Managing Access in
Cyberspace
How do states operate on Cyberspace?
Mike Winkel - 614303230-6-2014 Bachelor thesis
From the course:
A Future without Borders: International Political Geography Instructor: Darshan Vigneswaran
A Political Science essay in the field of International Relations University of Amsterdam
Contact information:
1 Abstract
In the short time it has been around, cyberspace has already left a permanent impression. With an estimated population of over three billion interconnected ‘netizens’, states are now forced to deal with permanent interconnectedness via an intangible and borderless virtual space and its empowered inhabitants. Perceiving a loss of control and a multiplicity of threats to state sovereignty, states now attempt to gain a foothold in cyberspace by nationalization via a mix of technical, social and economic means, not unlike those found in the geographic world. By shifting the current power structures on the internet in such a manner, however, states also transform the dynamic structure of cyberspace itself at the same time. While, arguably, a good thing for states in terms of regaining control, this trend might not necessarily be favorable. The means employed by states in cyberspace and its results are not unlike those found in contemporary migration discourses. By utilizing literature from both fields, this work attempts to explore the possibilities of using the narrative of migration discourse on cyberspace issues. This essay, therefore, hypothesizes that both fields of study would stand to benefit from an interdisciplinary perspective on their theories to gain new insights.
Introduction
As far as there are real life precedents, cyberspace could, at first, best be described as the new Wild West. A frontier with little to no structural governance in which a multitude of actors venture for various purposes. Of course this comparison ends when one tries to ascribe land acquisitions or even basic geographical features to cyberspace, as the web lacks a conventional dimension of place. This is not to say, however, that no wisdom is found in drawing these comparisons. For instance: Similar to the American Gold Rushes, a modern day ‘Big Data Rush’1 leaves various actors scrambling for gold and glory. Also similar in this respect is the lack of governmental oversight, arguably making it a free for all.
More interesting in these comparisons is the fact that actors on cyberspace are perceived as being on the fringe of society and that there is little governments can do to uphold its own set of rules. Therefore, letting people reside on the web would create problems of law enforcement for states. But what exactly is cyberspace and is this the case? Cyberspace, according to Choucri (2012, p. 3), includes the Internet, the hundreds of millions of computers the Internet connects, the institutions that enable it, and the experiences it enables. The answer to the latter question lies in the dynamics between the structure of cyberspace and the workings of sovereign states and its system.
What is cyberspace?
The advent of global virtual networks, most notably seen in the rise of the World Wide Web and the widespread distribution of advanced telecommunications, has created crosscutting debates whether to perceive these networks as being a complementary tool to physical reality or them being a reality of its own. Often a source for great and pioneering science fiction stories like ‘The Matrix’ (1999), ‘Ghost in the Shell’ (1995) and ‘Neuromancer’ (1984)2, academics have also created distinct views on the matter. Choucri (2012 pp. 5-6) argues that cyberspace is a space on its own. It refers to space as a
1 Big Data can be described as datasets that are too large for anyone to make sense on its own. They can be
used in creative ways to increase competitive business intelligence, better security measures and unprecedented scientific generalizations. For more information see:
http://www.bentley.edu/newsroom/featured/big-data-21st-century-gold
2 The origin of the term cyberspace can be found in this work. The author - William Gibson - described it as ‘a
2 domain of interactions that (1) creates potential sources of power, (2) provides for an expansion of influence and leverage, (3) enables new services, resources, knowledge or markets and (4) realizes further potentials when reinforced and sustained by technological advances. As such, other spaces (like colonialism, outer space, nano-space, etc.) can be seen as similar arenas. the book Information
Technologies and Global Politics (2002) Rosenau and Singh address the question how the spread of
information shifts away power and the locus of authority away from the state. In this work cyberspace (or modes of new communication) is defined as an environment (id., p. 117). Here it is stated that:
‘Communications environments … facilitate and constrain social forces, collective images, and ideas much the same as natural environments facilitate and constrain the reproduction of species.’
(Rosenau & Singh 2002, p. 117)
This idea is shared by authors as Jordan (1999) and Farrall & Carpini (2004) who perceive cyberspace as a new social space with its own laws and workings. These views are extended in Choucri’s benchmark work Cyberpolitics in International Relations (2012). In her view cyberspace (along with other types of spaces) refer to ‘domains of interactions that create potential sources of power, provide for an expansion of influence and leverage, enable new services, resources, knowledge, or markets, and realize further potentials when reinforced and sustained by technological advances.’ (id., p. 5) She goes on stating that:
‘When activities of one actor threaten the sovereignty, stability, or security of other actors, then [a] space becomes a critical variable in international relations.’
