Islam and Democracy in Practice: the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party in the post-Arab Spring transitional period LAURENS VAN DER WOUDE

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Laurens van der Woude Den Haag 07-12-2016 Den Haag 02-11-2016 s2226758

RuG, Centre for Middle East Studies Master thesis L. van der Woude Supervisor: dr. P. G. T. Nanninga

2nd examiner: prof. dr. W. J. van Bekkum

Islam and Democracy in Practice: the Egyptian Muslim

Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party in the post-Arab Spring

transitional period

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Acknowledgements

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Introduction: The Arab Spring in Tunisia and Egypt and the rise of

Islamism

On 17 December 2010, the 26-year old Tunisian street vendor Tarek el-Tayeb Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire after his cart and goods were confiscated and after he was publicly humiliated by police officers in the Tunisian city of Sidi Bouzid. According to the police, Mohamed Bouazizi sold the goods without having the proper license to do so. Yet, Tunisian laws did not require any special license for street vendors to sell goods from a cart. The behavior of the police officers serves as a typical example of corruption and abuse of power by Tunisian authorities under the authoritarian Ben Ali regime. According to witnesses, it was not the first time that Bouazizi had undergone acts of humiliation by Tunisian authorities. This time however, the abusive behavior of the authorities led him to undertake the symbolic act which marked the starting point of the Tunisian revolution. After setting himself on fire, Bouazizi was rushed into the hospital where he died of his injuries a few weeks later. Bouazizi would become a national hero and the face of the Tunisian uprising that would start soon after these events.1

The desperate situation in which Bouazizi found himself was characteristic for a large part of Tunisian society. Many Tunisians struggled on a day to day basis, regularly confronted with corruption and abuse of power by authority figures. Tunisia suffered from a lack of social justice and severe unemployment with 29.4 percent of the youth unemployed in 2010.2 Income and wealth disparities, corruption and the oppression of oppositional voices caused a growing popular discontent with the rule of president Ben Ali who had been in power for over 23 years. All forms of activism or attempts to oppose the regime were met with strong oppressive action on behalf of the Ben Ali regime. In 2010, Human Rights Watch published a report on the human rights situation in Tunisia accusing the regime of a wide range of human rights violations, including a lack of independence of the judiciary, limited space for free media, the harassment of human rights defenders and human rights violations in the run up to the elections.3 Bouazizi’s ultimate deed of resistance thus represented the grievances of a large part of Tunisian society.4

After the symbolic act, protesters appeared in the streets of Sidi Bouzid, protesting against corruption and calling for individual rights and democratic reform. The protests would not be limited to Sidi Bouzid but soon spread throughout the country. Laborers started protesting in the underdeveloped south, and in January 2011 the protests spread to major cities, such as Sousse and the capital city of Tunis. Never had the call for democracy and individual rights been so strong in Tunisia. Most of the protesters belonged to the young urban middle-class,

1_{Y. Ryan, ‘The tragic life of a street vendor’, Al-Jazeera, 20 January 2011, accessible through:}

http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html. And J. Thorne, ‘Bouazizi has become a Tunisian protest ‘symbol’, The National, 13 January 2011, accessible through:

http://www.thenational.ae/world/tunisia/bouazizi-has-become-a-tunisian-protest-symbol.

2_{Y. Sabha, ‘Youth Employment in Egypt and Tunisia vs. Jordan and Morocco Three Years After the Arab}

Awakening’, World Bank Blog, 18 April 2014, accessible through: http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/youth-employment-egypt-and-tunisia-vs-jordan-and-morocco-three-years-after-arab-awakening.

3_{Human Rights Watch World Report 2010: Tunisia, accessible through:}

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/tunisia.

4_{J. L. Esposito, T. Sonn and J. O. Voll, Islam and Democracy after the Arab Spring, Oxford Scholarship Online,}

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shared liberal views, had an understanding of the outside world and were connected to it through social media. This group of pioneers was soon backed up by large parts of society, Islamists and secularists alike.5 Different social organizations, such as labor unions and student associations, called on their members to protest against the regime.6 The widespread use of social media, especially Facebook and Twitter, generated a continuing information flow about the ongoing events, ensuring the continued engagement of the people and attracting the attention of the international media. The use of social media also facilitated the mobilization and organization of the protesters throughout the country.7

It was not the first time Tunisians went into the streets to express their discontent. In late 1983 and the beginning of 1984, people protested about economic reforms cutting certain food subsidies.8_{Also in 2008, educated unemployed demonstrators started protests in the}

town of Redeyef in the disadvantaged region of Gafsa, demanding equal rights and social justice.9 In both cases, Ben Ali ultimately succeeded in silencing the protesters by combining severe oppressive action with promises to make changes. In 2011, Ben Ali relied on the same strategy of oppression and compromise. He took significant action by dismissing his interior minister and by promising not to seek re-election. This time, however, the protesters would not settle with empty promises. Instead, the protest movement grew stronger and the protesters soon demanded the resignation of President Ben Ali. In a final attempt to crush the revolt, Ben Ali ordered the army to use lethal force against the protesters. The army command refused to fire on the citizens in the streets and sided with the protesters. Knowing he was on the loose, Ben Ali fled to Saudi Arabia on 14 January 2011.10

The events in Tunisia would not remain unnoticed in other countries throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Like it was all planned out, protests emerged in the entire Arab world from Morocco to Iraq from Syria to Yemen. The events in one country triggering protests in other countries indicated a revival of Arab nationalism.11 Well informed through the international news channel al-Jazeera, and connected with the rest of the Arab world through social media, a young generation of Arabs had internalized a new kind of pan-Arabist identity.12

One of the countries that was affected by the events in Tunisia was the Egypt of Hosni Mubarak. For over 30 years, President Mubarak had managed to oppress oppositional forces and stay in power. Like in Tunisia, Egyptian society suffered from social injustice, severe income disparities and worsening unemployment with 26.3 percent of the youth being

5_{M. Lynch, The Arab Uprising, the Unfinished Revolutions of the New middle East, New York: Public Affairs}

2012, p. 70.

6_{Esposito, Sonn & Voll 2015, p. 175.}

7_{See on the use of social media during the Arab spring: H. H. Khondker, ‘Role of the new Media in the Arab}

Spring’, Globalizations, 8:5, 2011, pp. 675-679.

