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Master Thesis

Civil war and the peace process in Myanmar

Name: Yinneke de Hoop yingtingdehoop@live.nl Student number: 10199101

Master Political Science, International Relations Project: Micro-Foundations of Conflict

Supervisor: Dr. S. Tanaka Second reader: Dr. J. Krause Date: 23-06-2017

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Table of contents

Acknowledgements 3

List of Abbreviations 4

Chapter I. Introduction 5

Chapter II. Literature Review 8

2.1. Identifying the gap 12

Chapter III. Myanmar’s road to peace 14

3.1. The roots of the armed conflict 14

3.2. The NCA process from 2011 – 2015 15

Chapter IV. Theoretical Framework 17

4.1. The Bargaining model 20

4.2. Argument and observable implications 21

4.3. Alternative explanation

Chapter V. Research Design 22

5.1. Methodology 22

5.2. Case selection 23

5.3. Data collection 24

5.4. Operationalization 25

Chapter VI. Analysis 29

6.1. The role of grievances 29

6.2. Findings 31

6.3. The role of military capabilities, commitment, and stakes 32

6.4. Findings 35

Chapter VII. Discussion 36

Chapter VIII. Conclusion 37

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisor, Seiki Tanaka, for guiding me through the whole process of writing my thesis. His feedback and encouragement has helped me enormously. Furthermore, I would also like to express my appreciation towards dr. Jana Krause for accepting to be my second reader and taking the time to review my thesis. And lastly, I am thankful to have such great friends and family who have been there constantly for moral support – thank you.

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List of Abbreviations

AA Arakan Army

ALP Arakan Liberation Party

BGF Border Guard Force

BNI Burma News International

CDES Centre for Development and Ethnic Studies DKBA Democratic Karen Buddhist Army

EAOs Ethnic Armed Organizations

EU European Union

IDPs Internally Displaced People

KIO/KIA Kachin Independence Organization / Kachin Independence Army

KNU Karen National Union

MAR Minorities at Risk Database

MIMU Myanmar Information Management Unit MNDAA Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army NCA Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement

NDAA-ESS National Democratic Alliance Army – Eastern Shan State NGOs Non-governmental Organizations

NLD National League for Democracy

RCSS/SSA-S The Restoration Council of Shan State / The Shan State Army-South SLORC State Law and Order Restoration Council

SPDC State Peace and Development Council Tatmadaw The Myanmar Armed Forces

TNLA Ta’ang National Liberation Army UPCC Union Peace Central Committee

UNFC The United Nationalities Federal Council UPWC Union Peacemaking Working Committee

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Chapter I. Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the number of armed conflicts worldwide has decreased substantially, especially interstate wars (Pettersson and Wallensteen, 2015: 536). Today most armed conflicts occur between groups within the same nation-state. Moreover, a third of all nations have experienced this kind of armed conflict, also called a civil war (Blattmann and Miguel, 2010: 4; Murshed, 2002: 388).

Ending armed conflict has been a long concern of practitioners and scholars of international relations (Call and Cousens, 2008: 1). The majority of armed conflicts has come to an end through a negotiated settlement rather than outright victory or defeat (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000; Fortna, 2004). Most studies focusing on the termination of civil wars analyze the underlying structural conditions that encourage rebel groups to continue to fight rather than to settle. Consensus exists amongst scholars that poverty, large populations, a low level of economic development, a prior history of civil war and political instability drive rebel groups to pick up arms. Little less understood is the negotiation process that occurs between governments and rebels as they attempt to establish peace, and the reasons why these attempts frequently fail (Walter, 2009: 244). The bargaining model of war deals with this negotiation process as it addresses which obstacles may occur during the negotiations. This model dominates the debate on the study of civil war since the late 20th century, and will be used to

empirically test its explanatory power on one of the longest running civil war, namely Myanmar (Hartzell, 2016).

The civil war in Myanmar is running for almost 70 years and has still not been resolved. Since its independence in 1948, many different ethnic groups have been fighting the government and each other for political self-determination and socio-economic rights (BNI, 2017: vi). Many attempts, in the form of ceasefire agreements, have been undertaken in order to establish peace. Ceasefire agreements are a form of a negotiated settlement where the main focus is to halt the fighting, whereas a negotiated settlement also involves terms of postwar power sharing agreements (Toft, 2010: 11). Historically, most of these ceasefire agreements in Myanmar were bilateral and signed between the government and only one ethnic armed organization (EAO). However, many of these agreements were violated again by either one of the two parties, which resulted in the continuation of fighting. Now, for the first time in history a Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) on the union level has been drafted and signed between the government and several EAOs in Myanmar. However, not all EAOs signed the

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NCA. One could assume this can be explained by economic self-interests or political goodwill of the EAOs that influences the decision to sign or not but when taking a closer look at the case it is more complicated. This raises the question why only 8 out of 15 EAOs signed the NCA. This leads to the main question of this research:

What explains the variation in the decision of the EAOs in signing or not signing the NCA?

In order to answer the research question, the focus will be on the variables provided by the bargaining model of war. From this theory, the following argument can be considered: signatory to the NCA happens when the military capabilities of an EAO are weak, the EAO trusts the government and the EAO has no secessionist aspirations.

This research aims to make a contribution by empirically testing the conditions given by the bargaining model of war in the case of Myanmar as most research on the bargaining model of war has been quantitative (Reit, 2003: 37). In doing so, it becomes clear that the bargaining model of war cannot explain fully the variation in the decision of the EAO in signing the NCA or not.

Moreover, this study contributes to meso-level research by examining civil war on a sub-national level and using rebel groups as the unit of analysis. This is in contrast with macro-level studies, which focuses on the national macro-level thereby using large quantitative data sets. Furthermore, it differs from micro-level research, which emphasizes the role of the individual and uses survey-based techniques as research method. Rather than dismissing existing cross-national data, studying armed groups can instead complement them in a smaller but more detailed sample of countries and conflicts. This is most useful when armed actors do not align consistently with or against the government and these interactions occur across varying levels of violence, which is observable in Myanmar (Staniland, 2017: 2).

Compared to other cases of civil war such as Colombia or Syria, less research has been done on the civil war in Myanmar, especially on the current NCA process. Furthermore, the case of Myanmar is highly relevant as the country is moving towards a democracy and has recently become economically more interesting for foreign investors. However, the civil war is the main obstacle in creating a stable government and economic development. Understanding the factors that influence the signatory of the NCA by the EAOs, can contribute to the debate on how to reach and maintain peace in the country.

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The following chapter provides an overview of the existing literature on civil war. Then chapter 3 consists out of an overview of the conflict in Myanmar and of the NCA process. In chapter 4 the theoretical framework and the arguments are presented. Chapter 5 describes the research design of this study including the methods and operationalization of the dependent and independent variables. Then chapter 6 presents the analysis based on the theoretical arguments and observable implications of this research. Chapter 7 discusses the limitations of this research and includes recommendations for future research. The final chapter, chapter 8, contains the conclusion.

