Threatening democratization
How does a threat influence the process of gaining civilian
control over their military?
A thesis presented to
the Faculty of Social Sciences
Leiden University
In partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the Degree of Bachelor of Science
By
Nick Kempers
June, 2019
Abstract
The transition from an autocratic to a democratic regime means an uncertain future. For democratization, there is no one size fits all model which guarantees success. Multiple institutions need to be reformed, all of which are influenced by different factors. One of the reforms that needs to take place is the establishment of civilian control over the military. Only when this has happened the newly created democracy can become legitimate and live without the danger of domestic military intervention. How different factors have influenced this process is heavily discussed in the current literature, and it names the threat environment as one of many factors. Threats have shaped policies of states throughout time, so how would it exactly influence the democratization process?
This thesis uses a comparative case study to examine the relationship between the
establishment of civilian control over the military and the threat environment of the state. The two cases that are used are Taiwan and Indonesia. Both went through the process in the same time period and have taken similar measures. Taiwan, however, was faced with an external threat, China, while Indonesia suffered from internal threats coming from different separatist movements. By comparing how they reformed their civil-military relations and looking into how the threats influenced this, insights will arise about the question what the influence is of the threat environment on the establishment of civilian control over the military.
The expectation is that this influence will be significant. External threats make domestic instability dangerous. Both civilian and military elites will try to avoid this and therefore have incentives to work together. Internal threats, on the other hand, will have the opposite effect. They focus the military on domestic issues instead of looking beyond their borders. This gives the military leverage over the civilian government and consequently makes reforms harder to implement.
The process of gaining civilian control over the military was much smoother for Taiwan than for Indonesia. In Taiwan the military gave up all their policy- and internal security roles without too much resistance and became completely focused towards their external defense policy. While Indonesia tried to take the same measures to gain control, there was much more opposition from the military. It has been trying hard to keep control over regions and has a history of defying the will of the civilian government. While the transition did happen, it went much slower than it did in Taiwan. These findings confirm our hypothesis and show that the threat
environment indeed has a significant influence on establishing civilian control over the military and that the nature of the threat determines how it influences the process.
Literature review
Croissant et al. (2010) agree with the consensus in the literature that democratization cannot be completed without establishing civilian control over the military. They also point out that there is a lack of research as well as of a precise model that describes this process. Another problem is that civilian political control as a concept often was described as just the absence of military intervention or rule. This simple dichotomy means that many aspects of the concept are neglected, which in turn can not create a realistic view of the civil-military relationship. They solve this by distinguishing five relevant decision-making areas which they extracted from
democracy theory: Elite recruitment, public policy, internal security, national defence and military organization. By analyzing the distribution of power within these areas, it is possible to get a view of how much civilian control there is within a state.
Kohn (1997) instead looks into how well institutions are developed. He starts with describing two different kinds of challenges in relation to civilian control over the military. The first one is for mature democracies where civilians need to make sure that they continue to exercise supremacy over military policy and decision making. The second challenge is for fledgling democracies which need to ensure that the military does not try to stage a coup or intervene in politics in another way. Including mature democracies has implications for the concept of establishing civilian control. It is not seen as a goal to work towards but as a continuous
process. How well this process is going can be measured by weighing ‘the relative influence of military officers and civilian officials in decisions of state concerning war, internal security, external defense, and military policy (that is, the shape, size, and operating procedures of the
military establishment’ (Kohn, 1997, pp. 142). This description fits Huntington’s (1957) concept
of objective civilian control, which means that the military is professionalized and has very limited influence in domestic politics. Kohn names four fundamentals that need to be reached to make sure that civilians get more influence over the military. The first one is democratic
governance, which means that all necessary democratic institutions are put in place. These are institutions such as the rule of law, a framework for elections, a method for peaceful power transitions and a specified role for the military within the law which makes sure it can not be used internally. The second one is found in the operating mechanisms of government. How is the civilian government going to control the military? In a democracy, the most common way is to divide the power over the military between different people (president, prime-minister) and ministries. This leads to parliamentary accountability and oversight and thus active control of the parliament over the military. Then there is a need for a countervailing power, this can be in the sense of other defense bodies like the police, militias or even by arming the population.
