Tripartite partnerships for development : an empirical analysis of the Dutch government

Tripartite partnerships for development

An empirical analysis of the Dutch government

BSc. thesis by Berend Brugts

Student number: 10264280

Supervisor: Dr. N.O. Stofberg

BSc. Business Studies

July 28th, 2014

Abstract

Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to find out how the Dutch government can facilitate tripartite

partnerships for development. The challenges of development problems are complex in nature and addressing them contains a high level of economical, societal and political risk and requires the use of a new type of partnership; tripartite partnerships. This type of partnership includes NGO’s, companies and governments and is relatively new and therefore an interesting research area. This paper aims to find out what the difficulties of tripartite partnerships are and if the Dutch government is capable to act as facilitator to overcome these difficulties.

Method: An extensive literature review about existing theories of partnerships will be conducted

which enables the establishing of several sub-questions. Subsequently, qualitative, semi-structured interviews with seven participants, all involved in tripartite partnerships, will be held to gain new insights and answer the sub-questions and eventually the research question.

Findings: The paper indicates that the Dutch government can facilitate tripartite partnerships for

development as convener, mediator and learning catalyst and by adjusting the application procedure, offering an increased amount of flexibility in the level of accountability and by using Dutch embassies in developing countries. This study contributes to the scientific literature and provides suggestions for specific actions and tools to increase partnership effectiveness.

List of abbreviations

AIM – Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition BoP – bottom of the pyramid

CSR – corporate social responsibility CEO – chief executive officer

FMO – Dutch Development Bank MDGs – Millennium Development Goals MP – member of parliament

NEA – Netherlands Enterprise Agency NGOs – non-governmental organizations

OECD – Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development PPPs – public private partnerships

UN – United Nations

WHO – World Health Organization WFP – World Food Program

List of tables and figures

List of tables

Table 1: Example of open coding for sub-question 3………26

Table 2: Exemplary quotes for sub-question 1………..31

Table 3: Exemplary quotes for sub-question 2………..33

Table 4: Exemplary quotes for sub-question 3………..35

Table 5: Exemplary quotes for sub-question 4………..37

Table 6: Overview of results………39

List of Figures Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the possibilities for governments to facilitate tripartite partnerships……….……..19

Figure 2: Overview of the name, function and organization of the interviewees………....24

Figure 3: An example of axial coding for sub-question 3………27

Table of content

Part I Introduction ...6

Part II Theoretical framework...8

Changing environment...8

Tripartite partnerships...10

Part III Methodology...20

Qualitative interviews...20 Sample...21 Data collection...25 Data analysis...25 Part IV Results...29 Sub-question 1... 29 Sub-question 2...31 Sub-question 3...34 Sub-question 4...36 Sub-question 5...38 Sub-question 6...38

Part V Discussion and Conclusion...40

Discussion...40

Limitations...45

Implications for theory and practise...46

Conclusion………48

Part VI Bibliography and appendices...42

Bibliography...42

Appendix A: Interview Questions...45

Appendix B: Interview transcripts...46 5

Part I Introduction

In 2000, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were established to improve the livelihoods of many people in developing countries. In 2015, these MDGs officially end and still many people in developing countries face the persistence of stunting and micronutrient deficiencies (SOFA 2013). The MDGs and other developmental problems are complex in nature and addressing them contains a high level of economical, societal and political risk and requires a large diversity of resources and capabilities (Tennyson & Wilde, 2000). As a result, development problems cannot be solved by one type of actor only and need to be addressed by multiple actors in the form of strategic alliances between business, government and non-governmental organizations (NGO’s) (Warner 2003). These partnerships, in Kolk et al. (2008) addressed as ‘tripartite partnerships’ are able to share the risks of development problems and they offer a large diversity of resources and capabilities (Warner 2003). As a result, scholars and practitioners alike have highlighted the importance of tripartite partnerships to overcome development problems (Warner 2003, Kolk et al. 2008, Gainhealth.org, 2014). Sørensen and Petersen (2006) define a partnerships as ‘a voluntary or collaborative alliance which implies cooperation between two (or more) actors be it public, private, NGOs or any group of individuals which could fundamentally have different objectives, values, cultures, structures, but are sharing risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies whilst committed to common tasks which would achieve their specific individual goals’ (Sørensen and Petersen, 2006, p. 147). Their definition indicates that a partnership cuts across sectors and is based on the principles of cooperation, shared responsibility, non-hierarchical structures and the bundling and transferring of capabilities, knowledge and resources.

Partnerships have several potential benefits, including a decrease in risk by distributing risk among partners, best value creation by transferring, and an increase in efficiency and innovation, (Kraak et al., 2012, Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008, Tan, 2012).

However, these and other potential benefits of partnerships are not easily realized due to several pitfalls of partnerships (Berger et al., 2004). The most important pitfalls are: mismatched partners, misunderstandings between partners, misallocation of costs and benefits, mistrust and misfortunes of time (Berger et al., 2004). Partnerships between companies and NGOS also known as Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) have been around for a long time -and relatively much is known about potential advantages and risks. However, company, government, NGO tripartite partnerships are very new and are therefore an interesting research area (Kolk et al., 2008, Stadtler & Probst, 2012).

Adding the government as third party and thereby establishing a tripartite partnership 6

increases the capability to share responsibility and risk and pool resources and capabilities (Warner 2003). However, the pitfalls previously described may be even more significant if the government as third party is added to the partnership.

Several papers highlight the need of a broker to overcome difficulties of tripartite partnerships (Warner, 2003; Pope & Lewis, 2008; Stadtler & Probst, 2012). According to Warner (2003), Pope & Lewis (2008) and Stadtler & Probst (2012), partnerships are based on the formation and maintenance of relationships and therefore require a management style that is based upon network facilitation. Broker organizations can facilitate the partnering and networking process in the partnerships by acting as a convener, mediator or learning catalyst (Stadtler & Probst, 2012). Pope & Lewis (2008) describe in their paper the potential of governments in building networks, thereby contributing to the formation and maintenance of relationships. As a result, this paper aims to find out whether one of the existing partners, namely the government, can take over certain elements of the broker and facilitate the partnership. Literature about governments facilitating partnerships and the government acting as convener, mediator or learning catalyst is very scarce or fragmented and therefore needs further deepening (Pope & Lewis, 2008).

Additionally, this paper focuses on the Dutch government in particular in tripartite partnerships because her development policy shifted to a focus on economic progress in developing countries (de Caluwé, 2014). In 2003, the Dutch government stated that partnerships are a crucial component to achieve the MDGs (Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008). Since then, she increasingly started to use tripartite partnerships for the execution of development programs (Ruben, 2013). The aim of this paper is to research tripartite partnerships for development and to analyze the influence of the government and the Dutch government in particular in these type of partnerships. Furthermore, this paper aims to find out what the capabilities of the Dutch government are to act as a facilitator in tripartite partnerships to overcome partnership difficulties. This leads to the following research question: How can the Dutch government facilitate tripartite partnerships for

development?

