owned firms. Different environments have dissimilar effects on how firms operate. China might have aspects in its environment that support family owned firms, but so does Germany. Only the aspects that support family owned firms differ per country. Other countries might have other aspects supporting family owned firms that are so strong that family owned firms in these countries do outperform their counterparts in other countries.

The second test did show a significant difference between German and Chinese state-owned firms, the state-owned firms in China significantly performed better compared to their German counterparts. This was also expected in the second hypothesis and this hypothesis is therefore supported. The study therefore contributes to the existing literature that the

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Practical implications

The results have several practical implications for organizations. First of all, family owned firms in China may not purely rely on their collective culture for good performance. The Chinese family owned firms do not perform better compared to the German family owned firms. This was expected as was expected, this may be a part of the answer why this is so. Although it is expected that family members are given positions in the firm, they may give them positions that do not correspond with their capabilities. A family member on a position that is too high for them is bad for the firm and therefore also bad for the family. Therefore, Chinese firms should take this into consideration when hiring family members.

German family firms may focus more on the concept of self-actualization. Although it has not been found that these firms perform significantly worse, they can always try to perform even better. Instead of focussing on family ties, they should focus more on the performance of the individuals and give incentives to them individually. Family ties are not likely to be important in Germany. From the theory it is not likely that family ties are the key to success in

Germany. They should instead focus on the performance of the individual because this is more important in Germany.

Concerning state-owned firms, state-owned firms suffer from several negative effects. Like a lack of skills and information of managers/ministers to guide the firm and less monitoring. While the positive effect of a ‘helping hand’ from the government might not changed by the state-owned firms themselves (this is part of the policy of the government). They can try to lower the negative effects of state-owned firms. The negative effect of a lack of skills and information of ministers that manage the firm can be lowered with the hiring professional managers who assist these ministers. If assisting the minister is not possible, these managers can at least be placed in high positions, so that the professionalism within the firm will be enhanced. Furthermore, the case of less monitoring might also be solved by appointing members within the firm or to monitor departments to enhance efficiency.

26

Limitations and Future Research

Future research may still prove that there is a difference between family firm’s performance in different countries. But also strengthen the claim that state-owned firm’s performance differs per country. Research following on this may look at a bigger sample of Chinese firms. The number of Chinese family owned firms available in Orbis is much lower compared to Germany. Probably the database in Orbis misses much of the Chinese family owned firms because they are not registered there. For the Chinese sample of family owned firms there were just enough firms with data, while the number of German firms was much larger and the amount of data was also larger. This may not give a good comparison, the sample of Chinese firms may not give a good random sample of the total number of family owned firms in China and give a distorted image. Because the number of firms for the German sample was much larger, it is probable that this sample is more random and gives a better image of the total German family owned firms.

A limitation of this research is the lack of control variables. Some industries may have better performance compared to others, or the size of the firm may also have an effect. In future research the use of control variables can give additional information on the performance of different kinds of ownership in different countries. Future research may focus on one industry or research one certain size of firms so the mix of different sizes and industries will not affect the outcome.

Another point which would maybe give a better overview of the performance of the different types of ownership is more performance indicators. Although the chosen indicator of

27 Hofstede (2014) some countries are more future orientated while others find the present more important. This may also have an effect on some financial indicators.

Furthermore, the study can be extended with other types of ownership like institutional ownership. The difference in state-owned firms’ performance per country could also be true for institutions. For this thesis, it was beyond the scope to examine more than two types of ownership. Culture and environment are likely to influence all firms within the country, an institutional owner may for example be prohibited or supported by laws to carry out its business.

28

6. Conclusion

29

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35

Appendix

4 HEAG SUEDHESSISCHE ENERGIE AG

(HSE)

DE 4,39

5 HAMBURGER HAFEN UND LOGSTIK AG DE 8,09

6 WVV WIESBADEN HOLDING GMBH DE 4,83

7 NETINERA DEUTSCHLAND GMBH DE 0,34

8 MESSE FRANKFURT GMBH DE 3,43

9 BUNDESDRUCKEREI GMBH DE 33,03

10 ABG FRANKFURT HOLDING

WOHNUNGSBAU- UND BETEILI- GUNGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH

DE 0,93

11 DEGEWO AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT DE 0,30

12 GESUNDHEIT NORDHESSEN HOLDING

AG DE -1,11

13 BAOSTEEL EUROPE GMBH DE 11,93

14 GENERTEC EUROPE TEMAX GMBH DE -4,90

15 SINOSTEEL GERMANY GMBH DE 0,01

16 COSCO CONTAINER LINES EUROPE

GMBH DE 2,23

17 GAG IMMOBILIEN AG DE 1,68

18 STADTWERKE HAMM GESELLSCHAFT

MIT BESCHRAENKTER HAFTUNG DE 1,62

19 TECHNISCHE WERKE LUDWIGSHAFEN

AM RHEIN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT

DE -0,20

20 FLUGHAFEN STUTTGART

GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRAENKTER HAFTUNG

DE 4,09

21 STADTWERKE POTSDAM GMBH DE -0,25

22 GESOBAU AG DE 1,40

23 NETCOLOGNE GESELLSCHAFT FUER

TELEKOMMUNIKATION MIT BESCHRAENKTER HAFTUNG DE 9,04 24 HSK, DR.HORST-SCHMIDT- KLINIKEN GMBH KLINIKUM DER LANDESHAUPTSTADT WIESBADEN DE -2,67 25 HSK RHEIN-MAIN GMBH DE -2,92

26 ENERGIE UND WASSER POTSDAM

GMBH

DE 0,49

27 LAUSITZER UND MITTELDEUTSCHE

BERGBAU-

VERWALTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT MBH

DE 0,70

28 KOELNMESSE GMBH DE -1,75

29 STAEDTISCHE HOLDING

BIETIGHEIM-BISSINGEN GMBH

DE 1,25

30 AGGERENERGIE GMBH DE 3,70

36

32 STADTWERKE NEUSS ENERGIE UND

WASSER GMBH DE 0,33 33 HIL HEERESINSTANDSETZUNGS- LOGISTIK GMBH DE 3,22 34 ENERGIEVERSORGUNG FILSTAL GMBH & CO.KG DE 4,06 35 M-NET TELEKOMMUNIKATIONS GMBH DE 13,88 36 EDG HOLDING GMBH DE 8,13 37 SWN STADTWERKE NEUMUENSTER BETEILIGUNGEN GMBH DE 0,87 38 OBERSCHWABENKLINIK GMBH DE -4,09

39 LAND BRANDENBURG LOTTO

GESELLSCHAFT MIT BESCHRAENKTER HAFTUNG

DE 10,80

40 KLINIKUM MITTELBADEN GGMBH DE 0,39

41 WOHNUNGSBAUGESELLSCHAFT

LICHTENBERG MIT BESCHRAENKTER HAFTUNG

DE 1,26

42 NEUBRANDENBURGER STADTWERKE

GMBH DE 0,66

43 LOTTO HAMBURG GMBH DE 0,10

44 HSE TECHNIK GMBH & CO. KG DE 2,54

45 STWB STADTWERKE BAMBERG GMBH DE 1,84

46 STADTWERKE ROSENHEIM GMBH & CO.

KG DE 5,80 47 SAECHSISCHE AUFBAUBANK FORDERBANK DE 0,01 48 BAUVEREIN AG DE 1,59 49 STADTWERKE RHEINE GMBH DE 0,17 50 BETEILIGUNGSVERWALTUNGS-

GESELLSCHAFT DER STADT VELBERT MBH

DE 1,79

51 PRO POTSDAM GMBH DE 0,22

52 STADTWERKE COTTBUS GMBH DE -4,67

53 AWB ABFALLWIRTSCHAFTSBE- TRIEBE

KOELN GMBH & CO. KG

DE 4,95

54 MITTELDEUTSCHE FLUGHAFEN

AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT DE -4,17

55 KLINIKUM LINKS DER WESER GGMBH DE 0,88

56 WBG NUERNBERG GMBH

IMMOBILIENUNTERNEHMEN DE 1,07

57 KLINIKUM DUISBURG GMBH DE -0,76

58 FRANKFURTER

DIENSTLEISTUNGSHOLDING GMBH DE -1,09

59 STADTWERKE ZWICKAU HOLDING

GMBH

DE -0,69

60 LEOPOLDINA-KRANKENHAUS DER

STADT SCHWEINFURT GMBH DE 4,80

61 BREMER VERKEHRSGESELL- SCHAFT

MBH

DE -11,54

62 AVG ABFALLENTSORGUNGS- UND

VERWERTUNGSGESELLSCHAFT KOELN MBH

DE 3,20

63 GRUNDSTUECKS- UND GEBAEUDE-

WIRTSCHAFTS-GESELLSCHAFT M. B. H. (GGG)