Something that is more common is making it clear that illegal acts will be punished accordingly and having the judicial means to punish people in the military. The last one is the understanding of civilian control of the military itself. Political neutrality needs to be a pillar of the military establishment and the importance of it need to be understood throughout the organization. This
To make sure that the government and military keep working effectively while respecting these four foundations, there are some day-to-day practices that need to be respected. The first organizational feature is that the structure of command needs to be clear and respected in any case. The executive power of the government always needs to be on top and ready to choose to deploy the army. The second need is that the decision to start or end a war needs to be in civilian hands, because a war is a society-altering act. Taxes will increase, the government will have more power, etc. The last critical need is that all military policy choices should be made by elected officials, whether in peace or war times.
This tells us what needs to be in place to have effective civilian control, but how does a state get there after regime change? Croissant et al. (2011) argue that the (socio-political) power
militaries have are institutionalized and that these institutions are characterized by path
dependency. This means that the longer the institutions exists, the harder it becomes to change it. This is due to three mechanisms that keep them in place: power, legitimization and
compensation. Power is the most important one for militaries, these inherently harbour a lot of hard power and often have gathered some soft power as well. These mechanisms need to be challenged by the civilian government to successfully take over control.
A framework for establishing civilian control emerges from these articles. Building on this framework, this thesis focuses on the role of the threat environment. Gibler & Sewell (2006) demonstrated statistically that states are more likely to transition to democracy when external threats are low. Conversely, autocracies are more likely to persist in more threatening
environments. They use the example of NATO, which reduced external threat for countries like Ukraine, while heightening it for Russia. Ukraine started a democratization process, while Russia became more autocratic. Desch (1996) argues that the changes in the international security area after the Cold War, a decline in external threats, means that states that are not coherent enough will collapse if given enough time. His argument is that a threat can mask internal differences and force multiple ethnicities within one state to work together. When such a threat disappears, these internal differences become an issue. In his article he focuses on ethnic differences within the state, but there is no apparent reason why this mechanism could not work for other internal divisions as well.
This gives a clear theoretical view of all the variables that are included in the research question. To know how the transition from a autocratic towards a democratic state works out practically, it is important to examine what has been written about states which went through this process. In this thesis the cases are Taiwan and Indonesia, which will be examined next.
Taiwan
While most researchers agree that Taiwan was successful in establishing civil control over their military, their views differ on which factors were important in reaching this. Kuehn (2008) argues that it is important that two generations have different roles in this process and that the
combination of the right actor at the right moment, making the right strategic choices, is of utmost importance. He suggests that Taiwan's presidents and generals, the actors, were the deciding factors. In another paper Kuehn & Croissant (2009) look into the environmental factors of different states in South-east Asia. Taiwan's environment would be very helpful in
establishing civilian control. It inherited relatively strong civilian control from the authoritarian regime, it was well-developed and it had an external threat instead of an internal threat. Fravel (2002) does not look for a structural explanation but investigates four sources that were important in the case of Taiwan. He starts with that the previous regime was autocratic but still controlled by civilians. The second one is that Taiwan suffered from an external threat. The third one is that the newly installed civilian leadership acted effectively and adequate, and he ends with that there was a quick emergence of democratic institutions in the transition process. As mentioned before, the second reason of Fravel (2002) lists for the successful consolidation of democratic power over the military in Taiwan is its external threat: China. It created common ground between the military and civilian elites and downplayed their internal struggles. It also gave the military its own need to change: To improve its efficiency and effectiveness. This led to more practical reforms, like creating a clearer structure of command and merging commands, which were also helpful in the process of establishing civilian control (Fravel, 2002, p. 75-76). Kuehn (2008) adds more aspects of this external threat that helped this consolidation. Firstly, democracy was seen as something that could form a Taiwanese identity which was clearly different from the Chinese. It also meant that civilian control did not have the choice to give the military less resources or ignore its demands. This combined with the lack of internal struggle meant that the army only needed to think beyond their own borders and willingly left the internal security of Taiwan to civilians (Kuehn, 2008, pp. 882). Lind (2011) notes how Taiwan did not meet the expectations that were set by war and democratization theory. This states that countries which go through the democratization process are more likely to cause provocation and war because of their internal instability. In Taiwan, most of the provocations were initiated by China while the government in Taipei had a moderate stance on the main issue between the two states, the independence of Taiwan. It has to be mentioned that these three articles all mentioned multiple variables of which the external threat was just one of many.
