United in diversity?

(1)

United in diversity?

EU actorness and effectiveness in multilateral WMD disarmament and

non-proliferation regimes

Tessa van der Miesen S1723669

(2)

1

Introduction

1 Research scope

On 22 January 2003, a few months before the US-led invasion in Iraq, Charles Groenhuijsen, a Dutch journalist, interviewed the then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Groenhuijsen argued that many Europeans would rather give the benefit of the doubt to Saddam Hussein than President George W. Bush.1 Rumsfeld responded: ‘[…] if there is leadership and if you are right, and if your facts are persuasive, Europe responds. And they always have. Now you are thinking of Europe as Germany and France. I don’t. I think that’s Old Europe.’2 The statement of Rumsfeld on ‘Old Europe’ and ‘New Europe’ reflected the divisions on the invasion of Iraq between European Union (EU) Member States. These divisions highlighted the importance for the EU to adopt a coherent security strategy in order to overcome these divisions. In the same year, the European Council adopted the ‘European Security Strategy’ (ESS) with the title: A secure Europe in a better world.3 One of three objectives put forward in the ESS is: ‘an international order based on effective multilateralism’.4 This commitment to multilateralism can be seen as a response to the security strategy that the US adopted in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks: ‘the New Security Strategy’, which contained a strategy of unilateralism over multilateralism. The ESS describes the role the EU should play within international security affairs and states that the EU should be prepared to take responsibility in establishing a secure and better world. According to the ESS, the EU has the potential to do this. Furthermore, the ESS states that a capable and active EU could make an impact on a global level and could contribute to an effective multilateral system.5_{The proliferation of Weapons of}

Mass Destruction (WMD) is described in the European Security Strategy (ESS) as ‘potentially the greatest threat to our [European] security: the international treaty regimes have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in biological sciences may increase the potency

1_{Wikipedia, ‘Old Europe (politics)’ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Old_Europe_(politics) (accessed 17} April 2014)

2_ibid

3_{Council of the European Union, ‘A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy} 15895/03’

(5)

4 of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility.6

Around the same time, the EU adopted another document, specifically dealing with WMD: the EU Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD Strategy).7 The proliferation of WMD is described in the WMD Strategy as a growing threat: non-compliance with treaty provisions, states outside conventions and misuse of dual use technology are a few of the risks mentioned in the WMD Strategy.8 In the ESS a lot of emphasis is put on the importance of ‘effective multilateralism’ and this emphasis is reflected in the WMD Strategy: ‘a multilateralist approach to security, including disarmament and non-proliferation, provides the best way to maintain international order’.9 Multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements and treaties must be implemented and strengthened. In addition, verification mechanisms need to be put in place and compliance must be upheld and reinforced.10_{The WMD}

Strategy therefore acknowledges the importance of disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, such as the NPT, the CWC and the BTWC and stresses that if these regimes are to remain credible, they must be made more effective.11 Principles of the WMD Strategy other than ‘effective multilateralism’ are: promotion of a stable regional and international environment, close cooperation with partners and strengthening EU structures.12

The emphasis put on multilateralism in both the strategies seems to be making sense. As Louise van Schaik and Barend ter Haar put it in their Clingendael Policy Brief: “Multilateralism is believed to be in the European DNA. The European integration project is the example par excellence of how states can address cross-border policy challenges by building a rule-based international order.”13 Nevertheless, one might also wonder if it is possible for the EU to operate as an actor within multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, since the EU is a multilateral actor itself.

6_ibid

7_{K. Zwolski, ‘Unrecognized and unwelcome? The role of the EU in preventing the proliferation of} CBRN weapons’ Perspectives on European Security 12 (2011), 477-492, 478

8_{Council of the European Union, ‘Fight against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction: EU} Strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction’ 15656/03

9_ibid 10_ibid 11_Ibid 12_Ibid

(6)

5 A multilateral actor operating within a multilateral regime? Does this work? Can the EU operate as a single actor? Is it effective? And if so, how? How does the EU position itself next to its member states? Furthermore, the two strategies, the ESS and the WMD Strategy, show that disarmament and non-proliferation of chemical, biological and nuclear weapons are of central importance to the EU and, in addition, show the aspiration of the EU to become a global actor in this field. 14 Is the EU able to realise this ambition?

Ten years after the adoption of both the ESS and the WMD Strategy it is relevant to examine if the EU has been able to realise its ambition to become an actor within multilateral WMD disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Has it been possible for the EU, a multilateral actor, to perform as one actor within these multilateral regimes? In 2003, with the adoption of the ESS and the WMD strategy, the EU has clearly expressed its ambition and wish to become a global actor in the area of WMD disarmament and non-proliferation and therefore, in this research, 2003 will be taken as a turning point. Was the EU able to perform as an actor within multilateral WMD disarmament and non-proliferation regimes before 2003? And how was the situation after 2003? This method enables to identify the developments that have been important for the EU as an actor and at the same time enables to provide an answer on to what extent the two strategies, the ESS and the WMD Strategy, have contributed to this. The following research question flows from this:

In answering the main research question, the concept of ‘actorness’ will be used. ‘Actorness’ will be defined as (following the definition of Bretherton and Vogler): ‘the capacity to act, which is a function both of external opportunities, including those associated with the international legal and institutional framework; and internal capabilities, which include the availability of policy instruments and the capacity and legitimacy of decision making processes ’15 The following multilateral WMD regimes will be examined:

14_{Zwolski, ‘Unrecognized and unwelcome?’, 477}

15_{C. Bretherton and J. Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor (Abingdon 2006), 29}

(7)

6

● The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970.16 By signing and ratifying this treaty, the nuclear weapons possessor states have pledged: ‘not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear weapon state to manufacture or acquire such weapons or devices’17. The non-nuclear weapon states on their part have, by signing and ratifying the NPT, pledged: ‘not to receive nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, as well as not to manufacture them or receive assistance in their manufacture’.18 In addition to these non-proliferation clauses the NPT also has a disarmament aspect. Nuclear weapons possessor states have committed themselves to ‘pursue negotiations in good faith on measures relating to nuclear disarmament’19. Currently, 190 states are party to the NPT. Most of the EU Member States have signed the NPT when it was opened for signature in 1968 and ratified it within a few years. The main exception is France, who acceded to the treaty only in 1992.20