(Choucri 2012, p. 5)
The chances of collisions occurring are growing at a tremendous rate due to the features of cyberspace. Distinct from other spaces, cyberspace transcends traditional territory, governmental, social and economic constraints by ignoring hierarchy (due to the ‘pseudonimity’ of its users) and conventional dimensions of place. Moreover, the sheer amount of cyberspace inhabitants is growing at an unprecedented rate with 16 million users on the Internet in 1995, one billion users in 2005 and nearly three billion users in 2014.3 Adding these elements makes cyberspace a space that is:
‘Heavily contested, colonized, and reshaped by governments, militaries and private corporate
and civic networks.’
(Choucri 2012, p. 8)
Cyberspace access difficulties
Accepting the premise that cyberspace is a space with its own distinct features and is growing more politicized, it becomes clear that most, if not all, states encounter difficulties in defending their prerogatives on the web. In conjunction with the inherent characteristics of cyberspace4, these developments severely impose on a state’s national sovereignty. According to Johnson and Post (in Kahin & Nesson 1997, p. 6) cyber realities undermine state sovereignty in general by marginalizing its power over online behavior, the effect of online behavior on individuals and things and the legitimacy and ability of the state to enforce rules applicable to global phenomena. Moreover, as the
3 For more statistics on the Internet see: http://www.internetworldstats.com/
4 Choucri’s work states that the characteristics of cyberspace are: Near instantaneity, transcendance of the
physical, penetration of borders, constantly changing, low participatory barriers, ‘pseudonimity’ (as opposed to anonymity) and a bypassing of mechanisms of responsibility. (p. 4) To this I would add that the whole of the internet acts as a database, making recollection an objective matter.
3 WikiLeaks incidents have shown, states themselves continuously stress that the transparency and the permanency of content on the web is a permanent potential threat to national security (whether or not this is indeed the case falls outside the scope of this research) (The Guardian 2013). Finally, for some less liberal states, the web proves to be a venting place of alternative ideologies or just that of (potential) dissent to the leading elites. The degree of success that states have had in containing these difficulties is a matter of debate and determines whether or not national sovereignty has indeed eroded.
Seeing as states have a stake in controlling movement and access if the internet, but seem unable to do so, states will attempt to ‘embrace’ its population in new ways in order to control movement and distinguish between members and nonmembers. Adopted from the work of Torpey (1998, p. 246), the term ‘embracing’ refers to the identification and enduring access by states to its subjects in order to monopolize the legitimate means of movement. Cyberspace (along with other contemporary developments) has made conventional means of embracement (i.e. identification and mobility regulation)(id., p. 241) inadequate and almost impossible to uphold. Whereas the most obvious means of regulating access to content (i.e. restricting access, content filtering, and monitoring behavior) have long been documented, Morozov (2011) has summed up a more comprehensive list by asserting that control envelops a sociopolitical as well as a technical dimension. Moreover, Johnson and Post (in Kahin & Nesson 1997) postulate that states increasingly develop cyberspace laws and institutions, distinct from territorial based law. This has unveiled that states have more diverse and accurate means of exerting control than was previously thought, calling into question earlier measurements of exerting control.
This diversity in means is important for liberal states as they would naturally have difficulties exerting direct control over their population on cyberspace. Seeing as liberal states cannot censor the internet without greatly straining their rule of law, the decentralized nature of cyberspace has left these states in a disadvantaged position in controlling the movement of their population on the web. However, even if these states would be able to find precedents to directly limit access to the internet they still would not do so as states have great economic interests in keeping the internet open (Rosenau & Singh 2002, p. 133). This puts states in a, as Hollifield (2004) would call it, liberal paradox. The tradeoff between democracy and liberty is examined by O’Loughlin (2001) whose findings lead to the conclusion that:
‘In a liberal, marketdriven democracy, government has an interest in creating consumer-citizens in order to nurture economic growth in the global economy … The freedom users enjoy on the Internet will cause politicians to draw up regulations for Internet use (e.g. censorship) …’
(O'Loughlin 2001, p. 606)
Seeing that the difficulties states have in controlling its subjects’ movement on the politicized sociopolitical space that is cyberspace are issues of embracement and of a liberal paradox, this article argues that cyberspace access problematique is a matter that is best answered by migration regime discourse. This is belief is reinforced by the fact that both discourses seem to involve issues of access in virtually constructed spaces. While this extension may not hold up due to the fact that cyberspace owns some inherent features not present geographical space, the contraction of these two fields might yield explanatory value to both fields. Immigration theorists could benefit from the fact that its theories can be abstracted from traditional borders to other frontiers to test its validity in a more general sense, whereas cyberspace literature lacks a more structural theory on how states perceive access management. Furthermore, this article hopes to make a contribution to state development theory. Where, in a networked international state system, a next possible step for states to take in order to maintain sovereignty is to append Torpey’s theory to include the expropriation of the means of access as the next necessity for states in order to keep embracing its subjects. By doing so, however, some states might have a difficult time maintaining its core democratic values. This
4 categorization of state behavior might enable authorities to recognize such tendencies and take preventive measures earlier.
