The Internal Mechanisms that drive Political Institutions and their Stability: A Comprehensive study of the effects of Political Party Motivations on Electoral (Non)-Reform

The Internal Mechanisms that drive Political Institutions and

their Stability

A Comprehensive study of the effects of Political Party Motivations on Electoral (Non)-Reform

Faculty of Public Administration

Master Thesis submitted in Partial Fulfilment of the requirements for obtaining the MSc Public Administration: International and European Governance

Author: Ardit Orana

Supervisor: Dr. Dovile Rimkute Date: 11 June 2018

Abstract

Given the scope of academic scholarship, political institutions are seen as a point of con-tention for many scholars. In particular, the questions of institutional change and stability remain at the forefront of institutional analysis, and thus, many of the empirical cases found throughout state of the art academia. Through employing a Historical Institutionalist discourse, this study sought to explore the interconnected relationship between political elites and the electoral system, and how attempts at reforming this political institution, are manifested through a peculiar mecha-nism. By building a refined theoretical model based on the state of art literature on electoral reform, the study has established that both ideational and material motivations are central in the study of non-reform phenomena. While the model features a three-part mechanism that highlights the causal process that binds the two main variables together, evidence collected to test the inferential weight of the hypotheses vary considerably on different levels. Although the first and last part of the model feature relatively strong pieces of evidence that highlight the existence of simultaneous material and ideational motivations in stalling reform initiatives, the second part, subject to a rel-atively understudied aspect of electoral reform; namely the relationship between actor preference es and electoral barriers, only provided hoop-types of evidence. While the inferential weight of the second part of the theoretical model is less robust, it nevertheless points toward the main arguments developed in this thesis. Through employing a process-tracing approach to the study of electoral non-reform in Kosovo, the thesis builds on the implications of contemporary public administra-tions, and the role elected officials play in outlining the extent and outcome of reform initiatives. In what can be considered a relatively distinct approach to the study of electoral (non)-reform, the study has provided a methodological approach often required in process tracing historical studies, yet often, overlooked.

Table of Contents:

1. Introduction………...4 1.1 Impetus for Research on Electoral (Non) Reform……… 4-5 1.2 Problem Definition and Research Question………. 5-7 1.3 Public Administration Link………7-8 1.4 Academic and Social Relevance………8-10 2. Literature Review………..11

2.1 Approaches to the Study of Electoral System Reform………11-12 2.2 Actor Motivations and Electoral System Reform………12 2.3 Towards a more Comprehensive Approach to Electoral System Reform………13-14 3. Theoretical Framework………..15

3.1 A Historical Institutionalist Approach to Electoral Barriers to Reform………...15-18 3.2 Electoral Reform as an ‘Elite Bargaining Process’ ………..18-19 3.3 Actor Motivations toward Electoral Reform………19-20 Material Motivations……….20-23 Ideational Motivations………...23-26 3.4 Conceptualizing Electoral Non-Reform………26-27 3.5 Theoretical Models………28

Sufficiency Combination………...28-30 Convergent Colligation Model………..30-31 3.6 Hypothesizing the Causal Mechanism………31-33 3.7 Scope Conditions……….34-37 4. Research Design………38

4.1 Case Selection……….38-39 4.2 Process- Tracing within-case Sequences……….40-41 4.3 Operationalizing the Causal Process………...41-44 4.4 Data Collection and Measurement………...44-46 5. Kosovo: Shaping the outcome of Electoral Non-Reform……… 47-56 6. Analysis: From Electoral Reform Observation to Case-Specific Evidence Formation………67

6.1 Evaluating Reform Observations and their Relevance………57-63 6.2 Assessing the Accuracy of the Observations………..63-64 6.3 Process Testing the Hypothesized Causal Mechanism………65-71 6.4 Evaluating the Relevance of Scope Conditions in light of the Evidence………71-73 7. Conclusion……….75

7.1 Empirical Conclusion………..75-76 7.2 Academic and Practical Implications………..76-78 7.3 Limitations and Points for Further Research………78-79 8. Bibliography………... 80-86 9. Appendices……….. 87-94

1. Introduction

1.1 Impetus for Research on Electoral (Non) Reform:

The study of electoral systems in established democracies has undergone significant con-ceptual changes throughout its existence. These changes can be partly ascribed to the approach academics employ when dealing with the caveats surrounding the effects of electoral systems on governance. While these effects are often studied and date back to canonical works conducted by Lijphart (1994), Tagpeera and Shugart (1989) and others, contemporary research tends to diverge in their variable use of electoral systems. In retrospect, literature on electoral systems can often be characterized as belonging to two differing pillars; first, studies that treat electoral systems as “an independent variable, as explanans” and second, studies that “view electoral systems as a depend-ent variable, as the explanandum” (Leyenaar and Hazan, 2011, 437; Farrell 2011). While studying the consequences of electoral systems on democratic regimes remains a crucial feature of many studies, the contemporary debate on the electoral system as a dependent variable is particularly interesting. As a result of this shift, studying the factors that account for change in electoral systems have drawn considerable interest in contemporary academia, specifically, the question of electoral reform (Rahat and Hazan 2011; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005).

Electoral reform, specifically, is a puzzle that is featured significantly in academic schol-arship. Attempts at theorizing about electoral reform often converge on the role of political elites in shaping outcomes (Layenaar and Hazan, 2011; Norris, 2011; Bol, 2016). As Bol (2016) notes, “while electoral systems shape a structure of incentives to which parties must adapt strategically, these parties, once elected are able to modify electoral systems through the legislative process they dominate” (Bol, 2016, 94; Benoit and Shiemann, 2001). As a result, this interconnected relation-ship between electoral systems and political parties becomes of increasing importance. The study of electoral non-reform in particular, proves to be considerably complex. This is specifically inter-esting in cases where national parliaments push for electoral reform, yet it is the very same power constellations between parties that often leads to a deadlock in reform.

seeking to bridge both rational choice and ideational explanations that guide electoral system re-form. The ability of this model to synthesize the two main approaches “in electoral system reform” studies, namely “institutionalism and strategic calculations”, allows for the presentation of a new theoretical approach that seeks to capture the mechanisms that drive or hinder reform (479). As a result of this multi-barrier approach, the question of electoral system reform becomes one in need of closer scrutiny. As shall be seen in latter parts of this study, conceptualizations of electoral reform are ample; thus, it becomes of growing importance to introduce a synthesized model which is necessary to crystallize the question of electoral system reform, both in the context of its insti-tutional formation, and the ramification of political bargaining.

