1
DECLARATION BY CANDIDATE
I hereby declare that this thesis, “Seeing Security? Towards a New Framework for the Study of Visual Securitization” , is my own work and my own effort and that it has not been accepted anywhere else for the award of any other degree or diploma. Where sources of information have been used, they have been acknowledged.
Name: Sanne Roefs
Signature:
3
Seeing Security?
Towards a New Framework for the Study of
Visual Securitization
Final Draft
5 Contents
List of Images p. 7
Introduction p. 9
Chapter 1 – The Theory of Securitization p. 13
§1 Securitization p. 13
§
2 Criticism on Securitization Theory p. 15Different Strands of Criticism p. 15
A One-step or a Multi-step Framework p. 17
Audience p. 18
Context p. 19
The Failure to Look Beyond the Act of Speech p. 19
Chapter 2 – Towards a New Framework for the Study of Visual Securitization p. 21
§1 The Visual Turn in IR
p. 21
§ 2 The Challenge of the Visual
p. 22
The Ambiguous Image
p. 22
The Power of the Image
p. 23
Can Images ‘Speak Security’?
p. 24
§ 3 Current State of Visual Securitization
p. 27Möller’s Pictorial Memory p. 28
Vuori’s Doomsday Clock p. 29
Lene Hansen’s Theoretical Framework p. 30
Heck and Schlag’s Iconological Approach p. 33
§ 4 Towards a New Framework
p. 36
Roland Barthes
p. 37
Stuart Hall
p. 40
§ 5 How to Use Barthes and Hall in the Study of Visual Securitization
p. 41
Chapter 3 – Case Study 1: Colin Powell’s Speech at the UN Security Council
p. 43
§ 1 Introduction - Context
p. 43
§ 2 The Speech – Speech and Visual Act
p. 45
6
Chapter 4 – Case Study 2: Geert Wilders’ Short Movie Fitna
p. 53
§1 Introduction - Context
p. 53
§ 2 An Image or a Video?
p. 54
§ 3 A Much Discussed Movie - Context
p. 56
§ 4 The Visualized Threat of Islam – Speech and Visual Act
p. 57
§ 5 The Result of Fitna – Reading of the Audience
p. 66
Conclusion
p. 69
Bibliography
p. 73
Picture Credits p. 79
Appendix I: Peter Kanne, ‘Spoedonderzoek Film Wilders na uitzending’, TNS NIPO p. 81
Appendix II: Maurice de Hond, ‘Na het uitbrengen van Fitna, de film van Geert Wilders’ p. 87
7 List of Images
Fig. 1 Hieronymus Bosch, Garden of Earthly Delights, ca. 1490-1510, 220 x 389 cm , p. 24 Museo del Prado, Madrid.
Fig. 2 Jan van Eyck, Madonna with Canon Van der Paele, 1436, 122 x 158 cm, p. 25 Groeninge Museum, Bruges.
Fig. 3 Kurt Westergaard, Muhammad, originally printed in the Jyllands-Posten on p. 31 30 September 2005.
Fig. 4 Cover of TIME, edition of August 9, 2010. p. 34
Fig. 5 The construction of the myth, based on Roland Barthes, Mythologies, p. 115. p. 38
Fig. 6 Cover of Paris Match, edition of June 25, 1955. p. 38
Fig. 7 Chemical Munitions Stored at Taji. Slide 12 of Colin Powell’s Powerpoint p. 46 presentation at the UNSC.
Fig. 8 Sanitization of Ammunition Depot at Taji. Slide 13 of Colin Powell’s Powerpoint p. 46 presentation at the UNSC.
Fig. 9 Bulldozed and Freshly Graded Earth, Al-Musayyib Chemical Complex. Slide 26 p. 47 of Colin Powell’s Powerpoint presentation at the UNSC.
Fig. 10 Terrorist Poison and Explosives Factory, Khurmal. Slide 39 from Colin Powell’s p. 47 Powerpoint presentation at the UNSC.
Fig. 11 NBC News Poll on Powell’s presentation at the UN SC. p. 50 Fig. 12 Various Polls put together by the Pew Research Center with regard to Powell’s p. 51
presentation before the UNSC.
Fig. 13 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 58
Fig. 14 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 59
Fig. 15 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 59
Fig. 16 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 60
Fig. 17 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 60
Fig. 18 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 61
Fig. 19 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 61
Fig. 20 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 62
Fig. 21 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 62
Fig. 22 Still from the movie Fitna. p. 63
9 Introduction
International Security Studies (ISS) emerged as a field of study after the Second World War. It occupied itself with questions about the protection of the state against (new) internal and external threats. Although it was an independent field of study at first, it was soon taken in as a subfield of International Relations.1 The unforeseen end of the Cold War had a deep impact on the landscape of
ISS. It was argued that the traditional approaches of ISS – Strategic Studies and Peace Research – were not able to respond satisfactory to the challenges of the post Cold War era, because their main topics ‘superpower rivalry and the fear of nuclear war’ lost much of their importance.2 The scholars
that held this opinion tried to ‘expand the concept of security’, since for them ‘the narrowness of the military state-centric agenda was analytically, politically and normatively problematic.’3 Those
expanders of the concept of security were called wideners and deepeners. Security was widened, because it came to comprise more than only the military sector, and the concept was deepened, because the state lost its monopoly as referent object.
In the widening-deepening debate several approaches in ISS were created and one of those is important for this thesis: the Copenhagen School.4 The term refers to a group of academics working in
ISS in a post-traditionalist fashion. Some well-known scholars of the Copenhagen School are Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, who all have been affiliated with the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI). Although the Copenhagen School has introduced several important concepts for the study of ISS, one will be singled out and further elaborated upon: securitization.5
The power of securitization lies in the fact that it is a ‘discursive conception of security’.6 Ole
Wæver argued in his article 'Securitization and Desecuritization' that although the concept of security was being widened there was no critical engagement with the meaning of term security; it was ‘uncritically borrowed from the traditional view’.7 What did security actually mean? To formulate an
answer to this question Wæver introduced security as speech act.8 Securitization refers to the process
of speech act in which an actor declares something a security problem – a threat – that needs to be
1 Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies (Cambridge 2009), pp. 1, 8. 2 Ibid., p. 158.
