Dealing with missed opportunities: The causes and boundary conditions of inaction inertia

Tilburg University

Dealing with missed opportunities

van Putten, M.

Publication date:

2008

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van Putten, M. (2008). Dealing with missed opportunities: The causes and boundary conditions of inaction inertia. Ridderprint.

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DD

DEALING WITH

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES.

THE CAUSES

AND BOUNDARY

CONDITIONS

Illustrator: _KizzyWeber

This researchis _{supported by}a_{grant from} theNetherlands _Organization

forScientificResearch _{(NWO400-03-385).}

© Marijke van Putten, 2007 ISBN/EAN978-90-5335-147-5

DEALING

WITH

MISSED OPPORTUNITIES. THE

CAUSES

AND BOUNDARY CONDITIONS

OF

INACTION

INERTIA

Proefschrift

ter verkrijging vande graad van doctor

aan de Universiteitvan _Tilburg, op gezag van de_{rector magnificus,}

Prof. Dr. F.A. van der Duyn Schouten, in het openbaar teverdedigenten overstaan

van een_{door college} van_promoties aangewezen commissie

in de aula vandeUniversiteit

op dinsdag 15_{januari 2008}

om 14.15 uur

door

Marijkevan Putten geboren op 27 december 1979

Promotores: Prof Dr. _{M. Zeelenberg}

(Universiteitvan_Tilburg) Prof. Dr. E. van Dijk (UniversiteitLeiden)

Promotiecommissie: Prof Dr. O.E. _Tykocinski (Ben GurionUniversity, Israel) Prof. Dr. P. Ayton

(City University, London) Prof. Dr. S. Dewitte

(KatholiekeUniversiteit Leuven, Belgium) Dr. B.A. Nijstad

(UniversiteitvanAmsterdam) Prof Dr. F.G.M Pieters

(Universiteitvan_Tilburg)

Prof. Dr. D.A. _Stapel (Universiteitvan _Tilburg)

==3=1-1

Contents

Chapter 1 Introduction 5

Chapter 2 Whenj' 11

MULTIPLE OPTIONS IN THE PAST AND THE PRESENT: THE IMPACTON

INACTION

INERTIA

Experiment 2.1 15

Experiment 7 7 18

Experiment 9 1 22

Chapter 3 When, 29

DECOUPLING THE PAST FROM THE PRESENT ATTENUATES INACTION INERTIA Experiment 3.1 34

Experiment 3 0 40

Experiment 3 1 45

Chapter4 Whop 53

DEALING WITH MISSED OPPORTUNITIES: ACTION VS. STATE ORIENTATION MODERATES INACTION INERTIA Experiment 4.1 55

Experiment 4.9 59

Chapter 5 Why? 69

TURNING SWEETDEALS SOUR: INACTION INERTIA AS A SOUR GRAPES PHENOMENON

Experiment 5.1 74

Experiment 5 7 79

Experiment 5 3 85

Chapter 6 Conclusions and Discussion 93 SAMENVATTING _(Summary in _Dutch) 109

REFERENCES

113

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 121

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

How many things did you notdo today? Theanswer to that question is

infinite. I, forinstance, did not eat pastathis _{morning, I did} notdrive a car, I didnot leave myhousethroughthe window, and I did not buy an

airplane.

Of

course, I could go on and on and on and on. When there is

suchan abundance

of

inactions in everyday li fe

it

seems almostsilly to try to study them and

it

seems moreefficient to study actions instead.

However, many inactionshave_{importantconsequences, such as}

hinderinggood decision making. Forexample, there are two different

systems toregisterorgandonors. Inone system, people areautomatically

non-donors and have to explicitly indicateto become one (opt-in), in the

other peopleare automaticallydonors and have toexplicitly indicate not

to become one(opt-out). In countrieswith opt-in situations (e.g.,

Belgium, Poland and Sweden) much more people choose to become an organdonor than in countries withan opt-out system (such as The

Netherlands, U.S.A. and _{Germany; Johnson}

&

Goldstein, 2003; see also

Ritov

&

Baron, 1992; Spranca, Minsk,

&

Baron, 1991). Anotherexample

of

inactions hindering good decision making, isthatpeople consistently

choose to donothing when thenumber

of

choices are sooverwhelming, theycannot figure out what theywantanymore(Iyengar

&

Lepper, 2000; Schwartz, 2000). Thus, the consequences

of

people's inactions can

become _{very important at}the individual, but also atthe societal level. Interestingly, people sometimes even choose not to act on

opportunities thatareobjectively attractive. Forexample, whywould

somebodybooking a

_flight

refrain _{from signing up for air miles} without costs when they get4,500 miles (halfa free

_flying

_ticket) extra for free?

Thereare _{people who} do. Theseare_{peoplewho found out they could}

-6 Chapter I

have had 15,500 freemiles _{ifthey hadsignedup} earlier_(Tykocinski,

Pittman,

&

Tuttle, 1995). Options that wereavailable in the past, but not anymore inthe presentare shown tolargely drive people not to act.

This effect,

of

peoplenot actingon attractive opportunities simply because

of

missed_{prioropportunities,} iscalled inactioninertia

(Tykocinski et al., 1995) and is thecentral theme

ofthis

dissertation. In social psychology, the effects ofprioractions that stimulate people to

take action arewell known. For example, people are more

likely

to invest

in afailing course

of

action, whenthey invested inthatactionearlier

(e.g., thecostly Dutchrailwayknown astheBetuwelijn; Arkes & Blumer, 1985). Or, people's willingness to put up a huge signin their

yard against thebuilding ofalocal _expresswayis _{greater when they}

earlier_signed a_{petitionagainst} the_{expressway (Freedman}

&

Fraser, 1966). Inactioninertiais similar,because it also describes that past decisionsinfluence currentdecisions, but at the same time it is_different,

becauseitdescribesthat inactions can leadto subsequentinactions.

INACTION INERTIA: WHAT, WHEN, WHO, AND WHY?

What? 66

Inaction inertia occurs_{when bypassing} an initial _{action opportunity has} the effect

of

decreasing the likelihoodthat subsequent similaraction opportunities willbe _{taken" (Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 794). Put}

differently,when people miss an opportunity to act, they are less likely to

act on asimilar opportunity later. The firstexperiment investigating this effectshowedthat people were less willing to buy a ski pass ondiscount from $100 for $90 when theymissed theopportunity to buy the pass for $40 than when they did not miss an _{opportunity. Thus, because the}

initial, moreattractive action _opportunity ismissed (initial inaction), the

second less _{attractive action opportunity is not}taken_{(inertia). This effect} is stronger, the largerthedifferencein attractiveness between the missed and thecurrent_{opportunity. Thus, likelihood to act on the $90 pass did} not decrease when theopportunity to buy the pass for $80 was missed

Introduction 1

showingthat people are less likely to act onthe currentopportunity when

thedifference between the missed and the currentopportunity is large than when the difference is small.

When?