● Biological Weapons Convention

The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) was opened for signature on 10 April 1972 and entered into force on 26 March 1975.21_{Each State Party to the}

BWC has, by signing and ratifying the treaty, pledged to, inter alia: “never in any circumstance to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain: microbial or other biological agents or toxins, whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes or weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.”22_{Whereas the CWC is the first multilaterally negotiated}

16_{United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’} http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear/NPT.shtml (accessed 7 January 2014)

17_{J. Goldblat, ‘The Non-Proliferation Treaty: How to remove the residual threats?’,United Nations} Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Research Paper 13 (1992), 1.

18_{Goldblad, ‘The Non-Proliferation Treaty: How to move the residual threats?’, 1}

19_{C. L. Glaser, ‘The flawed case for nuclear disarmament’ Survival 40 (1998),112-128, 112}

20_{United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’} http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt (accessed 7 January 2014)

(8)

7 agreement in the field of disarmament that aims to eliminate an entire category of WMD under international control, the BWC has no such strong verification mechanism. Attempts to establish a BWC verification protocol failed when the United States (US) rejected the draft protocol and did not want any further protocol negotiations.23

● Chemical Weapons Convention

On 13 January 1993, the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) was opened for signature and on 29 April 1997 the CWC entered into force.24 With this entry into force, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) was established. 25 All states party to the CWC have pledged, never under any circumstances: “To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone. To use chemical weapons. To engage in any military preparations to use chemical weapons. To assist, encourage or induce, in anyway, anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State Party under this Convention. ”26 Furthermore: “Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it owns or possesses, or that are locates in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.”27 And: “Each State Party undertakes to destroy chemical weapons it abandoned on the territory of another State Party, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention”, “Each State Party undertakes to destroy any chemical weapons production facilities it owns or possesses, or that are located in any place under its jurisdiction or control, in accordance with the provisions of this Convention”28 And finally: “Each State Party undertakes not to use riot control agents as a method of warfare.”29 The CWC is the first multilaterally negotiated agreement

23_{T. Sauer, ‘The limits of ‘normative power’. The EU’s lack of persuasion capacity during the Biological} Weapons Protocol negotiations’, Institute for International and European Policy Working paper 7 (2004) 24_{United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’} http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Chemical/ (accessed 7 January 2014)

25_ibid

26_{Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’}

http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-i-general-obligations/ (accessed 7 January 2014)

27_{Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, ‘Chemical Weapons Convention’}

http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/articles/article-i-general-obligations/ (accessed 7 January 2014)

(9)

8 in the field of disarmament that aims to eliminate an entire category of WMD and that has verification mechanisms and international control.30 Currently, the OPCW has 190 member states, including all EU member states.

2 Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework that will be used is a framework developed by Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler in their book: ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’. They have developed an approach, from a social constructivist perspective, in which ideas and expectations are accorded significance and in which structure and agency are conceived as interacting dialectically. The definition of ‘actorness’ of Bretherton and Vogler: ‘the capacity to act, which is a function both of external opportunities, including those associated with the international legal and institutional framework; and internal capabilities, which include the availability of policy instruments and the capacity and legitimacy of decision making processes ’31

Moreover, Bretherton and Vogler have identified four criteria by which ‘actorness’ can be measured:

-‐ Shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles

-‐ Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities, relating to external policy

-‐ The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies -‐ The availability of, and the capacity to utilize, policy instruments32

The framework developed by Bretherton and Vogler offers a useful instrument in examining EU ‘actorness’ in international forums. This framework will be further discussed in chapter 1.

3 Structure of the research

In addition to ‘actorness’, another important concept for this research is ‘effectiveness’. It is relevant to examine if the EU can act as one actor within multilateral WMD disarmament and non-proliferation organisations, but it is also important to take into consideration if this performance is effective. This will be done by, in addition to examining the presence or absence of the four criteria of Bretherton and Vogler, also

30_{United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, ‘Chemical Weapons’} http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Chemical/ (accessed 7 January 2014) 31_{Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 29}

(10)

9 look at the practical performance of the EU during Review Conferences of the respective multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Review Conferences are conferences which are held every five years in order to review the implementation of the respective treaties of the last five years and in order to set future guidelines for the next five years. Since these conferences set the guidelines for the future, it is highly important to influence the negotiations if you want to be an important actor. As mentioned before, 2003 will be taken as a turning point in this research and the situation before and after 2003 will be examined. The presence or absence of the four criteria of Bretherton and Vogler will be examined both before and after 2003 and, in addition, practical case studies of EU performance during Review Conferences before and after 2003 will be conducted. At the end of these chapters, a conclusion will be given on both actorness and effectiveness. The actorness of the EU will be compared with the effectiveness of its performance during Review Conferences in order to make comments on the relationship between actorness and effectiveness.

This leads to the following structure of this research:

• Introduction The introduction will introduce the research topic and will give background information on the strategies adopted by the EU in 2003: the ESS and the WMD Strategy. In addition, the introduction will provide background information on the disarmament and non-proliferation regimes that will be examined: the NPT, the BWC and the CWC/OPCW.

• Chapter 1 – Theoretical framework In this chapter the theoretical framework of the research will be discussed. The theoretical framework that will be used is the framework developed by Bretherton and Vogler in their book ‘The European Union as a Global Actor’. Bretherton and Vogler have identified four criteria by which ‘actorness’ can be measured.

• Chapter 2 – Was the EU able to perform as one actor in multilateral

disarmament and non-proliferation regime before 2003?

