No Business as Usual: an analysis of Dutch
policy towards Russia in the wake of MH17
University of Amsterdam
MSc Political Science: International Relations
Research Project: Conflict: Political Economy, Colonial Legacy,
Foreign Policy
Author: Michael van Dam, 11044705 Supervisor: Dr. Said Rezaeiejan
Second Reader: Dr. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh Date: 5 June 2020
Table of contents
Acknowledgements………..5 List of abbreviations……….6 Abstract………7 Chapter 1 Introduction………..8 1.1 Historical background………8 1.2 Research Plan……….9 1.3 Relevance………...10 1.4 Outline………....11Chapter 2 Literature Review………12
2.1 Political………..12 2.2 Economy………15 2.3 EU perspective………...17 2.4 Russian Perspective………...19 2.5 Security………..20 2.6 Conclusion……….21
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework………..23
3.1 Foreign Policy………...23
3.2 National Interest………25
3.3 Liberal institutionalism and Normative Power………...…..28
3.4 Foreign Policy Analysis………30
3.5 The Rational Actor Model………32
3.6 Conceptualisation of Variables……….34
4.1 Operationalisation of the Variables………35 4.1.2 Research Design………..37 4.2 Sources………...39 4.3 Reflection………...40 Chapter 5 Security……….42 5.1 Territorial Security……….42 5.2 Digital Security………..47
5.3 Security against foreign influence……….50
5.4 Conclusion……….54 Chapter 6 Koopman………..55 6.1 Trade………..55 6.2 Energy………58 6.3 Russia’s neighbourhood……….62 6.4 Conclusion……….……….65 Chapter 7 Dominee……….………67 7.1 Human Rights……….………67 7.2 MH17……….……….71
7.3 Crisis Areas: Ukraine and Syria……….………….75
7.4 Conclusion……….………..78
Chapter 8 Conclusion………..………80
Bibliography………..…………84
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Acknowledgements
The road that I have followed that eventually led me to this moment has been long, but worthwhile. When I graduated from high school I never figured I would end up pursuing an academic master’s degree. Yet, my interest in history drove me to study to become an
historian. During this study I developed a fascination for contemporary international relations and so I ended up following this path. This decision has proven to be the right choice as it broadened my world view.
It has not been an easy task to write my dissertation as the writing process coincided with the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. Although the lockdown measures did erase some distractions for finishing my research, it was a mental burden to stay focussed as the world almost seemed to collapse around me. As a result, the past few months have been quite stressful as I had to attend to both finishing my thesis and worrying about my future in a world torn by a global pandemic.
Against this backdrop, I am obliged to express my sincere gratitude to those who helped me to reach the finish line. Firstly, my mother; without your mental support
throughout the years, I’m not sure if I would have been able to keep my head above the water of my eternal ocean of self-doubt. You always had faith in me and encouraged me to never give up, thank you! Secondly, my father; you basically funded my entire tertiary education and therefore spared my from being captured by immense student loans. Whereas your parents never offered you the same opportunity, thank you! Thirdly, I also owe my supervisor dr. Said Rezaeiejan my gratitude. You provided great and fast feedback and your constructive criticism steered my in the right direction. Thank you for your time! Lastly, I want to thank Dr. Mehdi Parvizi Amineh for his time to assess my thesis as a second reader. Thank you!
Michael van Dam Velserbroek, June 2020
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List of abbreviations
AIV Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken
AIVD Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst
CDA Christen-Democratisch Appèl
EAEU Eurasian Economic Union
EU European Union
EUCO European Council
FPA Foreign Policy Analysis
GGE United Nations Group of Governmental Experts
JIT Joint Investigation Team
MH17 Malaysia Airlines Flight 17
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NCTV Nationaal Coördinator Terrorismebestrijding en Veiligheid
NDPP NATO Defence Planning Process
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
RAM Rational Actor Model
RVO Rijksdienst voor Ondernemend Nederland
UN United Nations
UNHRC United Nations Human Rights Council
UNSC United Nations Security Council
US United States
VNO-NCW Vereniging VNO-NCW
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Abstract
The aim of this study is to answer how the policy of the Netherlands towards Russia has developed in the wake of the MH17 disaster. The main theme of friction in this work is the ongoing Dutch debate of whether the country should primarily focus on playing the role of a ‘Koopman’ (Merchant) or a ‘Dominee’ (Pastor) when it interacts with other sovereign actors in a foreign policy context. However as Russia is an important actor in the field of security (military threat, cybersecurity and exerting foreign influence), this dimension was also addressed in this study. By studying these individual topics based on theoretical insights derived from liberal institutionalism, normative power and the rational actor model, it was possible to identify links between them that ultimately constituted the development of the Russia policy. The findings can be summarised as the following.
The Netherlands security interest in its Russia policy was not influenced by the MH17 disaster. It can be characterised mainly as following in line with international partners,
primarily NATO. Cooperation in an EU and NATO context was the main theme that
constituted the Dutch approach in safeguarding its security interests in relation to Russia. This policy course did position the Dutch internationally as a trustworthy ally that believes in cooperation. As a Koopman, the Dutch did not forget that it had an economic interest in Russia, but The Hague refrained from ‘openly’ interacting with Moscow directly. Instead it rather dealt with local authorities, via the EU or the Russian sphere of influence. Since the Dutch did not play their ‘Koopman’ role openly, it could credibly play its Dominee role. The Hague again looked towards international partners and institutions for aid in fulfilling its national interests. The main strategy of The Hague was to employ normative pressure on the Russian Federation to frustrate its role in violating human rights, meddling in crisis areas and resisting cooperation in the MH17 investigation. Therefore, the Dutch policy developed in a rational manner that allowed it to satisfy all national interests without compromise.
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Chapter 1- Introduction
1.1 Historical Background
After the end of the Second World War, the Dutch Foreign policy has been based on three pillars: ‘International rule of law’, ‘Multilateralism’ and ‘European Cooperation’ (Hellema 2014: 5). In the immediate Post-war period, foreign policy was rooted in a notion of a global battle between good and evil, reinforced by the Netherlands’s collective memory of wartime experiences, which poses the Dutch as ‘good’ and the Germans as ‘evil’. The Cold War period was a continuation of this battle with the Dutch being on the side of the ‘good’
Americans vs the ‘evil’ Soviet-Union. However, this illusion faded as the Vietnam War made clear that the Americans were not inherently good and the Netherlands role in the Indonesian War of Independence gradually entered into the collective memory of the nation (Both 2014: 3)
At the same time, the Netherlands sought to compensate for losing its status as both a maritime and colonial power. A fitting role was found in the principle of being a ‘Gidsland’ (Guiding Nation). Both political and societal factions agreed that it would be up to the
Netherlands to change the world for the better by setting an excellent example for the world to follow. This translated into liberal drugs, prostitution and abortion policies. In the
international domain and via international organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Netherlands became a strong advocate for humans rights, environment and global
disarmament and spent more than average on development aid in the third world (Klijn 2011: 135-139).