The inaction inertia effect is a very robustfinding. Researchers found the effect in various _{decisions, in scenario studies aboutbuying shoes,} booking_vacations, signing up for_courses, etc. (Arkes, Kung,

&

Hutzel, 2002; Butler

&

Highhouse, 2000;Kumar, 2004; Sevdalis, Harvey, & Yip, 2006; Tykocinski,Israel,

&

Pittman, 2004; Tykocinski

&

Pittman,

1998,2001; Tykocinski et al., 1995; Van Putten, Zeelenberg, & Van Dijk, 2007; Zeelenberg,Nijstad, Van Putten, & Van Dijk, 2006;

Zeelenberg & Van Putten, 2005), as well asbehavioral studies in the lab, where_participantswere_{placed in}a _{gambling situation (Tykocinski et al.,}

1995) ora stock market_{setting(Tykocinski et al., 2004).} Put_differently, it seems that anydecision is strongly influenced by inactions from the

past and thatpeople do not seem able to let go

of

theirpast inactions. But thatwould imply thatwhenever we miss out on an_{attractive deal, we are}

nevertakinganothersimilar opportunityeveragain. With all the sales on

clothing nowadays inWestern societies, people arebound to miss a few

good deals sooneror _{later. If we take this to the extreme,}

it

would mean that in theendnobody willwear anything ever again. How appealing as

thismay sound to some people, everyday experience indicates that this is highly unlikelyto happen. I, for_{example, missed some good deals on}

trousers now and then, andstill I amwearing onewhile writing this dissertation. In otherwords, there mustbeconstraints on theinaction inertia effect, boundary conditions thatdetermine when it

will

emerge and when not.

Chapter 2 and3 reportthe studiesthat investigatedthebasic question,

when does inaction inertiaoccur? The studies in _Chapter2 _{investigate the}

effect

of

choice context on theinaction inertia effect.

Until

now inaction inertiawas studied in _{settings thatoffered participants}one missed

opportunity and subsequentlyone _{current option.} Basedon_previous

literature ontheinfluence ofthe presence

of

multipleoptions ondecision making (Hsee

&

Leclerc, 1998; Jones,Frisch, Yurak, & Kim, 1998), the

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8 Chapter 1

hypothesiswasderived that when multiple options are _{currently offered,}

inaction inertiadecreases. Thereason for thisdecrease is that the

decision to act or not on thecurrent opportunity might not just be influenced by themissedopportunity, but rather bya _{comparison of the}

options available. In short, theexperiments demonstrated thatinaction inertia occurs only when thecurrent andmissed _{opportunity are} compared one-to-one.

Chapter 3 turns to thecharacteristics

ofthe

decision itselfthat_might determinewhether inaction inertiaoccurs or not. In _{previous inaction}

inertia studiesthe missed_{opportunitywas always strongly}associated

with thecurrent_{opportunity. The} idea studied _{in Chapter 3 is that}

inaction inertia

will

occur when this association is _{verystrong, and the}

comparison withthe missed opportunity is then easy tomake. _However, when themissed_opportunity is _{decoupled from}the _{current opportunity}

(put differently, when the two opportunities are"segregated"), inaction inertia might be less likely to set in. Based on the literatureonmental

accounting and_{decoupling (Soman}

&

Gourville, 2001;Thaler, 1999; Van Dijk

&

Zeelenberg, 2003), themoderating effect

of

decoupling on inaction inertiawas_{investigated. Specifically, the investigation looked at}

the influence

of

factors thatdecouplethe missed fromthe current opportunity (e.g., the missedopportunity was lesscomparable to the

currentopportunity) on the inaction inertiaeffect.

Who,

Inactioninertia has been studied with _{participants from various cities and} countries. All withtheirdifferent_{backgrounds, cultures andpersonalities.}

In these diverse groups, the inaction inertia effect is found over and over

again. This should notbetaken as anindication that individual differences do not matter. _{For example, when I observethe people} around me, some peopleare natural 'decouplers', such that they are very goodat segregatingdisappointing outcomes, orother situations that went

Introduction 9

happened, and keep their eyes on the past, and how thingsmight have

been. Based on thequestion when inaction inertiaoccurs, and the studies

in Chapter 3 _{investigating}the effect

of

_decoupling oninaction _{inertia, it} is interesting to seewhether this individual difference

of

_{dealing with}

disappointingoutcomes has a similarinfluence onthe inaction inertia

effect. Toanswer the question who ismostlikely to show inaction inertia, Chapter 4 investigated the in fluence of thisdistinction-action

versusstate_{orientation (Kuhl}

&

_{Beckmann, 1994)- on} the inaction inertia effect. The results showed that the 'linkers' (state-oriented people)

show stronger inaction inertia effects thatthe _'decouplers'

(action-orientedpeople), becausethe linkers usedthe missedopportunity much

more to estimate theworth ofthe currentopportunity than the decouplers

did.

Why?

Afteraddressing thequestions of what inaction inertia is, when it will

happen and who is mostlikely to fall prey to it, themore fundamental question is whythis effecthappens. What is the psychology underlying

the inaction inertia effect?The literatureon inaction inertiais still inconclusive on what precisely causesthe inactioninertia effect. On the

one hand thereis evidence in favor ofan_{explanation in}terms

of

_{regret of}

missing the firstopportunity. People either wanttoescape the regret they

feel for_missingthe first _{opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002), orstay} inactive

to avoid feeling regret inthe future (Tykocinski

&

Pittman, 1998, 2001). However, recent findings show that regret is not necessarilya causal

factor inthe occurrence ofthe inaction inertia effect and thus castdoubt

on the regret explanations

of

inaction inertia. (Zeelenberg et al., 2006).

Insteadthere was more evidence in favor

of

another_{explanation of}

inaction inertia interms of thevaluation ofthe _opportunity,which shows

that how muchvalue people place on thechoice optiondepends on the

attractiveness ofthe missed_{opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002). According} to the valuation explanation, inaction inertiaoccursbecausethe missed

opportunity is used as a referencepoint compared towhich the opportunity is seen asworth less than it iscurrently offered for.

10 Chapter 1

Chapter5 outlines anew_explanation

of

inaction inertia. The

alternative explanation isthat devaluation might not be an end, but a means to cope withthe frustration people feel over missing a more attractive opportunity. According to this so called 'sourgrapes

mechanism' (Elster, 1983),

if

peoplecannot get what they want, and feel frustrated over it, a way theymight deal with it is by downgrading the object

of

frustration. After all, if you care less about _{something, it is less}

frustrating if youcannot have it! Appliedto_{inaction inertia,}people then

stay inactive onthecurrent opportunitybecause theydowngraded it in ordertoalleviatethe frustration formissing the more attractive

opportunity. Chapter 5 showsresults thatinaction inertiadecreases when

downgrading is impossible and thus that frustrationcannotbe alleviated. Also, the results show thatinaction inertiadecreases when this sour grapes mechanism isprevented, or discouraged.