8_{Lynch 2012, p. 45.}

9_{F. Khosrokhavar, New Arab revolutions that shook the world, New York: Routledge 2016, pp. 28-31.} 10_{Esposito, Sonn & Voll 2015, p. 175.}

11_{F. Gregory Gause III, ‘Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian}

Stability’, Foreign Affairs, 90:4 (2011), pp. 81-90, p. 87.

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unemployed in 2010.13_{Opposition against the regime was met with oppressive action. Human}

Rights Watch reported on the human rights situation in 2010, pointing out widespread human rights violations, in particular violations of political freedoms such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of assembly and association.14 Illustrative for the situation is the brutal killing by security forces of the Egyptian student Khaled Mohamed Said in broad daylight. On 6 June 2010, policemen dragged the student out of an internet cafe beating him to death in the streets. The police declared that Khaled Said was suspected of the possession of weapons and that he refused to collaborate during his arrest.15 This example of excessive and deliberate use of force would not go unnoticed as the pictures of his battered corps spread across the internet. Activists would soon set up the Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said” and the student would become an important icon of the Egyptian revolution, similar to the icon of Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia.16

Inspired by the collapse of the Ben Ali regime in Tunisia, a group of young activists used Facebook and other social media to mobilize protesters for demonstrations against the Mubarak regime on 25 January 2011, the National Police Day. It was no coincidence that the activists chose this particular day to be the starting point of the revolution. Starting protests at National Police Day had a highly symbolic meaning as the police institution was closely linked to the regime and was considered a symbol of the oppressive and corrupt character of the regime.17 The demonstrations turned out to be bigger than expected. Within hours, protesters marched through the streets in all major cities demanding social reform and respect for individual rights. The initially peaceful demonstrations soon turned violent when demonstrators in Cairo attempted to reach the symbolic heart of Cairo: Tahrir square, literally meaning ‘liberation square’. Well-aware of the symbolic meaning of the demonstrators occupying Tahrir square, the authorities tried to prevent the demonstrators from reaching the square.18 However, the riot police was largely outnumbered by the protesters and soon the protesters managed to break through the police lines. In the days that followed, clashes between police and protesters broke out in the entire country.

Efforts of the regime to conceal the events by manipulating the public through the state television had no chance as protesters made wide use of social media to inform the public and to mobilize the masses. On the 28th of January, the regime shut down the internet in an

13_{ILO and World Bank data, demonstrated in Y. Sabha, ‘Youth Employment in Egypt and Tunisia vs. Jordan}

and Morocco Three Years After the Arab Awakening, World Bank Blog, 18 April 2014, accessible through:

http://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/youth-employment-egypt-and-tunisia-vs-jordan-and-morocco-three-years-after-arab-awakening.

1414_{Human Rights Watch World Report 2010: Egypt, accessible through:}

https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2010/country-chapters/egypt.

15_{B. Wedeman, ‘Demonstrators in Egypt rail against brutality, man’s death’, CNN, 25 June 2010, accessible}

through: http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/africa/06/25/egypt.police.beating/.

16_{For more information on Khaled Said: J. Preston, ‘Movement Began With Outrage and a Facebook Page That}

Gave It an Outlet’, The New York Times, 5 February 2011, accessible through:

http://sites.suffolk.edu/govt467667/files/2009/08/Movement-Began-With-Outrage.pdf . See also: Facebook page “We are all Khaled Said”, accessible through: https://www.facebook.com/elshaheeed.co.uk/.

17_{E. Iskander, ‘Connecting the national and the virtual: can Facebook activism}

remain relevant after Egypt’s January 25 uprising?’, International Journal of Communications, 5 (2011), pp. 1225-1237, p. 1230.

18_{Al-Jazeera (2011) documentary Egypt Burning part 1: ‘Breaking the Barrier of Fear’, accessible through:}

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attempt to entirely cut the people of information.19_{In response, Google and Twitter opened}

phone lines through which activists could continue to report to twitter by recording voice

messages. 20

Mubarak took several measures in an effort to appease the public. He appointed a new vice-President and he announced not to seek reelection. Obviously, Mubarak did not want to be remembered as the President who was ousted by the people. Instead, he announced that he would finish his term and that he would commit to a peaceful transition process. The concessions did not appease the people but rather strengthened them in their determination. Feeling ignored and humiliated, the people called for the resignation of President Mubarak.21 After 18 days of protests, Hosni Mubarak showed unable to knock down this revolt of unprecedented magnitude. Ultimately, on 11 February 2011, vice President Omar Suleiman announced the resignation of President Mubarak on state television, leaving behind an ecstatic crowd on Tahrir square.22

The sudden Arab call for democratic reform in 2011 came fairly unexpected. The Arab world was characterized by authoritarian regimes that had managed to survive several democratization waves that had spread through the world in the 21st_{century. This exceptional}

persistence of authoritarianism in the Arab world had been a focus of research of many political scientists and Middle East experts for decades. Much of the research concluded that democracy would always be problematic in the Arab world, some scholars ascribing the failure of democracy to the incompatibility of democracy and Islam.23 Other often heard explanations concern a weak civil society, the inability of oppositional forces to organize and the Arab preference for stability over democracy.24 In 2011, experts were as surprised by the Arab uprisings as the general public, forcing them to reconsider their assumptions about democracy in the Arab world.25

Many expected the events to be the beginning of progression, liberalization and democracy,

optimistically labeling the events: the ‘Arab Spring’. Surprisingly however, the big winners of the first democratic elections in Egypt and Tunisia after the overthrow of the regimes of Mubarak and Ben Ali were the Islamist Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party. The Islamist triumph is surprising and paradoxical in several ways. First of all, the Islamist ideology is not necessarily regarded as an ideology compatible with the values of individual human rights and democracy whereas the call for democratization and individual human rights was central to the protests in 2011. Secondly, as mentioned before, the pioneers of the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were mostly well-educated liberal youth well-aware of and connected to the outside world, backed up by several groups of society.

19_Idem.

20_{Esposito, Sonn & Voll 2015, pp. 210-211.}

21_{Al-Jazeera (2011) documentary Egypt Burning part 1: ‘Breaking the Barrier of Fear’.}

22_{Esposito, Sonn & Voll 2015, p. 209. And Al-Jazeera (2011) documentary Egypt Burning part 3: ‘The Fall of}

Mubarak’, accessible through: http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/2011/02/201121310411102992.html.

