1
WOMEN IN THE BOARDROOM: FIRM-LEVEL
PREDICTORS OF BOARD GENDER DIVERSITY
IN THE PHILIPPINES
Master Thesis
MSc International Business and Management Rijksuniversiteit Groningen
Faculty of Economics and Business
June 20, 2014 KATHRIN-LUISE HAHN Student number: 1983032 Kamer 10, Boterdiep 94 9712 LS Groningen tel.: +31 (0) 681982906 e-mail: kathrin.l.hahn@gmail.com
2 ABSTRACT
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION………...………4
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES I. The Philippine Governance Regime and its Impact on Gender Diversity………6
A. Dominant Ideology: Traditional gender roles as shaped by Philippine culture and norms……7
Education and Equal Work Opportunities………...……7
Traditional gender roles………...………8
B. National Business System: The Rule of Family Business Empires……….9
Relations between the state and the elite………...…….. 9
The politicized business environment ………...……….10
Ownership structure and control………...………11
Promotion practices………...………12
C. Governance Practices ………...……….12
General governance regulations ………...………12
Nomination of directors ………...………..13 II. HYPOTHESES 1. Family Ties ………...……….…14 2. Firm Size ………...……….15 3. Industry Nature ………...………...16 4. Network Effect ………...………18 5. Concentration of Ownership………...………18 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Sample and Procedure ………...………19
Measures ………...……….………20
Data Analysis ………...……….….23
RESULTS Descriptive Statistics and Correlations ………...………...23
Hypothesis Testing ………...……….26
DISCUSSION ………...……….…28
Findings ………...……….……….29
Theoretical Implications ………...……….30
Strong and Weak Points………...………. 31
Practical Implications ………...……….32
CONCLUSION ………...………..33
4 INTRODUCTION
Following the highly publicized corporate scandals of the 2000s1 and the introduction of initiatives such as the Dodd-Frank Act2, increased attention has been given to the effectiveness and composition of the corporate boardroom. As voiced by Bloomberg Businessweek, these corporate scandals have prompted many to ask, “Where is the board of directors who were supposed to be guarding our interests?” (Thornton, 2008). While board composition has long been studied by academics (Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009), one of the most currently debated topics in this sphere is gender diversity in corporate boards (Kang, Cheng, & Gray, 2007; Milliken & Martins, 1996). The importance of board gender diversity is also mirrored by the practitioner world as illustrated by the flurry of quotas for increased female participation in European boards and the voluntary increase of female directors in U.S. firms (Srinidhi, Gul, & Tsui, 2011).
Several studies suggest that gender diversity provides benefits to the firm. At the board level, the presence of female directors is likely to improve communication among board members and with stakeholders (Terjesen et al., 2009) as they tend to have good interpersonal skills for collaboration and give importance to the concerns of mulitple stakeholders (Konrad, Kramer, & Erkut, 2008). Additionally, increased female board participation tends to enhance decision making quality as they bring in different opinions and experiences (Fondas & Sassalos, 2000). At the firm level, board gender diversity may lead to a reputation as “female-friendly employer” which increases organizational legitimacy in the eyes of current and future female employees (Sealy, 2008). Furthermore, as a result of board gender diversity benefits such as those described above, financial performance may improve as well (Burke, 2000).
Given the advantages of board gender diversity, Hillman, Shropshire and Cannella ask,“why do some organizations have women on their boards of directors but others do not?” (2007: 941). A large amount of research examines predictors of board gender diversity at the individual, institutional and national level but relatively fewer researchers explore firm-level predictors (Hillman et al., 2007). As one of the first to focus on organizational predictors,
1 e.g Enron, Lehman Brothers, Satyam 2
5 Hillman et al. (2007) propose that firm size, industry type and network effects3 are likely to increase female representation on boards. Other researchers similarly find the following factors to play a role: firm size (e.g. Burke, 2000; Hyland & Marcellino, 2002), ownership concentration (e.g. Kang et al., 2007; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013), board size (e.g. Brammer, Millington, & Pavelin, 2007; Kang et al., 2007), industry (e.g. Brammer et al., 2007; Hyland & Marcellino, 2002; Kang et al., 2007) and family ownership (e.g. Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013; Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva, 2007; Sheridan & Milgate, 2005).
What is noticeable from these studies and other research on organizational predictors is that they test their hypotheses using data from developed countries such as the U.S., Australia, France, the U.K., and Switzerland. Conversely, not much is known about board diversity – let alone board gender diversity – in a developing country context (Mahadeo, Soobaroyen, & Hanuman, 2012). Developing countries face a set of social, cultural, legal and political contexts different from those in developed countries, and therefore board gender diversity may be experienced differently in such countries.
In light of the above, the current study seeks to contribute to theory by exploring gender diversity in Philippine boards of directors. As such, the following research question will be investigated: To what extent can firm-level determinants explain differences in gender diversity
in Philippine corporate boards?
The Philippines is chosen as the research context since it presents an unusual case. It is the only developing country aside from Nicaragua to be part of the world’s top 10 countries with the smallest gender gap4 (World Economic Forum, 2013) and the proportion of female directors in Philippine boards is 34%, which is well above the global average of 19% (Grant Thornton, 2013). This makes the Philippines a special research context different from previous ones as it is a developing country with high board gender diversity. The majority of previous research contexts, on the other hand, consisted of either developed countries with high board gender diversity or developed countries with low board gender diversity. Within the special research context of the Philippines, the current study will examine the firm-level determinants of gender diversity in boards of directors to explain why some Philippine boards have high gender diversity but others do not. This study thereby provides the opportunity to explore board gender diversity in a developing country context and test whether theory on organizational determinants in the
6 developed countries (e.g. Hillman et al., 2007 and Kang et al., 2007) can be applied to developing countries as well.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section describes the Philippine governance regime with the purpose of uncovering the backdrop against which board gender diversity is set. Although the focus of this paper is on firm-level determinants, aspects of the governance regime may help define which specific firm-level characteristics are important in the Philippines. Thereafter, a literature review and corresponding hypotheses are presented followed by an explanation of the data and methodology. The subsequent sections discuss the results and analysis. The paper concludes with theoretical implications, limitations, practical implications and suggestions for future research.