By answering the when, who andwhyquestions

of

inaction inertia, this dissertation aimsto contributes to theunderstanding ofthe inaction inertia effect. That is whythe _{question "What} is inaction inertia" will be

readdressed in the general discussion with the findings from this

dissertation in mind. When we understand inactioninertiabetter we can

use this knowledgeto enhance its effectto preventits effects when inactionis _{undesirable (e.g., not booking} avacation when _takingabreak

wouldbe_important).

A final noteconcerns the _{setup of}the individual _{empiricalchapters that} follow. The chapters inthis dissertationare basedonjournal articles. The downside

ofthis

structure is thatthis mightcausesome overlap in issues

explained ordiscussed. An upside of this construction is that

it

gives readers achance to read each _{chapter separately,} without_{missing crucial} information. I hope this dissertation givesan informative overview and

extension

of

inaction inertia research up till now, whether youchoose to read

it

cover_{to cover, or just a} few_{chapters. My aim is that}after_reading it, youunderstandinaction inertia and have a _{clear view of what, when,}

to whom and why

it

occurs. I invite you to join me on the path 1 chose a couple

of

years ago to explorethe fascinatingworld

of

missed

Chapter 2

When 7

MULTIPLE

OPTIONS IN THE PAST AND THE

PRESENT:

THE IMPACT ON

INACTION

INERTIA

How_{do people decide} whether to act onan _{attractive action opportunity?}

If there is onethingwe learnedfrom recent decision makingresearch it is thatpeople's preferences are notstable, buthighlydependent on the

conditions underwhichsuch _{attractive action opportunities}are evaluated (e.g., Kahneman

&

Tversky, 2000). One example

ofthis

context

dependency is theinaction inertia effect.

It

shows that_{missing an} attractive opportunitydecreasesthe likelihood that_{people will act on a} subsequentopportunity within thesame_{domain (Tykocinski et al.,}

1995). Forexample,people are less likely to book a discountedvacation to Tuscany for $900instead ofthe regular $1000 when theymissed a

prioropportunity to bookthe vacation for $400 than when they missed it for$800 (Tykocinski

&

Pittman, 1998). Thus,preferences vary

systematically depending onthe _{comparison withpast}offers. This inaction inertia effect is found fornumerous decisions, ranging from the decision to buy a pair

of

shoes to sign up for a_{course, and} from renting

an apartment to saving airmiles (Arkes et al., 2002; Kumar, 2004;

Sevdalis et al., 2006; Tykocinski et al., 2004; Tykocinski

&

Pittman,

1998,2001; Tykocinski et al., 1995; Van Putten et al., 2007; Zeelenberg et al., 2006;Zeelenberg & Van Putten, 2005).

Since the firstdemonstration (Tykocinski et al., 1995), the insights into this phenomenon havegrown substantially. We now know that inaction inertia occursbecause the missed_{prioropportunity is used as a} referencepoint when evaluating the presentopportunity. Forexample, researchhas shown that themore attractivethemissed _{opportunity was,}

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11 Chapter 2

the _{more people perceive the current offer as a loss, and the more people}

anticipateregret imagining that they would act on thiscurrent

opportunity (Tykocinski et al., 2004;Tykocinski

&

Pittman, 1998,2001; Tykocinski et al., 1995). Also, themoreattractive the missedopportunity

was themore peopleregret missing it and the more they devalue the current opportunity (Arkes et al., 2002; Kumar, 2004;Zeelenberg et al.,

2006). Thus, thecomparison ofthecurrent opportunity tothe missed opportunity and thedifference in attractivenessbetween the two opportunitiesare crucialelementsfor inaction inertiatooccur.

Until now, most inaction inertia studiesinvestigated the effect of missing a_{single prior opportunity on the likelihood to act on} a_single

current opportunity, which is understandable fromaresearch perspective.

In real life, however, action opportunities are_{usually not offered in such}

isolation. Inthe example

of

booking avacation, the trip to Tuscany may

be advertised next to a_{skiing trip} in Aspen,a vacation to see_{tulips in} Holland, a trip to go diving in_{Eilat, or}a vacation to experience the

mystery

of

India. Especially now, whentheinternet allows us to shop

around the_{world, multipleoptions are only}one _{click away. Thus, one}

could argue that the typical inaction inertiastudiesrepresent

oversimplified situations to the _{participants.}

By itself simplification is not necessarilyproblematic, and in fact helpful to providea cleardemonstrationand understanding of the

phenomenon. However, in the current_chapterattention isdrawn to the possibility that the situation in whicha_{single opportunity}ismissed and a singleopportunity is offered _mightfacilitate the use

ofthe

missed

opportunity as a reference point, because this is theonly reference

information available. Put differently, theseoversimplified situations may beespecially conducive to the inaction inertia effect. Ifone option is missed and one _option isoffered_{peoplenaturally focus on the loss} incurred bythe missedopportunity (Tykocinski et al., 1995). If alternative options arepresent in thecurrent choice set, the temporal

focus

of

people is likelyto shift to the gains that arestill available. Manipulatingthe focus from pastlosses to futuregains moderates the

inaction _{inertia effect (Tykocinski et al., 1995, Exp. 6). In} a _{similar vein,}

it is proposed thattheavailability

of

multiple options increases people's

Multiple options in the past and the present 13 Therefore, in the present research the influence

of

multipleoptions on

the occurrence

of

inaction inertiawas studied. The investigation started in the firsttwo experiments by studyingthe influence

of

multiple current

options. In the third experimenttheinvestigation continued by studying the influence

of

multiple missedoptions oninaction inertia.

MULTIPLE CURRENT OPTIONS

To my knowledge, there is only oneprevious article that investigated inaction inertia in thecontext

of

_{multiple options (Zeelenberg & Van} Putten, 2005). Participants inthis research wereaskedto choose between

eight brands of beer (orfourbrands

of

_{detergent)after they} missed a

discount on one

of

_{those brands. They were} less _{likely to opt for the}

formerlydiscounted brandwhen there wasa large_discount, compared to when there was asmall discount. But, at the same time they were more

likely

to switch to abrand thatthey perceived to be moreattractive at that

time. The aim ofthat article was to show thatinaction inertia might be another explanation forthedecrease in sales onabrand _{immediately after}

a promotion _(i.e. post-promotion dip), and that this may be due to the switching to other brands. The current research extends this finding, by showing thatmultiple currentoptions shiftattention frompast losses to present possible gains. As a_{result, the}current _{options will}be _compared

toeach otherinstead of to the more attractivemissed opprotunity. This

will

lead people to choose the mostattractive option inthe currentchoice

set. An important implication ofthe presentresearch thus isthat people

mightnotnecessarily switchto anotheroption but can alsodecide to act

on the same option, _{depending on its attractiveness compared to the}other options inthe choice set.

Indirect evidence for this effect

of

multiple options on the inaction inertia effectcomesfrom earlierresearch on the influence

of

multiple options on thechoice process. Jones_{and colleagues (Jones et al., 1998)}

showed that peopleweigh attributes ofa_{choice option differently when a}

choice is framed asan _{opportunity (e.g.,} should I booka vacation to Tuscany or not), than when itis framed as achoice (e.g., _{should I book a}

vacation to_{Tuscany, or}to _{Holland, or} no_{vacation). Decision} makers

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respondmarkedly differenttoopportunitiesas _{compared to choices.}

Jones et al. (1998, p. 213) argue that this is the casebecause"people

focustheir attention onthose_{aspects of}thedecision _{problem which are}

explicitlyrepresented, and that they tend to payless attentionto those aspects of the problem whicharerepresentedonly

implicitly."