However, despite the seemingly idealistic character of the Dutch foreign policy, the economic element cannot be ignored. Even more so, policymakers realised that a free and independent trade environment is paramount to the Netherlands. This led to the realisation that the space the Dutch have for conducting trade is subject to foreign influence and this sparked an active Dutch foreign policy and the desire to always have a seat at the negotiation table (Idem: 123).
Acting within the sphere of alliances such as the European Union (EU), UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to secure its national interests became the pillars of Dutch foreign policy, but the Dutch would retain a specific native element, that of being a ‘Gidsland’ by trying to be on the forefront of changing the world for the better. This policy translated into the ongoing political and societal debate of ‘de Koopman vs de Dominee’
9 (Merchant vs the Pastor). To clarify, this means the question of whether economic or
idealistic issues should be the main focus of foreign policy and its aligned diplomatic efforts (Hoebink 2006: 478-480).
The debate that originated in the 1970’s carried over into the 21st century. However, until 2014 the dilemma never hit the Netherlands at home. This changed with the downing of Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 (MH17) in which 193 Dutch nationals perished, presumably at the hands of Russian backed separatists in Ukraine. This incident was a national trauma for the Dutch population and there was strong political and societal pressure on the government to undertake a serious effort in bringing those who were responsible to justice. However, the fact that the disaster was linked to Russia was problematic, considering that strong economic ties between the Netherlands and Russia had develop since the fall of the Soviet-Union in 1991; with the Netherlands being one of Russia’s major trade and investments partner and in turn Russia being the largest supplier of the Dutch energy needs via gas and oil exports (Tocht 2015: 1-3).
Efforts of the Netherlands to compel Russia into compliance via UN institutions such as the Security council have proven to be futile. At the same time, Ukraine being the location of the disaster has possibly brought a pry between the Dutch interests of bringing perpetrators to justice and the Dutch and EU interests of deepening political and economic relations with Ukraine and maintaining economic relations with Russia. The old pillars of maintaining an idealistic foreign policy within the framework of multilateralism in the sense of international organisations and the rule of law have now been challenged and the question is:
“How has the Netherlands policy towards Russia developed since the MH17 disaster?”
1.2 Research Plan
The disaster has to be considered as an event that altered the ‘normal’ course of relations between the Netherlands and Russia. The former had to alter its approach to the latter which is multiple times its size in both geographic and demographic terms. There are multiple
dimensions that one needs to consider before the main question can be answered in an integral manner. These dimensions consist of three subjects that will be analysed. Firstly, the main characteristics and developments in the Dutch Russia policy regarding security implications shall be examined. Second, the implications of the Dutch economic strategy regarding Russia or as it will be called in this thesis, the ‘Koopman’ aspect. Third, the normative ‘Dominee’
10 approach of the Dutch government in persuading Russia to cooperate with MH17
investigation, human rights and other ´gidsland duties´.
Firstly, ‘security’ was an issue before the disaster took place. In 2014 Russia invaded and annexed the Crimea and supported separatists militarily in a civil war that was fought in the eastern part of Ukraine. This created tensions between NATO and Russia. The
Netherlands, being a NATO member state, could not afford to be on the side-line in this conflict. In the same year, the Netherlands became a victim of this war. The focus in this chapter shall lie on how security themes developed in the Russia strategy of the Netherlands with the previous mentioned background in mind.
Secondly, the ‘Koopman’ aspect of Dutch foreign policy will be thoroughly analysed. The Netherlands is a ´trade nation´ that heavily relies on exports for generating its national wealth. Russia was an important trade partner and market for Dutch businesses. At the same time, Russia is the largest supplier of Dutch energy needs, regarding gas and oil imports. It is quite challenging or even undesirable to neglect a state with this status of importance. In this regard, the focus shall lie on how the economic part of the Russia strategy is polished towards a new political reality that exist between these two nations.
Thirdly, the ‘Dominee’ component of Dutch foreign policy towards Russia will be the centre of focus in the next chapter. While the traditional role that the Netherlands attributes itself, namely that of a normative nation that has the duty the make the world a better place to life in, has now transformed into a less altruistic character, since the stakes are now ´rooted in its own backyard´. A nation that lost 193 of its citizens cannot afford to remain silent and be immobilized on the international stage. Especially since the role of Russia in the occurrence of the disaster was suspected at an early stage. Therefore, a focus shall lie on how the strategy is tailored towards compelling Russia into compliance with the investigation into the disaster and how multilateral contexts such as the working through the EU, UN and NATO were involved here.
1.3 Relevance
The relevance of this research is twofold. It will serve to fulfil both an academic and a societal necessity. Regarding the academic component, this research will expand upon existing
research that has been conducted on the question how the Netherlands policy towards Russia has developed since the MH17 disaster. It is important to note here, that whereas existing material has already covered loose components of the complex dynamics that define the
11 relationship between the Netherlands and Russia, i.e. economic, political, security, societal, no work has been produced that ties these component together in a coherent manner. It will be the aim of this research to accomplish this task, by employing foreign policy analysis. As an additional merit, the research will provide an academic element in addition to the abundant journalistic articles that have been written on the topic.
Regarding the societal component, the research will contribute to a better
understanding of the decision making process of the Dutch government. Relations between the Netherlands and Russia were shook, because of MH17. A political dilemma for the Dutch ensued: how would it find a balance between the economic and societal interests of a grieving nation? And how would its other interests be affected by this? It is relevant to inquire into how a middle sized Western democratic nation copes with this dilemma, considering a contemporary trend of the revitalisation of great power politics. Although no claim is made here that the research has a high degree of transferability, considering its unique case.
Regardless, the research is important, not only from a Dutch perspective, but also for a wider global audience. Since it provides an overview of how a nation and the individuals who reside inside its borders can maintain a voice in an international arena of great powers and the Netherlands is not the only country that faces this challenge.
1.4 Outline
This thesis consists of eight chapters. This chapter served as an introductory chapter and provided context and an overview of what one should expect reading this work. In the next chapter, the current state of literature on the topic of this thesis shall be summarised and reviewed. The third chapter shall provide a theoretical framework that will guide the analysis of the empirical data. The methodology, research design and data sources will be discussed in the fourth chapter. The actual empirical analysis shall commence from the fifth chapter and onwards to and including the seventh. In the fifth chapter, we will examine the security aspect of the Netherlands Russia policy. In the sixth chapter we turn to the economic dimension that is relevant the Koopman role of the Netherlands policy towards Russia. The seventh chapter will account for the Dominee role of the Netherlands and therefore display the Netherlands normative policy actions. Finally, in the eight chapter we will formulate an answer to the pivotal question of this thesis, by utilising the insights that we have gained from the three empirical chapters.