The research question will be answered by a comprehensive literature review in part II which will explore partnerships in more detail, deepen the understanding of adding a third party to partnerships and which will highlight the role of a broker in tripartite partnerships. This will be followed by the introduction of several sub-questions which will be answered in the results section. Part III will present the methodology, including the data collection and analysis. Semi-structured interviews were conducted for this paper with different actors related to tripartite partnerships and government agencies in particular. The results of these interviews will be presented in Part IV, the results section. Finally, the paper will end with a discussion and a short conclusion.

Part II Theoretical framework

Part II will provide the reader with a comprehensive review of the literature written about the development of role of governments and companies in society, the change in development programs and the rise of public private partnerships (PPPs) and tripartite partnerships. This part will also introduce the reader to several sub-questions that will be answered in the results section.

1 Changing environment

1.1 The role of governments and companies in global and economic development

Since Adam Smith’s, ‘’the wealth of nations’’, there have been considerable changes to the view what economic development is and how global development should be achieved. When ‘’The wealth of nations’’ was first published in 1776, Adam Smith’s view on economic development was limited to the maximization of profit while reducing costs. According to him, economic development was best achieved when the role of the state was minimal and when there was no governmental regulation of the market. Furthermore, Smith’s private market economy model assumed that all people were rational and individualistic and that they all acted independently and non-cooperatively, with no sense of community or society (Thanawala, 2002). If the market was left alone, it should provide solutions for every problem (Heilbroner, 1999).

Since then, the view of economic development and what it should entail has changed (Heilbronner 1992). As a reaction to excessive poverty and inequality of the Industrial Revolution, socialism began to gain popularity and Western European social critics, including Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, stated that the market mechanism could not provide solutions to every problem and that, as a result, governments should increasingly be involved in economic affairs (Heilbronner 1999). Ever since, there has been considerable debate about the role of private companies and government agencies in economic and global development.

The acknowledgement that companies did not only have responsibilities with respect to making profit but also when it comes to society gave rise to the idea of ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR). The Worldbank defines CSR as ‘’the commitment of business to contribute to sustainable economic development by working with employees, their families, the local community and society at large to improve their quality of life in ways that are both good for business and development’’ (Petkoski, 2003 p. 1). CSR became increasingly popular in the 1990s and even more after the millennium change, when the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) revised their guidelines for responsible business conduct (OECD, 2011). According to these guidelines, multinationals are responsible for finding a balance between economic, environmental

and social development and governments adhering to these guidelines have to maximize the positive impact that multinational enterprises can make to sustainable development and enduring social progress (OECD, 2011). The public expected that multinationals would not only pursue profit maximization but would also contribute to the social and environmental development of a country and it rewarded the multinationals that succeeded in CSR by increased sales and attitude towards the company (Williams 2008). Therefore, CSR was not only a ‘good thing to do’ from moral perspective but also from financial perspective. These days, almost all companies are involved in some CSR activities (Oberseder, Schlegelmilch & Murphy, 2013).

Just as companies take more responsibility, governments also increasingly work together to address development problems. This trend started with the foundation of the United Nations (1945), followed by newer programs and institutions such as Unicef (1946), the World Health Organization (WHO) (1948) and the World Food Program (WFP) in 1961 (Un.org, 2005). In 2000, the eight Millennium Development Goals were established and signed by 189 United Nation Members and 23 international organizations during the Millennium Summit of the United Nations (Un.org, 2014). Among the goals are the eradication of extreme hunger and poverty (first goal) and the development of global partnerships for development by the end of 2015 (8th goal). The introduction of the 8th millennium goal for the development of global partnerships clearly demonstrates the role of businesses, governments and non-governmental agencies working together to meet developmental problems. Indeed, given the fact that the complexity of many developmental problems ‘exceed the capabilities of a single sector’ (Kolk, Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008, p. 262) scholars and practitioners alike now look to partnerships between NGOs, businesses and governments to come up with viable solutions together (Kolk, Tulder and Kostwinder, 2008). However, partnerships have not always been seen as an effective instrument to tackle developmental problems. The paragraph below explains unilateral action for development and the downsides of it.

1.2 Limits of unilateral action for development

Government agencies, non-governmental organizations and other public or civil-society organizations have been known as the traditional players in development problems.

At first, government spending on developing countries was focused on delivering aid in the form of financial capital with a low amount of accountability. This kind of aid was prone to corruption and misallocation and has been compared to the ´´resource curse´´ (Djankov, Montalvo & Reynal-Querol, 2008). The countries who received aid often had lower economic growth and worse development outcomes than countries that were less dependent on foreign aid. This lead to a change in public opinion about foreign aid and the best way to assist developing countries in their

development. Transparency and results based projects became important and development projects were seen as investments rather than black holes for public money. As a result of this, efficiency became an important topic in development issues and government agencies and NGO’s were questioned for their capability of providing efficiency. Private companies were to an increasing extent seen as part of the solution for development problems and since the millennium change they have taken a significant role in the development of developing countries. However, private partners lacked the expertise that NGOs did have through their experience in developing countries and their protection of public interests (Kraak et al. 2012). Private companies also needed government agencies as provider of local market knowledge, contacts and also expertise on the ground (Kraak et al. 2012). In addition, risk involved with investing in alien markets such as developing countries was too high for private companies and had to be shared with other actors such as NGOs and government agencies (Warner 2003).

Consequently, government agencies and NGOs sought the help or collaboration of companies to tackle development problems, in order to gain access to much needed resources, knowledge and capabilities, such as efficiency and companies sought the collaboration with governments and NGOs to gain local market knowledge, legitimacy and share risk (Kraak et al. 2012, Warner, 2003). This kind of partnership is also known as tripartite partnerships.

2. Tripartite Partnerships

As stated prior, partnerships between NGO’s, firms and governments are now all the rage to address complex developmental problems, which no sector can address on its own. This section will delve more deeply into such partnerships by first discussing the key factors and benefits and risks of more traditional, public private partnerships. After that, the link with tripartite partnerships will be discussed.

2.1 .1 Principles of partnerships.