Chapter 2 will be divided in the following subchapters: • 2.1. Actorness

1. Shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles

2. Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities, relating to external policy

(11)

10 4. The availability of, and the capacity to utilize, policy instruments

• 2.2. Effectiveness

1. Case study 1: The Fifth Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995

2. Case study 2: The Fifth Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in 2001

• 2.4 Conclusion: Actorness and Effectiveness

• Chapter 3 – Has the EU been able to perform as one actor in multilateral

disarmament and non-proliferation regimes after 2003?

Chapter 3 will be divided in the following subchapters: • 3.1. Actorness

1. Shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles

2. Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities, relating to external policy

3. The ability to identify policy priorities and to formulate coherent policies 4. The availability of, and the capacity to utilize, policy instruments

• 3.2. Effectiveness

1. Case study 1: The Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2010

2. Case study 2: The Third Review Conference of the Chemical Weapons Convention in 2013

• 3.4. Conclusion: Actorness and Effectiveness

• Chapter 4 – Which developments have contributed to the actorness and

effectiveness of the EU in multilateral WMD disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and which problems does the EU still face?

Chapter 4 will be divided in the following subchapters:

• 4.1. Comparing actorness and effectiveness before and after 2003 • 4.2 Identifying important developments and remaining problems • 4.3 Conclusion

(12)

11

4 Relevance of the research

The research that will be conducted is relevant for several reasons. First of all, it will be relevant to examine whether the EU as a multilateral entity can play a role within other multilateral forums. The EU has the ambition to be a ‘big player’ within multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation but might face several issues and problems. These will be addressed in this research. At the same time, developments or tools that have contributed to the EU’s actorness and effectiveness will be identified.

Furthermore, this research will contribute to earlier studies on EU performance in international multilateral institutions and international negotiations. Many have questioned and criticised the effectiveness of the EU in these multilateral institutions and international negotiations. The EU would only be able to find the ‘lowest common denominator’ amongst its member states and would therefore not have strong positions.33 Others, on the other hand, have argued that the EU functions as a ‘laboratory of consensus’ in and that it benefits from the input of member states that have different views and opinions.34 This research will contribute to this debate.

In addition, ten years after the adoption of the ESS and the WMD Strategy by the EU, it is relevant to examine if and how these strategies contributed to the development of the EU as an actor in disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. Perhaps it is time to review and change these strategies after ten years, or maybe completely new strategies have to be adopted in order for the EU to be an effective actor within multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes.

5 Methodology

The methodology that will be used in examining the main research question will be literature review. In order to examine is the four criteria of actorness are present or absent, criteria on the EU in external affairs will be reviewed. In addition, official EU documents, such as Presidency declarations, Council Decisions and EU Treaties will be studies. In order to examine the effectiveness of the EU, case studies on the EU’s performance in Review Conferences will be conducted. These review conferences

33_{D. Feakes, ‘The emerging European Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Agenda on Chemical and} Biological Weapons’, Disarmament Diplomacy 64 (2002)

(13)

12 review the implementation of the respective treaty or convention and set future guidelines for the coming years. These review conferences are an important instrument for actors since it is an important opportunity to put forward preferences and new policies. In order to be able to comment on the EU’s effectiveness during these conferences, the objectives of the EU, described in the Common Positions and Joint Actions will be compared with the final report of the conference.

(14)

13

Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework

This chapter will first provide a short overview of the application of ‘actorness’ within International Relations theory. An important question in this regard is: how do we recognise actors in the international system. Can only states be actors or can other entities, such as international organisations, also be conceived as actors? Secondly, this chapter will explain the most important ontological assumptions of constructivism and it will connect these assumptions with the framework that will be used throughout this research.

International Relations theory has long been dominated by Realism, a state centric approach focusing on states as the only actors in the international political system. Furthermore, Realists emphasise the predominance of power, conflict and self-interest. Morgenthau, one of the most important Realist scholars, described the aspiration for power of sovereign states as the moving force of the world.35 Realists consider international organisations as subordinate and not as powerful independent actors.36 From the 1970s however, the state-centric Realist approach proved to be inadequate to conceptualise a new world order with growing interdependence and was challenged by liberals such as Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane.37_{In their book Power and}

Interdependence, Keohane and Nye developed the concept of ‘complex interdependence’. In a system of ‘complex interdependence’ societies are connected through multiple channels and relations: interstate, transgovernmental and transnational.38 Although in this Liberal approach states are no longer considered as the only actors, they are still considered to be the principal actors in world politics.39

Despite the fact that within Liberal theory states are still considered to be the principal actors in world politics, there was increasing attention to other actors. And more specifically, the start of European Political Cooperation (EPC) led to an interest of scholars to try to capture the role of the EU (or at that time EC).40 The EPC started after agreement on the completion of the Common Market and agreement on the establishment of a European Economic and Monetary Union. The prevailing thought

35_{H.J. Morgenthau, Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace (New York 1948) 8} 36_{Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 18}

37_{S. Burchill and A. Linklater (ed.) Theories of International Relations (London 2009) 213} 38_{R.O. Keohane and J.S. Nye, Power and Interdependence (London 2009) 21}

39_{Burchill and Linklater, Theories of International Relations, 213}

(15)

14 was that political cooperation would foster progress in the economic field and this view led to the Hague Summit of 1969.41 The goal of this summit was: ‘to study the best way of achieving progress in the matter of political unification’ and thereby ‘paving the way for a united Europe capable of assuming its responsibilities in the world of tomorrow and making a contribution commensurate with its tradition and its mission’.42 This process together with several consultations held led to the agreement to cooperate in the area of foreign policy. The EPC eventually became the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the preoccupation of scholars and analysts with the role of the EU in the world increased only more after the development of the CFSP.43

This new interconnected world-order challenged the classical Realist approach, but this challenge did not go unanswered: Kenneth Walz introduced in his book Theory of International Politics a revised theory of Realism. This new approach was labeled ‘neo-Realism’ or ‘structural ‘neo-Realism’44_{Subsequently, Robert Keohane introduced in 1984 a}

neo-Liberal theory. Neo-Realism and neo-Liberalism have several common assumptions. Both neo-Realism and neo-Liberalism see states as the main actors, both argue that states are self-interested and both stress the importance of anarchy in the international system.45 Nevertheless, neo-Realism and neo-Liberalism draw totally different conclusions about the possibility of international cooperation. Where neo-Realists argue that ‘cooperation between states is at best precarious, at worst non-existent’, neo-Liberals see the establishment of international regimes as a means for states to overcome cheating and other obstacles of cooperation under anarchy.46