23_{J. L. Esposito and J. P. Piscatori, ‘Democratization and Islam’, The Middle East Journal, 45:3 (1991), p. 427.}

See also: G. Salame, ‘Sur la causalité d’un manqué, pourquoi le monde Arabe n’est-il donc pas démocratique?’,

Revue Française de Science Politique, 41:3 (1991), p. 311.

24_{E. Bellin, ‘Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons from the Arab}

Spring’, Comparitive Politics, 44:2 (2012), p. 128.

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There was, especially in the beginning stages of the protests, little involvement of Islamic groups and the protests seemed void of Islamic rhetoric.26 Initially, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood even officially stated not to support the revolutionary movement and denied any involvement in the protests.27

One of the concerns after the outcomes of the democratic elections was whether the democratic transition could be successful with the Islamist parties rising to power. Many liberals and secularists were afraid that the Islamist parties in power would be the end of the democratization process and the beginning of the imposing of the Islamist ideology. Some argued that the ‘Arab Spring’ was ‘hijacked by Islamists’.28_{Even if the Islamist parties}

complied with democratic principles, secularists were suspicious about the true motives of the Islamists, believing that they would only temporarily comply with the rules of democracy in order to impose Islamic rule on the people once they got the opportunity. Also in the West fear and concerns exist about the rise of Islamism, some considering it a threat to Western Security.29

The question is however if this fear for Islamism is well-founded. It seems like an increasing part of Islamist parties are willing to comply with democratic values and some individuals and groups within the Islamist spectrum even actively promote these values. The Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda were both democratically elected, and it may well be that the parties intended to comply with democratic values. After all, the inclusion of the relatively moderate Islamist groups, backed by a significant part of Egyptian and Tunisian society, might even be a prerequisite for the successful building of a democratic society.30

This thesis investigates the rise to power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and the Ennahda party in Tunisia during and after the protests in 2011. A considerable amount of literature has been devoted to the compatibility of Islam and Democracy. Going beyond the typical analysis of the compatibility of Islam and democracy, this research empirically determines the behavior and strategies of the Islamist parties during the political transition period in Egypt and Tunisia. Comparisons will be made in order to discover parallels and differences between the parties, and to examine the different developments in both countries. The unique empirical and comparative approach of the research contributes to the general debate about the compatibility of Islam and democracy. It investigates how the Islamist parties behaved as political actors, balancing between pragmatism and Islamist ideals, the main question being: To what extent did the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda show

compromising and pragmatic behavior in order to gain and consolidate power in Egypt and Tunisia in the five years from early 2011 (Arab Spring) until the beginning of 2016? The first

chapter provides some background information on the origin and ideology of the Muslim

26_{T. Ildefonso Ocampos, ‘Islamists and Secularists in Tunisia: A Democratic Success in the Making’,}

MiddleEastEye.net, 7 April 2016, available through: http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/islamists-and-secularists-tunisia-democratic-success-making-723803950.

27_{Esposito, Sonn & Voll 2015, p.211. See also: S. Brooke and S. Hamid, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood’s Role in}

the Egyptian Revolution’, CTC SENTINEL, 4:2 (2011), p. 2.

28_{See for example: J. R. Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East Revolts, New}

York: Palgrave MacMillan 2012.

29_{K. Al-Anani, ‘Islamist Parties Post-Arab Spring’, Mediterranean Politics , 17:3 (2012), pp. 466-472, pp.}

470-472.

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1. The Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda: origin and ideology

This chapter provides an overview of the history and ideology of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party. It starts by providing a short explanation of Islamism in general and how the terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘Islamist’ are used in this thesis. It then continues by explaining the origin of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood as this movement can be considered the mother organization of most major Islamist movements in the Middle East and North-Africa. Many Islamist movements, including the Tunisian Ennahda party, have been inspired by the ideology and the success of the Egyptian organization. Thereafter, the chapter continues with an explanation of the origin of the Ennahda party.

1.1 Islamism, shari’a and the Islamic State

The general aim of Islamist movements is to Islamize society and to uphold Islamic principles and values through Islamic politics. The very core of the Islamist ideology is the compliance with Islamic values and the establishment of an Islamic State based on shari’a.31 Islamists thus reject the separation of religion and politics based on the religious proverb ‘Islam is a religion and a state’ (Islam diin wa dawla).32

Many Islamists do not strive for any particular political order but only seek the application of shari’a. In this vision, there is a focus on the principles on which the state is based rather than the exact design of the state (be it a presidency, a monarchy or a caliphate). The government functions as the guardian and executive of shari’a, basing its policies on the principles to be found in the Quran and the sunna. The government should base its laws and policies on the five main principles of ‘justice’ (‘adl), ‘mutual consultation’ (shura), ‘equality’, ‘freedom’, and the ‘struggle in the path of God’ (jihad). Disagreement exists with regard to the exact function of shari’a, some Islamists believing that shari’a should be the sole law with no place for worldly laws, whereas others believe that shari’a functions as the basis of national (worldly) laws.33

In this thesis, the term ‘Islamism’ is understood to mean ‘political Islam’, that is to say, politics inspired by or based on Islamic principles. This broad definition includes mainstream Islamist organizations as well as radical Islamist groups. However, mainstream Islamist organizations such as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennahda party must not be confused with radical Islamist groups such as al-Qaeda and IS. For practical reasons, throughout the thesis the terms ‘Islamist’ and ‘Islamism’ will be used to refer to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Tunisian Ennahda party despite the negative connotations these terms may have.

31_{J. Walsh 2003, accessible through:}

http://hir.harvard.edu/perspectives-on-the-united-statesegypt-s-muslim-brotherhood/.