In the literature, there are many definitions of partnerships but in this paper, the definition of Sørensen and Petersen (2006) is most useful. In their paper, they provide a very practical definition and describe a partnership as “a voluntary or collaborative alliance which implies cooperation between two (or more) actors be it public, private, NGOs or any group of individuals which could fundamentally have different objectives, values, cultures, structures, but are sharing risks, responsibilities, resources, competencies whilst committed to common tasks which would achieve their specific individual goals” (Sørensen and Petersen, 2006, p. 147). This definition demonstrates that a partnership cuts across sectors and is based on the principles of shared responsibility, i.e.

cooperation rather than regulation is the key with which to solve problems, non-hierarchical structures (all partners should equal regardless of the financial or material contribution they have made) and the bundling and transferring of skills, knowledge and resources. Furthermore, the collaboration is voluntarily and partnerships should provide the individual actors with added value which may vary from financial benefits, material or intangible benefits (Tennyson, 2003). Another key element of a partnership is trust as there should be a certain amount of trust in the partnership to be able to work together. The individual partners should also be accountable for their actions which can be realized by drafting contracts that clearly indicate the roles and responsibilities of each partner. Finally, partners should be committed to the partnership and be willing to learn from each other. There should be mutual respect among partners and it should be allowed for partners to individually benefit from the partnership besides the general benefit of the partnership (Tennyson, 2003). As a consequence of all these principles, perhaps the most important element of a partnership is the selection and profiling process of partners.

2.1.2 Benefits of PPP and tripartite partnerships

When the key factors of partnerships are present, partnership effectiveness increases and several benefits become applicable. According to the literature (Vermeulen 2014, Tan 2012, Kraak et al. 2012), PPPs and tripartite partnerships have several advantages. First of all, risk and work of the partnership are transferred to the partner with the best capabilities to manage it at the least cost. Consequently, the best value is achieved. Secondly, the selection procedure of the projects enables the commission to choose the partnerships with the best applications, therefore benchmarking the cost of public services. Third, the transfer of public and private sector skills, resources, knowledge and expertise between the actors may lead to innovation and increased efficiency. Private companies in the partnership have marketing and management expertise and use their capital efficiently and cost-effective. According to Selva of the WFP: ‘’ in the private sector, there is a lot more competition and this forces the companies to work efficiently. We, as non-profits, could learn from this and increase own our efficiency’’ (Vermeulen, 2014). Furthermore, companies often link the payment of employees to their performance, thereby creating incentives and efficiency (Tan 2012). On the other hand, NGOs provide the partnerships with expertise on the ground and they protect public interests by monitoring government and industry actions, thereby creating legitimacy for the partnership and increasing the public attitude towards the private partners (Kraak et al. 2012). According to Bas van der Wal, head of Land Rover Netherlands: ‘’It’s fantastic to see the Red Cross on the news, driving a Land Rover. This is of course better than a commercial with a nice couple living a fantastic live and driving a Land Rover’’ (Vermeulen 2014). The role of the government in tripartite partnerships is

described as the provider of local market knowledge, contacts and also expertise on the ground (Kraak et al. 2012). Finally, the risk of the partnership is shared between the different actors which decreases the risk of the individual partner. Developing countries can be seen as alien markets and the risks that tripartite partnerships face in these markets are relatively high due to a lack of market-specific information and experience (Warner 2003). These risk are not only commercial but also social and political and tend to scare off companies to invest in developing countries. A tripartite partnership is able to share these risks between the different partners. Furthermore, government agencies are often the most important financing partner in a tripartite partnerships, thereby attracting private partners by reducing the risk of the investment of private partners (de Caluwé, 2014).

These advantages enable tripartite partnerships to overcome several failures that may become the result of unilateral action by either governments, companies or NGO’s (Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008). These failures include; governance failure, as mentioned previously aid may become a curse just like the ‘’resource curse’’; market failure, the ineffectiveness of CSR due to a lack of active involvement of companies’ stakeholders and; ‘’good intention’’ failure for non-profit organizations, the ‘’bottom up’’ development ideas of these organizations have limited efficiency due to ‘do good’ mentality of their employees (Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008).

2.1.3 Tripartite partnerships and the role of a broker

Despite the potential of partnerships on paper, realizing these benefits in practice is very difficult according to Kolk et al. (2008). Among the most important pitfalls of partnerships are; misunderstandings between partners, misallocation of costs and benefits, mismatched partners, mistrust and misfortunes of time (Berger et al., 2004). Moreover, whilst partnerships between companies and NGOS have been around for a long time -and relatively much is known about potential advantages and risks- company, government, NGO tripartite partnerships are very new and still present a foray into uncharted territory (Kolk et al., 2008, Stadtler & Probst, 2012). The pitfalls previously described may be even more significant if a third party, namely the government, is added to the partnership.

Moreover, research has demonstrated that the benefits and risks of more traditional two party partnerships face, vary according to different phases (the start-up phase, the implementation phase and the review phase) the partnership finds itself in (Stadtler & Probst, 2012). In a nut shell partnership ineffectiveness is caused due to partner mismatch during the start-up phase, partners need to be wary of problems of time and power inequality during implementation and they need an objective look at the partnership to assess its effectiveness during the review phase. Therefore it is not surprising that several scholars point out the need of a broker in all these phases to help

overcome these difficulties (Warner, 2003; Pope & Lewis, 2008; Stadtler & Probst, 2012). Warner (2003), Pope & Lewis (2008) and Stadtler & Probst (2012) reason that since partnerships are based on the formation and maintenance of relationships, they require a management style that is based upon network facilitation. Broker organizations can facilitate the partnering and networking process in the partnerships by acting as a convener, mediator or learning catalyst (Stadtler & Probst, 2012). Brokers can act as convener and prevent misunderstandings between partners, mismatched partners and mistrust by mediating stakeholder dialogues and moderating stakeholder discussions. Additionally, they can act as mediators and avert misfortunes of time by managing departures and arrivals and motivating partners to keep momentum (Stadtler & Probst, 2012). Finally, brokers can act as learning catalyst and mitigate misallocation of costs and benefits by bringing in best practices tools for the allocation of costs and benefits. Pope and Lewis (2008) highlight the potential role of governments in building networks and maintaining relations in partnerships. This paper focusses on the Dutch government in particular since her development policy shifted to a focus on economic progress in developing countries (de Caluwé, 2014). Since then, she took a high interest in partnerships and increasingly started using partnerships for the execution of development programs (Ruben, 2013). In 2011, Dutch government spent € 48.3 million on 54 tripartite partnerships and this amount has increased since (Ruben, 2013). In April 2014, member of parliament Ingrid de Caluwé published an initiative note criticizing the Dutch government for ineffective involvement in tripartite partnerships. According to her, the Dutch government should change her current role as ‘’director’’ to a more facilitating one (de Caluwé, 2014).