DE -3,74

64 TECHNISCHE WERKE BRANDENBURG

AN DER HAVEL GMBH

DE 0,36

65 KEW KOMMUNALE ENERGIE- UND

37

66 STAEDTISCHE WERKE

UEBERLANDWERKE COBURG GMBH

DE 1,12

67 FEK FRIEDRICH-EBERT- KRANKENHAUS

NEUMUENSTER GMBH DE 1,89 68 STADTWERKE RATINGEN GMBH DE 2,60 69 STADTWERKE TROISDORF GMBH DE 2,77 70 THUERINGEN-KLINIKEN GEORGIUS AGRICOLA GMBH DE 0,31

71 FOERDERGES. FUER DIE HOSPIZARBEIT

IN SINGEN U. IM HEGAU FUER DIE GEMEINNUETZIGE

DE -1,59

72 BOCHUM-GELSENKIRCHENER

STRASSENBAHNEN AG DE -41,33

73 KLINIKUM BAD HERSFELD GMBH DE 0,89

74 RUPPINER KLINIKEN GMBH DE 3,53

75 HVV HERFORDER VERSORGUNGS- UND

VERKEHRS-BETEILIGUNGS-GMBH DE 0,38 76 ALLBAU AG DE 3,74 77 MUENCHENSTIFT GMBH GEMEIN- NUETZIGE GESELLSCHAFT DE -5,09 78 OBERLAUSITZ-KLINIKEN GGMBH DE 5,02 79 KLINIKUM GARMISCH- PARTENKIRCHEN GMBH DE 1,23 80 STADTWERKE GOETTINGEN AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT DE 1,65

81 KRANKENHAUS BUCHHOLZ UND

WINSEN GEMEINNUETZIGE GMBH

DE 1,00

82 WIRTSCHAFTSBETRIEBE DER STADT

UNNA GMBH DE 2,41

83 STADTWERKE SOEST GESELLSCHAFT

MIT BESCHRAENKTER HAFTUNG

DE 5,98

84 KLINIKUM WORMS GGMBH DE 0,06

85 BIETIGHEIMER WOHNBAU GMBH DE 0,95

86 KLINIKUM BARNIM GMBH, WERNER

FORSSMANN KRANKENHAUS DE 0,63

87 GGEW TRADING LAMPERTHEIM GMBH DE 3,11

88 STADTWERKE BORKEN/WESTF. GMBH DE 4,11

89 KLINIKEN DES LANDKREISES

LOERRACH GMBH

DE -0,03

90 KLINIKUM FRIEDRICHSHAFEN GMBH DE -1,46

91 CONGRESSFORUM FRANKENTHAL GMBH DE 3,92

92 DOGEWO DORTMUNDER GESELLSCHAFT

FUER WOHNEN MBH DE 0,32 93 MEDL GMBH DE 15,84 94 STAEDTISCHE KLINIKEN MOENCHENGLADBACH GMBH DE 0,15 95 SBK SOZIAL-BETRIEBE-KOELN GEMEINNUETZIGE GMBH DE 1,30 96 REINHARD-NIETER-KRANKEN- HAUS STAEDTISCHE KLINIKEN GGMBH DE -1,01

97 GESELLSCHAFT FUER BAUEN UND

WOHNEN HANNOVER MIT

38 101 CHINA PETROLEUM & CHEMICAL

CORPORATION

CN 8,78

102 PETROCHINA COMPANY LIMITED CN 16,31

103 INDUSTRIAL & COMMERCIAL BANK OF CHINA (THE) - ICBC

CN 0,66

104 SAIC MOTOR CORPORATION LIMITED CN 1,62

105 CHINA RAILWAY CONSTRUCTION

CORPORATION LIMITED

CN 0,97

106 CHINA RAILWAY GROUP LTD. CN 1,15

107 CHINA FIRST AUTOMOBILE GROUP

CORPORATION (THE FIRST AUTOMOBILE FACTORY)

CN 0,93

108 CITIC GROUP CN 0,80

109 CHINA UNITED NETWORK

COMMUNICATIONS LIMITED CN 1,49

110 CHINA COMMUNICATIONS

CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LIMITED

CN 2,52

111 CHINA SHENHUA ENERGY COMPANY

LIMITED CN 9,64

112 JIANGSU ELECTRIC POWER COMPANY CN 1,16

113 BAOSHAN IRON & STEEL COMPANY LIMITED

CN 7,93

114 MINMETALS DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. CN 2,62

115 SINOPHARM GROUP CO., LTD. CN 0,87

116 TAIYUAN IRON & STEEL (GROUP) CO., LTD.

CN 4,57

117 HENAN ELECTRIC POWER

CORPORATION

CN 1,19

118 KAILUAN (GROUP) LIMITED LIABILITY

CORPORATION

CN 0,35

119 SHANXI TAIGANG STAINLESS STEEL

CO., LTD.

