You have the right to remain silent:

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You have the right to remain silent:

A case study on collaborative behaviour in the judicial supply chain.

Master Thesis Supply Chain Management

University of Groningen, Faculty of Economics and Business 15th_{August 2016}

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Abstract

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1 Introduction

Organisations in the judicial supply chain have to collaborate in order to effectively process the needs of their stakeholders (Dandurand 2014). Governmental organisations, however, do not seem to fully collaborate to their full potential (Van Gestel, Voets & Verhoest 2012; De Blok, Seepma, Roukema, Donk, Keulen, & Otte 2014). Although the importance of collaboration between partners of the Dutch ministry of justice has been recognized, collaborative efforts have met limited successes (Algemene Rekenkamer 2014; Ministerie van Justitie 2016). These unsuccessful efforts of integration, such as an integrative ICT project called GPS (NOS 2013), have been subject of press articles and political debates. The reasons why these collaborative efforts in the judicial supply chain have met limited success remains unclear. Managers have complained about short-sightedness of inter-organisation colleagues in the justice department and stated that their colleagues suffered from “tunnel-vision” embedded in “an island culture” (NRC, 2015). These statements relate to the inability to execute inter-organisational activities known as collaborative behaviours. In order to successfully collaborate between supply chain partners these collaborative hindrances need to be addressed.

Collaborative behaviour concerns relationships between organisations. These relationships are critical to supply chain performance because more time and effort have to be invested to control them (Frohlich & Westerbrook 2001; Hendricks & Singhal 2005; Flynn et al. 2010; Zhao, Huo, Selen, & Yeung 2011; Wu, Chuang & Hsu 2014). Successful supply chain collaboration is rare because of behavioural constraints (Simatupang & Sridharan 2002; Whitfield & Landeros 2006; Lewis & Brown 2012;Fawcett et al. 2015). This include resistance originating from individual behaviour such as unwillingness to share information, protection of autonomy within the supply chain and mutual decision making (Laing, & McKee 2001; Fawcett et al. 2015). Fawcett et al. (2015) describe these as resistors which, according to them, are countered by enablers. Literature on enablers of collaborative behaviours remains limited except for the work of Fawcett et al. (2011) and Wu et al. (2014) on the ICT systems as enablers. ICT systems, when aligned, provide a better flow of information. It is unclear how organisations identify and use enablers and resistors in order to conduct successful collaborative behaviours.

Between these organisations different service typologies entail different managerial issues and priorities (Verna 2000) which can lead to a conflict of interest. Justice courts within the judicial chain are characterized as professional service organisation (Pekkanen & Neimi 2013). Theory of professional service organisations and collaborative behaviour provide common ground on the notion of social inertia, or social resistance towards adaption or change. This is due to the fear in loss of autonomy by these professionals (Pekkanen & Neimi 2013; Laing, & McKee 2001). Lewis & Brown (2012) researched professionals in a law firm and found that organisational matters are delayed because professionals are only interested in their own field of expertise and rather not address organisational matters. This can reflect the reported island cultures and tunnel vision stated by the employees in the justice department (NRC 2015). Better collaboration leads to reduced wastes, due to more focus on core competencies, and more accurate information on demand. However, it remains unclear how organisations manage these resistors to collaborative behaviours (Fawcett et al. 2015) organisation there continue to struggle implementing enablers. Until now research has focussed on listing the factors, either positive or negative, that influence collaborative behaviour but have stopped at identifying how organisation manage these resistors and enablers. Another question that remains unanswered is if these resistors and enablers counter each other (Fawcett et al. 2015).

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other organisations in the supply chain to take place. The main research question of this report concerns these judicial organisations and the question how they manage behavioural resistance and enablers to achieve collaborative behaviour:

How do organisations in the judicial supply chain manage behavioural resistors and enablers in order to conduct successful collaborative behaviour?

This research will address this through a single case study conducted at two organisations in the judicial supply chain. This paper aims at contributing to theory by providing insights in how organisations face behavioural resistance and promote collaboration. In addition, a contribution is made to the limited body of supply chain studies in judicial systems. Further structure of this thesis concerns the relevant theory and the methodology that is applied.

2 Theoretical background

2.1 Collaborative behaviour

By externally integrating with other supply chain actors, organisation can get a better grip on demand and reduce costs. External integration is achieved by collaboration and coordination (Richey, Roath, Whipple, & Fawcett 2010). Soosay & Hyland (2015) distinguishes collaboration from coordination by viewing coordination as decision making in higher levels of the organisation. Collaboration is integrating external parties by mutual policy setting and decision-making, characterized by long-term involvement in product development and technology sharing (Soosay & Hyland 2015). Successful supply chain collaboration is however rare. Authors have stated that collaboration is limited by structural and social constraints (Richey et al. 2010; Fawcett et al. 2015; Soosay & Hyland 2015). These constraints are overcome by collaborative behaviours.

Collaborative behaviours are instances of two or more organisations, executing inter-firm processes (Wu et al. 2014). This can be the exchange of data, problem solving, or communication on organisational related issues. Collaborative behaviours help organisations to acquire more accurate information on customer demand (Stank et al. 2001) and eliminate waste so that they can focus on their core activities (Wu et al 2014). Studies have addressed successful supply chain collaboration by looking at factors that facilitate and limit collaborative behaviours. These factors include establishing trust, sharing information, willingness, and implementing decisions together (Simatupang & Sridharan 2002; Soosay & Hyland 2015). In the work of Fawcett (2002;2011;2015) described these as resistors and enablers. Alignment of the two should further envelop collaborative behaviour (Fawcett et al. 2015).