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9 1.2 The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

One of the most famous Islamist Organizations is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. The organization was founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. Al-Banna was born in Mahmuddiya, a small town in the Nile delta. His father was a local sheik who had enjoyed a prestigious Islamic education at the al-Azar University in Cairo. Al-Banna grew up in a highly religious environment before he moved to Cairo for his studies at the Dar al-‘Ulum University, one of the first modern educational institutes in Cairo. As a student in Cairo, al-Banna was confronted with the significant influence the British exerted on Egyptian society. It was in Cairo where he first developed his anti-western ideology. It struck him that at the Dar al-‘Ulum University most of the students enjoyed an un-Islamic Western lifestyle. Al-Banna was concerned about how the un-Islamic (and thus objectionable) influences impacted Egyptian society. He strongly condemned the ‘secularization’ of Egypt and started to advocate the upholding of Islamic values and ideals. According to al-Banna, Egypt had to become an Islamic state void of western influences. 34

After his graduation, al-Banna worked as a primary school teacher in the city of Ismailia in the Suez region. With the Suez Canal being a symbol of British imperialism, the Suez region was one of the regions where the British authority was most noticeable. In this region full of British military officers, diplomats and business people, al-Banna was again confronted with the British influences on a daily basis. He witnessed how the British lived in luxury and abundance whereas the Egyptians had to work for the British under unbearable circumstances. Moreover, the local Egyptian elite gradually took over western habits distancing itself from the working class Egyptians. Devoted to the upholding and the revival of Islamic values, al-Banna started to preach in a local mosque and several coffee shops. His ideas found widespread support under the population of Ismailia and al-Banna soon developed into a charismatic speaker.In 1928, he founded the Muslim Brotherhood with the aim of educating youth about Islam and promoting Islamic values in different ways, including charity work.35 Although many similar Islamic organizations originated in the 1930s, the Muslim Brotherhood was by far the most successful one. The popularity of the organization might best be explained by the great dedication and the strong charismatic leadership of al-Banna. The movement soon established several departments throughout the country and moved its headquarters to Cairo. The interregional presence and the enormous popularity of the movement allowed the Muslim Brotherhood to mobilize a considerable amount of people for the undertaking of actions such as strikes and protests. Due to the growing significance and the oppositional nature of the movement, it was increasingly considered a threat by the Egyptian and British authorities. Even though the movement was initially not violent in character, militant members of a para-military wing of the organization started to commit attacks against British and Egyptian government targets, leading to the first violent confrontations between the authorities and the Muslim Brotherhood in the late 1940s. The

34_{C. R. Wickham, The Muslim Brotherhood, Evolution of an Islamist Movement, Princeton, New Jersey:}

Princeton University Press, 2013, p. 20.

35_{Wickham 2013, p.20-21. For more information on life of al-Banna see also: G. Krämer, Hasan al-Banna,}

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efforts of the authorities to oppress the movement eventually led to radicalization and more violence.36

The violent actions of the movement’s militant members led to the dissolving of the movement by the Egyptian monarchy in 1948. In response, radical militants of the movement assassinated the prime minister. Even though al-Banna had denounced the act of the murderers, the government hit back by assassinating him in 1949. Strengthened in their opposition to the regime, the Muslim Brotherhood cooperated with colonel Gamel Abdel Nasser and his companions of the Free Officer Movement, assisting them in the military coup aimed at overthrowing the monarchy on 23 July 1952. Although the movement considered Nasser to be a reliable partner in Islamizing Egyptian society, Nasser broke with his Islamic pledges and built a secular regime instead as soon as he had established his authority. When militant members of the movement attempted to assassinate Nasser, the oppressive action of the regime forced the Muslim Brothers back underground.37

The ascendance to power of Nasser’s successor in 1970, Anwar Sadat, marked a period of relief for the Muslim Brotherhood. Probably in an effort to de-radicalize the movement, the Muslim Brotherhood was given plenty of space to operate, providing the opportunity to grow and to expand membership in the middle class.38_{Sadat also made important concessions}

pleasing the Islamist faction. He abolished the one-party system and constitutionally declared Islam the state religion and shari’a the principle source of legislation.39 However, tensions between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood reemerged due to dissatisfaction with Sadat’s pro-western policies and his openness to cooperation with Israel.40 Sadat, who was concerned about the movement’s growing influence but well-aware of the threats of excluding the movement, offered the Muslim Brotherhood to participate in the government through the multiparty system. However, the Muslim Brotherhood refused this offer because the leadership was of the opinion that participation in a secular government would contradict with the Islamic character of the movement.41

The presidency of Hosni Mubarak, who came into power after president Anwar Sadat was murdered in 1981, marked a new period of relative participation. Although the movement was still illegal, Mubarak allowed the movement some, albeit limited, space to operate. Aware of the threat of radical Islamists, he combined tactics of oppression and limited participation in order to prevent radicalization of the movement as much as possible. 42 The Muslim Brotherhood showed clear signs of moderation with many prominent members openly

36_{Wickham 2013, p.21-22. And: ‘Profile: Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood’, BBC News, 25 December 2013,}

accessible through: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-12313405.

37_{R. S. Leiken and S. Brooke, ‘The Moderate Muslim Brotherhood’, Foreign Affairs, 86:2 (2007), pp. 107-121,}

pp. 108-110.

38_{M. Tadros, The Muslim Brotherhood in Contemporary Egypt: Democracy Redefined or Confined?,}

London/New York: Routledge Press, 2012, p. 6.

39_{S. Eddin Ibrahim, Egypt, Islam, and Democracy: Critical Essays, Cairo: American University of Cairo Press,}

1996, p. 37. And: M. Zahid, The Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Succession Crisis, London/New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2010, p. 82.

40_{S. E. Ibrahim, ‘An Islamic Alternative in Egypt: The Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat’, Arab Studies Quarterly,}

4:1/2 (1982), pp. 75-93, p. 80. See also: B. Rubin, The Muslim Brotherhood, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 43.

41_{Zahid, 2010, p. 92.}

42_{J. Walsh, ‘Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, understanding Centrist Islam’, Harvard International Review, 24:2}

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embracing democracy. In 2005, Mubarak allowed some members to run for elections independently. The independents affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood obtained a stunning 20% of the seats in parliament. Although Mubarak had tried to gradually integrate the movement into Egyptian politics in order to prevent radicalization, he considered the political success of the movement and the independent affiliates a threat. At the same time, rumors spread that Mubarak was preparing his son Gamal for taking over power after he would step down. This might explain the increased oppressive action on behalf of the Mubarak regime, eventually resulting in a deteriorating relationship between the government and the Muslim Brotherhood.43

It is important to note that from the beginning stages, the Muslim Brotherhood was not a unified movement. Internal disagreement among members and different factions existed on several issues, for example the strategies of the organization and the exact implications of the envisioned Islamic state. Militant branches of the movement radicalized under the influence of the famous Islamic theorist Sayyid Qutb who was executed by the Nasser regime in 1966.44 Qutb refused to acknowledge the notion of popular sovereignty and strongly believed that individuals should never be subjected to the will of other individuals. In his view, there is only one authority, being God, and people should obey to God only. According to Qutb,

shari’a is a complete legal and moral system and no additional legislation is needed. On the

contrary, worldly laws only distract people from the right path.45 He went even further by stating that governments not exclusively ruling by shari’a are apostate because these governments assume sovereignty over God. Therefore he called for violent jihad against the secular regimes in the Arab world.46