Viewed

this way,thetypical inaction inertia situation can be interpreted as an

opportunitydecision in which the main focus is onthe (difference

between) thecurrent andmissed opportunity andthe perceived loss that

goes with it. Buttheintroduction

of

multiple current optionsmay shift the decision-makers' attention fromthemissedopportunity totheother

alternatives, which probably put it less in aloss_{perspective. Thus, the}

opportunity to book the tripto Tuscany would be more influenced by the

missedopportunity, than thechoice of this trip out of a set that also includesthe _{alternative options to go to Israel or America.} Jones et al.'s

findings may thus substantiate the reasoning that inaction inertia will be

attenuated when there are_multiplecurrent _{options present,} because these

alternative _options decrease _{the negative impact of}themissed opportunity as a_point

of

reference.

This idea is alsoconsistent with the work

of

Bazerman, Hsee and

theircolleagues,who investigatedthe difference betweenjoint and

separateevaluation (Bazerman, Moore, Tenbrunsel, Wade-Benzoni, & Blount, 1999; Hsee, Loewenstein, Blount,

&

Bazerman, 1999).

Especially important forthe currentresearch are the insights provided by

Hsee and _{Leclerc (1998) who}suggested that anattractive but unavailable

referencepointinfluences the evaluation ofan option more when it is

evaluated separately than when it isevaluated

_jointly

withanother_option. In one

of

theirstudies, participantswere presented ascenario inwhich theywere considering to buya cordless phone,and learned thata friend

had_justboughta _{phone with a} 100 meterreach and a_batterythat lasts 20 days (this attractive but currently unavailablealternative was the

reference_point). One_group

of

_participantswas asked_{whether they}

would buya_{phone with a} 50meterreach and a_batterythat lasts 2 days

(separate evaluation). Another group

of

participantswas asked whether they would buy aphone with 20 meters reach andabattery thatlasts 10

Multiple options in the past and the present 15 the separateevaluation conditions were notlikely to buythe phone,

probablybecause

it

_{comparedunfavorably to} theunavailable attractive

reference_{point. Participants in}the

_joint

_{evaluation condition, however,}

were likely to buy one ofthe phones, probablybecause they were not so

much focused on theunattractivereference_{point, but also paid attention} to the otheroption in_{the choice set. Thus,} although reference information

was present in both the

joint

andseparate _{evaluation conditions, the}

impact ofthisreference information decreasedwhenanother_{option was} present in the current choice context.

Theseprevious findings support the idea that the loss incurred by missing a_priormore attractive_opportunity

will

influencethe decision to

act on a_{current opportunity less when} the_{current opportunity} is offered

in a choice setwith other_{options than when it}is offered alone. Note that this implies expecting onlyalarge influence

of

multiple options when the difference in attractivenessbetween the missed and thecurrent

opportunityis large. When the difference in attractivenessis _{small, and}

its influence on the current decision is_small, the influence

of

multiple optionsis _{expected to} be_negligible.

EXPERIMENT 2.1

The investigation

of

Experiment2.1 studied the influence of the availability

of

anothercurrent option onthe inactioninertia effect. The

reasoning behind this is thatan_{additional option in}the choice setwould

decrease the_{weight of}themissed _{opportunity in}thedecision whether to

act on the _{current opportunity. As} a_{result, the}difference in attractiveness

withthe missed _{opportunity would be} less _{important when another option}

is in the choice set than when thecurrent opportunity isoffered in isolation. The hypothesis istherefure that inaction inertiawouldoccur whenthe_{current opportunity is theonly option available, but when} another_{option would}be _{currently availabletoo,} inaction inertia would be

attenuated due to a_{higher likelihood to act on}the _{current opportunity.}

Participants read that they wereconsidering buying a sofa, and that they previously eithermissed a muchmore attractiveoffer(large difference), ora_slightlymore attractive offer on asofa _(small

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16 Chapter 2

difference). This was all information in one

half ofthe

situations (one

current option). Inthe othersituations itwas mentionedthatanother

option was also_{currently available (two current options). In the one} currentoption conditionsthe expectation was thatthe larger the

differencein attractiveness between the missed and thecurrent

opportunity, theless likelypeoplewould act onthe current opportunity (= inaction inertia). However, in thetwo current options conditions the

expectation was that, because people areless likelyto compare the

current to themissedopportunity, thatthe influence

of

difference in attractiveness woulddisappear.

Method

Participants and design

Hundred-sixtystudents (40 male, 120 female, Mage =21 years) atTilburg

Universityvolunteeredtoparticipate in this experiment. They were randomlyassigned to one of thefourconditions of a2(Difference in

attractiveness: largevs. _{small) x} 2 _{(Current option: one vs. two)}

between-participantsdesign. Procedure and measures

Participantswereprovided with a_{questionnaire containing}the scenario.

The scenario in theone current _{option and large [small] difference in} attractivenesscondition read as follows:

You would like to have a new sofa. You thought that eitherablack or

a blue sofa_{would look nice in your room. In} awindow ofafurniture

shopyou recently sawnice black and blue sofas. Theblack sofa was offered for €250 [€350] instead_{of€500. That is why you}are_{eager to}

stop by the shop. When you get to the shop

it

appears that you are too late and the offerhas_{expired. The sofa} is still for sale.

A

salesperson

tells youthe black sofa is nowoffered for€400 instead of €500.

In thetwo currentoptionsconditions the last two sentences of the scenariowere_{changed into "The sofa} is still for sale in black and blue.

Multiple options in the past and the present 17

sofa is nowoffered for €400 instead of €500".

After

readingthe scenario

participants indicated action likelihood forthe black sofa on an 11-point

scaleranging from 0 (very unlikely) to 10 (very likely).

Results

The purpose

of

Experiment 2.1 was to test the hypothesis thatlikelihood

to act on achoiceoption aftermissing a more attractive offeris lower

when the differencebetween the missedand subsequent options is large

than when thisdifference issmall _{(i.e., inaction inertia), but that this}

decrease in action likelihooddisappears when the subsequent offer is

evaluated in the _{presence of}analternative _{current option.} The results of action likelihoodwith_{respect to the} black sofaare summarized inTable

2.1.

A 2 x 2

ANOVA

_{yielded a}maineffect

of

difference in_{attractiveness,}

17(1,156) = 12.89, p <.001, and a main effect

of

current option, F(1,156) = 20.87, p < .001. These were _{qualified by} a_{significantinteraction effect,}

17(1, 156) -4.52, p

<.05.