Wu et al (2014) list the reasons for collaborative behaviours due to inter-organisational dependencies, but the context of this research concerns organisations that are dependent on each other by law. This means that the organisations are obligated to work together, thus collaboration is important in order to achieve organisation goals. Wu et al. (2014) describe that organisations can collaborate on the basis of trust, information sharing and an interdependence on willingness to work together. Therefore, the context of this research can provide new insights in the way organisation collaborate, since the collaboration is not voluntary but mandatory.

Resistors and enablers

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Enablers on the other hand facilitate collaborative behaviours. Wu et al. (2014) and Fawcett et al. (2011) both describe an aligned ICT system as an enabler for collaborative behaviours. The ability to exchange data on customer demand and aligning the flow of communication seems to be key in their research. In addition to ICT connectivity Fawcett et al. (2011) describes that a cultural willingness to share information positively influences collaboration between parties. Describing instances where managers either did not trust the other party, or did not know what their exact needs were. Parties should have established a consensus on how to exchange information since it is a key part in the supply chain infrastructure (Wu et al. 2014).

Based on the findings of Wu et al. (2014) and Fawcett et al. (2011) it becomes clearer that effective collaboration is closely linked with communication and the ability to understand each other. Research that looked in on collaborative behaviour (Wu et al. 2014; Fawcett et al. 2011; Fawcett et al. 2015 Simatupang & Sridharan 2002) have, however, focussed on either what resisted collaborative behaviour or what enabled it. Resistors and enablers have not been researched in the same context, let alone the influence one has on the other. This leads to a negative or positive framing of a factor in a specific context. For example; For example; information sharing contributes to collaboration (Stank et al. 2001), where Fawcett et al. (2015) notes that information hoarding is a resistor. Simatupang & Sridharan (2002) and Wu et al. (2014) state that mutual effort benefits collaboration, in line Fawcett et al. (2015) mentions managerial inertia, resistance towards collaboration from individual managers, as a resistor. Thus this thesis argues that factors, in a neutral state, can be either positive or negative towards collaborative behaviour depending on the context that is set in practice. Furthermore, it can be assumed that the negative state can be identified by the organisation and action taken in order to reduce or eliminate its effects. This leads to the main topic of this thesis; How do organisation manage enablers and resistors in order to conduct successful collaborative behaviour?

Table 1 below sums the factors that were identified in the theory and applied in the conceptual model of this research.

/. Table 1; Behavioural factors and their form as a resistor or enabler.

Managing resistors and enablers refer to actions that are attentively or inattentively conducted in order to control and identify resistors and enablers. These can be identified by reflecting on the

consequences of actions from the past. In order to understand what organisations are and how these can differ this thesis relies on service organisation terminology.

Behavioural factor Corresponding resistor Corresponding enabler Description

Information sharing Information Hoarding (Fawcett et al. 2015) Mutual information sharing Degree of sharing information with other parties Attitude towards collaboration Managerial inertia (Fawcett et al. 2015) Mutual willingness (Wu et al. 2014) Willingness to collaborate with other parties

Supply chain awareness Territorial (Fawcett et al. 2015) Holistic view (Dandurand 2014) Realization that work contributes to multiple actors in the same chain Decision making Isolated decision making Mutual decision making (Soosay & Hyland 2015)The input of other parties in decisionmaking process

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2.2 Defining service organisations

Using general terminologies for service organisation has limited applicability. It is does provide insights in complex organisational relationships (Verma 2000). Since this study addresses the execution of inter-firm processes, the distinction between the two firms must be clarified. Applying general terminology in order to describe service organisations makes them better generalizable for learning purposes (Silvestro, Fitzgerald, Johnston, & Voss 1992). Silvestro et al. (1992) describe that service organisations can be distinguished on the basis of people vs equipment orientation, length of contact times, degree of customization, level of employee discretion, value added processes back or front office, and the focus on either product or process. Silvestro et al’s (1992) model is in line with Verma’s (2000) although it illustrates a two dimensional idea between customer interaction.

Figure 1 observed management challenges with the service organisation terminology (Verma 2000).

The works of Silvestro et al. (1992) and Verma (2000) leave room for variety within the service types. As will be further introduced in the method-section; this researched concerned the relationship between the execution part of the chain and the prosecution part of the chain. Pekannen & Neimi (2013) described justice courts as professional organisations, where there is a high degree of customer interaction and product customization. Von Nordenflycht, A. (2010) describe professionals as functions that have a specific knowledge basis, acquired by passing specific tests and apprenticeships. Product customization refers to the variety of verdicts that is ordered by the courts on the basis of the same law, i.e. there is no standard penalty for a certain case.

Their sphere of managerial priorities and issues are illustrated with the corresponding lists. The execution part of the chain is far less concerned with customer contact, which can be observed through the high degree of automation. Furthermore, with a priority on the ICT systems it can be concluded that the flow is less labour intensive on that part of the chain compared to the courts. Consequently, this research addresses two organisations with different service terminology, a Service Factory and a Professional Service, which leads to different management issues and priorities. The interactions between different types of service organisations remains unknown. This model can provide further insights on the resistors and enablers provided previously by arguing that a conflict between parties can arise from a different context.

2.3 Judicial Supply Chain

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(Pekkanen & Neimi 2013). Pekkanen & Neimi (2013) state the justice courts can be categorized as professional services but are in some ways unique since, according to them, there is a greater focus on the autonomy of self-management of the professional. Furthermore, Pekkanen & Neimi (2013) describe objectivity as an important law criterion for the justice courts.” The fear of losing objectivity and autonomy can manifest in the form of a negative attitude towards process improvement

“(Pekkanen & Neimi 2013 pp 606). This entails the social inertia as described by Fawcett et al. (2015) in the judicial context. In the introduction section of this research newspaper articles were used to highlight the need to collaborate between partners. The terms tunnel-vision, island culture, or silo-thinking (Pekkanen & Neimi 2013) refer to an organisations being concerned with their own specific role only. According to Pekkanen & Neimi (2013) this is due to a strong role perception and a perceived need for autonomy.