1.2 Problem Definition and Research Question:

The barriers model to electoral reform establishes that barrier saliency tends to vary de-pending on the political landscape of different domestic contexts (Rahat and Hazan 2011) (Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011). In this sense, the institutional constellations and strategic calculations of actors are both intertwined in giving rise to barriers that in many cases are central to the study of electoral reform. In many ways however, the barriers model falls short in providing an encapsu-lating view of the role of political actors in the construction of these barriers, which in turn, con-strain their agency. Historical institutionalist (HI) discourses on the other hand, although provide for a more nuanced conceptualization of the interconnectedness between institutional constrains and actor agency, cause for a more daunting puzzle on electoral (non)-reform. Fioretos et al. (2016) for example, re-enforce the notion that the study of the relationship between “institutions and po-litical agency” forms the bulk of academic interest in the context of new institutionalist scholarship (p. 7). Streeck and Thelen’s (2005) in support of this, prompted a new development in HI by arguing that “institutions should be seen active objects of political contestation and instruments in the hands of political actors” (Streek and Thelen 2005, p.15; Hall 2016, p.39). In this sense, both the electoral system and the formal/informal barriers to reform, are institutional by-products of actor constellations. This puzzle has moved many authors in HI to coin the phrase “paradox of plasticity”, questioning the ability of institutions to constrain political actors, insofar as they are a product of these same actors (Hall 2016, p.39; Strek and Thelen 2005, p.15; Riker 1980). While this continues to remain a major implication in HI accounts, many empirical studies in this domain

have inherently pointed toward the conclusion that, while institutions are “to some extent plastic”, they can “nonetheless contribute to the structuring of the political world” (Hall 2016, p.39; Ma-honey 2000; Capoccia and Keleman, 2007). To extend on this puzzle encompassing the institu-tional barriers of electoral reform and HI, Hall (2016) adds that institutions in many cases are a direct result of “social coalitions” composed of “actors powerful in the relevant arena” (p. 40).

In the same line, social coalitions are pivotal in the introduction of electoral barriers and in turn, maintaining their existence. This is why the turn to HI proves important in the context of the study of Rahat and Hazan’s (2011) barrier model. A HI lens allows for a more dynamic study of the nature of the different electoral barriers proposed by Rahat and Hazan (2011), by allowing scholars to trace the engineering of these barriers by political actors, and in turn, analyze the role of these barriers as institutional constraints for initiating electoral reform. It is through this con-ceptualization that this study yields its main empirical findings. As such, the main research ques-tion which guides the confines of this study is;

While this study maintains a considerable political science focus, it also incorporates ele-ments that are central to the debate in public administration literature. In doing so, the study estab-lishes this link through adding nuance to the academic debate through two main discussions. Given that institutional analysis has become a prominent approach in public administration research, this study’s heavy reliance on this approach helps draw relevant findings detailing the relationship between political institutions and the decision-making process. While the electoral system as a formal political institution (Pierson, 2000) draws the confines of the legislative structure, actor attempts and initiating institutional change highlight the imbalances between the primacy of either elected officials, or the bureaucratic state apparatus. Through engaging in a study of institutional change, this study seeks to build on empirical findings that help shed light on the decision-making implications political institutions have on public administrations.

The study of institutional change in particular, also helps shed light on one of the most prominent academic debates in public administration: namely, the governance issue. The rise in the public administration conceptualization that governance features a multi-level decision-mak-ing process which inherently moves away from the primacy of government, naturally points to-ward the inclination that institutional change is a multi-level multi-actor driven process (Rhodes, 1997; Rosenau, 1995; Peters, 2000; Salamon, 2002). The question of electoral reform here, through building on a set of robust empirical findings, seeks to add nuance to this debate. While public administration in the eyes of governance paradigms holds the extensive role of un-elected bureaucratic staff and civil society actors in driving institutional change, this study aims to chal-lenge such propositions (Pierre at al, 2000; Halligan , 2002; Hood, 1991). The question of electoral system engineering in particular, helps highlight the mechanisms by which modern governance often takes a back seat, and elected officials are at the forefront of political institutional change initiatives, which often are of vital interest to such actors’ bureaucratic influence. As a result, even though the study engages in a debate of decidedly political science variables, the findings equally cater to the contemporary debate in public administration literature.

This study develops its niche within academic scholarship through three contributions. Through integrating a HI approach with existing scholarship on the barriers model to electoral reform, the study seeks to test a more encompassing and parsimonious model. Most studies that seek to treat (non)- reform phenomena as a dependent variable almost always dismiss the historical pre-conditions which accounted for the formation of certain barriers (Hooghe and Deschouwer, 2011; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011). Moreover, while a wide range of studies touch upon the barriers model indirectly through their conceptualization on material or ideational factors that hinder re-form, they often do so through a fixed discourse (Benoit, 2004; Colomer 2005; Norris, 1995). That is to say that many of these studies fail to account for the role of development over time in con-structing electoral reform barriers or change in saliency of such barriers. In this sense, integrating an HI lens in the study of the initial conditions (actor motivations) that lead to the institutionaliza-tion of such barriers, and actor roles in enforcing them vis-a-vis periods of reform discussions, allows for a better understanding of how the barrier model fits within specific cases.

Bridging a HI discourse with the barriers model further allows for a more critical exami-nation of actor motivations toward electoral (non)- reform. As es established briefly above, studies in the context of electoral reform center upon dealing with either material or ideational factors behind deconstructing actor motivations when dealing with questions of reform. While they pro-vide substantial finding in their individual cases or statistical inferences, they often fail to account that the process behind electoral reform may be driven by several, often competing ideational and material motivations. Rahat (2004) is one of the only studies which takes an encompassing view of electoral reform, combining both “rational choice” paradigms and “psychological” ones in order to understand the electoral reform process through various stages. The ambiguous relationship between ideational and material interests is something that is featured extensively in HI scholar-ship too. Partly due to its scope in tracing the effects of temporal processes on actor preferences, “power relations” and “patterns of resource allocation”, HI discourses often overlap with those of ‘Rational Choice Institutionalism’ and ‘Sociological Institutionalism’, both, respectively dealing with the role of material or ideational interests (Fioretos et al., 2016, p.6). HI’s ability to cover macro (structural) and micro (actor) dimensions, coupled by material-ideational factors, integrates

approach is particularly interesting vis-a-vis the barrier model, where existing studies rest on either material or ideational arguments for examining electoral (non) form. As Fioretos et al. note, con-temporary studies should move to explore “ideational and material understandings of institutions side by side in order to gain greater understanding of the complex realities that define politics nationally and internationally” (p. 17). Therefore, it is through integrating both HI and the barrier’s model that this study seeks to examine the role of political actors’ motivations (both material and ideational) in the promotion of institutional barriers to electoral reform, and at the same time, the ability of these barriers to constrain actor capabilities towards passing reform.