Indonesia
Whereas Kuehn & Croissant (2009) were positive about Taiwan’s environment, they believe Indonesia is less fortunate. The history of political interventionism by the military, relatively low development and the internal threat all are factors that would make establishing civilian control harder. Other authors also agree that there are lots of challenges to overcome in the Indonesian case. Lee (2000) writes that there are different reasons for the current lack of civilian control over the military. He found that Indonesia does not have strong civilian political institutions because the country is still mostly ruled by elites. More importantly, the armed forces are not actively disengaged from their socio-political role. Mietzner (2011) focuses on the relationship between structure and agency and argues that while the structure in which Indonesia exists may be very disadvantageous, personal agents are much more important. These agents can make sure that the transition period towards a civilian controlled military works or undo all that already has been reached.
Ghoshal (2004) starts with the observation that the army has not changed its doctrine that much since the democratization process started. He also notes that the military still uses its territorial structure to influence local politics, from provincial to the village-level. Then he acknowledges all the internal threats the country faces. Ethnic and religious divisions run through the state and every group wants to be better represented in politics. This while the military wants to protect national unity and has a history of going very far to do this. Crouch (2000) calls out some examples, like the direct aftermath of the independence of East-Timor. It became independent after a violent struggle which the Indonesian military, the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI), lost. After this incident two other regions, Aceh and Irian Jaya, also increased their call for
independence. Instead of starting a military struggle, the civilian government tried to resolve it diplomatically while keeping their autonomy limited. In other regions ethnic and religious divisions created constant tensions. The civilians, under pressure of the military, sometimes adopted extreme measures to keep all these provinces under control. One example is the bill that was passed after the Bali Bombings in 2003. This was an extensive ‘anti-terrorism’ bill, which made it easier for the military and police forces to prosecute civilians. Another example is that when unrest stirred in Aceh, martial law was decreed which gave the military extensive control over the region (Nymann, 2006, p. 36-38).
Combining the information that is gathered about civilian control over the military, threat
environments and the selected cases gives a clear view of how these variables could influence each other. This means that it can be summarized into a theoretical framework which will be expanded upon in the next section.
Theoretical framework
The importance of establishing civilian control over the military in the democratization process is clear and there are multiple models of how civilian control could be reached. All of these models are based on how civil-military relations evolve in this transition period and how to reform the military in such a way that it does not resist (too much). These relations are based on a lot of variables and it is clear that the threat environment is one of these. In other articles they are treated as minor variables and the focus is mostly on the internal political and economic workings of a state.
In any form of government the function of the army is to minimize the risk of threats for the regime, which implies that risks are far more important for the military than for other institutions. By defining a threat as a risk that challenges the control of the state over its citizens and
territories, thus its sovereignty (Heywood, 2014, p. 116-117), we can identify threats that are important enough to at least have noticeable influence. Then we can analyze how our cases went through the democratization process and where these threats could have influenced these developments, and if they did. The last step will be to determine if the threat had any significant influence on the process of establishing civilian control over the military.