Below, the paper will discuss the potential risks of partnerships and the complications of governmental agencies as the “third actor” will be stipulated in this regard. This will be structured according to the three phases in a partnerships, beginning with the start-up phase. This paper will also argue the need for brokers to help overcome these hurdles and give these partnerships a chance to succeed. Finally, the question will be asked whether the Dutch government can facilitate in tripartite partnerships and what the role should look like in order to be effective.

2.2.1 Start-up phase

During the start-up phase potential stakeholders and the resources needed to tackle the problem in question are identified and a common definition of the problem is established. Furthermore, partners design the partnership, formulate ground rules and draft an agenda (Gray, 1989). During this phase, several risks may arise that could hinder partnership effectiveness. In the section below, first the risks of traditional PPPs, i.e. a partnership between NGO and private company, will be discussed after which the potential complications of adding a third party, the government, will be argued. Additionally, a sub-question on the added risks of the government as third partner will be

provided and this will be answered in the results section. Finally, the need of a broker in the start-up phase to limit these risks will be reviewed and the potential of the Dutch government to facilitate tripartite partnerships will be discussed.

2.2.2 Risks and the role of a broker

There are several risks that PPPs face and that must be taken into account before starting a partnership. First of all, not every development problem requires a partnership. Partnerships are only useful when the issues they want to address are complex enough in scope and scale and require a diversity of expertise and resources (Pope and Lewis, 2008). Therefore, the value of the partnership must be objectively weighed against the alternatives of partners addressing the issue on their own or by other parties such as the local government (Warner 2003). This must be done early in the process of formulating a partnership agreement during the start-up phase. Furthermore, the selection of partners is also of critical importance. A mismatch of partners significantly reduces the effectiveness of the partnership and can be the result of a lack of overlap in goals, cultures, markets, decision processes, or structures (Berger et al. 2004). Berger et al. stated in his article (2004) that: ‘’The nonprofit partner usually lives in a world defined by enduring, long-standing social issues, while the corporate partner is usually driven by short-term results. The time-consuming, consensus-driven decision style of many nonprofits flies in the face of the hierarchical, command-and-control style of the firm’’ (Berger et al. 2004, p 63). Consequently, the partners of a partnership all have individual and specific goals for joining the partnership, these are strongly influenced by their societal background, public vs. private, profit vs. non-profit and by their moral standards or virtues (Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008). These should be made clear to the other partners to prevent misunderstanding and to manage possible conflicts of interest and biases. Therefore, partners should be tested on their ‘virtuousness’ for joining the partnership (Kolk, Van Tulder, & Kostwinder, 2008). The roles and responsibilities between the partners should also be optimal and clearly divided as well as the allocation of costs and benefits. Misunderstandings of roles and responsibilities or misallocations of costs and benefits are often core issues that underlie partnership breakups (Berger et al. 2004).

The risks mentioned above are likely to be more extreme when a third party, the government, is added to the partnership and a tripartite partnership is created. In the process of weighing the partnership against the alternatives of partners addressing the issue on their own, the government as third party should also be analyzed whether she is capable of addressing the issue on her own. This analysis is time costly and as a result, less time is available for analyses of the other two parties if a third party is added. This may increase the risk of adding superfluous partners to the partnership, thereby decreasing partnership effectiveness. Furthermore, the government has its own

set of goals, cultures, markets, decision processes, or structures which may not fit with the goals, cultures etc. of the other partners. Adding this party to the partnership increases the change on a mismatch of partners and may therefore hinder partnership effectiveness. Also, if not communicated clearly, the goals of the government may create conflicts of interest and biases and misunderstandings. Finally, when a third party joins the partnership, additional agreements have to be made about the allocation of costs and benefits. If the government is funding the partnership, she would want a certain degree of justification of how the funding is used. When this degree of justification leads to time costly procedures it may hinder partnership effectiveness. Taking these factors into consideration, this paper states the following sub-question.

Sub-question 1: What are the added risks of the government as partner in tripartite partnerships

during the start-up phase?

The role of a broker during the start-up phase should be focused on limiting the risks addressed in the paragraph above. First of all, to check if the development issue requires a partnership, the broker could analyze and identify areas for tripartite partnerships. To decrease the chance of adding superfluous partners to the partnership, a broker could identify important stakeholders and resources and initiate stakeholder dialogues to test whether partners add value to the partnership and to find out the motivations of the partner to join the partnership. Furthermore, the broker could analyze the fit of the goals, cultures, markets, decision processes, or structures between partners (Stadtler & Probst, 2012). If vital information for the partnership is lacking or knowledge about required areas of expertise is missing, the broker could provide the partners with research and expertise on the development issue by conducting feasibility studies and market analyses or by advising the partnership with experience from previous partnerships.

The Dutch government is partner in many partnerships for development and is a significant financial contributor (Ruben 2013). In return, she requires a certain degree of accountability for public spending. However, the current role of the government is described by de Caluwé (2014) as one of director and it hinders partnership effectiveness by controlling instead of assisting the partnership. According to her, the government should be more facilitating by giving advice and provide assistance in order to minimize the risks previously mentioned (de Caluwé, 2014). However, it is arguable whether the Dutch government is able to make this shift as it requires a lower degree of control on public spending and a higher degree of trust in the other private and NGO partners. As a result, the following sub-question is drafted:

Sub-question 2: How can the government best facilitate tripartite partnerships for development

during the start-up phase?

2.3.1 Implementation phase

During the implementation phase, the partnership becomes operational and the partners work according to their commitments and carry out the planned tasks (Gray, 1989). Below, the risks during this phase will be elaborated on, first by highlighting the traditional partnerships and their risks and second by stipulating the potential issues of adding the government as third party. Next, the role of a broker to mitigate these risks will be discussed as well as the potential for the government to facilitate tripartite partnerships during this phase.

2.3.2 Risks and the role of a broker

First of all, the input of partners, either material or immaterial, should not create a mismatch of power during the implementation phase. According to Berger et al. (2004), power is closely related to the input the partners provide the partnership with. He further states that the most powerful partner often dominates the partnership and despite the best intentions this decreases the effectiveness. ‘’The weaker partner is sometimes treated in a patronizing and dismissive manner. ‘’This can be not only demoralizing and enervating, it may even limit the potential of the alliance since key resources may not be fully understood or exploited’’ (Berger et al, 2004 p. 65).