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES I. The Philippine Governance Regime and its Impact on Gender Diversity
Governance regimes encompass key contextual elements that define the behavior of firms (Anand, Milne, & Purda, 2012). The Philippine governance regime therefore plays an important role in explaining firm-level antecedents of gender diversity in Philippine boards of directors.
7 The following section describes the Philippine governance regime according to the conceptualization developed by Maclean, Harvey and Press (2006). As seen in Figure 1, a governance regime consists of three interrelated levels: dominant ideology, national business system and governance practices. The dominant ideology will be discussed first as it is the foundation on which the other levels rest.
A. Dominant Ideology: Traditional gender roles as shaped by Philippine culture and norms A dominant ideology consists of ideas, beliefs, values and assumptions upon which the national business system and governance practices are based (Maclean et al., 2006). The dominant ideology also determines the manner in which gender is conceptualized by a society and how it affects governance and leadership (Collinson & Hearn, 1996; King, 1995), thereby influencing the opportunities for women to advance to board positions.
Over the course of history, numerous nations such as the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and America have all attempted to conquer the Philippine islands. Among these nations Spain ruled the Philippines for the longest period – namely three centuries long (Agoncillo, 1990). Despite the colonization reaching its end in 1898, Spain’s influence can still be felt today as the Philippines has remained a predominantly Catholic country. Catholicism is an essential part of Philippine society and supports the strong familial ties between its people (Kondo, 2014). In the remaining sections it will become evident how pervasive the social norm of family-centeredness truly is, what this implies for board gender diversity.
Education and Equal Work Opportunities. The Philippines has a strong family culture
that exhibits kinship patterns where both male and female lines are equally important (Agree, Biddlecom, Chang, & Perez, 2002; Kondo, 2014; Yamauchi & Tiongco, 2013). According to tradition, children should support their parents and parents therefore invest in the education of their children in the hope of gaining some returns (Yamauchi & Tiongco, 2013). This belief could explain the prevalence of large families in the Philippines. In addition, daughters are sometimes given priority over sons, with parents consequently investing more in their daughters as they are more likely to support their parents later on. As a result, females reach significantly higher levels of education compared to males (Yamauchi & Tiongco, 2013).
8 higher proportion of men, 8 have an almost equal distribution of men and women and 3 have a significantly higher participation of women. The industries with the greatest proportion of female employees are ‘Financial and Insurance Activities’, ‘Education’, and ‘Human Health and Social Work’ (National Statistics Office, 2014). The relatively broad work opportunities available to women complements the commonly held perception that Philippine women have a high status in both the business and public sector compared to women in other Asian countries (Roffey, 2000).
Aside from general intiatives by both government and non-government organizations to improve gender equality, no gender quotas have been legislated and there are no corporate governance codes specifially aimed at increasing the number of female directors in Philippine corporate boards (Openshaw, Uy-Tioco, & Hastings, 2012).
Traditional gender roles. While it appears that Philippine men and women are more or
less equal, separate gender roles still remain (Roffey, 2000). These gender roles can be traced back to a Philippine myth concerning the creation of mankind entitled, ‘Si Malakas at si
Maganda’5 (The Strong One and The Beautiful One). Malakas and Maganda were the names of
the first man and woman and from these names the traditional roles of men and women are quite evident. The ideal man should be malakas – strong and powerful, while the woman should be maganda – beautiful, soft and virtuous (Docdocil, 2009; Roffey, 2000).
This definition of gender roles is carried over to the business world, which remains to be the domain of men and where it is socially acceptable for men to exert direct power due to their association with the concept of malakas (Roffey, 2000). Since women are associated with the construct of maganda, traditional gender roles imply that they should prioritize their family and not their professional career (Eviota, 1992; Illo, 1991; Roffey, 2000) and if they indeed have power in the business sector, it is traditionally exercised in an indirect manner (Jocano, 1990). However, businesswomen may exert direct power if they balance this with indirect power, which is more culturally accepted (Roces, 1996; 1998). In a study of the strategic leadership characteristics of Philippine businesswomen, Roffey (2000) finds that women lead most effectively when they balance their direct power with qualities embodied by the maganda construct. Usage of indirect power or maganda qualities means that women use charm, persuasion and diplomacy. Another situation where a woman’s direct expression of power is acceptable is when she belongs to the appropriate social network.
5 Malakas is a Philippine word for strength, power or influence whereas maganda means beautiful but can also mean
9 Turning to the traditional family roles of Filipino men and women, men are normally the principal breadwinners of the family while women are in charge of controlling the family budget. In addition, it is common for women to lend support to their husbands by having their own side business (Roffey, 2000). In many cases, women even work abroad in order to support their families. Although this may be in conflict with their role as carer of the family, women overseas workers are actually seen as heroes working hard to give their family a brighter future6 (Kondo, 2014). Women’s traditional family-oriented role extends to the business context as well, since businesswomen are usually seen as the nurturers and the social glue holding the company together (Roffey, 2000).
The complicated nature of a Philippine woman’s role makes it difficult to ascertain whether the Philippine society is patriarchial or matriarchal, or perhaps a mixture of both. As Roffey (2000:16) specifies, “managers and employees described the Philippines as a ‘matriarchal society’, [while] women business leaders exercise their strategic management within a ‘macho’ society”. Despite the lack of research available for this topic, a number of well-known Philippine journalists believe that their society is matriarchal. Wilson Lee Flores explains that “on the surface, the Philippines may be mistaken for a male chauvinist macho country, but it is in essence a matriarchal society with many women actually holding sway over families, businesses and politics” (Flores, 2002). In a BBC report on the narrowing global gender gap, Marites Vitug further adds, “We're a matriarchal society. Mothers are dominant - generally, they influence their children to a large extent. Women usually hold the purse. Even if they are not the major breadwinners, they do the budget, decide how money is spent. Thus, men don't have a dismissive attitude toward women” (BBC, 2013).