Furtheranalyses using simple effectsshowed that inactioninertiawas found in theonecurrent _{option condition, F(1,}

156)-16.35, p

<.001. However, as_{expected this} effect_{disappeared in}

thetwo currentoptions_{condition, 17(1, 156) = 1.07, ns.} Discussion

The results show that the size ofthe differencebetween the missed and the currentopportunity influencesthe likelihood to act on the current

opportunity when itis evaluated_{alone, but not when it} isevaluated togetherwithanother currentoption. Note, thatwith anotheroption in the

choice set, the likelihood to act increasedacrossconditions to the level of the likelihood to act withasmall difference _{in attractiveness (and}

normally has less_{negative impact on} the likelihood to act onthecurrent opportunity). This corresponds to the idea thatthe presence

of

multiple

currentoptions shiftsthetemporal focus from the pastmissed

opportunity tothe present availableoptions.

--1 .- 9<//FL./ .1 .

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18 Chapter 2

Table2.1: _{Mean and Standard Deviation of Action Likelihood as a Function of}

Current Option and Difference in Attractiveness in Experiment 2.1 Dijference in attractiveness

Large Small

Current option M SD M SD

Onesofa 4.47a (2.21) 6.52b (2.47) Twosofas 6.88b (2.47) 7.4Ob (1.87)

Note. _{Ratings were made on 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled not}likely (0) and verylikely(10), means with different subscripts per row differ at p < .001.

Althoughthe currentfindings support thecurrentreasoning, one

mightposit thatthe findings could also be_{explained differently. One}

couldargue that the sofa was purchased morebecause ofasimple contrast withthe otheravailable option. Due to this contrasteffect the current opportunity mayhave looked better in the conditions with two options than in theconditions with onlythe current option. This way, not only the presence ofanalternative option was manipulated, but also whetherthe_{present opportunity by} itsel f was seen as moreattractive or not. Although thiscouldonly explain the maineffect ofthe number of options and notthe interaction effect,

it

would berelevantto control for this possibility. The aim

of

Experiment 2.2 was to replicatethe findings

of Experiment 2.1 while controlling forthe possible difference in

attractiveness of the_{current opportunity}between the one andtwo _options conditions, providingadifferent test ofthe hypothesis.

EXPERIMENT2.2

In Experiment2.2participants all missed anopportunity to buy a

cordlessphone. Next, theywereoffered a lessattractive opportunity to buy a cordlessphone with a _{large or} asmall difference in attractiveness

Multiple options in the past and the present 19 another, orthese two phones wereoffered together. Thus, the same phones were offeredtogetheror separately. The main dependentvariable

of interest was the likelihood to act on the subsequentoffer. The

hypothesis was thatthedifference in attractiveness wouldbe important in the decision to act in theconditions with onecurrentopportunity, but that this effectwouldweakenordisappear in the conditions where the two optionsare offeredtogether.

Method

Participants and design

Two hundred-ten _{students (85 male,} 114 female, 11 didnot indicate their

gender, Mage = 21 years)

of

Tilburg Universityvolunteeredto participate in this_{experiment. They were randomly assigned to one of the six} conditions of a2 _(Differencein attractiveness: _{large vs. small) x 3}

(Current option: Phone_{A, Phone B, Phone A & B) between-participants} design.

Procedure and measures

Participants wereprovided with a_{questionnaire containing} the scenario

of one of the six conditions. The scenario wasamodified version of Hsee and Leclerc's (1998)cordless phone scenario. The scenario in Phone A

and large [small] difference inattractivenesscondition readas follows: Youare _{looking for}acordless _{phone for use at home. In}a

_{flyer of}

Primafoon_{(a telephone shop) you saw} a_{phone with a 100 [50]}

meterreach and

of

whichthe _{batterylasts for 20 [10] days. You}

were interested in this _{phone. That is why}a _{couple ofdays later you}

went to the shop. There

it

turned out thatthe phone was already

sold out. You_{briefly talk to} a_{salesperson. Herecommends you}

another phone thatis _{available. The price} is within_yourbudget.

The phone hasa reach of50 meters and the_{battery lasts for 2 days.}

Difference in attractiveness was manipulated the same in thePhone B and the Phone

A&B

conditions. In thePhone B and the

Phone A&B

condition itwas _{manipulated whichphone(s) were currently offered to}

-10 Chapter 2

the participants. Inthe Phone B conditionthe phone that is currently

considered hadareach of20meters and the _{batterylasts for 10 days. In}

the conditionswith

Phone A&B

bothphones were currently offered

together.

Afterreading the scenario participants could indicate theirlikelihood

to act onthese alternatives. Inthe PhoneA condition theywere asked,

"How likely are you to buythe phone with 50 meters reach andabattery that lasts for 2 days?" Inthe PhoneB condition the same question was

asked but then forthe _{phone with}20 meters reach anda_batterythat lasts

for 1 0 days. In the Phone A & B condition boththesetwo questions were

asked. In addition, amore general question was added in thePhone A &

B condition, namely,"How likely are you to buy one

of

these phones?"

All

action likelihood_questions were assessed on _{11-point scales (0 =}

very unlikely, 10 = verylikely). One general measure

of

action likelihood

was calculated which used the single action likelihoodmeasures in the Phone A and thePhone B condition andthe measure ofthe likelihood to buy one ofthe phones in thePhone A

&B

condition. This measure was

usedto compare action likelihood between the three conditions.

Results

The purpose

of

Experiment 2.2 was to testthe hypothesis that inaction inertia is replicated fortwooptions when they are evaluatedin isolation,

and not when these options areevaluated together. The results of the action likelihood measure_percondition are summarized inTable 2.2.

A 2 x 3 ANOVA onaction likelihood _{yielded a} main effect of difference in _{attractiveness, 17(1, 204) = 12.14, p < .01, and a main} effect

of

_{current option, F(2,204) = 6.16, p <} .005. These maineffects were qualified by a_{significant interaction effect, F(2,204) = 3.41, p < .05.}

Simpleeffects nalysis showeda significantdifference in action

likelihoodbetween the_{large and small} difference_{(i.e., inaction inertia) in}

the Phone Acondition, 17(1,204) = 12.37, p < .001, as well as in the

Phone B _{condition, F(1,204) = 6.55, p< .05. In}the

Phone A&B

Multiple options in the past and the present 21

0.002, ns:

Table2.2. _{Mean and Standard Deviation of Action Likelihood as a Function of}

Current Option and Difference in Attractiveness in Experiment 2.2 Differencein attractiveness

Large Small

Current option M SD M SD

PhoneA _{2.5la (1.90) 4.63b (2.87)}

PhoneB 2.94a (2.33) 4.49b (2.50)

PhoneA&B _{4.94a (2.95) 4.9la (2.39)}

Note._{Ratings were made on 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled notlikely(0) and}

verylikely (10). action likelihood in the Phone A&B condition indicated the likelihood

to act on one of_{the phones, means}with different_{subscripts per rowdiffer at p < .001.}

Discussion

Inaction inertiawas found in both conditions with onecurrent

opportunity, but not in the conditionwherethese two opportunities were offeredtogether,providing aconceptualreplication

of

Experiment 2.1. Additionally, unlike in Experiment 2.1, the other available option is this Experiment was not _{inferior, ruling out}the alternativecontrast

explanation that people are morelikely to act onthe currentopportunity

because

it

looks better next tothe otheroption in the choice set. As a result, the higher likelihood to act onthecurrent options is due to the

multiplicity

of

options and not the favorable contrast withthe other

To examine whether,andhopefullypreclude that inaction inertia decreases inthePhone A

& Bcondition simplybecausethe chance that oneofthe phonesischosen ishigher, the ratingsonactionlikelihoodon_{phone A and}onactionlikelihoodon_{phone B in}thePhone A

& B conditionswerecompared to the ratingsonlikelihood to actonphone A inthePhone A condition and on phone B inthePhoneBcondition.The results show thesamepattern as the resultsdiscussed in the main text: Thelikelihood to acton Phone A andonPhone B both increase inthe PhoneA&Bconditions.Thisshows thatattenuation oftheinactioninertia effect isnot merely due toahigher chanceofacting ononeofthetwophones.