Besides a radical wing, an influential moderate wing emerged under the lead of moderate teachers, the most significant being Hassan al-Hudaybi. Al-Hudaybi came to lead the Muslim Brotherhood in 1951. Having good ties with the Free Officer Movement, al-Hudaybi sought to exert influence with the aim of bringing an Islamic order into reality.47_Al-Hudaybi

maintained a different view on the issue of shari’a and popular sovereignty than Qutb. In his teachings, he distinguishes two kinds of rules. Firstly, he mentions ‘ibadat’, rules that immediately derive from the Quran and the Sunna. These rules are “unchangeable, timeless and represent a constant in Islamic law” (Zollner 2009). Secondly, he talks about ‘mubahat’ (permissible actions), these rules are changeable. They have to be in conformity with the Quran and the Sunna, but they rather derive from human reasoning. Therefore, these rules are different from divine law, and they can change in time and context. In al-Hudaybi’s view, only a few laws can be considered divine laws and a wide range of rules fall under the second category, mubahat. Islamic law should thus not be considered a mere set of unchangeable universal rules, but as an adaptable ruling system to a great extent derived from deductive reasoning.48

43_{Leiken & Brooke 2007, p. 114.} 44_{Leiken & Brooke 2007, pp. 108-110.} 45_{Esposito & Piscatori 1991, pp. 435-436.} 46_{Leiken & Brooke 2007, pp. 110-111.}

47_{B. H. E. Zollner, The Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Hudaybi and Ideology, London/New York: Routledge}

2009, p. 147.

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Although al-Banna and Qutb have been important figures for the development of the organization and ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, al-Hudaybi can be considered the most important influencer of the mainstream faction of the organization. It is from al-Hudaybi’s teachings that the organization derives the principle of non-violent opposition. Moreover, the recent pragmatic approach of the Muslim Brotherhood of seeking to participate in the political system and seeking recognition as a political actor can be explained on the basis of al- Hudaybi’s ideology.49_{The violent strategy Qutb advocated for has been formally abolished}

by the movement. Instead, the movement opted for a strategy of gradual and peaceful Islamization of society by ensuring popular support and by increasingly embracing democratization.50

1.3 Ennahda

The Ennahda movement has its origin in the ‘Islamic Group’ (Al Jaamaa al Islamiyya) that was established by Rachid Ghannouchi in 1972. The group was primarily a student movement focusing on religious activities and education. Through religious preaching, Islamic education and the publication of a religious magazine called al-Maarifa, the movement aimed at upholding Islamic values and principles amongst Tunisian youth. Although the history of the Ennahda movement is characterized by several periods of confrontation with the authorities, the movement was tolerated and even encouraged by the government in the early stages.The secular regime of Tunisia’s first president, Habib Bourguiba, who is known for being the founding father of the modern Tunisian state, saw in the movement a partner against the left-wing opposition of his regime. The Islamic Group became increasingly politically involved during the political crisis between the government and the labor union in 1978. The movement sided with the government condemning the violent protests of the leftist organization which was considered an enemy by the Islamist movement. Under these pro-government circumstances, the Islamist movement was given space to develop and gradually increase its influence.51

The relations with the government deteriorated when Bourguiba’s secular policies started to alienate the Islamists from the government. The implications of Bourguiba’s efforts to create a unique ‘Tunisian Islam’ reconciling religion and modernization provoked many conservative Muslims. The widespread modernization campaign, the dismantling of the Islamic Zaytouna University, and Bourguiba urging Tunisians not to adhere to the fasting tradition during the holy month of Ramadan are examples of Bourguiba’s far-reaching modernization policies. 52 According to the movement’s leader, Rachid Ghannouchi, Bourguiba sought to destroy Tunisia’s Arab-Muslim identity, leading Muslims to feel trapped

49_{Zollner 2009, p. 146.}

50_{Leiken & Brooke 2007, pp. 110-111.}

51_{A. Allani, ‘The Islamists in Tunisia between confrontation and participation: 1980-2008’, The Journal of}

North African Studies, 14:2 (2009), pp. 257-272, p. 259. And F. Ayari, ‘Ennahda Movement in Power: A Long

Path to Democracy’, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 2 (2015), pp. 135-142, p. 136.

52_{A. Wolf, ‘An Islamist ‘rennaissance’? Religion and Politics in Post-Revolutionary Tunisia’, The Journal of}

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between westernization and their traditional identity.53_{As the Islamists alienated from the}

government, a part of the movement became more confrontational even revolutionary. The revolutionist faction of the Islamic Group openly supported the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979.54 Inspired by this successful Islamic revolution, the movement started to use more radical rhetoric drawn from the Salafist and Wahhabist ideology, and from radical scholars, such as Sayyid Qutb. As the movement grew stronger, it attempted to become more organized at its first congress in August 1979. At this congress it was decided to unite all separate cells of the Islamic group and the organization drafted the basic rules and objectives of the movement.The 1970s thus marked a shift in attitude towards the Bourguiba regime, and a change in focus from solely religious to increasingly political.55 When in 1980 the regime discovered the magnitude of The Islamic Group and the extent to which the movement was organized, Bourguiba felt threatened and started to confront and oppress the Islamists.56

At yet another congress in April 1981, the movement changed its name to the ‘Islamic Tendency Movement’ (Ḥarakat al-Ittijaah al-Islaamii) and officially opted for a confrontational strategy by explicitly labeling the government as its enemy and by calling for the overthrow of the regime. It also applied for registration as an official political party in Tunisia. The movement was, however, immediately crushed by president Bourguiba who recognized the revolutionary potential of the movement. With over 107 activists imprisoned after a first round of prosecutions, the early 1980s would mark the beginning of violent confrontations and severe oppression of the movement by the Bourguiba regime.57

