Master Thesis, MSc Human Resource Management University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business
June 2014 INGE TEMPEL Studentnumber: s2407795 Plutolaan 184 9742 GV Groningen tel.: +31 (0)655190979 e-mail: h.a.i.tempel@student.rug.nl Supervisor: dr. J. Jordan Second reader: dr. L. B. Mulder Word count: 9154
GUILT AND EMPATHY PREDICT PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR OF THE POWERFUL
Abstract. Guilt enhances prosociality because it helps the guilty to more easily
empathize with others (Joireman, 2004). This process is weakened by power, as power orients inwards. People with high-power are less likely to perspective-take, and more likely to exhibit self-focused behavior at the expense of others (Galinsky, Magee, Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). While this is true, I argue that the degree to which one’s power reduces the effect of guilt on prosocial behavior depends on how empathic that person is. Therefore, I propose a three-way interaction between guilt, power, and empathy to predict prosocial behavior. The hypotheses have been experimentally tested among students of the University of Groningen. The findings suggest that when a powerful person is able to empathize with other people, this person becomes more prosocial when induced to feel guilty. However, this effect is not witnessed for those who do not feel empathy for other people. These results contradict the image of the powerful person as merely selfish and antisocial and provide a more nuanced view of the relationship between power and prosociality.
INTRODUCTION
Recent publicity about corporate scandals has directed the focus of research towards ethical and prosocial decision-making of powerful leaders and managers (e.g., Bratton & Strittmatter, 2013; Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005). Having managers who behave
ethically and prosocially in an organization is beneficial, as it is found to be positively related to employee’s commitment and job satisfaction (Brown et al., 2005), subordinate’s voice and psychological safety (Walumbwa & Schaubroeck, 2009), and employee’s performance, self-efficacy, and organizational identification (Walumbwa, Mayer, Wang, Wang, Workman, & Christensen, 2010). Furthermore, prosocial behavior of leaders informs subordinates about moral expectations and standards, and thereby demonstrates which behavior is deemed morally appropriate in an organization (Brown & Treviño, 2006; Resick, Hargis, Shao, & Dust, 2013). Hence, organizations can value from having leaders who use their power ethically and for prosocial purposes. In order to find a deeper understanding for when the powerful will use their power to benefit others, it is necessary and useful to research emotional antecedents that stimulate prosocial behavior.
Recalling and considering previous antisocial behavior activates an individual to engage in prosocial behavior (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). More specifically, feeling guilty about past incidents is found to be related to prosocial behavior, in the sense that experiencing feelings of guilt makes people put the interests of others above their own (de Hooge, Nelissen, Breugelmans, & Zeelenberg, 2011). In addition, Roseman, Wiest, and Schwartz (1994) found that, when people recall situations in which they felt guilty, those who though that they were in the wrong and should not have done something, felt like undoing their actions and
punishing themselves, apologized, and wanted to make up for their misdeeds and be forgiven. Following Roseman et al. (1994), guilt seems to be an emotion that induces people to think about their transgressions and, in turn, motivates them to rectify their antisocial behavior.
Löwe, Kogan, Goetz, & Keltner, 2008). In addition, they might have the tendency to behave less prosocially, as they are likely to be focused on accomplishing their own goals at the expense of others’ goals (Galinsky et al., 2003). Thus, powerful individuals are likely to be self-oriented, because they do not necessarily empathize with other people.
In sum, guilt is associated with the goal of taking someone else’s concerns into account, because it makes people more easily empathize with others, and hence increases the willingness to cooperate (Nelissen, Dijker, & de Vries, 2007). In contrast, when in power, one seems to take less perspective, respond less empathic towards others and become more self-focused (Galinsky et al., 2003). Research has not specifically self-focused on the relationship between guilt, power, empathy, and prosocial behavior. This Master’s Thesis focuses on the interaction between these variables, in order to find an emotion-related individual difference that causes powerful individuals to behave prosocially. Firstly, I assert that recalling a situation in which one feels guilty increases prosocial behavior, as de Hooge et al. (2011) found that guilt was positively related to prosocial behavior. In addition, I suggest that power negatively influences this relationship because power reduces empathic and social responses towards others (Galinsky et al., 2006; Keltner et al., 2003). Finally, I claim that the prosocial behavior of powerful people is conditional upon how empathic that person is. I will answer three research questions: Is guilt positively related to engaging in prosocial behavior? Does power moderate the relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior? And, Is the positive relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior, as moderated by power, conditional upon empathy, such that the negative effects of power on the guilt to prosocial behavior
relationship will not be witnessed for those who are high in empathy?