The context of this research, judicial systems, might impede its own resistors and enablers due to industry characteristics. Dandurand (2014) has underlined the culture in judicial systems as a limitation in a change process, highlighting that social resentment to change rather than organisation structure limits the ability to improve processes. Organisational change is not addressed in this research but it highlights that this context might play a unique role in conducting successful external integration. The degree of contextual influences in the judicial system and how related organisations manages these constraints remains unclear. For example; the autonomy through trias politica might introduce a certain power position at the courts. The rest of the chain have to simply follow their verdicts. Another influence can be derived from other research in judicial supply chains. The research of Lewis and Brown (2012) expands on the idea of role-perception in professional service

organisations. Lewis and Brown (2012) studied a law firm in their research, which can be a participating organisation in the judicial chain. In their research Lewis and Brown (2012) found that professionalism in this industry is dominant in how people work and think. Lewis and Brown (2012) state that people qualify for a career in law on the basis of knowledge in law, thus they are only concerned with performing their profession rather than changing the organisation. According to them, inertia to change can be explained how people perceive their jobs. Social inertia in the judicial chain is diverse and can be rooted in the degree of specialized expertise by which professional organisation are characterized by. It remains unknown what these organisations do in order to manage these resistors towards collaboration.

When studying the chain more thoroughly it can be observed that this need for objectivity and autonomy is not standard for all supply chain partners. These vary in the parameters of professional service organisations as described by Goodale, Kuratko, and Hornsby (2008).

The courts, for example, have a high degree of customization, penalties are not standard and vary according to the judgement of the courts. The courts are labour intensive and have a certain degree of customer interaction (i.e. the dialogue in court session). In terms of service terminology, differences between organisations can be described in terms of customer interaction and labour intensity (Verna 2000). These vary in the chain, i.e. after a verdict has been non-recallable, meaning that it is permanent, it is send to the execution part of the chain. Here the interaction mainly concerns informing and transferrin rather than shaping the product.

The CJIB, the inquiry and execution agency, is focussed on execution, large parts of its processes are automated and the interaction with the customer is concentrated within a single department. Arguably the courts and the CJIB differ in their nature of professional service organisation. How do the notions of Fawcett et al. (2015) Pekannen & Neimi (2013) and Lewis and Brown (2012) hold when their findings are applied between organisations rather than within?

/. Table 2 Industry factors related to collaborative behaviour

Behavioural factor Corresponding resistor Corresponding enabler Description

Professionalism Territorial(Lewis and Brown 2012) Cross-functional Degree of interest in organisational concern Tradition (Parker & Bradley 2000) Conflicting traditional values Unifying traditional values i.e tradition

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2.4 conceptual model

The conceptual model of this research is based on the differences of resistors and enablers of collaborative behaviour. The organisational factors are based on the theories of Fawcett et al. (2008;2010;2015), Richey et al. (2010) and Wu et al. (2014). The industry factors are derived from the work of Lewis and Brown (2012) and Pekannen & Neimi (2013). As stated before this research interprets that existing literature is based on a negative or positive frame, and formulates a neutral factor instead. These factors, as shown in the model, can be present as resistors or enablers.

The conceptual model sketches the main research question which is aimed at finding out the influences of resistors and enablers on collaborative behaviours, and how these are managed in order to conduct successful collaborative behaviour. Purpose of this model is to reflect the findings of this research on the existing theory.

The empirical part of this research will be conducted in three parts. First identifying resistors and enablers, second identify the means in which these resistors and enablers are managed.

Figure 2 Conceptual Model

3 Methodology

Case study research are suitable methods for environments where not all variables are known (Voss et al. 2002). This entails that a case study allows for detailed analysis of the research setting. Since the factors that influences collaborative behaviour in judicial systems are not known, and the whole field of judicial supply chains remains under-research, it fits the choice of case study research. (Voss, Tsikriktsis, and Frohlich 2002). Voss et al. (2002) state that case study research allows the researcher to study a phenomenon in its natural setting which generate meaningful theory by studying actual practice. The purpose of this type of research is to perform theory testing and refinement by obtaining data from actual practice and studying the phenomena in their natural setting (Voss et al. 2002). This allows the research to chart how organisations in the judicial supply chain operate and what enables them to collaborate.

The scope of this research is limited to two organisations within the judicial supply chain; The central inquiry agency, or CJIB, and the public prosecutor, the OM. Furthermore, it relies on the experiences of the interviewees that participated in the interviews.

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3.1 Case selection

Cases are selected on the basis of their scientifically interest, and of their representable data (Seawright & Gerring, 2008). The organisations involved within this research are the OM and the CJIB. The CJIB, the agency responsible for transactions concerning fines and refunds, and the OM, the public prosecution. Both organisations contribute to the process of prosecution and execution, and report to the Dutch ministry of justice. The CJIB is located in Leeuwarden, the Netherlands, where all departments are located in close proximity to each other. The OM is much more decentralized (to promote reachability) in 14 departments which are spread throughout the country.

3.2 Case description

The OM relies on the ICT systems Compass and GPS to transfer their data to the CJIB. In the introduction it was already stated that this GPS project, the system that should have replaced Compass, was considered a failure. The ministry department, according to one of the interviewees of this research, forcefully put the system through in order to move towards digitalization. As a consequence, only the OM and the courts work with this system. The intake department of the CJIB doesn’t have excess to this system and thus use their own variant. In order for the CJIB to use the data it needs to be transferred to a certain file-format before it is send. When parties deliver cases through Compass, employees at the CJIB have to fill in the data by hand. The compass system is mainly used as a back-up system when GPS doesn’t support the data-transfer. This happens when cases have exceptional clauses that, for example, need longer explanations which is not supported in the standard form.