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review
Regarding prior research into the Netherlands relations with Russia after the occurrence of the MH17 disaster, it is notable that relatively few academic sources have been produced in the last couple of years. This does not mean that no authoritative work is available. Quite to the contrary, journalistic and think tank articles were written. It will be primarily these works that will be studied in this literature review. However, academic work is not completely absent from this review. In the light of the Netherlands embeddedness in the frame of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, the scholarly work on the relations with Russia on an EU level will also be examined. This literature review is constituted of five categories that relate to the subject, namely ‘Economy’, ‘Politics’, ‘European perspective’, ‘Russian perspective’ and ‘Security’.
2.1 Political
A compact but insightful sketch of the immediate diplomatic efforts towards Russia has been written by Han ten Broeke.1 Ten Broeke’s main characterisation of the Dutch approach
towards Russia in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster is ‘neutrality’. Apparently it was vital to the Dutch interests to appear to the international community as neutral as possible, despite the fact that Netherlands was the largest victim of the disaster. This position of neutrality has to be appreciated as mere pragmatism on the side of Dutch officials. By displaying an image of neutrality they believed it would generate the highest chance of success in achieving three main goals. These goals were set in the following particular order: 1) repatriation of the victims, 2) determination of the disaster’s causes, and 3) investigation and trial of the perpetrators. The success of achieving these hinged on the cooperation of both Ukraine and Russia who could exert influence on the pro-Russian rebels in Eastern Ukraine, the location of the disaster. Acting neutral was vital to prevent the antagonization of Russia and securing its cooperation. (Ten Broeke 2019).
Ten Broeke deemed the success of achieving the first two goals and with the first goal in particular as the merits of Mark Rutte and Frans Timmermans (former Minister of Foreign affairs). ‘They were the right men at the right position at the right time’, because both men possessed capable diplomatic skills which they employed to rally the international community
1 Ten Broeke was spokesperson for the ruling party VVD on matters of foreign policy and the Dutch armed forces, at the time of the MH17 disaster. It is important took take into account that ten Broeke as a former high ranking VVD politician had (and possibly still has) close relations with Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who also held this position in 2014.
13 to the Netherlands side and appease Russia at the same time.2 In his final remark, Ten Broeke summarises the causes of success as ‘maintaining good contacts’, agile diplomacy’ and ‘realpolitik leadership’ (Ibid).
There are certain elements of Ten Broeke’s argument that seems to be worthwhile to further investigate. At first, the goals of the Netherlands. It is mentioned that the Netherlands had vital interest in appearing neutral on the international stage. However, Ten Broeke fails to provide a clear picture of how this translated to its foreign policy strategy towards Russia. What elements were specifically altered to maintain a neutral position? Secondly, how did the notion of neutrality being the best course of action came about? One could argue that this seems to be the natural outcome when one country needs another country´s favour, but this does not correspond to what Ten Broeke describes in the same article of what Australia’s initial strategy was. Namely a course of seeking a direct confrontation with Russia, which was prevented by the efforts of the Dutch. (Ibid).
Therefore for this thesis it is prudent to build upon what Ten Broeke’s analysis lacks. Namely a clear set of concepts that guides an inquiry into the decision-making process of a state. For instance, ´neutrality´ is not a passive immobilised course of action, but rather a deliberate action. Hence, the reason why one needs to dissect what action a state makes or refrains from making and what consequences this entails. Furthermore what rationale is the backdrop behind this course of action. This thesis will seek to answer this mechanism. The Hague Centre for Strategic studies published a report on developments regarding international conflict. This report was produced in cooperation with Clingendael Institute. The report was written by three authors who employed both qualitative and quantitative data for their analysis. The approach of the researchers adhered to academic standards in the sense of providing clarity about the utilised methodology and dataset.
The main findings related to the research question were assessments of what kind of actor Russia is from the perspective of the Netherlands. For instance, Russia is deemed as a ‘counterpart’. Counterparts are of strategic interests for Netherlands, but they do not share the same values as the Dutch. In the case of Russia, the authors translate this into a Dutch reliance on Russia as a supplier of energy, hence the strategic interests, but at the same time the
meddling of Russia in the Ukrainian Civil War is was denounced by Western democracies.
2 There are other elements however that seems to be more problematic. For instance, Ten Broeke does ascribe a high amount of credit to just two men: Mark Rutte and Frans Timmermans. Considering that the other was a colleague of both, it seems fair to assume that Ten Broeke’s assessment is tainted by his personal relationship with them. Also the primary sources that the author utilises are his own experiences as a VVD politician who was part of this political process. A certain amount of academic neutrality is therefore not guaranteed.
14 The authors do not mention Russia’s stance in the MH17 dossier (Spiegeleire et al.: 16). Another article that sheds more light on the Dutch perspective was written by
Clingendael researcher Barend ter Haar. The main aim of the article ‘Dutch narratives about Russian-Western relations’ is to provide an overview of how Dutch foreign policy has developed across the years in congruence with the broader relations between the West and Russia.
Ter Haar offers the reader concepts to help understand how Dutch foreign policy has been constructed. These are ‘trade, engagement and withdrawal’. The advocates of trade believe that international trade made the Netherlands a very prosperous nation and therefore foreign policy should be directed towards promoting foreign trade and investment. At the same time, elements such as contributing to international stability and the rule of law should be incorporated in this policy. Engagement refers to an active contribution to a peaceful and prosperous world. Not just out of self-interest but also out of a moral duty. Foreign policy should therefore by directed towards supporting international organisations such as the EU, UN, etc. Lastly, withdrawal refers to a more isolationist stance. The advocates for it believe that engagement and international cooperation and immigration only serve the needs of a select elitist group, but harms the interest of the rest of the Dutch population (Ter Haar 2017: 89-90).
In Ter Haar’s assessment of the Dutch-Russian relations in 2017, it is revealed that the relations between the Netherlands and Russia are sour, because the former blames the latter for the security crisis in Europe as a result of Russia’s annexation of the Crimea. As was established by Ten Broeke, the government avoids accusing the Russian government directly for the downing of MH17. Furthermore, major economic interests are paramount. The two countries have a relative high bilateral trade volume and the two countries would benefit from cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism (Idem: 94-96).
The different approaches to foreign policy are rather visible here. Whereas
engagement advocates would be horrified by seeking closer relations with Russia, because of MH17 and the Crimea, ‘Withdrawal’ and ‘Trade’ advocates would probably disagree. ‘Trade’ advocates would appreciate opportunities to mend trade relations and ‘Withdrawal’ advocates assume involvement in the international affairs of others (even though MH17 is a Dutch affair) might hurt the interests of the Dutch people. These concepts can be helpful to give some structure to how the decisions regarding the Russia strategy were made. What interests dominated the narrative? Still, the employed sources are rather limited in Ter Haar’s article and they only date back to 2015.