This research contributes to theory on guilt, power, and prosocial behavior, as it provides insight into how an emotion-related individual difference might explain why the powerful sometimes act in prosocial (versus antisocial) ways. This research is also useful for practical considerations, as it demonstrates that by fostering a particular individual difference (i.e., empathy) it can help the powerful to ward against the otherwise negative tendencies that accompany power.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK Guilt Leads to Prosocial Behavior
norm. The experience of guilt is related to social distress, as it increases interpersonal conflict, rejection, loneliness, and feelings of uncertainty (Baumeister, Reis, & Delespaul, 1995). Guilt is defined as, “an individual’s unpleasant emotional state associated with possible objections to his or her actions, inaction, circumstances, or intentions.” (Baumeister, Stillwell, & Heatherton, 1994, p. 245).
Guilt has a relationship-enhancing function. This ‘moral emotion’ is found to benefit social relationships, as it stimulates prosocial behavior in one’s social environment and makes people put the interests of others above their own (de Hooge et al., 2011). Feelings of guilt arise from transgressing social norms and the awareness of positive inequities between people. Guilt enhances social relationships, as it induces individuals to avoid future norm violations, strengthens social relationships, and re-balances the inequities (Baumeister et al., 1994). Frank (2004) describes guilt as a commitment device, as, “a guilty person may invest time and energy to make up for something (s)he did to another person, but may eventually benefit therefore by saving a mutually rewarding and beneficial relationship.” (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009, p. 543). So even though guilt is an individual process occurring within one’s psyche, it is also a product of social interaction (Baumeister et al., 1994). Thus, guilt is a function of human relationships. People behave prosocially when they feel guilty because they want to enhance social relationships.
A transgressor’s future behavior is influenced by guilt, as feeling guilt provides motivation to compensate for the transgression. Roseman et al. (1994) assert that guilt is, “an emotion in which people think about their transgressions and may [lead them] to rectify the situation (p. 214)”. Feelings of guilt influence a transgressor’s future behavior in the sense that he or she is motivated to avoid future norm violations, engages in self-punitive behavior, and is likely to help other people (Carni, Petrocchi, del Miglio, Mancini, & Couyoumdjian, 2013). In addition, Amodio, Devine, and Harmon-Jones (2007) found that guilt was positively related to motivational and behavioral change. These researchers asserted that awareness of norm violation led to feeling guilty. When a transgressor had an opportunity to make up for the transgression, he or she would generally be motivated to do so.
The relationship between guilt, empathy, and prosocial behavior has had some
attention in research. For example, guilt is found to facilitate interpersonal relationships, as it elicits other-focused empathic responses (Joireman, 2004; Leith & Baumeister, 1998;
to others (Baumeister et al., 1994). In this sense, guilt may increase empathy because people experience empathy if they “consider how others have been hurt, wronged or harmed.” (Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009, p. 543). There is some empirical evidence suggesting this relationship between guilt and empathy. Firstly, feeling guilty after transgressing is correlated with empathy, in the sense that empathic individuals are more likely to experience guilt than are less empathic individuals (Tangney, 1991). In addition, Exline, Baumeister, Zell, Kraft, and Witvliet (2008) found that when people reflect on how they are capable of harming others (an experience that may elicit feelings of guilt), they subsequently feel more empathy for the victim.
To conclude, I suggest that guilt motivates people to engage in prosocial behavior because it elicits empathic responses towards other people. Therefore, I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Guilt is positively related to engaging in prosocial behavior.
Power as Moderator of the Guilt to Prosocial Behavior Relationship
As I argue above, when feeling guilty, one is inclined to put other people’s interests above their own (de Hooge et al., 2011), and is motivated to satisfy others’ needs by actively helping and cooperating (Dijker, Nelissen, & Stijnen, 2013; Ketelaar & Au, 2003). Guilt enhances prosociality because it helps the guilty to more easily empathize with others – a process that is often blunted by power (Galinsky et al., 2006).