The role of the CJIB is to control and execute parts the orders that arrive from the OM’s, this includes that they translate the punishments and reimbursement programs in the system and send them to relevant supply chain partners. For example, a penalty can have a fine component as well as a labour penalty component; these components are send to different supply chain partners respectively. Each type of punishment or program has its own system, which exist mainly due to historic reasons. Two systems that were discussed in the interviews were Terwee, victim reimbursements, and Plukse, the repossession of funds and goods acquired by criminal activity. Daily communication between parties’ concern collecting missing information, controlling verdicts and analysing the impact of new laws. The relationship between the organisations are, by default, founded in law and do not experience any market competition.

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/Figure 3 interactions

The focus of this research is the collaboration between the OM and the CJIB. Formally this is conducted by department execution at the OM and department C&I, which stands for coordination and informing, at the CJIB. Because of their involvement in the relationship between the

organisations; DVOM and I&I, which stands for informing and inquiry.

Since January 2016 the CJIB is reforming its organisation towards AICE. This is an effect of increasingly taking in new types of verdicts to execute. In the new AICE-layout the organisation becomes more centralized and gain het coordinating role towards their supply chain partners. This structure can be found in appendix B (to-be model). As a consequence of the AICE structure, they describe their strategy in quality management as “forward-control” meaning that quality checks are performed further downstream. Therefore, the organisation hopes to reduce return-flows. There is however still communication backwards, or a return flow. These originate from two departments at the CJIB; C&I and I&I or Coordinating & Informing and Information-Centre & Inquiry. The latter is responsible for maintaining contact with the end-customer by maintaining a call centre OM

furthermore is the link between the court and the CJIB. C&I am a result of AICE and formally the gate-keeper between the two parties. However, I&I maintains their own quality control which in turn can lead to issues in product flow when a verdict has multiple punishments.

Figure 4 Organisation overview (Simplified)

3.3 Data collection

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Besides the interviews general observations were made during the site visits. The observations relate to the context discussed by the interviewees and served as examples in some interviews, as well as examples in the analysis. Lastly, a work conference on the new organisation structure of the CJIB, called AICE, was attended on the 19th of May in Leeuwarden. Here all supply chain partners participated in group discussions. The audio recordings of the interviews were recorded and transcribed in a later stage.

The interviews were conducted between April and May 2016. The data collection was done by means of semi-structured interviews, meaning that some questions are prepared but there is room left for improvisation (Myers & Newman 2007). Semi-structured interviews allow the interviewer to ask in-depth on examples that arise during the interview. Therefore, the interview can be steered in a direction which yield the most information. Constructs that were prominent in one interview became a structural part of the interview guide for sequential inter views. For example, the second interview underlined the role of ICT system complexity, which was confirmed by all the following interviews. Through this method this research applied multiple sources to confirm the validity of the findings by data triangulation (Yin 1994). Furthermore, the main concepts of this research were used as a basis for the interview guide. Therefore, the concepts were tested and described in the practical context which promoted the reliability of this research (Yin 1994).

By using semi-structured interviews, the interviewer can apply mirroring to use the context of the interviewee and enveloped the conversation in their world rather than translating it to a neutral one (Myers & Newman 2007). Questions concerning trust were in none of the interviews asked directly, the question to it mainly developed around the context of the interviewee.

Interviewees Organisation Function Date Duration

Interviewee (A) CJIB Tactical Management 19/04 00:53:44 Interviewee (B) CJIB Tactical Management 19/04 00:53:49

Interviewee (C) OM Tactical Management 26/04 00:58:56

Interviewee (D) OM Operational 03/05 01:16:03

Interviewee (E) CJIB Operational Management 04/05 00:54:04

Interviewee (F) CJIB Operational 04/05 00:45:08

Interviewee (G) CJIB Operational 04/05 00:25:43

Interviewee (H) OM Tactical 09/05 00:47:37

Interviewee (I) OM Operational Coordinator 19/05 00:42:08

. /Table 4 interviews

3.4 Data analysis

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category does this indicate? And what is actually happening in de data? This focusses on a pattern between the incidents prescribed in the data. The idea of open-coding is that codes are re-assigned based on the patterns that emerge between the context. For example; “So you want to have a personal execution of the case. For example, whenever somebody has two penalties, you don’t want these penalties to work against each other. “(B) This quote was initially coded as personalization but further analysis of the data shows a different interpretation of roles between organisations. Because this quote in relation to other quotes relate to the inconstancy in supply chain interpretation the second order code separation of roles was assigned. The codes were further defined in the continuation process (Thomas 2006) in which sub-codes were assigned to refine, contradict or confirm the second order codes.

Themes Second order codes Description

Individual dependability Willingness Quotes referring to obstructions or limitations in collaborative

behaviours, based on individual input.

Supply chain awareness

Quotes referring to the ability or inability to understand other supply chain partner's needs by the interviewee or as experienced by the interviewee

Inter organisational alignment

Alignment initiatives Initiatives taken to bring organisation closer together. Exchange of information in person or inter-organisational teams

Information systems _{Remarks describing the exchange of} information

Service design Service terminology Remarks referring to the interpretation of quality and service design, as well as the perceived design and tasks of others

Service structure Remarks on the layout and design of the service and how these

characterises play a role in the service delivery

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Deductive code Data Sub codes

Service terminology “She kept insisting that they never give us that information, and that they have never provided us with that information. My instincts tell me that she just said No (…) because she doesn’t have a clue” (G) ___

Personally I think the CJIB needs to limit their tasks. (…) Their job is to say “You have been convicted than, and you should pay” (D) ___

Look if its three weeks in jail and it should have been five, then it’s a wrong verdict. But if they send it back because the lawyers details are incorrect (…) that has nothing to do with the verdict (I)

 Resistance towards collaboration  Professionalism

Information systems (Observation) Two parties sending screenshots through e-mail in order to understand each other.