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11 Chapter 2

available option. Itagain supports thereasoning thatwhen multiple optionsare_offered,the focus on the missedopportunitydecreases

leading to ahigher likelihood to act.

EXPERIMENT 2.3

Experiments 2.1 and2.2 showed that inaction inertia isattenuated when

multiplecurrent options are available. The reasoning behind this effect is

that when multiplecurrentoptions aretaken into consideration thefocus

shifts from pastlosses to possible future gains. As a_result, likelihood to

act inthe large difference conditions is as high as inthe smalldifference conditions, in which the _{impact of}themissed _{opportunity is}less _strong.

We cannowconcludethat_{multiple current options}attenuate inaction inertia. However, wecannotbe _{entirely sure if this} is_really because of a

shift in focus away from the missed _{opportunity. Therefore, it was also} tested whether the samereasoning can be appliedto reverse the effect obtained_{in Experiment 2.1 and 2.2.}

If

_{multiplecurrent opportunities shift}

the focus from past losses to present possible gains,multiple missed

opportunities should increase the focus to the pastloss incurred by the

missedopportunity. The loss felt over havingmissedtwo opportunities is likely tobe _{greater than the loss felt over having}missed one. Hence,

missing multiple options would leadto inaction even when the difference

in attractiveness is small. In other words, theexpectation isagain to find no effect ofthe difference inattractiveness between the missed and the

current opportunities, but this time becauselikelihood to act on the current opportunity would belowoverall.

Along the lines

of

_{Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, theexperiment was} designed such thateach_opportunitywas missed _{separately in half of the}

conditions or that itwasmissed in combination withthe other

opportunity inthe remaining conditions. This experimentwas about

deciding to booka vacation to a GreekIsland. Participants read that they

hadeither missedan opportunity to book a trip to theGreek island

Rhodes, or to book a trip tothe Greek island Kos, or that theymissed

boththese _{opportunities. Toreplicate}the _{typical single option inaction}

Multiple options in the past and the present 23

tripto _{Rhodes [Kos]} were subsequentlyoffered a tripto _{Rhodes [Kos]. In}

the conditions in which participantsmissedbothopportunities, they were

subsequentlyoffered either the tripto Rhodes, or the trip to Kos. This

was done in orderto adequately testwhetherthe likelihood to act on a currently offered vacation to Kos orRhodes was _{influenced by missing a} single offer for a trip to thesame island versus by missing twooffers. The hypothesis was that whenmultiple opportunitiesare _previously

missed, theeffect

of

difference inattractiveness decreases through the factthat likelihood to act onthe current opportunity isreduced.

Method

Participants and design

Two hundredand _{forty college students (122 male,} 114 female, 4 did not indicate _{gender, Mige = 22 years)}atTilburg Universityvolunteered to participate in this experiment. The design was a2 _{(Difference in}

attractiveness: large vs. _{small) x} 3 _{(Missed option: Kos} vs. Rhodes vs.

both) x 2 _{(Current option:} Rhodes vs. _{Kos) between-participantsdesign.}

For theoretical reasons theconditions inwhich Rhodes was missed and Kos _{currently offered and Kos}missed and Rhodes_{currently offered were} nottested. Consequently, participantswere randomly assigned to one of

the eight remaining conditions.

Procedure and measures

Participants wereprovided with a_{questionnaire containing} a scenario

withthe dependent measures. The scenario in the Kos-Kos and large

[small] difference inattractivenessconditions readas follows:

In your vacation you would like to get away toa sunnyplace for a few days. Youwerethinkingabout a trip to aGreekIsland. When

you passa travel agencyyou happen to see anoffer fora completely

organized 10-day trip toa Greek_{Island. A trip to Kos now offered for} €149 _{[€199] instead of €299. That is why you}are_{eager to go to the}

travel agency. Inthe _{following week you have not had time and when}

you get tothe travel agency theofferhasexpired. The travel agency

has a new_{offer: a trip to Kos for}€249 instead of €299.

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./.--14 Chapter 2

In the Rhodes-Rhodesconditionthe initial offerforRhodes was €199

[€249] insteadof€349, and a _subsequentoffer forRhodes was €299 insteadof€349. Finally, in theremaining two conditionsboth offers were

missedandsubsequentlyeither the tripto Rhodes or to Koswas offered.

Thus,one offerwas missed and one was_{currently offered, or two were} missed and one was_{currently offered.} After_{reading the scenario} participants in the Kos condition indicated how

likely

they would book the trip to Kos, participants inthe Rhodes conditions indicated howlikely they would book a tripto Rhodes (0 =very unlikely. 10 = very likely).

Results

The purpose of the experiment was to test thehypothesis thatlikelihood

to act ona choice option after missingasingle more attractiveoffer was lower when thedifference _{between the missed and presentoption was}

large than when thisdifference was _{small, but that this difference would} decrease when two_{options were missed,} becauseaction likelihoodwould

be lowoverall. The means ofthe action likelihood_{ratings are}

summarized in Table 2.3.

The design was not

full

factorial andbecause not all the cells were filled the data_{were analyzed}witha 2 x 3 x 2

ANOVA

_{using the Type IV}

sum-of-squares method. Thisanalysis yielded a main effect

of

difference in attractiveness, F (1,232) = 13.23,p<.001, showing thatafter missing

a much moreattractive offer

for

either Kos, Rhodes orboth _{people were} less likely to act onthe current _offer(s)than after missing aslightly more

attractiveoffer_{(revealing overall inaction inertia).} Additionally, there was a main effect

of

missed_{option, F (2,232) = 6.07, p <} .01, showing

that the likelihood to act onthe subsequentoffer for a trip to Kos and

Rhodesdiffers_dependingonwhether Rhodes or Kos or both were

missed.

To test thespecific prediction that action likelihoodwould behigher

inthe small difference conditions thanthe large _{difference conditions,}

but only when one optionwas missed and not when twooptions were

missedtwo contrast analyses were ran. The first contrast showed that the

Rhodes-Multiple options in the past and the present 25 Rhodes _{condition, and in}the Kos-Kos condition, t(116) = -3.55, p < .01.