(Social) power can be described as, one’s “capacity to influence other individuals through asymmetric control over valuable resources and the ability to administer rewards and punishments” (Gruenfeld, Inesi, Magee, & Galinsky, 2008, p. 112). Powerful individuals are likely to be focused on serving their own interests, influencing others’ behavior, and
manipulating others. Furthermore, powerful individuals are less aware of the emotions and needs of the people around them, and are inclined to focus on their own goal achievement (Galinsky et al., 2006; Keltner et al., 2003).
self-orientation of powerful people is demonstrated by two findings: people with high-power are (1) less likely to perspective-take, and (2) more likely to exhibit self-focused behavior at the expense of others (Galinsky et al, 2006; Keltner et al., 2003).
Perspective-taking. Perspective-taking can be described as, “the cognitive capacity to spontaneously consider the world from another’s viewpoint.” (Gilin, Maddux, Carpenter, & Galinsky, 2013, p. 3). People with power are less likely to perspective-take. Galinsky et al. (2006) empirically tested the relationship between power and perspective-taking and showed that people who were primed with high-power, in contrast to people primed with low-power, had less tendency to take other people’s perspectives into account (i.e., seeing, thinking, and feeling). Moreover, Keltner et al. (2003) found that high-power was related to attention to rewards and automatic information processing. They asserted that having high-power made people behave in ways without conscious awareness of the effects of their behavior on others. Finally, having high-power made people less cognizant of others, perceive the social
environment in more automatic, simplistic ways, and act in a disinhibited and sometimes counter-normative fashion (Keltner et al., 2003).
Self-focused behavior. Individuals who have high-power may exhibit self-focused behavior, in the sense that they are more likely to pursue their self-interests at the expense of others, and have less propensity to respond emotionally to other people’s suffering. A wide range of research has confirmed this relationship by suggesting that power appears to elicit behavior that gives primacy to one’s own interests and desires (Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001).
When having high-power, people are less dependent on the resources of others, more easily able to satisfy their own needs and desires, and more likely to have an action
orientation (i.e., acting in goal-consistent manner), regardless of social consequences
(Galinsky et al., 2003). Moreover, high-power individuals are freed from social interference and insensitive to punishments and threats, and more likely to pursue self-serving attributions (Galinsky et al., 2003). Finally, individuals who have high-power experience more positive than negative emotions and therefore do not perceive other people’s emotions very accurately. As a result, they experience less distress and less compassion, and exhibit greater autonomic emotion regulation when confronted with other people’s suffering (van Kleef et al., 2008).
and makes them more self-focused. Thus, I suggest that whereas guilt is found to lead to prosocial behavior (de Hooge et al., 2011), power would likely blunt these effects, because power reduces empathic responses towards others. I propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Power moderates the positive relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior, such that the relationship becomes weaker when power is high.
The Effect of Empathy on the Interaction Between Power and Guilt
Moral emotions, for example, empathy, induce people to engage in behavior in which they neglect their self-interests at the expense of others’ interests (Batson & Moran, 1999; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009; Nelissen et al., 2007). Therefore, I suggest that the extent to which power reduces the effect of guilt on prosocial behavior depends on how empathic that person is.
Empathy is an affective response derived from the understanding of someone else’s emotions or experience of a situation (Taylor, Eisenberg, Spinrad, Eggum, & Sulik, 2013; Teller and Pfister, 2012). Empathy is related to “social and cognitive skills such as emotion understanding, perspective-taking, and self-awareness that provide [people] with an
awareness of other people’s feelings and needs” (Taylor et al., 2013, p. 822).
Empathy is an important contributor of prosocial behavior oriented towards other persons (Eisenberg, Eggum, & Di Giunta, 2010; Roberts & Strayer, 1996). Empathy is found to increase the degree to which an individual will behave prosocially (Taylor, et al., 2013). This was confirmed by Stocks, Lishner, and Decker (2009), as they found that empathy elicited an unselfish motivation to decrease a victim’s suffering instead of “an egoistic aversive-arousal reduction motive” (p. 649). Taylor et al. (2013) also argued that empathy is positively related to behavior that benefits other people (i.e., prosocial behavior) and that empathic individuals were more likely to understand other person’s feelings, and be sensitive when responding to these feelings. Empathy induces people to “direct attention to others’ needs and engender feelings of concern for others in pain, need, or distress.” (Taylor et al., 2013, p. 824).
2007). Therefore, I suggest that while power may weaken the effects of guilt on prosocial behavior, this will not be the case if the powerful person is high in empathy. That is, for the powerful who are high in empathic understanding, guilt will lead to prosocial behavior, just as it does in those who lack power.
