Imperial Overstretch

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Imperial Overstretch

An analysis of the overseas basing policy debate

Master Thesis IRIO

Name: Rein-Jan Eringa (1481568)

Nachtegaalstraat 1

8916 BA, Leeuwarden

Tel: 06-50929373

Thesis Supervisor: Dr. C.M. Megens

Rijksuniversiteit Groningen

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List of abbreviations

BRAC -Base Realignment And Closure

CENTCOM -Central Command

CONUS -Continental United States

CSL -Cooperative Security Location

DOD -Department of Defense

EUCOM -European Command

FOB -Forward Operating Base

FY -Fiscal Year

GDP -Gross Domestic Product

GNP -Gross National Product

MOB -Main Operation Base

NATO -North Atlantic Treaty Organization

PACOM -Pacific Command

PDA -Project on Defense Alternatives

PMC -Private military company

PNAC -Project for the New American Century

QDR -Quarterly Defense Review

UAE -United Arab Emirates

UN -United Nations

U.S. -United States

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Introduction

The New York Times reported on August 14, 2010 that the Obama administration had secretly escalated its fight against terrorist organizations.1 _{The article confirmed what many observers had}

known for a while: that President Obama had increased the use of military force not only in Afghanistan, but also in countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. This article and others like it serve as a reminder of the staggering amount of military obligations the United States (U.S.) has around the world. At the same time, it has been widely reported that the U.S. is faced with a budget crisis. Budget deficits have reached record heights in the past two years and the projected budgets for the next few years are bleak. Combine the miserable fiscal situation with extensive military commitments, and what comes to mind is a concern about imperial overstretch.

From an academic perspective it would be appealing to learn whether a concern about imperial overstretch is reflected in the American foreign policy discourse. More specifically, since military commitments usually translate into overseas military bases, it is interesting to know whether imperial overstretch plays any role in the overseas basing policy debate.

This leads to this thesis’ main research question: to what extent has imperial overstretch figured in the overseas basing policy debate of the last two decades?

This period of two decades is chosen because it was about twenty years ago, that historian Paul Kennedy coined the term imperial overstretch.

In order to answer the main research question, it is necessary to survey and analyze the type of arguments used in the overseas basing policy debate. But there are some things that need to be explained before one can adequately analyze the policy debate. Firstly, it is required to gain understanding of the concept of imperial overstretch. In chapter 1, the literature concerning imperial overstretch is discussed and analyzed, beginning with Kennedy and followed by alternative approaches of various scholars.

Secondly, it is helpful to get a grasp on the basics of the American global military presence. To that end, chapter 2 elaborates on the subject of what military bases are and where they are located. After these preconditions to comprehending the subject matter of the policy debate have been met, in chapter 3 the actual overseas basing policy debate is mapped out and analyzed. The analysis focuses on the different types of arguments used and their respective dominance in the debate, for each of the three phases in which the debate is divided.

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Finally, in the Conclusion, an answer to the main research question is formulated using the findings from the preceding chapters. Additionally, the significance of the answer to the research question is considered here.

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Chapter 1: Imperial overstretch

“There is an idea afoot that America is in decline and we’re in decline because we are engaged abroad. ‘Over-extended’, the prophets of decline call it. These are false prophets.”

~George Shultz, Secretary of Defense, in 19892

“Great empires do not die by murder, but suicide.”

~Arnold Toynbee3

Central to this thesis’ analysis of the overseas basing policy debate is the concept of ‘imperial overstretch’. This concept was coined by Yale historian Paul Kennedy in his 1987 book The Rise and

Fall of the Great Powers. This chapter seeks to clarify this concept as it applies to the United States. It

turns out that ‘imperial overstretch’ is not a straightforward term, not in its meaning nor in the way it is being used. In order to effectively work with the concept of imperial overstretch it is therefore critical to thoroughly analyze it.

What follows is a discussion of Kennedy’s perspective on imperial overstretch, followed by an analysis of the various manifestations of imperial overstretch found in the literature. Next, alternative approaches to imperial overstretch, put forward by a variety of scholars, are discussed. Finally, the relation between imperial overstretch and the overseas basing policy debate is explained.

1.1 What is ‘imperial overstretch’?

In The Rise and Fall, Kennedy seeks to explain the ascendency and decline of great powers throughout the past five hundred years. What he specifically tries to establish are the common characteristics of declining great powers, a pattern of decline. According to Kennedy:

“[I]t simply has not been given to any one society to remain permanently ahead of all the others, because that would imply a freezing of the differentiated pattern of

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growth rates, technological advance, and military developments which has existed since time immemorial.”4

These elements -differentiated patterns of growth rates, technological advance, and military developments- cause the rise and fall of great powers, in relative terms. But there is another factor at work. Kennedy notes that great powers are typically faced with a choice between defense expenditures that yield short-term security and expenditures that lead to long-term economic growth. In this regard prudent policies delay decline, while unwise policies accelerate it. Like previous hegemons, the U.S. is faced with this challenge:

“[Whether] it can preserve a reasonable balance between the nation’s perceived defense requirements and the means it possesses to maintain those commitments; and whether, as an intimately related point, it can preserve the technological and economic bases of its power from relative erosion in the face of ever-shifting patterns of global production.”5

According to Kennedy, the U.S. seems to have failed to keep this “reasonable balance”. He points out that when the U.S. acquired its massive array of military obligations around the globe, some of it inherited from the former British Empire during the Second World War (WWII) and most of it acquired during the first decade of the Cold War, its share of world Gross National Product (GNP) was much larger than it is today.6_{As a consequence, Kennedy submits that the U.S now runs the risk of}

‘imperial overstretch’, that is, a situation in which “the sum total of global interests and obligations is far larger than the country’s power to defend them all simultaneously”.7 _{Kennedy raises several}

points to clarify this somewhat curious statement. Firstly, he summarizes the military commitments that the U.S. maintains. Ranging from the Middle East, to Europe and East Asia, these commitments are truly massive in scale and global in scope. They are detailed in the next chapters. Secondly, Kennedy concedes that it is improbable that the U.S. would ever need to defend these interests simultaneously, much less alone.8_{And yet:}

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ago, when its share of global manufacturing and GNP was much larger, its agriculture was not in crisis, its balance of payments was far healthier, the government budget was also in balance, and it was not so heavily in debt to the rest of the world.”9

This paragraph is as close as Kennedy gets to specifying the contributing parts of imperial overstretch. It is important to note that Kennedy has not troubled himself to dedicate even a chapter of his book to defining ‘imperial overstretch’.10_{Be that as it may, Kennedy does point out the major}

component parts: extensive military liabilities; declining shares in global manufacturing and GNP; agricultural decline; and large budget deficits and national debt.