Existing academic scholarship dealing with the question of electoral system reform more than often focuses on established democracies (Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005; Norris 2011; Kaatz 2005), with a few exceptions such as Nikolenyi’s (2011) study on electoral non-reform in post-communist societies. While there are existing studies which test the barriers model on established democracies (Nuenez and Jacobs 2016; Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011), there are limited insights on how barrier influence varies based on specific contextual settings. Expanding the scope of this puzzle to cases beyond the ones touched upon by existing studies makes for a more rigorous the-ory-testing approach. Therefore, a turn to a case not considered as an established democracy as the ones in Western Europe, such as Kosovo, can prove beneficial. While Kosovo’s electoral system was engineered by the international community following the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, which prompted the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) and other bodies such as the OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK); its electoral system post-independence makes for an interesting case. Since 2007 when Kosovo gained auton-omy in the organization of elections, and jurisdiction over legislative changes to the electoral sys-tem, discussions of electoral reform have been featured prominently. Electoral system discussions in the context of Kosovo often take shape through two main discourses; scholarship focusing on electoral engineering in post-conflict ethnically fragmented societies (Norris, 2004; Taylor 2005; Wagner 2013; Horowitz 1995; Lijphart 1990; Bieber 2003), or, domestic expert reports on areas of potential electoral reform such as the ones conducted by the Kosovo Institute for Policy Re-search and Development (KIPRED), Democracy for Development (D4D), Institute for Develop-ment Policy (INDEP), and the Kosovo Democratic Institute (KDI). None of these strands however, touch upon the factors that account for electoral non-reform in Kosovo, even after attempts by the

legislative branch to initiate a discussion on potential reform. As a result, this study aims to intro-duce a more integrated approach which seeks to account for this phenomenon of non-reform in Kosovo’s electoral system. As shall be justified in latter parts of the study, the use of the 2010-2012 episode highlighted by the creation of the parliamentary ‘Committee for the Amend-ment/Change of the Electoral System’ is central to understanding the dynamic nature of electoral non-reform.

2.1 Approaches to the study of ‘Electoral System Reform’:

The study of electoral systems in established democracies has undergone significant con-ceptual changes throughout its existence. These changes can be partly ascribed to the approach academics employ when dealing with the caveats surrounding the effects of electoral systems on governance. While these effects are often studied and date back to canonical works conducted by Lijphart (1994), Tagpeera and Shugart (1989) and others, contemporary research tends to diverge in their variable use of electoral systems. In retrospect, literature on electoral systems can often be characterized as belonging to two differing pillars; first, studies that treat electoral systems as “an independent variable, as explanans” and second, studies that “view electoral systems as a depend-ent variable, as the explanandum” (Leyenaar and Hazan, 2011, 437; Farrell 2011). While studying the consequences of electoral systems on democratic regimes remains a crucial feature of many studies, the contemporary debate on the electoral system as a dependent variable is particularly interesting. As a result of this shift, studying the factors that account for change in electoral systems have drawn considerable interest in contemporary academia, specifically, the question of electoral reform (Rahat and Hazan 2011; Leyenaar and Hazan 2011; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005).

Electoral systems are no longer seen as monolithic institutions which guide the mecha-nisms of party politics and legislation, rather, they are actively contested and open to remodeling (Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011; Pilet and Bol 2011; Renwick 2010). This conceptualization be-came predominant in the 1990s when major electoral system reforms engulfed a number of estab-lished democracies, Israel, New Zealand, Italy and Japan, cases which have been studied exten-sively by scholars in their respective fields (Renwick 2010; Sakamoto 1999; Benoit 2004). As such, Leyenaar and Hazan (2011) provide a synthesis by which academic scholarship on electoral reform has developed over the years (438).

- Studies that focused solely on the “systematic description and consequences of electoral sys-tems”, with little to no insights on factors that might account for independent effects on electoral systems.

- Studies focusing on the nature of major reform and “the political consequences”, with an evident focus in within case analysis of single case studies (cases of established democracies as mentioned above)

- A move toward more “comprehensive approaches to the study of electoral reform”, with a focal point in understanding the underlying mechanisms that lead politicians to consider electoral re-form.

2.2 Actor Motivations and ‘Electoral System Reform’:

While there are a variety of approaches to studying electoral reform, attempts at theorizing about it often converge on the role of political elites in shaping outcomes (Layenaar and Hazan, 2011; Norris, 2011; Bol, 2016). As Bol (2016) notes, “while electoral systems shape a structure of incentives to which parties must adapt strategically, these parties, once elected are able to modify electoral systems through the legislative process they dominate” (Bol, 2016, 94; Benoit and Shiemann, 2001). More recent works which deal with the question of electoral system reform ar-gue vehemently for the use of rational choice models in order to understand bargaining processes that either hinder or allow reform. In many cases, political parties are seen as pivotal actors who for self-interested motivations seek to insist upon retaining or changing existing electoral systems (Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005; Boix 1999). In a stark criticism of such conceptualizations, new approaches to the study of this phenomena sought to explore the ideational reasons behind electoral reform, specifically due to failures of rational choice models to account for bounded rationality of political actors, coupled with the roles of norms and values guiding their rhetoric on reforms (Birch et al. 2002; Pilet 2007; Bol 2016; Renwick 2010). In this sense, behavioral factors are seen to play a crucial role in the identification of stances toward reform or non-reform, however, there is a clear divide between academics on how these motivations are manifested.

The seminal work on the “barriers model” to electoral system reform as conceptualized by Rahat and Hazan (2011), paves the way for a more nuanced approach to electoral system reform, seeking to bridge both rational choice and ideational explanations that guide electoral system re-form (see Rahat and Hazan (2011) for a synthesis of the barriers model). The ability of this model to synthesize the two main approaches “in electoral system reform” studies, namely “institution-alism and strategic calculations”, allows for the presentation of a new theoretical approach that seeks to capture the mechanisms that drive or hinder reform (479). As a result of this multi-barrier approach, the question of electoral system reform becomes one in need of closer scrutiny. While Rahat and Hazan (2011) provide a state of the art approach to the study of electoral (non) reform, their discourse faces a key caveat vis-a-vis existing literature. Although, the barriers model fits into what Layenaar and Hazan (2011) term as a “multi-approach study of electoral change” as a result of a synthesis of “rational choice, behavioralists and institutionalist approaches”, it still car-ries a substantial gap (p. 443). One of the key arguments that is developed in Rahat and Hazan (2011) is the idea that a range of institutional and behavioralist barriers may coexist at any given reform sequence in a certain political context (p. 485). While this does highlight a multi-approach, it fails to account for the intertwined nature between both behavioralist and institutional factors that give rise to reform barriers. Though it does hold true that specific barriers may be more prone to be labelled either institutional or behavioralist, it is inherently flawed to treat these phenomena in isolation from each other’s influence. Nikolenyi (2011) in support of this, contends that while actors’ self-interests do play a vital role in studying questions of electoral reform, it is also essential to look at them vis-a-vis the structural aspects of a domestic political climate. Riker (1986) in an encapsulation of this puzzle between strategic interests and the institutional context, establishes that while both preferences over institutions and institutions themselves cycle, it becomes evident that institutions nor actors may alone account for stability or change over a reform process. Pierson (2000) state of the art discourse on institutional change and stability accounts considerably for the approach encapsulated in this study. In arguing against a functional understanding of institutions, Pierson (2000) urges forthcoming studies to focus on a view of institutional change as a “dynamic process that can highlight the implications of short time horizons, the scope of unintended conse-quences, the emergence of path dependence, and the efficacy and or limitations of learning and competitive mechanisms” (p.494). Ultimately, Pierson (2000) demands for genuine historical re-search focused on “critical examination over time” rather than “static deductive arguments” (p.