B. National Business System: The Rule of Family Business Empires
Relations between the state and the elite. While the Philippine’s strong family culture has
significant implications for gender roles, it is also the one of the most crucial factors that shapes the Philippine business system. According to Witt and Redding (2013), the Philippines is one of the clearest examples of a predatory state wherein rulers or leaders use the country for their own benefit. Solely considering the relation between the state and its citizens, the Philippine state is certainly predatory (Quimpo, 2009). However, a number of scholars question whether this is truly
6 As mentioned in the previous section, Philippine families tend to be large and therefore it is usually the relatives
10 the case (Hutchcroft, 1998; McCoy, 1993; Quimpo, 2009). Indeed, a more thorough examination reveals that even though the state is strong, large elite families are much stronger and therefore able to overpower the state (McCoy, 1993). In effect, the elites are actually the ones using the country to advance their own agendas. As suggested by Hutchcroft (1998), the Philippines can therefore more aptly be classified as a ‘patrimonial oligarchic state’ where the state preys on the weak citizenry and the elite oligarchic families prey on the state. Normally, governments have ownership of key enterprises in areas such as energy, transportation and telecommunications in order to protect national interests. This is not the case in the Philippines where elites usually control these key industries (World Bank, 2008) thereby further cementing their position of power.
The politicized business environment. The realms of business and politics greatly overlap
in the Philippines, with business elites frequently having direct involvement in governmental affairs. Political dynasties, which can be viewed as politics’ answer to an oligarchy, dominate the political arena and it is commonplace for a politician’s family member to become a successor or to run for other governmental positions (World Bank, 2000, 2001). In fact, around seventy percent of the legislators are related to each other through familial ties (Coronel, Chua, Rimban, & Cruz, 2007). It is therefore highly probable that elite business families have relatives who are politicians, and who can serve as a ‘connection’ to help smooth out any problems the business is facing or help gain the favor of legislators. As stated by a board member of one of the largest business groups in the Philippines, “so much economic power depends on political power” (dela Rama, 2012: 512).
11 Senator Panfilo Lacson, it is a “…big, big mafia or syndicate involving the executive and legislative branches of the government [fused] in circles of kickbacks, corruption, patronage politics and wasteful spending”. He adds that “less than fifty percent…actually went to the programs of work. And more than fifty percent went to the many deep pockets of corruption” (Gamala, 2014; Mangahas, 2013).
Ownership structure and control. Owing to the high degree of corruption in the
Philippines and the accompanying low trust in the state, it is likely that business groups experience more lenient standards with regard to corporate governance. Controlling shareholders consequently have a strong bearing on the corporate governance of their firm (dela Rama, 2012). To help shed some light on gender diversity in boards of directors, it is therefore useful to examine the ownership structure of Philippine firms.
Family-owned businesses are the most common form of ownership structure. While the majority of these businesses are private, family ownership extends to a number of publicly listed firms as well (Kondo, 2014; Saldaña, 2001; Witt and Redding, 2013). A large portion of the country’s wealth lies in the hands of a few elite business families, highlighting the power that these families wield in the Philippine economy. In fact, the top fifteen families are responsible for 46.7% of the country’s GDP (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). Some of these elite families trace their roots back to the Spanish colonial period in which their forefathers owned haciendas or estates. Other families gained their wealth as industrialists during the American rule. Several large family businesses have also managed to emerge in more recent times (Eviota, 1992; Kondo, 2014; Lande, 1968).
Family-owned corporations are often characterized by a high concentration of ownership (dela Rama, 2012). Most Philippine firms are not listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange with the exception of a few qualified firms. Among those that are listed, only a few are traded actively (Kondo, 2014). Moreover, even with the Securities and Exchange Commission withdrawing the 40 per cent foreign ownership cap (Morales, 2013) foreign ownership of shares remains limited. As families usually wish to keep control to themselves, they maintain large blocks of shares and only issue the minimum amount of shares required for them to be listed on the stock exchange, which ranges from 10 to 20% of outstanding shares (Kondo, 2014; de Ocampo, 2000).
12 2014; The Hofstede Centre, 2014). With the exception of top management and people with close ties to the family, employees are rarely given responsibilities. While this may be partly explained by high power distance, corruption may also play a role as it lessens institutionalized trust in a society and consequently discourages the delegation of responsibility (Kondo, 2014; Witt and Redding, 2013).
Promotion practices. With regard to gender diversity on corporate boards, it is especially
important to consider the promotion practices, which are frequently marked by clientelism (Kondo, 2014). Clientelism refers to relations of patronage between individuals of unequal socioeconomic status (Briquet, 2013) and is essentially a quid pro quo (Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno, & Brusco, 2013). In corporations where clientilism is present, the client informs the patron about important events occurring in the firm, especially those that may affect the position of the patron. In exchange, the patron gives the client preferential treatment which increases the chance that the client will be promoted (Kondo, 2014). As for the top management positions, these are normally occupied by relatives or close friends of the owning family (Witt and Redding, 2013).
Since relationships form the main basis of promotion (Witt and Redding, 2013), it is implied that women have a higher chance of becoming corporate board members if they have close relations to the owning family or if they are members of the patron-client network.
C. Governance Practices
Governance practices form the most visible part of a governance regime and consist of formal practices, rules and regulations (Maclean et al., 2006). Particularly the manner in which board directors are recruited directly affects how open corporate boards are to female participation.