3 Ibid., p.187.
4 The term Copenhagen School was coined by Bill McSweeney is his review: Identity and Security: Buzan and
the Copenhagen School, Review of International Studies, vol. 22 (1996), no. 1, pp. 81-93, there 81.
5 The main texts of the Copenhagen School on the concept of securitization are: Ole Wæver, 'Securitization and
Desecuritization', in: Ronnie Lipschutz, ed., On Security (New York 1995), pp. 46-86. Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder 1998). Ole Wæver, 'The EU as a security actor. Reflections from a pessimistic constructivist on post –sovereign security orders', in: Morten Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams eds., International Relations Theory of Politics of European Integration: Power, security and community (London en New York 2000), pp. 250-294. Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, 'Macrosecuritization and security constellations: reconsidering scale in securitization theory', Review of International Studies, vol. 35 (2009), no. 2, pp. 253-276.
6 Buzan and Hansen, The Evolution of International Security Studies, p. 213. 7 Wæver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization', p. 49.
10
handled. If the audience accepts the uttered threat, it will bestow upon the securitizing actor the legitimacy to handle it, most probably with measures that would not have been possible. Securitization is a process of persuasion in which a securitizing actor, with the use of words, tries to convince the audience of the existence of an existential threat. The discursive approach detached security from its traditional state centric meaning.
The theory of securitization has been influential in ISS, but like every theory it has been criticized. Michael Williams and Lene Hansen, amongst others, have noted that non-verbal forms of communication are left out, because the Copenhagen School only focuses on words.9 Nowadays, the
world is saturated by the visual and it does not seem enough to focus only on verbal communication when discussing the creation of threats. It cannot be denied that images have a function in everyday security practices and instances of securitization. Theories and methodologies are needed to make sense of those images. The study of the visual is troubled, however, by the fact that the meaning of the visual is less straightforward than that of words. To put it differently: images can have multiple meanings and are in need of interpretation. Therefore, it is important to think about how exactly images are used in visual securitization. Some scholars have started theorizing about the incorporation of the visual into the framework securitization, but their approaches leave to be desired.10
Although the study of images is relatively new in ISS, other fields – like art history and visual culture – have been occupying itself with it for quite some time. The methodologies and theories from these fields can be useful in the study of visual securitization. Some scholars of ISS have indeed turned to visual culture for help.11 Unfortunately, their proposed framework is not satisfying; not only
is the audience’s response to the visual barely theorized about, but the process of how a meaning is bestowed upon an image is treated insufficiently as well. That is where this thesis comes in. I want to propose a new framework for the study of visual securitization, by focusing on the one hand on how images are assigned meaning to and on the other hand on how images are read. In order to theorize about this I have chosen to turn to semiotics and to the writings of prominent semioticians and cultural theorists Roland Barthes and Stuart Hall.12 I will work with the following research question: How can
the process of visual securitization be made more understandable with the inclusion of semiotics?
9 Lene Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen
School', Millennium – Journal of International Studies, vol. 29 (2000), no. 2, pp. 285-306, there 300. Michael Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', International Studies Quarterly, vol. 47(2003), no. 3, pp. 511-531, there 512.
10 Lene Hansen, ‘Theorizing the Image for Security Studies: Visual Securitization and the Muhammad Cartoon
Crisis’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 17(2011), no. 1 pp. 51-74. Axel Heck and Gabi Schlag, ‘Securitizing images: The female body and the war in Afghanistan’, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 19 (2012), no. 1, pp. 891-913. Juha Vuori, ‘A Timely Prophet? The Doomsday Clock as a Visualization of Securitization Moves with a Global Referent Object’, Security Dialogue, vol. 41 (2010), no. 3, pp. 255-277. Frank Möller, 'Photographic Interventions in Post-9/11 Security Policy', Security Dialogue, vol. 38 (2007), no. 2, pp. 179-196.
11 Heck and Schlag, ‘Securitizing Images’. Vuori, ‘A Timely Prophet’.
12 Roland Barthes, Mythologies (London etc. 1973) [trans. by Annette Lavers]. Roland Barthes, ‘Myth Today’,
11
Semiotics lets one look differently at the formation of the meaning of images and thereby provides handles for the study of visual securitization. Furthermore, the second-order semiotic system of Barthes and Hall’s theory of decoding and encoding can shed light on the aforementioned aspects that were not researched enough in the field of visual securitization: how a certain meaning is given to an image and how the audience reads the visual.
The goal of this thesis is to ameliorate the understanding of visual securitization. It in no way proposes a causal framework; it wants to make understandable. Like many of the non-traditional approaches to ISS the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization can certainly not be defined as positivistic. The inclusion of the visual to the framework does not change this fact. Since the interpretation of the visual and the formation of meaning are dependent on so many different factors, it seems impossible to formulate a causal positivist theory.
The relevance of this thesis and the contribution to ISS is found in the fact that it is the first time that semiotics is used to study visual securitization. As will be shown below, semiotics ameliorates our understanding of visual securitization, because it offers an explanation of how images acquire certain meanings and how these meanings are interpreted by the audience. This thesis is relevant for visual culture as well, because it offers visual theorists a tool with which they can study images that are used in the domain of international security.
This thesis has four chapters. In the first chapter the theory of securitization is discussed. How does the process of securitization work? Which actors are important and which steps have to be taken to achieve a successful securitization move? The main points of critique on securitization, next to the lack of the visual, are also investigated. It is important to scrutinize securitization as it forms the basis in which the usage of the visual is placed.
In the second chapter I turn to visual securitization. First, I discuss some characteristics of the visual and some methodological choices I made. Then, I examine in more detail the literature dealing with visual securitization. To my knowledge there are only four articles directly concerned with the subject and therefore it is important to discuss them.13 What can be learned and appropriated from the
already existent literature? Where do some theories or approaches fall short? Thirdly, the writings of Barthes and Hall are presented and their added value for this thesis discussed. In the end I propose a new framework that can be used to study visual securitization.