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Chapter II. Literature review

Literature on civil war is extensive and a great amount of research has been done in various areas in this field of study. Broadly taken, the literature on civil war can be divided into the different stages of war, namely the beginning of civil war, the duration of the civil war and the termination of civil war. Organizing the different stages in this manner, by distinguishing between war onset, duration and termination, can help identifying the particularities of each of these processes (Sambanis, 2010: 220). Moreover, it will help position this research within the literature of civil war.

The Beginning

Within the existing literature, a central puzzle that causes debate in the study of civil wars is on the question why civil wars occur. Despite the high costs and the existence of less costly alternatives, governments and rebel groups often still turn to war (Walter, 2009). Research on explaining the causes of civil war used to be dominated by cross-country regressions (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). However recently, the focus is now more on collecting data at the micro-level and meso-micro-level. This shift has helped scholars to understand the relationship between state capacity, regime type and political violence better by examining at the individual and group level thereby using single case studies (DeRouen Jr. and Sobek, 2016).

Although controversial, one of the most influential contributions to the study of civil war is the greed and grievances theory by Collier and Hoeffler (1998; 2002). According to Collier and Hoeffler it is ‘greed’ that motivates combatants instead of ‘grievances’. Thus, combatants perform a cost benefit analysis and start fighting when it will better their situation rather than start fighting over identity issues such as religion, ethnicity, language and social class. Their work is in accordance with the economic theory literature on civil wars and draws on earlier findings from Grossman (1991: 1999) who explains rebellion in circumstances that generate profitable opportunities. Fearon and Laitin (2003) conducted a similar research and found comparable findings, though disputed among scholars as well. However, different than Collier and Hoeffler and Grossman, they also argue that state institutional capacity and strength are robust predictors of civil war. Thus, a country is more prone to civil war when it has a weak central government and possesses environmental conditions favoring insurgents.

An often heard critique on the studies of Collier and Hoeffler and Fearon and Laitin is their choice of proxy variables which has consequences for the measurement in the data sets,

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such as unreliable results. For example, the economic variable of education by Collier and Hoeffler only looks at education enrollment but does not explain how schooling might influence the risk of civil war. High education rates are present at civil war countries such as Cyprus, Yugoslavia and Russia, whereas Saudi Arabia has the lowest education rates but experienced no war (Sambanis, 2004). Moreover, Nathan (2005) notes that the proxies use by Collier and Hoeffler are arbitrary as they are used differently in their other studies. At times, for example, income per capita is a proxy for government’s revenue-raising and defense spending capacity, and elsewhere a proxy for the cost of paying rebel recruits. Fearon and Laitin’s interpretation of GDP as a measure of state strength is also seen as problematic as a low GDP does not always measure a state’s capacity to prevent civil war. Sambanis (2004) explains this with the case of Kenya where a weak economy existed but no civil war occurred because of state control through corruption.

While economic motivations for civil war is currently still better theorized than psychological or sociological factors, non-economic explanations cannot be completely discarded (Blattman and Miguel, 2010). Horowitz’s (1985) work on the role of ethnicity in civil wars shows that conflict is rooted in intense emotional reactions and feelings of mutual threat. In addition, Stewart (2008) argues that mobilization by identity can occur because people themselves can be strongly convinced about their nature of identity and that of others. However, a commonly heard critique on the civil war literature is that economic, social, political and psychological factors are far more complex and should not be studied separately (Cramer, 2002). As Herbst (2000) argues, the motives for rebellion are many and interlinked. Pure economic motives are not consistent with the behavior of many rebel leaders or groups. The struggle for power, the persuasiveness and persistence of ideological beliefs, and political and other forms of inequality must be considered in thinking about the many possible motives for political violence. In other words, the emphasis should rather be on how greed and grievances motives interact rather than researching the two separately (Keen, 2000).

The Duration

Another important aspect of civil wars within the literature is its duration, which is also often linked to the outcome or ending of a civil war. For example, Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) look at rebel motivations related to characteristics of the conflicts and the country in which it takes place. They apply the greed and grievance thesis for the duration and termination of war but instead restate it as rebellion-as-investment and rebellion-as-business. Rebellions as

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rebellions as business is the profitability of the rebellion, such as commodity prices. Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom conclude from the empirical analysis that declines in profitability increase the chances of war termination, thus the rebellion-as-business explains the duration of war better than rebellion-as-investment. Similarly, Fearon (2004) shows that short civil wars are mainly motivated by seeking political control over the government by rebel groups, such as coups and popular revolutions, while long term civil wars are mostly motivated by gaining autonomy or ‘sons of the oil’ conflicts – conflicts over natural resources. However, Fearon explains the variance in civil war duration less with reference to the motivations of the rebels than to the commitment problems involved in reaching a negotiated solution (Hegre, 2004).

The duration of civil war is furthermore examined in terms of state capacity and military capabilities of both government and rebel groups (Cunningham et al., 2009). Incapacity of the state can enhance opportunities for insurgents to benefit from resource extraction, e.g. diamonds or drugs, to use it to finance themselves (Ross; 2004). As the insurgency grows, the required organization, political support and financing of the military campaign becomes more challenging to the government. Herbst, DeRouen and Sobek (2004) argue that this is often very complicated for governments, especially in large countries, which leads to long conflicts where neither sides are able to win. External military intervention is therefore a means to alter the military balance. Depending on which side the intervener lines up with, the duration of war could either increase or decrease. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) find that interventions on the side of the government increase duration, and Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom (2004) find military interventions on the rebel side decrease the duration of war.

While these findings have been useful, they still suffer from many challenges such as divergent results using different datasets, endogenous explanation variables and heroic interpretations of proxy variables. This makes the variables sensitive to measurement error (Gates and Håvard Strand, 2004).

Termination and outcome

The termination and outcome of a civil war is often determined by its duration and how the war is being fought. For instance, long wars are expected to end badly for the initiator and become more violent the longer the conflict lasts (Gates and Håvard Strand, 2004; Slantchev, 2004). Among scholars, consensus exists on the fact that civil wars are more difficult to end than interstate wars. The reason for this is because members of the two sides need to live and work together in a common government after the war ends. This is in contrast with an interstate

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war where the opponents are able to retreat to their own territories after the war ends (Licklider, 1995).