___

So we never see what each other sees. So I can call you because you are in Groningen and you will say: I see this; Well I see something completely different (D)

__

We had a court case set in Almelo but it was originally planned in Arnhem. The system couldn’t handle that change (D)

 Inability to communicate effectively  Heterogeneity of flow

 ICT System compatibility

Supply Chain Awareness I could always send it to him and he would fix it. When he became ill and his colleagues took over, they were like; “you should follow protocol”. (D)

___

And then I knocked myself on the head asking; why didn’t I know this before? (E)

___

“He was a god there at the CJIB” well such terms you should not use on me. What are we doing? You could not bother him because he was too important (D)

 Unfamiliar with supply chain demand  Familiar with supply chain demand

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3.5 Validity

The results are limited by their view on a certain case. Furthermore, time was a constraint; the interviews were conducted in a 2-month time window. This had to do with security clearing of the researcher and university deadlines. Initially this researched aimed at performing a multiple case study with a cross-case analysis. Through the progression of this research however, it became clear that any cross case data did not provide new helpful insights as intended. This was due to the nature of collaborative behaviours by which by dialogue between organisations needs to be studied. Therefore, this research is a single case study. Singular-case studies are limited in generalizability and risk premature conclusions and biases (Eisenhardt 1989; Voss et al. 2002). Meaning that findings might not be verifiable and single events can misrepresent its proportion (Voss et al. 2002). It does however allow the researcher to discuss the phenomenon more in-depth (Voss et al. 2002) and focus on existing literature.

4. Results

The results are divided in the three themes that were discussed in the interviews. Based upon the success-rate of collaborative behaviours, which is often sporadic and circumstantial, the role of individuals became important within this research. Furthermore, digital infrastructure, as describe by the research of Fawcett (2011), became a prominent theme within the interviews. This lead to the inter-organisational alignment and the flow of information. Lastly, the service design became an important theme since the restructuring towards the AICE system.

4.1 Individual dependability

All the interviews confirmed that employees sought out willing individuals to collaborate with. Bureaucracy and hierarchy limited the alternative individuals. Therefore, there was frustration from the OM on the strict hierarchy and bureaucracy on the CJIB side. Within the CJIB organisation however, so the execution part of the supply chain, employees referred to the missing or incomplete data as an obstruction for successful collaborative behaviours.

“He was a god there at the CJIB” well such terms you should not use on me. What are we doing? You could not bother him because he was too important” (D)

“She kept insisting that they never give us that information, and that they have never provided us with that information. My instincts tell me that she just said “No (…) because she doesn’t have a clue” “(G)

“I could always send it to him and he would fix it. When he became ill and his colleagues took over, they were like; “you should follow protocol”. (D)

Successful collaboration for organisations is dependent on finding willing - and available individuals. This ability is limited to the extend in which there are alternatives. Within and between both

organisations individuals created networks of colleagues with which ones had a good working experience with. Seldom did these networks existed on paper, and if they existed it was not exchanged with other departments “I can show you here, I have a list of all the people I can contact for certain things at the CJIB” (I). These problem-solving networks indicate the way organisations managed resistors, however it also shows sensitivity when these networks fall out.

“I am looking for players that are willing to do something” (E)

“If you would call department B and this specific colleague picks up; you would be like oh dear here we go again” (E)

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collaboration between parties. During these events, operational employees exchanged daily frustration with each other’s work. This resulted in resolving simple problems and a better understanding; therefore, the interviewees had positive associations with these events. The AICE organisation recognized these advantages, and discuss matters with other organisations on a regular basis. This can be through account managers, as well as work conferences. During these meetings expectations and processes are exchanged. However, the topics and simplicity of the issues that are occurring differ when employees of different organisation levels are involved.

4.1.1 Supply chain awareness

The difference between willing and unwilling individuals could not be proven on the basis of personal resentment, or the resistance to change. However, willingness was described in terms of

understanding demands and needs of other supply chain partners. This in turn might lay in the vision organisation have on their role within the supply chain. For individuals however, this seemed to be different within every case. Most interviewees stated their role without fully mentioning stakeholder interest or end-users of their work.

“Timely and fully, as best as possible the verdicts that are not electronically delivered, for me at least, that cannot pass the line [of quality check], to put them in the system so that they can enter the chain with the appropriate information. “(F)

“Deliver a verdict on time and completely at the CJIB; that’s our goal. We have certain terms for those, which are agreed upon. And that’s what we have to do” (I)

The formulation of their goals and their presence argues that the organisations are short-sighted and self-concerned. There were however variations. Managers seemed to be more inclusive in their goal and task formulation than operational employees. Managers are however involved in

inter-organisational meetings.

4.1.2 Technical know-how

Individuals within the supply chain carry a certain specific and unrecorded information type that made the success of collaboration dependent on them. A practical example of this is when two organisations find a solution for a certain problem; the success would rely if the message was received by the right colleague on the other side. The current ICT systems do not support the variety of input of the OM, by which it is rejected automatically, or by unknowing colleagues. The ICT system however assigns cases randomly, sending it to another person at the CJIB after which the process starts over. “So I discussed with him my problem and he would say: “Okay I will fix it, send me the files”. And before you know he was on a break or something, someone else would see it and reject it again.” (I) Furthermore, success in one part of the supply chain did not lead to other parts of the same chain. Successful collaboration practices were not easily taken over, nor were root causes for these successes identified. “By now department C should already have been using the electronic system, I don’t know why they still use that paper based system” (I). Even successful collaborative efforts differ between OM departments due to their differences in working methods. Therefore, successful supply chain collaboration, and the enablement of it, depended heavily on the input and presence of willing and understanding individuals, as well as a system that supports this process.