The third and fourth chapters present two case studies to empirically test the new framework. The speech Colin Powell gave to the United Nations Security Council on 05-02-2003 is discussed first. Powell used satellite images to convince his audience that Iraq was a serious threat. Barthes’ and Hall’s theories are used to understand the formation of meaning of the satellite images and the reading of the audience. The same will be done in the second case study with the short movie Fitna (2008), made by the Dutch politician Geert Wilders. How do the used images visually securitize? How can
12
Barthes and Hall help to make sense of the conveyance of meaning and the reading by the audience? The two case studies have been chosen because they highlight important aspects of visual securitization. Both securitizing actors try to encode their images with a preferred reading and enough material is available to make some convincing arguments about the reading of the audience. Furthermore, the case studies have been selected because they provide the opportunity to research the motionless visual (the speech of Colin Powell) as well as the moving image (Fitna by Geert Wilders). In the end of this thesis conclusions will be drawn and the research question will be answered.
It has to be noted that I have chosen to focus only on securitization and not on its counterpart desecuritization. Desecuritization, as the name would suggest, deals with the process of making securitized issues desecuritized. An issue is no longer seen as an existential threat against which extraordinary measures have to be taken. Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde defined desecuritization as: 'the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere'.14 Desecuritization has its own dynamic and not every securitized issue will be desecuritized.
Furthermore, not every instance of visual securitization, will be countered with visual desecuritization. Because I want to focus on the power of the visual for securitization theory I have decided not to discuss desecuritization.
13 Chapter 1 - The Theory of Securitization
§1 Securitization
The theory of securitization was first presented by Ole Wæver in his article 'Securitization and Desecuritization'.15 This article can be placed in the widening and deepening debate in ISS. As was
mentioned in the introduction, the traditional view on international security did not suffice anymore. Traditional scholars were not able to respond effectively to the problems of the post-Cold War era. In his article, Wæver argued that security had to be widened in order to contain more than was currently the case.16 With that he meant that military security threats were still an important part of international
security, but that ISS had to include threats ‘other than military ones’.17
Furthermore, and maybe even more importantly, Wæver argued that both traditional scholars in the field of ISS and the new wideners and deepeners did not engage with the concept of security.18
They argued that ‘security is a reality prior to language, [it] is out there’.19 In other words, threats were
already present in our world. Wæver disagreed; he was of the opinion that security and threats were constructed. Only when a problem was declared threatening, it became a security issue. So, securitization could be described as a speech act.20 There are no security problems prior to reality. He
wrote:
‘[i]n this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as in betting, giving a promise, naming a ship). By uttering “security” a state-representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it.’21
The theory of securitization was further elaborated upon by Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde in their book Security: A New Framework for Analysis.22 They positioned themselves between the traditionalists and
the wideners and deepeners of security studies. The traditionalists argued that the widening of the security agenda had the possible pitfall to include a range of issues too broad to retain its value, because every possible problem could become a security problem. The authors of Security shared that
15 Wæaver, 'Securitization and Desecuritization'. 16 Ibid., p. 46.
17 Ibid., p. 51. 18 Ibid., p. 49. 19 Ibid., p. 46. 20 Ibid., p. 55.
21 Ibid. emphasis Wæver’s.
14
opinion.23 Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, however, also stated that ISS had to comprise more than only
the military and the state, thereby countering the fundamental claim of the traditionalists.24 In the
introduction of their book they wrote:
‘[w]e want to construct a more radical view of security studies by exploring threats to referent objects, and the securitization of those threats, that are military as well as non military. (…) We seek to find coherence not by confining security to the military sector but by exploring the logic of security itself to find out what differentiates security and the process of securitization from that which is merely political.’25
By investigating the process that took issues out of the sphere politics and into the realm of security they overcame the problem of a possible too wide agenda for security studies. In order for issues to be seen as security problems they had to meet ‘strictly defined criteria’.26 These criteria were described
as: ‘[t]hey have to be staged as existential threats to a referent object by a securitizing actor who thereby generates endorsement of emergency measures beyond the rules that would otherwise bind.’27
When these criteria are met, an issue is successfully securitized. If, however, the criteria are not met, securitization has failed and a problem will not become a security issue. The criteria make sure that not too many issues are seen as security problems, thereby keeping the agenda of security studies manageable. Furthermore, the quote sheds light on the various parts of the process of securitization. A successful act of securitization has to include an existential threat to a referent object, a securitizing actor and an audience that gives endorsement to take extraordinary measures.
Furthermore, Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde argued that security is about the survival of a referent object.28 It is only when an existential threat is posed to the referent object that securitization
can take place. The referent object has to be protected, with all necessary means, to ensure its survival. In the traditional – military centric - view of international security, the referent object would in almost every instance be the state. Since Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde wanted to widen and deepen the scope of ISS they introduced other referent objects that could be existentially threatened as well.
The utterance of security is done by a securitizing actor or agent. The actor describes a problem as existentially threatening to a referent object; this is the so-called securitizing move or act.29
An example of a securitizing actor is the spokesperson of a government. The chance of success of a securitizing move depends on the authority of the securitizing actor, because he or she has to persuade
15
an audience.30 The audience is another player in the theory of securitization. It has to be convinced of
the fact that a referent object is being existentially threatened. With the acceptance of the securitizing move it approves of extraordinary measures to counter the threat.31
Now the features of securitization theory as it was developed by Buzan, Wæaver and De Wilde are discussed. For them security is about the survival of a referent object. Threats do not exist prior to reality; they are created in the process of securitization. A securitizing actor can phrase an issue or a problem in terms of an existential threat to a referent object. When this utterance is accepted by an audience the problem has become a security issue. The securitizing actor acquires the right to take all necessary means to counter the threat by the acceptance of the audience. When the securitizing move is not accepted by the audience, however, securitization has failed and the problem has not become a security issue. Furthermore, if an issue is not uttered by a securitizing actor it cannot become a security issue either. Thus, ‘”[s]ecurity” is (…) a self-referential practice, because it is in this practice that the issue becomes a security issue – not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such a threat.’32
The added value of the theory of securitization for ISS is twofold. First of all, threats are constructed, they do not exist prior to reality.33 Secondly, securitization makes way for a widening of
the security agenda. By including other sectors and other possible referent objects than the traditional military sector and the state, the scope of security studies is enlarged. The widening of the security agenda is confined, however, because issues only become security problems when the process of securitization has been successful.