The first period of serious confrontation ended in 1984. Although still many activists were imprisoned at that time, confrontations between the movement and the government diminished. Eventually, the relaxation led to the release of many activists. Two developments are illustrative for this relief period. Firstly, Prime Minister Muhammed Mzali was relatively tolerant toward the movement and made some compromises although the movement was formally still illegal. Secondly, in a compromising move, the movement declared to president Bourguiba that it acknowledged the importance of the principles of modernization and progress and that it rejected violence as a strategy to obtain its goals. When the governing period of prime-minister Mzali ended in 1986, and when the radical Islamic group ‘Islamic Jihad’ committed terrorist attacks at hotels in the cities of Sousse and Monastir, Bourguiba revived his strategy of confrontation of the Islamist movement with serious oppressive action in 1987, issuing severe prison sentences and even the sentencing to death of some activists.58

The sentences were, however, revoked when Ben Ali seized power from Bourguiba in 1987. Ben Ali soon promised democratization and parliamentary elections. Well aware of the importance of pleasing the Islamist faction, Ben Ali was cautiously dealing with the movement by allowing them some space to operate but in the meanwhile making sure the movement would not become too powerful. Ben Ali tried to present himself as the protector and promotor of Tunisian Islam through the use of Islamic symbolism and by making a

53_{Interview with Rachid Ghannouchi, quoted in Wolf 2013, pp. 561-562.} 54_{Wolf 2013, p. 563.}

55_{Allani 2009, p. 260.} 56_{Wolf 2013, p. 562.}

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pilgrimage to Mecca as part of a propaganda campaign to generate popular sympathy.59_Ben

Ali also declared that political movements should never monopolize Islam, passing a law stipulating that political parties were not allowed to refer to Islam. In a compromising move, the movement committed to the new regime and changed the name from ‘Islamic Tendency Movement’ to ‘Ennahda’, which means renaissance. An important Ennahda leader stated that they accepted ‘the rules of the game’ and that they were willing to function within a democratic system.60 The improved relationship with the Ben Ali regime allowed the movement to participate more extensively in the political sphere and in 1989 individuals of the movement were allowed to run as independents in the elections. The Ennahda members who participated in the elections had a surprising electoral success, winning more than 10% of the votes despite allegations of widespread fraud and president Ben Ali manipulating the electoral outcomes.61 Struck by this electoral success, and afraid that the movement became too powerful, Ben Ali refused to recognize Ennahda as a political party on the basis that the movement unlawfully combined religion and politics, thereby forcing the movement back underground. Since 1989, most of the influential Ennahda members spent their time either detained or living in exile. Among the members fleeing the country was the movement’s leader Rached Ghannouchi.62

In 1996, the movement organized a congress in exile in Belgium. At this congress, the movement decided to opt for a more moderate approach of no violent opposition, focusing on political legitimacy and calling for democratic reform. This moderate approach and the willingness of the movement to compromise was then further reaffirmed during a congress held in London in 2001.63_{After the ousting of Ben Ali in 2011, Ennahda’s leader Ghannouchi}

declared that the party sought to cooperate with other opposition groups in order to start a democratization process with the aim of establishing a democratic system in Tunisia.64 In addition, a spokesman of the Ennahda movement stated that Ennahda was not an Islamist party but an ‘Islamic party’ inspired by the Quran.65_{More recently, at the Ennahda congress}

in May 2016, the movement explicitly rejected the term ‘Islamist’ introducing the term ‘Muslim-democrat’ instead.66_{At the congress, Ghannouchi also proclaimed the separation of}

religious and political activities of the movement, and declared that political Islam would be left behind and ‘democratic Islam’ would be entered.67

59_{Wolf 2013, p. 562.}

60_{Interview with Abelfattah Morou in Le Quotidien de Paris, November 16, 1987, p. 15, cited in Esposito and}

Piscatori 1991, p. 431.

61_{E. Hayward, ‘Assessing Ennahda, Tunisia’s Winning Islamist Party’, The Washington Institute Policy}

Analysis, 18 November 2011, accessible through: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/assessing-ennahda-tunisias-winning-islamist-party.

62_{Allani 2009, pp. 162-163. And Ayari 2015, p. 136. And Esposito & Piscatori 1991, p. 431.} 63_{Allani 2009, p. 265.}

64_{‘Tunisian Islamist leader Rachid Ghannouchi returns home’, BBC News, 30 January 2011, accessible through:}

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12318824.

65_{Interview with Samir Dilou, German Deutschlandradio, 18 May 2011, cited in Ayari 2015, p. 137.} 66_{‘Ennahda leader Ghannouchi: We are Muslim-Democrats, not Islamists’, Middle East Eye, 19 May 2016,}

accessible through: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/ennahda-leader-gannouchi-we-are-muslim-democrats-not-islamists-1710821541.

67_{‘Tunisia’s Islamist Ennahda holds key congress’, Al-Arabia, 21 May 2016, accessible through:}

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Like the Muslim Brotherhood, the Ennahda movement was from the beginning stages a heterogeneous movement encompassing different streams and interpretations of Islam. The main division within the movement has always been between the reformists on the one hand and the revolutionists on the other, with some periods being dominated by the more radical and hardline revolutionists and other periods being dominated by the more moderate and pragmatic reformists.68_{The ideological pioneers of the movement drew their ideology from}

influential Egyptian Muslim Brothers, such as Hassan Banna, Sayid Qutb and Hassan al-Hudaybi. Interestingly however, influenced by the relatively moderate Islamic tradition of Tunisia, the mainstream faction of the Ennahda party developed an own kind of relatively liberal Islamist ideology. The ideological development has been influenced by different European political ideologies as well, considering Tunisia’s strong ties with Europe (especially France) and considering the fact that many influential Ennahda members spent their lives in exile in Europe. Finally, also influential Shiite thinkers, such as al-Khomeini, are believed to have influenced the unique Islamist ideology. The acceptance of certain aspects from different ideologies in itself demonstrates the relative openness and tolerance of Ennahda’s mainstream faction.69

1.4 Conclusion

Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the Ennahda party were from the beginning heterogeneous organizations encompassing a range of streams and interpretations of Islam. The history of both movements is marked by periods of oppression, confrontation and relative participation. It is questionable to what extent movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda still strive for the establishment of an Islamic state, considering the embrace of democratic processes and the rhetoric of influential party members. The development of the seemingly new concept of ‘Muslim-democrats’, introduced during an Ennahda congress in May 2016 leads to both hope and doubt among secularists. Where some believe Islamists might be able to participate within the democratic system, many believe that Islamists are only complying with democracy for strategical reasons, seeking to establish an Islamic state based on shari’a once they get the opportunity to do so. It might well be that the Islamist embrace of democracy is a purely pragmatic choice in order to gain power, allowing the movements to gradually introduce Islamic laws and policies, or to seek absolute power once sufficient popular support is ensured.70 Whether or not the parties intent to establish an Islamic state and whether the embrace of democracy is purely pragmatic and strategical is hard to tell. Both the claim that Islamists are only complying with democracy for pragmatic reasons and the claim that they are genuinely committed to democratic development are speculative. Therefore, it is best to study the concrete proposals and promises of the movements as well as their efforts and success in realizing them. The next chapter will zoom into the post-revolution electoral programs of the Muslim Brotherhood and Ennahda analyzing and comparing the Islamist proposals and promises on paper.