4.2 Inter-organisational alignment

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this finding. At the OM it was observed that employees exchanged screenshots of their system in order to get a better understanding the different interpretations. The systems for example labelled the same data differently, taking time on what the other might meant. Furthermore, some data was exclusive to one screen and some to the other. This was done because some data was deemed unnecessary for other positions. In another example but this time at the CJIB, a team looked at one computer screen to figure out why something went wrong on the side of the OM. They asked a colleague from another department to log into their system because they themselves could not use the system the OM was using.

“So we never see what the other sees [on another computer screen]. So I can call you because you are in Groningen and you will say: I see this; Well I see something completely different” (D) “What would it be great if you could just have the system of the OM besides you so you could have a better understand of; You are there and this is what you mean” (H)

Employees went to great extend in order to work around the ICT systems. Site-visits were often conducted to share information and compare data with each other. Other departments established a list of names with cases they could be contacted for. These initiatives are taken by departments

themselves and are not shared within the organisation. Also, both the OM and CJIB indicate that close personal links influences collaboration positively, because information can be shared more easily. “Viewing cases not just through email or over the phone but also to gain grip by just looking at it together. Because we have no idea of each other what we are doing.” (F)

Tasks and responsibilities seem to be drawn with clear boundaries. Organisations will keep themselves to these responsibilities which leads to short-sightedness and silo-thinking. There are however initiatives that did change how organisation thought and listened to each other. The change came through laws that converged all the flows within the chain towards the CJIB. Therefore, it became the OM’s only direct customer.

4.3 Service design

Organisations identified failed collaboration efforts due to misunderstanding or misinterpretation of demand. The biggest change within the organisations collaboration was achieved by transforming the CJIB to the AICE system. Although the system has not been fully implemented yet, it has shown progression in the way the OM is willing to change to the AICE’s needs.

“Now you can see with the introduction of AICE and the shift in responsibility (…) AICE will become in charge of the execution which is headed by the ministry and you can see that it opens the dialogue to make clear agreements with each other.” (B)

Adding responsibilities and representation capabilities seemed to have been the strongest enabler in this case. The mind-set of changing other organisations upstream, or forward control as the managers called it, proved to be a willing attitude towards collaboration.

“We couldn’t make formal agreements with the justice courts. That just wouldn’t do” (B) Where work-agreements failed in the past, due to unwillingness to make formal contracts, parties upstream from the OM were willing to listen to the new AICE structure. This was due to their representation capabilities; their demands were more in line with the downstream partners. “Until 2011 we were not able to reject the verdicts from the justice courts (…) every case we got back then was changed because it contained mistakes”

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were not filled in by partners. As said earlier, AICE has not been implemented as intended and the project has been delayed several times. When asked about the impenetrable wall interviewee I responded as followed:

“Oh yes but I have brought that wall down already. It was simply not possible to deliver what they asked for” (I)

The CJIB obtained leverage to make changes within the chain. It seemed however that the infrastructure, which was considered a hindrance before, still limited collaborative behaviours. The roles within the chain remained under dispute and what should, and should not, be delivered to each other remained under debate.

“I think that the CJIB needs to be simplified; What they are doing now is: They send an inquiry, with all the facts. They just have to say; you are convicted for this particular case and that is it. “(D) “Look if its three weeks in jail and it should have been five, then it’s a wrong verdict. But if they send it back because the lawyers details are incorrect (…) that has nothing to do with the verdict” (I) The roles of both organisations remained under debate while the research was being conducted. The definition of quality, and how each organisation should operate remained a discussion point.

5 Discussion

Below the findings are discussed in the light of previous authors and highlighted on an organisational level.

Reflecting on the conceptual model it has to be stated that the relations between enablers and resistors are much more complicated than previously stated. The results highlight that successful collaboration is dependent on different factors, and that success in one area is not a guarantee for success in other areas. These can be distinguished on an organisation, department and individual level. The

organisation can manage resistors and enablers in a certain degree, but where it fails to do so it relies on the input and improvisation capabilities of individuals. The origins of resistors and enablers are distinguishable as well, and it seems that some factors do not inter-react with each other.

At the end of the day, information or cases have to be send through to the next party. The

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 ICT infrastructure

 Organisation power position  Service design

 Supply chain awareness Collaborative gap  Personal networks  ICT manipulation  Willingness Structural enablement Provisional enablement Successful collaborative behaviour Resistors Enablers Resistors Enablers

/Figure 6: Structural enablement and provisional enablement

Management is therefore, in a certain degree, willingly and unwillingly circumnavigating or eliminating resistors to achieve successful collaborative behaviour. Factors can still act as either resistors or enablers, depending on their context. ICT infrastructures can limit collaborative behaviours and promote collaborative behaviours as Wu et al. (2014) describes.

5.1 Provisional enablement: Dependability on individuals

This research found that responsibility setting was one of the most effective mean to manage enablers and resistors. One of the best examples that rose from the interviews was the redesign of the

organisation CJIB towards AICE. Although it faces difficulties in implementation; it has opened up discussion and aligned quality definitions between the suppliers of the CJIB. AICE is becoming a party on which the OM will heavily rely on in order to do their work properly. As a representative of the downstream chain, AICE is a rather more powerful player in the supply chain than the previous CJIB.

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(RBV), that more forces than knowledge and economic buying power add to the power of

independent actor. Basically the weight of the organisation can be a factor that enables organisations to listen to each other; weather that is through economic forces, knowledge or ownership of responsibilities.