General governance regulations. In accordance with the Corporation Code (Batas
13
Nomination of directors. In firms that issue shares of stock, directors are nominated by
the stockholders. Employees, meanwhile, are not allowed to vote except in the case that they are also shareholders. The law has no regulations regarding the manner in which firms choose to organize their boards. Some firms only have a board of directors7 while others make a division between the board of directors, the executive board and the supervisory board. A classification of directors into either executive or non-executive directors is also not provided by the Corporation Code. Instead, it is primarily within a firm’s discretion whether it distinguishes between these classifications or not (Institute of Corporate Directors, 2001). As no standard board structure exists, the Philippine governance system cannot be classified as either one-tiered or two-tiered.
For private firms, independent directors are not obligatory and they are quite uncommon (de Ocampo, 2000). In the case of banks and publicly listed firms however, the General Banking Law of 2000 and the Securities Regulation Code require that there be at least two independent directors. An independent director, as the name implies, refers to a person who is not an employee of the firm and is not related to the firm in such a way that it would lead to biased judgment (Institute of Corporate Directors, 2001). Nevertheless, firms commonly fail to uphold this requirement in practice. Many family-owned businesses prefer to keep confidential issues to themselves and the controlling shareholders therefore select ‘independent’ directors from their trusted personal network (de Ocampo, 2000). Such deviations from the law are enabled by the poor law enforcement in the country. In a study conducted by dela Rama (2012: 511) concerning corporate governance and corruption in Asia, a board director of a Philippine firm was quoted as saying, “Rules are violated brazenly here by people in power […] You can’t invoke the law in an environment of lawlessness. The law is brazenly and routinely violated by the government […] If you complain, they charge you in courts. The process takes forever and the culprits then disappear to the USA or an unknown place. If people are good, laws are useless. If people are bad [the laws are as equally] useless.”
Consistent with the general promotion practices described earlier, directors are also selected on a relational basis. The Institute of Corporate Directors (2001) reported that the most important criterion in the selection of directors is the relationship they have with the dominant shareholder, which in most cases is the owning family. The second most important factor concerns the amount of shares the director owns. The bigger the share, the better since it aligns
14 the interests of the directors with those of the dominant shareholders or owning family. Following these two criteria is professional expertise, which is the least important among the three. These selection criteria have important implications for female participation on corporate boards, which will be discussed in the following hypotheses along with other key aspects of the Philippine governance regime.
II. HYPOTHESES 1. Family Ties
It is evident from the discussion of the Philippine governance regime that the social norm of family-centeredness permeates all levels of the regime, from the dominant ideology to the governance practices. As such, it is expected to have an effect on board gender diversity. Before proceeding it must be noted that in this study, family-centeredness is represented by family ties and not by family ownership. This is due to the lack of publicly available data regarding which firms are family-owned and which are not. Even if the share ownership structure were used to trace the shares to the owning family, it would be difficult to determine since the Securities and Exchange Commission only requires public ownership reports to specify the name of the ‘record’ shareholder and not the name of the ‘actual’ or ‘beneficial’ shareholder (Perez, 2012). Furthermore, Claessens et al. (2000) propose that the issue of incomplete or unclear ownership data can be managed by examining whether there are family ties between the board members and if they share surnames.
Following research (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013; Ruigrok et al., 2007) on the positive association of board gender diversity with family ties, an increase in female directors is expected when directors have family ties with each other. As described in the previous section, family-owned businesses are the most common form of ownership structure (Witt & Redding, 2013) and in addition to owning and controlling the firm, the family tends to directly manage it as well (Kondo, 2014). Relatives or close friends of the owning family tend to occupy the top positions in a firm, which may be partly explained by low levels of institutionalized trust8 caused by the rampant corruption in the country. Low institutionalized trust levels and the desire of many family-owned businesses to keep confidential issues to themselves (de Ocampo, 2000) may cause the owning families to preferably select their
8 Institutionalized trust is based on the wider social system that prevents people from acting dishonestly (Witt &
15 relatives as directors. Owning families may appoint family members to the board in order to maintain the continuity of family leadership (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008). As previously discussed, board directors of family-owned firms indeed tend to be hired on a relational basis since relations form the most important criterion in director selection (Institute of Corporate Directors, 2001).
For firms that are not family-owned, family ties may still play an important role. Through the widespread nepotism in the Philippines, director candidates that are related to a current director are likely to be ‘endorsed’ by the relative or selected. Therefore, in situations where the choice lies between a female candidate who is a relative versus a male candidate who is not, the female candidate would be chosen. Even if no nepotism is present Nekhili and Gatfaoui (2013: 231) suggest that “social ties might signal a public recognition of women’s expertise, which reassures CEOs and nominating committees in appointing women to boards”. As a result, the presence of family ties increases a woman’s chance to become a director in the male dominated business world where she might not have been chosen under ‘normal’ circumstances (i.e. when family ties are absent).
In addition to the above arguments, an initial examination of the data revealed a pattern with regard to family ties. The average proportion of women on corporate boards with family ties between its directors was found to be 18.18% while boards without family ties averaged 16.78%. Although the difference is only 1.4%, it may hint at a significant positive relation between family ties and board gender diversity. Therefore,
Hypothesis 1. Family ties have a positive effect on board gender diversity.
2. Firm Size
16 Moreover, while it is sometimes thought that women can more easily succeed in smaller than bigger firms (Sealy, Vinnicombe, & Singh, 2008), many studies find that firm size and board gender diversity are positively related (e.g. Burke, 2000; Hyland & Marcellino, 2002; (Terjesen & Singh, 2008). Additionally, the majority of large firms in the Philippines are family owned and characterized by highly concentrated ownership9, making them less open to control from minority shareholders and external forces such as the market. While the owning families are officially independent from the influence of others based on the share ownership, they still need to answer to the ‘unofficial’ demands of society and are therefore still vulnerable to social pressure. Therefore,
Hypothesis 2. Firm size has a positive effect on gender diversity in corporate boards.