15 Together with her colleagues Hubert Smeets and Laura Starink, Rothenberg wrote a letter to the Dutch parliament in which they sketch the past development of relations between the Netherlands and Russia in the light of both the ‘Ukraine crisis’ and the MH17 dossier. The letter is a call to action, thus one needs to approach this letter from a critical standpoint in the sense that the information that is displayed in the letter does serve to reinforce achieving a goal, namely that of inciting the Dutch parliament to seek rapprochement to the Russian civil society.
According to the authors, since 2014 the Dutch government has pursued a double strategy. This strategy was twofold: the Dutch government would support and advocate for European sanctions targeted to Russia to keep the pressure on its government, but at the same time, Dutch foreign policy actions had to correspond to ‘keeping the door open’ to enter into a dialogue with the Russians. The most recent Russia strategy of the Dutch government does not aim to bring any significant changes to the just described approach. The main reason for this is that Russian president Vladimir Putin is not expected to leave office before 2024 and any significant reforms are therefore not expected in the coming years. (Rothenberg et.al. 2019).
This letter only seeks to criticize the Russia strategy and therefore this document is the only employed source. Again there is some merit in this letter that can be utilised for this thesis. The rigidity that the authors describe is certainly something to look out for. The aim of the thesis is to describe how the strategy has developed (read: changed), but is this necessarily the case? It is quite possible that policy matters have not developed much since external circumstances just did not justify this course of action.
2.2 Economy
In 2015, Van der Togt wrote an analysis about the relations between Russia and the Netherlands in the aftermath of MH17.3 There is one point that stands out and that is the conclusion that the Netherlands had to make a dichotomic choice between playing the ‘merchant’ or the ‘pastor’. Even though nobody officially accused the Russians, the EU was united in posing ‘third tier’ sanctions on Russia immediately after the disaster. The author does not make clear what ‘third tier’ sanctions contain and whether the sanctions were
3 One needs to note that this analysis was written in 2015, only one year after the disaster. Considering that this thesis will span a timeframe of six years (2014-2020), the amount of insight that can be gained from this piece is rather limited, considering that major development took place in the years thereafter.
16 imposed as a result of MH17 or if this matter played a background role. However, the author does note that imposing the sanctions on Russia without the occurrence of MH17 would have been less likely. Russia responded and imposed sanctions on the EU as a countermeasure. According to the author, because of these developments, it only took a year until talks about restoring economic relations resurfaced. The author notes that energy companies such as Shell and Gasunie in particular are very keen on going back to ‘business as usual’ and even under the regime of the sanctions these businesses seem to already conduct business again with Russian partners (Van der Togt 2015: 3-7).
The argument of Van der Togt does confirm that the ‘Koopman’ and ‘Dominee’ role posed a problem. How can these two policy aspects be reconciled with each other, or in other words how do the ‘merchant’ and ‘Pastor’ cope with each other?
Meanwhile, economists from the economic office of the Rabobank, state that the Netherlands does not have to worry about the impact of the current sanctions for its economic well-being. The export volume to Russia is relative small. If the Netherlands would decide to impose additional sanctions against Russian on top of the sanctions that it had imposed in an EU context it would hurt the Dutch economy more than the Russian economy. In return, if the Russian Federation would decide to impose additional sanctions against the Netherlands, they would avoid sanctioning sectors that directly damages Russian interests, such as generating revenue via the energy sector (Wim Boonstra and Tim Legierse 2014).
The authors write from a rational economic perspective and they employ this theoretical perspective to provide a predictive outlook on the development of economic relations between these two states. However, their rational model contains a noteworthy flaw. The rational actor is here considered to be ‘one-dimensional’. Just a mere single source informs here whether a decision is rational or not, namely the economic perspective.
However, states are not one-dimensional and they have to harbour different types of national interests. Therefore, it is unhelpful to analyse the economic situation from an isolated
position. One needs to factor in other interests such as normative goals and security interests. In the case of the Netherlands, besides being a ‘Koopman’, the country is also a ‘Dominee’ and this fact will influence how it will fulfil its ‘Koopman’ role. This thesis will serve to provide an overarching account of how the Netherlands balances the different interests. Another author places emphasis on the economic efficacy of the imposed sanctions. Nora Neuteboom writes that the sanctions did not substantially damage the Russian economy, although the productivity on the long term might be affected. Domestic institutions like the Russian central bank can shield the Russian private sector from suffering a shortage of foreign
17 exchange, also the oil prices did contribute to stabilise the economy. Therefore, the Russian state has no reason to alter its political course, since the overall effects on its economy are minimal. The author states that the EU is not likely to lift the sanction due to the domestic political situation in France and the US (Neuteboom 2017).
The analytical problem here however, is that the author mainly focused on the
economic dimension of the sanctions. The efficacy of the sanctions is measured in economic terms like growth and productivity. This is unhelpful when we take into account the broader political perspective. Sanctions do not solely serve a material economic goal, like the author suggests. Instead, sanctions also serve a normative goal, such as damaging legitimacy and thereby exerting pressure on the other actor. If we were to solely focus on the economic efficacy of sanctions than we could not properly explain certain policy actions from a rational point of view.
2.3 EU perspective
What are the broader implications of the relations with Russia for the EU as a whole? The German ‘Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik’ published a paper answering this very question. This institute, although independent, does seek to advise the German government on issues related to foreign and security affairs, it also advises the EU, NATO and UN.4
The main argument of their publication ‘Strategische Autonomie Europas: Akteure, Handlungsfelder, Zielkonflikte’ regarding the EU and Russia is that the EU is dependent on Russia for its energy needs and that some EU member states have a greater interest in keeping relations relaxed, since they made a deal with Russia on constructing the Nord Stream
pipeline. This issue however splits EU member states, because some EU member states value security issues more than the economic ones (Lippert et.al 2019: 28).
This realisation is especially problematic considering that Russia has an interest in pitting EU member states against each other. This objective coincides with splitting Europe from its American ally, with whom relations have cooled since Donald Trump took office. The author does argue that it is vital for the EU to develop independent means to guarantee its own safety, considering that it cannot solely rely on the US to do so. The Russians on their part wish to split the EU from the US, but seeing the EU actually developing independent capabilities is not in its interests (Idem: 33-34).
The stance this publication takes is a realist one in which power dimensions seem 4 Die Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (2020), https://www.swp-berlin.org/ueber-uns/
18 dominate. At the same time the EU is here posed as a goal seeking actor, in this case security. The Netherlands is also a goal seeking actor and for the purposes of this thesis; analysing the development of this point of view seems to be a prudent course of action. At the same it is also interesting to look more into the European perspective of the Dutch energy debate, since it is also a party in the construction efforts of the Nord Stream Pipeline.
Lastly, since the largest pressure on the Russian government is the result of European sanctions, we need to know what was written about the process of these sanctions. In the article ‘Die neue Wirklichkeit der Außenpolitik: Diplomatie im 21. Jahrhundert’ the authors discuss what the most significant development has been for international diplomacy in the 21st century so far.