494). This approach of dissecting the interconnected nature of actor interests and the institutional setting over time, is similarly predominant in ‘Historical Institutionalist’ scholarship, and remains a key component of this study.

The aim of this chapter is to provide a synthesized theoretical framework which forms the conceptual backbone of this study, and thus, guides the hypothesized predictions. As argued in the introductory chapter of this research, the value of integrating HI approaches with the barriers model to electoral reform allows for a more critical approach to the study of electoral non-reform. This approach allows for a more nuanced study of political actor motivations through a simulta-neous consideration of both material and ideational interests in the context of electoral reform. In order to do so, the theoretical framework is developed in three parts. Firstly, the study examines the analytical benefits offered by introducing a HI approach to the study of the barriers model, and in turn, electoral reform. Secondly, the study turns to conceptualizing the electoral (non) reform as a process characterized by ‘elite bargaining’, coupled with the role of ideational and material motivations in accounting for reform outcomes. Lastly, a wide array of scope conditions are con-sidered in order to account for alternative explanations that may explain the study’s main hypoth-esized outcome.

3.1 A Historical Institutionalist approach to Electoral Barriers to Reform

The barrier model which was briefly introduced in the earlier parts of this research accounts for an important part of the analytical component of this study. Rahat and Hazan’s (2011) barriers model was introduced as a synthesis to the approaches electoral reform scholarship had identified since the wave of electoral reform in the 1990s. This “menu of barriers” is argued to be an encap-sulation of the most prominent hurdles political actors need to overcome in order to achieve sen-sible electoral reform (Rahat and Hazan 2011, p. 479; Hooghe and Deschouwer 2011; Nuenez and Jacobs 2016). Political actor coalitions are instrumental in both reducing or stressing the salience of these barriers when faced with electoral reform (Rahat and Hazan 2011; Jacobs and Leyenaar 2011; Pilet and Bol 2011). As Rahat and Hazan (2011) further note, “a reform initiative will be blocked if it cannot cope with each and every barrier” relevant in a specific context (p. 481). This entails that electoral reform barriers are indeed dependent on the socio-political context of states. While this model accounts for both “institutional and strategic behavior” barriers to electoral re-form, it requires considerable refinement. In institutionalist scholarship however, a clear dichot-omy between institutional and strategic behavior barriers, as suggested by Rahat and Hazan (2011), is increasingly problematic to attain.

The reason why this dichotomy does not hold in the context of an historical institutionalist les is due to the notion that one can not only look at how “institutions mediate and filter politics” rather, there needs to be attempts at “demonstrating how the impact of institutions is itself mediated by the broader political context” (Stienmo and Thelen, 1992, p.12). In this sense, Rahat and Ha-zan’s (2011) barrier model, runs the risk of determinism on two levels. On one hand, the legal, cultural, and sociological barriers proposed focus exclusively on the institutional constraints on reform, whereas on the other hand; the seat maximizing, veto player and game theory barriers focus on constraints as a result of the strategic behavior of actors. In the context of the barriers model, what could be considered as missing, is, a need to stress on “explicit theorizing on the reciprocal influence of institutional constraints and political strategies, and more broadly, on the interaction of ideas, interests and institutions” (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992, p. 14). Considering this institutionalist lens, treating the barriers as specific to either institutional or strategic behavior fac-tors proves troublesome. As Steinmo and Thelen (1992) further note, the inherent gaps as a result of “institutional determinism” or actor-centered determinism, can be remedied by the ‘institutional dynamism’ approach embodied by historical institutionalist discourses (p. 14). This approach seeks to challenge “more static institutional analyses that imply that political outcomes can be read off the institutional map” through establishing how “the meaning and functioning of institutions are shaped by features of the socioeconomic and political context in which they are embedded” (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992, p. 16). Rahat and Hazan’s (2011) barrier model tends to fall under discourses that follow a static institutional approach, with almost no recognition of the temporal effects of the political context on the salience of reform barriers.

HI’s aptness in bridging the gap between political struggles and institutional constraints, compounded by its ability to assess this relationship through a temporal lens, proves imperative for a more robust refinement of the barrier model. Immergut (1992) argues that “a nation’s elec-toral rules and constitutional structure provide the institutional rules of the game, in which, subse-quent political battles are fought” (p. 59). If one takes a view of the barriers model in this context, a barrier’s saliency is very much dependent on the political context and the electoral formula of a specific state. Given that political actors are not just “spectators” to the institutional setting, rather,

reform directly impact the salience of “institutional constraints” (in this case, institutional barriers to reform) (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992, p.24). In this sense, electoral reform holds that “institutions themselves become the object of contention” and it is particularly through actor motivations that the institutional constraints limit or enable the possibilities of reform (Immergut, 1992, p. 60). As a result, the relationship between political actor motivations and institutional constraints (institu-tional barriers) can be seen as mutually dependent. Insofar as actor motivations create conflicting views on reform, and in turn augment the saliency of specific barriers, it is the same barriers that in turn limit possibilities of reform. Not only does a HI approach help one conceptualize this rela-tionship between political actor motivations and institutional barriers to reform, it also allows for a temporal dimension to it. Considering that HI treats actor preferences as shaped by the “institu-tional context”, it in turn allows to temporally study how motivations form specific preferences, and how said preferences impact the saliency of institutional constraints (Immergut 1992; Hall 2016; Hattam, 1992).

If one integrates this approach to the barrier model, there is no longer a need to distinguish between Rahat and Hazan’s (2011) ‘institutional’ or ‘strategic behavior’ barriers. Given that elec-toral system in itself, establishes the confines of the political struggle towards reform, it also im-pacts the saliency of context dependent barriers. As Steinmo and Thelen (1992) conclude, “insti-tutional choices can shape people’s ideas, attitudes, and even preferences” (p.32). In this sense, the content of the reform will largely determine the political context by which actor preferences are formed, and in turn, how these preferences impact the salience of institutional barriers. This conceptualization of the relevance of blending an HI approach with the barriers model is further strengthened in the following parts of the theoretical framework. The following part on ‘elite bar-gaining’ stands to depict the effect of the electoral institution on the confines of how the political struggle for reform is structured. As a result of this institutional context, the study then moves to establish how actor motivations about electoral system reform guide their preferences and in turn, the saliency of institutional barriers.

Scholarship on electoral reform tends to converge on the notion that electoral reform can be seen as a form of elite bargaining (Benoit, 2004; Colomer ,2005; Bol, 2016; Pilet and Bol 2011). As such, electoral systems do not “arise from a vacuum, but from political debate and struggle” (Dunleavy and Margetts, 2017). As such, moves toward electoral reform are seen as an “elite level game among rival partisan interests” (Norris, 2011, p.531). In most cases, studies that seek to examine the factors that account for electoral reform in established democracies almost always account such changes “as a result of those in power” (Bowler et al., 2001, p.434; Pilet and Bol, 2011).Despite arguments that carefully mapped out ‘strategic incentives’ guide political parties in electoral reform discussions (Benoit, 2004; Colomer, 2005), Norris (1995) argues that, “electoral systems are rarely designed, they are born kicking and screaming into the world out of a messy, incremental compromise between contending factions battling for survival, determined by power politics” (p.3). A critical examination of such political debates and struggles becomes of growing academic importance as “electoral systems are a key focus of preference-shaping behavior by es-tablished political parties” (qtd. in Dunleavy and Martgetts, 2017; Dunleavy, 1991).