3. Industry Nature
In their study of gender diversity in corporate boards of British firms, Brammer, Millington and Pavelin (2007) find that gender diversity significantly varies across industries. They explain that industry experience is an important criterion in the selection of board directors and therefore the prevalence of female employees in the industry determines the representation of women on boards. For instance, in industries with a large number of female employees, the ‘criterion of industry experience’ would favor female directors. In addition, Hillman et al. (2007) posit that firms in industries that are largely dependent on the female workforce may wish to increase gender diversity on their boards in order to gain legitimacy as perceived by current and future female employees.
As recorded by the Philippine National Statistics Office (2014), the industries with the lowest proportion of women (ranked from lowest to highest) are:
1. Mining and Quarrying; 2. Construction;
3. Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing;
4. Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply;
5. Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation; 6. Transportation and Storage; and,
17 7. Arts, Entertainment and Recreation.
The industries with an almost equal participation of men and women (ranked from lowest to highest proportion of women) are:
1. Administrative and Support Service Activities; 2. Accommodation and Food Service Activities; 3. Real Estate activities;
4. Information and Communication;
5. Wholesale and Retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 6. Manufacturing;
7. Professional, Scientific and Technical Activities; and, 8. Other Community, Social, and Personal Service Activities.
The industries with a significantly higher proportion of women, ranked from lowest to highest, are:
1. Financial and Insurance Activities; 2. Education; and,
3. Human Health and Social Work.
From the above information, it can be expected that firms in the industries of ‘Financial and Insurance Activities’, ‘Education’ and ‘Human Health and Social Work’ will be the most likely to have female directors in comparison to firms in industries such as ‘Mining and Quarrying’, ‘Construction’ and ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing’.
In addition to the industry experience effect, an industry’s proximity to final consumers is also a key factor. Brammer et al. (2007: 396) argue that “industries that predominantly serve final consumers, rather than business customers, tend to serve relatively high proportions of females”, increasing the need for firms in those industries to have female directors to represent their female consumers. The authors state that the industries with a close proximity to final consumers (and consequently higher gender diversity on boards) include consumer goods manufacturing, retail, banking, utilities and media while the industries that are more isolated from final consumers include resources, business services and construction. Summarizing the arguments above, it is hypothesized that,
18 Hypothesis 3b. Firms in industries with a close proximity to final consumers have high levels of gender diversity in corporate boards.
4. Network Effect
According to Hillman et al. (2007), firms establish links with each other to overcome the uncertainty posed by the external environment and to share important information and resources. These links often take the form of interlocking directorates, which refers to the situation where a director serves on the corporate boards of multiple firms (Buch-Hansen, 2014). Hillman et al. add that “Interlocking directorates can also convey the value of particular practices, such as gender diversity on a board of directors, and provide additional information and links to a supply of female directors” (2007: 945). This implies that if a firm is part of such a network, it is more likely to have female directors on its corporate board. The network effect becomes stronger the more links a firm has since this increases the firm’s access to information and resources. As a result,
Hypothesis 4. Firms with a high number of links to other firms with female directors have high levels of gender diversity in corporate boards.
5. Concentration of Ownership
According to stakeholder theory, firms need to consider not only the interests of their shareholders but also the broader interests of society (Kang et al., 2007). Kang et al. (2007: 198) suggest that “One proxy for such interests is the presence of minority shareholders, or alternatively, the degree of shareholder concentration measured by the percentage of shareholdings held by major shareholders”.
Firms with high concentrations of ownership are thought to have poor corporate governance since they cannot be controlled by market forces (dela Rama, 2012; Kondo, 2014). The decreased influence of the market also suggests that such firms are less likely to be affected by social interests as represented by minority shareholders. Consequently, they experience less external pressure to consider social interests such as board gender diversity.
19 group of shareholders and is not kept by a single group. Firms with low ownership concentration can therefore demand that the board represent their interests through an equally diverse set of directors. It is assumed that shareholders characterized by low ownership concentration value diversity since boards with a degree of diversity and independence are more likely to ensure that society’s interests are properly represented on the board (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). Moreover, board diversity is also a matter of ethics and firms can improve their corporate social responsibility by incorporating more diversity into their boards (Kang et al., 2007). These propositions are supported by Kang et al.’s (2007) findings that there is indeed a significant negative relationship between ownership concentration and board gender diversity. Therefore,
Hypothesis 5. High ownership concentration has a negative effect on gender diversity in corporate boards.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY Sample and Procedure
The data of this study were obtained from the Orbis company database. Aside from the list of Philippine firms provided by the Philippine Stock Exchange, there is no publicly available firm listing that is comparable to those such as the Fortune 500. Therefore the Orbis database was used, which also includes all the firms listed on the Philippine Stock Exchange. All the needed variables from year 2013 were available on the database except for Network Effect, which had to be created manually. In the situation were some data was missing, these were collected from the company annual reports of 2013. For missing information on ownership concentration, the public ownership reports of 2013 were consulted. Both the company annual report and the public ownership report were accessed from the Philippine Stock Exchange website
20 Measures
Gender diversity. The gender diversity of corporate boards is measured as the percentage
of female directors in each company board. While the Orbis database already provided the gender of each director, this information was validated using the Board of Directors section of the company annual reports and director profiles from the Bloomberg Businessweek website
http://investing.businessweek.com/. In the case of gender-ambiguous names, especially Chinese names, their gender was confirmed using Google.
Family Ties. The family ties were operationalized as the number per firm of board
directors that are related to each other through family ties. First, directors with the same surnames were identified. In the case of the most well-known business families such as the Sy’s and the Ayala’s (Forbes, 2013), it was relatively easy to confirm family ties. Using the information from the profiles of top business people from the Forbes’ “Philippines’ 50 Richest” list (2013), the family names were linked to the companies and from there the family ties were determined. The SM group, for instance, was founded by Henry Sy and all the directors with the Sy surname were therefore considered to be related to him.
