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Between politics and administration : compliance with EU Law in Central and Eastern Europe

Toshkov, D.D.

Citation

Toshkov, D. D. (2009, March 25). Between politics and administration : compliance with EU Law in Central and Eastern Europe. Between politics and administration: Compliance with EU law in Central and Eastern Europe. Retrieved from

https://hdl.handle.net/1887/13701

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License: Licence agreement concerning inclusion of doctoral thesis in the Institutional Repository of the University of Leiden

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Note: To cite this publication please use the final published version (if applicable).

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APPENDIX III APPENDIX III APPENDIX III APPENDIX III

EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM DURATIO EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM DURATIO EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM DURATIO

EMPIRICAL RESULTS FROM DURATION MODELS N MODELS N MODELS N MODELS

III.

III.

III.

III.1 Data and method 1 Data and method 1 Data and method 1 Data and method

The dataset used for the original analysis was transformed for the application of duration models. For this purpose, each time period (at a yearly interval) for each directive in the eight member states becomes an entry (observation) in the dataset if during that year the directive is at risk of being transposed (it has been adopted and it is not transposed yet).

The outcome variable then is 1 if the directive has been transposed in that particular time- period in a country and 0 otherwise. The method used for the duration analysis is Cox proportional hazards with time-varying covariates as it can incorporate both directive-level and country-level (time-varying) exogenous variables and it is well suited for duration outcomes (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2007).

III.2 Results III.2 Results III.2 Results III.2 Results

Two models are estimated: a baseline model (see Table III.1) and one featuring ‘country’

variables which are supposed to pick up any influence of the particular countries not accounted for by the country-level variables included in the model. (Table III.2). The observations are clustered with respect to the directive/country level (the entries on the transposition of one directive in one country form a cluster) in order to take care of the violation of the independence assumption. Robust standard errors are used in the estimation.

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Duration Models

Table III.1 Cox Table III.1 Cox Table III.1 Cox

Table III.1 Cox proportional hazards regression of transposition durationproportional hazards regression of transposition durationproportional hazards regression of transposition durationproportional hazards regression of transposition duration

coef exp(coef) se(coef) p value

Time to deadline 0.68 1.98 0.20 0.00

Implementing legislation -0.15 0.86 0.07 0.03

Relation to trade 0.41 1.51 0.08 0.00

Political complexity (recitals) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.38 Support for EU integration 0.09 1.10 0.03 0.01

Left/right positions 0.06 1.06 0.01 0.00

Distance on the left/right 0.04 1.04 0.01 0.03 Distance on the EU integration -0.04 0.96 0.03 0.14

Number of parties -0.12 0.89 0.05 0.04

Rule of law -0.42 0.65 0.25 0.06

Regulatory quality 0.34 1.41 0.23 0.08

III.3 Comparison with the logistic regression analysis III.3 Comparison with the logistic regression analysis III.3 Comparison with the logistic regression analysis III.3 Comparison with the logistic regression analysis

The findings using the duration model are consistent with the findings form the logistic regression analysis to a very large degree. Table III.3 compares the estimated effect of the variables of major theoretical interest according to the logistic regression and the CPH models. The direction of the influence, as well as the statistical significance of the effect of these variables, are the same in both versions of the analysis. Only the ideological distance measures seem to work in the duration models but not in the logistic regression estimation, but the effects that the CPH analysis finds are minor and sensitive to the model specification. In conclusion, the results from the duration model analysis completely support the findings of the corresponding logistic regression estimation.

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Appendix III

Table III.2 Cox proportional hazards regression of transposition duration (clustering) Table III.2 Cox proportional hazards regression of transposition duration (clustering)Table III.2 Cox proportional hazards regression of transposition duration (clustering) Table III.2 Cox proportional hazards regression of transposition duration (clustering)

coef exp(coef) se(coef) p

Time to deadline 0.68 1.98 0.20 0.00

Implementing legislation -0.17 0.84 0.08 0.01

Relation to trade 0.41 1.51 0.09 0.00

Political complexity (recitals) 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.56 Support for EU integration 0.18 1.19 0.04 0.00

Left/right positions 0.15 1.17 0.02 0.00

Distance on the left/right 0.24 1.28 0.04 0.00 Distance on the EU integration -0.01 0.99 0.04 0.85

Number of parties -0.94 0.39 0.18 0.00

Regulatory quality 2.68 14.65 0.53 0.00

Rule of law -2.29 0.10 0.57 0.00

Estonia -1.86 0.16 0.31 0.00

Hungary 0.97 2.63 0.19 0.00

Latvia 0.94 2.56 0.38 0.01

Lithuania 0.05 1.05 0.20 0.78

Poland 0.70 2.01 0.28 0.01

Slovakia 0.24 1.28 0.33 0.42

Slovenia 1.34 3.81 0.25 0.00

Table III.3 Comparing logistic regression and duration models o Table III.3 Comparing logistic regression and duration models oTable III.3 Comparing logistic regression and duration models o

Table III.3 Comparing logistic regression and duration models of transposition in CEEf transposition in CEEf transposition in CEE f transposition in CEE Logistic regression

Logistic regression Logistic regression

Logistic regression Duration modelsDuration models Duration modelsDuration models Implementing legislation Negative (stat. significant) Negative (stat. significant) Relation to trade Positive (stat. significant) Positive (stat. significant) Pol. complexity (recitals) Small negative insign. effect No effect Support for EU Positive (stat. significant) Positive (stat. significant) Left/right positions Positive (stat. significant) Positive (stat. significant) Number of parties Negative (stat. significant) Negative (stat. significant) Regulatory quality Positive (stat. significant) Positive (stat. significant)

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