Renwick’s (2010) conceptualization of electoral reform as a product of “elite settlement” further strengthens the above argument. Given that politicians retain the power of initiating elec-toral reform, which is the main premise of this study, they can do so in two ways. In line with this reasoning, electoral reform can be conceived as one of “elite majority imposition” or “elite settle-ment”, where the former entails that a particular party can initiate reform to bolster its positions vis-a-vis other losing parties, whereas the latter holds that, electoral reform can be initiated as a result of a wide party consensus (Renwick, 2010, p.12). These trends however, can also be empir-ically distinguished on the basis of electoral formulas in countries. In cases where there is a plu-ralist system. elite imposition is more likely, particularly due to the inherent primary plurality gives to a specific party (Gallgher and Mitchell, 2005; Tagpeera and Shugart, 1989). On the other hand, countries subject to a PR (proportionality) system, are more inclined toward ‘elite settlement’ for electoral reform, particularly due to PR’s ability to instill power-sharing actor constellations (Li-jphart, 1990; Horrowitz, 1995; Gallagher and Mitchell, 2005). In establishing this dichotomy, Ren-wick (2010) further argues that “elite majority imposition” can be characterized by a “redistribu-tive institution” whereas, “elite settlement” is subject to a “efficient institution” (p. 11). Where

‘redistributive’ constellations sought to ‘improve the conditions of one party over the others’, ‘ef-ficient’ constellations aimed toward improving the benefits of all actors involved (Renwick, 2010).

Due to the scope of this study, which seeks to examine electoral reform within a PR setting, ‘elite settlement’ maintains a central role. This, however, does not naturally entail that the reasons for reform initiation are purely grounded on an ‘efficient institution’ premise. Renwick (2010) extends on his argument on ‘redistributive’ and ‘efficient’ institutions through a more nuanced framework. As Renwick (2010) argues, “across the range of actors, some may treat the electoral system essentially as redistributive, others more as efficient” (p.12). In this sense, electoral reform initiative, even though characterized by ‘elite settlement’, may imply that “members of that con-sensus each subscribe to it for differing redistributive reasons” (p.12). This is particularly where the study of political actor motivations becomes imperative, insofar as the reform process is char-acterized as one of the primacy of politicians.

3.3 Actor Motivations Toward Electoral Reform

As argued earlier, preference-shaping behavior has been featured prominently in academic accounts of electoral reform, however, accounts often center on either material or ideational moti-vations as drivers of ‘preference-shaping behavior’ (there has been little attempts to reconcile both into one) (with a few exceptions, see Rahat 2008; Bowler et al. 2006; Bol 2006; Renwick, 2010). The core of this study as a result, is to provide for a refined theoretical model which accounts for both material and ideational motivations in studying electoral reform. However, before proceeding to examine the role of such motivations, the study briefly turns to Renwick’s (2010) view on elec-toral reform outcomes. Given that the elecelec-toral reform process is elite-driven, it can be character-ized as a three-stage process (Renwick, 2010). In this view, actor motivations are first considered in the light of their weight vis-a-vis electoral reform; second, the process by which these motiva-tions “translate to specific preferences” is essential, and finally, addressing how “these preferences translate into outcomes” (Renwick, 2010, p.47). In the context of this study, the outcomes of interest are the types of electoral barriers that surface as a result of these preferences, and ulti-mately, their effect on electoral non-reform. Employing this approach proposed by Renwick (2010) is noticeably beneficial, particularly due to its ability to highlight the causal process linking

motivations to outcomes in the form of electoral barriers. As shall be seen in the latter parts (the methodological part characterized by ‘Process Tracing’), theoretical refinements which build upon the causal process connecting the two main variables is pivotal for providing an encompassing view of the puzzle. Hence, the following part seeks to propose a theoretical model by which one can study this causal process in the context of ideational and material motivations.

Material Motivations

Conceptualizations of material motivations are the most exhausted in the context of elec-toral reform scholarship. In this sense, political parties engage in “self-interested” calculations in weighing down whether electoral reform will directly translate to a higher allocation of seats (Be-noit 2004; Boix 2004; Bowler et al. 2006; Renwick, 2010). This approach is directly driven by actor calculations of “future payoffs” stemming from “alternative institutions” (Norris, 2011, p. 532; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005). Bol (2016) in conjunction with Benoit’s (2016) argument, adds that political parties “rank electoral system alternatives according to their respective expected seat-payoff compared to the status quo and then opt for the preferred one” (p. 94). Employing such an approach to electoral reform entails that “change is likely only when a sufficient number of incum-bents expect to gain more influence under new rules” (Bowler et al. 2006; Benoit 2004; Colomer 2005; Renwick, 2010). As such, the study identifies three main sets of motivations that drive ma-terial consideration within elite deliberations of electoral reform:

1. Ability to maintain or gain more Votes;

The ability of political parties to maintain a consistent number of votes is a key component which drives material motivations of political actors. In this view, electoral reform is largely con-sidered on the basis whether the new change ushers in new mechanisms which may increase the electorate of a political party (Colomer, 2005; Rahat and Sznajder 1998; Carstairs 1980). Voting trends represent one of the most critical features of electoral system engineering, as in many cases, even incremental changes, may have considerable effects on the way votes are maintained based on existing domestic socio-political trends (Benoit 2004; Rahat 2004).

As already established, motivations toward ensuring the maximum share of seats is argua-bly the most pivotal motivation that drives political actors. Considerations of this often feature Duverger’s (1954” 226) notions of “mechanical and psychological effects”; where, first, “the ef-fect of the electoral system on the translation of votes into seats” is considered, and second, “the consequent effect upon strategic voting and the translation of voters’ preferences across parties into votes” (Renwick, 2010, p.29; Amorim Neto and Cox, 1997). In this sense, both seat share and voting trends are often treated as synonymous to each other, as they constitute the foundation of material interests that drive electoral reform (Brady and Mo, 1992; Benoit 2004; Rokkan, 1970).

3. Influence over policy and coalitions;

This aspect of material considerations is featured considerably in academic debate (Bawn 1993; Colomer 2005; Taylor 2002). This view entails that parties will seek “to maximize not only its chances of occupying government office, but also its power within the coalition” (Renwick, 2010. p.34). While this might also be determined by the share of votes and seats a party may acquire as a result of reform, Renwick (2010) argues that it also very much depends on “the degree to which each party retains an independent identity and voter base, which can give it added weight in coalition agreements” (p.34). In this sense, considerations of electoral reform are also increas-ingly determined by how parties see their growth in influence, and in turn, ability to have a better bargaining position.