Again, despite the growing interests in capturing the role of the EU and other ‘new’ actors in the world and the broadening of the scope of IR to admit ‘new’ actors, such as international and intergovernmental organisations, the primarily focus of analysis remained to be states.47 Moreover, according to Charlotte Bretherton and John Vogler, the attempts that were made to capture the role of this ‘new’ actor have not been notably successful. In their book The European Union as a Global Actor they mention the scheme developed by Keohane and Nye that discusses six types of actors. In this

41_{A. Pijpers, E. Regelsberger, W. Wessels (ed.) European Political Cooperation in the 1980s. A common} foreign policy for Western Europe? (Dordrecht 1988) 5-6

42_Ibid

43_{Dryburgh, ‘The EU as a Global Actor?’, 253} 44_Ibid

45_{Ibid, 214} 46_{Ibid, 215}

(16)

15 scheme the EC would fall in the category ‘intergovernmental’. Bretherton and Vogler, however, argue that this does not cover the multi-dimensional nature of the EC.48 They argue that many attempts to conceptualise the EU or appoint a role to the EU have given too much influence to state-like characteristics of actors and/or use merely a behavioral basis for their analysis.49

The end of the Cold War posed again a challenge to the dominant American discourse of IR and produced a shift in debates, fostered by the rise of a new school of thought: constructivism.50 Constructivism has three ontological propositions. First of all, constructivists stress that normative structures are equally important as material structures. This means that values, beliefs and ideas can influence social and political action.51 Secondly, constructivists believe it is important to understand in what way non-material structures influence the identities of actors because identities affect interests and interests affect, in turn, actions.52_{Finally, constructivists emphasise the}

mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structure. Non-material structures have an impact on identities, interests and actions but, vice versa, actions and practices also influence the maintenance or transformation of these non-material structures.53 As Alexander Wendt has argued: ‘Anarchy is what states make of it’.54

Bretherton and Vogler have tried to conceptualise the role of the EU and examine the ‘actorness’ of the EU. In this attempt they have found the constructivist approach very useful.55 Bretherton and Vogler argue that it is not possible to deduce ‘actorness’ only from characteristics of an organisation or unit. Using a constructivist perspective, they emphasise the importance of looking to ‘patterns of constraint and opportunity associated with the political and economic structures within which the EU is located’.56 Structure and agency and both internal and external characteristics, need to be considered.

48_{Ibid, 20} 49_{Ibid, 30}

50_{Burchill and Linklater, Theories of International Relations, 218} 51_{Burchill and Linklater, Theories of International Relations, 220} 52_{Ibid, 221}

53_Ibid

54_{A. Wendt, ‘Anarchy is what states make of it. The social construction of power politics’ International} Organization 46 (1992) 391-425

(17)

16 Constructivists see structures as providing both opportunities and constraints and actors operating within these structures as both ‘rule makers’ and ‘rule takers’. Actors are, to some extent, knowledgeable about the structures in which they are located and are also to some extent able to change these settings.57 Constructivists argue that agents and structure are engaged in a dialectical relationship. Using this constructivist perspective on agents and structure, Bretherton and Vogler also argue that, while examining the ‘actorness’ of the EU, there is the need to look not only to structure or only to agency, but to this relationship between them.58 Bretherton and Vogler have developed an approach for examining EU ‘actorness’ in which ideas and expectations are accorded significance and in which structure and agency are conceived as interacting dialectically. ‘Actorness’ or the capacity to act is, according to Bretherton and Vogler: ‘a function both of external opportunities, including those associated with the international legal and institutional framework; and internal capabilities, which include the availability of policy instruments and the capacity and legitimacy of decision making processes’59.

Bretherton and Vogler argue that the EU is an ‘actor under construction’ and this construction process is influenced by the concepts ‘opportunity’, ‘presence’ and ‘capability’. ‘Opportunity’ is explained as: ‘the external environment [of the EU] of ideas and events’ and ‘the context which frames and shapes EU action or inaction’.60 Opportunity does not merely represent the background against which the EU is operating, but constitutes a dynamic process in which the EU is participating. Ideas and events are being interpreted and are accorded meaning.61 ‘Presence’, as explained by the authors conceptualises ‘the ability of the EU to, by virtue of its existence, exert influence beyond its borders’.62 ‘Presence’ consists of both ‘character’ and ‘identity’. With character the authors refer to the material existence of the EU; its institutions and system of Member States. With identity they refer to shared understandings about the EU; what is does and what it is.63 ‘Capability’ refers to: ‘the internal context of EU action or inaction’ and more concrete: ‘the ability to formulate effective policies and the

57_{Ibid, 29} 58_{Ibid, 28}

59_{Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 29} 60_{Ibid, 24}

(18)

17 availability of appropriate policy instruments’64 However, only the availability of policies and policy instruments is not enough, the EU must also have the ability to utilize these policies and policy instruments. Understandings from third parties about this ability to utilize are important as well.65

The processes of opportunity, presence and capability together construct the ‘actorness’ of the EU. From these processes, Bretherton and Vogler derive four criteria by which ‘actorness’ can be measured:

-‐ Shared commitment to a set of overarching values

-‐ Domestic legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to external policy

-‐ The ability to identify priorities and formulate policies – captured by the concepts of consistency and coherence where

o Consistency indicates the degree of congruence between the external policies of the Member States and of the EU

o Coherence refers to the level of internal coordination of EU policies -‐ The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments – such as,

diplomacy/negotiation, economic tools and military means.66

Several scholars have used the framework of Bretherton and Vogler when they examined the role of the EU in external policy and found it very useful. Lynne Dryburgh is one of these scholars. In her article: ‘The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy towards Iran’ she has slightly amended the four criteria as developed by Bretherton and Vogler in order to make them, according to her, more useable in examining an individual policy area. Dryburgh argues that the four criteria of Bretherton and Vogler are useful tool for examining EU ‘actorness’ at the institutional level, but not at the level of individual policy areas. The amended criteria for examining ‘actorness’ as developed by Dryburgh are:

-‐ Articulations of actorness -‐ Consistent and concrete policies -‐ A diplomatic/administrative apparatus

(19)

18 -‐ Resource and policy instruments

-‐ Third party perceptions of EU actorness. 67

Dryburgh’s argument on the usefulness of the criteria of Bretherton and Vogler at the institutional level of the EU, not at individual policy areas is not satisfying. Bretherton and Vogler do recognise that the ‘actorness’ of the EU can differ per individual policy area: ‘[the EU] can appear to be several different actors’.68 Moreover, the first four of Dryburgh’s criteria can be traced back to the criteria developed by Bretherton and Vogler. First of all, ‘Articulations of actorness’ are not possible without a ‘shared commitment to a set of overarching values and principles’. Moreover, ‘consistent and concrete policies’ corresponds with ‘the ability to identify priorities and formulate policies’ and both the criteria ‘resource and policy instruments’ and ‘a diplomatic and administrative apparatus’ correspond with ‘the availability of, and the capacity to utilize, policy instruments’.

The last criterion of Dryburgh (third party perceptions of EU actorness), however, cannot be found in the criteria of Bretherton and Vogler. Dryburgh argues that when employing a social constructivist perspective, as Bretherton and Vogler do, ‘actorness’ must be understood as: ‘a social contract between the agents involved, based on shared understandings of the EU as an actor, as having a role to play’69_{Including a criterion}

on the perceptions of third parties is therefore important according to Dryburgh. Although not explicitly mentioning ‘third parties perceptions’ in their criteria, Bretherton and Vogler do, however, acknowledge the importance of third parties perceptions. They argue: ‘[the perceptions and actions of third parties] contribute significantly to the shared understandings framing the policy environment, and hence shaping the practices of Member State governments, EU officials and third parties alike’.70 Rather than having a separate criterion, third parties perceptions are included in each of the criteria of Bretherton and Vogler since these criteria are derived from the processes opportunity, presence and capability and the authors have shown that in these processes perceptions, meanings and responses are of crucial importance. Dryburgh’s criticism is therefore not convincing.

67_{Dryburgh, ‘The EU as a Global Actor?’, 257}

68_{Bretherton and Vogler, The European Union as a Global Actor, 31} 69_{Dryburgh, ‘The EU as a Global Actor?’, 257}

(20)

19 Since the criteria of Dryburgh can be traced back to the criteria developed by Bretherton and Vogler and since the arguments of Dryburgh for amending the original criteria are not satisfactory, this research will use the criteria developed by Bretherton and Vogler. In the next chapters these criteria will be used to examine ‘actorness’ of the EU in an individual policy area, namely disarmament and non-proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction.

A question that is related to EU ‘actorness’ or EU unity within international forums or international organisations is the question of EU effectiveness: ‘the extent to which the EU reaches the main goals of its position in the results of international negotiations.’71 Louise van Schaik, senior research fellow at the Netherlands Institute for International Relations Clingendael, states that the literature on EU ‘actorness’ often assumes that the EU is more effective when it acts united in its external representation.72_{In this way,}

resources can be bundled and EU visibility in international negotiations would increase. On the other hand, it has also been argued that in order to arrive at common positions, the EU Member States have to compromise, which leads to a weakening of positions and inflexibility during debates and negotiations. 73 In addition, it takes time to come to a common position and often the EU is only able to decide on very EU-centered positions.74 Coordination of the EU Member States’ positions works rather well if there is enough time for the Member States to prepare, but when unexpected changes or developments happen, it is hard for the EU to adapt easily. Van Schaik compares the EU with a ‘big oil tanker, which can change direction only slowly.’75

Another interesting outcome of the research of Van Schaik on EU effectiveness is that it is likely that EU unity will lead to more effectiveness of the EU in international negotiations, but that it might also invoke negative responses from the partners at the negotiation table.76 These possible negative reactions are caused by irritation due to not understanding how the EU functions in international negotiations.77 In addition, many negotiation partners of the EU do not understand why the EU does not fully replace its member states in international negotiations. Negotiation partners also tend to strengthen

71_{L. Van Schaik, EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations. More than the sum of its} parts? (Hampshire 2013), 9.

72_{Van Schaik, EU Effectiveness and Unity in Multilateral Negotiations, 45} 73_ibid

74_ibid 75_{ibid, 198}

(21)

20 their position when they see the EU acting united; they then consider the EU to be a stronger entity and therefore raise their opposition.78

Therefore, the relationship between ‘actorness’ and effectiveness is not that clear as one might assume. By conducting several case studies on EU performance during review conferences of disarmament and non-proliferation regimes, the effectiveness of the EU will also be taken into consideration in this research. The relationship between ‘actorness’ and effectiveness will not be the central theme in this research; however by examining both some statements on its relationship will be provided.

Thomas Gehring, Sebastian Oberthur and Marc Muhleck argue in ‘European actorness in international institutions: why the EU is recognised as an actor in some international institutions, but not in others’ that the question should not be if the EU can act united so that its effectiveness is raised to be ‘more than the sum of its parts’, but if the EU can offer something as an autonomous actor separately from its Member States.79 According to them, within research on EU ‘actorness’, too little attention is given to research that separates EU action from coordinated action from EU Member States. The EU can act autonomously from its Member States if it possesses ‘action capability in the relevant governance area’80 If it has acquired this, the formal status of the EU in an international organisation or institution is less significant.81

It can indeed be relevant to separate EU action from coordinated action by Member States in order to examine if and when it is possible for the EU to be an actor in its own right in international affairs. However, since this research will mainly focus on CFSP issues and this a policy area is in which there is (still) little room for the EU to act autonomously. Therefore, in this thesis, coordinated action by Member States on behalf of the EU will be equated with EU external action.