Within the literature, two types of civil war endings can occur: a military victory and a negotiated settlement. These two types of endings are often at the center of debate on which ending produces the most durable peace within a country after the fighting ends and the likeliness of war recurrence. Toft (2010) argues that a military victory for rebel groups, as opposed to government victory, results in peace, democracy and economic prosperity by using the dataset of both Cold War and post-Cold War data from 1940s to 2000s. Though not specifically focused on a rebel victory, Wagner (1993) also argues that military victories create the most durable peace because it dismantles the losing party, making it more complicated to resume war. This in contrast with a negotiated settlement where segments of power-sharing governments retain the capacity for resorting to civil war. Licklider (1995) draws a similar conclusion, however adds that military victories are also more likely to be followed by acts of genocide. A study by Fortna (2008) however indicates that both military victories and negotiated settlements can produce a durable peace. In contrary, Walter (2004) concludes that neither type of war outcome has a significant effect on the duration of peace.

However, scholars in favor of negotiated settlements argue that negotiated settlements can generate durable peace. They assign this to the fact that agreements on the distribution of state power among adversaries, provisions created for the groups’ security and increasing the costs of resorting to armed conflict, contributes to rival groups staying committed to peace (Hartzell, 1999; Mattes and Savun, 2009). Moreover, a negotiated settlement can also result in fewer casualties when one side surrenders and the other side does not carry out genocide (Licklider, 1995). Regardless, a negotiated settlement implies a transformation of decision making power, or the right to control force, from the central authority to the insurgency movements (Svensson, 2007). This happens through the process of bargaining. However, these bargains are usually hard to reach and to implement. The bargaining model of war addresses the fact that adversaries sometimes fail because of factors or mechanisms that produce bargaining failures. The model suggests that peace will last as long as the formerly opposite groups are committed to the bargain they have reached (Fearon, 1995, 1998; Reiter, 2003).

The bargaining model of war is useful for framing and advancing research on civil war termination. However, a weakness of the model is that by focusing the attention on the bargains associated with choices to go to war or end war, it tends to focus only on the roles of the elite that play a role in these processes (Hartzell, 2016). As Wood (2000) argues, mass actors can

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play an important role in transforming elite interests in a way that shapes the prospects for and means of ending civil war.

Another limiting aspect of the model is that it may be leading scholars to neglect some features that are unique to, or at least characteristic of, civil wars that could have an effect on conflict termination processes. As the bargaining model was initially designed for interstate wars, scholars are used to conduct their analysis based on two or more actors engaged in a long-term competition for goods or resources. However, developments in the conflict or within the engaged actors, such as non-state actors that dismantle their organization at the end of the war, and the consequences it may have for the bargaining process makes the model a bit static (Hartzell, 2016; 2009).

2.1. Identifying the gap

In reviewing the literature, it becomes clear that the study on civil war is a highly debated topic among scholars. Early studies on civil war have been done on macro-level, by the use of large quantitative data and conducting cross-country regressions. Two important papers in this category – one by Collier and Hoeffler and the other by Fearon and Laitin – have generated much interest and debate in the question of why civil war occur. Their conclusion was that civil wars are not caused by ethnic fractionalization or political grievances, but by the opportunity for the organization of rebellion. The main critique on these studies is the use of arbitrary proxy variables and the strict separation in research of economic and political, social and psychological factors in civil war, rather than looking at how they interact. Moreover, civil war studies on the macro-level tend to overlook information about the causal pathways that link individual or group behavior with the outbreak of civil war (Sambanis, 2004: 259). More recently, civil war studies are now conducted on the micro- and meso-level using case studies and survey based data that fills in the gap left by macro-level studies. However, findings on micro- and meso-level are more difficult to generalize to other cases (Hartzell, 2016).

The literature on civil war furthermore shows that the different stages of war, especially the duration and termination, are inherently linked with each other. Long wars are associated with calls for autonomy from the rebel side or with conflicts over natural resources. Natural resources can also determine the length of a war, as resource extraction can help finance rebel groups to continue fighting. State capacity and military capabilities of both government and rebel groups influence the duration of civil war as well. Moreover, it is argued that long wars become more violent over time than short wars. However, when the economic profitability of rebellion declines, the chances that war ends increases. With help from outside, by a military

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intervention, the chances of war termination become bigger. Scholars find that intervention on the government side increases duration, whereas military intervention on the rebel side decreases the duration of war. Consensus exists among scholars that civil wars are more difficult to end than interstate wars. This is because members of the two sides need to live and work together in a common government after a war ends and commitment from both sides is needed to sustain this post-war situation of peace. A theory that addresses these adversaries is the bargaining model of war. Finally, two types of civil war endings are distinguished: a military victory and a negotiated settlement. Debate among scholars still exist on which one of the two produces the most durable peace after the war ends.

This research builds to some extent on the previously mentioned articles but mainly focuses on the termination of civil war through a negotiated settlement by using the bargaining model of war. However, emphasis will also be put on the whole process and how the civil war in Myanmar developed over time instead of just treating civil war as an event which is common in quantitative studies. This way, useful information will not be discarded (Sambanis, 2004: 268). Furthermore, as most research on the bargaining model has been quantitative, this research will use a more qualitative approach to test the core propositions of the bargaining model by using Myanmar as case study (Reit, 2003: 37). Thus, instead of solely describing the possible causal mechanisms, this research seeks to test these mechanisms empirically as well. Moreover, the study aims to contribute to the civil war studies on the meso-level by taking rebel groups as unit of analysis. And finally, due to its contemporary nature, the case of Myanmar has been less examined and analyzed which makes it an interesting case to study.

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Chapter III. Myanmar’s road to peace

This research seeks to explain the variation in the signatory and non-signatory of the NCA by the different EAOs in Myanmar. Therefore, it is important to first outline the conflict that has resulted in almost 70 years of civil war and explain the NCA process for a better understanding of the country’s politics and the dynamics between the government and the EAOs. Moreover, this chapter is useful for shaping the main argument and observable implications of this research, which will be discussed in the next chapter of the theoretical framework.

3.1. The roots of the armed conflict

Myanmar is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in Asia and has been plagued by civil war since the end of British colonial rule in 1948. The independence movement of Myanmar was led by General Aung San who met with representatives of the country’s various ethnic minorities in 1947 to discuss the future of a multi-ethnic state. Among those minorities were the Chin, Kachin and Shan who were independent people in the pre-colonial era and had the rights to regain their national independence from Great-Britain independently and found their own nation-state. Instead, they all opted to create a Union together by signing the Panglong Agreement in 1947. The Agreement held the principles of voluntary association, political equality and the right of self-government in their respective homelands through the right to internal self-determination. The idea was to create a decentralized federal system, however this idea was never implemented and instead Myanmar became a more unitary state where the dominant ethnic group of Burman people controlled the government (Sakhong, 2014: 1). This created the root cause of ethnic inequality and political grievance. Moreover, the Panglong Agreement had not been inclusive as three major ethnic nationalities, namely the Karen, Mon and Arakan, were excluded from the meeting. With the assassination of General Aung San in 1948, rebellion from Burmese communist groups started fighting against the government of the first prime minister of Myanmar, U Nu. At the same time ethnic minorities started fighting for a separate state or for more federal rights within the Union (Walton, 2008: 897).