While all three types of motivations identified above account for material considerations of political actors in considering reform, they are not mutually exclusive. In this sense, one of these motivations can be present at any given time, or all three of them at the same time. Even though the study has tried to synthesize some of the most important material motivations considered in academic literature, it is evident that they overlap with each other, and at the same time, there are other existing material motivations which may play a role within deliberations (Benoit, 2004; Ren-wick, 2010; Rokkan 1970). As a result, the existence of any of these motivations (or all at the same time) is sufficient in accounting for the self-interested material motivations of political parties. In line with Rewnick’s (2010) argument presented in the beginning of this part, it now becomes im-portant to understand how these self-interested motivations account for power-seeking prefer-ences. Here, one may distinguish by the different factors that account for the contextual landscape

political parties find themselves in and the extent to which parties seek to pursue material motiva-tions. Hence, in the absence of “coalitions or the expectation of coalitions, seat share may largely determine” a party’s preferences (Renwick 2010, p.53; Benoit, 2004). In another context where “coalition dynamics are a feature of politics, coalition dynamics are likely always to matter” (Ren-wick 2010, p.53). Both of these aspects can also be present at the same time, thus accounting for power-seeking preferences on both types of motivations. As a result, the ability of power-seeking preferences to take shape is largely determined by the content of the electoral reform proposed, while at the same time, compounded by the political landscape political parties find themselves in. As such, the hypothesis detailing this step of the causal process is:

H1: Self-interested actor motivations lead to power-seeking preferences.

As power-seeking preferences take shape and are constructed in the context of countering electoral reform, Rahat and Hazan’s (2011) “vested interests barrier” is molded. While this barrier in the context of Rahat and Hazan’s (2011) study considers seat-maximizing premises as central to its molding, they also extend on it. References to the study conducted by Boix (1999) highlights that political parties aim to change or maintain the system in order to control the outcomes that best suits their needs. This barrier comes as a direct result of material motivations that guide the preferences parties hold towards a specific electoral reform (Rahat and Hazan, 2011). This causal process between material motivations and material barrier’s is pivotal in understanding the mech-anisms that account for electoral non-reform. As such, the hypothesis detailing the next step of the causal process is:

H3: Power-Seeking Preferences lead to the increase in saliency of the Vested-Interests Electoral Barrier.

Ideational Motivations

self-interest” arguments (Bowler et al. 2006; Andrews and Jackman 2005; Blais and Massicotte 1997; Bol 2016). In this sense, politicians’ views “about democratic processes may also mute the potential effect of electoral self-interest” (Bowler et al., 2006). The gaps of ‘self-interest’ expla-nations to account for an encompassing view of electoral reform prompted a number of scholars to turn to ‘value-driven’ explanations (Renwick 2010, Bol 2016). Bol (2016) in support of this, argues that values “appear to be as crucial as self-interests” when examining the factors that ac-count for debates on electoral reform (p. 96). As Bolwer et al. (2006) further reinforce, discussions of electoral reform are not solely guided by “partisan interests”, they are also “strongly influenced by ideas about what is good or just” (Bolwer et at., 2006, p. 437; Blais and Massicotte 1997). In this sense, political party ideas about democratic accountability, structures of inclusiveness, and citizen participation, play a pivotal role in shaping preferences toward reform (Blais and Masciotte 1997; Andrews and Jackman 2005; Bowler et al., 2006). Similar to the material motivations, ide-ational mechanisms can be characterized as belonging to three-sets of motivations.

1. Need to maintain Accountability;

Ideational motivations under this approach highlight the ability of reform to raise questions about electorate accountability (Gallagher 1999). Electoral reform can be seen as detrimental to the ability of the electorate to hold the central government accountable to governance issues (Katz 1999; Renwick, 2010; Gallagher 2005; Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 2005). In this sense, reform should not only be able to increase accountability at times of electoral volatility, rather, the system should inherit “ongoing checks and balances” throughout governments terms in office (Renwick, 2010, p.40). This accountability also moves to encapsulate the ‘fair distribution of power’, in which any electoral reform will be countered if it signals as an impediment to power diffusion (p.39)

2. Ability to ensure Representation;

Representation is another factor which plays an important role in the ideational motivations of political actors toward reform deliberations. This approach can be distinguished between “the complete representation of society” and “voter choice” (Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 2005; Renwick

2010). In the context of the former, if the reform threatens the equal representation of minorities, reform initiatives will be considerably disabled. (Gallagher, 2005l Reynolds, Reilly and Ellis, 2005). In the context of voter choice, Renwick (2010) argues that this ideational factor is stressed if the reform weakens a citizen’s ability to choose between preferred parties.

3. Question of maintaining Simplicity;

Administrative simplicity and electoral simplicity may play a pivotal role in the way polit-ical parties view reform. Insofar as the reform seeks to add complexity into a system designed to cater to less educated societies, will not be favor by political elites (Reilly 1996; Renwick 2010). On the other hand, as Renwick (2010) argues, “the choice of any electoral system is, to some degree, dependent on the cost and administrative capacities of the country involved” (p.45). A country plagued by low growth and seeks to add dimensions to the electoral system which are not thought to be feasible, will in turn prompt a backlash on the proposed reform (Reilly 1996; Gal-lagher 2005).

As argued in the earlier part on material motivations, these aspects do not have to be mu-tually exclusive, nor do they all have to be present in order for ideational motivations to guide non-reform outcomes. As Renwick (2010) argues, it is a matter in part “of the degree to which particular values are threatened”; where, “representation is secure” but accountability is “imperiled, “atten-tion is likely to focus upon the latter” (p.51). As a result, the existence of any of these factors, or all at the same time, are sufficient in accounting for democratic values (Bol, 2011; Bowler et al., 2006). In turn, it is the existence of this democratic values that shape actor ideational preferences toward non-reform. As a result of the above-mentioned motivations, ideational preferences are geared toward effective governance. Insofar as the reform goes against the mechanisms which were set up to guard specific democratic principles within a society, effective governance preferences will be prevalent (Gallagher 2005; Bowler et al., 2006; Bol 2011). As such, the hypothesis detailing this part of the ideational sequence is:

As a result of effective governance preferences taking a center stage, the electoral barrier of “social structure” is enforced. As argued by Rahat and Hazan (2011) this barrier is largely reflected by the ability of the reform to capture the relationship between the institutional setting and the structure of society. Insofar as the reform seeks to erode the existing social structure, char-acterized by “the arrangements of social groups and values” this barrier saliency is stressed and thus counters reform initiatives (Rahat and Hazan, 2011, p.482). Renwick (2010) in support of this, argues that “electoral reforms are seen as policies implemented to achieve social goals” (Bol, 2016, p. 95). In this sense, any reform that is seen by political elites as detrimental to the existing social structure, be it, dissolving existing structures of equal representation, or creating a new sys-tem of asymmetrical accountability, inherently stiffens the social structure barrier. As Rahat and Hazan (2011) further elaborate, if the democratic framework of the current electoral system is thought to be undermined, the reform initiative will face this specific barrier. As such, the hypoth-esis detailing this part of the sequence is:

H4: Effective governance preferences lead to the increase in saliency of the Societal Structure Electoral Barrier.