This claim is supported by the findings of Anderson and Berdahl (2002) and Keltner et al. (2003). These researchers asserted that a social consequence of having high-power is behavioral disinhibition, that it, behavior driven by one’s true state or traits. Following these researchers, highly empathic individuals will act upon their empathic feelings toward others when they are in power. Thus, if having empathy for other people reflects one’s ‘true self’, guilt combined with power should bring out one’s prosocial side, instead of one’s antisocial side.
To conclude, power makes people focus on their own interests at the expense of others (Galinsky et al., 2006; Keltner et al., 2003). In contrast, empathy increases the degree to which one takes the interests of other people into account (Gilin et al., 2013). Therefore, I suggest that the negative effects of power on guilt to prosociality will not be witnessed for those high in empathic understanding.
Hypothesis 3: The positive relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior, as moderated by power, is conditional upon empathy, such that the negative effects of power on the guilt to prosocial behavior relationship will not be witnessed for those who are high in empathy.
To note, while beyond the scope of my hypotheses, I expect that for those low in power, empathy will have no effect on the guilt to prosocial behavior relationship, because for people low in power, the guilt is already an empathy-enhancing motivator.
FIGURE 1
The Conceptual Model
METHODS
Participants
I collected the data from participants in the FEB Research Lab in the Duisenberg building of the Faculty of Economics and Business of the University of Groningen. The participants studied at the University of Groningen and I compensated them for their
participation with either three research credits or €6. In total, 141 participants completed the study. The average age of the participants was 21 (SD = 2.34), and 55 percent of the
participants were female. The majority of the participants (83 percent) came from Europe. In total, 64 percent of the participants were Dutch, and 12 percent were Asian. The remaining participants were Indian, Middle Eastern, or American.
I had to exclude 16 participants due to errors in the research procedure or due to manipulations that did not succeed (e.g., participants did not believe that they had to cooperate with someone else or that they would participate in a decision-making task). Confidentiality was guaranteed, as participation to the study was completely anonymous.
Research Design and Measures
and level of education), and probed for participants’ suspicion as to the purpose of the research.
Power manipulation. To manipulate power, I used a role-based manipulation.
Specifically, I told participants that they had to participate in a task in which they had to build a Tanagram from a set of Legos, in cooperation with another participant (see Jordan,
Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2011). All participants received the following instructions:
In this task, you will be completing something called a Tanagram from a set of Legos. If you are a MANAGER in this game, you will evaluate the other players' performance and divide €15 in bonus money among yourself and the builders. If you are a BUILDER in this game, your performance evaluation and bonus compensation will be decided by the person in the manager role.
In order to determine the role division, the participants had to complete a Leadership Questionnaire. I told the participants that the Leadership Questionnaire was diagnostic of their leadership abilities and that their role assignment to either the role of manager or builder for the Tanagram task would be based on the results of this questionnaire. However, in actuality, the role assignment was pre-assigned prior to the participant entering the lab and was
completely random. After completing the Leadership Questionnaire, the participants received feedback. Specifically, participants in the high-power conditions received the following feedback:
Based on your score and the score of the other people in the lab on the
leadership questionnaire, you are assigned to the role of MANAGER in the Tanagram completion task later in this session.
As a MANAGER you are in charge of directing the subordinates across the hall in building something called a Tanagram from a set of Legos. You decide how to
structure the process of building the Tanagram and the standards by which the work is to be evaluated. In addition, you will also evaluate the builders at the end of the
determine how the bonus money, an amount of €15, will be divided between the builders and you.
Thus, as a MANAGER, you will be in charge of directing the building, evaluating your subordinates, and determining the rewards you and your subordinates will receive.
Whereas, participants in the low-power conditions received the following feedback:
Based on your score and the score of the other people in the lab on the leadership questionnaire, you are assigned to the role of BUILDER in the Tanagram completion task later in this session.
As a BUILDER you will have the responsibility of carrying out the task of building a Tanagram according to instructions given to you by your manager. Your manager will call you in to give you instructions when ready. Your manager will decide how to structure the process for building the Tanagram and the standards by which the work is to be evaluated. Which tasks you complete will be decided by the manager.