§2 Criticism on Securitization Theory
Different strands of criticism
Since the initial publications on securitization theory, numerous articles and books have engaged with and have formulated criticism against the concept of securitization. Ulrik Pram Gad and Karen Lund Petersen have showed that in the period 1995-2009 83 articles were published that dealt with securitization and desecuritization.34 Furthermore, in the period of 2009-2015 the literature on the
subject kept on growing.35 It is besides the scope and aim of this thesis to discuss all articles dealing
30 Ibid., p. 33. 31 Ibid., p. 25. 32 Ibid., p. 24.
33 See also: Wæver, 'The EU as a security actor’, p. 251.
34 Ulrik Pram Gad and Karen Lund Petersen, 'Concepts of politics in securitization studies', Security Dialogue,
vol. 42 (2011), no. 4-5, pp. 315-328, there p. 316.
35 To give just some examples: Thierry Balzacq ed., Securitization Theory: How security problems emerge and
16
with securitization. I want to create a proper basis that can be used in later chapters to discuss visual securitization. Therefore, I will only briefly outline the main themes and strands of criticism that can be found in the various publications and then I turn to the criticism that is important for this thesis.
Pram Gad and Lund Petersen identified three strands of criticism that surfaced in the various articles on securitization. The strands were ‘all attempts at developing, refining and/or critically engaging [with] securitization theory’.36 First of all, there are publications concerned with the process
of securitization and the explanatory power of the theory. Some scholars have argued that the framework of securitization does not provide adequate handles to do empirical research and that it has to be. Furthermore, they argue that some parts are underdeveloped.37 Secondly, the possible normative
aspects of the theory of securitization and the preference for desecuritization have been criticized. It has been argued that the theory of securitization cannot be used to improve the situation of the needy, because it has no emancipatory power.38 The third and last strand criticizes securitization for its
inability to explain the formation of new security issues.39 The theory explains how security issues are
formed – by speech act and the acceptance of an audience – but fails to engage with the problem why a securitizing actor chooses to securitize one issue and not another.
The criticism that engages with the explanatory power of the framework and some underdeveloped aspects is important for this thesis. Since I want to ameliorate the understanding of visual securitization it is also the explanatory part of the securitization framework with which I occupy myself. Therefore, it is important to discuss this criticism before I turn to the visual. The possible normative implications of securitization are of less importance when one wants to research and make understandable the power of the visual. It is not the question why some issues should become securitized and not others that interests me, but how the visual is deployed to convince an audience of a particular threat. Therefore, no attention will be given to the second strand of critique. The same goes for the third strand. The focus will be on the process of securitization and the place of the visual in this process. These are instances in which the decision to securitize has already been made.
Enactment, and Preparedness Exercises, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 37 (2012), no. 3, pp. 227-239.
36 Pram Gad and Lund Petersen, 'Concepts of politics in securitization studies', p. 316.
37 See for example: Thierry Balzacq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization: Political Agency, Audience and
Context', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 11 (2005), no. 2, pp. 171-201. Thierry Balzacq, 'A theory of securitization: origins, core assumptions, and variants', in: Thierry Balzacq ed., Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve (London 2011), pp. 1-30. Thierry Balzacq, 'Enquiries into methods: a new framework for security analysis', in: Thierry Balzacq ed., Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve (London 2011), pp 31-54. Holger Stritzel, 'Towards a Theory of Securitization; Copenhagen and Beyond', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 13 (2007), no. 3, pp. 357-383. Matt McDonald, 'Securitization and the Construction of Security', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 14 (2008), no.4, pp. 563-587.
38 Pram Gad and Lund Petersen, 'Concepts of politics in securitization studies', p. 316. For criticism on the
normative implications of securitization and desecuritization see: Claudia Aradau, 'Security and the Democratic Scene: Desecuritization and Emancipation', Journal of International Relations and Development, vol. 7 (2004), no. 4, pp. 388-413. A response to Aradau: Rita Taureck, 'Securitization Theory and securitization studies', Journal of International Relations and Development, vol. 9 (2006), no. 1, pp. 53-61.
17 A One-Step or a Multi-Step Framework?
In their book Security Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde argued that security issues are constructed. Threats do not exist ‘out there’; they are formed in the process of securitization. The authors concluded that security is self-referential, because it is by the reference to or the uttering of security that an issue is formed.40
Thierry Balzacq disagrees on linguistic grounds with the fact that security is self-referential; according to him securitization is a perlocutionary act.41 Balzacq cites Habermas to clarify the
distinction between acts that are locutionary, illocutionary or perlocutionary. Habermas wrote: ‘to say something [locution], to act in saying something [illocution], to bring about something through acting in saying something [perlocution].’42 When one says: ‘this table is red’, the meaning is clear because
there is a convention on the denotation of the words. This is locution. Illocution signifies the act that is performed when saying or uttering a locution, like making a promise. Lastly, perlocution deals with the effects that a speech act has on the listener, or the audience for that matter.43 In the words of J.L.
Austin: ‘what we bring about or achieve by saying something, such as convincing, persuading, deterring, and even, say, surprising or misleading.’44
The Copenhagen School defined their speech act as an illocutionary, self- referential act.45
One can wonder if this really is the case. It was shown above that an important part of securitization rests on the convincing of an audience. Without the consent of a persuaded audience measures to counter the threat cannot be taken. Therefore, one could argue that the process of securitization is concerned more with the effects speech-acts have on an audience than the speech-act itself.
Illocutionary and perlocutionary acts have to meet different criteria to be successful, but they do not exclude each other.46 An illocutionary act can also have perlocutionary effects. The point I want
to make is that securitization is not a one-step framework, but a multistep framework. A securitization actor does not make something a threat by uttering the words while at the same time – stante pede – the audience accepts it as such. So, while for the securitizing actor an illocutionary act might be enough to create the threat (because the actor is already convinced of its existence) the audience must form its own opinion. Since the act can fail, it cannot be known beforehand whether the act will have perlocutionary effects. This way of thinking is important because the process of visual securitization
40 Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security, p. 24.
41 Balzacq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization', pp. 174-176. In this article the criticism against securitization
being a self-referential and illocutionary act is voiced first. His findings are repeated in: Balzacq, 'A Theory of Securitization', pp. 4-6. Stritzel, 'Towards a Theory of Securitization' makes some similar remarks. He focuses on the internal and external aspects of the securitization act.