Imperial overstretch, to Kennedy, reflects the gap between American global interests and the means to defend them. Addressing the problem of imperial overstretch therefore requires bringing into proper alignment ‘means and ends’. But striking the right balance is very difficult and there is no general rule to which decision-makers may adhere in order to be successful.11

Kennedy suggests that the U.S. focus on managing its relative decline. America’s disproportionate share of global power would eventually have to gravitate towards a more “natural” share of the world’s wealth and power.12 _{He was careful to point out that the U.S. would not fade into the}

background anytime soon. Instead, because of its sheer size, he expected the U.S. to remain a very powerful player in a multipolar world for the foreseeable future.13

As Kennedy stresses in his epilogue, his analysis of the rise and fall of great powers is not intended to serve as a theory of political science.14_{Consequently, the analysis in general and the use of imperial}

overstretch in particular is developed primarily for retrospective purposes. Kennedy has not laid down measurable criteria of imperial overstretch, economic or military, that, if met, could predict the decline of a great power. Kennedy would be the first, however, to add that this in no way diminishes the quality of his analysis.

9_{Kennedy, 1987, p. 529.}

10_{Strikingly, imperial overstretch is not even listed in the glossary.} 11_{Idem, p. 540.}

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1.2 Various expressions of imperial overstretch

As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, there is a range of approaches to imperial overstretch as well as different ways of referring to imperial overstretch. That is to say, there are many ways to talk about imperial overstretch without actually using the words ‘imperial’ and ‘overstretch’. In order to produce a comprehensive analysis of the overseas basing policy debate, it is important to identify the various expressions of the same theme of imperial overstretch.

Many of these variations are actually found in Kennedy’s original text. The reason he used variations may have to do with style rather than substance; using the same phrase repeatedly dulls the reader. On the other hand, there is a quality to using synonyms that has more depth: alternative expressions of the same concept may shed light on its diverse characteristics. Nonetheless, judging from the context in which they are used, and the larger argument they serve, they seem interchangeable. Generally, there are three figures of speech that transplant imperial overstretch: synonyms, euphemisms and hyperboles. What follows below is a survey of the manifestations of these three figures of speech.

Synonyms

Kennedy’s variations on imperial overstretch include “strategic overstretch”, “strategic overextension” and “imperial overextension”.15 _{Semantically, “overstretch”, “overextension”,}

“overreach” and “overstrain” are practically synonyms. In combination with various adjectives, in

casu different component parts of imperial overstretch like economic or military aspects, they yield a

few dozen possible variations. These adjectives include “imperial”, “military”, “economic” and “strategic”.

If this is true, then a random combination like “economic overreach” should be as much related to imperial overstretch as is another random combination like “strategic overextension”. Recall that Kennedy originally described imperial overstretch as the situation in which a great power cannot simultaneously defend the sum total of its global commitments. Since these commitments are of both military and economic nature, and since strategy involves making decisions concerning both military and economic commitments, it becomes clear that “economic overreach” and “strategic overextension” really are expressions of the same concept: imperial overstretch. It may be superfluous to state here, but while they are of the same kind, they are not identical. Since strategy involves decision-making regarding both economic and military commitments, “strategic overextension” is inherently broader than “economic overreach”.

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Euphemisms

Next, there are euphemisms for imperial overstretch. A euphemism is “the substitution of an agreeable or inoffensive expression for one that may offend or suggest something unpleasant”.16

Kennedy uses euphemisms like “at full stretch”, “mismatch between American forces and strategy”, “discrepancy between American commitments and American power” and “gap between interests and capabilities”.17_{These are more pleasant ways of the same nasty message: imperial overstretch.}

To elaborate on just one of these, “at full stretch” is a euphemism because being at full stretch is not quite as serious as being “overstretched”. Yet, as is evident from Kennedy’s text, the message that these phrases are supposed to convey are identical.

One popular example of a euphemism used is a military that is “bogged down”.18_{For all its possible}

meanings, a “bogged down” military could mean an overstretched military, certainly when the implications of a “bogged down” military resemble those of an overstretched military. Such implications may include the inability to wage a new war or mount an adequate military response to a potential crisis. Other examples of euphemisms are: “the military is stretched”, the need to “tighten the belt” and the need to get the “financial house in order”.19_{Depending on proper context,}

as always, “tightening the belt” and “getting the financial house in order” are thinly-veiled references to the imperative of avoiding imperial overstretch.

The examples provided above represent but a part of the total of euphemisms used in the literature. Even so, to understand these euphemisms is to understand most euphemisms.

It should be noted here that not all euphemisms of imperial overstretch are intended as such. Authors may seek to convey a very different message than anything close to imperial overstretch. It would be a mistake to assume that every possible reference to imperial overstretch is just that: a reference to imperial overstretch. To avoid misguided interpretations, it is therefore important to take account of the larger argument in which the aforementioned euphemisms are used. If arguments that use imperial overstretch and arguments that use euphemisms of imperial overstretch bear great resemblance, it is reasonable to conclude that the euphemism is intended as a reference to imperial overstretch.

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Hyperboles

Hyperboles for imperial overstretch exist as well. During the past few years, against the backdrop of the global financial crisis, increasingly there have been alarming statements along the lines of “the collapse of the United States is imminent”.20 _{Variations to the same tune include “the end of the}

American era” and “America’s fall”.21 _{What is important is that these hyperboles are identified as}

being related to imperial overstretch just as much as the aforementioned synonyms and euphemisms are. As discussed earlier, imperial overstretch is a situation that is associated with the decline and eventual end of a great power. Expressions like ‘demise’, ‘end’ and ‘collapse’ are therefore legitimate, if dramatic, references to imperial overstretch.

1.3 Alternative approaches to imperial overstretch

Kennedy’s thesis provoked an international debate. In the years following the publication of The Rise

and Fall, two types of reactions to Kennedy’s approach to imperial overstretch can be distinguished.

On the one hand, some scholars have adapted or criticized the criteria of imperial overstretch. On the other hand, there are scholars who have taken an altogether different approach to the concept. What follows is an analysis of both kinds of reactions. These reactions to Kennedy’s approach to imperial overstretch are taken in consideration not out of mere academic inquisitiveness, but because they are part of how this concept is understood today. But first, there is something that must be explained about the historical context of Kennedy’s publication and the ensuing debate. International political events, as illustrated below, have had a profound influence through-out this debate.