In addition, you will be evaluated by the manager at the end of the session. This evaluation will be private, that is, you will not see your manager's evaluation of you. These evaluations will help determine how the bonus money, an amount of €15, will be divided between the builders and the manager. You will not have the opportunity to evaluate your manager. Only the manager will be in charge of directing production, evaluating your performance, and determining the rewards you will receive.
Guilt manipulation. I manipulated guilt by using an adaptation of the Ketelaar and Au (2003) manipulation. In the guilt-condition, the participants recalled and described a personal situation in which they harmed or hurt another person to who they were close to – and in which they felt guilty afterwards. In the low-guilt condition, the participants recalled and described an incident in which they interacted with someone who they were close to. In order to check the manipulation, I used two items of the emotion-manipulation scale of de Hooge et al. (2011). All participants had to indicate how much guilt and regret they currently (i.e., at the moment of participating) felt, on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = not at all; 5 = very strongly) (α = .79).
Prosocial behavior. I measured the dependent variable by letting the participants play a variation of a dictator game, in the sense that they had to divide five lottery tickets among themselves and a charity. This measurement was a variation of the dictator game, because, “in a typical dictator game, one person decides how to divide a sum of money (or other resources) among oneself and another person without the other having any influence on the division of the resources.” (de Hooge et al., 2011, p. 4). In my version of the game, participants took part in a lottery in which they could win €50. The €50 could either be won for themselves or for a charity of their choice. Participants received instructions to indicate on each of the five lottery tickets whether they would like the €50 to go to themselves or to a charity of their choice. They did not have to indicate the same choice on all the tickets and could allocate their choice as they desired. After indicating their choice, the participants had to put the lottery tickets in a sealed box.
Empathy. I measured empathy by using the perspective-taking scale from Davis (1980). Participants had to rate nine items (1 = not at all; 7 = very much so) such as, ‘If I were currently in a disagreement, I would try to look at everybody's side before I made a decision’, and ‘I would try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their perspective’. As the original items of Davis (1980) focused on general situations, I slightly adapted them to represent the current situation in order to measure how the participants felt at the moment of participating in the study. Chronbach’s alpha of the Davis scale was .74.
Procedure
‘Leadership’, and that they would complete several different tasks, such as answering
questions about their leadership capabilities, completing a group exercise, recalling a situation about their own life, taking part in an actual lottery, and finally answering some questions about themselves. After agreeing to participate, the experimenter guided the participants to a separate room in which they individually completed the study on a computer. All instructions and manipulations were presented on the computer.
Firstly, the participants participated in a Lego-building task in cooperation with another participant (Galinsky et al., 2003). They had to believe that the other participant was in the room next door. Participants then completed the bogus Leadership Questionnaire. After the participants completed the Leadership Questionnaire, the experimenter came in and said that the computer was tabulating their responses. While waiting for their role assignment, the participants started with the next part of study.
Next, participants completed the recall assignment, adapted from Ketelaar and Au (2003). Immediately after completing their recall, the participants received the feedback on the Leadership Questionnaire. I then measured prosocial behavior by having the participant divide the five lottery tickets amongst themselves and a charity.
Then, the participants left the room. To ensure that the participants believed that they actually had to do a different part of the study, they had to move from the rooms to individual cubicles, where I measured their empathy. In addition, the participants completed the power manipulation check, and several demographic measures. Furthermore, I probed for suspicion as to the purpose of the study.
Lastly, participants received compensation for their participation, by either money or research points, and received debriefing via a written statement. In the debriefing, participants were instructed not to disclose any information about the study.
RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
(mean = 6, SD = .78) than the builders (mean = 2.11, SD = 1.18), F (1, 123) = 466.16, p < .05. In addition, on the two-item guilt manipulation check, the participants in the guilt condition reported to feel more guilty (mean = 3.13, SD = 1.10) than the participants in the low-guilt condition (mean = 1.63, SD = .76). F (1, 123) = 77.64, p < .05.
Descriptive Statistics
The means, standard deviations and intercorrelations for all of the variables are presented in Table 1. I computed the Pearson correlation coefficient to determine the correlations between all the variables. The correlation analysis only showed a marginally-significant positive correlation between empathy and prosocial behavior (r = .15, p < .10).