Regarding the process of imposing the economic sanctions, the authors argue that even though Russia did try to undermine unity among EU member states, it did not succeed as a result of ‘network diplomacy’. Not all member states where very content with imposing sanctions since it would jeopardise their economic interests. The authors primarily see the extensive diplomatic efforts of German diplomats and business relations to be the factor of success in maintaining unity throughout the EU. Although, the Germans main efforts were to seek support for imposing sanctions, does not mean that all branches of German society were on board with it. The Ministry of Economic Affairs was opposed to an increase in the amount of sanctions on Russia. Also on a local level the ‘state government of Bavaria conveyed a ‘lighter tone’ to President Putin with regard to the sanctions. (Stanzel 2018: 52-53). It is hard to judge whether German efforts were the decisive factor in pushing the sanctions forward, based only on this article. The evidence is not compelling. The author neglects to refer to other major stakeholders in the conflict, such as the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Regardless the disunity that the German government experienced on local level is inspirational for this thesis. To develop a coherent Russia policy, it seems only natural that the Dutch government did consult major actors in the Dutch business sector. Considering that the Netherlands is a decentralised unitarity state, it does not seem likely however that lower branches of government undermined the national Dutch government.
The authors claim that on a European level there is much to be gained from
cooperation on anti-terrorism activities. Still, the EU and Russia failed to do so. Again, this is the result of problematic relations that spurred from wars in Ukraine and Syria. Difficult relations between the West and Russia need to be understood against this backdrop (Spiegeleire et al.: 57).
19 and Syria. The national trauma for one of its member states does not seem to weigh much in this regard, if we take the analysis of HCSS for granted. It is however worthwhile to look more into how the Netherlands rallied the EU behind its cause in its Russia objectives. Furthermore the report also raises the stakes for the Netherlands, considering that Russia is important for its energy supply and the Dutch Russia strategy certainly has to reflect this. The analysis would have benefited from a clear focus on what the main points of contestation are between the Netherlands and the EU. No framework of interests is employed here which would have helped to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics that are behind the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
2.4 Russian perspective
Another perspective on Russia is provided by Hella Rothenberg a Slavistics expert and journalist who writes for the journalist collective ‘Raam op Rusland’.5
Rothenberg writes that Russia’s return in the council of Europe is a major victory for the Kremlin. Russia was suspended from attending council session in 2014 and lost its voting right in the council. This measure has now been revoked by the council. Various European countries are not content with this decision with countries as Ukraine, Poland and the United Kingdom in particular. Germany and France however wished to prevent Russia from acting on its threat, that it would withdraw from the council completely if the suspension would not be lifted. Germany and France on their part then negotiated with Russia on its reinstatement as a full-fledged member of the council. Rothenberg writes that Russia had to provide extra guarantees that is would adhere to the Minsk protocols. Also, the ability of the council to issue sanctions against one of its members will be constrained in the future.
This article does show some clear developments on European-Russian relations. First, the leading EU countries Germany and France clearly show a desire to preserve and possibly repair relations with Russia. Also there is still a clear divide within Europe on how to deal with Russia. Even more so, MH17 was not part of the negotiations between Berlin, Paris and Moscow. From a Dutch perspective this might prove to be problematic that it seems to lose support in Europe.
Rothenberg is not clear about the sources she utilised, but her comments on the current
5 This institute is partner of the University of Leiden and aims to spread knowledge and fostering a critical debate on the development of Russia. https://www.raamoprusland.nl/. Consulted on 16 march 2020.
20 developments of European relations with Russia are in a unfavourable manner for the Dutch perspective are worthwhile to look into.
The first journalistic product in this review is the article ‘ Russia's Roadmap Out of the MH17 Crisis’. This article was published by the digital newspaper ‘the Moscow times’.6
The main line of argument by Eastern European studies Professor Mark Galeotti is that Russia has been secretive and obstructive in the case of the MH17 investigation because admitting blame would expose the Russian regime as untrustworthy. For more than five years the Russian government claimed that it had nothing to do with the Ukrainian Civil War. Russia has nothing to gain from openly admitting blame, because the narrative of lying still benefits the Russians more than ‘coming clean’, Furthermore, the Kremlin relies on patriotic feelings experienced by its diplomats, military officials and entrepreneurs to serve the state. In turn, the Kremlin will go to great lengths to protect and back them up when necessary. By extraditing the perpetrators of the MH17 disaster to the Netherlands, it would violate this trust. Finally by dealing with the Dutch behind the curtains and avoiding admitting guilt openly, it would still take a position of humility instead of strength, which is unacceptable for Russia (Galeotti 2019).7
The author does raise some significant points. Namely that Russia cannot afford to admit guilt, because of (geo)political reasons. Is seems highly unlikely that Dutch
policymakers are unaware of this. Still, on their part, they could not afford to not try to work with Russia. It is worthwhile to look more into the Dutch strategies to cooperate with Russia even though the latter had a clear incentive to avoid this.
2.5 Security
The following argument was written by the Advisory Council on International Affairs (AIV).8 The AIV approaches the topic from a security standpoint. The situation in Ukraine must be regarded as the result of Russia’s wish to bring the country back into its sphere of
6 It is interesting to note that the Moscow times is supported by the Dutch foundation "Stichting 2 Oktober" to promote independent journalism in Russia, which on their turn are partners of the Dutch ministry of Foreign affairs. https://stichting2oktober.org/ Consulted on 20 March 2020.
7 Galeotti writes from a Russian point of view and it is unclear what sources form the basis for his argument. It is likely that he relied on his professional expertise on the subject to construct his argument, but actual empirical research is probably not applied here.
8 An independent body which advises the Dutch government and parliament on foreign policy. Although the organisation is independent from the Dutch Foreign office, one still needs to consider that the main aim of this organisation is to provide advice and this particular policy brief was requested by the Dutch government, which ultimately comprises academic neutrality and distance (AIV 2017: 26).
21 influence (Idem: 16). This realisation is not connected in the article to the Dutch efforts of dealing with the aftermath of the MH17 crisis and no security implications are given for these efforts. Still the document does make a connection to Dutch-Russians relations in the wake of the disaster in the form of cyberattacks and propaganda. In the last couple of years the
Netherlands has been targeted by Russia on various occasions related to the disaster by disseminating false and contradictory information to frustrate events such as the presentation of the results of the Joint Investigation Team (JIT). The AIV states that Russia has grown to be one of the biggest threats to the Netherlands in terms of cybersecurity (Idem: 10). As mentioned earlier the document is a policy brief and most content is related to providing recommendations to government on how to deal with certain issues. Therefore there is not much background information available on the development of the Dutch policy
towards Russia, but rather how it should develop. However, the AIV does refer to
cybersecurity and the dissemination of false information. This seems to be worthwhile to look into, because there is a high probability that this new challenge had an effect on the Dutch strategy towards Russia.