42 Habermas quoted in: Balzacq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization', p. 175, emphasis original. See also J.L.
Austin, How To Do Things With Words (Oxford 1975) [second edition], pp. 94-120.
43 Balzacq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization', p. 175. See on the distinction between locution, illocution and
perlocution: Austin, How to do things with words, pp. 109-120. Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action; Volume I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 288-305.
18
functions in the same multistep way; the actor can give an image one interpretation, but the audience can read it differently.47
Audience
Several critics of securitization already noted that the Copenhagen School does not discuss the aspects of audience and context very elaborately.48 This is rather unfortunate because they are important
aspects. Without the audience’s consent no extraordinary measures can be taken. Secondly, one has to keep in mind that securitization acts do not occur in a vacuum. Therefore, it is important to discuss the context in which an act takes place as well.
Every securitizing act has its own audience or multiple audiences.49 The Copenhagen School
noted that the existentially threatened referent object often is the state, thereby making its inhabitants the audience.50 But with the widening and deepening of security audiences can be different than the
inhabitants of a country. To give an example: in the first case study of this thesis Colin Powell’s audience is formed by the members of the United Nations Security Council (and the American people).
The securitization actor does not make his act without thinking about the audience first. The actor will direct the move towards an audience that is susceptible to ensure the biggest chance of acceptance and endorsement. Furthermore, the actor seeks the audience that is in the position to give the legitimacy that is needed for the extraordinary measures.51 This led Balzacq to the conclusion that
the actor must feel for the audience’s interest in order to achieve approval.52 This seems to be a fair
point. If there is an immigration problem making a part of the population feel insecure the securitizing actor will most probably direct a securitizing act about immigration to this part of the population, thereby making it an audience.
Furthermore, the Copenhagen School only noted that the acceptance of an audience was needed for securitization to succeed. They did not further elaborate upon the various forms acceptance or support could take. Since the acceptance of an audience can cause actions that were previously impossible it is important to further look into this. I agree with Balzacq who noted that the acceptance
47 Paul Roe noted yet another step in the securitization framework: once the audience is convinced of the
existence of an existence threat it must also be convinces of the necessary extraordinary measures. Paul Roe, 'Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures: Securitization and the UK’s Decision to Invade Iraq', Security Dialogue, vol. 39 (2008), no. 6, pp. 615-635, there p. 615.
48 See for example: Stritzel, 'Towards a Theory of Securitization', Balzacq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization',
Michael C. Williams, 'Continuing Evolution of Securitization Theory', in: Thierry Balzacq ed., Securitization Theory: how security problems emerge and dissolve (London 2011), pp. 212-222, there p. 212.
49 This was also noted by: Juha Vuori, 'Illocutionary Logic and Strands of Securitization: Applying the Theory of
Securitization to the Study of Non-Democratic Political Orders', European Journal of International Relations, vol. 14(2008), no. 1, pp. 65-99, there p. 72.
50 Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde, Security, pp. 36-42.
19
of a securitizing act can be moral, formal or both.53 Moral support is the acceptance of a threat without
giving the securitizing actor the formal approval for exceptional measures. This kind of support is most easily measured by using polls.54 Formal support – like the consent of parliament – is needed to
set measures in motion to counter the threat.55 One can investigate the voting results to measure this
kind of consent. The securitizing act can be directed towards parliament to ensure formal support and to the public in order to create moral support.56 When researching instances of (visual) securitization it
is important to touch upon various aspects of the audience; the audience has to be defined and the form of consent has to be discussed. In the two case studies that will be conducted at the end of this thesis ample attention is will be given to these aspects of audience.
Context
Every securitizing act has its own characteristics (different previous history, different audience, different existential threat, different securitizing actor etcetera) and therefore context is never the same. It is shaped by the audience, the securitizing actor, the existential threat, and the securitizing act in an interactive process. It is a source of information and a frame of reference for the participants in the securitizing act. It also serves as a memory for the audience and the securitizing actor, because it gives the possibility to relate securitizing acts to events that already happened.57
It is very difficult to theorize about the context, because it changes with every instance of securitization. It is, however, a very important aspect for securitization in general and visual securitization in particular: the audience relies on the context to make sense of the act. By relating the presented image or the uttered words to images and texts already known the audience interprets it. This process will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. For now it is enough to note that context helps to understand a securitization act.
The Failure to Look Beyond the Act of Speech
The most important underdeveloped aspect of the securitization framework for this thesis is the failure to include the visual. Wæver, De Wilde and Buzan focused only on the use of words in their discussion on the creation of threats. Lene Hansen was the first scholar to notice that the Copenhagen School was not able to explain instances in which security issues were formed without the use of
53 Ibid., pp. 184-185.
54 In various case studies polls are used to give an indication of the acceptance of the audience. See for example:
Roe, 'Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures’ and Matt McDonald, 'The Failed Securitization of Climate Change in Australia', Australian Journal of Political Science, vol. 47 (2012), no. 4, pp. 579-592.
55 Balzacq, 'The Three Faces of Securitization', pp. 184-185. 56 Roe, 'Actor, Audience(s) and Emergency Measures', pp. 632-633.
57 In their book Security Buzan, Wæver and De Wilde wrote about the institutionalization of security. It is
20
speech act or with the use of the visual.58 Hansen wrote that this was a serious shortcoming as the
visual was obtaining an ever more prominent place in our lives.59 I could not agree more. Also
Michael Williams noted this fact and wrote:
‘As political communication becomes increasingly entwined with the production and transmission of visual images, the processes of securitization take on forms, dynamics, and institutional linkages that cannot be fully assessed by focusing on speech-act alone.’60
It is not enough to focus on words to understand the formation of security nowadays, the visual has to be included. This key challenge for the framework of securitization will be the subject of the second chapter of this thesis. Enough for now is to note that the Copenhagen School has been criticized for their failure to look beyond the act of speech.61 This chapter has discussed the framework of
securitization and the points of critique that were deemed important for this thesis. By doing so enough handles have been provided to expand the theory with the inclusion of the visual in the next chapter.
58 Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen
School'.
59 Ibid., pp. 300-301.
60 Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International Politics', p. 512.