5.2 Organisational alignment of willingness and power position

Fawcett et al. (2015) describes territorial behaviour as a resistor of collaborative behaviour. Territorial behaviour is the hoarding of responsibilities and knowledge to maintain a power-position over another supply chain actor. In the light of Wu et al. (2014) and what was discussed previously in 5.1, these statements seem to contradict that obtaining a position of power will result in better collaboration, as the case in this research has shown. However, their statement refers to the alignment with willingness as follows:

“Collaborative champions leveraged personal persuasion and relationships to initiate collaboration strategies” (Fawcett et al. 2015 p.27)

Collaborative champions are organisations with an established power position and show willingness to collaborate. It leads to the idea that one factor can nullify the other. Meaning that a willing partner cannot achieve successful collaboration without a representative power position, and that a powerful organisation cannot achieve successful collaboration without willingness.

One of these two scenarios was active in the recent history of the context that was researched. The movement towards successful collaborative behaviour however, could only be made possible through the change in responsibilities. This was achieved since lawmakers changed the organisation forms of the organisation in the supply chain. It does however beg the question why organisation do not show willingness to collaborate in the first place. Why did the previous organisation forms show no willingness towards successful collaborative behaviour?

5.3 Service design and the definition of quality

Unwillingness in previous research sketched the idea that there is a lack of trust or resistance to change (Fawcett et al. 2015). The findings of this research could not confirm personal resentment between parties as a predominant factor. The results show that willingness is mostly aligned with the ability to understand other organisation’s needs and demands, and successfully incorporate those in the organisation’s output.

Wu et al. (2014) link the resistors trust, commitment, reciprocity, and power with information sharing. Where reciprocity is formulated as inter-organisational goal alignment (Wu et al. 2014). These factors are solved by aligned ICT systems. The findings of this research suggest reciprocity is a prerequisite for information sharing rather than a consequence; saying that organisation goals should be in line before an integrative ICT system can be implement. The context of this research highlights that the implementation of an ICT system was made difficult due to the misalignment of the organisations’ goals and quality definitions. Although this does not revoke the statement, it adds complexity to the role of reciprocity within the implementation of ICT systems.

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6. Conclusions

This research analysed resistors and enablers through a case-study between two organisations in the judicial supply chain context. The main findings of this research address how organisations manage enablers and resistors. First, managing resistors and enablers is dependent on individuals; the model in the discussion shows a distinction between structural enablement and provisional enablement. Although organisations might have resistors, such as an unaligned ICT system, individuals work around it in order to conduct successful collaborative behaviour. Also individuals seek out other willing individuals by forming networks which they use to achieve their goals. These networks are not a structural part of the organisations and are rather sensitive to disruption. Second, these organisations managed resistors and enablers by establishing a balanced power position within the supply chain. By obtaining a power position dialogues with other organisation can be opened and the process of organisational alignment can be improved. Third, the definition of quality needs to be aligned before organisations can align information flows through ICT systems. By setting similar or equal goals the implementation of ICT systems can be more successful, which in turn resolve resistors.

Enablement in the judicial supply chain relate to structural and provisional organisation changes. The organisations in this research have reduced, knowingly and unknowingly, resistors by shifting the responsibilities of inter-organisational flow. The reduction of power-distance has positively influence supply chain awareness and willingness to collaborate. The monopoly of knowledge and the

privileges hold by professional service organisations should be balanced throughout the supply chain to prevent a centralized power-position. Still the enablement of collaborations is dependent on individuals and their ability to create personalized networks of willing and understanding colleagues. Organisation should take these actions into account and invest in identifying structural resistors. Organisations stimulate this actively by establishing inter-organisational taskforces and project groups.

Theoretical contribution

The theoretical contribution of this research rest on the refinement of the resistors and enablers as indicated by Wu et al. (2014) and Fawcett et al. (2011;2015). The distinction of structural and provisional enablement adds depth to the way theory sees resistors and enablers. It confirms the sensitivity of collaborative behaviours towards ICT systems and adds to the importance of quality definitions and goal setting. Furthermore, this research provides insights on the resource based view, and outlines responsibility setting as a force to achieve buying power with. Doing so it creates practical insights on the organisation structures and initiatives that organisations make. Additionally, this research adds to the limited body of research in judicial supply chains.

Limitations and future research

The time limitation of this research reduces the generalizability and depth of the finding. The exact impact of the new AICE structure, and the dialogue between the supply chain partners downstream from the CJIB, could not be charted in this time frame. Due to a lack in available interviewees not all departments of the OM were included, though the interviewees that did participate provided insights in their change process towards better collaboration and their view on the other departments. Furthermore, both parties stated difficulties in working with the justice courts which were not included in this research but could provide refined findings on the influences between different service types. After all the OM represents this body rather than is the court itself, research here can provide more refined ideas on the findings of this research.

Lastly the power-position between service organisations and their aligned power-position can provide viable fields of research. Also some factors seem to have a specific strong relationship; such as willingness and power position. As well as a statistical study on the mediating effect of different organisation structures on the relationship between enablers and resistors, as well as the different

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Appendix A Interview guide

Mijn naam is Wouter, student Supply Chain Management aan de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Als onderdeel van mijn scriptieonderzoek neem ik interviews af om de samenwerking tussen het OM en het CJIB te analyseren. Als het goed is met U wordt het interview opgenomen, na dit gesprek wordt deze geluidsopname uitgewerkt en daarna verwijderd. Uw naam zal niet herkenbaar terugkomen in het verslag. Als dit allemaal prima is naar uw idee dan wil ik graag beginnen.

Inleiding

 Wat is uw functie binnen het [CJIB/OM]?

o Heeft u nog op andere posten gewerkt binnen het OM of CJIB?  Hoe lang werkt u voor het [CJIB/OM]?

o Heeft u nog elders gewerkt binnen de rechtsketen?