In 1962, General U Ne Win staged a coup and drafted a new constitution in 1974 which ignored all ethnic political and geographical aspirations. Moreover, he aspired a homogenous unitary state through ‘nation-building’ which was based on the notion of ‘one ethnicity, one language and one religion’. In the meantime, the ethnic armed conflicts continued and became ‘institutionalized’ in the 1970s when both sides were not able to win from each other. It was

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until 1989 that the dynamic of the internal conflict changed. The military regime, before known as Supreme Law and Order Ruling Council (SLORC) and later as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), announced its take over from U Ne Win and began ruling Myanmar after 1988. The military regime was determined to end the civil war and started bilateral ceasefire agreements with a small selection of ethnic armed organizations (EAOs). Throughout the 1990s many ethnic armed groups were forced into a ceasefire agreement with the government when they could no longer withstand the intensified attacks of the Burmese military (Burmalink, 2014). Yet at the same time the government sent troops into action against the Karen National Union (KNU) and other ethnic armed groups including the Mon, Kachin and Karenni (Nyein, 2009: 129-130).

In 2010 general elections were held for the first time in twenty years after the military coup, although they were highly controversial. The elections were won by the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) and U Thein Sein became the new President of Myanmar (Burmalink, 2014). Since U Thein Sein became president, the country saw several political reforms of which new rounds of peace talks were the most significant.

3.2. The NCA process from 2011 - 2015

The political transition in Myanmar and its peace process initiated by the semi-civilian government in 2011 needs to be understood in light of the previous military regime. The new government, at that time, had to restore the legitimacy problem from both the Myanmar citizens and the international community. In restoring the legitimacy issue, the government started to make some reformist changes such as the release of some political prisoners and initiated peace talks with EAOs to seek bilateral ceasefire agreements (Zaw Oo, 2014: 15). These bilateral ceasefires were not something new. Before 2011, the long running civil war in Myanmar had already seen ceasefires signed between a number of EAOs and government forces. The most remarkable ceasefires over the last 25 years were the ones with the United Wa State Army (UWSA), the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) in 1994, though this one broke down in 2011, and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) in 1995 (ISDP, 2015: 1). In 2013 the government agreed to start multilateral negotiations over a single-document national ceasefire agreement, now known as the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA). It was the first time in history that a government had agreed to negotiate a multilateral ceasefire (Ibid: 1).

From 2013 to 2015 many peace talks and negotiations were held between the government and EAOs. Throughout the seven rounds of negotiations the EAOs were

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members. The government and the Tatmadaw were represented through the Union Peace-making Central Committee (UPCC) and the Union Peace-Peace-making Working Committee (UPWC), running the actual negotiations, composed out of mostly regional-level representatives. Finally, after two years since the initial start, the NCCT and UPWC met in March 2015 for an official signing of the ‘Provisional Draft NCA’.

A major achievement was when the government made a commitment to a ‘federal’ system, which was requested by the NCCT. Since the NCCT cannot sign on behalf of its members, the NCCT referred the draft to the EAOs leaders for review. In order for the EAOs to agree with the draft, they proposed 12 amendments. One of the main amendments was the inclusivity of all EAOs as only 15 EAOs were invited by the UPWC to come sign the initial NCA with an option for half of those excluded to negotiate their inclusion at a later stage. Another point of disagreement involved the Tatmadaw’s demand for an NCA to be in accordance with the military’s ‘6-point guidelines’. Agreeing to this demand from the Tatmadaw would implicitly mean an acceptance of the 2008 Constitution which fails to guarantee any ethnic nationality rights. Moreover, article 455 of the Constitution underlines the role of the military regime in participating in political leadership and solidified impunity for government officials, even those suspected of committed serious human rights violations (ISDP, 2015: 2-3; Burmalink, 2014).

A series of new negotiating rounds followed in July and August where most of the remaining disagreements were negotiated. Some of those have been deferred for further discussion in a later round of political dialogue. The NCA is a first step in the larger peace process as the whole peace process contains seven stages. These are: signing the NCA (1), drafting political dialogue and negotiating security reintegration matters (2), holding political dialogue and implementing security reintegration (3), Union Convention (4), Union Accord Signing (5), Union parliament approval (6) and finally the implementation (7). Despite the fact that not all disagreements have been resolved and are deferred to a later stage of the ceasefire and political dialogue, 8 EAOs still have signed the final draft of the NCA in October 2015 with the government (ISDP, 2015: 3).

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Chapter IV. Theoretical Framework

The previous chapter provided an overview of the conflict and the NCA process. The information on the conflict in Myanmar and the current peace process provides a better understanding of the country’s politics and the dynamics between the government and the EAOs. Moreover, it useful in shaping the main argument and observable implications of this research. For the theoretical framework of this research the bargaining model of war will be used as it links the causes, duration, termination and consequences of war into a single theoretical consistent process. Furthermore, it also points out often overlooked factors that may halt peace in a country, such as disagreements over military capabilities, overcoming commitment problems and the potential inability to divide up the goods at stake (Reiter, 2003: 27). Myanmar makes a good case for empirically testing the bargaining model of war as the government is currently involved in a bargaining process with several EAOs to establish peace within the country. Following the theoretical framework, the main argument of this research and its observable implications will be presented. An alternative explanation is discussed at the end of this chapter.

4.1. The bargaining model of war

The brief overview of the history of Myanmar, previously discussed in the above paragraph, shows the complexity of the conflict. The latter stresses the importance to analyze the conflict and the obstacles that halt peace within the country. Thus, how can we theoretically make sense of these complicated processes in Myanmar’s conflict between the government and the EAOs?

The bargaining model of war starts with the assumption that rational actors may resort to war in order to get what they want. This model has dominated the study of war since the late 20th century. In order to solve the conflict in which the involved parties disagree over the

allocation of goods, resources or policies they can be expected to bargain with each other (Reiter, 2003: 28). The logic behind this is the fact that war is costly and, therefore, the parties should be motivated to bargain with each to end the war or even to withdraw from starting a war as it is an undesired outcome for both. However, it often occurs that the parties are not able to come to an agreement due to factors or mechanisms that influence bargaining failures (Hartzell, 2016).