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statistics and Study Variable Intercorrelations
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 1. Guilt -- 2. Power .03 -- 3. Empathy 4.59 .67 .08 -.09 -- 4. Prosocial behavior 1.73 1.73 .02 -.07 .15+ -- Notes. N = 125. +p < 0.10, *p < .05, **p < .01 Tests of Hypotheses
TABLE 2
Regression Analyses Results for Prosocial Behavior
Prosocial Behavior Predictor B SE t p LLCI 95% ULCI 95% Main effects Guilt .07 .15 .47 .63 -.22 .37 Power -.13 .15 -.87 .39 -.42 .17 Empathy .17 .15 1.14 .26 -.13 .47 Two-way interactions Guilt x Power -.13 .15 -.85 .40 -.42 .17 Guilt x Empathy -.04 .15 -.26 .79 -.34 .26 Power x Empathy .53** .15 3.57 .00 .24 .83 Three-way interactions
Guilt x Power x Empathy .32* .15 2.14 .03 .03 .62
Notes. N = 125. Standardized regression coefficients are presented. +p < 0.10, * p < .05, ** p <.01
Hypothesis 1 suggested that guilt was positively related to engaging in prosocial behavior. I did not find a significant relationship between guilt and pro-social behavior (B = .07, SE = .15, t = .47, p = .63, LLCI 95% = -.22, ULCI 95% = .37). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is rejected.
Hypothesis 2 suggested that the guilt to prosocial relationship was moderated by power. I did not find a significant interaction between guilt and power on prosocial behavior (B = -.13, SE = .15, t = -.85, p = .40, LLCI 95% = -.42, ULCI 95% = .17). There are no differences in the effects of guilt on pro-social behavior between people with high-power and low-power. Hence, Hypothesis 2 is also rejected.
of power and empathy to prosocial behavior (B = .53, SE = .15, t = 3.57, p < .001, LLCI 95% = .24, ULCI 95% = .83).
Significance of the Slopes
The three-way interaction between guilt, power, and empathy to prosocial behavior is depicted in Figure 2. The slopes demonstrate the expected guilt to prosocial behavior effect, that is, powerful people with high-empathy behave more prosocially when made to feel guilty. This effect is blunted for people low in empathy.
FIGURE 2
Three-way Interaction Plot I
However, the slopes are not significantly different from one another (B = .38, SE = .28, t = 1.37, p = .17, LLCI 95% = -.17, ULCI 95% = .93). In addition, I did not find a significant difference between the highly-empathic people in the high-guilt and low-guilt conditions (Slope 1: B = .38, SE = .40, t = .95, p = .35, LLCI 95% = -.42, ULCI 95% = 1.18).
In addition, there is also no significant difference between those with low-empathy in the high-guilt and low-guilt condition (Slope 2: B = -.38, SE = .30, t = -1.26, p = .21, LLCI 95% = -.97, ULCI 95% = .21). This could be a Type II error or due to low statistical power, since the study had 4 conditions (high-power/low-power and high-guilt/low-guilt), in addition to moderation by an individual difference (empathy), and a sample size of 125 participants.
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3
Low Guilt High Guilt
Pr
osoc
ial
b
eh
avior (1) High Power. High
Empathy
In order to further explore these effects, I split the sample by doing a median-split for empathy, and used one-way ANOVA to examine the significance of the differences between the points of the slopes for those in the and low-guilt conditions. For those in the high-guilt condition, I found a significant difference between those with high- and low-empathy (F (1, 30) = 7.28, p < .05). Thus, for those high in power, guilt makes those with high empathy more prosocial than those with low empathy. In addition, there is no significant difference between those with high-empathy and low-empathy in the low-guilt condition (F (1, 27) = 1.25, p = .27). Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is accepted.
Low Power
Although outside the purview of my hypotheses, I expected and noted that for the low-powered, empathy would have no effect on the guilt to prosocial behavior relationship, because for people with low-power, the guilt is already an empathy-enhancing motivator.
FIGURE 3
Three-way Interaction Plot II
When examining the significance of each slope, I did not find a significant difference between the highempathic people in the highguilt and lowguilt conditions (Slope 3: B = -.34, SE = .36, t = -.94, p = .35, LLCI 95% = -1.10, ULCI 95% = .38). However, there is a significant difference between low-empathic people in the high-guilt and low-guilt conditions (Slope 4: B = .58, SE = .33, t = 1.76, p = .08, LLCI 95% = -.07, ULCI 95% = 1.24).