Historical context

The context of Kennedy’s work is the 1980s. Kennedy was by no means the first declinist. Before him, some had worried about the “Sputnik and ‘the missile gap’, followed by Vietnam and Soviet nuclear parity”.22_{During the 1980s, several important developments occurred that may have helped shape}

Kennedy’s notion about American decline.23 _{Under President Reagan, defense spending rose}

dramatically, driving record national deficits that turned the U.S. from a creditor into a debtor nation. Other nations were growing their economies significantly faster, most notably Japan. One of the key economic data supporting Kennedy’s assessment of the United States’ position was its steadily declining share of world GNP.

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Kennedy’s “declinism” would not remain popular for a long time.24_{For several years later, numerous}

international political events would give rise to what might be called “triumphalism” or “revivalism”.25 _{One of the most prominent voices in this movement was political commentator}

Charles Krauthammer, who wrote the 1990 article The Unipolar Moment.26 _{In this article,}

Krauthammer argues that contrary to common assumptions, the world will not move directly from a bipolar to a multipolar world. Instead, there will be a unipolar moment (which could last decades), with the U.S. as the obvious superpower. The international events that helped shape this movement included the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union, which meant the elimination of the United States’ sole military rival. Furthermore, Japan’s economy stagnated, while the U.S. experienced strong economic growth and intervened successfully in Kuwait.

These and other developments during the 1990s certainly discredited Kennedy’s worries about American imperial overstretch, reflect authors Roger Burbach and Jim Tarbell.27 _{They continue,}

saying: “at the turn of the millennium, Kennedy’s argument of imperial overstretch was largely forgotten and appeared to be irrelevant”.28 _{But when President George W. Bush’s administration}

took office in 2001“its turn to a unilateral, pre-emptive imperial modus operandi re-established the concept of overstretch as the likely outcome of U.S. foreign policy.”29 _{Today, Kennedy-esque}

declinism is back, as evidenced by a plethora of articles30_{and news items.}31

It must be recognized that not much has been written about the specific topic of imperial overstretch. As noted above, even Kennedy himself has not tremendously elaborated on the concept as such. Even though scholars and the media refer to imperial overstretch in various international political discourses, often politely acknowledging Paul Kennedy, it seems that it has not been subjected to a comprehensive study yet. Still, much has been published that refers to imperial overstretch.32_{Almost always, the meaning of the term is assumed known to the reader, or explained}

using a quote from Kennedy. While this is understandable, ‘imperial overstretch’ carries a fairly obvious connotation after all, it is also unfortunate. Even so, some authors have taken the trouble to elaborate on imperial overstretch a bit more, and it would serve this thesis’ analysis well to take these authors into account.

24_{Burbach & Tarbell, 2004, p. 13.} 25_{Bacevich, 2009.}

26_{Krauthammer, 1990. Francis Fukuyama’s 1989 article “The End of History?” is another famous example of}

triumphalism.

27_{Burbach & Tarbell, 2004, p. 13.} 28_Ibidem.

29_Ibidem.

30_{E.g.: Pape, 2009. Miller, 2010. Ferguson, 2010.} 31_{E.g.: CNN, 2008. Bloomberg, 2010.}

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Criteria

Scholars James Petras and Morris Morley take issue with Kennedy’s criteria of imperial overstretch. They follow Kennedy’s description of imperial overstretch, yet contend that “Kennedy overstates one factor (military spending) and underestimates the significance of the internationalization of capital”.33_{That is why they focus more on international debt (which grew at that time) and balance}

of trade deficits than Kennedy did. On the military side, they point to some successful interventions, i.e. the first Gulf War and Bosnia, as supporting their view that America’s military, despite its vast obligations, is in excellent shape. Also, they highlight the increasing American political, economic and military influence in the ‘Third World’ as a contrarian trend to imperial overstretch.34_{Still, in their}

assessment “as the [American] empire grows by diverting domestic resources to sustain global power, the national economy and society deteriorates”.35

Having another way of looking at the criteria of imperial overstretch are Burbach and Tarbell. Like Petras, their positions are on the far-left side of the political spectrum. Their work is a blunt indictment of the George W. Bush policies. Its verdict: “a momentous consequence of the belligerent policies pursued by George W. Bush around the globe is imperial overstretch”.36_{They support this}

claim by stressing the military aspects of overstretch. For example, they point to the fact that the Pentagon, in the wake of the Iraq war, “began debating the need to increase the size of the U.S. armed forces and the possible reinstatement of the military draft to meet the need for U.S. troops abroad.”37 _{In Bush’s ambitious foreign policy, they see a course of action that causes imperial}

overstretch, as it draws heavy on both financial and military resources. Increased defense expenditures are financed by borrowing money abroad, while committing more troops and military assets to the Middle East stretches the military thin. They argue that “even some neocons[ervatives] and sectors of the Christian right are convinced that Bush, Cheney and Rumsfeld have dangerously overstretched the American empire in Iraq”.38 _{They further note that during a forum of the}

conservative think tank American Enterprise Institute in 2003, it became clear that the participants “all agreed that the Bush administration was too overstretched to do anything but try to delay the construction of nuclear weapons in Iran”.39_{These are just two samples of the array of examples they}

provide arguing that the United States is militarily overstretched. Adding to this, they point out that

33_{Petras & Morley, 1995, p. xiv.} 34_{Idem, p. ix.}

35_{Idem, p. xvi.}

36_{Burbach & Tarbell, 2004, p. 11.} 37_Ibidem.

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the U.S.’ loss of public legitimacy, domestically and internationally, is another clear sign of overstretch.40

In the same period of time, Harvard economic historian Niall Ferguson made a contribution to the discussion of the criteria of imperial overstretch.41 _{In his view, Kennedy got it wrong for several}

reasons. First of all, Kennedy failed to anticipate that the defense expenditures boom of the 1980s, of which he had disapproved, would yield some extraordinary results. Ferguson states: “Not only did the Soviet Union collapse as it strained to match the Reagan-Weinberger arms extravaganza, but the U.S. also went on to collect a triple peace dividend in the 1990s: falling defense spending as a share of GDP, accelerating economic growth and a quantum leap in military capability that left other powers far behind.”42_{These developments undermined the worries that Kennedy ventilated back in}

the late 1980s.