What follows are the main arguments of why the threat environment plays a much bigger role in the process of establishing civilian control over the military than implied in the current literature.
Theoretical argument
In the democratization process, the restructuring of civil-military relations is considered an essential aspect of building a successful civilian democratic regime. This is because when the military is not controlled, there is a chance of the government being overthrown by it. When this chance exists it is impossible to have accountable political systems (Frazer, 1995, p. 39). There has been a lot of research into this aspect of the democratization process, mostly about how civilian and military elites interact in an attempt to reform their state to their own advantage. Less is known about how the relative positions of the civilian government and the military change due to the threat environment in which they exist and about how this could influence the chance of success of the transition. Militaries are in essence very much involved in this threat environment, which leads to the idea that it will influence how the military behaves towards the democratic regime and thus influence the transition process. If we take all of this in account, the research question would become: How does the threat environment of a state influence the establishment of civilian control over the military in the democratization process?
In “The soldier and the state” Huntington (1957) describes two models of civilian control over the military: objective and subjective. Objective control entails the professionalization of the army and denying it access to any form of politics. Subjective control, on the other hand, means that the military is intertwined with the ruling elite and has a role in the national policy, mostly through sharing the same views and/or identity. In the democratization process, most states strive to move towards Huntington’s model of objective civilian control. There has never been a one-size-fits-all model for transitioning regimes to reach this goal, but there is a bottomline of what needs to happen for a new civilian government to establish objective civilian control over the military. Kohn (1997) describes four foundations which form this bottomline: Democratic governance, strong operating mechanisms of government, countervailing powers and the attitude of the military itself. These need to be combined with three practices that are to be used day-to-day. The first one is that everybody follows a clear structure of command, the second one is that the decision to start or end a war needs to be always be taken by civilians and the last one is that the whole of the military policy needs to be in hands of civilians. Even then there is still a need for some checks and balances, created by a division of tasks between the
legislative and executive powers. Kohn argues that when this is the case, the military is fully under civilian control. This does not mean that states are done when they have ticked all these boxes. Civilian political control over the military is not a end-goal, but a continuous process that all states deal with. Keeping the military controlled is as important as gaining this control. The concept of democratic civilian control would then be a measure of the relative influence of elected civilian officials in the decision-making processes concerning military-related issues (institutions, defense, policy, war). This influence can be measured by looking into the aspects of civilian that Kohn uses and to look into the degree to which these are implemented.
All schools in International Relations acknowledge that the threat environment influences the decision-making within a sovereign state. Realists say threats lead to a military build-up via the security dilemma, while liberals say states are willing to solve this problem by building
parts of the governmental structure and how it affects their decision-making towards each other. This has to do with the vast array of different threats: economic, political, military, ecological, etc. For this research, the danger needs to threaten the internal sovereignty of the state. This means that the threat challenges the position of the state as the highest power over its land and citizens (Heywood, 2014, p. 116-117). This threat can come from within, an internal threat, or from beyond their borders, an external threat. An internal threat means that another group challenges the status-quo by wanting to overthrow the current government or strives to create a new state within their borders. An external threat is when another state (or multiple states) threaten to invade or annex the country. The existence of such threats constitute the threat environment of the state.
Hypotheses
The main hypothesis is that the threat environment does influence the establishment of a
democratic civilian regime, but that the origin of the threat determines how it affects it. When the threat originates from an external actor, the military and the civilian elite are forced to work together. The military can not afford to challenge the new elite because instability would make the state look impaired towards the external threat. The democratic civilian government in turn needs to make sure the military is not neglected to make sure the country is able to defend itself. This leads to the first hypothesis:
H1: An external threat makes it more likely to successfully establish democratic civilian control over the military.
When a threat comes from the inside of the country, the interests of the military and democratic civilian regime are not aligned. The military has a lot of leverage because an internal threat that challenges their sovereignty, like violent secession movements, give it an important internal role within the state. This leads to the second hypothesis:
H2: An internal threat makes it less likely to successfully establish civilian control over the military.