In the Philippines, it is also common to for a son to be named after his father with the suffix “Jr.” attached. In cases where both the father’s name and the son’s suffixed name were present, these were considered family. Another Philippine naming tradition concerns name changes after marriage. Upon marrying, Philippine women will continue to carry their maiden name as a middle name or a middle initial. For example, if Joy Cruz where to marry a man with the surname Garcia, her new name would be Joy Cruz Garcia or Joy C. Garcia. Joy’s children would then also have both their mother’s maiden name and their father’s surname. When directors were found with matching middle names and surnames (i.e. Helen Yuchengco Dee and Albert S. Yuchengco) it was assumed that they were related. If only the middle initial was given, an internet search or company annual reports would usually give the full maiden name.
Although this method of determining family ties may result in some errors, it is the best that can be done given the large size of the dataset and lack of specific data on which directors have family ties with each other. Furthermore, Claessens et al. (2000) propose that the issue of incomplete or unclear ownership data can be managed by examining whether board members have the same surnames.
Firm Size. Firm size is measured as the logarithm of total assets, which is a common
21 commonly used to measure firm size (e.g. Hillman et al., 2007). In this study, the logarithm of total assets will be used but the number of employees will also be considered to see if this affects the statistical results differently.
Industry Nature (a). Hypothesis 3a states that firms in industries with a larger proportion
of female employees have high levels of gender diversity in corporate boards. In this case, data from the Philippine National Statistics Office (2014) was collected to create a measure of the percentage of female employees per industry. The Philippine National Statistics Office and Orbis both use the NACE Rev. 2 industry classification code, and therefore there was no need to reorganize the industries with a common classification system.
Industry Nature (b). According to Hypothesis 3b, firms in industries with a close
proximity to final consumers have high levels of gender diversity in corporate boards. Brammer et al. (2007) propose that industries such as retail, banking, utilities and the media have a close proximity to final consumers. Based on this, the following are classified as final-consumer industries: ‘Wholesale and Retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles’, ‘Financial and Insurance Activities’, ‘Electricity, Gas, Steam and Air Conditioning Supply’, ‘Water Supply, Sewerage, Waste Management and Remediation’, ‘Information and Communication’, ‘Transportation and Storage’, ‘Arts, Entertainment and Recreation’, ‘Accommodation and Food Service Activities’, ‘Real Estate activities’ and ‘Education’.
Brammer et al. (2007) also add that natural resources, business services, and construction are examples of industries that are not in close proximity to the final consumer. Applying this classification to the current industry data implies that the non-final-consumer industries are: ‘Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing’, ‘Mining and Quarrying’, ‘Manufacturing’ and ‘Construction’. These groupings also correspond with the classification of service-oriented (final-consumer) and non-service-oriented (non-final-(final-consumer) industries used by Fang (2013). Final-consumer industries were coded as 1 while non-final-Final-consumer industries were coded as 0.
Network Effect. To test the network effect, it was first determined whether the directors
of the focal firm also serve on the boards of other firms. Following Hillman et al.’s (2007) operationalization, the network effect for each firm was then measured as the total number of female directors on the boards of the other firms on which the focal firm’s directors also served.
Concentration of Ownership. The ownership concentration hypothesis was tested by
22 Corporation (PCNC) and other similar corporations such as Guild Securities and BDO Securities Corporation. PCNC is a subsidiary of the Philippine Central Depository (Bloomberg Businessweek, 2014) and ensures that securities settlement is done in a quick, safe and efficient manner. The corporation acts as a trustee-nominee for investors, with beneficial share ownership remaining in the hands of the lodging shareholder. PCNC is therefore not granted any voting powers (Philippine Stock Market Advisory, 2014).
This complicates the share ownership since multiple shareholders for a firm can be collectively listed under the name “PCD Nominee”. For instance, in the case where a 90% share concentration is listed under “PCD Nominee”, this may or may not be merely the sum of multiple investors’ shares. The individual investors can also not be identified since the Securities and Exchange Commission only requires the disclosure of record stockholders and not the actual names of the investors (Perez, 2013). To ensure that the trustee-nominee share ownership does not distort the hypothesis testing, the analysis was performed twice: once using an ownership concentration variable that considered the trustee-nominee shares as shares owned by one person, and a second time using an ownership concentration variable that ignored the trustee-nominee and instead used the percentage of shares owned by the second largest non-trustee-nominee shareholder.
Control variables. Firm performance, board size and firm age were controlled for, as they
have been found to have an effect on gender diversity (Brammer et al., 2007; Farrell & Hersch, 2005; Hillman et al., 2007).
There are contrasting views on what the effect of firm performance is on board gender diversity. One view is that of the glass cliff phenomenon where women tend to occupy risky management positions, making it more difficult for women to perform well which results in lower actual and perceived performance (Ryan & Haslam, 2007). A more positive view is given by Farrell and Hersch (2005) with their finding that high performing firms are likely to have more female directors. The reasoning they offer is that firms with better performance can afford to give more attention to board diversity issues.
23 firm’s market value, which cannot be surely known until the firm is sold. Moreover, computing the market value of private is an arduous task that entails looking at comparable firms to estimate the market value (Stanford University Development Research, 2012).
Board size is the second variable to be controlled for since it has been consistently linked to board gender diversity. While the difference in corporate governance structures (i.e. two-tiered versus single-tiered) across countries make it difficult to compare results, it is found that large boards have more female directors (Brammer et al., 2007; Hyland & Marcellino, 2002). A possible explanation for this is that firms with large boards have the extra capacity to add more female directors to their boards (Luoma & Goodstein, 1999). For this study, board size is operationalized as the number of directors on a board.
Lastly, firm age is included since it may affect firm performance. There is evidence that firms improve with age but there is also evidence that performance worsens with age (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2013) and this may consequently affect board gender diversity in an indirect manner. Firm age is measured as the amount of years since the firm was founded.