CN 5,82

120 CHINA SOUTHERN AIRLINES COMPANY

LIMITED

CN 0,25

121 AIR CHINA LTD CN 3,20

122 GREAT WALL TECHNOLOGY COMPANY

LIMITED CN -1,20

123 WUHAN IRON & STEEL CO., LTD. CN 8,11

124 SICHUAN ELECTRIC POWER

CORPORATION CN 2,21

125 CHINA COSCO HOLDINGS COMPANY

LIMITED

CN 3,66

126 SINOPEC SHANGHAI PETROCHEMICAL

CO., LTD. CN 3,08

127 CHINA COAL ENERGY COMPANY

LIMITED

CN 7,03

128 CHINA GREATWALL COMPUTER

SHENZHEN CO., LTD. CN 2,31

129 ANGANG STEEL COMPANY LIMITED CN 12,12

130 TONGLING NONFERROUS METAL

GROUP CO., LTD. CN 3,65

131 SHANGHAI ELECTRIC GROUP COMPANY

LIMITED

CN 3,20

132 SINOMACH AUTOMOBILE CO., LTD. CN 0,12

133 HUAYU AUTOMOTIVE SYSTEMS CO.,

LTD.

CN 2,06

134 YANGQUAN COAL INDUSTRY (GROUP)

CO., LTD. CN 12,20

135 GD POWER DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD. CN 3,10

136 SHANXI ELECTRIC POWER

39

137 XINXING DUCTILE IRON PIPES CO.,

LTD.

CN 4,62

138 NORTH CHINA GRID COMPANY

LIMITED CN 4,53

139 SINOCHEM INTERNATIONAL COMPANY

LIMITED

CN 4,51

140 CHINA NATIONAL HEAVY DUTY TRUCK

GROUP CO., LTD. CN 3,32

141 SAIC GM WULING AUTOMOBILE CO.,

LTD.

CN 5,95

142 DAQIN RAILWAY CO., LTD. CN 10,75

143 DONGFANG ELECTRIC CORPORATION

LIMITED

CN 7,24

144 CHINA NATIONAL PETROLEUM

CORPORATION TARIM OILFIELD COMPANY

CN 50,02

145 INNER MONGOLIA BAOTOU STEEL

UNION CO., LTD. CN 4,85

146 ZHONGJIN GOLD CO., LTD. CN 7,42

147 AVIC INTERNATIONAL HOLDINGS

LIMITED

CN 3,04

148 ZHENGZHOU COAL INDUSTRY (GROUP)

CO., LTD.

CN 1,66

149 KWEICHOW MOUTAI CO., LTD CN 16,14

150 FAW CAR CO., LTD. CN 3,33

151 CHINA MERCHANTS PROPERTY

DEVELOPMENT CO., LTD.

CN 5,06

152 CHINA OILFIELD SERVICES LIMITED CN 8,59

153 CHONGQING MUNICIPAL POWER

CORPORATION

CN 1,41

154 CHINA CSSC HOLDINGS LIMITED CN 5,98

155 CNHTC JINAN TRUCK CO., LTD. CN 5,10

156 PINGDINGSHAN TIANAN COAL MINING

CO., LTD.

CN 10,09

157 CHINA LONGYUAN POWER GROUP

CORPORATION

CN 1,03

158 ZHENGZHOU COAL INDUSTRY &

ELECTRIC POWER CO., LTD. CN 7,00

159 SGIS SONGSHAN CO., LTD. CN 3,43

160 KAILUAN ENERGY CHEMICAL CO., LTD. CN 8,41

161 COFCO EASTOCEAN OILS & GRAINS INDUSTRIES (ZHANGJIAGANG) CO., LTD.

CN 6,24

162 COSCO SHIPYARD GROUP CO., LTD. CN 16,16

163 TIANJIN PORT CO., LTD. CN 7,14

164 SHENMA INDUSTRY CO.LTD CN 0,20

165 TAIYUAN HEAVY MACHINERY GROUP

CO., LTD.