78_ibid

79_{T. Gehring, S. Oberthur and M.Muhleck, European Union Actorness in International Institutions: why} the EU is recognised as an actor in some international institutions, but not in others’ Journal of Common Market Studies 51 (2013) 849-865, 850

(22)

21

Chapter 2

Before the adoption of the ESS and the WMD Strategy in 2003, some important steps have already been taken in increasing the EU’s actorness within multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes. The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty and the subsequent establishment of the Common Foreign and Security (CFSP) were very important in this regard. In this chapter, these developments will be discussed and at the end of this chapter, a conclusion on EU ‘actorness’ before 2003 will be given. The conclusion of this chapter will also reflect on the effectiveness of the EU in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation regimes and in order to do this, two case studies will be conducted.

2.1 Actorness

2.1.1 Shared commitment to a set of overarching principles

This section examines if there existed a shared commitment to a set of overarching principles between EU Member States in the area of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation before 2003. It is most relevant to examine if there was a shared commitment towards a EU policy on WMD disarmament and non-proliferation and, in addition, it is relevant to examine the commitment of the EU to the principles of the WMD disarmament and non-proliferation regimes that are being discussed.

From 1945 till the end of the 1970s, nuclear non-proliferation was mainly a concern of the United States. In Europe, the United Kingdom was a recognised nuclear power and France was becoming one. Several other European industrial powers were among the few in the world that were technically capable of developing a nuclear programme.82 There was no unified European proliferation policy: nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation was dealt with mainly through bilateral consultations and, moreover, there was a lack of agreement in many subjects between the members of the European Community.83 Regarding the NPT negotiations and the treaty itself, for example, the European Nuclear States, the UK and France, did not stop nuclear testing and refused to participate in disarmament negotiations. France was not even a signatory to the NPT and critised the rationale of the treaty. France saw the NPT as ‘a product of US-Soviet condominium’. Germany and Italy were also hesitant over the NPT because a nuclear

82_{C. Grand, ‘The European Union and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’, Institute for Security} Studies Western European Union Chaillot Paper 37 (2000), 1-81, 7.

(23)

22 abstinence was not self-evident at the time.84 Another division existed between the European countries that favoured ‘full scope safeguards’, the Netherlands, Ireland and the UK and the countries that favoured a more flexible approach, Germany, France and Belgium.85 The members of the European Community therefore were in favour of adopting the NPT for a limited duration of 25 years.86

The European role in chemical and biological weapons (CBW) disarmament was less complicated than that of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.87 With regard to CBW there did not exist an unequal status between EU Member States like with nuclear weapons. The nerve gas programme of the UK was active until the mid 1950s and the programme of France until the 1960s. Most countries that had CBW stopped their programmes when realisation occurred that there was more to gain by stopping to develop CBW than by continuing to hold on to the CBW programmes.88_In

international context, CBW disarmament and non-proliferation were, however, only mentioned occasionally in this period, and most of the time in the light of the Cold War division. This changed when the US and the Soviet Union (SU) accepted a Swedish proposal to put CBW on the agenda of the Geneva multilateral Conference of Disarmament (CD).89 The UK was of the opinion that biological weapons had to be discussed before chemical weapons and consequently it drafted an outline for a treaty. After some modifications, the Treaty on Biological Weapons was agreed upon in the CD.90

In the late 1970s, Europe became more active within the international debate on non-proliferation and disarmament. It became increasingly clear that non-non-proliferation was going to be an important element in the external relations of the European countries.91 The first steps towards a common external policy on non-proliferation were taken in 1981 when a ‘working group on non-proliferation’ was established within the

84_{Ibid, 7} 85_{Ibid, 6} 86_{Ibid, 7}

87_{U Jasper, ‘The challenge of biological weapons: proposals for greater EU effectiveness’ Disarmament} Diplomacy 78 (2004)

88_{J.P. Robinson, ‘The negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: an historical overview’ in: M} Bothe, Natalino Ranzitti and Allan Rosas (ed), The new chemical weapons convention: implementation and prospects (The Hague 1999), 17-37, 22

89_{Robinson, ‘The negotiations on the Chemical Weapons Convention: an historical overview’, 21} 90_{ibid, 23}

(24)

23 ‘European Political Cooperation’ (EPC) framework. This working group was the first time that issues on security were being discussed in an institutional setting.92

In the beginning of the 1990s several factors enabled the European Community to upgrade its role and develop a more solid nuclear and CBW non-proliferation framework. First of all, the end of the Cold War created a new security environment in which new opportunities and new challenges asked for new policies. For example, the discovery that Iraq was developing a nuclear programme were a signal that more needed to be done and therefore increased the need for international efforts to strengthen nuclear non-proliferation measures.93 In addition, the chemical attack on civilians in Iraq in 1988 also increased the international necessity to act. Furthermore, during the Cold War, non-proliferation and arms control was mainly the domain of the superpowers and the end of the Cold War therefore allowed for an increase and strengthening of multilateralism.94_{Secondly, Title V of the Treaty on European Union}

(TEU) established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and this provided for possibilities for closer cooperation in the area of foreign and security matters and enhancement of foreign policy instruments.95 And finally, with regard to nuclear non-proliferation, France reconsidered its traditional opposition to the NPT and joined the Treaty in 1992. France was the last EC member state to join the treaty and therefore this meant that a major obstacle to a common EC policy on nuclear non-proliferation had been removed and the EC was from now on able to take a common stance within the NPT.96

The European Council started to discuss non-proliferation and started to issue presidency statements on this matter. The first statements on non-proliferation were issued in Dublin in 1990 and in Luxemburg in 1991. The statement in Dublin: ‘The European Council strongly supports and is fully committed to the objective of nuclear non-proliferation. It believes that the further spread of nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices would endanger stability and threaten regional and global

92_{P. van Ham, ‘The European Union’s Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction. From ambition to} dissapointment’, Clingendael paper no. 6 (2011), 1-40, 3