Case selection
Two cases have been selected to test these hypotheses and thus answer the research question. Both need to have undergone a democratization process, of which one has to have successfully established full civilian control over the military, while the other did not. If the hypotheses are correct, the first one then should have an external threat and the second one should have an internal threat. Because this research is based on the most-similar-system design, it is necessary that the cases are as similar to each other as possible. The cases of Taiwan and Indonesia fulfill all of these criteria and will therefore be compared in this thesis.
In 1986 Taiwan officially started its democratization process after having lived under an
authoritarian civilian regime, the Kuomintang (KMT), for almost 40 years. This government came in power after the Taiwanese were driven off the mainland by China in 1948. After that the KMT instituted martial law and used the military to consolidate power. Military personnel got
positioned throughout the government and the military was responsible for internal security. The military carried this duty out by integrating itself deep into the state, by for example censoring the press, spying on civilians, acting as the border force and imprisoning political dissidents. This made them a major socio-political power and active throughout Taiwanese society. It is therefore all the more surprising that in the three decades after 1986, Taiwan has almost completely succeeded in removing the military from all these positions and gained a neutral, politically inactive military, while in the whole period the threat of China still loomed over the state (Fravel, 2002, pp. 60-76).
Indonesia was also ruled by a civilian authoritarian regime since the 1960s, in which the regime dictated that politics was reserved for the elite. They built and spread its own national ideology throughout the state which forcibly replaced all other ideologies. To be able to do this, they gave the TNI considerable political power. The TNI had roles in governments on all levels, was
responsible for territorial management and controlled the internal security forces. This gave them extensive influence in how regions were administered, which they found necessary to keep regions from separating: Ever since the founding of the Indonesian Republic it faced uprisings and rebellions from secession movements. While in 1998 the ‘Reformasi’ period was started in which the authoritarian regime started transitioning into a democratic regime, the military has not lost all its socio-political power since then: Especially on a local level it still holds a considerable amount of influence (Nymann, 2006, pp. 29-38).
Taiwan and Indonesia are two states in the same region that started the democratization process in roughly the same time period, while they both had a civilian authoritarian regime for the most part of the time after World War II. Their threat environments did differ: China still threatened Taiwan, while Indonesia had regions that strove for independence. This combined with the fact that Taiwan successfully gained control over the military, while the Indonesians were just partly successful, make them fitting cases to test the hypotheses on.
Description and justification of the empirical strategy
The research is based on a most-similar-system design in which two cases, Taiwan and Indonesia, will be compared to discover if there is an empirical relationship between the variables ‘establishment of democratic civilian control’ and ‘threat environment’. Using the comparative methods potential third variables are controlled by selecting two cases which are as similar as possible and by narrowing in on a defined research area. This also allows us to focus on the earlier mentioned key variables. (Lijphart, 1971, pp. 683-690). This means that the process of establishing democratic civilian control in Taiwan and Indonesia will be examined thoroughly by using existing theories about this process. The influence of the threat environment will then be involved to look into how it has affected this process and how this relationship, might it exist, works.
The process of establishing civilian control of the military in Taiwan
To understand the democratization process of Taiwan (officially the Republic of China), we first need to understand what the status quo was before it started. After the retreat of the Republic of China from the mainland to the island, the Kuomintang (KMT) regime took full control of the Taiwanese island and declared martial law that would be enforced for decades. While the state did have an extent of control over the military, the military itself was also active throughout society. Around 30% of the seats in the Taiwanese Committees were filled by military personnel, it was involved in selecting government officials, had an active internal security mission, there was no oversight of the legislative, and there was mandatory military education in all schools. All these roles, and more, show that the military was not politically neutral, there was no democratic control nor any social impartiality (Fravel, 2002, 59-63). The military was used as a tool by the KMT regime to keep power consolidated around themselves while it maintained full control over the external defense policy. This started to change in 1987, the year martial law was lifted and the country started the transition process from a one-party state to a liberal democracy.