The first factor mentioned by the bargaining model of war that influence bargaining failures is that of information about the other party’s capabilities and adversaries. The decision to continue fighting instead of reaching an agreement is closely related to a groups’ military

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capabilities. During bargaining over the allocation of political power, bargaining participants tend to use their own military capabilities relative to their opponent’s to determine what they will demand and how much, and whether they will accept or reject demands from their opponents or otherwise go back to fighting (Park, 2015: 174). However, gaining this information about the opponents’ military capabilities and adversaries is usually difficult as civil war combatants have many reasons not to be truthful about their relative power. This could be the case when they fear that the information can be used against them at a later stage in the bargaining process or in the post-war situation but also because they believe they might get a better deal out of the negotiations. Thus, this incomplete or false information makes the bargaining process more complicated (Walter, 1999: 132). However, it is also argued that the other party capabilities and adversaries should reveal during the war and that the longer a war lasts, the more information can be collected about each other and the better they will be able to resolve any new or lingering disputes (Walter, 1997: 256).

Another obstacle to a negotiated settlement is the level of uncertainty the involved parties face, also called the commitment problem. According to the bargaining and war literature, commitment problems could make war a rational strategy in situations where the combatants cannot credibly promise to adhere to an agreement over time (Walter, 2009: 246; Fearon, 2004). The explanation for this is twofold. Firstly, usually a large power asymmetry exists between governments and rebel groups. This makes it easy for a government to renege a promise and harder for rebel groups to trust the government on upholding the agreement, especially when the government gains strength again and has an upper hand in terms of the strategic environment (Fearon, 2004). As state’s intentions are never fixed, but are subject to change with little advance notice, this makes it risky for rebel groups to cooperate too closely with the government. For example, minds can be changed, new leaders can come to power, values can shift and new opportunities or dangers can arise (Jervis, 1978: 172). Moreover, rebel groups do not often have the means to penalize the government should they violate the agreement (Walter, 2009: 246). Thus, negotiated settlements are highly sensitive to any changes in relative power that may occur after a war is fought.

Secondly, by agreeing to the settlement, rebel groups always become military weaker and more vulnerable through demobilizing their soldiers and giving back controlled territory to the government. This makes rebel groups all more vulnerable in making a good agreement for themselves and therefore have a weaker bargaining position, which makes it hard to make a settlement (Walter, 1999: 134). Even if a government offers all the concessions the rebels originally demanded, it may still occur that rebels walk away from a settlement if the

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opportunity for post-treaty exploitation exist (Walter, 2009: 254). In this state of uncertainty, the opposition may be inclined to preempt government action and take up arms again to avoid being the victims of a first strike (Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). To address this dilemma, a mediator or a peacekeeping mission is often mentioned as a solution to the commitment problem. Mediators facilitate communication between the parties to build trust, increase the flow of trustworthy information, can influence the parties’ beliefs and thereby helping adversaries to strike a bargain that secures peace (Mason and Siegfried, 2013). Moreover, peacekeeping missions may help the adversaries to credibly commit to maintain peace after a peace agreement has been signed between the parties. However, mediators and peacekeeping missions may mitigate fears of cheating, this it is not always the case. Even a peacekeeping mission is far from robust and cannot prevent combatants from simply giving up their weapons or guarantee to make combatants commit to their agreements. Moreover, third parties rarely have incentives to remain involved for an extended period of time (Downes, 2004: 239).

Finally, the last bargaining problem has to do with the stakes over which disputants are fighting. Negotiated settlements can be difficult to reach if combatants cannot divide the stakes over which they are fighting unless they can compromise (Ikle, 2005). The more the combatant values the stakes of the conflict and see it as something that is indivisible, the more willing he is to incur the costs of fighting rather than make concessions. Conversely, the more sensitive the combatant is to the costs of the conflict, the more willing he is to settle for an agreement and accept demanding proposals in order to avoid incurring the costs of another war (Filson and Werner, 2002: 829). Stakes related to territorial claims, were 70 percent less likely to be resolved through peace negotiations with rebel groups than with rebels seeking other goals (Walter, 2003). Bercovitch and DeRouen (2005) note that secessionist rebellions were less likely to seek mediation of their conflict and such conflicts were less likely to experience successful mediation than non-secessionist rebellions. Governments may also be wary to make agreements with a rebel groups seeking autonomy, because doing so would create a precedent and encourage other groups to seek a bargain. This fear of establishing a precedent effectively makes the issue at stake highly indivisible (Reiter, 2003: 30). Moreover, stakes appear to be more difficult to resolve in conflicts over symbolically and strategically important territory (Toft, 2006). Thus, the model anticipates that those who place a high value on the stakes of the conflict, especially those related to territorial claims or secessionist aspirations, are harder to resolve but may also be able to demand better terms during the negotiations (Filson and Werner, 2002: 829).

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4.2. Argument and observable implications

Paragraph 4.1 provided an overview of the historical roots of the conflict between the central government of Myanmar and the EAOs, which was then followed by the theoretical framework of this research in paragraph 4.2. Using this theoretical framework and the information derived from the case of armed conflict in Myanmar, the main argument of this research can be theorized.

The bargaining model assumes that the role of and access to information about the opponents’ military capabilities and adversaries has an influence on to the decision whether to continue or end the war. In the case of Myanmar this means that an EAO is more likely to sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement when they become aware that its military capabilities are weak compared to those of the central government. Thus, the costs to continue the fighting is too high. Furthermore, commitment problems create a level of uncertainty that can stand in the way of making a peace agreement. Therefore, an EAO will sign the NCA when it has reason to believe that the government can credibly commit to its promises made in the Agreement and during the peace talks. Finally, the bargaining model assumes that negotiated settlements are harder to reach when combatants perceive the stakes as indivisible. In the case of Myanmar, this means that an EAO will not sign the NCA when the stakes include separatist claims from the central government. In order words, signatory to the NCA will happen when the military capabilities of an EAO are weak, the EAO trusts the government and the EAO pursues more self-determination within the country.

If this argument is correct, it is expected that the EAOs that did sign the NCA have more difficulties defending themselves against the government of Myanmar and did not have enough financial means to sustain their army than the EAOs that did not sign the NCA. Oppositely, non-signatory EAOs military capabilities are sufficient enough to continue fighting and are able to finance their military. Furthermore, it can be observed that signatory EAOs have had more positive experiences with the government, which creates more commitment to work towards peace together and therefore sign the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement. On the contrary, non-signatory EAOs are expected to have more negative experiences with the government. Lastly, it is expected that signatory EAOs have accepted that their state remains part of the Union of Myanmar and shifted their demands from a separate state towards self-determination and more political autonomy within a federal union, whereas non-signatory EAOs want to become a separate state still.

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It could be possible that one of these mechanisms in the argument does not uphold anymore in the empirical analysis of the case, but when the other mechanisms are found to be present, the bargaining model can still make a contribution to the explanation for the variation in the signatory of the NCA by an EAO in Myanmar.