Ferguson maintains that worries about defense expenditures along with America’s global security commitments are overblown. He supports his point of view by saying: “the cost of the U.S. military has declined steeply in relative terms, from an average of 10 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the 1950s to just 4 percent in the 1990s and a forecast 3.5 percent in the first half of the present decade”.43 _{Ferguson would rather shift the attention to fiscal factors that cause imperial}

overstretch. In his analysis, what cause the U.S.’ troublesome fiscal outlook are not its military commitments abroad, but the commitments of the welfare state at home. Fiscally unsustainable social programs like Social Security and Medicare are the major drivers of America’s deteriorating fiscal position.44_{This is echoed by professor emeritus political science of the University of California}

Chalmers Johnson, who fears that imperial overstretch in its economic dimension is more urgent.45

A different, less-talked about criterion of imperial overstretch is decadence. Part of the reason it is not much discussed may be that decadence is hard to quantify. In contrast to shares of world GNP or defense spending, it is hard to put a number to decadence. But whatever the reason, it merits attention. The ascent of great powers or civilizations has sometimes been explained in sociological terms, like sociologist Max Weber did in The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Likewise, so has the decline and fall of empires. Historian Edward Gibbon, for example, in his classic work The

History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, blamed the collapse of ancient Rome partly on

40_{Burbach & Tarbell, 2004, p. 21.} 41_{Ferguson, 2004.}

42_{Idem, p. 262.} 43_{Idem, p. 263.} 44_{Idem, p. 269.}

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decadence or internal decay. Decadence means forsaking prudence in favor of excessive self-indulgence. It is plausible that a culture of decadence invites imperial overstretch. As detailed in chapter 3, some claim that parts of the U.S. government have been filled with decadent elites, who are responsible for profligate spending and consequently for imperial overstretch.46 _{Kennedy does}

not elaborate on this theme. It is not because he does not think it has explanatory power; indeed, he explicitly lists “national morale” as an important factor.47_{Yet, in terms of his broader analysis of the}

rise and fall of great powers, he prefers to focus on relative shifts in economic positions.

Approaches

Some take a more societal approach to imperial overstretch. Military analyst Andrew Bacevich is a scholar who examines the cultural forces that drive America’s global military commitments. Bacevich’s main thrust is raising awareness about the alarming rate with which the American society militarizes. Americans seem to take America’s global military role as a natural fact of life, along with the indefinite (or perpetual) war (against terrorism) that it wages.48_{The ‘new American militarism’ is}

basically a reaction to the disorientation of the Vietnam War. Bacevich explains: “in the wake of a humiliating defeat and a closely related cultural upheaval, restoring the sinews of U.S. military might and celebrating soldierly virtue seemed to offer an antidote”.49_{But this antidote proved to be “toxic”}

over the past decades.50

The discussion on imperial overstretch is related to the debate on the proper role of the United States in the world. Without plunging into that debate, it is constructive to pay attention to scholars with a more ‘grand strategy’ type of approach to imperial overstretch.51_{One such scholar is Zbigniew}

Brzezinski, former national security advisor to President Jimmy Carter. In The Grand Chessboard (1997) and its addendum The Choice (2004) he lays down his vision of what the guiding geopolitical principles of American foreign policy ought to be. One of the over-arching principles should be:

“America’s security henceforth has to be seen as inexorably tied to the global condition. The maintenance of a peerless and comprehensive U.S. military capability and enhanced domestic survivability must be reinforced by systematic efforts to enlarge the zones of global stability, to eliminate some of the most egregious causes 46_{See top of p. 46} 47_{Kennedy, 1987, p. xxiv.} 48_{Bacevich, 2005, p. 17.} 49_{Idem, p. 225-226.} 50_{Idem, p. 226.}

51_{Grand strategy is a comprehensive design of foreign policy, heavily influenced by the military implications of}

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of political violence, and to promote political systems that place central value on human rights and constitutional procedures.”52

His assertion that the U.S. really should continue to be the world’s only superpower, for reasons including maintaining security and promoting human rights, as one the basic principles of American foreign policy has implications. A grand strategy that calls for “a peerless US military capability” and “systematic efforts to enlarge the zones of global stability” is susceptible to the dangers of hubris and imperial overstretch. It can be said that Brzezinski is aware of this danger: later on, he advises that “U.S. policy makers also anticipate the wider risks to America of overextension and of rising anti-American political and religious hostility produced by solitary anti-American intervention”.53_Furthermore,

Brzezinski implicitly points to another element of imperial overstretch, which is being engaged in a protracted war that could become like a “quicksand”.54 _{What Brzezinski seems to suggest, is that}

there is a fine line between intense global engagement, seen as crucial for maintaining American and global stability and security, and overextension, which is obviously undesirable.

Also discussing imperial overstretch from a strategic perspective, Bacevich raises an interesting point: “From the invasion of Cuba in 1898 to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, policymakers have acted as if having an ever larger perimeter to defend will make us safer or taking on burdens and obligations at ever greater distances from our shores will further enhance our freedoms. In fact, apart from the singular exception of WWII, something like the opposite has been the case.”55

Bacevich provides here a rationale for expanding American global security commitments, while dismissing its prudence at the same time. Bacevich’s assertion that America got caught up in defending the military outposts (for homeland defense originally, regardless of the U.S.’ advantageous geographical position) with ever new outposts resembles the dynamics of a vicious circle. As a dynamic, it also harkens back to Kennedy’s observation that great powers in the wane of their power and in the face of (perceived) threats to their position often engage in hemorrhaging warfare, thusly wasting national economic resources on military assets, which ends up reinforcing decline rather than reversing it.56_{What Bacevich consequently proposes is that the U.S. rid itself of}

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the concept of national security, which was developed during and after WWII, and return to ordinary national defense.57

Johnson agrees with Bacevich’ analysis of the U.S.’ expanding security needs. On this subject he says that “this kind of logic -comparable to the domino theory in the Vietnam War- leads to an endless progression of places and commitments that must be protected, resulting inevitably in imperial overstretch, bankruptcy, and popular disaffection, precisely the maladies that plagued Edwardian Britain”.58_{Much like Bacevich, Johnson regrets to ascertain that the United States has been travelling}

down a path that will result in its eventual collapse.59

There is one more side to imperial overstretch that deserves mentioning. This involves a legal approach to imperial overstretch. It has been insinuated by some, Krauthammer among them, that the position international law enjoys in international politics can be either conducive or prohibitive to imperial overstretch.60 _{Great power dismissal of or adherence to international law may produce}

distinctly different outcomes. A tradition of strict compliance with international law has a constraining effect on a great power’s behavior, thereby reducing the likeliness it will engage in imperial overstretch.61

1.4 Conclusion on imperial overstretch debate

In conclusion, an analysis of academic literature shows that imperial overstretch is a contested concept. Kennedy’s approach to imperial overstretch and its associated criteria is disputed. The scope of imperial overstretch has been widened as a result, as will be argued below. Nonetheless, a broad definition of imperial overstretch is generally accepted: a situation in which a great power cannot simultaneously defend its wide array of interests and obligations.