5 Data and Methodology
Researching the saliency of combining migration and cyberspace access discourse requires the juxtaposition of both fields, both in theory and in practices. Being exploratory in scope, this research aims to develop a framework with which to better understand both fields of study and ascribe to them a certain connection. To accept this is to acknowledge that there are limits of this comparative reasoning and that it is necessary to find them in order not to overdraw the findings. Acknowledging the extensive work done by many great academic scholars in both fields, this work will set up the parameters by using classifications and theories construed in other research. As such, this work will try to connect the dots in order to provide a theoretical framework with which to scrutinize the saliency of juxtaposing both fields of study via empirical research.
To test the explanatory value and the validity of the juxtaposition, it has to be subjected to real world scrutiny. This can be done, for instance, by analyzing the actions of several sovereign national states in regulating access to cyberspace. At first, the selection of cases depends largely on being able to get a clear picture of the typical behavior of sovereign states and figuring out by what characteristics they differ from each other. This can be done by selecting a diverse set of typical states, varying in only a few characteristics, in order to illuminate the full range of variation and their similarities (Gerring 2007, p. 89). Such a study needs to guard itself against selecting deviant cases as not to draw faulty conclusions. Other criteria of case selection with which the researcher has to deal with are, for example, the amount of internet users in a state and the availability of documentation on its cyberspace activities.
Empirical analysis of states’ behavior on cyberspace can best be done via textual analysis of state related actions and policies on the matter of regulating content on the net. As nearly everything is documented in some form on cyberspace, this landscape is a great source of data5, even about states that do not maintain much documentation about certain topics themselves. Furthermore, the data about a state’s behavior on cyberspace is likely to be sensitive material, making it likely that governmental actors will be reluctant to communicate this information themselves. Lastly, there exists a multiplicity of organizations6 that keep track of the state activity surrounding cyberspace. It seems likely that these organizations would be willing to hand over data surrounding this topic.
However, after a preliminary exploration on the subject, it seems that such a research would be redundant at this time. An empirical research can and should only be conducted if there is a sound theoretical base on which to build. Reading up on the subject, the literature revealed no sign of research being done via this line of enquiry, thus making it necessary to create a firm theoretical base first. This article will therefore only make an attempt to explore the possibilities of linking cyberspace access discourse and migration theory via a comprehensive literature study. Making it more of a thought experiment based on scholarly work of both fields, this work sets aside the use of a thorough real world empirical research. Doing both would likely prove to be too much in the limited timescale for this research.
The research will follow a problem-solution structure of looking at state behavior on cyberspace and investigates to what extent this behavior is analogous to the contemporary migration regime. It does so by drawing on academic research done in the field of social theory on cyberspace, since its conception up until now. By looking at the content and trends in the cyberspace literature, it is possible to look for similarities with the migration regime. The first part describes the structure of cyberspace, its inhabiting actors, where the power in cyberspace naturally lies and what kind of ideology prevails. Doing so enables this work to look for causal explanations for a state’s reasons of moving onto cyberspace. The second part explicates the existence of the state on cyberspace and its
5 This, also, is a form of big data, thus further proving that cyberspace is the information goldmine, many
analytics perceive it is.
6 reasons for being there. This part follows a chronological narrative of state encroachment on cyberspace. Furthermore, finding a common denominator in the reasoning of a state with regard to the structure of the contemporary migration regime and that of cyberspace could provide insight on general state behavior in their management of ‘space’ as a broader concept. The third line of enquiry concerns itself with the methods of cyberspace access controls that states employ. This part investigates the types of control states use, their effectiveness and whether or not there exists real world methods that resemble these controls. As such, this might provide more information on the utility of the methods of control employed by states in both fields. Finally, the last part examines the effects that state actions have on the structure of cyberspace itself. Is there a shift in power relations, structure, institutions and ideology on cyberspace? What are the normative implications of this? And lastly, what might (tentatively) be a good course of actions for states to take? This research concludes with an answer to the central questions and themes, discusses its implications and makes suggestions of possible follow-up research.
Power in cyberspace: natural tendencies
Like the definition of cyberspace itself, the structure and institutions of cyberspace have proven to be difficult to explicate. The artificiality of cyberspace has made it so that cyberspace manifests sustained shifts and reconfigurations (Choucri 2012, p. 4) , thus making the whole of this space more dynamic and very dissimilar to our common understanding of social reality (Castells 2001, p. 3). Many attempts made to understanding the structure of cyberspace employed a working concept of cyberspace as a network of computing devices used for storage and communication (Borgman 2000, p. IX). . Most social scientists have ignored the structure as a whole, opting to explain cyberspace as a product of its transnational characteristics (Kahin & Nesson 1999, p. 3) (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, pp. VII-VIII) (Eriksson & Giacomello 2006, pp. 221-222). The solution came in 2010 by Clark (2010) who described cyberspace as an interconnected four layered structure composed of:
- The physical foundations that support the logical elements, it is the only real connection to the physical world.