CN 1,54

166 AVICHINA INDUSTRY & TECHNOLOGY COMPANY LIMITED

CN -1,33

167 LUZHOU LAOJIAO GROUP CO., LTD. CN 10,28

168 DONGFANG TURBINE CO., LTD. CN 6,33

169 CHINA MEHECO CORPORATION CN 3,85

170 XJ GROUP CORPORATION CN 3,15

171 GUANGZHOU DEVELOPMENT GROUP

INCORPORATED

CN 5,84

172 YTO GROUP CORPORATION CN 1,59

40

174 SINOPEC GROUP ZHONGYUAN

PETROLEUM KANTANJU

CN -0,89

175 SHANGHAI JIN JIANG INTERNATIONAL

HOTELS (GROUP) COMPANY LIMITED CN 3,28

176 BAOSHENG GROUP CO., LTD. CN 5,70

177 SHENZHEN ENERGY GROUP CO., LTD. CN 6,27

178 YUNNAN CHIHONG ZINC &

GERMANIUM CO., LTD. CN 22,77

179 HUDONG-ZHONGHUA SHIPBUILDING

(GROUP) CO., LTD.

CN 5,65

180 HAFEI AVIATION INDUSTRY CO., LTD. CN 4,48

181 ZHEJIANG PROVINCE

GUOHUAZHENENG POWER GENERATION CO.,LTD

CN 2,84

182 BEIJING SHOUGANG CO., LTD. CN 2,80

183 GUANDONG GUOHUA YUEDIAN

TAISHAN ELECTRICITY GENERATE CO,LTD

CN 9,68

184 CHINA CAMC ENGINEERING CO., LTD. CN 5,58

185 SHANXI XINGHUA CUN FEN CHIEW

(GROUP) CO., LTD.

CN 7,53

186 NANJING AUTOMOBILE GROUP CO.,

LTD.

CN -0,55

187 BLUE STAR NEW CHEMICAL MATERIAL

CO., LTD.

CN 3,06

188 SHENZHEN GAS CORPORATION

LIMITED

CN 3,10

189 BEIJING TONGRENTANG CO., LTD. CN 4,09

190 JIANGNAN SHIPYARD (GROUP) CO.,

LTD.

CN 0,23

191 SHANGHAI DATUN ENERGY RESOURCES

CO., LTD.

CN 8,51

192 SHANGHAI JIAO YUN GROUP CO., LTD. CN 4,93

193 DOUBLE-STAR GROUP CO., LTD. CN 0,70

194 ZHEJIANG EXPRESSWAY COMPANY

LIMITED CN 8,45

195 HUNAN TIGER FOREST & PAPER GROUP CO., LTD.

CN 1,50

196 ZHEJIANG SOUTHEAST ELECTRIC

POWER COMPANY LIMITED CN 5,78

197 LIAOHE PETROLEUM PROSPEETING

BUREAU

CN 3,66

198 CHINA RESOURCES SANJIU MEDICAL &

PHARMACEUTICAL CO., LTD. CN 2,97

199 COFCO PROPERTY (GROUP) CO., LTD. CN 5,24

200 BEIJING URBAN CONSTRUCTION

41 Family Owned Firms

Company name Country ISO Code 2006 ROA using Net income %

1 CHENGDE DALU CO., LTD. CN -13,31

2 YANGZHOU SENSPORT SPORTING

GOODS CO., LTD.

CN 16,45

3 BEIJING ZHONGHE WINE CO., LTD. CN 9,26

4 TIANJIN H.I.T AUTOMATION

MACHINERY CO., LTD

CN 25,88

5 GUANGXI YULIN YUCHAI INDUSTRIAL

CHEMICAL CO., LTD. CN 10,11

6 SHENYANG YUHONG AGRICULTURAL

POWER BUREAU ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE MANUFACTURING COMPANY

CN 14,31

7 ZHUHAI ORBITA CONTROL

ENGINEERING CO LTD

CN 15,48

8 BEIJING MECC HYDRAULIC CO., LTD. CN 1,21

9 FENGHUA AIYIMEI DRESS ORNAMENT

CO., LTD.

CN 0,99

10 SANYOU HOLDINGS GROUP CO., LTD. CN 2,86

11 SHANDONG LITTLE DUCK GROUP CO.,

LTD.

CN -2,19

12 RUICHANG GOLD POWER

GENERATING EQUIPMENT (WUXI) MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.

CN 4,20

13 HUIREN GROUP CO., LTD. CN 7,83

14 SHENZHEN GRANDSUN ELECTRONIC

CO., LTD. CN 1,66

15 SHENZHEN HIFUTURE ELECTRIC CO

LTD

CN 15,08

16 SHANDONG FIN CNC MACHINE

COMPANY LIMITED CN 15,29

17 ZHEJIANG HUABIN PACKING

MATERIAL CO., LTD.

CN -0,95

18 CNLIGHT CO., LTD. CN 11,24

19 SICHUAN HAITE HIGH-TECH CO., LTD CN 5,70

20 HUBEI DINGLONG CHEMICAL CO LTD CN 7,69

21 TALKWEB INFORMATION SYSTEM

COMPANY LIMITED

CN 26,88

22 XIAMEN ANNE CORPORATION

LIMITED CN 9,21

23 HENGKANG MEDICAL GROUP CO., LTD. CN 10,28

24 CHONGQING HOPE FEED CO.,LTD. CN 4,83

25 JIANGSU DONGYUAN ELECTRICAL

GROUP CO., LTD.

CN 5,26

26 WENZHOU TAICHANG IRON TOWER

MANUFACTURING CO., LTD.

CN 2,81

27 BEIJING DYNAMIC POWER CO., LTD. CN 1,17

28 ZHEJIANG YONGTAI TECHNOLOGY CO

LTD

CN 15,65

29 BEIJING BDSTAR NAVIGATION CO LTD CN 20,19

30 ZHEFU HOLDING GROUP CO. LTD. CN 6,26

42

32 GUANGDONG RONSEN SUPER

MICRO-WIRE CO LTD

CN 7,36

33 GREATOO INC. CN 7,28

34 HENGBAO CO., LTD. CN 7,78

35 GUOXI ENTERPRISE GROUP CO., LTD. CN 3,47

36 GUANGDONG CHAOHUA TECHNOLOGY

CO., LTD

CN 8,86

37 ZOJE SEWING MACHINE CO., LTD. CN 5,06

38 BEIJING SL PHARMACEUTICAL CO.,

LTD.

CN 10,34

39 ZHEJIANG JINGXIN PHARMACEUTICAL

CO., LTD. CN 1,81

40 ZHOUSHAN ZHENYANG DEVELOPMENT

CO., LTD.

CN 0,15

41 DYMATIC CHEMICALS, INC. CN 10,04

42 SHANGHAI KEHUA BIO-ENGINEERING

CO., LTD.

CN 15,33

43 TIBET RHODIOLA PHARMACEUTICAL

HOLDING CO., LTD. CN 0,47

44 ZHONGHE CO., LTD. CN 6,74

45 SHANGHAI HI-TECH CONTROL SYSTEM

CO. LTD. CN 12,53

46 HEDY HOLDING CO., LTD. CN 4,41

47 ZHEJIANG MIZUDA PRINTING &

DYEING GROUP CO., LTD. CN 2,00

48 JIANGSU JIANGNAN HIGH POLYMER

FIBER CO., LTD.

CN 10,05

49 SHANTOU WANSHUN PACKAGE

MATERIAL COMPANY LIMITED CN 5,94

50 ZHEJIANG HUAFENG SPANDEX CO.,

LTD.

CN 5,55

51 MIRACLE AUTOMATION ENGINEERING

CO., LTD. CN 4,00

52 ZHEJIANG HUAHAI PHARMACEUTICAL

CO., LTD.

CN 10,06

53 SHENZHEN COSHIP ELECTRONICS CO.,

LTD. CN 5,69

54 SHENZHEN KINGDOM TECHNOLOGY

CO., LTD.

CN 9,38

55 BLUEFOCUS COMMUNICATION GROUP

COMPANY LIMITED CN 17,82

56 JIANGSU YANGLI GROUP CO., LTD. CN 3,57

57 MESNAC CO., LTD. CN 6,98

58 FUZHOU FD AUTOMATION-TECH CO.,

LTD.

CN 27,70

59 LIANHE CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY

COMPANY LIMITED CN 9,33

60 ZHEJIANG HANGXIAO STEEL

STRUCTURE CO., LTD.

CN 0,91

61 LIZI INDUSTRY GROUP CO.,LTD CN 19,49

62 QINGDAO KANGDA FOREIGN TRADE

GROUP CO., LTD

CN 7,29

63 DAYANG GROUP LTD CN 9,67

64 SIYUAN ELECTRIC CO., LTD. CN 10,26

65 SICHUAN GAOJIN FOOD CO LTD CN 6,16

66 SHANDONG LUHE GROUP CO., LTD. CN 7,62

67 ZHEJIANG TRANSFAR CO., LTD. CN 12,94