Data Analysis
A regression analysis was performed to determine whether the level of gender diversity on corporate boards can be predicted by the independent variables of family ties, firm size, industry nature, network effect and concentration of ownership. The control variables were entered in to the first step of the regression analysis, followed by the independent variables which were entered in the second step.
RESULTS Descriptive Statistics and Correlations
Descriptive Statistics. One of the reasons why this study was initiated is the information
24 participation was measured. It is not clear whether the business leaders gave estimates or exact figures when asked about the female board participation in their company. It is also not known how many Philippine business leaders were asked, which could significantly alter the average results. It is therefore not ideal to compare the Grant Thornton results with those of the current study.
Looking to other research, a study by the Economist called the Glass-Ceiling Index (The Economist, 2014) found that the average percentage of women on boards is 12.5%. According to the current study, the Philippines’ 17.70% scores above the average and higher than the following countries: US 16.9%, Germany 14.1%, Australia 14%, Britain 12.6%, South Korea 1.9% and Japan 0%. Countries scoring higher than the Philippines include France 18.3%, Finland 26.8%, Sweden 27% and Norway 36.1%. Although this is a rather simplistic comparison, it shows that the Philippines has a relatively high level of board gender diversity.
Considering the variable of industry nature, Table 1 shows that the average proportion of female employees per industry is 44.43%. Of the 266 firms, 21.1% were in industries with below average proportions of female employment while the remaining 78.9% were in industries with above average proportions of female employment. In terms of an industry’s proximity to final consumers, 73.3% were close to final consumers while 26.7% catered to intermediate or business consumers.
Correlations. Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations and correlations for the
variables of this study. Gender diversity was significantly correlated to board size (r = -.14, p < .05), family ties (r = .15, p < .05) and the amount of female employment in an industry (r = .17, p < .01). No significant correlations were found between gender diversity and the other independent variables.
25 Table 1. Pearson correlations among the variables (N = 266)
26 Hypothesis Testing
To test whether the independent variables predict gender diversity, a hierarchical multiple regression analysis was performed. Table 2 provides the results of the analysis. Hypothesis 1 predicts that the presence of family ties on boards will have a positive effect on board gender diversity. Evidence in Table 2 provides support for this hypothesis (b = .09, p < .05), although the effect size is relatively small.
Hypothesis 2 predicts that an increase in firm size leads to an increase in the number of women on corporate boards. The regression results do not support this hypothesis, both when assets (b = -2.18, p < .05) and employees (b = .48, n.s.) were used as measures of firm size. In the case of firm size as measured by assets however, there is a large significant but negative effect.
Hypothesis 3a states that firms in industries with a larger proportion of female employees will have high levels of gender diversity in corporate boards. According to the results, this hypothesis is supported (b = .15, p < .05). Hypothesis 3b specifies that firms in industries with a close proximity to final consumers will have high levels of gender diversity in corporate boards. Evidence does not support this hypothesis (b = -2.56, n.s.).
According to Hypothesis 4, firms with a high number of links to other firms with female directors will have a higher number of female directors. The evidence provides no support for this hypothesis (b = .04, n.s.), and therefore it is rejected.
Lastly, Hypothesis 5 proposes that firms with a high concentration of ownership will have less female directors. As the results were not significant, the hypothesis is not supported (b = .05, n.s.). In the previous description of variable measures, it was discussed that many firms had large concentrations of shares owned by trustee-nominees such as PCNC and how this complicates the share ownership structure of the firms. Two separate regression analyses were therefore performed – once using the measure of the largest trustee-nominee share ownership percentage and another time using the measure of the largest non-trustee-nominee share ownership percentage. Table 2 displays the results where the trustee-nominee is not included while the results that include the trustee-nominee are found in Table 3.
27 ownership concentration changes from .15 to .84 although it remains insignificant. Given the minimal changes in results, the following discussion proceeds with the results where the non-trustee-nominee ownership was used (Table 2).
Table 2. Results of the regression analysisa (N = 266)
Board Gender Diversity
Steps and Variables 1 2
1. ROA -.02 -.05 ROE -.01 .00 Board Size -.64† -.46 Firm Age -.03 -.03 2. Family Ties .09* Size (Assets) -2.18* Size (Employees) .48 Female Employment Final Consumer Network Effect Ownership Concentration ∆R2 .03 .06* Adjusted R2 .01 .05* a
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported for the respective regression steps.
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
28 Table 3. Results of the regression analysisa: Trustee-Nominees (N = 266)
Board Gender Diversity
Steps and Variables 1 2
1. ROA .00 .00 ROE -.01 -.00 Board Size -.64* -.58 Firm Age -.03 -.03 2. Family Ties .09* Size (Assets) -1.27 Size (Employees) .00 Female Employment Final Consumer Network Effect Ownership Concentration ∆R2 .03 .06* Adjusted R2 .01 .05* a
Unstandardized regression coefficients are reported for the respective regression steps.
† p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
DISCUSSION
This study aimed to determine whether gender diversity is predicted by family ties, firm size, industry nature, network effect and concentration of ownership. Based on related literature and an initial data examination, the presence of family ties in a board was expected to increase the proportion of female directors. Based on previous literature on organizational predictors of board gender diversity, it was also anticipated that firm size, an industry’s proportion of female employees, an industry’s proximity to final consumers and the network
29 effect would positively affect board gender diversity while concentration of ownership would have a negative effect.
Findings
Based on the regression analysis, only family ties and the amount of female employment in an industry were found to have a significant positive effect on board gender diversity. This signifies that boards with family ties between its directors tend to have more female directors, which complements previous literature (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008; Institute of Corporate Directors, 2001; Kondo, 2014; Nekhili & Gatfaoui, 2013; de Ocampo, 2000; Ruigrok et al., 2007; Witt & Redding, 2013). Previous research (Brammer et al., 2007; Hillman et al., 2007) also supports the finding that firms in industries with a large proportion of female employees tend to have more female directors on their boards.