- The logical building blocks that make up the services and support the platform nature of cyberspace. These blocks facilitate the continuous and rapid evolution of new capabilities and services, making cyberspace a dynamic whole.
- The information that is stored, transmitted and transformed in cyberspace. Because of the logics on cyberspace, this information is created dynamically and on demand.
- The actors, entities and users with various interests who participate in the ‘cyber-experience.’ By utilizing cyberspace, they also transform the very nature of it by the way they choose to interact with it, Therefore the nature of cyberspace relates to the conditions people interact with it.
Clark argues that differences in interaction with cyberspace can be created by all the actors involved in the different layers. As such, power and control comes from the ‘natural conditions7’(id. pp. 4) of an entity relating to the locus of power and control implied by the design of cyberspace.
The fact that actors on cyberspace have a direct influence on the nature and perception of cyberspace itself constitutes to a trend of empowerment of various actors. As cyberspace is mostly a construction of the private sphere and civil society of western nations, it were mostly nongovernmental organizations that have managed cyberspace since it was privatized in the early 1990’s (Choucri 2012, p. 15). Therefore, the public sphere, initially, had little interest in having a say in the construction of cyberspace (Deibert et al. 2012, p. 6). As such, the net was designed without any structural contemplation of national boundaries (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, p. 58), making websites the highest domain of authority on the internet (id.). This freedom of statehood authority along with
7 Borrowed theme from Mahan about a nation’s power on sea: “The history of the seaboard nations has been
7 the fact that organization and creation and diffusion of content no longer require a massive amount of resources, provides civil and private actors with a massive amount of potential power (Kahin & Nesson 1999, Preface) (Schmidt & Cohen 2010). The idea of individual empowerment is further explored by Jordan (1999) who observes that individual power in cyberspace comes from a difference in natural hierarchy by the blurring of identity and the access to information (pp. 2-6). Moreover, Cammaerts & Audenhove (2005) also explicated the empowerment of social groups as individuals cluster around certain information and organize themselves around it to further their causes. Dubbed meso-mobilization, this form of organization is argued to contribute to a sense of unbounded citizenship among cyberspace participants. Along with the empowerment of individuals and social groups developed a distinct cyberspace ideology which held the belief that cyberspace would lead to a globally encompassing and cross-cultural civil society by diffusing knowledge and information in freedom of authority (Deibert et al. 2012, pp. 6-8). This ideology is still salient among the general cyberspace population.
The advent of cyberspace and the opening of the geographical borders following the demise of the soviet era is no coincidence. The subsiding of threats to the power of the United States and its constituents and its establishment as the unilateral world hegemon led to the diffusion of its technology around the world. Indeed, without this happening, it would seem very unlikely that a globally encompassing network of any kind would have ever emerged. Likewise, the rise of global migration and integration reached a peak in the 1990’s as well with the opening of the soviet borders, the relative ease of access to western states and the implementation of the European integration project (Hollifield 2004, p. 899).Not since 1914 has the world been this open. This itself can be seen as a form of civil empowerment as individuals now had the freedom to move beyond construed borders to live under different rules, with other cultures and types of freedoms. Moreover, as displayed in the work of Meyer et al. (1997), meso-mobilization among certain themes (i.e. the world environmental regime) in the global society also increased as the world ‘opened up’.
However, while clear similarities in terms of openness can be found in cyberspace and the opening of the geographic borders in the 1990’s, there is a fundamental distinction between the two. As the world opened up at the end of the millennium after a period of closed borders, cyberspace had just been conceived and has therefore no precedent of ever being compartmentalized. As such, no public institutions initially would or could concern themselves with the events on this medium. This has, arguably, led to a discrepancy in reactions against both types of access control. States were relatively quick to react to threats coming from international migration in various ways8 (Lahav & Guiraudon 2000) (Broeders 2007) (Joppke 1998). In contrast, cyberspace interaction was still something akin to a lockean state of nature up until the early 2000’s, relatively devoid of any meaningful central governmental activity. Therefore, activities on cyberspace were relatively far more extensive and it took much longer before any meaningful action was taken9. The distinction here is thus that migration control was opened up, while cyberspace had never been closed yet.
Nationalizing Cyberspace: Changes over time
Looking back, it would only seem natural for a backlash in openness of space to occur should threats to sovereign security in any form arise again. As cyberspace allowed the linking up of more diverse states (i.e. non-western states) it seemed that more and more of these states were hesitant to allow its inhabitants access to the full range of cyberspace. The claim, therefore, that there was ever real global openness on cyberspace is contestable. As many states did not open their borders for migration so too did they not do so for cyberspace.