2.6 Conclusion
To conclude, there are major and complex dimensions that one needs to take into
consideration when it comes to dissecting the development of the Netherlands policy towards Russia in the aftermath of MH17. For instance what are the major stakes? For the Netherlands these are economic and moral issues. What are the power dimensions? Does the Netherlands possess the power to achieve its goals and does this translate into its Russia policy? The Netherlands foreign policy however is embedded in a wider framework of an European foreign policy and it does rely on its allies to meet its goals, but what are the implications if the needs of these allies are not in congruence with the needs of the Netherlands, how does the Dutch government adept to this? Furthermore, how much space did The Hague in its Russia policy allocate to achieving normative goals, such as finding justice for MH17, and did this frustrate achieving economic goals?
As the authors, that have been discussed in this chapter, primarily focussed on specific aspects regarding their specialised fields, it will be the aim of this thesis to structure all these elements into a coherent narrative. While for instance the economic perspective that has been covered here is compelling when studied in isolation, it becomes less fruitful when one
considers normative, political and security goals. Also the Netherlands as an EU member state has to cooperate with its European allies and this diminishes policy freedom. Therefore a
22 proper account of the development of the Netherlands policy towards Russiawill be offered in this thesis by examining the different perspectives translated into interests by the Dutch government such as economic, normative and security interests. These ‘loose pieces’ will be connected and thereby help to support the construction of an overarching view on how the Netherlands manoeuvred and acted in relation to Russia with regard to the problems that arose as a result of an endeavour to balance the different interests the Netherlands has.
23
Chapter 3 Theoretical Framework
Since one specific aspect of the Dutch foreign policy, namely its Russia strategy, plays a pivotal role in this thesis. It is prudent to firstly define what actually constitutes foreign policy. There are several possible approaches to foreign policy and it is important to note that currently no academic consensus regarding the concept exists. Therefore we need to examine the different possible definitions first, before we can conclude which definition best suits the purposes of this thesis. Furthermore, we need to identify relevant theoretical concepts that will serve as the ‘building blocks’ for this research.
3.1 Foreign Policy
One of the possible definitions of foreign policy states that ‘foreign policy is merely the sum of external relations conducted by independent actors’ (Hill 2003: 4). The author claims that the policy aspect refers to an effort of independent actors to apply coherence to a set of individual decisions, hence policy is a sum. The ‘foreign’ aspect refers to the reality of a world separated into different communities and that actors in this reality need strategies to cope with each other (Idem: 5). Therefore we can conclude that policy is a set of actions that one can undertake, whereas ‘the foreign’ is the target of this set of actions. If we accept this definition than we accept an ontology that dictates a world of observable facts, namely the set of actions and the respective targets. In this world, foreign policy is independent and only meant to cope with foreign states.
This also implies that policy cannot be dissected into individual actions, since policy is ‘a sum’ and is only measurable as a set. Furthermore, the definition also means that the result of the actions is the only part that matters for the level of analysis. A clear distinction can be made between ‘the result’ of an action and the ‘intention’ of an action. Beach elaborates on this notion in his critique on Hill’s definition. He defines foreign policy as “both the broad trends of behaviour and the particular actions taken by a state or other collective actor(s) as directed toward other collective actors within the international system.” (Beach 2012: 3). Accepting this definition means that we can include a wider variety of eligible actors for employing foreign policy. For instance this definition allows for a more inclusive collection of actors, since supranational organisation like the European Union (EU) can also be
24 Considering that the Netherlands is an EU member state, accepting that both the Netherlands and the EU conduct their own foreign policy has consequences for the Dutch Russia strategy. A meta-analysis of a state with a foreign policy that seeks to alter the foreign policy of another actor to satisfy its own needs would become optional here.
The definitions that we have discusses so far both neglect the domestic component of foreign policy. It exists independently from society. According to Groom we can ascribe different meanings to foreign policy based on the conceptual framework that one adheres to. For instance if we were to follow a pluralist account of what foreign policy is, then foreign policy would be ‘downgraded’ to merely being one of many possible interactions in a system of transactions. States are no more important in a network of actors, who conduct transactions, than civil society, NGO’s, churches and corporations. The nature of these transactions can be religious, economic, cultural, ethnic or politically based (Groom 2007: 199). Therefore foreign policy is just one of the many possible transactions and is influenced by domestic forces.
Another view of what foreign policy entails is provided by Alden and Aran. They employ a ‘snapshot’ of contemporary Russian foreign policy to discern the complexity of foreign policy. They argue that the amount of influence a leader can exert in his country and conceptions that he/she may have regarding the identity and place his country takes in global politics do actually shape decision-making in foreign policy. At the same time, civil society can pose as an opposite force to the ruling government by offering an alternative perspective of what the nation’s foreign policy should entail (Alden & Aran 2012: 2).
According to this perspective on foreign policy, the role of the nation’s leader and his ideas on what the country should do and what it should be, takes a pivotal role in foreign policy development. The leader does not hold a monopoly in this regard, since domestic forces like civil society can form an opposing power. It is interesting to note here that national interest is the result of identity. A country’s position in the world dictates its interests and policy should be aligned towards this goal.
This does raise an important question though. Is it required to have national interests to construct foreign policy? If we take Brian White’s argument into account, it seems that, at least on the surface, this is not necessarily the case. For White it is worthwhile to consider that foreign policy can be analysed from a European perspective. The author calls this ‘European foreign policy’. Much like Hill, does White view foreign policy as a sum. However in this case, the sum is constituted by national foreign policies and the ensuing external relations which in their turn make up an European foreign policy. (White 2001: 38).
25 The problem with this approach is that the ‘roots’ are neglected. In other words, if an European foreign policy is constructed by a sum of national foreign policies, then how are the national foreign policies constructed?
In the preceding paragraphs an overview of various perspectives of what foreign policies can be and contain has been provided and various points of contention have been identified so far. These points tend to focus on the ontological questions of who are the relevant actors in foreign policy? How broadly should policy be defined? And who or what is responsible for the construction of a certain foreign policy? The upcoming paragraphs will seek to answer a different question. Although it has now been made clear what foreign policy can be. However, up until now, a clear indication of what ‘feeds’ a foreign policy is still missing. In order to truly understand what drives the construction of a foreign policy. We need to examine the role of national interests. This will be discussed in the next section.
3.2 National Interest
National interest in itself as a guide for foreign policy goals is inadequate according to Hill, as it is ‘tautologous’: ‘No reasonable policy-maker would ever go against the interest of the nation’ (Hill 2003: 128). The more important question should be what interests are actually national and why? One cannot simply qualify national interests in ‘terms of power, security, prosperity and independence’ as these interests are too broad and disagreement about what they actually entail commences, once the discussion is brought up about the specificity of these goals. For Hill, this concept helps to identify whether a policy helps to serve public concerns or whether it is derived from an interest. But to this author, phrasing these functions as national interest is problematic (Idem: 128-129).