Thus, in these _{conditions, in which}one _optionwas missed, inaction inertia_{was replicated. The second contrast showed that the}effect of difference inattractiveness was not significant intheboth-Rhodes and

both-Kos conditions, t(116) = -1.65, ns. Thiscorresponds to the

reasoning that the inaction inertiaeffect does notoccur when two offers

were missed andoneoffer was subsequentlyoffered. Additional t-tests supported the reasoning more: the results showed ahigherlikelihood to act whenthe differencebetween the missed_{optionwas large than when}

the differencewas small when only Rhodeswas missed and currently offered, t(57) = -3.27, p <.01, and when only Koswas missed and

currently offered, t(59) = -2.40, p <.05. However, there was no such

difference in action likelihood when Both optionswere missed and Rhodeswas _{currently offered, t(58) = -0.99, ns, nor when both options}

were missed and Kos was_{currently offered, t(58) = -1.39, ns.}

Discussion

The _{current findings}thus corroboratedthe _{basic reasoning. First of all,}

the manipulation

of

difference in attractiveness only affectedlikelihood to act when one offerwas missed and notwhen_multiple offers were

missed. Thus, theeffect thatis_{generally seen}as _{being characteristic for}

the inaction inertia effect was only apparent in the case ofa single missed

opportunity and notwith multiplemissed _{opportunities. Secondly,} action likelihood was very lowwhen multipleoptions were missed, which

supports thenotion thatwith multiple missed opportunities action likelihooddecreases. These_findings

of

_Experiment2.3 _{complement the}

findings

of

Experiments 2.1 and 2.2, andsupport the reasoning that

multiple options affect likelihood toactbecause ofa_change infocus on the missed opportunity asapoint

of

reference.

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16 Chapter 2

Table 2.3. Mean and Standard Deviation of Action Likelihood as a Function of Missed and Current Options and Difference in Attractiveness in Experiment 2.3

Difference in attractiveness

Large Small

Missed-current options M

SD M SD

Rhodes-Rhodes 4.90a (2.32) 6.57b (1.55)

Kos-Kos 4.03a (2.56) 5.47b (2.91)

Both-Rhodes 3.87a (2.71) 4.57a (2.78)

Both-Kos 3.9Oa (2.02) 4.73a (2.59)

Note._{Ratings were made on 11-point scales, with endpoints labeled notlikely(0) and}

very likely (10), means with different subscripts per row differ atp < .05

GENERAL DISCUSSION

The inaction inertia effect refers tothe findingthatpeople are less likely

to act onanattractive opportunityonlybecause theymissed a more

attractive opportunity earlier on. The present chapter reports the

investigation ofthe effect ofthe presence

of

otheroptions in the current

ormissedchoice set. Three_experiments showed thatthis_{availability of}

alternatives _{considerably impacts people'stendency to} act. _Experiment

2.1 and2.2 showed that when the _{current opportunity}is_presented

togetherwith anotheroption, the likelihood to act onthe current

opportunityincreases_{such that inaction inertia is attenuated. Experiment}

2.3 showed thatwhen multiple options _{were missed, the}likelihood to act

on the current_opportunitydecreases, also attenuating inaction inertia.

Based onthese findings itisconcluded thatthe presence

of

multiple

options next tothe current opportunity shiftthe focus away from the

missedopportunity, and, alternatively,thatmultiple options next to the

missedopportunity increasethe focus on the missedopportunity. Our_reasoning about the role ofthe missed_opportunityas reference

pointwas _{supportedby insights from}the literatures on choices vs.

opportunities andthe

joint

vs. _separateevaluation. _{The presentfindings}

Multiple options in the past and the present 27 the referencepoint. the findings thus not onlyprovide insights into the effect

of

multipleoptions on inaction inertia, they also support those

previous literaturesby replicating them in an inaction inertia context and by extending the reasoning frommultiple options in thepresent to

multiple options in the past.

The present research extendsthe_finding

of

_{Zeelenberg and Van}

Putten (2005)that people switchto otherbrands than thebrand

previously on sale.

If

multipleoptionsare offeredthemissedopportunity

has less_{weight in}the decision to act on one ofthe _{current opportunities.}

If

anotherbrand is the mostattractivechoice option among thecurrent opportunities that brandislikely tobechosen. _{However, when the same}

brand is themost_{attractive option in} the currentchoice set_{people will}

not necessarily switch. Instead they will be verylikelyto choose the

same_{brand again.}

The findings obtained in thepresent research appear to berelevant for other_{sequential decision making phenomena as well. The sunk cost}

effect, as anexample, shows thatdecisionmakers aremore likely to invest in a_{project when they already invested in}

it

before_{(Arkes &}

Blumer, 1985). Indeed, Neal andNorthcraft(1986) found that the sunk

costeffect decreased_{byletting participants activelygenerate} alternative

courses

of

action thanthe currentlyfailing course

of

action. Based on the

current findingsand_{previous findings} on _{multiple options}one_might

explain this finding bythe effect

of

_{multiple options, whichmight have}

decreasedthe _{impact of}the_previous investments.

In conclusion, the influence

of

missed_{opportunities on subsequent} decisions _{clearlydepends on the size}

of

choice setwithwhich the decision makeris confronted. The _availability

of

_multiple options can both enhance and attenuate the _{impact of}the _{missed opportunity on the}

decision to act onthe current opportunity. Afterhaving_misseda large set

of

attractive opportunities, we become extra inert, resulting inafailure to

seizethe moment and acton currently offered attractive opportunities. However, amultitude

of

_{options offered in the present, may reduce the} tendency todwell on the past and may helpto seizethe attractive

opportunities

of

today. These findings are notonly insightful withrespect to the occurrence

of

inaction inertia in externallyvalid situations, but also

reassuringwith respect to our susceptibility to fall prey to this bias.

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Chapter 3

When?

DECOUPLING THE PAST FROM

THE

PRESENT

ATTENUATES

INACTION INERTIA

Decisions arehardly ever made in avacuum. Onthe contrary, they often followonprevious decisions within thesame domain. Ampleresearch has shown thatthis sequentialelement of our day-to-day decision making has implications for how and what we decide. Thus, behavioral decision makingcannotbeunderstood if one_only looks at the_{options under}

current consideration and not atthe_{temporal embedment of most} decisions.

A

well-known fact isthat decisions in thepastoften promote similardecisions in_{the present.} For_example,as _{shown by}'the foot-in-the-door-effect' _(Freedman

&

_{Fraser, 1966),} adecision tohonor alarge

request is much more likely when thedecision maker previouslyhonored

a smallerrequestwithin the samedomain. Thenotion thatprevious

decisions to act influenceourcurrent decisions to act isalsopresent in

the sunk cost _{effect, which}describes the tendency "to continue an

N

endeavor once an investment in _{money, effort, or time has been made} (Arkes

&

Blumer, 1985, p. 124). Interestingly, effectsofpastdecisions oncurrent decisions are also found for_pastdecisions not to act. _People are less likely to act on a 10%discounted offerbecause they did not act on a 50%discounted_{offer. This specificfinding} isreferred to as inaction inertia (Tykocinski et al., 1995).