61 Besides Lene Hansen and Michael Williams other scholars have occupied themselves with the lack of the
21
Chapter 2 - Towards a New Framework for the Study of Visual Securitization
‘We only see what we look at. To look is an act of choice.’62
§1 The Visual Turn in IR
This statement made by John Berger in the seventies in his famous book Ways of Seeing might not be so easy in our contemporary society saturated by the visual. One is surrounded with images and mass media. Since the visual is so omnipresent, it has its effects on international politics and international relations too. The challenges for IR and ISS posed by the visual have not gone unnoticed. Scholars have realized that the inclusion of the visual can be valuable for the study of international relations.63
The so-called ‘visual turn’ has been made by paying ‘more and more attention to the relation between visuality, security and power in theoretical, methodological and empirical terms’, according to Axel Heck and Gabi Schlag in their article on securitizing images.64
As was discussed above, the Copenhagen School’s theoretical framework for securitization focused solely on the act of speech as a creator of existential threats. Several scholars have criticized this rigid focus on words and this has led to a ‘visual turn’ in the field of securitization as well.65 The
adjustment of the securitization framework to incorporate the visual – in all its forms (cartoons, movies, art, documentaries, images broadcasted during the news, television series, and photographs) - is a daunting task and it presents a series of problems unfamiliar to the Copenhagen School’s theory.
One can turn to other fields of study when one wants to study the visual and incorporate it in IR. In the last decades numerous publications on visual culture have been published.66 Useful
methodologies to study the visual and its meaning are discussed in these writings. These methodologies – for example, content analysis or semiotics – can be helpful when studying the impact of the visual for securitization. Scholars of IR and ISS, however, have found it difficult to incorporate these methodologies in their studies of visual securitization. This is rather unfortunate, because it might be the key to a better understanding of the process of visual securitization. If one is able to grasp
62 John Berger, Ways of seeing (London etc. 1975), p. 8.
63 See, for example: the special issue ‘Art, Politics, Purpose’ of the Review of International Studies, vol. 35
(2009), no. 4. The special issue on ‘Securitization, Militarization and Visual Culture in the Worlds of Post 9/11’, Security Dialogue, vol. 38 (2007), no. 2. Roland Bleiker, Aesthetics and World Politics (New York 2009). David D. Perlmutter, Photojournalism and Foreign Policy: Icons of Outrage in International Crises (Westport 1998). W.J.T. Mitchell, Cloning Terror; The war of Images, 9/11 to the present (Chicago and London 2011). David Shim, Visual Politics and North Korea: Seeing is believing (London etc. 2014).
64 Heck and Schlag, ‘Securitizing images: The female body and the war in Afghanistan’, p. 892.
65 Hansen, 'The Little Mermaid’s Silent Security Dilemma’, pp. 300-301. Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies',
pp. 524-528. Hansen, ‘Theorizing the Image for Security Studies. Heck and Schlag, ‘Securitizing Images’. Vuori, ‘A Timely Prophet?.
66 See, for example, Richard Howell and Joaquim Negreiros, Visual Culture (Cambridge etc. 2012) [second
22
the formation of an image’s meaning better, one will also understand the functioning of an image in visual securitization.
Where does the visual enter the framework of securitization? As was discussed above, securitization is a process of persuasion in which a securitizing actor, with the use of words, tries to convince the audience of the existence of an existential threat. The audience processes the presented information and decides if it is convinced by the words uttered. In this thesis I will elaborate upon a framework for visual securitization that stays close to the original process of securitization. That means that I will research the possibilities for the visual in a process that includes existential threat, securitizing actor, securitizing act, the referent object, audience, and the context. It is important to formulate a framework in which the study of securitization is combined with visual methodologies, because it is currently absent in scholarly literature. Furthermore, many of the articles that study the visual in securitization do not discuss its entire process. This is unfortunate, because I think it is possible to insert the visual into the framework of the Copenhagen School’s theory of securitization, thereby giving it more explanatory power.
I will work with the following proposition. When the process of securitization is transformed into one of visual securitization, the securitizing actor is equipped with a broad range of visual material that can be used to shape the opinion of the audience about the existence of a threat. So instead of (only) using words the securitizing actor uses images to designate something as an existential threat. It still remains up to the audience to interpret the visual and to decide if it accepts the act of visual securitization. Therefore, the visual enters into the process of securitization on two separate occasions: it is used by the securitizing actor and it is interpreted by the audience.
§2 The Challenge of the Visual
The Ambiguous Image
The incorporation of the visual presents new challenges that were unfamiliar to the Copenhagen School. The meaning of the spoken or written word appears to be pretty straightforward, although some linguistic scholars would disagree. If a securitizing actor states that nation X forms an existential threat to the safety of nation Y, the audience can debate whether this is the case, but the uttered words will be understood (if the audience speaks the same language as the securitizing actor). This, however, is not the case with the visual. The meaning of an image is never fixed and is in constant need of interpretation. Furthermore, as it was nicely put by Sturken and Cartwright, ‘meanings are the product of a complex social interaction among image, viewer, and context.’67 In short, the meaning of an
image is created in a process of interpretation between viewer and image. There is not one good interpretation of an image, or, in the words of Gillian Rose: ‘there is [not] some essential truth lurking
23
in each image, awaiting discovery (…).’68 Therefore, every image possesses a number of meanings
and interpretations and, as will be discussed in further detail below, meanings may change over time. These observations lead to important questions about the study of visual securitization. If one wants to understand how visual securitization works, one has to think and theorize about how (what) meaning is given to an image, how securitizing actors use the visual in their securitizing act, and, how the audiences interpret the image.
The Power of the Image
Why use the visual if its meaning cannot be fixed with certainty beforehand? It is the powerful versatile character of it that provides us with the answer to this question. First of all, it is because images, especially images that purport to show the real world (photographs, news footage, satellite imagery etc.), are often believed to be objective and to contain true information about the world.69 This
may make it easier to convince the audience of the existence of a threat. Linked to that, images can provide the audience with proof. The message that IS beheaded twenty one Coptic Egyptians on the coast of Libya may have sounded unbelievable, but when confronted with a video of the barbaric act, the audience had no choice but to believe it.70
Furthermore, an image can convey information more easily than words. One only has to think about the proverb ‘a picture is worth a thousand words’ to understand that the visual is better equipped to communicate a particular scene than words are.71 Think, for example, about the amount of words
one would need to describe the painting The Garden of Earthly Delights (fig. 1) painted by the Dutch painter Hieronymus Bosch, when only one (high quality) image of the triptych suffices. Lastly, the visual can evoke powerful feelings more easily than words can. Returning again to the video of IS showing the beheading of the Coptic Egyptians, the images of their deaths aroused much stronger feelings of horror and grief, than it would have been the case if the event was not accompanied by a terrible video. Hansen called this effect the immediacy of the image.72 In short, images make powerful
tools for securitization, because they have the possibility to communicate information convincingly and expressively to the audience.