4.3. Alternative explanation

Where the bargaining model focuses on the bargaining problems that complicates negotiations and the peace process, other scholars have emphasized the role of more socio-economic, psychological and political issues that need to be addressed and resolved first in order to create peace. This becomes clear when reviewing the existing literature on civil wars that these underlying issues, such as economic inequality and political rights, are present throughout each stage of civil war. Thus, civil war termination is not seen as an independent puzzle but is inherently linked to the start and duration of civil war. Moreover, the bargaining model assumes that the actors are completely rational, however war has also an irrational component. Actors in civil wars are not just solely motivated by rational and economic reasons. In contrary, some scholars view civil wars as intense value conflicts that are fought over issues closer to the heart such as identity issues. Therefore, the underlying issues that drives rebel groups are more sociological and psychological factors, which is also referred in the literature as ‘grievances’. Grievances is a motivation based on a sense of injustice in the way a social group is treated, often with a strong historical dimension and are for that reason harder to compromise in establishing a negotiated settlement (Murshed, 2002: 389). Therefore, an assumption that can be made is that grievances play a more fundamental role in the decision making process of signing the NCA for the non-signatory EAOs than the signatory-EAOs.

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Chapter V. Research Design

The main purpose of this research is explaining the variation in the decision making of the EAOs in Myanmar in signing or not signing the NCA. This chapter describes the methodology, case selection, data collection and operationalization of the independent and dependent variables used in this study.

5.1. Methodology

In studying the termination of civil war, cross-country national studies have been the most common design in conducting research. However, these statistical analyses are more exposed to broader interpretation of concepts by putting together dissimilar cases to get a larger sample. Contrary, case studies and single case studies particularly allow for a higher level of validity because of the small sample (George and Bennet, 2005: 19). Furthermore, case studies are better in identifying the scope conditions of theories and assessing arguments concerning causal necessity or sufficiency (Ibid: 25) This also makes it easier to deal with the problems of endogeneity and selection that likely affect the results of more cross-country regressions studies (Sambanis, 2004: 263). Therefore, a single case study is used in this research to help explain the motivations or decision making process of the EAOs in Myanmar regarding the (non-)signatory of the NCA. The level of analysis is thus on the sub-national level and more specifically on the group level. This allows for a deeper analysis and understanding of the behavioral conditions from the actors’ perspective and employs a more credible research design. However, findings may be more context dependent and faces limitation in its generalizability (Zainal, 2007:1; Blattman, and Miguel, 2010:8).

In order to provide strong and robust research findings, this research employs two methods, namely congruence analysis and to a smaller extent semi-structured interviews. By using congruence analysis, the explanatory relevance or relative strength of the theoretical argument is tested by deducing sets of specific propositions and observable implications from the theory first. It will then compare the propositions and observable implications with empirical observations from the case study. When a high degree of congruence between the deduced implications and empirical evidence from within the case exists, the theory is argued to have great explanatory power (Blatter and Haverland, 2012: 144).

The semi-structured interview method was selected as a means for data collection because it allows for the exploration of the perceptions and opinion of respondents for a more

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in depth analysis (DiCicco-Bloom and Crabtree, 2006: 315). The questions were organized around a set of themes and assumptions deducted from the main and alternative argument.

5.2. Case selection

Ceasefire agreements are a common phenomenon in ending the fighting in civil wars. In 2016, a ceasefire between the FARC and the Colombian government was attempted to establish peace which would end five decades of civil war. In the same year, a ceasefire between the New People’s Army (NPA) and the government of the Philippines collapsed when counter-insurgencies were conducted by the government troops. Other examples of ceasefire agreements in civil wars include, amongst others, the case of Syria, Sri Lanka and Nepal. However, there are several reasons why Myanmar makes an interesting and typical case for this research.

Firstly, in terms of duration and the number of involved parties, Myanmar’s civil war stands out from others. The war in Myanmar is one of the longest running civil war in the world with almost 70 years of fighting. Moreover, whereas other civil wars deal with two or three rebel groups, the Myanmar government attempts to establish a ceasefire with fifteen EAOs. This great number of parties involved, makes the peace process more complicated as there are many different interests to take into consideration but the parties also have the ability to continue a war on their own, even when other groups sign a peace agreement (Cunningham, 2006). Thus, a deeper understanding of what drives these EAOs in signing a ceasefire agreement in such a complex situation could provide a road map for, and inspire, other long lasting civil wars in establishing peace.

Secondly, it is not the first time a ceasefire agreement has been drafted in Myanmar. Former ceasefire agreements were bilateral and between one EAO only and the government. However, it is the first time that a nationwide ceasefire agreement has been drafted. Due to the contemporary nature of this phenomenon, Myanmar and its rebel groups have been less studied and analyzed in terms of this recent NCA.

Thirdly, the theory and main argument of this research contends that EAOs will sign the NCA when they are provided with full information, are able to overcome the commitment problem, and have easily divisible stakes. It is argued that the longer a war lasts, the more information rebel groups are likely to collect about each other, and the better able they will be to resolve any new or lingering disputes. The length of civil war in the case of Myanmar should provide the EAOs with enough information about each other and the peace process, enabling

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explanation to the termination of civil war. The nature of the civil war in Myanmar is less ideologically driven than other civil wars. For example, the FARC in Colombia is driven by a communist ideology. Instead the civil war in Myanmar involves more political and socio-economic issues (Sakhong, 2013). Therefore, Myanmar represents a typical case for the rationalist explanation given in this research.

Due to time limitation and the availability of English resources online, it was not possible to examine the motivations of all fifteen EAOs in detail. Therefore, a focus will be on two EAOs – one from the signatory group and one from the non-signatory group. From the signatory group this is the Shan State Army South/Restoration Council Shan State (SSA-S/RCSS) and from the non-signatory group the Kachin Independence Organization/Kachin Independence Army (KIO/KIA). These two EAOs are mostly selected based on the available sources online, however they do share some similarities as well. For example, the KIO/KIA and SSA-S/RCSS have both one of the largest military troops and were involved in the original Panglong Conference in 1947 where they were promised to receive autonomy. This makes them one of the oldest established ethnic groups in conflict with the government. Furthermore, the areas in control of the KIO/KIA and SSA-S/RCSS – the Kachin state and Shan state – still experience sporadic violence until recently. However, the selection of these two cases can lead to selection bias whereas the result might be different from when if the entire non-signatory and signatory group of EAOs were examined (Hague and Harrop, 2010: 49). The selection bias will be more elaborated on in the discussion section of this research.

5.3. Data collection

The data for this research is derived from different sources including reports from non-governmental organizations (NGO’s), academic journals, local and international newspapers online, official government websites and databases. Furthermore, two interviews have been conducted.