Finally, the median-split for empathy showed that, for those in the high-guilt
condition, there is no significant difference between those with high- and low-empathy (F (1, 30) = 1.27, p = .27). In addition, as can be seen in Figure 3, there is also no significant
difference for those in the low-guilt condition between those with high- and low-empathy (F (1, 30) = .39, p = .54).
DISCUSSION
This Master’s Thesis focused on the interaction between guilt, power, empathy, and prosocial behavior. A positive relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior was suggested, as guilt is found to elicit unselfish, empathic, and other-oriented behavior (de Hooge et al., 2011). Power was hypothesized to negatively influence this relationship, as power reduces empathic responses and gives people an opportunity to exhibit self-oriented behavior at the expense of others (Galinsky et al., 2003; Gruenfeld et al., 2008). Furthermore,
0 0,5 1 1,5 2 2,5 3
Low Guilt High Guilt
Pr
osoc
ial
b
eh
avior (3) Low Power. High
Empathy
it was expected that this relationship was contingent on empathy. The negative effect of power on the guilt-to-prosocial behavior relationship was expected not to be witnessed for those who are high in empathy, as empathic individuals are more likely to have a
predisposition to understanding other person’s feelings (Taylor, 2013), and empathy increases the degree to which one takes the interests of other people into account (Gilin et al., 2013).
Findings
Power and Empathy. The third hypothesis suggested that the negative effects of power on the guilt to prosocial behavior relationship would not be witnessed for those who are high in empathy. This hypothesis is accepted, as I found that for those high in power, guilt made those with high empathy significantly more prosocial than those with low empathy. In addition, this effect was not witnessed in the low-guilt condition.
These findings demonstrate that when a powerful person is able to empathize with other people, this person becomes more prosocial when induced to feel guilty. Instead of power making that person more selfish and antisocial, guilt and empathy bring out that
person’s prosocial side. Hence, the positive relationship between guilt and prosocial behavior, as moderated by power, is conditional upon how empathic that person is.
The relationship between power, empathy, and prosocial behavior has also been studied by Côté et al. (2011). Côté and colleagues found that the prosocial behavior of those with elevated power was strongly associated with empathy accuracy. Empathy accuracy reflects the degree to which one accurately perceives the emotions of others. These
researchers found that when prosocially-oriented individuals (i.e., those who perceive others’ emotions accurately and act upon this by benefiting other people) are in power, they are likely to pursue prosocial goals, such as attending to other people’s emotions and needs. In addition, this effect was not witnessed for those with reduced power. Thus, elevated power provided highly empathic individuals the opportunity to act upon their prosocial goals and motives (Côté et al., 2011).
the people around them than are the powerless. Schmid and Drioly (2013) asserted that the powerful might be motivated to recognize other people’s emotions correctly, as the skill helps them to maintain good relationships with their subordinates, and hence achieve better
leadership outcomes.
Furthermore, Chen et al. (2013) found that people’s relationship-orientation determines the goals that one pursues with his or her power. People with an exchange relationship-orientation associated their power with self-interest goals, as they were focused on the rewards they received when helping someone else. They were merely self-focused, as they expected something of equal value in return when satisfying other people’s needs and interests. In contrast, people with a communal relationship-orientation were found to use their power for social-responsibility goals, as they were focused on satisfying other peoples’ needs and interests (Chen et al., 2001). The communal relationship-orientation seems to be related to empathy, since empathy also leads one to focus on other people’s interests, needs and emotions (Taylor et al., 2013). Hence, following Chen et al. (2001) a powerful person’s attitudes towards relationships might also explain their empathic responses towards others, and subsequently determine whether or not they behave prosocially when feeling guilty.
Low Power and Prosociality. I expected that for the low-powered, empathy would have no effect on the guilt to prosocial behavior relationship, because for people with low-power, the guilt is already an empathy-enhancing motivator. Against expectations, I found a significant difference between low-empathic people in the high-guilt and low-guilt conditions. Powerless people with low-empathy behaved more prosocially when they felt guilty than when they did not feel guilty. In addition, this effect was not witnessed for those high in empathy. When made to feel guilty (as opposed to not feeling guilty), powerless people with high-empathy did not behave more prosocially.
negative emotion derived from being powerless might reduce one’s motivation to respond to other peoples’ suffering, and hence prevent one from behaving prosocially.