68 Rose, Visual Methodologies, p. xiv.
69 A lot of scholars have noted this fact; see, for example, Sturken and Cartwright, Practices of Looking, pp.
16-17. Shim, Visual Politics and North Korea, pp. 26-28, 38. Hansen, ‘Theorizing the Image for Security Studies’, p. 60.
70 Often noted in discussions on the objectivity of the photographic image is the fact that this objectivity may
seem more real than it actually is. Photographs and videos can be easily manipulated, thereby showing a ‘reality’ that is not real. Frequently, the authenticity of an ‘objective’ image is questioned, as was the case with the video of the beheading of the twenty one Coptic Egyptians (see for example: Al Jazeera America, ‘ISIL video purports to show beheading of 21 Egyptian Christians in Libya’, http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/2/15/isil-releases-video-purporting-to-show-beheading-of-egyptians-in-libya.html (visited on 24-02-2015)). The authenticity can be determined in two ways: investigating if there was digital tampering with the (moving) image or a declaration by a person or institution with social status stating that the images are real.
71 W.T.J. Mitchell, What do pictures want?; the Lives and Loves of Images (Chicago etc. 2005), p. 152, also
noted this fact.
24 Can Images ‘Speak Security’?
When a securitizing actor chooses to use an image in his act, it is of the utmost importance that he is able to communicate his intended meaning of the visual to the audience. Whether the audience accepts the preferred meaning, is another matter. It seems the case that when an actor is not able to get his intended meaning across, the securitizing act is doomed to fail from the very start. Since the visual does not have a fixed meaning the actor will have to use another tool to communicate the message. The easiest tool, according to me, is the use of words with which the actor can explain what the visual purports to show. This remark leads to a theoretical decision on which I need to elaborate. I argue that in instances of visual securitization the image will always be accompanied with words, be it a caption, explanatory remark or a speech act. Without words, the audience is left to itself to interpret the presented image.
This theoretical choice hinges upon the debate whether images create their own effect or that they are in need of words to be interpreted. Heck and Schlag, following Judith Butler, argue that ‘images carry their own interpretations’ and that ‘images do have a power of their own which makes them attractive for political purposes (…)’.73 W.J.T. Mitchell, however, states: ‘images are not words.
It is not clear that they actually ‘say’ anything. They may show something, but the verbal message or speech act has to be brought to them (…)’.74 Shim is of the same opinion and writes ‘that the effect(s)
and meaning(s) of pictures are only created th[r]ough the interplay between images and texts.75 Rose
73 Heck and Schlag, ‘Securitizing Images’, p. 895. 74 Mitchell, What do pictures want?, p. 140.
25
notes that although ‘it is very unusual to encounter a visual image unaccompanied by any text at all (…) an image may have its own visual effects.’76 At first sight, I agree with Rose that an image may
invoke effects, also without words. The effect of an image and its meaning are, however, not the same thing. One can be struck by the beauty of an image (when it is a beautiful image) or appalled by the horror of if (when it shows something horrific), but what the actual image purports to mean is a different matter. When, for example, a spectator finds himself before the Madonna with canon Van der Paele (fig. 2) painted by Jan van Eyck, feelings and effects will be most certainly aroused, be it a sense of awe, a feeling of devoutness, or something else. The spectator does not have to read the caption in order for the image to have a certain effect. What the picture means or depicts, on the other hand, is more difficult to interpret without a caption. When not a student of early Netherlandish art, the beholder would not know, without reading the caption, that the man represented in white is canon Van der Paele. Without investigating the painting further or reading some articles about it, it would remain unknown that the painting was commissioned by the portrayed canon Van der Paele and that it performed a funerary roll. To put it differently, although the paining can arouse an effect at first sight, the meaning remains hidden without a text.
Furthermore, images do not exist in a vacuum. When a beholder interprets an image it will always do so by linking it to other visual material it already knows. An image of a Madonna and Child is interpreted as such, because the spectator is familiar with other representations of the Madonna and Child. When one sees an image of two airplanes flying into the World Trade Center in New York, one immediately recognizes it as the terrorist attack on 9/11. This is because one is familiar with the imagery of the attack. But again, the specific purpose and meaning of the image has to be made clear by a text (is the image shown to convince people that all Muslims are bad people? Or is it a part of a photographic exhibition? Etcetera).
This fact is also explained by Rose: ‘Virtually all visual images are multimodal (…) – they always make sense in relation to other things, including written texts and very often other images’.77
26
Hansen also notices this fact and uses Kristeva’s theory of intertextuality to explain it: ‘every text is unique in that no two texts are ever fully identical, yet all texts are at the same time referring to texts that came before.’78 The same goes for the image. This means that if we are presented with an image
without text or caption we will consciously or unconsciously think of other images, read texts, and amassed knowledge in order to interpret the image. This does not mean that the image has one fixed meaning, every spectator will link the image differently. Therefore, it is highly plausible that the same image means something different for two beholders. Now, one can ask if images really ‘carry their own interpretations’ and ‘can speak security’ when these ‘own’ interpretations are formed in reference with other images and texts. I think the answer to this question is negative. It is true that images can evoke feelings of awe, without the usage of texts, but it is also true that an audience interprets and identifies the visual with multimodal or intervisual reference to other images and texts. Furthermore, without caption or other kind of text the audience will not be able to ascertain the meaning the producer of the image wanted to convey.