Another important element to take into account during this phase is time. First of all, the partnerships costs a lot of time (Vermeulen 2014). Not only maintaining the relationship between partners is time costly, for example also the posting of employees from the different partners into a new workgroup takes a lot of time. Therefore, long term planning and commitment is necessary to increase the likelihood of achieving the mission of the partnership. Secondly, there may be misfortunes of time. All PPPs can be considered to have a lifecycle with certain consequences. ‘’The honeymoon ends; the novelty wears off’’ according to Berger et al. (2004). Every partnership needs to be refreshed at some point so prevent certain problems and to maintain the believe of achieving the goals. Some of the main predictable problems that occur in a PPP is the turnover of key people. What happens when the chief executive officer (CEO) that supported the partnership leaves the company? This happened to a PPP, including TNT and WFP. The CEO of TNT, Peter Bakker, left in 2011 and afterwards the effectiveness of the partnership decreased significantly. The new CEO of TNT prioritized new goals and the partnership was not one of them. As a result, the partnership ended (Vermeulen 2014). This and other inconsistent participation hinders the effectiveness of partnerships according to Mckinsey & Company who released a report in 2004 of the impacts of Global Impact, a UN partnership for responsible corporate citizenship. The report notes that: “inconsistent participation and divergent and unmet expectations limit the impact on companies” (Mckinsey & Company, 2004). In order to prevent such failures, exit strategies of important partners

should be planned and solutions in case of an exit should be made in advance (Berger et al. 2004). If the government joins the partnership, the chance of a mismatch of power may increase depending on the input provided by the government. Since the Dutch government is a significant funder of many partnerships, the likelihood that the Dutch government has more saying in the partnership than other, less resourceful, partners is present. Also, the government increases the change of misfortunes of time. Partnerships for development need long-term commitment in order to succeed in their goals. However, the political climate may influence the attitude toward specific partnership or partnerships in general. In addition, the likelihood of turnover of key people may also increase when the government is added as third party since there may be more key people required to sustain the partnership if parties are added. All this lead to the following sub-question.

Sub-question 3: During the implementation phase, what are the added risks of the government as

partners in tripartite partnership?

To further improve communication between the partners during the implementation of the partnership, a broker could moderate stakeholder discussions and mediate in joint problem diagnosis. In case of a mismatch of power and unfair behavior, the broker could act as a mediator between the partners. During the implementation phase, the broker could also refresh partnerships by motivating partners to keep momentum. In case of any problems, the broker could bring in tools and best practices for partnership management. Furthermore, the broker could identify the key actors, regularly meet with them to anticipate in case they are planning to leave the partnership and look for replacements. Therefore, the broker could manage departures and arrivals (Stadtler & Probst, 2012).

De Caluwé (2014) discusses the role of the Dutch government in the implementation phase. According to her, the government should act as linking pin with embassies in the developing countries and function as back office for the partnership (de Caluwé, 2014). However, Stadtler and Probst (2012) argue in their paper that broker organizations should not be bound by national or specific political interests. Since the Dutch government has specific political interests it is arguable whether she would be able to remain her neutrality in the partnership and act as an effective broker to overcome problems during the implementation phase. Therefore, the following sub-question is drafted.

Sub-question 4: During the implementation phase, how can the Dutch government best facilitate

tripartite partnerships?

2.4.1 Review phase

During the review phase, partners look back on the partnership progress and decide either to sustain or end it (Grey, 1989). This phase is not considered the end of the partnership, rather a phase is which partners might agree to reshape their partnership in line with changes in the partnership constellation or the environment that call for adaptation. According to Stadtler & Probst (2012), this leads to; ‘’a cyclic process that, again, starts either by redefining the problem to be addressed or by reworking issues in the direction-setting phase’’. The risks of PPPs in this phase will be discussed in the next paragraph as well as the potential complications of adding the government as third party. Additionally, the possibility of the government facilitating the partnership will be argued.

2.4.2 Risks and the role of a broker

Finally, as is the case for any new relationship, regular review and maintenance is important in order to reveal possible changes in the partnership constellation or changes in the environment that call for adaptation. Especially in alien markets where market, social and political information is relatively scarce and changes to them unpredictable, regular review is important When done properly, this leads to a cyclic process that, again, starts either by redefining the development issue or by reworking problems in the implementation phase. However, ‘the evaluation of PPPs for development is complex and requires experience, since ‘traditional analytical frameworks, which presuppose a more ’normal’ context for contractual arrangements, or a ‘moral’ obligation of actors to engage in activities seem not adequate’’ (Stadtler & Probst, 2012 p. 34). If the government joins the partnership, the need for regular review is likely to increase due to an increase in partnership complexity. The review will also require more time and the reviewer will need a broader understanding, not only of the NGO’s and private partners but also of the government. This leads to the following sub-question.

Sub-question 5: During the review phase, what are the added risks of the Dutch government as

partner in a tripartite partnership?

A broker could increase the effectiveness of the partnership by monitoring and evaluating the partners. The broker could organize regular meetings with each individual partner to check if progress is made and interim goals are being accomplished. If necessary, the broker could connect with other actors to prepare the exit of partners or help to scale up approaches. Further, the broker could motivate adaptations and conduct research on how to scale-up or best practices for the exit strategy. During this phase, experience from the previous phases is used to evaluate the partnership

and therefore, experience gained during the previous phases will be useful. The sub-question below examines whether the Dutch government is capable facilitating tripartite during the review phase.

Sub-question 6: During the review phase, how can the Dutch government best facilitate tripartite

partnerships?

These sub-questions will be answered in part IV, the results. Below, a conceptual framework is presented for the role of a broker to summarize the literature presented previously.

Figure 1: Conceptual framework of the possibilities for governments to facilitate tripartite partnerships. Adapted from Stadtler & Probst (2012).

Part III Methodology

The methodology will discuss the research design of this paper as well as the way data was collected, namely by conducting interviews. Furthermore, the participants of the interviews will be introduced and their role in tripartite partnerships and their relation with the Dutch government will be explained. Finally, this part will specify the analytical tools used in this research. The research design of this paper can be considered as both deductive and inductive. The deductive part of the research is done by reading published articles and creating theoretical frameworks which enables the establishing of the sub-questions, interview questions and initial codes (Saunders et al. 2007). The inductive part of the research is done by conducting interviews with several stakeholders that are part of or cooperate with the Dutch government in tripartite partnerships. This part enables further theory building rather than testing by gaining new insights and emerging codes (Saunders et al. 2007). The combination of deduction and induction allows this paper to find new results and deepen the understanding about tripartite partnerships and the government as partner in particular. Since knowledge about this topic is scarce or fragmented, the combination of inductive and deductive research is an appropriate research design for this study (Saunders et al. 2007).

3.1 Qualitative interviews

This thesis is researching the most effective role for the Dutch government in tripartite partnerships which depends to a high degree on a specific context, namely developing countries. The understanding of different dynamics and levels within tripartite partnerships and studying the roles of different stakeholders in tripartite partnerships require an extensive research on partnerships, an area which is still relatively undiscovered (Kolk et al., 2008). As a result, a qualitative data collection method will be applicable for this research. Quantitative data collection is not applicable for this study because this approach tries to quantify the problem via statistical, mathematical or numerical data or computational techniques (Bell, 2009).