While the essence of this study seeks to enhance an understanding of the simultaneous effect of ideational and material interests, the barrier of “disagreement over content” becomes of increasing importance. While Rahat and Hazan (2011) treat the “disagreement over content” bar-rier as one relating to game-theory and the prisoner’s dilemma in coalition politics, it can also be extended. This barrier is shaped as a direct result of the inability of political actors to reach an agreement on a specific reform. As Rahat and Hazan (2011) argue, reform tends to be blocked as a result of actor hopes that a “specific version of reform” may take shape (p.486). As a result, this has the consequence of reform postponement or failure to be imposed (p.486). In the context of this study, one could argue that this barrier can be subject to both ideational and material motiva-tions. As actors disagree on the proposed reform both as a result of power-seeking and effective governance preferences, the reform features a disagreement over the content. As such, the hypoth-eses detailing the final steps of the causal sequence are:

H5: Both the Vested-Interests barrier and Societal Structure barrier lead to the Disagreement over Content Barrier.

H6: The Disagreement over content barrier in turn leads to Electoral Non-Reform.

3.4 Conceptualizing Electoral Non-Reform

The major ambiguities that surface as a result of scholarship that deals with electoral reform often come as a direct result of varied conceptualizations of reform. In this sense, theoretical mod-els proposed by authors often fail to be generalizable throughout cases of electoral reform, as in many cases, the electoral reform as a unit of analysis, varies considerably. Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) in their study of ‘major, minor, and technical’ electoral reform introduce a convincing ap-proach to classifying electoral reform initiatives. However, this apap-proach is not novel and confined to Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011); studies in the past such as Lijphart (1994), Farrell (2011) and Katz (2005), have all moved to explore the varieties of reform and approaches to their study. Never-theless, Jacobs and Layenaar’s (2011) research provides a robust synthesis and sets out a clear framework for conceptualizing and studying reform.

In doing so, Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) introduce three forms of electoral reform, namely, “major, minor, and technical” reform, which also vary depending on the national, or sub-national level. This study seeks to treat electoral reform in the context of what is considered as technical reform. In setting up the confines of technical reform, Jacobs and Layenaar (2011) argue that “most changes to the boundaries of the electoral districts (redistricting) fall in the category” of either “minor or technical reform” (p. 503). An important aspect further developed on, is that notion that non-major reforms may well be “less determined by idiosyncratic factors and can probably be explained more accurately by existing theories” (p. 504). Due to the fact that the parliamentary committee was tasked with producing changes to electoral districting in Kosovo, this study exclu-sively focuses on what Jacobs and Leyenaar (2011) term as ‘technical reform’.

The refinement of this theoretical framework is imperative in the context of the methodol-ogy of this study. Particularly due to the fact that this research features a ‘Process Tracing’ ap-proach, which will be dealt with in the next section, it requires a theoretical model which accounts for the causal process tracing of the effect of ‘political party motivations’ on electoral non-reform.

(George and Bennet, 2013). By blending a HI discourse with existing approaches to electoral re-form, this study has been able to refine existing theories in order to provide for a more rigorous theory-testing model. The following part introduces these synthesized theoretical models and ac-counts for the hypothesized causal process between the two main variables

Figure 1.0 Sufficiency Combination Depicting the Hypothesized causal mechanism between the main independent and dependent variable

Figure 1.0 depicts a causal model which is drawn from an approach introduced by Mahoney et al (2016) in the context of accounting for ‘causality and time’ in historical cases. In order to account for specific outcomes in in historical cases, HI often “understands causes as conditions that are necessary for specific outcomes and/or as conditions that combine together with other conditions to create packages of causes that are sufficient for specific outcomes” (p.72). In this sense, the combination of conditions for “political party motivations” and conditions for “institu-tional barriers to reform” is “sufficient for electoral non-reform (p.74). Given that political actors’ struggles solidify the institutional barriers to reform, which in turn limit their capabilities toward reform, this model accounts for the role of this causal combination in arriving at the particular outcome of electoral non-reform.

In order to understand the essence of this model, one must again turn to arguments consid-ered by Setinmo and Thelen (1992). Considering that the above mentioned theoretical conceptu-alization has established the interconnected nature between political actor struggles and institutions that guide their behavior, it would be inaccurate to argue that only one of those conditions may account for the outcome. While institutions indeed “constrain and refract politics”, they are “never the sole cause of outcomes” (Stienmo and Thelen, 1992, p. 15). Given that the electoral system, through its rules and norms, determines the power relations between political actors, as well as sets up the confines of which barriers are more likely to surface, it becomes problematic to only capture only one of these dimensions as the cause. As Steinmo and Thelen (1992) rightfully con-clude in their seminal work on the new institutionalism debate:

“By focusing on institutions that are a product of political conflict and choice but which at the same time constrain and shape political strategies and behaviors, historical institutionalism pro-vides a framework for directly confronting the central question of choice and constraint in under-standing political life” (p. 32).

It is through the notions of choice and constraint mentioned by Steinmo and Thelen (1992) that this study forms its main theoretical approach. It is particular choices, in this case, the type of electoral reform, that directly shapes “people’s ideas, attitudes and even preferences” (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992, p.31). The political struggle to reconcile diverging preferences of political actors is what in turn makes constraints more salient, and thus, impacts the outcome of the bargaining process. Hence, the causal model above provides for a robust synthesis of the main mechanisms that account for electoral reform outcomes through a generalizable theory-testing model. Figure 1.1 on the other hand, takes the mechanisms suggested by this causal model a step further, and develops a series of hypotheses detailing the steps through which political party motivations and institutional barriers to reform converge in accounting for the study’s outcome.

Figure 1.1 Convergent Colligation Model depicting the hypothesized causal process between the two main variables where; 1) self-interested motivations 2) power-seeking preferences 3) demo-cratic values 4) efficient governance preferences 5) vested interests reform barrier 6) social struc-ture barrier 7) disagreement over content barrier 8) Electoral Non-Reform

Figure 1.1 features a model which aims to set out the methodological approach of this study as well as guides the analytical inferences drawn from the empirical case through a set of causally mapped hypotheses. Due to the fact that this study deals in considerable depth with one single case study, it allows for a more rigorous study of the causal process that accounts for the effect on the independent variable on the dependent variable. In line with this, the aim of the theoretical frame-work has been to establish the confines of this analytical approach. Through entertaining a histor-ical institutionalist approach to electoral systems, the study has been able to deconstruct the way

while the study deals with a single independent variable, the conceptualization of political party motivations has suggested that it is imperative to study both material and ideational motivations that may account for electoral reform outcomes. Coupled with the role of institutional constraints as barriers, the causal mechanisms between the central variables is considerably more complex than conventional forms of process tracing account for. In this sense, it is increasingly problematic to deal with this causal mechanism through a “linear colligation”, which depicts “a straightforward chain of events” leading to the hypothesized outcome (George and Bennet, 2005).