What does this mean for the study of visual securitization? Above, I already stated that in my opinion words are needed in cases of visual securitization. The discussion about whether images can speak security explained this. Images are always ambiguous and the securitizing actor cannot rely on the intervisual references audiences will make. Without a text or caption the interpretation of an image cannot be guided and a preferred reading cannot be proposed, thereby making it very hard for the securitizing actor to convince the audience of the existence of a threat. By using words the actor guides its audience towards the preferred meaning, thereby making the visual instrumental to the verbal message. The semiotician Roland Barthes remarked: ‘all images are ambiguous; they imply, underlying their signifiers, a ‘floating chain’ of signifieds, the reader able to choose some and ignore others. Hence (…) various techniques are developed intended to fix the floating chain of signifieds (…); the linguistic message is one of these techniques.’79
Above I stated that the visual enters the process of visual securitization on two separate occasions. It is used by the securitizing actor and it is viewed and interpreted by the audience. In both these instances a meaning is given to the visual. The securitizing actor will communicate a preferred meaning through the use of words and the audience will interpret the image by reading those words and by referencing it to other images and texts. Therefore, one could argue that the visual is instrumental in a process of visual securitization; it still is in need of words to ensure a preferred reading. In her book on visual methodologies, Rose wrote that the meaning of the visual is made at three sites: the production site, the site of the audience and the site of the image itself.80 The
production site concurs with the site of the securitizing actor and also the audience is the same. Images can be analyzed by their compositional elements and their colors for example. This happens according
78 Hansen, ‘Theorizing the Image for Security Studies’, p. 54.
79 Roland Barthes, ‘Rhetoric of the image’, in: Jessica Evans and Stuart Hall, Visual Culture; The Reader
(London etc. 1999), pp. 33-41, there p. 37.
27
to Rose’s on the site of the image. 81 For the study of visual securitization this site is of lesser
importance, because it is the way the securitizing actor imposes a meaning on the visual and the way the image is interpreted by the audience that matters.
The incorporation of the visual in the framework of securitization entails the study and the understanding of how a meaning is made. I do not propose a positivistic theoretical framework for visual securitization. The making of meaning depends on so many variables (securitizing actor, threat, image, context, intervisual references made by the audience etcetera) that it might be quite impossible to formulate such a theory. I want to understand the process of visual securitization by building on theories and methodologies from the field of visual culture. I propose a semiotic approach for the study of visual securitization. In particular the writings of Roland Barthes and Stuart Hall can help to understand visual securitization. Barthes took the theory of semiotics out of the sphere of linguistics and adapted it for the study of the visual. He wrote that every image is a sign that is built up by a signifier and a signified. The real meaning of an image, however, was imbedded into it by a second-order semiotic system.82 Stuart Hall wrote, amongst many other things, that the audience does not
passively look at images, but actively interprets them, in the end creating one of three responses: a preferred reading of the image, an oppositional reading or a negotiated reading.83 The theoretical
reflections of Barthes and Hall will be studied more in depth below. To my knowledge it is the first time that visual securitization is approached by way of semiotics. Before turning to a more detailed discussion of the new framework, I will discuss the articles already written about visual securitization.
§3 Current State of Visual Securitization
In the first decade of the new millennium several scholars of International Relations and ISS noted that the visual had to be incorporated in the Copenhagen school’s framework, because the concept ‘remain[ed] almost wholly undeveloped’.84 These scholars encountered the same challenges as were
noted above, namely that the incorporation of the visual entails ‘an analysis of how meaning is conveyed by images’85 and that ‘visual representations raise difficult questions about (…) the
importance of the contestation over meaning’86. As was stated in the introduction, to my knowledge
there are only four articles directly concerned with visual securitization and to those articles we now turn.
81 Ibid., pp. 19-22.
82 Barthes, Mythologies. Barthes, ‘Myth Today’. 83 Hall, ‘Encoding/decoding’.
84 Williams, 'Words, Images, Enemies', p. 526. 85 Ibid.
28 Möller’s Pictorial Memory
In his article 'Photographic Interventions in Post-9/11 Security Policy' Frank Möller researched the incorporation of photographs in the study of visual securitization.87 He studied the visual by using the
triangle: security, visual culture and pictorial memory and discussed three photographic exhibitions that showed photographs in relation to the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and the war in Iraq.88 Every
exhibition highlighted a different aspect of the visual: the power to influence popular opinion and to shape a particular public memory89, the ‘construction of a collective memory’90, and thirdly,
desecuritization91.
According to Möller, the study of visual securitization is complicated by three aspects: the fact that there still is no consensus on the exact definition of images, the fact that the meaning of images is never univocal and thirdly, that the images have to be placed in the visual reservoir, or pictorial memory of the beholder.92 It was already discussed above that an image carries more than one
meaning and is therefore ambiguous. Möller is right in stating that this fact complicates the study of visual securitization. Since the methodologies for studying the speech act in securitization do not suffice in understanding the visual, we need to incorporate other methodological tools to facilitate the research of visual securitization. Möller’s article unfortunately, did not have the intention to provide a ‘picture theory of security’ but was ‘conceived as a thought piece, heuristic in character.’93
His point on the visual reservoir of the audience has been touched upon before too. Möller wrote: ‘memory crucially helps us order and assign meaning to incoming information, visual and otherwise, and make sense of the world’.94 This hints to the intervisuality and multimodality of images
we have seen in the preceding paragraph. Images do not exist in a vacuum and the audience uses its memory to interpret the images it sees. Möller made some interesting statements about the use of this memory in securitization. He wrote that ‘[s]ecuritization can be successful only if it is in accordance with the collective memory of the targeted audience (…). From the actor’s point of view, the issue is
87 Möller, 'Photographic Interventions in Post-9/11 Security Policy’. 88 Ibid., p. 181.
89 Ibid., pp. 187-189. The exhibition After September 11: Images from and Memories of Ground Zero showed
photographs made by Joel Meyerowitz of the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. For some time, the photographs were displayed on the website of US Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.
90 Ibid., pp. 189-191. The exhibition Here is New York also showed photographs of the attacks on the World
Trade Center. This time, however, the photos were made by professional as well as non-professional photographers. The organizers of the exhibition asked everyone to send in their photos. A selection of the material was printed and hung in a storefront in Manhattan. The pictures were not accompanied with texts or titles. This gave the audience the opportunity to define their own interpretation.
91 Ibid., pp. 191-192. The exhibition Iraqi Faces and Surfaces showed photographs by Jan Øberg of the people
of Iraq.