Although Hill raises a strong point regarding the subjectivity of certain interests, it is unhelpful to claim that national interests in its entirety do not exist. For instance, imagine country A, which possesses a strong military apparatus and seeks to conquer territory from country B, which on its turn has a much weaker military. Looking at this situation from the perspective of a foreign policy maker, it seems evident that security is indeed a national interest. The policymaker’s perception of how to serve this interests may be subjective. For instance one approach could be to appease country A, but another approach might be to seek an alliance with country C against country A. Still, security as a national interest is no point of contention in this thought experiment.
26 As was established in the introduction. The Netherlands has two main branches that influence its foreign policy: ‘Koopman’ and ‘Dominee’. To make sense of these two role concepts on an analytical level, we shall now discuss compatible theory.
One author who agrees with the notion that national interest as a concept is not useless, is Nuechterlein. He states that abandoning the concept would be futile since the term has been deeply integrated in the vocabulary of diplomats and other officials.9 Nuechterlein defines national interest as “the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to other sovereign states comprising the external environment.” (Nuechterlein 1976: 247). However, the author is not satisfied with this definition. He states that in order to provide a helpful frame to a scholar, the national interest should be divided into four basic needs, which on their turn underpin foreign policy. These four needs are defence, economy, world order and ideology. Firstly, ‘defence’ relates to shielding the nation-state and its citizens from physical harm or the undermining of its political system by an external party. Secondly, ‘economy’ is about improving the general well-being of the state in relative terms to other states. This particular interest corresponds to the notion of being a ‘Koopman’. The
Netherlands as a ‘Koopman’ seeks to generate and improve its national wealth by securing trade relations with other states. Thirdly, ‘world order’ relates to the maintenance of an international political and economic system that is the most beneficial to your state. Fourthly, ideology implies that protection and the fostering of a set of values that the people of the nation state perceive as ‘universally good’ (Idem: 247-248). Both ‘world order’ and
‘ideology’ can be matched with the specific Dutch concept of ‘Dominee’. The Netherlands seeks to improve the world by making a contribution to fostering the adoption of ‘good’ values across the world.
It should be noted that these ‘root sources’ of national interest will not play an equal role in every state. It is hard to imagine a small state with little relative economic and political power to put much emphasis on altering the world order. Nonetheless, these four basic needs do serve an important role in actually identifying the formation process of foreign policy. Then how do we differentiate between interests and ‘national interests’? Kenneth Waltz does offer a solution. He argues that a distinction exists between national interests and intentions. Waltz views intentions as being orientated towards the short-term timeframe. Intentions are derived from domestic preferences to obtain small political or economic
advantages. However pressures from the international sphere are neglected. National interests 9 Hill (2003) actually confirms this (p.128) that this is still the case in 2003. Considering that Nuechterlein wrote his article in 1976, it implies that not much has changed in the meantime.
27 are, in contrast to intentions, formed by the international sphere and relate to issues of power and security (Waltz 1979: 65-66).
According to this analyses, individual preferences by leaders or even civil society cannot make an important difference regarding the formation of foreign policy, considering that the goals that this policy seeks to serve are primarily the result of interactions with the external sphere. National interest therefore has an exogenous nature. It is interesting to note that foreign policy itself seeks to alter the international sphere. When a state would succeed in this objective, the international sphere itself would be subject to change. As a result, a state’s interests would be renewed. Thus this would be a case of a feedback loop, although not a very formidable one.
The conceptual debate that has been outlined above, has shown that various
perspectives on foreign policy and how it is ‘fed’ exist. Hill regards foreign policy as merely a sum of external relations, conducted by independent actors. Beach on the other hand disagrees with Hill on the notion that foreign policy is a sum. Instead foreign policy should be dissected into the intention and results of actions. Furthermore, both broad trends as particular actions of one actor against another actor are of value here. A quite different approach can be found in the pluralist framework. According to this framework foreign policy as an interaction between international actors is not unique and subject to influence of other types of international transactions.
According to Alden and Anran, the role of the leader and its perception of the nation’s identity and role in the world shape foreign policy and with it its behaviour on the
international stage. White contributes to the debate by implying that foreign policy can contribute to an even broader concept, namely European foreign policy. Not all authors mention what ‘feeds’ foreign policy. Hill criticizes the utility of the concept ‘national interest’. He views the subjectivity of interest as problematic for categorising something as national. Waltz does however view national interest as a helpful concept. Still, the main national interest that are important for foreign policy are power and security and the main root for these interests are exogenous. In contrast to Waltz, Nuechterlein identifies national interest as endogenously based. The main roots for national interest has a wider variety in
Nuechterleins’s account by including ideology and world order and economy besides security. Based on the overview that was sketched above, this thesis will accept the account that Beach has provided regarding what foreign policy comprises of. However this thesis will follow Nuechterlein’s account of how foreign policy is fed by national interest. Considering that this research aims to examine how the Netherlands policy towards Russia has developed
28 after occurrence of the MH17 disaster, it is helpful to accept a definition of foreign policy as a concept that includes both broader and particular actions, since the development can only be accurately examined if we can detect individual measures that were undertaken by the Dutch state to achieve its goals. As a result, an explanation of national interest and what this contains and how it influences foreign policy is the best theoretical fit.
3.3 Liberal institutionalism and Normative Power
Before we address how foreign policy should be analysed, it is worthwhile to firstly consider the theoretical implications for the Netherlands. As was established in section 3.2,
Nuechterlein’s account of national interest can be matched to the concepts ‘Koopman’ and ‘Dominee’. For the purposes of this research, these theoretical insights are fruitful, but not sufficient enough. As the Netherlands is a country whose international relations are embedded in international organisations and institutions, we do need theory that accounts for how such as state behaves on the international stage. Furthermore, a theoretical account is required for how a country, that is significantly smaller in size than its target country in political,
demographic, military and economic terms, can still play the role of ‘Dominee’. One could make an analogy to the biblical story of David versus Goliath in which the Netherlands somehow needs to acquire its own version of David’s sling.
Regarding the first issue, we can draw from the theoretical insights of Liberal
institutionalism. This is an international relations theory who’s conceptual roots can be traced to both liberalism and realism. The liberal institutionalist scholar does accept realist notions of state-centrism in which the state is the centre of analytical attention, an anarchic system where states are ultimately self-reliant and lastly, states are rational actors who act in their own best interest. However, where realists would assume that international relations are a ‘zero-sum game’, in which only relative winners can exists, liberal institutionalists, on the contrary, reject this notion and assert that states can benefit from absolute gains (Johnson and Heis 2018: 10). Liberal institutionalist depart from classical liberal thinking by emphasizing the role (international) institutions play on the global stage. According to liberal institutionalist thought, international institutions spread peace and democracy and therefore play a key role in fostering cooperation between states (Idem: 12). However, the core assumption for the
‘success story’ of international institutionalism should be found in the idea that states act in their own best interest. States do not relinquish sovereignty to international institutions just for the sake of cooperation. Instead, sovereignty is used as a bargaining resource that states
29 can negotiate away for benefits that they can obtain via institutions (Keohane 2012: 127). For some states this can include influence over other states, while for other states security is the main reason to be part of an institution. Institutions are functional because they can “provide information, coordination, enforcement or other benefits that states could not access on their own” (Johnson and Heis 2018: 10).