"Inaction inertia occurswhen_bypassingan initial _{action opportunity}

hasthe effect

of

decreasing the likelihoodthat subsequent similaraction opportunities willbe taken" (Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 794). For

example,participants who failed to purchase a ski pass for $40 were less

likely to purchase the $90 ski pass than thosewho failed to buy the $80

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-30 Chapter 3

ski _{pass(Tykocinski et al., 1995, p. 794).} Thus, because theinitial, more attractive action _opportunity is missed _{(initial inaction),} the second less

attractive action _{opportunity is not}taken_{(inertia). This} basic finding has

been _replicated numeroustimes in _manydifferentchoice-situations (Arkes et al., 2002; Butler

&

Highhouse, 2000; Kumar,2004; Sevdalis et al., 2006;Tykocinski et al., 2004; Tykocinski

&

Pittman, 1998,2001; Tykocinski et al., 1995; Zeelenberg et al., 2006;Zeelenberg & Van

Putten, 2005). Putdifferently, one mayconclude that inaction inertia is a

veryrobusteffect.

In thepresentresearch this assumed robustness was investigated in a

series

of

_{three experiments. The investigation} was _{prompted byquestions}

such as: Does inaction inertia mean that_{every time we miss out on a} good deal we stay inactive on subsequentlyoffereddeals? Are we always

prisoners of our missedopportunities inthe sense that we never let go of them? When we miss outon highly discounted underwear, will we refrain _{from buying underwear for the rest of our lives? This} is_probably

not the case. There areprobably limits to the inaction inertia effect; boundary conditions underwhich it

will

occur. But whatthen determines that we stayinactive afterone inaction butget relativelyquickly over

another? To answerthese_{questions let's turn to}theliteratures onmental

accountingandtransaction decoupling.

MENTAL ACCOUNTING AND TRANSACTION DECOUPLING

One of the core findings in the mental accounting literature is that events (i.e., decisions, outcomes, experiences, etc.) tend toexert the most

influence_{on subsequent events when they}are_placed within the same

mental account(Thaler, 1985,1999). Eventsmay differ inthe degree to

which theyareprocessedas_{parts of the} same account or not (Bonini & Rumiati, 2002; Henderson

&

Peterson, 1992). Forexample, people are

less likely to buy a new theaterticket after having losttheirtheaterticket earlierthan _{after having lost}an _{equivalent amount}

of

money (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). Theexplanation for this finding is that the loss of the

theaterticket is seen as part of the samemental account (e.g., for

Decoupling the past from the present 31

seen as part ofa different_{mental account (e.g.,} forvarious _spending during the day). Consequently, the loss ofthe theatre ticket weighs

heavier on the decision to buy a new one than the loss ofthe equivalent

amount

of

money. On a more general level this implies that events that

areplacedwithin the same mental account exert more influence on each other than events thatareplaced intoseparate accounts.

The more two transaction opportunities are seenas relating to the

samemental account, the more they are seen as "coupled" toeach other

"

(Prelec

&

Loewenstein, 1998). The literatureon _{"transaction decoupling} has shown thatcoupling factorsineconomic transactions can have a

profuund influence on_{decision making (Gourville}

&

Soman, 1998; Soman

&

_{Gourville, 2001; Van Dijk}

&

_{Zeelenberg, 2003). Forexample,} thedecision whether or not to goskiing ona particularday under bad

weatherconditions is moreinfluenced by theprice people paid when peopleboughtaone-day ski pass than whenthey bought afour-day ski

pass (Soman

&

Gourville, 2001). Whenthe _{costs of one day skiing is} clear and hasa one-to-one connection tothebenefit of one _{day skiing, it}

is moretightly coupled tothe decision to goskiing than when the cost is

more ambiguous and has aless clearone-to-one connection. Soman and

Gourville (2001, p. 31)hypothesizedand showed that"This _ambiguity

shouldresult in a_{dissociation or "decoupling" of the cost andthe}benefit

of one day skiing, leading toaweaker attention tosunk costs and a

relatively low likelihood

of

skiing in the poor conditions". These

counterfactual decisions getlessattention when they are decoupled from

thecurrentdecision. Thisisconsistent withthe research onthinking and memorythat indicates that concrete informationis easier_{to consider,} process, andremember(e.g., Reyes,Thompson,

&

Bower, 1980;

Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman,

&

Reynolds, 1985). Thus, similar to

having twoevents being_{booked to separate} mental _{accounts, decoupled} factors tend to exert less influence on each other.

In general, boththe mental accounting andthetransaction decoupling literature imply thatthe extent towhich apreviousevent

will

affect the evaluation ofa _{subsequent eventdepends on the strength}

_of

their

association. This doesnot _{imply that for}two eventstoaffecteach other

they necessarily have to be placed in thesameaccount. If two

opportunities end up in the same mental account, a_vague standard will

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32 Chapter 3

also make a_{comparisonprocess much more}

difficult.

Rather, when both

events relate to the samemental account or when theyareotherwise tightly coupled, they

will

exert astrongerinfluence on each other than when they relate to separate accounts or when they areonly loosely

coupled.

Now, how does thisrelate toinaction inertia? In inaction inertia

situations people are less_{likely to act on} an_{attractive opportunity} because_they missed a more _{attractive opportunity before. From the}

inaction inertia literature we canconclude that thisoccurs because

inaction inertia_requires a_{comparison of}the _{current opportunity to a past.}

The occurrence oftheinaction inertia effectrequires theperception that a

real _opportunity existed, and one must be able toimagine taking

advantage ofthis previous opportunity (e.g.,Tykocinski

&

Pittman,

1998,2001). Based onthese basic _{findings it}is _{suggested that}acrucial

factor for inaction inertiato occur is the fact thatthe currentopportunity

has to betightly coupled to the pastopportunity. Consequently,

manipulationsthat reduce thetight coupling should weaken theinfluence of the_{past opportunityresulting in} anattenuation ofthe inaction inertia effect. Therefore, the goal of thepresent research is to investigate whether_{tightcoupling of the past and} the _{current opportunity is} necessary for inaction inertia to occur.

To obtainfirst_insight in these_{boundary conditions, it}is instructive to

closely read the scenarios used to study inaction inertia. In typical inaction inertiasituations the missed and the current opportunity are

presentedas highly_{related, and} hencetightly coupled toeach other. For example, in the Ski pass scenario the missed and thecurrent opportunity

are _{both about a ski pass in} Ski Liberty. Inother scenarios both

opportunities concernedbuying a pair

of

shoes(Arkes et al., 2002) or both opportunities concernedbookingavacation with the same

destination _(Tykocinski

&

Pittman, 1998,2001; Zeelenberg et al., 2006). Again,another scenario described an _opportunityto

follow

a course after being too late toregister for the same course atanearlier time

(Tykocinski

&

Pittman,2001). These examples already show that the

past and thecurrent opportunity aretypically highly comparable and

highly related toeach other. _{This comparability might be one reason why}