68_{Wolf 2013, p. 563.}

69_{M. Affan, ‘The Ennahda Movement … A Secular Party?’, ALSHARQ Expert Brief Regional Politics, June}

2016, p. 4.

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2. The Islamist electoral programs in the 2011 elections

This chapter analyzes the electoral program of the Ennahda movement and the electoral program of the Freedom and Justice party (Hereafter: FJP) on behalf of the Muslim Brotherhood, both presented after the revolutions in 2011. It is in these programs where their visions of the post-revolutionary societies can be found. An analysis will be made of the degree of Islamism in the programs. Did the Islamist parties advocate an Islamic state based on shari’a? If so, what would such a state look like in the view of the Islamist parties?

The extensive programs contain a variety of topics not limited to Islamism, but covering all fields of politics from economic policies and international relations to national identity and culture. In some fields there is explicit reference to Islam and Islamic law, while others are void of Islamist rhetoric. In order to analyze the extent of Islamism in the program, the research focusses on explicit mentioning of Islam, shari’a and the Islamic State. Furthermore it looks at topics that are especially interesting in the light of Islamism, such as family and education, international relations, culture and national identity, the rights of minorities, and the role of women in society. The chapter will first elaborate shortly on the foundation of the FJP followed by an analysis of the FJP electoral program for the 2011 parliamentary elections. Then, the electoral program of the Ennahda party for the 2011 constituent assembly elections will be analyzed. In the end, the proposals of both parties will be compared. This comparison is important as it might become evident that there are significant differences between the proposals of both Islamist parties, demonstrating that it is hard to speak of ‘Islamism’ in general as it is not a univocal ideology.

2.1 The Muslim Brotherhood and the founding of the Freedom and Justice Party

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modernization, ideological revision and moderation. Many Muslim Brotherhood members regard this group as having turned their back to the principle values and goals of the organization.71

These three roughly distinguished factions hold different views on political participation. Many brothers belonging to the ideologically conservative faction regard participation as an abandonment of Islamic principles, some of them deeming a democratic system contrary to Islam. Others argue against participation because they consider the movement a religious organization and not a political organization. These members believe the Muslim Brotherhood should pursue Islamization through education and the provision of social services rather than participating in the political sphere.72 Contrary to the ideologically conservative faction, members belonging to the mainstream pragmatic conservative faction are very likely to support participation in the new political system and the democratic elections. Well aware of the broad popular support for the organization and the potential to gain influence through political participation, many brothers would embrace democracy for pragmatic reasons. Participation is considered a means of achieving the goal of Islamizing Egyptian society, though some members belonging to this faction might also genuinely embrace democracy considering the concept of democracy compatible with Islam. Most members belonging to the reformers faction support democracy if it goes hand in hand with organizational reform. They favor participation in politics and elections not for pragmatic reasons but because of a genuine embrace of democracy.73

The question of whether or not to participate exposed wide division within the Muslim Brotherhood. At last, the organization decided to found a separate political party formally independent from the Muslim Brotherhood: the Freedom and Justice Party. The Shura council accepted the formation of a the FJP and appointed the leadership with Mohamed Morsi becoming the party’s chairman. There were around 9000 founding members with about 80% of them belonging to the Muslim Brotherhood.74 The party was founded on 30 April 2011 and obtained legal status on 6 June 2011. Although formally independent from the Muslim Brotherhood, the party held strong links with the organization as it was founded and funded by it, striving for the establishment of an Islamic State.75 Furthermore, the party could count on the support of the largest faction of the Muslim Brotherhood, the conservative pragmatic faction. The participation of the FJP in the 2011 elections can thus be considered a ‘de facto’ participation of the Muslim Brotherhood. The party won around 47 percent of the seats in the 2011 parliamentary elections. With a stunning 235 out of 508 seats in parliament, the FJP was the biggest political party in Egypt just months after its founding.76

71_{C. R. Wickham, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood and Democratic Transition in Egypt’, Middle East Law and}

Governance, 3 (2011), pp. 204-223, p. 209-210.

72_{E. Trager, ‘The Unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood: Grim Prospects for a Liberal Egypt’, Foreign Affairs, 90:5}

(2011), pp. 114-122, p. 122.

73_{Wickham 2011, p. 210.} 74_{Wickham 2011, p. 214.}

75_{‘Profile: Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party’, BBC News, 25 November 2011, accessible through:}

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-15899548.

76_{‘Egypt’s MB wins most parliamentary seats’, PressTV, 21 January 2012, accessible through:}

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2.1.1 The 2011 Electoral Program of the Freedom and Justice party

Let us now turn to the analysis of the electoral program of the FJP. For the 2011 elections, the FJP published an extensive electoral program in both Arabic and English. The English version comprises 45 pages divided into 5 parts: Urgent Issues, Freedoms and Political Reform, Social Justice, Integrated Development and Regional Leadership. In the preamble, the program already deals with one of the main issues of the program, ‘Islam and democracy’, albeit the relationship between the two concepts remains ambiguous. The program starts with an embrace of democracy by acknowledging the need for a balanced parliament. This is soon followed by the first mentioning of shari’a when stating the four fundamental principles of

shari’a on which the program is founded. These principles are: 1) Freedom; 2) Justice; 3)

Development and; 4) Leadership.77 The introduction then continues by strongly condemning and criticizing the policies of the former regime. In this part, typical Islamic rhetoric emerges when the issue of Palestine is raised. The program strongly condemns the cooperation between the former regime and Israel (in the program called ‘the Zionist occupiers of Palestine and Jerusalem’).78