The roles of stakeholders in tripartite partnerships and the behavior of stakeholders in that role are interesting for this research but they took place at some previous point in time. Therefore, these behaviors are not observable but can be gathered by use of interviews (Patton, 2002). The interviews that were conducted in this paper are structured interviews. In these semi-structured interviews a combination or interview approaches is used according to the paper of Patton (2002). He states that a combination offers the interviewer; ’flexibility in probing and determining when it is appropriate to investigate certain subjects in greater depth or even to pose

questions about new areas of inquiry that were not originally anticipated in the interview instrument’s development´ (Patton, 2002, page 36). A similar approach to this study is the study conducted by Pope and Lewis (2008) who researched methods for analyzing partnership effectiveness. Their approach is based on interviews to examine connections between people and the quality of relationships within partnerships. Interviewees were asked about their relationships with each of the other partners, the biggest successes or achievements that had resulted from the partnership, what could have been done better and many more questions. Their study revealed a number of characteristics that were features of all the effective partnerships, including a good broker to build relationships (Pope and Lewis, 2008). Since their study covers an area interesting for this study and their research approach proved to be useful in the same field of expertise as this study, a similar approach, in the form of semi-structured interviews has been chosen for this paper. Furthermore, the use of the paper of Pope and Lewis (2008) to find the best fitting research design also decreased the amount of bias for research design. The interview strategy used in this paper involves a standard set of general open questions in the early part of the interview to find out what the work of the participant entails and what the personal motivations of the participant for this sort of work are, but most important; to make the interviewee feel comfortable. The interview continues by focusing on the themes that are interesting for this study but enhances the freedom for the interviewee to discuss the themes in the order that is spontaneously addressed by the interviewee. For an overview of the open-ended questions see appendix A.

3.2 Sample

The participants of this study are from seven different organizations and institutions and they all are different pieces in the puzzle called a tripartite partnership. They vary from coordinators of actual tripartite partnerships to a manager of a knowledge platform for partnerships to a member of parliament. The interviewees have been selected throughout the different phases that exist in a partnership. As a result, actors important in the start-up phase, implementation phase and review phase have been identified and contacted for an interview. Consequently, the whole process of Dutch tripartite partnerships for development, from policy making and conceptualization to execution, implementation and reviewing, has been covered. Dutch tripartite partnerships and the role of the Dutch government are chosen for the study because there are many partnerships operating in developing countries in which the Dutch government is involved as a partner. The Netherlands announced partnerships as a crucial component of its politics since her development policy shifted to a focus on economic progress in developing countries to reach the Millennium Development Goals (Kolk et al. 2008). In 2011, Dutch government spent € 48.3 million on 54 tripartite partnerships and this amount has increased since (Ruben, 2013). As a result, Dutch

tripartite partnerships are highly suitable for this research.

The interviewees were preselected to make sure that they covered all aspects of Dutch partnerships and the government as partner in particular. Seven interviewees were selected according to Saunders et al.’ (2007): ‘purposive sampling’. This way, the seven interviews are sufficient for this study to make comparisons, draw conclusions and answer the research question. A wide range of interviews, i.e. a broad range of organizations, are used to increase the validity of this study (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Patton, 2002). A larger sample size would have further increased the quality of this research except this was not possible due to a short time-frame. Random selection of interviewees was also not possible due to the risk of missing a comprehensive overview and understanding with a limited amount of seven interviewees. However, to limit the amount of personal bias during the selection of interviewees, experts on the topic were consulted for their advice which participants to interview. As a result, the information gathered from the interviews contains perspectives of different levels in tripartite partnerships and provides a comprehensive understanding of tripartite partnerships and the role of the Dutch government in particular. Below, the seven interviewees will be introduced as well as their role in the partnerships.

The first interviewee is Sjoerd Dijkstra, previously coordinator and currently program manager of the Amsterdam Initiative against Malnutrition, also known as AIM. AIM is a tripartite partnership launched in 2009 to reduce malnutrition and food insecurity for 100 million low-income consumers in seven developing countries by 2015. Partners involved in the partnership vary from suppliers and producers of nutritious products or ingredients like DSM and Unilever to governmental organizations or NGO’s like the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Wageningen University and ICCO1_{. To}

reach their target they will focus on jointly developing and piloting innovative models to target vulnerable and low income populations, to improve supply and access to affordable nutritious products and to reduce vitamin and mineral deficiencies by 20 percent (AIM factsheet 2013). AIM is interesting for this study because the organization is a tripartite partnership and has multiple start-up projects in developing countries. These projects are in the middle of implementation and they being constantly monitored, thereby providing significant information of the three phases according to Stadtler & Probst (2012). Sjoerd Dijkstra has a lot of experience with the Dutch government as partner as well with the other partners that have been interviewed and he is working with AIM since the beginning which contributes to the quality of the data he provides in the interview. The second interviewee is Hester Foppen, program manager at Aqua for All. Aqua for All is also a tripartite partnership, started in 2002, and according to their website is; ‘’a foundation dedicated to fulfilling the needs of the poorest people in the world, the people with less than four

1 _{ICCO, Internationaal Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen. http://www.icco.nl/nl/}

22

dollars a day, the so called Bottom of the Pyramid (BoP). Our purpose is to steadily increase the number of people with access to clean water and adequate sanitation on a sustainable base. Aqua for All acts as a networking agent, connecting public and private organizations, mobilizing resources, expertise and finances from the Dutch water sector towards development projects focused on water and sanitation’’ (AquaforAll.nl, 2014). Aqua for All has a lot of strategic partners, including the ministry of Foreign Affairs, and is therefore an interesting stakeholder for this study. Hester Foppen has a lot of experience at Aqua for All and with the Dutch government as partner as well with the other participants of this study.

The third interviewee is Christina van der Heden, project advisor at the Netherlands Enterprise Agency (NEA). The NEA is hired and paid by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to run a number of programs for developing countries and has different grant schemes available to partnerships. All tripartite partnerships who want to receive funding from the Dutch government have to apply at the NEA. They decide whether an application for a partnership is approved or not. The first round of subsidies for tripartite partnerships for development has started in 2012 and since then there has been a lot of criticism about the assessment of applications. If the application is approved, the NEA remains involved in the tripartite partnership and cooperates with the partners to achieve the goals of the partnership and to provide accountability for public spending. Christina has been involved in the discussion from the beginning and functions as an important link between the Dutch government and tripartite partnerships, in all phases of the partnership. Both Aqua for All and AIM have applied and received funding from the Netherlands Enterprise Agency and they still work together very actively. As a result, the dynamics of their relationship are very actual and interesting for this paper. The fourth interviewee is Anno Galema, coordinator Public Private Partnerships at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. He is responsible for writing the policies that the NEA has to implement in their assessment of subsidy applications for partnerships. He is also coordinator of a knowledge platform for the improvement of tripartite partnerships. As a representative of the Dutch government and due to his experience with a lot of partnerships, including Aqua for All and AIM, Anno Galema is therefore of great importance for this study.