57_{Bacevich, 2005, p. 213.} 58_{Johnson, 2004a, p. 82.}

59_{Bacevich, 2005, p. 225. Johnson, 2004, p. 310.} 60_{Krauthammer, 2009.}

61_{The refusal of the United States to accede to the International Criminal Court may serve as an example in this}

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1.5 Relation imperial overstretch and overseas basing policy debate

There is an indirect, but real relation between imperial overstretch and overseas military bases. One connecting link is military commitments. On the one hand, military commitments are part of the concept of imperial overstretch. On the other hand, overseas military bases are a tangible manifestation of such military commitments. Another connecting link is fiscal commitments. Maintaining bases overseas costs money; and fiscal overload is part of imperial overstretch. Maintaining too great an overseas military presence may therefore lead to imperial overstretch both via its military and its fiscal component. These connections explain that it is rather natural to encounter overseas military bases and imperial overstretch in the same discourse.

Finally, important in this relationship is the concept of ‘national security’. National security, more so than sheer national defense, is sympathetic to expanding bilateral or multilateral security commitments. Unsurprisingly, the post-WWII establishment of national security as the guiding principle of American foreign policy has run parallel with a dramatic expansion of American military commitments.

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Chapter 2: The American global military presence

“During WWII, the British satirized our troops as ‘overpaid, over-sexed, and over here’. Nothing has changed.”

Chalmers Johnson62

“Once an American overseas base is established, it takes on a life of its own”

U.S. Senate, Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad (Symington Committee), Committee on Foreign Relations, in 197063

The United States is the world’s preeminent military power. The U.S. military has a global reach; it stations over 500,000 troops abroad and owns over 700 bases across dozens of countries.64

Obviously, this has not always been the case. There are several ways of interpreting the rise of the American global military presence. How one regards this ascent really matters in terms of understanding the American global military presence today. After considering this question, what follows is a survey of the manifestations of military bases. Facilities, installations and sites are among the quasi-synonyms of military bases. Next, this chapter paints in broad strokes the history of American overseas military bases, starting with the Spanish-American War of 1898, up until today. Included in this concise history are the conventional rationales for expanding, and at times contracting, this network of overseas bases. Finally, current numbers of overseas troops and bases and their associated costs are discussed.

By addressing the structure and dynamics of the American basing system, this chapter serves as a preparation for the next, which contains an analysis of the overseas basing policy debate.

62_{Johnson, 2004a, p. 37.}

63_{As quoted in Johnson, 2004a, p. 152.}

64_{Department of Defense, 2010, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country.}

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2.1. Historiography of the American rise

Present in the literature are two different ways of looking at the rise of the United States as a global power: one conventional and the other critical. Critical and conventional historians agree on many facts, but oftentimes disagree when it comes to how to interpret them.

There are some who regard the United States as an imperialist empire.65_{Like previous empires (the}

Spanish, Dutch, British etc.) it seeks wealth and dominance. Unlike its predecessors, it is not a colonial empire; in general, the U.S. has not sought colonies.66_{Instead, it maintains a global military}

presence that enables it to coerce ‘friends’ and deter ‘foes’. The network of overseas military bases is the primary expression of this global military presence. Furthermore, scholars who adhere to this critical reading of history would argue that American imperialism is not a new phenomenon, but dates back to the early days of the Republic. The history of the United States is a history of conquest: continental expansion first, overseas expansion later. This version of history is popular on the far-left side of the political spectrum.

Then there are those who have a more conventional perspective. They see the rise of the U.S. as a global power with extensive military commitments not as the sought outcome of deliberate imperialist policies. Instead, it has been a side-product of WWII and the Cold War, both of them largely unanticipated and undesired.

It is clear then, that those debating the American global military presence come to the table working with a different set of ideas and assumptions. The literature consulted for this thesis reflects both strands of historical paradigms. Yet, this chapter follows primarily the conventional version, only occasionally taking recourse to ‘critical history’.

2.2 Types and functions of bases67

When approaching the overseas basing policy debate, it is important to be aware of the fact that ‘military base’ is an umbrella term. That is to say, it is a term with multiple meanings. Without treating this subject in an exhaustive way, this paragraph touches upon the most common expressions.

A military base comes in many shapes and forms. Among the things meant with military bases are military installations, military facilities, sites, camps, posts, stations, forts, proving grounds, garrisons, docks, shipyards and airfields. It is for the sake of convenience that most people speak of the general

65_{What follows is a brief characterization of the critical perspective on the ascent of the U.S., as encountered in}

the works of e.g. Petras & Morley, 1995, Burbach & Tarbell, 2004 and Johnson, 2004a.

66_{Moreover, it had a strong anti-colonialist stance in the wake of WWII.}

67_{The information used in this section, if not otherwise indicated, has been derived from the following works:}

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term military base. Indeed, the next chapter confirms that in the policy debate generally the term military base is used. The Pentagon in its reports distinguishes three basic types of bases: Main Operating Base (MOB), Forward Operating Base (FOB) and Cooperative Security Location (CSL). MOBs are strategic, well-defended bases that contain a great number of permanent U.S. forces. These are the major bases found in South Korea, Japan and Germany for example. Whereas MOBs are the typical Cold War bases, FOBs and CSLs are relatively recent phenomena. They are “designed especially to meet the needs of expeditionary forces”.68_{The FOBs contain smaller, semi-permanent}

contingents of troops on less secure sites. These are used to support tactical operations. CSLs are bases that are host-nation owned, and have little to no permanent U.S. personnel. They often contain pre-positioned equipment and are known to serve as staging grounds for Special Forces and Intelligence operations.