One of the main sources for this research is the data collected from the Myanmar Peace Monitor online database. The Myanmar Peace Monitor is a project run by the Burma News International (BNI) that works to support communication and understanding in the current efforts for the peace and reconciliation in the country. It centralizes information and tracks past and current events regarding the peace process (BNI, 2017). Background information on the many stakeholders and rebel groups are presented by the Myanmar Peace Monitor and have been used for this research. Furthermore, official ceasefire documents, a

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reference guide on Myanmar’s peace process and analysis papers by the BNI have been derived from this database as well.

Another principal source used in this research is the Myanmar Information Management Unit (MIMU). The MIMU is a service to the UN Country Team and Humanitarian Country Team, under the management of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator. It maintains a common data and information archive in forms of maps, databases from various sources on all sectors countrywide and other tools which support the coordination, planning and implementation of humanitarian and development activities (MIMU, 2017). In particular, the MIMU has been useful for collecting information on the Kachin and Shan state containing its livelihood, conflict and internally displaced persons (IDPs). For more detailed information on the conflict in Kachin and Shan state and the risks for its people, the Minorities at Risk (MAR) database was used. The MAR is a research project by the University of Maryland that monitors and analyzes the status and conflicts of politically-active communal groups in countries with a population of at least 500,000 (MAR, 2017). However, the data was only current as of December 2006 but still relevant in providing background information.

Furthermore, other than databases, NGO reports and statements have been informative to this research. Especially CDES, Centre for Development and Ethnic Studies, an independent think tank and study center on topics such as democracy and human rights for Myanmar, and Fortify Rights, a NGO focused on investigating human rights violations based in Southeast Asia which regularly reports on the conflict Myanmar. Other NGOs that were inquired for data were, amongst others, Human Rights Watch, Swiss Peace Foundation, Crisis Group and local NGO’s focused on and representing specific ethnic groups.

Despite many attempts to hold interviews with individuals, rebel groups in Myanmar and organizations involved with or knowledgeable about the civil war, only two parties replied and were willing to answer the interview questions. One interview was with David Baulk, human rights specialist at Fortify Rights, and conducted via mail. The other interview was with the head of the political section, Nick Peulen, at the Netherlands Embassy in Yangon, Myanmar. This interview was conducted via mail as well. Other parties approached for an interview were, among others, East West center, Burma Partnership, Burma Centrum Nederland, CDES and journalists from the Myanmar Times and The Irrawady.

Finally, local and international newspapers such as the Myanmar Times, The Irrawaddy and The Diplomat, the official website of the government of Myanmar, and websites of the rebel groups itself have been used in the process of the data collection.

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5.4. Operationalization

This paragraph addresses how the dependent and independent variables of the main argument and the alternative argument are measured.

The dependent variable of this research is twofold: a signatory of the NCA or a non-signatory of the NCA. A non-signatory of the NCA is considered in this research as the actual signature from a representative of an EAO on the official NCA document. Furthermore, a signatory of the NCA is measured in the implementation of the main agreement of the NCA: ending the fighting. This will be from the moment the signatory took place, which for the signatory EAOs means October 15, 2015. There is a possibility that fighting will resume after the NCA has been signed, but it will still be considered as a signatory if it was the Myanmar army to make the first attack and violates the agreement.

The non-signatory of the NCA, on the contrary, means no signature from a representative of an EAO on the official NCA document and armed clashes between the EAO and government is still a regular phenomenon. Hence, while some EAOs are in primarily peace talks with the government and are perhaps willing to sign the NCA in the future, this will also be considered as a non-signatory of the NCA.

Now that the dependent variables are discussed, the independent variables are as follows. According to the bargaining theory of war, information about the other party capabilities and adversaries will reveal during the war. This influences the decision to continue or end a civil war and was closely related to the military capabilities of a group. Therefore, the first independent variable is military capabilities. Military capabilities can be measured in many ways, for instance the total population of a state or iron and steel consumption. For this research, military capabilities will follow the operationalization by the Correlates of War Project, version 4.0. Therefore, military capabilities will be operationalized in the number of military personnel under the command of the national government or rebel group.

The second independent variable of the main argument is the commitment problem. The commitment problem deals with the level of trust that rebel groups have in the government in Myanmar. The level of trust is difficult to measure, but it can however be operationalized in terms of earlier ceasefire agreements that have failed due to violation from the government side. Furthermore, the level of trust can be operationalized empirically by promises that have been made to the rebel groups in the past by the government but have never been executed. Another possible way to measure commitment problems is by the how rebel groups can credibly commit to an agreement. However, that measurement focuses more on peacebuilding

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after a ceasefire agreement has been signed while this research looks at the obstacles rebel groups face in their decision to sign a ceasefire agreement or not.

The third variable, the divisibility of stakes, exists out of two measurements, namely ‘divisibility’ and ‘stakes’. Stakes can be measured in multiple ways, for instance claiming more political power or natural resources. Here, stakes are measured in claiming ownership over a piece of territory (Walter, 2004: 247). Divisibility depends on which aims the rebel groups have, whether they are secessionist or non-secessionist. A secessionist war is when a faction attempts to split from the central government and aims to create a new state. If factions are fighting for more regional autonomy, the conflict is non-secessionist. Secessionist demands for territory are expected more difficult to meet than non-secessionist demands (Downes, 2004: 231).

The alternative explanation emphasized the role of grievances and contends that the role of grievances played a more fundamental role in the decision-making process for the non-signatory EAOs than the non-signatory EAOs. Grievances is operationalized here according the operationalization used by Collier and Hoeffler (2004) and includes several measurements. It is acknowledged that endogeinity could prevail as grievances can also lead to secessionist movements or demands, or commitment problems.

First, grievances are measured in ethnic and religious hatred. The degree of ethno-linguistic and religious fractionalization of a country’s population can lead to conflict due to ethnic and religious hatred and discrimination. As a result, grievances can be developed from discrimination (Gurr, 2000: 71).

The second measurement for grievances is political exclusion. According to Wimmer (2002: 91), ethno-nationalist mobilization is driven by the politicization of ethnic differences. When the government intends to become an even-handed, culturally neutral institution or favors one ethnic group over the others, it by definition fails to be representative of the entire population. Thus, political exclusion is a key factor in political and civil conflict and will be measured by the inclusion of EAOs in government decision making processes and the ability to influence the peace process (Hedström and Smith, 2013: 5).

Grievances is also operationalized in political repression. Hegre et al. (2001) find that repression increases conflict except when it is severe. Political repression will be measured in civil and political rights borrowed from the Freedom House and include, freedom of expression, assembly, association and education.

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prosperity of one group can influence the decision to continue to rebel or not. Sen (1973) asserts that the relation between inequality and rebellion is indeed a close one. The poor may rebel to induce redistribution, and rich regions may mount secessionist rebellions to pre-empt redistribution. However, income poverty data is not yet available for each state or per ethnic group in Myanmar thus economic inequality will be measured in how many people are living below the poverty line using the Integrated Household Living Conditions Assessment (IHCLA), measured by consumption expenditure on food and non-food items, and income extracted from natural resources.