The fifth interviewee is Jean Paul Schaaij, previously manager at a knowledge platform for improving tripartite partnerships at the ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment. His experience with tripartite partnerships is limited to partnerships in the Netherlands but therefore provide a basis for comparisons between tripartite partnerships in the Netherlands and in developing countries.

The sixth interviewee is Ingrid de Caluwé, member of parliament (MP) of The Netherlands. She focuses on matters of development aid, aviation, harbors and ship transport. In April 2014, she published an initiative note for simpler and more effective investment in development. This note

discusses the role of the Dutch government and the Netherlands Enterprise agency in tripartite partnerships and is therefore interesting for this paper.

The seventh and last interviewee is Astrid van Agthoven from the Netherlands Embassy in Accra, Ghana. She is project manager of the Ghana WASH project, a tripartite partnership that provides water and sanitation facilities for communities and their schools, clinics and households. In constructing boreholes, hand-dug wells, small-town piping systems, and supporting the development of surface water kiosks, the partnership is ensuring potable water access for thousands of people. The partnership is also improving community sanitation through the construction of household latrines and institutional latrines for schools and clinics (Ghana WASH Project, 2012). The WASH project is interesting for this paper because according to interviewees previously mentioned, embassies are an essential link for tripartite partnerships for development and they can be seen as an extension of the Dutch Government. The embassy of Ghana and in particular the WASH project serve as a benchmark for the role of the Dutch government in tripartite partnerships. Together, these interviews enable a comprehensive understanding of the dynamics in Dutch tripartite partnerships and the role of the government in these partnerships. The next paragraph discusses the analytical techniques used for this paper. Below, an overview of the interviewees is provided

Figure 2. Overview of the name, function and organization of the interviewees.

3.3 Data collection

The participants for this paper were approached by email or by phone with information about this research and an explanation why they were contacted. All seven interviews were conducted at the office of the interviewee, around the areas of the Hague and Amsterdam. For each interview, an hour and a half was taken into account and each interview was recorded, after permission was asked, and transcribed which will be elaborated on further in the paper. The interview had two different parts. The first part, as already discussed above asked the interviewee about his or her job description and motivation. This was done to make the interviewee feel more comfortable and to establish a certain degree of trust with the interviewee (Mortelmans 2011). The second part consisted of in-depth questions about tripartite partnerships and the Dutch government as partners to answer the research question and sub-questions. If the interviewee encountered any unfamiliar concepts the time was taken to explain these to them. Since the participants were Dutch and the interviews were spoken in Dutch, the transcripts are in Dutch as well. They can be found in appendix B.

3.4 Data analysis

The analysis of data starts by conducting the interviews, whereby a significant part of the information is already stored inside the mind, according to Mortelmans (2011) these notes are called; ‘’Head notes’’. Secondly, the interviews are written down word by word from the recordings in verbatim transcript. This way, the interviews can be analyzed in an academic way, namely by reading and coding the text. The reading of the text has been done in three ways (Mortelmans 2011), first of all, by literally reading the text to gain a general understanding of the interview. This was easily done since the interviews were conducted by myself and the content of the interviews was mostly in my head. Next, the interviews should be understood and therefore it is necessary to interpret the data in analytical terms. These were based on conceptual insights from the theoretical background and memos were used to write them down. According to Mortelmans (2011), memos are written down ideas at the moment they appear and are especially useful to prevent forgetting these ideas. The last ‘reading style’ is a reflective style and this is used to improve your skills as an interviewer. Skills that needed to be improved were; shorter and clearer formulation of questions, further questioning on the same topic when the interviewee fails in providing the complete answer and to limit time on questions less important for the study.

After reading the interviews, the coding starts in order to reduce the data. The data from the interviews is coded and analyzed using the computer software NVIVO. Computer-supported qualitative data analysis enables systematical, comprehensive and exhaustive analysis of data

retrieved from the interviews (Gephart, 2004). Coding can be done in several phases but in this paper, only one round of coding was used. Usually, the first round of coding is open coding, which is the disaggregation of data into units (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). However, several themes and subthemes are already constructed by the conducting the literature about partnerships, this is called the a-priori approach, and open coding is therefore not required. In some cases, open coding was used to describe new emerging themes in the interviews but these were rarely related to the focus of the paper. Table 1 provides an example of open coding.

Table 1. Example of open coding for sub-question 3: How should the government fulfill the role of

broker in a tripartite partnership during the start-up phase?

When open coding is finished, the second round of coding, known as axial coding, starts. Axial coding is used to find relationships between the founded units from the first round of coding (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009). In there, all the data of the interviews about the roles of the stakeholders in tripartite partnership and the role of the Dutch government in particular is combined. Figure 3 provides an example of axial coding.

Figure 3. An example of axial coding for sub-question 3: How should the government fulfill the role of

broker in a tripartite partnership during the start-up phase?

Corbin and Straus (2008) use the combination of open and axial coding for building theory using grounded theory. According to Corbin and Straus (2008), grounded theory is a systematic methodology to discover new theories through the analysis of data. However, this paper is not written to discover a complete new theory, rather to test already existing theories to practice. The use of only axial coding is therefore an appropriate strategy and fits well with the aim of this research (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill, 2009.

The reading and coding of the interviews can be considered as a cyclical process which was done after every interview. This made reflection and adjustments to the interview, reading and coding methods possible, thereby increasing the quality of the research (Mortelmans 2011). During the analysis process, several breaks were taken to refresh my thinking. The rough outline of the

insights emerged during the theoretical background research but further evolved during the interviews and the analysis of the interviews. As the analysis evolved, so did the level of abstraction in order to increase the quality of the results. Each time that an interview provided new insights, old interviews were reviewed to confirm and adjust the insights as needed. This way, the new insights continued to be consistent with the data from previous interviews (Mortelmans 2011). This lengthy, repetitive and extensive process led to the results that follow in the next section.

Part IV Results

This section will present the findings of the conducted interviews. The findings will be structured according to the sub-questions introduced in the theoretical background section, part II. All results will be presented in a summarized manner enhanced with tables including the cited quotes from interviews.