93_{Van Ham, ‘The European Union’s Strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction’, 4}

94_{C. Portela, ‘The role of the EU in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’ Peace Research Institute} Frankfurt report no. 65, 1-39, 2

(25)

24 security’.97 The European Council summit in Madrid in 1995 ‘stressed the need to continue encouraging disarmament and non-proliferation within the framework of the common foreign and security policy […] In this connection it reiterates the European Union’s wish that all its members ratify the Convention on Chemical Weapons at the earliest opportunity so it can come into force shortly’.98 At the European Council summit in Cannes in the same year, the hope was again expressed that the CWC would enter into force without delay.99 Not only at the European Council level support was expressed for the rapid entry force of the CWC, also the European Parliament passed a resolution in which the importance of early entry into force of the CWC is stressed.100 In conclusion, after the Second World War, the differences between European states on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation issues were very clear. Several of these differences remained to exist, even during the working group on non-proliferation within the EPC. Still, this working group was the first time non-proliferation was discussed in an institutional setting and was the start of a framework for European policy on non-proliferation. The European role in disarmament and non-proliferation of CBW was less complicated because there was no unequal status between possessor states and non-possessor states. The European framework on security issues started to take shape during the 1980s and became evident in the beginning of the 1990s. The accession of France to the NPT in 1992 and the establishment of the CFSP in 1993 were important moments. From that time, the EU has expressed it overarching commitment to the principles of the NPT, the establishment of a BWC and CWC and the rapid entry into force of these conventions. In a broader sense it has expressed its commitment to non-proliferation on many occasions, for example through Presidency statements and during European Council summits.

97_{The European Council, ‘Presidency conclusions Dublin 25 and 26 June 1990’} http://aei.pitt.edu/1401/1/Dublin_june_1990.pdf (accessed 24 February 2014) 98_{The European Council, ‘Presidency conclusions 15 and 16 December 1995’}

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00400-C.EN5.htm (accessed 24 February 2014)

99_{The European Council, ‘Presidency conclusions 26 and 27 June 1995’}

http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00211-C.EN5.htm (accessed 24 February 2014)

(26)

25 2.1.2 Domestic legitimation

This section will examine the legitimation of decision processes and priorities relating to EU external policy, both on the state-level as among the population of the EU Member States.

If you take a look at the ‘state-level’ of legitimation, the CFSP is located in the intergovernmental second pillar, which means that the intergovernmental European Council steers EU foreign and security policy.101 An example of the lack of domestic legitimation for the EU to act can be found within the NPT regime. Domestic legitimation by EU Member States for the EU to act within the NPT has not been present from the start when the NPT entered into force in 1970. Especially France, who only acceded to the Treaty in 1992, has opposed several EU actions in the area of nuclear non-proliferation. For example, in 1985 the Netherlands suggested a ‘detailed common guideline for non-proliferation policy’, France, however, objected the publication of the drafted guideline document.102 In the same year the third Review Conference of the NPT was held and France was not even present as an observer state and there was no organised coordination between the other EC member states that were participating in the conference.103_{When negotiations with Spain were held on accession}

of Spain to the EC, several countries such as the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland tried to connect Spanish EC membership with acceding to the NPT. Again, France opposed and argued that the Rome Treaties did not state anything about the ‘non-proliferation status’ of possible candidate member states.104 EU member states, some more than others, have been reluctant to hand over capacities to the EU to act in the area of foreign and security policy.

Nevertheless, domestic legitimation for European action in the area of common foreign and security among the population of EU Member States has been higher. The Eurobarometer shows that already in 1990, before the establishment of the EU CFSP, 64% of the population of the EU Member States at that time was in favour of

101_{C. Carta, ‘The EEAS and EU Executive within the Foreign Policy’ in: Mario Telo and Frederik} Ponjaert (ed.), The EU’s Foreign Policy. What kind of power and diplomatic action? (Surrey 2013), 88-105, 91

102_{H. Muller, ‘European nuclear non-proliferation after the NPT extension: achievements, shortcomings} and needs’ in: P. Cornish, P. van Ham, and J. Krause (ed.) Europe and the Challenge of Proliferation Chaillot Paper 24 (1996) 26-40, 31

(27)

26 community decision-making on foreign policy.105 In 1993 this was 66%. In 1995, about seven out of ten people supported the EU common foreign policy. In some member states (France, the Netherlands, Italy, Luxembourg and Belgium, almost all original EC Member States) this was even 75%. Two of the new member states at that time (Sweden and Finland) were not that supportive of EU common foreign policy: only 50% of the respondents were in favour.106 In 2000, the numbers were 64% in favour and 17% against common foreign policy.107 And finally, in 2003, 67% in favour and 19% against.108 As can be expected, the numbers of support were always lower in countries that have a tradition of neutrality and in the UK. In 2003, the support for the principles of the CFSP in these countries was less than 50%.109

To conclude, at the state-level, legitimation for EU policies and EU action in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation was not very high; Member States stressed the intergovernmental character of the CFSP on many occasions and were reluctant hand over capacities to the EU. The population of EU Member States, however, was much more in favour of community decision-making on foreign policy, even before the establishment of the CFSP.