While Navy vessels are not military bases per se, they are part of the American global military presence all the same, and sailors are listed accordingly in the Pentagon’s Active Duty Military

Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country annual report.69

It is interesting to note the evolution of military bases over the years; post-WWII bases differ from pre-WWII bases. Before WWII, overseas military bases were mainly naval bases operated by colonial empires within their colonies. The British Empire, for instance, had a vast array of these types of overseas bases. Oftentimes, these naval bases included garrisons to protect the harbor and keep the local population under control. Furthermore, these bases served to protect economic interests: commercial trade and economic investments. But technological innovation drove expansion of base functions. So it happened that during the early 20th_{century, overseas air and communication bases}

were introduced.70

It was during and after WWII, however, that the functions of overseas bases truly exploded. Military bases now included the categories “naval, air, land, missile, command and communications, intelligence, space-related, research and logistics”.71 _{Further increasing the amount of functions is}

the fact that each type of function is accompanied by a number of subtypes. To quote an example used by Robert Harkavy, an International Relations professor at Pennsylvania State University who has done important work in this field: “under air bases, there are forward fighter and bomber bases, tanker bases, maritime patrol aircraft bases, transport staging bases etc”.72_{It is remarkable to notice}

68_{Overseas Basing Commission report, 2005, p. 8.} 69_{Department of Defense, 2010.}

70_{Those bases were operated by a limited number of troops.} 71_{Harkavy, 2007, p. 17.}

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then how much overseas basing has evolved. Basing used to pertain to the ocean, but, says Harkavy, now it ranges from the “land, sea surface and the underseas to the atmosphere and outer space”.73

Further distinguishing the Cold War basing system is the fact that it is grounded not in colonialism, but in a bipolar security system split along ideological lines. What’s more, Harkavy would argue that the overseas bases do not have an economic function to the same extent as the old colonial bases did.74

But all these different types of bases do not automatically reveal the strategic purpose of overseas bases. If the ‘old’ bases of the colonial era mainly served to protect trade and economic investments, as well as to control local populations, what can be said of the Cold War and present-day bases? The answer to this question is not a straightforward one, as there are multiple functions that can be identified. Among these functions are: power projection, containment, first line of defense, great power symbolism, reassuring allies and rapid response capability. These and other rationales for maintaining overseas military bases are discussed in detail in chapter 3.

A number of military bases discussed in this thesis are American bases that are NATO bases in name. This mainly applies to American bases located in Europe and Afghanistan. The reality is that the U.S. in almost all cases provides the bulk of personnel and funds associated with these bases. For practical purposes they are therefore considered American bases. Additionally, some of the international interventions discussed below, such as the UN coalition intervention in the Gulf War of 1991, are approached from an American military point of view. Again, this is done so for practical purposes and justified by the fact that the U.S. provided the vast majority of military assets in these operations.

2.3 History of the American basing system75

The first American overseas base was the naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. This base, which is still formally being leased from the Cuban government, was obtained in the wake of the Spanish-American War of 1898. The U.S. also acquired the Philippines, Guam and Puerto Rico as a result of this war.76_{But it was during WWII that a veritable global chain of military bases came into existence,}

historically unprecedented in its scope. Fighting a two-theater war, one in the Pacific against Japan

73_{Harkavy, 2007, p. 17.} 74_{Idem, p. 15.}

75_{The information used in this section, if not otherwise indicated, has been derived from the following works:}

[Harkavy, 2007. Sandars, 2000. Ferguson, 2004. Johnson, 2004a].

76_{Guam and Puerto Rico became American overseas territory, while the Philippines (re)gained independence in}

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and the other being in the Atlantic/Mediterranean against Nazi-Germany, the U.S. military established a large number of bases in the Mediterranean, Europe, Asia and the Middle East. At the same time, installations from the allied British Empire were co-used or acquired in places like Newfoundland, Iceland, Greenland and Bermuda. Some estimate the total to have been “over thirty thousand installations located at two thousand base sites residing in around one hundred countries and areas, and stretching from the Arctic Circle to Antarctica”.77

The end of WWII did not signify the end of all those far-flung military bases. The political will to dismantle the American global military presence was absent. On the contrary, the United States decided to maintain troops and bases overseas. The American position at this point was illustrated by President Harry S. Truman during the Potsdam Conference of 1945, who stated:

“Though the United States wants no profit or selfish advantage out of this war, we are going to maintain the military bases necessary for the complete protection of our interests and of world peace. Bases which our military experts deem to be essential for our protection we will acquire.”78

This statement should be seen in the proper political context. The United States had just defeated the Axis Powers in a global war and was now an occupying power in Germany and Japan. Also, the U.S. was already in the process of becoming engaged in a global struggle with Soviet Communism. Given these conditions, the U.S. did not dismantle its network of overseas bases. It did, however, reduce its scope. By 1947, “half of that post-war base structure was gone” and by 1949, again half had been cut.79_{The size of its military in terms of troops was also decimated in this period: from 12}

million to about 950,000, with 328,000 overseas.80

During the Cold War, containment became the paramount principle of American foreign policy. Containment policy amounted to checking and combating the expansion of (Soviet) Communism anywhere in the world. The reasons to do so stem from the fact that Communism was regarded as an existential threat to human freedoms. Moreover, Soviet Communism was deemed being “inherently expansionist”, an assessment famously promulgated by American diplomat George Kennan in his 1947 ‘X-article’ in Foreign Affairs. Containment policy culminated in the Truman and Eisenhower doctrines, which promised American (military) aid to any government at risk of falling to

77_{An estimate by basing expert James R. Blaker, as quoted in the Monthly Review, 2002.} 78_{As quoted in Sandars, 2000, p. 5.}

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communism. Containment would even go as far as validating ‘strategic denial’: the U.S. was forced to maintain certain bases in order to prevent them from falling into Soviet hands.

Against this backdrop, the basing system expanded in the next two decades. Of special interest during the 1950s and 1960s were the Korean and Vietnam Wars. Permanent military bases were set up in South Korea, while the bases in South Asia (Vietnam, Thailand etc.) would prove to be of temporary nature. Interestingly though, the greatest expansion of bases during this time occurred in Europe.81

The bases in South Korea resembled those in Japan and Germany in at least two ways. Firstly, they were initially part of an occupational force in the wake of a war. After the surrender of Japan, the U.S. occupied the South, while the Soviet Union occupied the North of Korea. Secondly, the American bases in South Korea fall into the same category as those in Germany and Japan in terms of size and numbers. They are the only three countries in which at least 30,000 American troops are permanently deployed.

Other developments during the first decades of the Cold War include the establishment of a distant early warning radar network against the threat of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. A string of radar outposts was built along the Arctic Circle, from Alaska to north-eastern Canada. Furthermore, spy bases were set up around the globe, most famously the Menwith Hill station in England. The list of military bases related to Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) is very extensive indeed, a good part of which is kept secret.

The second contraction in the basing infrastructure occurred during the 1970s and 1980s, the first contraction being the drastic cuts following the end of WWII. This second reduction was a result mainly of the end of the Vietnam War, but also because the U.S. faced popular backlashes in several countries.