8 States dealing with migration issues have adapted by creating borders everywhere, by creating core and
peripheral areas and selection methods or have just accepted the fact that unwanted migration is happening.
9 Goldsmith and Wu (2006) name the example of Yahoo permitting the depiction of Nazi memorabilia;
8 The reasons for states to deny access to content are abound. Deibert et al. (2008, pp. 9-12) sum up a multitude of reasons in this regard in their first book on internet access control by states, which are mainly political, social and security related. More concrete, political filtering involves the muting of dissenting voices and ideologies, social filtering might envelop religious, cultural and other normative issues, while security related filtering denies access to actors and content which the state deems dangerous (i.e. terrorists and insurgents but also webbased technology such as anonimizing tools). Also listed, but deemed less common and important, are legal and economic filtering of content. The filtering of these categoires would involve things that are respectively in conflict with the state’s law (such as intellectual property rights) and things that damage existing economic interests (such as Skype does).
Besides this Goldsmith and Wu (2006) argue that, apart from the incentives to filter by states, citizens and private actors also acknowledge the necesity of state presence on cyberspace. Citizens, they argue, demand protection against one another and an internet that corresponds to local preferences. Moreover, corporations need a legal environment that guarantees stability and enforcement of the basic market principles. These demands and preferences by various actors all seem to push the state into establishing a presence on cyberspace.
Lastly, there is a growing acknowledgement of a threat of full blown cyber warfare between two or more states10 (Kremer & Müller 2014). As cyberspace more and more becomes a fact of daily life, incorporation ever more facilities and institutions, states are growing more vulnerable to attacks from other states. As there is, as of yet, no consensus on general state presence on cyberspace (it lacks a cyber westphalian process if you will), attacks and other insecurities from other states also seem to draw the military elements of a state onto cyberspace. As stated by Kremer and Müller “a rising “Cyber Westphalian” process […] will define the accepted characteristics of national jurisdiction in cybered terms.” (id. pp. V) This will likely create an established behavior and institutions of states on cyberspace.
While much literature discusses the changing trends occurring on cyberspace in some way, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI)11 provides the most thorough description of the ongoing encroachment of public authorities on cyberspace since the early 2000’s. Their latest work (Deibert et al. 2012) puts Internet Access and content regulation into four chronological phases. The first phase (dubbed “the Open Commons”) comprises the stateless cyberspace as described earlier and exists from its conception until the change of the millennium. In this period cyberspace was mostly seen as a separate space on its own. This phase, as mentioned before, can be perceived as being as close to a true Lockean state of nature as can be, where regulation of existing governmental authorities was marginal to nonexistent. The fallacy of this line of thought is that nothing in cyberspace technology is unrelated to human behavior and that all actions taken in cyberspace are interconnected with the real world and could therefore be regulated. While this era is long over, its ideals remain salient under many cyberspace actors.
The second phase, called the “Access Denied period”, ranges from 2000 to 2005. During this period the awareness that cyberspace was a space to be regulated developed among states. During this period the first filters to block access to content were developed. As such, states began to assert themselves in cyberspace for the first time. Nonetheless most events of filtering were crude, static and also encompassed non-threatening material as well. As a result most citizens with some technical knowledge were able to circumvent these blockades with relative ease. Moreover, the crudeness along with the fact that these methods were easy to detect often led to international
10 The Stuxnet incident (a piece of weaponized malware that infected and sabotaged Iranian nuclear power
plants) of 2010 is definite prove of this fact. For more information: http://spectrum.ieee.org/telecom/security/the-real-story-of-stuxnet/
11 The OpenNet Initiative is a collaborative partnership of three institutions (The Citizen Lab, the Berkman
center for Internet & Society and de SecDev Group) which aims to investigate, expose and analyze Internet filtering and surveillance practices. The initiative is responsible for writing the works Access Denied, Access
9 criticism to those states that would filter content for social and political reasons. This led to the advent of the third phase.
The third phase, from 2005 to 2010, is called the “Access-controlled period.” During this phase, most states have firmly established themselves on cyberspace by using a multitude of ‘regulatory approaches that function not only like filters or blocks, but also as variable controls’ (pp. 10). States now employ a large array of mechanisms at various points on cyberspace to limit and shape access to content. Novel in this period is the development of non-technical and offensive mechanisms of control1213 and the targeting of actors instead of content. The methods developed in this period are more difficult to detect and measure and are harder and more dangerous to circumvent. Along with this, many states also begin to systematically register peoples’ activities, demand identification and draft legislation in order to control people’s movement on cyberspace. Furthermore, states now also outsource regulation access control to other actors. Seeing the great range of mechanisms for control it is reasonable to conclude that states at this point have acquired a firm grasp on cyberspace.
The amount of control that states gained in the last period set in motion the fourth phase. In this phase non-state actors begin to contest the amount of control states have and employ against actors on cyberspace. Starting around 2010 and lasting, at least, until now, this period is aptly named the “Access Contested period.” As cyberspace is increasingly integrating in our everyday life, many are concerned with the amount of (potential) power states now have over civil society and private conduct. This is exacerbated by the fact that there still is no uniform agreement of proper state behavior on cyberspace (or distinct citizen rights for that matter). The salient question in this period is not whether cyberspace can be regulated, but how it must be done. States in this era have also acknowledged, to some extent, the existence of other states on cyberspace and try to find ways to constrain their actions. Lastly, the trend of outsourcing access control in cyberspace to private actors is becoming far more extensive than ever thought of before. This and the fact that most of cyberspace itself is run by private actors has led to the emergence of private authority with real power and authority over people.
There still is much discussion whether state presence on cyberspace is a good thing. On this matter ONI does not provide much information, leaving this task for other research. As argued before, Goldsmith & Wu (2006) state that state presence and control of access on cyberspace is a good thing as every actor stands to benefit from the protection that states can offer. More contemporary authors (Choucri 2012) (Kremer & Müller 2014) agree that its presence is a necessary evil as cyberspace begins to encompass virtually all aspects of daily life. Their main source of concern, as is the case with the contemporary migration regime, is that security and control will take precedent over freedom and rights (Hollifield 2004).
The main lesson learned from this narrative is the fact that states will express their presence wherever they feel they must. As such, by establishing in cyberspace, states have firmly embraced its own population in this space as well. Building on the work of Torpey (1998), this would implicate that his theory of a state’s ‘expropriation of legitimate means of movement’ should apply to movement on cyberspace. Moreover, it would seem that there is little difference in migration and cyberspace control at this point with regard to incentives to establish control. It is a well-documented fact that many, if not all, states – in some form – limit legitimate movement based on political, social or security related motivations (id. p. 241). At this point in time it can therefore be argued that both fields are now engaged in similar debates on freedom versus security.
12 A concrete example of non-technical access control is the 50 Cent Party hired by the Chinese Government.
This organization is a group of internet commentators that post comments favorable towards party policies on internet message boards. A commentator is, allegedly, paid 50 cent for every strategically useful post made.
10 Access control: returning ‘netizens’ back into the national fold
As stated in the previous section, states have developed a variety of means to control access to content on cyberspace. Where the first of these means were crude, easy to circumvent and prone to error, later developed mechanisms of control proved to be more effective. At a certain point states also began to look for non-technical ways of controlling access. This has led to the development of social, private, legal and intelligence related mechanisms. The variety of the means of control and the scope of which they are employed has indeed made cyberspace a more state controlled space.
Technical methods of access control involve the use of computer-skills and knowledge of the workings of the cyberspace-infrastructure to manipulate the structure of cyberspace in such a way that access to certain content and information is denied or pushed forward for a range of actors. Methods associated with technical control are basic filtering of content, censoring specific content, infiltration by targeted viruses and DDoS-attacks. As these methods of control are inherently cyberspace specific, there can be no precedent of using these methods for migration control. As stated before, systematic filtering of content is mostly used by authoritarian states to uphold control. It is the most obvious way of exerting content control and it tends to invoke international criticism (Deibert et al. 2010, pp. 2-3). Censoring specific content is distinct from filtering as it targets specific content. Mostly used in more liberal countries, this type of access control is used to remove content that goes against the rule of law. While formally legal, there exists a fine line between blocking content based on violations of the law and restricting freedom of information. Several liberal states have difficulties with finding a right balance (id. p 6). Targeted viruses and DDos attacks can be seen as a new generation of internet controls that go beyond mere denial of information (id pp. 6-7) as the deployment of these controls not only denies access, but it also actively dissuades people from visiting targeted domains (Morozov 2011, p. 66). A preferred method over simple filtering of content as it is significantly harder to track down the culprit (or to assert whether there even is one), Morozov (id.) states that this is likely to be a preferred method of authoritarian governments as its use falls outside the rule of law in liberal countries.
Other more subtle and effective methods involve the development of social control mechanisms. These mechanisms entail the dissuasion of actors to access deviant content and to report it. The focus therefore changes from targeting content to engaging actors. As such, several countries14 have begun a campaign to deliberately erode the social capital of online communities (id. pp 66-67) by methods such as ‘trolling’15, dispatching new members to create splits within the community as well as provoking moderators to take unpopular measures. If effective, these methods effectively disband communities instead of just suppressing them. Another method of control involves the nationalization of cyberspace. This method involves the bolstering of domestic Internet enterprises by national governments to reduce dependency on foreign services16. Often used by states that are antagonistic towards the American political agenda or liberal ideology, but also used by states that wish to promote nationalistic awareness. Nationalizing parts of cyberspace makes control and exertion of power easier as those parts can more easily be considered a part of its host country as it is solely controlled by its government.
The use of social mechanisms of control on its own is not linked to the migration control per se. The deliberate erosion of communities, at least, has more to do with the quelling of dissenting voices than with restriction of access (although an argument for this can be made as well). Creating nationalized public domains of cyberspace, however, might be the closest method of creating national borders in cyberspace as can be. Doing so enables state authorities to regulate access and
14 Like the 50 cent army in China and several youth movements in Russia.
15 Internet slang. It involves the deliberate sowing of discord by starting arguments or by upsetting others by
posting offensive messages.
16 An example is the development of the Turkish Anabena project. This project involves the creation of a
11 monitor behavior at their own leisure as they operate completely within their own jurisdiction. Moreover, while the erosion of online communities is not a form of access control, the strategy of deploying independent actors to do so is also utilized to control migration.
The use of external actors to manipulate content on cyberspace is a form of outsourcing internet control to third parties. This method of control prevents governments from having to take blame and spend resources, instead shifting that responsibility to private parties as they outsource the regulation of content and access to them (Morozov 2011, p. 68).17 It can be argued that this method of content regulation can be split into different mechanisms (id. pp. 68-69). These are the managing of content on websites, the management of access to websites and the surveillance of people on cyberspace. Deibert et. al (2012) contend that as private organizations assume more responsibilities, they begin to operate in ways that ‘straddle the public and the private’ (id. p. 17) as they are asked to regulate the domains that they own and operate in ways that constitute a de facto exercise of authority (id.).
The empowerment of non(-central) state actors to regulate access is a method that has been used in the contemporary migration regime as well (Lahav & Guiraudon 2000). A part of the reinvention of control over migration, states have opted for this method to expand the level of control states can exert while shifting liabilities from themselves to private actors. Doing this enables states to prevent migration at the source (abroad) by creating buffer zones and to uncover illegal migrants domestically (id. pp. 57-58). As this also entails the denial of access to some and the tracking of people’s activities, the methods employed by the private actors are the same in both spaces. Moreover, the same can be said for the reasons for states to outsource control to third parties. However, unlike in the migration regime private actors on cyberspace have fewer incentives to adhere to state reign completely. As private actors employed to control migration are bound by geographic space making them more receptive to sanctions and penalties (Lahav & Guiraudon 2000, p. 63), private actors on cyberspace are complete transnational entities and therefore less prone to react to correction.
To facilitate the various methods of control a more accommodating legislature has been drafted. Most states have defended their actions by linking access to security. Living in a post 9-11 world, cyberspace does not deviate from this trend As such, states have created a legal and normative environment that enable actors to deny access to content as and when needed (Deibert et al. 2010, p. 7). Moreover, states have also resorted to implement historical legal frameworks to regulate movement on cyberspace as well (id. p. 20).
Also common in the post 9-11 world is the increased frequency of state surveillance. While still in a gray area, methods of surveillance have become more and more legalized. Because of the characteristics and size of Cyberspace, it has become an increasingly important location of surveillance. At this point only persons of interest are being monitored on cyberspace (Deibert et al. 2010, pp. 5-7), but this is likely to change in the near future. As cyberspace is basically a giant library which keeps records of everything ever put online it becomes easier to identify people and predict their behavior as the web grows in size (this is called meta-data) (Morozov 2011, pp. 71-72). While these records are mostly used by companies for targeted advertising, it is already possible for states to identify and monitor persons of interest. While not yet implemented, the use of meta-data for prediction of behavior would likely attribute to targeted censorship in the near future.
While not used for prediction of behavior and targeted censorship online, the use of meta-data has already been integrated in the European migration discourse (Broeders 2007). As contemporary migration requires surveillance methods to identify and process ‘irregular migrants’ (read: illegal), the European Union has built several transnational databases that contain relevant information18. As these databases are accessible in the whole European Union, it has greatly
17 Arguably the most famous instance of outsourcing policy to private actors is Google’s blocking of content in
China as instructed by the Chinese government.
12 enhanced its capacity to monitor and regulate movement and access of these people (Broeders 2007, pp. 87-89).
Transformation of cyberspace: (un)intended consequences
As stated before, cyberspace is a dynamic whole where behavior of actors influence the structure of cyberspace and vice versa. As such, the introduction of state actors on cyberspace has transformed the experience and the structure of cyberspace itself. More concrete, there has been a fundamental shift in the balance of power on cyberspace, resulting in the introduction of realism. This shift has also provoked different cyberspace actors (i.e. websites and the likes) to manifest themselves or existing ones to change their content accordingly. Thus, ironically, the once progressive internet community is now cyberspace’s most conservative group, still clinging on to the ideals of an era long gone. Nevertheless the debate of changing cyberspace remains salient.
The balance of power on cyberspace has clearly shifted in the favor of states. While civil and private actors ruled cyberspace up until the early 2000’s, states increasingly perceived the need to establish their presence on cyberspace and embrace its population there to secure their interests. While originally thought of as nearly impossible for states to do so (Goldsmith & Wu 2006, pp. 67-68), most of them had achieved just that by 2010.Accordingly cyberspace is once again, largely, compartmentalized in the shape of the geographic international state system. Moreover, states tend to perceive threats in cyberspace in a similar manner (Kremer & Müller 2014). This has led to calls to initiate a Cyber-Westphalian process (id. Foreword). Therefore, Eriksson & Giacomello (2006) were right in asserting that realists do not revise their theories. For states, cyber trends are epiphenomena (id. p. 229).
The extent of structural realism on cyberspace should not be exaggerated. A lot of power still lies in private hands as they still manage most content and access (Jordan 1999, pp. 9-10) (Deibert et al. 2012). Furthermore, there is no indication that networked societies (Castells 2001) regress back into isolated units (Deibert et al. 2012). Moreover, the potential power of individuals is still present on the web as cyberspace enables them to organize groups, accumulate data and create with knowledge instead of resources (Kremer & Müller 2014, pp. 60-61) (Eriksson & Giacomello 2006). Also, while the structure of cyberspace is compartmentalized, any actor with a certain degree19 of knowledge on cyberspace knows how to overcome these borders. Nevertheless, this still might lead to criminal or terrorist activities. Schmidt and Cohen (2010), taking a liberal approach, argue that because private and individual actors still hold a fair amount of power, a Westphalian system will never come about and a nonpolar20 one rise instead (id. p. 80). Their argument is therefore that “governments, individuals, nongovernmental organizations and private companies will balance one another’s interests.” This makes it necessary for them to build coalitions and would therefore contribute to a democratic process on cyberspace (id. p. 76).
Lastly, there remains the question whether cyberspace contributes to freedom or to
authoritarianism in light of these events. O Loughlin (2001) states that as the Internet and real worlds are entwined, political trade-offs remain pertinent. Many authors describe the existent paradox of freedom on cyberspace (Rosenau & Singh 2002) (O'Loughlin 2001) (Deibert et al. 2012). Morozov (2011 p. 63) phrases that when technical restrictions to freedom are overcome by people, it would also spur the creation of a sociopolitical environment in which there would, paradoxically, be no freedom. States thus encounter a similar paradox in cyberspace as they do with geographic borders and migration (Hollifield 2004). As shown in Deibert et al. (2012), this is an ongoing debate.
19 It is enough for most states to restrict the movement in cyberspace of most people as the cost of restricting
access goes up exponentially.
20 An international system with numerous centers of power of which no center dominates another one (Haass
13 Conclusions
Since the establishment of states on cyberspace, the structureless nature of cyberspace has been evermore compromised. Indeed, states have, in a certain degree, attained control over cyberspace and have once again embraced its population. This has been a process that spans more than a decade of developments. The first steps made by states to control access to content had been crude, relatively easy to circumvent and called on itself a lot of international criticism. However, as time progressed states began to adapt to the interconnected environment and developed more sophisticated means to control access. These means now avoid criticism by not being detected, by being executed by third parties or by creating a legal framework around it to legalize their actions. However, traces of its anarchic nature remain in cyberspace as an ideology. This ideology emerges once again in the current debates around the enhanced means of control that states can exert on cyberspace.
The story of cyberspace does indeed look a lot like that of the migration regime, but with some distinct differences. To start, while the openness enjoyed in cyberspace does resemble the openness of geographical space. The distinct difference, however, is that geographical borders have opened up, while cyberspace had never been closed. This led to a discrepancy in the institutional capacities of states. Therefore the reaction on threats of any kind differed in both spaces. However, this gap has been closed in the first decade of the new millennium as states caught up on cyberspace policies. Moreover, states now seem to perceive mobility on both spaces in a similar matter. This can be seen by the similarity of reasons that states want to regulate access and by the similarity of methods applied. Nevertheless, there are also differences in methods, as states employ cyberspace specific methods of control. Lastly, liberal states have to deal with a liberal paradox in both spaces, making them walk a fine line between security and liberal freedoms. Therefore this research seems to conclude that there does indeed exist a connection between cyberspace access and migration access discourses.
As stated before, the connections made here are based on literary research. However, in order to truly prove the arguments made here empirical research is required. There still remains a lot of work to be done on the changing structure of cyberspace, the methods employed by states and the future of cyberspace. Moreover, more research on the presence of the three main theoretical schools of international relations on cyberspace is required. A good base for this research would be to start off with the works of (Eriksson & Giacomello 2006) and that (Choucri 2012). Lastly, the connection between the two types of space arrangements seems to imply a need for states to embrace all globally encompassing spaces. Further research on this matter would likely unveil general patterns of state behavior.
States seem to have a great potential of structuring spaces according to their liking. Therefore my concluding remark will be a paraphrase of Wendt’s famous work:
14
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