Part I of the program addresses the urgent issues that have to be dealt with once the FJP would come to power. Interestingly, this chapter is void of Islamic rhetoric. It focusses mainly on improving national security and dealing with the deplorable economic situation, which was one of the main causes of the uprising. More interesting in the light of Islamism is Part II of the program on freedoms and political reform. According to the program, the envisioned state is a ‘civil Islamic state’ with a new constitution based on the principles of shari’a. The Islamic state is civilian in nature because rulers in the Islamic State are citizens chosen by the people and the rulers base their authority on the nation.79 This description seems compatible with democracy as the rulers depend on popular support basing their authority on the nation rather than God. The text, however, becomes more ambiguous when elaborating on the characteristics of the state. The program comes up with the concept of a ‘national constitutional Islamic modern democracy’.80_{The combination of these five elements into one}

new concept without giving any explanations of this concept causes confusion and raises many questions. An interesting question concerns the Coptic Christian minority and the issue of national identity. Making up 10 percent of the Egyptian population, the Copts constitute a significant minority clearly belonging to the Egyptian nation. How can the state be both national and Islamic at the same time, while 10 percent of the population does not consider itself Islamic. How would this group be treated and represented in the new Islamic State system envisioned by the Freedom and Justice party?

In a special part on citizenship, the program seeks to clarify the relationship between Muslim citizens and Christian citizens (Copts). First the text explicitly acknowledges the fact that the Egyptian people consists of Muslims and Christians sharing equal rights. Yet, the text clearly divides Christians from Muslims by using the term our ‘fellow Christians’, thereby

77_{2011 Electoral Program FJP (official English version), p. 3. Can be found at:}_{http://www.fjponline.com/}_,

search: ‘Election program’. Direct link: https://www.scribd.com/document/73955131/FJP-Program-En.

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separating the Christians from ‘us’, the Muslims. 81_{At the very end of the program, in the part}

on religious leadership, the text even becomes contradictory by stating that the Egyptian people (Muslims and Christians) consider the religion of Islam the supreme authority and a fundamental framework in all fields, stating as follows:

“The Egyptian people are amongst the oldest and most devoted to their religion. They also have the most respect for the religious morals and values. They consider the religion of Islam the supreme authority and fundamental framework for them in all fields.”82

Although some Coptic Christians might accept Islamic authority, they will certainly not consider Islam a fundamental framework for them in all fields. The formulation is striking as the party first acknowledges that Christians belong to the Egyptian people, and then it continues by arguing that ‘the Egyptian people’ consider Islam to be of supreme authority and a fundamental framework for them in all fields. This is ambiguous as the program either forces the Christian Copts to adhere to Islam as a fundamental framework, or it does not sincerely recognize the Copts as belonging to the Egyptian people.

Another interesting topic when considering Islamism is the role of women in society. Part IV of the program on integrated development elaborates on the role of women, the family unit and the position of children. The program iterates the role of women ‘as wives, mothers and makers of men’.83_{Especially interesting is the party’s vision on how women contribute to}

society, basing their importance mainly on their ability to give birth to children and to raise them. This conservative view on the role of women is formulated as follows:

“The FJP has the greatest respect, appreciation and support for women’s role as wives,

mothers and makers of men; and aims to better prepare them for this role. The party aims for society to benefit from women’s capabilities and resources, and realize that their giving is more, not less than men’s giving – especially after their children grow beyond childhood and adolescence. Hence, the FJP holds that their power must be employed for the betterment of Egypt, our homeland.”84

Although the formulation might sound respectful at first glance, the formulation disregards the potential of women as successful employers, entrepreneurs or whatever other role besides the role of mother and wife and is therefore likely to be considered controversial by liberals and progressives.

As can be expected from an Islamist party, the family unit is deemed very important. The program states that the family is the ‘oldest institution on earth’ and the ‘first incubator for breeding and upbringing of humans’ and that it should be used as a means for making and shaping the good Egyptian citizen.85_{However, according to the party, the family unit has}

been corrupted by foreign influences, mainly by ‘suspiciously’ foreign-funded NGO’s and

81_{2011 Electoral Program FJP, p. 15 [emphasis mine].} 82_{2011 Electoral Program FJP, p. 41.}

83_{2011 Electoral Program FJP, p. 24.} 84_Idem.

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international human rights instruments signed by the former regime, such as the “Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women” (CEDAW) and the “Convention on the Rights of the Child” (CRC). According to the party, these foreign influences have forced Egyptians to engage in anti-Islamic (haram) behavior such as the acceptance and respecting of homosexuals and the changing roles of women. Therefore, the program calls for the reconsideration of Egypt’s treaty membership to international human rights instruments, reassessing the compatibility of those instruments with Egyptian culture, traditions and established (Islamic) values.86

Besides the role of women and the family unit, chapter IV contains Islamic references in the parts on education and banking. With regard to education, the program states that children have to be taught the principles of Islam and morality.87_{On banking the program states it}

wants to gradually replace usurious institutions and transactions with Islamic ones.88

Another part of the program which deserves special attention is part V on regional

leadership. In this part, references to important topics such as Egypt’s role in the international community, Islamic unity, and the Palestinian issue can be expected. The aim of the party is to revive Egypt’s role as an Islamic leader and as a regional leader in the Arab world and Africa. It aims to do so by investing in cultural leadership and by strengthening its ties with Islamic countries.89 Interesting is the party’s view on the adherence to principles established by the international community. The program stresses the importance of international principles and regulations on the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the laws of war because it considers these principles in accordance with shari’a.90 By noting that it respects these regulations only because of their compatibility with shari’a, the party demonstrates that it allows no higher authority than the divine laws of shari’a. In view of the foregoing, rules of international law can only be accepted if they are in accordance with or at least not contrary to

shari’a. However, one should take into account that the implications of this view depend on

the exact interpretation of shari’a. Although the FJP considers the peaceful settlement of conflicts and the laws of war conformity with shari’a, the party holds a conservative view on controversial issues such as homosexuality, women’s rights, and alternative family forms. In those cases, the reassessment of the conformity of rules of international law with shari’a could lead to a downturn of human rights norms because of a conservative interpretation of

shari’a.

Part V also elaborates on the gradual achievement of Arab and Islamic unity. According to

the party, Egypt must engage in cooperation with Arab and Islamic countries in order to achieve this unity, albeit only if compatible with popular will and while safeguarding national security.91 In this part, the program touches again on the sensitive issue of Palestine when it expresses its intention to solve the Palestinian issue ‘in a manner consistent with the Arab-Islamic perspective, and by supporting the Palestinian people in their struggle for freedom.’92

It further states that the Palestinian people have the right to liberate their land and that there is