As a result, Figure 1.1 considers a more complex model, similar to the one employed by Theda Skocpol (1972) in States and Social Revolutions. The model proposed features what is con-sidered to be a “convergent colligation” model, which “depicts the outcome to be explained as flowing from the convergence of several conditions” (George and Bennett, 2005). In this sense, given that material and ideational motivations converge in giving rise to institutional barriers to reform, and in turn account for non-reform, the model above depicts this relationship. Owing to the process tracing methodology of this study, the hypotheses account for “all the intervening steps” detailing the study’s outcome (George and Bennet, 2005). Even-though Skocpol (1972) convergent colligation model is case-specific, the one proposed here seeks to maintain a level of abstraction in order to allow for its generalizability and extension in other cases as well.

3.6 Hypothesizing the Causal Mechanism

Based on the conceptualization in the theoretical model, electoral reform can be understood as a three-part process, each subject to a unique set of conditions. Given that electoral reform proposals have been initiated by elites, political parties maintain a central role in shaping the out-come of interest (Bowler et al. 2006; Renwick, 2010; Colomer, 2005). Considering the academic debate on the motivations that drive political actors to consider or thwart electoral reform, this study has established that it is imperative to analyze both material and ideational reasons that shape actor preferences. At any given time, political actors may have a range of motivations (both/either or material and ideational) when considering the nature of the country’s electoral system (see page 13-17). However, once a type of electoral reform has been proposed or initiated, minor or major,

political actors, who are subject to the deliberations of designing the scope of the reform, form specific preferences about it based on their initial motivations about the electoral system. As a result, any combination of the motivations presented in the earlier part can be evident in shaping actor preferences towards the specific reform under scrutiny. As such, this first part of the casual process can be noted through the following predictions:

H1 step 1-2: Self-interested actor motivations lead to power-seeking preferences.

H2 step 3-4: Democratic value actor motivations lead to effective governance preferences.

Historical Institutionalism peculiar ability to bridge the gap between actor influence and the institutional context of political struggles is central to understanding the mechanisms of elec-toral reform (Steinmo and Thelen, 1992; Hall 2003; Hall and Taylor, 1996). Insofar as a country’s electoral system (as an institution) imposes the confines of how political parties operate within it; it is the preferences of political parties that constrain reform initiatives within a given institutional setting. These barriers to reform are similarly dependent on the type of electoral system a country has, coupled by the values and norms that reinforce the societal significance of such a system (Rahat and Hazan, 2011; Jacobs and Leyenaar, 2011; Rahat, 2004). The more actor preferences diverge, the more salient the barriers that constrain electoral reform become. In this case too, ma-terial and ideational preferences translate into their respective barriers, creating an unfavorable environment for reform. As such, the predictions that guide the second part of the process are:

H3 step 2-5: Power-seeking preferences lead to the increase in saliency of the Vested-Interests Electoral Barrier.

H4 step 4-6: Effective Governance preferences lead to the increase in saliency of the Societal Structure Electoral Barrier.

H5 step 5,6 -7: Both the Vested-Interests barrier and Societal Structure barrier lead to the Disa-greement over content barrier.

As the diverging preferences of political actors toward a specific electoral reform become more salient, so do the respective institutional barriers. Ultimately, as ideational and material

pref-on the cpref-ontent and nature of the proposed initiative. As such, the predictipref-on that guides the last part of the electoral non-reform process is:

3.7 Scope Conditions

Since the fundamental methodology of this research features a qualitative within-case ap-proach, equifinality maintains an important caveat in the context of reliability. Therefore, account-ing for alternative explanations of the outcome becomes of increasaccount-ing importance, given that the main hypothesized maintains a strong causal inference. As Bennet and Checkel (2015) note, “planations are more convincing to the extent that the evidence is inconsistent with alternative ex-planations” (p. 23). In process tracing specifically, failing to account for a well-grounded expla-nation can undermine the whole methodological approach (p.23). While the theoretical framework has established theoretical models, which try to account for agent-based and institutional explana-tions, there remains a variety of other explanations that fit within the confines of this study. As a result, this part seeks to examine a range of scope-conditions, as possible explanations which may account for non-reform, and will be further analyzed in latter parts of the study vis-a-vis empirical evidence. These scope conditions are grounded on firm theoretical propositions in the context of electoral reform scholarship, and thus, require proper attention. Because the scope conditions touch upon aspects of agent-based and institutional explanation of electoral reform that the theoretical models haven’t touched upon, measuring their impact on the case can have considerable effects on the strength of main hypothesized relationship

1. Cconstitutionnel Rigidity and the Status-Quo

The effects of constitutional rules and the preservation of the status-quo are among the most standard explanations of electoral reform scholarship. In Renwick’s (2010) considerations of types of electoral reform, it is established that political elites may often find themselves losing power to the judiciary as a result of constitutional constraints. Similarly, Nuenez and Jacobs (2016), consider that judicial actors may serve a pivotal role in undermining actor efforts toward electoral reform, and thus, overshadow the reform process. In this sense, judicial reviews can pro-claim the “unconstitutionality of reforms” and take a center stage outside of political actor moti-vations. As Rahat and Hazan (2011) further elaborate:

“the institutional status quo has inherent primacy over reform, and the necessary legisla-tion or amendment procedures supply the guardians of the status quo with numerous opportunities to block reform” (p. 480)

In many ways, reform is not necessarily about a “single, successful attempt to recruit a plurality”, rather, it requires “maintaining and rebuilding pluralities” at different forms and through different channels (Rahat and Hazan, 2011. p.480). Moreover, if reform initiates are considered to be unconstitutional, political elites are bypassed by constitutional courts and other judicial bod-ies in countering the reform initiative (Nuenez and Jacobs 2016; Reniwck 2010). This approach highlights a non-reform outcome that completely disregards the role of actor motivations, through focusing on the power of constitutional bodies as well as the superiority of the status-quo in ac-counting for non-reform.

2. Dispersion of Power and effects of Coalition politics

The dispersion of power among political parties can have a crucial role in the outcomes of electoral reform scenarios, with little emphasis on party preferences. Dispersion of power in this case can be seen through two means. In the first, as argued by Rahat (2004) in his classic study on electoral reform, intra-party power asymmetries may affect the way partisan factions may view reform initiatives. While Rahat (2004) looks at this approach through a framework that highlights possibilities of reform, Renwick (2010) sees dispersion in another light. In Renwick’s (2010) view, parties are seldom unitary actors, and thus, individuals within parties have their own power-seek-ing preferences. In this case, individuals are reluctant to push for reform because it may have adverse effect on their re-election, and/or their influence in the current political system (p.30).

In another view, the dispersion of power can also be seen from a coalition politics point of view. Granted that PR systems give rise to power-sharing constellations, political parties do not necessarily seek to maximize their seat share. Here, one needs to look at parties as “entities that are interested more in governing than in possible future seat maximization” (Rahat and Hazan, 2011, p.485). In cases where PR’s ability to ensure a specific power constellation, characterized