Interne organisatie

 Wat is de doelstelling van uw organisatie?

o Waar zijn jullie afhankelijk van om goed te kunnen functioneren?  Voorbeeld?

o Wie is afhankelijk van het werk van uw organisatie?  Voorbeeld?

o Wie heeft uiteindelijk baat bij uw functioneren?  Wat is de taakverdeling binnen het [CJIB/OM]?

o Waar bent u bij betroken?  Hoeveel zaken behandelen jullie?

o Zijn er zaken die in het bijzonder lastig zijn? Kunt u hier een voorbeeld van geven?  Wat is uw rol binnen de organisatie?

o Hoe beïnvloed dit het “eindproduct”?

o Wat heeft u nodig om goed uw werk te kunnen doen?  Zijn uw collega’s hiervan op de hoogte?  Kunt u hiervan een voorbeeld noemen?

o Met wie heeft u veel contact in de uitvoering van uw werk?

Samenwerking Koppelvlak

 Waarom moet uw organisatie samenwerken met het [CJIB/OM]?

o Op welke momenten is er contact tussen de organisatie in het proces van het slachtoffer?

o Om welke redenen vindt dit contact plaats?

 Is dit op basis van fouten/onduidelijkheden of structureel? o Hoe vinden deze uitwisselingen van informatie plaats?

 Met wie heeft u regelmatig contact?

o Hoe zorgt u zelf voor een goede samenwerking tussen het CJIB en het OM?  Zijn er verschillende koppelvlakken waar u betrokken bent?

o Wat voor koppelvlakken zijn dit? o Hoe verschillen deze?

 Zijn er andere functies betrokken?

 Gaat het om specifieke zaken? (m.b.t slachtoffers)

 Heeft u het gevoel dat de medewerkers bij het [CJIB/OM] op de hoogte zijn van uw benodigdheden?

o Waar blijkt dat uit (voorbeelden)?

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 Welke informatie heeft u van het [CJIB/OM] nodig om uw werk te doen? o Is het gemakkelijk om aan deze informatie te komen?

 Is er een specifiek soort informatie dat lastig te achterhalen is? o Werken alle partijen met hetzelfde informatiesysteem?

o Wat kan er beter gaan in de informatievoorziening?

 Worden er beslissingen genomen bij het [CJIB/OM] die invloed hebben op uw functioneren? o Kunt u een voorbeeld noemen?

o Wordt uw organisatie betrokken bij deze beslissingen? Is dit noodzakelijk?  Wordt het initiatief om samen te werken door een specifieke partij genomen? [CJIB/OM]?

o Waar blijkt dat uit?

o Wordt dit initiatief door beide partijen gedragen? o Hoe ervaart u de samenwerking?

Invloed interne organisatie op samenwerking [interne reflectie]

 Hoe ervaart u de samenwerking met andere [CJIB/OM]

o Heeft u het gevoel dat er in de andere organisatie bewustzijn is van wat u in uw werkzaamheden nodig heeft? (Ketenperspectief)

 Is dit specifiek voor bepaalde functies of zaken?

 Hebben zij een andere werkwijze dan wel een interpretatie van zaken? Waar blijkt dat uit? Voorbeeld?

o Wat is voor jullie leidend in jullie activiteiten? En wat bij de andere organisatie? o Welke invloeden heeft dit op de communicatie en samenwerking?

o Waarom veroorzaakt dit een conflict? / Waarom bevordert dit de samenwerking?  Praat u met regelmaat over de organisatie met de medewerkers bij het [CJIB/OM]?

(Professionalisme)

o Doet de organisatie er wat aan om dit te bevorderen?

 Hoe denkt u dat de organisaties beter met elkaar kunnen samenwerken?  Is er een wederzijdse vertrouwensband tussen de organisaties? (Trust)

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Appendix C Observations Observation 1

03/05/2016

Office public prosecution, Zwolle, the Netherlands

After the first interview was rounded off I walked with the interviewee to his desk to look at the screen he was looking at to do his work. When walking into his office there was a co-worker on the phone talking to someone at the CJIB. They were discussing inconsistencies in their screens, viewing the same case. Why exactly remained unclear to me but for one reason or another it needed to be solved. The interviewee quickly got pulled into the discussion and the rest of the conversation was on speakerphone.

Because the discussion didn’t lead to a clear conclusion both parties were sending screenshots to each other through e-mail. The exact definitions on their screens were different from each other and this had to be explained as well. The “why you call this this?” was for a long time part of the conversation. It came to the conclusion that both systems registered different dates as important to one function, thus showed, and less important to another, thus hidden.

The phone conversation lasted for, I assume, half an hour. Further discussion of between me and the interviewee followed on how he told this in the interview. He thought it was frustrating that both parties were not looking at the same screen.

Observation 2 03/05/2016

Head office CJIB, Leeuwarden, the Netherlands

After an interview with Eddie Boersma I met Bram Reudink in the hallway while I was introduced to the next two interviewees of that day. They were discussing a case on what went wrong with communicating with the OM. This was done internally, so the two operational employees with their supervising coordinator.

The three of them were looking at the GPS system, the system used by the OM. They had to fetch somebody from another department to look at the system because they themselves did not have access to it. The main topic of the conversation was if the mishap could have been prevented at the other side. I do not know much of the details but from what I understand it was about an article that was reported in the verdict but not put in the system.

It showed the extent to which they had to go to in order to understand the other party in the supply chain. This party was not involved but another colleague was fetched in order to do so. This shows the difficulty in understanding, as well as the intention to understand each other.

Observation 3 18/05/2016

Work conference AICE

Head office CJIB, Leeuwarden, the Netherlands

You have the right to remain silent: