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Comments to this draft measure are due to be sent to Iris van der Hart Vastetelefonie-MA@opta.nl by 4 December 2005.

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PO Box 90420 2509 LK The Hague Telephone +31 70 315 35 00 Telefax +31 70 315 35 01 Visiting address:

Zurichtoren Muzenstraat 41 2511 WB The Hague The Netherlands

Summary notification form relating to a draft decision of the commission of the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority in the Netherlands with respect to the relevant market for wholesale access on the public telephone networks provided at a fixed location (related to market 1 and 2).

This summary notification form relates to a draft decision of the commission of the Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority in the Netherlands (hereafter: OPTA) with respect to the relevant market for wholesale access on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location (related to market 1 and 2).

In accordance with article 6b.2 of the Telecommunications Act OPTA notifies draft measures which would affect trade between Member States to the Commission of the European Communities and to the national regulatory authorities. The commission gives both to the Commission of the European Communities and to the national regulatory authorities the opportunity to make comments to the draft measure.

Comments to this draft measure are due to be sent to Iris van der Hart Vastetelefonie-MA@opta.nl by 4 December 2005.

The Hague, 4 November 2005

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Section 1

Market definition 1.1 The affected relevant product/service market.

The relevant product market consists of

1. wholesale access for low capacity connections 2. wholesale access for high capacity connections.

Market 1 comprises wholesale telephony connections over which maximum two conversations at the same time can be held

Market 2 comprises wholesale telephony connections over which 3 or more conversations at the same time can be held.

See chapter 5 (pages 30-45), § 5.2 and chapter 11 (i - iii) of the draft decision.

1.2 The affected relevant geographic market.

The relevant geographic market for the provision of wholesale access on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location is the Netherlands.

See chapter 5 (pages 30-45), § 5.2 and chapter 11 (i - iii) of the draft decision.

1.3 Summary of the opinion of the Netherlands Competition Authority

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) agrees with the conclusions drawn by OPTA, as confirmed in a letter to OPTA dated 30 June 2005. See annex NMa advice on draft decision of 30 June 2005, 4762/11.B261.

1.4 Overview of the results of the public consultation to date on the proposed market definition

See separate documents "Nota van bevindingen ten aanzien van de bij de ontwerpbesluiten voor de

wholesale markten (voor gespreksopbouw, doorgiftediensten, gespreksafgifte en toegang tot het vaste

openbare telefoonnetwerk) en voor de retailmarkten voor vaste telefonie ontvangen bedenkingen",

OPTA/TN/2005/203112 d.d. 4-11-2005 and "Annex Q: Nota van bevindingen ten aanzien van de inzake

annex A tot en met H bij de ontwerpbesluiten ontvangen bedenkingen", OPTA/TN/2005/203078 d.d. 4-

11-2005. These documents describe the results of the public consultation, as well as the way in which

OPTA has responded to points brought forward in this public consultation. The public consultation has

not lead OPTA to make changes in the proposed market definition.

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3 1.5 Differences with the Commission Recommendation on relevant markets

Yes, OPTA acknowledges that the Commission does not define these markets in the Recommendation of

the relevant product markets. OPTA refers to the Commission comments on the case UK/2003/00013,

where the Commission considered that the definition of a wholesale market access is not inconsistent

with the methodology set out in the Recommendation and the Guidelines.

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Section 2

Designation of undertakings with significant market power

2.1 Name(s) of the undertaking(s) designated as having individually or jointly significant market power or where applicable, the name(s) of the undertaking(s) which is (are) considered to no longer have significant market power.

Koninklijke KPN N.V. is considered to have significant market power on the market for the provision of wholesale access for low capacity connections on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location and on the market for the provision of wholesale access for high capacity connections on the public telephone network provided at a fixed location.

See chapter 6 (pages 38-41), § 6.2 and § 6.4 and chapter 11 (v - vi) of the draft decision.

2.2 Criteria relied upon for deciding to designate or not an undertaking as having individually or jointly with others significant market power.

Market for low capacity access - market share;

- control of infrastructure not easily duplicated;

- barriers to entry;

- absence of or low countervailing buying power.

Market for high capacity access - market share;

- barriers to entry;

- absence of or low countervailing buying power.

See chapter 6 (pages 38-41) of the draft decision.

2.3 Name of the main undertakings (competitors) present / active in the relevant market.

Only Koninklijke KPN N.V. offers wholesale access for low capacity connections.

2.4 Market shares of the undertakings mentioned above and the basis of their calculation (e.g., turnover, number of subscribers).

Market share on the market for wholesale access for low capacity connections: Koninklijke KPN N.V.

100%.

Wholesale access for high capacity connections is not been offered.

Market shares on related markets:

- Market share of Koninklijke KPN N.V. on the retail market for low capacity connections in terms

of number of access lines: [95-99%]

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5 - Market shares of Koninklijke KPN N.V. on the retail market for high capacity connections in terms

of number of access lines [80-90%]

See chapter 6 (pages 38-41) of the draft decision.

2.5 Summary of the opinion of the national competition authority where provided.

The Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) agrees with the conclusions drawn by OPTA, as confirmed in a letter to OPTA dated 30 June 2005, which is also sent to the Commission. See annex NMa advice on draft decision of 30 June 2005, 4762/11.B261.

2.6 Summary of the results of the public consultation to date on the proposed designation(s) as undertaking(s) having significant market power (e.g., total number of comments received, numbers agreeing/disagreeing).

See separate documents "Nota van bevindingen ten aanzien van de bij de ontwerpbesluiten voor de

wholesale markten (voor gespreksopbouw, doorgiftediensten, gespreksafgifte en toegang tot het vaste

openbare telefoonnetwerk) en voor de retailmarkten voor vaste telefonie ontvangen bedenkingen",

OPTA/TN/2005/203112 d.d. 4-11-2005 and "Annex Q: Nota van bevindingen ten aanzien van de inzake

annex A tot en met H bij de ontwerpbesluiten ontvangen bedenkingen" OPTA/TN/2005/203078 d.d. 4-11-

2005. These documents describe the results of the public consultation, as well as the way in which OPTA

has responded to points brought forward in this public consultation. The public consultation has not lead

OPTA to make changes in the conclusions regarding undertakings with significant market power.

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Section 3

Regulatory obligations

3.1 Legal basis for the obligations to be imposed, maintained, amended or withdrawn

The commission imposes the following obligations to KPN for wholesale access for low capacity connections:

- Access regulation based on article 6a.2 jo. 6a.6 of the Telecommunications Act;

- Transparency: Reference Offer based on article 6a.2 jo. article 6a.9,2 of the Telecommunications Act;

- Non discrimination based on article 6a.2 jo. article 6a.8 of the Telecommunications Act;

- Tariff regulation (cost orientation and imposed cost allocation system) based on article 6a.2 jo.

6a.7 of the Telecommunications Act;

- Accounting separation based on article 6a.2 jo. 6a.10 of the Telecommunications Act.

See chapter 8 (pages 51 - 64), § 8.9 and chapter 11 (vii - xxvi) of the draft decision.

3.2 Reasons for the imposition, maintenance or amendment of the obligations

The obligations are imposed to prevent/counteract competitive problems:

1. wholesale access for low capacity connections - refusal to deal/denial of access;

- discriminatory use or withholding of information;

- delaying tactics;

- undue requirements;

- quality discrimination;

- strategic design of product;

- excessive pricing;

- margin squeeze;

- undue use of information about competitors;

- bundling/tying.

2. wholesale access for high capacity connections - no competitive problems.

See chapter 7 (pages 42 - 50) of the draft decision.

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7 Obligations:

Access Proportional

allocation of WSC Transparency;

reference offer Non-discrimination Tariff

regulation Accounting separation

Competitive problems

refusal to deal/denial of access

discriminatory use or withholding

of information

Delaying tactics

undue requirements

quality discrimination

strategic design of product

undue use of information about

competitors

price discrimination

excessive pricing

predatory pricing/margin squeeze • •

tying

Overview of obligations imposed to KPN for low capacity wholesale access and the competitive problems

3.3 Exceptional measures Not applicable.

3.4 Summary of the results of the public consultation to date on the proposed obligations

See separate documents "Nota van bevindingen ten aanzien van de bij de ontwerpbesluiten voor de wholesale markten (voor gespreksopbouw, doorgiftediensten, gespreksafgifte en toegang tot het vaste openbare telefoonnetwerk) en voor de retailmarkten voor vaste telefonie ontvangen bedenkingen", OPTA/TN/2005/203112 d.d. 4-11-2005 and "Annex Q: Nota van bevindingen ten aanzien van de inzake annex A tot en met H bij de ontwerpbesluiten ontvangen bedenkingen", OPTA/TN/2005/203078 d.d. 4- 11-2005. These documents describe the results of the public consultation, as well as the way in which OPTA has responded to points brought forward in this public consultation.

The public consultation has lead OPTA to make material change in the proposed implementation of the wholesale tariff regulation for WLR on low capacity connections. In the draft decision OPTA had

proposed a cost-plus system for setting the wholesale tariff. The commission will change this into a retail- minus system (see paragraph 6.4 of the “Nota van Bevindingen”).

Moreover, in the draft decision (see § 8.7) OPTA had proposed the proportional allocation of wholesale specific costs. The commission has decided not to impose this obligation (see paragraph 7.3.1 of Annex Q).

The draft decision will be amended, accordingly, after finalization of the notification

procedure.

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Section 4

Compliance with International obligations

4.1 Imposition, amendment or withdrawal of obligations provided for in Article 8(5) of Directive 2002/19/EC (Access Directive)

Not applicable.

4.2 Name(s) of the undertaking(s) concerned Not applicable.

4.3 International commitments entered by the Community and its Member States that need to be respected.

Not applicable.

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