While firm size based on employees had no significant effect on board gender diversity, a negative significant effect was found for firm size based on assets, which was contrary to expectations. To explain the difference in directions of effect of these two firm size measures, the firm size literature is revisited. According to Hillman et al. (2007) and Salancik (1979), large firms are more visible and have the tendency to attract public scrutiny since they need to answer to a greater mass of stakeholders and because their activities are closely followed by the media. This subsequently increases the pressure for large firms to conform to expectations of society such as improved female board participation.
The firm’s visibility to the public seems to be the main characteristic of large firms that affects board gender diversity, and therefore the presence of this characteristic is examined for each firm size variable. Firms with a large number of employees have an easily detectable physical presence, which can be seen for instance in the form of several store branches or large factories. Firms with large assets, on the other hand, may not be as readily visible to the public if a large part of their assets are intangible. The employee variable therefore essentially tests the firm’s visibility to the public while this may not necessarily be what the asset variable is testing. This may explain why the employee variable had a positive effect and why the asset variable had a negative effect.
30 results have been inconsistent. Kang et al. (2007), for instance, classify industries into ‘consumer services and products’, ‘financials’, ‘materials and industrials’ and ‘others’ but find no significant effects for board gender diversity. In contrast, Brammer et al. (2007) distinguish between consumer-oriented (retail and banking) and non-consumer-oriented (resources and engineering) firms and find that consumer-oriented boards positively affect board gender diversity.
The problem seems to lie in the way the industries are grouped together for analysis. Moreover, even if similar industry segmentation systems are employed, there are no comprehensive guidelines on how to decide whether a certain industry belongs to one group or the other. This issue is illustrated by industry results of the current study, Brammer et al. (2007) and Fang (2013) which arrived at different results despite using the same segmentation system.
A possible explanation for the insignificant result of the network effect may be that director networks are not a highly important basis of director selection. As previously discussed, interlocking directorates serve as a link to potential future female directors (Hillman et al., 2007). In the Philippines, however, relatives or close friends of the owning family or current director are likely to occupy the top positions and relations form the most important criterion in director selection (Institute of Corporate Directors, 2001; Kondo, 2014) (see Hypothesis 1 discussion). It can therefore be assumed that family ties are more important than the network effect in the selection of directors. Nevertheless, further research is required to establish whether this is indeed the case.
Lastly, ownership concentration also failed to have any significant effect on board gender diversity. From a methodological viewpoint, this may be caused by the trustee-nominee issue discussed in the section on variable measures. As the presence of trustee-nominees most likely distorts the ownership concentration structure of firms, the true effect of ownership concentration cannot be determined.
Theoretical Implications
31 In contrast to previous research that has found positive results pertaining to the relationship between board gender diversity and the independent variables of firm size, industry nature (closeness to final consumer), network effect and concentration of ownership, the current study derives non-significant results. This draws attention to the underdeveloped nature of literature on firm-level predictors of board gender diversity and therefore calls for more detailed and rigorous investigations into predictors at the firm level.
Strong and Weak Points
Theoretical strong and weak points. One of the theoretical strengths of this study is that
it tests board gender diversity predictors at the firm level, for which relatively little research currently exists. Using this approach, the current study contributes to existing knowledge on why some firms have diverse boards and others do not.
In addition, by performing this research within the context of a developing country, it was found that developed-country-theories may not be so smoothly transferred to the developing-country-context. Future research may therefore develop a new framework of board gender diversity that is specifically applicable to developing countries.
While a focus on the Philippine context may have contributed board gender diversity knowledge for a developing-country-context, using this study’s approach in other developing countries may lead to incongruent results.
Since board gender diversity is quite a broad topic, future research should try and uncover more firm-level predictors. The industry variable used in this study alone already showed multifaceted dimensions (proximity to final consumers and proportion of female employment). By uncovering a greater number of predictors and by deconstructing single predictors into sub-parts, a clearer picture may emerge on which predictors truly matter for board gender diversity.
Methodological strong and weak points.
A methodological strength of this study lies in the nature of the data. By using secondary data, biased responses may have been avoided. If an interview would have been done, there is a chance that the respondents might have modified their answers to fit the purpose of this study. Upon knowing that the research is about gender, for instance, they may have reported higher proportions of female directors. Reducing such bias increases the validity of this study.
32 diversity. Future studies needs to take a qualitative approach and delve deeper into these aspects to gain a full picture of what happens in and around corporate boards. In doing so, a better understanding may be gained as to which firm-level predictors affect board gender diversity and why this is the case.
Another weak point involves the measures used for family ties and ownership concentration. To better evaluate family ties and ownership concentration as board gender diversity predictors, they have to be measured in a more reliable way. For family ties, this may be done through detailed interviews with the board members themselves. For ownership concentration on the other hand, it may be more difficult since detailed shareholder records containing the names of the real shareholders may be confidential information.
Practical Implications
As this study suggests, family ties have a significant influence on board gender diversity. Family ties increases the proportion of female directors on boards, which at first glance may be a victory considering that the business world is dominated by men. However, the manner in which this occurs is not necessarily equal for men and women alike. Both men and women with family ties to the owners or current directors of the firm gain advantages but this discriminates against the other highly competent director candidates with no such family ties. Aside from hurting potential director candidates, the firm may also be disadvantaged. As Claessens et al. (2000) point out, family owners may select family members for director positions even though they are not the ideal candidate and lack knowledge and experience to lead a company. These kinds of misjudgments may consequently lead to poor firm performance. This signifies the need for fair selection procedures, although the enforcement of these kinds of rules may fall flat in countries like the Philippines that are characterized by an abundance of laws but poor law enforcement. Moreover, with regard to social practices such as hiring through relationships, a change or enforcement of law is not enough. Instead, a change of attitude is needed and this is challenging and lengthy process.
33 CONCLUSION
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