Moreover, the dependency of the powerless on the powerful might increase the competitiveness of the powered, and hence decrease the degree to which those with low-power engage in prosocial and cooperative behavior. Emerson (1962) characterized low-power as an attribute of a social relation, as opposed to an attribute of an actor. He asserted that social relations involve reciprocal dependency. In this sense, power is not derived from a
hierarchical position, but depends on the degree to which one depends upon someone else for achieving goals. The low-powered were generally motivated to get control over their goal achievement by stabilizing the social relation and by overcoming dependency on the powerful. In order to get back in control, the powerless engaged in self-serving “balancing operations”, such as reduced motivational investment in the relationship, and the denial of alternative resources to the powerful. Thus, following Emerson (1962), guilt might not automatically be an empathy-enhancing motivator to engage in prosocial behavior. In
contrast, empathic responses derived from guilt that could lead to prosocial behavior might be blocked by one’s competitive desire to overcome dependency on the powerful.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
Theory about the behavior of powerful leaders and managers has indicated two
contradicting perspectives. Firstly, power is found to have negative effects, as it makes people focus on personal goal accomplishment at the expense of others (Galinsky et al., 2003;
Galinsky et al., 2006; Keltner et al., 2003; Kipnis, 1972). On the other hand, power is found to have positive effects, as power can also be used as a means to benefit other people (Côté, 2011). The results of this research contribute to the theory about the behavior of powerful leaders and managers, as it found a situation (i.e., feeling guilty) and an emotion-related individual difference (i.e., empathy) that explains when powerful people are likely to behave prosocially. Hence, the findings provide a more nuanced view of the relationship between power and prosociality.
The findings of this research could guide human resource managers to identify leaders who will behave prosocially when feeling guilty. During a selection process, a similar test as I did during the study could be done. That is, the inducement of guilt, followed by a
behave prosocially in a situation in which he or she feels guilty. A manager with this
characteristic is beneficial when, for instance, he or she has a conflict in which a subordinate was wronged, and the manager feels guilty afterwards. As a result, the manager will respond by behaving prosocially and will, by that, positively influence the relationship with its subordinate.
The findings of this study support the use of guilt-inducing mechanisms in
organizations. For example, organizations could induce feelings of guilt by making powerful managers and leaders personally accountable for their actions, and by making them reflect on their behavior. This, in combination with screening applicants on their empathic responses towards others could lead to leaders who behave prosocially.
By employing leaders who are less likely to misuse their power and authority to influence others on behalf of their self-interests, an organization could enhance control over those who have power. An organization could benefit from having prosocial leaders, because having leaders who use their power for good causes, such as helping, cooperating and
benefiting others, increases subordinate satisfaction and performance (Walumbwa et al., 2010), and might reduce the likelihood of corporate scandals, and hence protect
organizational integrity and image.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
A limitation of this study is that the data is collected in an experimental setting in which guilt and power were primed. Field research has an advantage over experimental research, as field research gives a more accurate view of actual behavior within organizations. Experimental research does not capture the underlying relationships between leaders and their subordinates. Thus, in a future study, I would test the hypotheses in a more realistic work setting. Secondly, I would also measure the relations among the participants and the power of each participant, since power is not only derived from one’s hierarchical position.
Schaumberg, 2012, p. 125). Therefore, in future research, I would control for guilt-proneness, or use guilt-proneness as a moderator to predict prosocial behavior.
Another limitation is the prosocial behavior measure. Prosocial behavior was measured by letting the participants divide five lottery tickets among themselves and a charity. However, since donation to a charity was an adaption of a dictator game, it might not be a valid predictor of prosocial behavior. Carlo and Randall (2002) have asserted that
donating to charity is a measurement of a situation-specific social competence (i.e., a helping opportunity) instead of a measurement of prosocial behavior that can be generalized across contexts and motives. Secondly, not all participants might relate donating lottery tickets to a charity to prosocial behavior, and the decision to donate could have been influenced by social desirability. Finally, the participants were specifically asked to divide the lottery tickets. In this sense, the prosocial behavior did not emerge spontaneously. Thus, in a future study, I would use a measure that captures prosocial behavior in a more broad way, control for social desirability, and use a measure that reports spontaneous or unplanned prosocial behavior.
Furthermore, this study demonstrated an emotion-related individual difference that explained when highly-empathic powerful people would engage in prosocial behavior. However, it did not provide the specific reason why the powerful and empathic people behaved more prosocially when made to feel guilty. Future research could focus on explaining this motivational mechanism.
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