Although, we can see how the ‘Koopman’ aspect of Dutch Foreign policy can be matched to the liberal institutionalist notion of cooperation through institutions, namely that institutions could help protecting Dutch economic interests in relation to Russia. However, it does fail to provide a precise account of how the ‘Dominee’ aspect unfolds.
When we discuss the relations between the Netherlands and Russia we cannot neglect the ‘power dimension’ between these two countries. However, first we need to know what the concept ‘power’ entails and via what means one can exercise it. Barnett and Duval (2005) argue that one can divide power into two cores. The first core addresses the question of
whether power is an attribute, shaping circumstances of other actors or whether it is inherently social and shapes actors (Barnett and Duval 2005: 46-47). The second core is about whether power is a direct relation between the object and subject with a tangible short distance or if it diffuses via institutions that mediate the effect of power (Idem: 47-48). Based on these two cores, one can identify four ‘forms’ of power. Compulsory, institutional, structural and productive. However, for the purposes of this thesis only the first two forms are relevant. Compulsory power should be understood as direct control over others or as ‘the ability of A to get ‘B’ to do what ‘B’ otherwise would not do’. In this scenario ‘A’ wins because of A’s material or ideational resources (Idem: 49-50). This definition does allow norms and symbols to be ‘fuel’ for power. Institutional power is less direct than compulsory power, because it works via institutions as intermediary. In this scenario, ‘A’ lacks domestic power resources to compel ‘B’, but institutional arrangements and A’s favourable position to it does allow ‘A’ to exercise indirect influence over ‘B’ (Idem: 51-52). This form of power is strictly normative. Now that we have established that there are two ‘paths’ of exercising power over another actor’, it is crucial to determine how these paths unfold. In the case of the
Netherlands. The only viable material resources it could employ to coerce Russia would be economic means such as prohibiting foreign direct investments in Russia by Netherlands based businesses. A military threat by the Netherlands towards Russia, would not be taken seriously by Moscow. However there are other means of exercising power, namely ideational, or normative power. Normative power means the “ability to shape conceptions of ‘normal’” (Manners 2002: 240). According to Ian Manners the European Union is a normative power
30 and it diffuses its norms via six ways. Firstly, contagion as means of diffusion. In this regard, norms spread ‘unintentionally’. By setting a ‘virtuous example’ actors will adopt norms voluntarily (Idem: 247). Secondly, informational diffusion “is the result of the range of strategic communications, such as new policy initiatives by the EU, and declaratory communications, such as initiatives from the presidency of the EU or the president of the Commission” (Ibid). Thirdly, “procedural diffusion involves the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party, such as an inter-regional co-operation agreement, membership of an international organization or enlargement of the EU itself” (Ibid). Fourthly, transference of norms occurs when the EU demands conditions for “the exchange of goods, trade, aid or technical assistance with third parties through largely
substantive or financial means” (Idem: 248). Fifthly, overt diffusion “occurs as a result of the physical presence of the EU in third states and international organisations” (Ibid.). Embassies and monitoring missions in third states are responsible for the diffusion here. Lastly, the cultural filter dictates to what extent third parties are susceptible to certain norms (Ibid.). It is reasonable to argue that other actors could use these forms of diffusion as well. As we
established earlier, an actor can either exercise power over another actor directly, or via institutions. The Netherlands should therefore employ these forms of diffusion either by itself or via the EU or UN.
3.4 Foreign Policy Analysis
In the preceding section we established what foreign policy is and what underlying factors contribute to its formation. Nevertheless, a vital component of conducting this research to this thesis topic is still missing. This being how we should analyse foreign policy. IR scholars do disagree on to what acadamic field foreign policy analysis (FPA) belongs to. Some scholars would argue that FPA is a distinct discipline and requires a distinct theoretical toolbox to conduct proper analysis. Beach disagrees with this argument. He states that FPA is a
subdiscipline of International relations (IR) scholarship and therefore FPA does not require a distinct theoretical toolbox. For Beach it is the scope of analysis that differentiates FPA from IR. Where IR seeks to explain political phenomena that cannot be bound to a single actor, FPA is in fact limited to a single actor. (Beach 2012: 3-4).
Alden and Anran define FPA as “the study of the conduct and practice of relations between different actors, primarily states, in the international system”. In practise this means
31 that FPA focusses on “the sources of conduct of states in international affairs, the significance of foreign policy decision-making, the role that state and non-states actors have within the overall distinctive process, as well as the influence of institutional and societal factors in shaping foreign policy” (Alden & Aran 2012: 4-5).
Like these authors, Hill concurs with these descriptions of FPA. According to him FPA “enquires into the motives and other sources of the behaviour of international actors, particularly states. It does this by giving a good deal of attention to decision-making, initially so as to probe behind the formal self-descriptions (and fictions) of government and public administration” (Hill 2003: 12). Based on the descriptions of these authors we can identify a common theme. Decision-making is one of the most prevalent components of analysing foreign policy. All authors mentioned in the earlier paragraphs, mention this component to be one of the key areas that FPA seeks to analyse.
For Beach the actors who play a key role in the decision-making process of FPA can be individual leaders, collectives and states. Although the actor can have a different analytical shape, the main characteristic for these actors are the same. Namely, the actors are
“intelligent, intentional (…) that have the ability to learn from past events and respond creatively to a given context, actors can actively attempt to change a given context in order to make it more amiable to the achievement of their own goals.” (Beach 2003: 17). Thus, actors appear to be rational and act in the best way they can in a structuralised environment,
although there is a degree of agency available for the actors to shape their unique decision-making process. One important question still remain however, how do we measure this process?
Nuechterlein’s view expands on his conceptualisation of national interest. He states that we first need to examine the notion of ‘intensity of interest’. This concept should be utilised to determine what interest has priority for a state. For instance, while supporting a coup d’état in a particular country might be considered as repulsive under ‘normal’
circumstances, it could actually become acceptable when the economic interests outweigh the interests that relate to world order (Nuechterlein 1976: 248). The intensity of an interest is a determining factor for the prioritisation of the interests. In this scenario a trade-off was made in which economic interests are regarded as more important to the nation than maintaining a particular world order. However, one needs to note that the intensity of interests differs for different states. According to Nuechterlein, a capitalist state will prefer the just sketched scenario, whereas a socialist state would prioritise world order instead (Ibid.).