2.1.3. The ability to identify priorities and formulate consistent and coherent policies This section will examine the ability of the EU to identify priorities and to formulate consistent and coherent policies in the area of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation. Consistency in this regards means ‘the extent to which the bilateral external policies of Member States are consistent with each other and complementary to those of the EU’ and with coherence Bretherton and Vogler mean the internal policy processes of the EU. 110

A large constraint for a consistent EU policy in the area of nuclear non-proliferation are the different attitudes of EU Member States towards nuclear weapons. 111 Two EU

105_{Eurobarometer, ‘Public opinion in the European Community no. 33’}

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb33/eb33_en.pdf (accessed 22 February 2014) 106_{Eurobarometer, ‘Standard barometer 43’}

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb43/eb43_en.htm (accessed 22 February 2014) 107_{Eurobarometer, ‘Public opinion in the European Union no.53’}

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb53/eb53_en.pdf (accessed 22 February 2014) 108_{Eurobarometer, ‘Support for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is reinforced’}

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/notes/csf_pesc_papr03_en.pdf (accessed 22 February 2014)

109_{Eurobarometer, ‘Support for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is reinforced’}

http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/notes/csf_pesc_papr03_en.pdf (accessed 22 February 2014)

(28)

27 Member States, the UK and France possess nuclear weapons. Other Member States, such as Austria, Sweden and Ireland are strongly in favour of nuclear disarmament.112 The diversity of positions in the nuclear realm creates clear difficulties in achieving common positions.113 On substantive issues decisions within the CFSP are still made on the basis of consensus and because of the diverging positions towards nuclear weapons, the EU has only been able to act or take initiative on those issues on which all Member States agreed. 114 Due to this, the EU approach has favoured non-proliferation over disarmament and even within the non-proliferation realm there are substantive differences between issues that received attention from EU Member States.115 Even though cooperation and integration on nuclear non-proliferation issues increased, the nuclear weapons status of the UK and France has not been given serious consideration.116

The establishment of the CFSP was very important for increasing the consistency of EU policy. One of key objectives of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992 is ‘the convergence of national policies into a single, integrated Common Foreign and Security Policy’.117_{In a}

document that was issued in the preparatory phase of the establishment of the CFSP, non-proliferation of WMD was selected as one of the areas of priority.118 The provisions on a common foreign and security policy in the Maastricht Treaty: The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. Member States shall coordinate their action in international organisations and at international conferences. They shall uphold common positions in such forums. In international organisations and at international conferences where not all member states participate, those who do take part shall uphold the common positions.119 The Maastricht Treaty thus obliged Member States to coordinate their external policies and obliged member states to coordinate their

112_{C. Trezza, ‘The EU between Non-proliferation and Disarmament’, ISPI Policy Brief Global Watch} Issue 51 (2007), 1-5, 3

113_ibid

114_{Portela, ‘The role of the EU in non-proliferation of nuclear weapons’, 4} 115_Ibid

116_{U. Jasper and C. Portela, ‘EU defence integration and nuclear weapons: a common deterrent for} Europe?’, Security Dialogue 41 (2010), 145-168, 163

(29)

28 action in international organisations. And: ‘Member States shall ensure that their national policies conform to common positions.’120 The subsequent Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 stated that: ‘Member States shall inform and consult each other within the Council on matters of foreign and security policy of general interests in order to ensure that the Union’s influence is exerted as effectively as possible by means of concerted convergent action.’121 This increased the consistency of EU policies significantly. Nevertheless, in the pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty, the CFSP is the intergovernmental second pillar. This means that the rotating Presidency of the European Council has a significant role in initiating new policies.122 The Presidency rotates every six months and during these six months, the amount and content of activities of the Presidency is for a large part dependent on how concerned the Presidency is with this issue.123_{The system of the rotating Presidency might therefore}

complicate consistency. Additionally, Presidencies inevitably focus on the main issues and events during their term. It is important for the Presidency to leave a good impression of the EU on events for which they hold the responsibility and they will consequently avoid difficult issues.124 This has a negative impact on the long-term consistency of EU policies. In this regard, the newly introduced ‘Joint Action’ is a very important instrument because it enables the EU to set a long-term strategy.125

The EU member states do coordinate their positions. The General Affairs Council (GAC), the top of the foreign and security policy-making meets every month and is attended by the ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member states. These GAC meetings are prepared by the committee of permanent representatives (COREPER) and the political committee (CoPo). The details of the policies, however, are discussed in working groups.126 In this research the relevant working groups are the working group on Non-Proliferation (CONOP), the working group on UN disarmament (CODUN) and the working group on Non-Proliferation of CBW (CONOC).

The pillar structure of the Maastricht Treaty also has a negative impact of the coherence of EU policies since the activities of the EU with regard to nuclear non-proliferation and

120_{Feakes, ‘The European Union’s role in CBW disarmament and non-proliferation’} 121_{Treaty of Amsterdam, ‘Title V Article J.6’}

122_ibid 123_ibid

124_{Muller, ‘European nuclear non-proliferation after the NPT extension’, 37-39} 125_Ibid

(30)

29 CBW does not fit into one of these pillars.127 Activities of the EU in this regard cut across all pillars and this does not contribute to the coherence of EU policies. The problem of coherence already existed before the pillar structure and was inherited from the dual structure between the European Community and European Political Cooperation.128 The Single European Act of 1986 integrated the EPC framework within the EC and every treaty reform since has tried to address the procedural coherence of the EU and the divisions between economic, political and defense aspects within the external policies of the EU.129 However, according to Harmutt Mayer, Fellow and Tutor in Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, tensions between EU institutions and between the different policy areas remained to exist.130

To summarise, a large constraint for a consistent EU policy in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation are the different attitudes of EU Member States towards nuclear disarmament. Even in the area of nuclear non-proliferation, many differences exist between EU Member States. The entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty was very important for the consistency of Member States’ policies on multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation of WMD since it established the CFSP that obliged Member States to uphold common positions within international organisations. With regard to the coherence of internal policy processes of the EU, the pillar structure that was established with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty did not contribute to the coherence of EU policies in multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation, since many issues discussed in this policy area cut across the different pillars.

2.1.4. The availability of, and capacity to utilize, policy instruments such as diplomacy, negotiations, economic tools and military means

This section examines the availability of policy instruments and the EU’s capacity to utilise them.

The economic tools of the European Union for its external action are limited since the budget of the CFSP is relatively small. Furthermore, there are some other difficulties with the budget for EU external actions; Member States are sometimes hesitant to use

127_{Ibid, 4}

128_{H.Mayer, ‘The challenge of coherence and consistency in EU Foreign Policy’ In: Mario Telo and} Frederik Ponjaert (ed.) The EU’s Foreign Policy. What kind of diplomatic action? (Surrey 2013), 105-121,109

United in diversity?