During the 1980s and early 1990s, the U.S. had to abandon bases in Spain, Greece and the Philippines. In Spain, during the late 1980s, the U.S. was pressured to evacuate Torrejón Air Base’s F-16 wing. Among the Spanish population the American military installations were hated, as they had come to represent the support the U.S. had given former dictator Franco. Although the outbreak of the Gulf War delayed closure of the base for a few years, the F-16 wing was eventually relocated to Aviano Air Base, Italy. Morón Air Base is currently the sole air base operated by the U.S. in Spain, still housing a respectable number of 1200 military personnel. Like Spain, the Greek government urged the U.S. to relocate its forces. The U.S. support of the Greek junta had caused resentment among the

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Greek population. The U.S. did not abandon all its assets in Greece; e.g. it still maintains the naval base of Souda Bay (Crete). In the Philippines, the U.S. was forced to leave Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Station after decades of usage, due to a strong popular movement. American support for former dictator Ferdinand Marcos was an important reason for anti-American sentiments. The U.S. has since sought to regain basing access in the Philippines, which was granted in the early 2000s in exchange for help in the fight against Islamist separatists.82

Source: “U.S. Military Bases and Empire”, Monthly Review.83

When the Cold War ended, many expected the “troops to come home”. With the Soviet Union gone, what could possibly be the purpose of deploying thousands of troops in far-flung places? Also, with the demise of the Warsaw Pact, supposedly the time had come to enjoy the “peace dividend” in the form of steep reductions in defense spending. To some degree, these expectations were met. Defense spending relative to GDP declined in the 1990s, and the size of the military was reduced by almost thirty percent.84 _{According to some estimates, between 40 and 60 percent of bases were}

closed or turned over to host countries.85_{Taking place most notably in Europe (especially Germany),}

this could be called the third contraction. While the total of overseas bases shrank, the amount of U.S. military commitments increased. This is explained primarily by the 1990s expansion of NAVO with former Soviet-bloc, Easter European countries.

At the same time, several wars broke out that resulted in U.S. military interventions. Of these, the most consequential were the Gulf War and the Bosnian War. The Gulf War was the impetus for

82_{I.e. Abu Sayyaf.} 83_{Monthly Review, 2002.}

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escalating the American presence in that region. Countries like Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar and Kuwait welcomed bases and troops stationed within their borders. Incidentally, this larger American presence in the Gulf region corresponded with the Carter doctrine. The Carter doctrine, proclaimed in 1979 in reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, states that any attempt by any power to dominate the Gulf region would be rejected by the U.S. by any means necessary, including military means. Buttressing the ability to do so, the U.S. slowly increased its military presence in the Gulf from 1980 onward, a process accelerated by the Gulf War. The interventions of the 1990s had an adverse effect on the drawing down of overseas troops. But overall, there was a significant contraction of overseas forces during President Clinton’s years in office.

In Latin American, the U.S. increased its military footprint through its drug fighting activities under the banner of Plan Columbia.86_{While closing bases in Puerto Rico and Panama, it established CSLs in}

Ecuador, the Netherlands Antilles and El Salvador. These sites serve to detect and intercept drug trafficking. Additionally, the U.S. operates minor facilities spread across Latin America, to the same end.

2.4 The war on terror period

From 1998 onwards, but especially after the events of September 11, 2001, defense spending rose significantly.87 _{When President George W. Bush declared the war on terror and the U.S. invaded}

Afghanistan late 2001, a renewed process of basing expansion was set in motion. Contrasting the Cold War MOBs associated with containment, the new bases were mostly FOBs and CSLs, established to support actual fighting. To adequately supply the forces in Afghanistan, basing rights were acquired in Central Asian countries like Kyrgyzstan (Manas Air Base) and Uzbekistan (Karshi-Khanabad Air Base). Likewise, the Iraq War of 2003 saw the increase of bases in such countries as Kuwait, Oman, the UAE and Qatar.

The war in Afghanistan is now the longest running war in American history, running since 2001.88_As

of May 2010 there are more U.S. troops in Afghanistan than in Iraq, both around 90.000, and the number in Afghanistan will reach a planned 98.000 troops in August 2010.89_{In Iraq, the number of}

86_{Plan Colombia dates from 1999 and is part of the ‘war on drugs’: it is a major campaign to fight drug}

production and trafficking.

87_{Conetta, 2010.}

88_{106 over 103 months, counting from Gulf of Tonkin Resolution of 1964 to the withdrawal of the last}

American troops in 1973.

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troops is planned to come down to about 50.000 in 2010. Apart from Iraq and Afghanistan, many military operations are carried out in the wider region.

2.5 Costs

As the next chapter shows, part of the overseas basing policy debate centers around the costs of the American global military presence. It may therefore be helpful to consider its costs. It is difficult, however, to estimate those costs: which budget items should be included in such an estimate? Estimates vary, but a report by the Institute for Policy Studies provides a reasoned, though conservative estimate.90_{The total costs of the American global military presence is about 250 billion}

dollar annually. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan cost about 100 billion dollars annually in 2009.91

Understandably, not included in the latter estimate are the human costs, the potential future blowback costs and the opportunity costs of these wars. Then again, the potential future (opportunity) gains are equally neglected. The costs of wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are high compared with previous wars. A study by Carl Conetta of the think tank Project on Defense Alternatives (PDA) shows that the Iraq and Afghanistan wars are twice as expensive per person/year as the Korean War, and triple that of the Vietnam War.92

Going beyond that, there is the question of why the defense budget has skyrocketed in the period 1998-2010. The average annual Department of Defense (DOD) base budget at about 500 billion dollar was higher in this period than it was during the peak years of the Cold War. According to the above mentioned analysis by the PDA there are three major reasons for the inflated budget.93_{One reason is}

the current emphasis on high-tech warfare. As has been pointed out by Bacevich and Johnson, there is a tendency in the military to avoid casualties at all costs.94_{This reflects one of the ‘lessons’ of the}

Vietnam War. What impedes the ability of the military to wage war the most is public discontent at home. War casualties render wars unpopular very fast. To prevent ‘body bags’ from dominating the evening news, the military has resorted to high-tech warfare, as it tends to keep U.S. casualties low. Of course, it is also very expensive. Beyond this point made by Bacevich and Johnson, one might argue that reducing casualties is an end in itself. That may well be true. But it would be a mistake to ignore the larger picture, which is that the military goes to great lengths to avoid bad press.

90_{Dancs, 2009, p. 1.}

91_{Alternative calculations include the oft referenced estimate by}_{www.costofwar.com}_{, which yields a larger}

number: 185 billion for FY2008, 150 billion for FY2009, and 137 billion dollar for FY2010.