Reforming was not equally easy in every policy sector. One important sector that was difficult to reform was external defense policy. In the 1990s the leadership tried to restructure the military by focusing more on the navy and air force and cutting back on ground forces (Centre
Field-reform). The army, still involved in politics, protested heavily and thus a more balanced reform replaced the initial plan. Another example of how external defense was kept under control of the military was when the first two civilian defense ministers were appointed, the military decided to not work together with them. This forced the president to appoint a former general instead of a civilian. Only after 2002, when the National Defense Act and the
Organization Act of the Ministry of National Defence were passed, the defense structures were reorganized in a way that gave the civilian regime full control over the command structures and provided legislative oversight. Even after these reforms the military still blocked further reforms over external defense policy for years (Kuehn, 2008, 873-876). Recently, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) decided that the military force should be a voluntary force, and they have appointed less budget to the Ministry of Defense than it says it needs. These drastic changes in military policy suggest that the civilian regime finally has complete control over the external defense policy (McCauley, 2016). This extremely long process contrasts with the first policy sectors that were reformed: internal security and public policy. In just 5 years the jurisdiction of military courts was suspended, the police forces took over the internal security missions and border protection became a part of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Interior. The number of active or retired officers in democratic institutions also rapidly dropped to almost zero, with the Ministry of Defense as the only notable exception. Next to that, the military was forbidden to actively mobilize military voters in democratic elections. In 2000 the military even accepted the democratic victory of a president that pledged for Taiwanese independence, a stance that the military had deemed unacceptable before (Kuehn, 2008, 876-879).
The influence of an external threat on the transition process
The history of Taiwan and China is one of rivalry. Both have long claimed to be the sovereign government of the whole of the Chinese mainland and overseas Chinese territories, but after 1948 Taiwan had to retreat to its current geographical location. The retreating Chinese, together with the native Taiwanese, built a new national identity: Taiwan. These fleeing Chinese
controlled the native Taiwanese since then but with democratization also came Taiwanization: the creation of a national Taiwanese identity. The People’s Republic of China still sees Taiwan as a province of their own, so they deemed this unacceptable (Chu & Lin, 2001, pp. 129). As a reaction, China became more and more assertive towards Taiwan while it was in the
democratization process (Keuhn, 2008, pp. 877). This increase in pressure created an
environment in which the military and civilian elite were forced to work together and make sure that the transition would go as smoothly as possible. Due to the lack of an internal threat, the military could focus completely on this external threat (Croissant & Kuehn, 2010, pp. 31). The internal security of Taiwan became less and less important and the military accepted the first phase of reforms in which the military pulled back from society. They still defended their grips over the external defense policy, in which they regarded themselves as key players. Over time they also lost their power over this policy area, because the comparative power of the civilian regime grew to a point the military could not resist reforms anymore.
When we fit this process in the framework of Kohn (2008), the Taiwanese state seems very successful in establishing civilian control over the military. In just 20 years all of the proposed fundamentals are met, with one notable exception. The military delayed and protested against reforms that would have created operating mechanisms for government that would be controlled by civilians, especially for the Ministry of Defense. Until recently it enjoyed a lot of freedom in creating its own national defense policy and was heavily influenced by (retired) military personnel. The threat of China gave the military elite a clear goal; defend Taiwan against a possible invader. This made sure that it had to start looking outwards instead of inwards which gave the civilian regime opportunity to enact reforms. By slowly draining power from the military, it in the end became fully controlled by civilians. Nowadays the military even has been willing to reduce its own power and has openly declared political neutrality (Kuehn, 2008, pp. 876-878). This means that it also fulfills the last, and most important fundamentals of Kohn, the will of the military to stay out of politics.