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Chapter VI. Analysis

Chapter 3 already provided an overview of the conflict in Myanmar, which had as objective to contribute to the main argument and observable implications of this research. This chapter will build on chapter 3 by focusing first on the alternative explanation, which assumes that grievances play a more fundamental role in the decision of EAOs in signing the NCA or not. It becomes clear that grievances cannot fully explain the variation in the signatory of the NCA by EAOs. Therefore, after discussing grievances, this chapter will shift its focus to the main argument of this research. The analysis is organized according to the three assumptions made by the bargaining model of war.

6.1. The role of grievances

Successive Myanmar governments, since 1948, have always made clear their disdain for the country’s ethnic nationalities (Baulk, 2017). They have always pursued an ethnically homogenous unitary state of Myanmar with Myanmar-batha-ska as the official language and Buddhism as the state religion. This started with U Nu (1948-1962) who tried to establish nation-building through cultural and religious assimilation and his successor Ne Win (1962-1988) who imposed the national language policy of Myanmar-batha-ska as a means of creating a homogenous unitary state. Similarly, the SPDC (former SLORC) used ethnicity as a means of national integration by imposing ethnic assimilation into the dominant ethnicity,

Myanmar-lumyo and changed the name from Burma to Myanmar in 1989 (Sakhong, 2014: 7).

Consequences of these policies were targeted offenses against ethnic minorities by the Tatmadaw who aspired a separate ethno-national identity in Myanmar. The Kachin, for instance, are targeted by Burmese authorities because of their Christian beliefs and reports show that Kachin are subjected to conversion activities and discriminatory treatment by authorities (MAR, 2017). Moreover, a massive counterinsurgency campaign by the Tatmadaw against Shan started in 1995 and there have been many reports of Shan being subjected to human rights violations such as forced labor, destruction of property and discrimination of members of the Shan community. Furthermore, their language is not allowed to be taught in schools (Ibid, 2017). The inability for ethnic minorities to maintain and practice their own cultures which defines their identities, including language, religion and literature will continue to be a source for future conflicts between EAOs and the government (Pederson, 2008: 56). Baulk (2017) contends: “This is nothing new. Myanmar governments have presided over the

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destruction of ethnic nationalities' religious and cultural property, refused to allow ethnic languages to be taught in schools, and rewritten the history of Myanmar's recent conflicts while presiding over campaigns of terror in ethnic states.”

Political repression was severe under the military government of General Ne Win as many political leaders and activists were improvised without trial. The political leaders also included the first president of Burma, Sao Shwe Thaike and Prime Minister U Nu. These deaths have always been remembered by the ethnic minorities, especially by Shan people since the first president was a highly respected Shan political figure. Moreover, General Ne Win abandoned the federal structure that was established with the 1947 constitution and tried to establish a centralized, one-party system government (Smith, 1994: 26). The new constitution of 1974 centralized every aspect of political, economic, social and cultural life and abolished the right of secession. New political parties were not allowed to be formed. Only when then 1974 constitution was suspended by the successive government in 1988, a new era of multi-party democracy was shortly lived and political parties were permitted to form. (Smith, 1994: 27-28). Restrictions on the rights to freedom of expression and assembly still persists since the government still applies a wide range of rights-abusing laws that have long been used to criminalize free speech and prosecute dissidents. In 2013, Thein Sein pledged to release all political prisoners by the end of his term. Instead, his government continued to arrest activists under the name of politically motivated charges. Throughout the year, many Arakanese men were arrested under the Unlawful Association Act for alleged ties with the EAO, the Arakan Army (Human Rights Watch, 2017). Publication of non-Burman newspapers and books are still banned (Pederson, 2008: 56).

One of the most fundamental grievance of ethnic leaders in Myanmar is their lack of influence on the political process and thereby policy decisions that affect them and their communities. Since the country’s independence, all main national political institutions have been dominated by ethnic Burmans. With the centralization of the government throughout the years, more ethnic leaders have been excluded from power in their local areas as well. Many have thus accused Bruman-dominated governments of having betrayed the promises that were made at the 1947 Panglong Conference (Pederson, 2008: 54). For example, the Kachin were excluded from participating and voting in the national elections of November 2010. The Tatmadaw forbid political parties or independent candidates of the Kachin to participate and removed KIO-candidates who were already on the list. Furthermore, it barred thousands of Kachin in KIO controlled areas from voting (Human Rights Watch, 2012). Moreover, in

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regards of the NCA, the government has systematically denied inclusion of six EAOs in the initial signing round in 2015 (Baulk, 2017).

Finally, ethnic states are economically behind compared to the center of Myanmar where most ethnic Burmans reside. Ethnic states have the highest percentage of people living in poverty, particularly in Chin state (73%), Rakhin state (44%) and Shan state (33%) (BNI, 2014: 21). Moreover, according to Unicef’s ‘Child Risk Index’, most of the border regions fall significantly below the national average of twelve socio-economic indicators of household income including health status, health care, education, and safe water and sanitation. Chin, Arakan (Rakhine), eastern Shan, and Karen states are considered particularly high risk areas for children, followed by southern Shan, northern Shan and Karenni states. Only Mon and Kachin states are better off than the least developed parts of central Myanmar (Pederson, 2008: 55). Governments after 1988 have provided more financial aid to some ethnic states but the assistance is of questionable value for local populations. Improved access to former conflict areas has also attracted new investors who are plundering the natural resources closing access for local communities, and rapidly exhausting the potential for future development. Moreover, successive governments have got very rich from the natural resources that have made Kachin and Shan famous – namely, jade and poppy. For decades, the financial benefits of extracting these natural resources have been denied ethnic populations – a trend which continues today. Finding gainful employment that upholds basic worker rights in that environment is hardly impossible (Baulk, 2017). Baulk (2017) says about this situation: “We’ve spoken to young men and women who feel that they have only two options: eke out a living in poppy fields or mines where safety standards are almost non-existent, or join an EAO and fight.”

6.2. Findings

The alternative explanation for the variation in the decision of the EAOs in signing or not signing the NCA, assumes that grievances play a more fundamental role than the rationalist explanations given by the bargaining model of war. When looking at the first variable for grievances, ethnic and religious hatred, it becomes clear that all ethnic minorities are exposed to discriminatory behavior from the government. Successive governments since the country’s independence have always tried to unify the country by imposing discriminatory policies and neglecting the culture, language and religion of ethnic minorities. Therefore, this variable cannot explain the difference in the decision making of signatory and non-signatory EAOs. This also applies to the variable of political repression as rights-abusing laws apply to all ethnic minorities. Political exclusion seems to have some explanatory power as political inclusiveness

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