Sub-question 1: What are the added risks of the government as partner in tripartite partnerships

during the start-up phase? Risk of financing

During the start-up phase, a common definition of the development problem is drafted and the potential stakeholders and resources required to address the problem are recognized. In addition, ground rules are formulated and the partnership agreement is established. In this phase, the participants highlight the effect of government as significant funder of the tripartite partnership. Often, the government funds 60 percent of the partnership and the other partners 40 percent. (1, table 2)

Before the government participates in the partnership and financially contributes, the other partners have to apply and meet certain criteria to receive the required funding. This is done by developing an application procedure in which partnerships can apply for government funding and inherently for the government as partner. By doing so, the government establishes a certain degree of accountability for public spending. However, there are several remarks about this application procedure that may hinder partnership effectiveness and therefore create a risk to tripartite partnerships. First of all, the application is time costly which leads to a destruction of capital since this amount of time could also be used for the benefit of the partnership. (2, table 2) Secondly, the list of criteria to which the other partners have to comply with is very strict and not communicated clearly. The criteria for partnerships don’t take into account the level of uncertainty, economically, socially and politically in developing countries. As a result, partners that might have been successful in developing countries fail to meet the criteria or are scared off by the strictness of the criteria. The partnership initiators further indicate that the criteria they have to comply with are not communicated clearly by the NEA. According to Sjoerd Dijkstra of AIM, ‘You have

to be an expert consultant to be able to know all the criteria for the application or you have to hire one.’ (3, table 2)

Thirdly, the people who rate the applications are not qualified enough according the respondents of the interviews. Currently, NEA employees assess the applications but they lack

experience of markets in developing countries and of market based development projects. As a result, the risk increases of accepting applications with a low success rate in developing countries instead of a high success rate. (4, table 2)

Political bias

Finally, the government as third party may include political bias in the partnership. When large companies instead of small companies are involved in the partnership, the NEA is more likely to approve their application due to an increase in pressure from their employer, the government. If these large companies perform well in developing countries, politicians who made sure the application was approved may benefit as well by an increase in media coverage. As Christina van der Heden of the NEA said about the tripartite partnership AIM; ‘AIM, which includes partners such as

Unilever and DSM, is a high level partnership and we as NEA felt pressure from the ministry of Foreign Affairs that this partnership had to be pushed through the application round’. The risk of this political

bias is that less effective, but ‘larger ‘partnerships are favored above more effective, but ‘smaller’ partnerships. (5, table 2)

To summarize, the added risks of the government as third partner are the destruction of capital due to the time costly application procedure, the risk of failing to attract important partners due to the strict criteria, an increase in accepting applications with a low success rate due to an incompetent application committee and lastly the risk approving ‘larger, but ineffective partnerships due to political bias. The next paragraph will discuss how the government can facilitate partnerships and thereby possibly decrease the risks previously mentioned.

Table 2. Exemplary quotes for sub-question 1.

Sub-question 2: How can the government best facilitate tripartite partnerships for development

during the start-up phase?

The government as financial partner

To decrease the added risks due to financing of the government as third partner, three participants state that a combination of funding, other than private and government are an alternative for partnerships. According to them government funding should be only used when there is no other option, due to the high public costs and the added risks it brings along. Loans should also be considered an option for funding in order to increase the likelihood of getting the required capital for investment. (1, table 3)

However, other participants mention that banks and also development banks such as the Dutch Development Bank (FMO) charge high interest rates, which is fine in countries with low risk but not in developing countries with high risk. They further state that it is utopian that every project will be a success and that there simply are costs of failing that should be considered as sunk costs.

Therefore, loans and other financial structures that include debt are not an option since there is no guarantee on a return on investment. Private companies take these costs, also known as seed funding, into account when a start-up is launched and so should tripartite partnerships. Therefore, it is unlikely that the partnerships receive enough funding without financial assistance of the government. (2, table 3)

As a result, financial contribution of the third partner, the government, is essential to tripartite partnerships. However, the government is able to facilitate the partnership by addressing the application procedure and introducing several adjustments.

Application procedure

First of all, the formats currently used to communicate the selection criteria are complicated, confusing and ambiguous and need to be more consumer friendly. For instance, Sjoerd Dijkstra of AIM stated that; ‘You have to read everything very carefully and even then there are little rules

between the lines that you have to be aware of’.

Secondly, the list of criteria should be less strict. Instead of controlling partnerships by focusing on details, a framework should be established in which the partnership experiences more flexibility to react to changing circumstances.

Finally, the committee that reviews the applications should include entrepreneurs with experience in developing countries or with market based development projects. Since tripartite partnerships are market oriented, the view of an entrepreneur is essential to judge whether a tripartite partnership is viable or not. In addition, the judging committee should also include government official(s) to explain the policy written by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in case of a tripartite partnership with a technological product, a scientist to judge the scientific viability of the partnership. (3, table 3)

To sum up, the government can facilitate the partnership during the start-up phase by adjusting the application procedure in three ways. First of all; produce consumer friendly formats, secondly; establish less strict criteria and finally; include entrepreneurs and scientists in the judging committee.

During the start-up phase, the government can also facilitate the partnership as convener, i.e. bring parties together, by identifying areas for partnerships and creating urgency. According to Anno Galema of the ministry of Foreign Affairs; ‘It is true that we can point out that in a particular

field, such as food and water sanitation, we want to see more partnerships and adjust our policy to create a sense of urgency’ . Embassies, as representatives of the government can also identify areas

in their country which need to be addressed. As convener, the government is also able to identify important stakeholders and connect them to each other. This can be done by initiating stakeholders

dialogues and organizing meetings for potential partners. Christina van der Heden from the NEA; ‘It is

not always easy to find the right partners, as a result we can help by organizing ‘table sessions’ with potential partners’. (4, table 3)

Additionally, the government can facilitate the partnership by sharing experience from previous partnership with new partnership initiators and advising them on their project development. According to Anno Galema from the ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Because of our

experience with previous partnerships, we can give some sort of direction by saying something like: "If you're going to do this, it will contribute nicely on that" Or "I've heard this idea already, it doesn’t work and you should do it this way’ Or we say, "wonderful idea, but if you want to achieve this you need to actually have a partner there.’ Furthermore, they could facilitate the partnerships by advising

them on the best practices to manage partnerships. As a result, the government could also facilitate the partnership as learning catalyst. (5, table 3)

In a nutshell, the government can facilitate tripartite partnerships during the start-up phase by adjusting the application procedure, as convener by identifying area’s and connecting potential partners and as learning catalyst by sharing experience and advising on project development.

Table 3. Exemplary quotes for sub-question 2.