92_{Conetta, 2010, p. vi.} 93_{Idem, p. 20-21.}

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The second reason mentioned in the PDA’s analysis is that the Pentagon hires expensive private military companies (PMC). One reason the Pentagon resorts to this practice is the fact that it has to cope with the cuts made in military personnel in the 1990s. To boost its manpower, it relies on hiring PMCs to provide various services. Many of the menial tasks in the military are now performed by private contractors like Halliburton or Kellogg, Brown and Root (former subsidiary of Halliburton). PMCs build bases and provide food and all other kinds of services. Additionally, PMCs like DynCorp are hired to take care of police training and various security tasks.

Thirdly, there has been a lack of prioritizing military goals after the Cold War ended. With the Soviet threat out of the way, the

“US national leadership adopted military security goals that were, at once, more ambitious and more diffuse than those of the Cold War period. The new goals and strategies entailed preserving and extending both the reach and the complexity of America’s armed forces, despite force reductions”.95

The proper term associated with this development is “full spectrum dominance”. This concept reflects the intent to ensure dominance in every aspect of warfare (land, air, sea, space or cyber sphere etc.). Maintaining a dominant force for such a vast range of contingencies is very demanding indeed. Adding to this problem is this point raised in the same PDA report: “capabilities and requirements are based primarily on individual service wants versus collective defense needs”.96_This,

of course, must be identified as classic inter-agency tug-of-war. Of importance to explaining these dynamics may be that the policy in this period had shifted towards a national security strategy based on the U.S. as ‘lone superpower’ and a preventive war doctrine.

2.6 U.S. global military presence today

What can be said of the current U.S. global military presence? How many bases and troops does the U.S. military maintain overseas? In answering these questions, two key sources to rely on are the DOD annual Base Structure Report and the quarterly DOD report on Active Duty Military Personnel

Strengths by Regional Area and by Country.97_{According to these Pentagon reports, the total military}

strength is 1,418,542. Of this total, 262,793 are stationed outside of the U.S. and its territories (i.e.

95_{Conetta, 2010, p. 20.} 96_{Idem, p. 21.}

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overseas). This number can be split between 242,291 troops ashore (on bases) and 20,502 afloat. Not included in the subtotal of 262,793 are the troops deployed in and around Afghanistan and Iraq, where about 200,000 troops are deployed. The total of overseas bases amounts to 716, spread across 38 countries.98_{The majority of these bases and sites are located in Germany (235), Japan (123)}

and South Korea (87). It is important to note that the Base Structure Report is far from complete. The bases in Afghanistan and Iraq, for example, are not included in this report.

There are additional caveats in considering the accuracy of official reports. Firstly, overseas deployed battalions rotate regularly. This means that soldiers, sailors, marines and airmen are in constant flux. The number of overseas troops therefore represents an estimate, not a solid number. Secondly, while the ‘official’ number of overseas troops is reported by the Pentagon, there is every reason to suspect that the real number is kept secret. This real number, in terms of troops as well as in overseas installations, is very likely to exceed the official number. In some cases secrecy is desired by the U.S., but it is known that countries like Saudi Arabia also prefer the basing facts to remain obscure, lest its population be aggrieved. It is helpful in this regard to resort to independent fact checking organizations, think tank reports and investigative journalism to gain insight into classified facts and numbers.

Thirdly and finally, under the surface of these numbers lies the fact that troops are stationed abroad in a rotation system. If, on an annual basis 500,000 troops are stationed abroad, it obviously takes more than 500,000 troops to sustain that number; troops typically serve tours of one to three years on overseas bases. In other words, the strain on the military as an organization is greater than the numbers seem to suggest.

98_{Some use a number of countries of about 100, or even 130 (Ferguson) or 150. These inflated numbers}

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To put the information outlined so far into perspective, it is useful to consider the command structure of the U.S. military.99 _{The map reflects the great degree to which the U.S. military is}

engaged overseas.

Source: wiki commons

The U.S. military is divided in 10 unified commands. Four of these handle logistical support and six commands are responsible for geographic areas in the world. They are ‘unified’ because each command contains all branches of the military: the Army, Air Force, Marine Corps and Navy.

The oldest and largest command is the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM). It is headquartered in Hawaii and its area of responsibility stretches from India in the West, to the West Coast of the U.S. in the East. This region is home to many of the major non-NATO allies of the U.S.: Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand. The U.S. maintains special relations with Taiwan as well, in effect acting as its protector. A large portion of the U.S. overseas bases and troops are found within PACOM.

The U.S. European Command (EUCOM) was established in 1952, tasked primarily with checking the Soviet threat. The large majority of NATO allies are located within its area of responsibility. Much of the infrastructure built during the Cold War still exists. Consequently, EUCOM is still an important command in terms of installations and troop numbers.

99_{Based on information provided by the website of the DOD. See for portal:}

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The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) was created in 1983 and has as its area of responsibility the Middle Eastern and the Central Asian countries. Two on-going wars, in Afghanistan and Iraq, take place within the CENTCOM region. Preoccupied with combating Al-Qaeda and its radical affiliates, the U.S. additionally conducts operations in other countries in this region, most notably in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia. In the past two decades the center of gravity has shifted from EUCOM towards CENTCOM.

The other three regional Commands are the U.S. African Command (AFRICOM), the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) and the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM). These commands are less prominent in terms of number of overseas military bases and troops located within their areas of responsibility.

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Chapter 3: Overseas basing policy debate

“Isn’t the point of having lots of allies around the world to get them to do lots of things that will make us safer (and save us money), instead of simply multiplying the number of countries we think

we are obligated to protect?”

Stephen Walt, 2010100

“The U.S. may be only the latest in a long line of countries that is unable to place sensible limits on its fears and aspirations”

Robert Jervis101

This chapter centers around the overseas basing policy debate of the past two decades. Discussed and analyzed are the various types of arguments used by those advocating contraction or expansion of the overseas basing system. In so doing, chapter 3 builds upon the most important parts of the previous chapters. What follows is an outline of the debate in the first paragraph, followed by the actual debate in the later paragraphs.

3.1 Framework of the debate

Recall that chapter 1 discussed the concept of imperial overstretch. The notion of imperial overstretch is typically invoked when debating great power decline. When a great power is incapable of defending the sum of its interests it is said to be imperially overstretched. Important factors leading to this overstretch include an excess of military commitments and relative industrial and economic decline. As a tangible, modern-day manifestation of military commitments, the U.S. network of overseas military bases serves as a potential component part of imperial overstretch. At this juncture, the history of the American basing system comes into play. As detailed in chapter 2, the United States developed an extensive network of overseas bases during WWII, which it retained during the Cold War. From the end of WWII up until today, there have been phases of expansion and

100_{Walt, 2010.}

Imperial Overstretch