The process of establishing civilian control of the military in Indonesia
After the Indonesians fought an independence war against the Dutch after 1945, their newly founded state, the Republic of Indonesia, became a liberal democracy. The following ten years were highly unstable and this ended when the last elected president reformed it into an
autocratic state to regain order and protect national unity. From then until 1998, there were multiple measures implemented which limited the freedom of their citizens and expended the power of the regime. One such extreme measure was a national ideology imposed while they forbid all others. To be able to enact such policies, they made the Indonesian Army an
extremely important actor in the regime. Firstly, it was deeply imbedded in society itself. In 1958 it started with the dual-function doctrine, which meant that the military also had a role in politics and policy. It had military governments throughout the country and military personnel who held civilian positions. Secondly, the military was responsible for territorial management to protect national security. Lastly they were represented in parliament by having a set number of seats reserved for military officials (Nymann, 2008, pp. 32-34). This made the TNI possibly the most powerful institution in Indonesia until 1998. Due to the Asian economic crisis protests erupted and Suharto demanded that the military would intervene. The military refused and a few months later the regime fell, and the democratization process (reformasi) started (Lee, 2014, p. 106). The democratization process would inherently mean that the military was going to lose at least some of its power and it was held possible that the military would intervene (Mietzner, 2009, pp. 195). This did not happen but in the following years in which institutions were rebuilt and a new democratic civilian regime was established, the military succeeded partly in defending their position. The first big measure against the TNI was that the police force was split from them which eliminated them mostly from the internal security area (Nymann, 2008, pp. 36-37). The amount of military personnel holding public office also was reduced, and military officers were later forbidden from holding office. While military representation was removed, there were still senior military officials which held positions throughout governmental security organizations (Mietzner, 2008, pp. 360-362). Most of the institutional reforms to reduce the power of the TNI were successful, but extending control over internal military matters turned out to be the hardest. The most influential civilian who could interfere was the president and it differed per president in which extent this power was used. Due to the lack of other institutional regulation and control mechanisms, the autonomy of the TNI fluctuated heavily through presidencies. This level of general self-regulation still has never been successfully addressed. This is because the military has stopped reforms which would have led to such mechanisms or which limited their local powers. Even if they are implemented, they make sure it is heavily influenced by (retired) military personnel (Mietzner, 2009, pp. 360-361). In the end the power of the military has been reduced drastically but the transition to complete civilian control has not been made. Bilveer (2000) names different reasons why the transition has not been made, one of which is the military’s nonnegotiable commitment to pancasila, the national ideology, which for them is key to
The influence of internal threats on the transition process
The worries about the survival of the current Indonesian state are not unfounded. In 1999 East-Timor held a referendum in which the population could choose between staying a
autonomous region within Indonesia or independence. Before and after the referendum, which ended in a vast majority voting for independence, military-backed militias ravaged the
soon-to-be state. Other regions like Aceh and Irian Jaya also wanted independence, both partly motivated by grievances against the TNI which had killed hundreds of civilians in anti-autonomy operations. In other regions, like Ambon, there were tensions because of ethnic and religious dividing lines which ended in mass killings between Christians and Muslims (Grouch, 2000, pp. 122-125). The regions calling for independence had their own guerilla armies fighting for independence when tensions were highest. At the same time, the ethnic and religious tensions in other regions raised questions about how well the Indonesian state could protect its own citizens. This, together with the army still being seen as the freedom fighters who brought independence and the military doctrines that focus on internal defence instead of external, made the TNI very conservative towards the democratization process (Goshal, 2004, pp. 521). When a situation arose that the military deemed threatening to national unity drastic measures were undertaken. The aftermath of the Bali Bombings in 2003 is one example: a radical bill was passed which gave them the power to prosecute civilians on the basis of suspicions. The TNI also had anti-separatist operations in East-Timor, Papua (2000) and in Aceh (2003) that were not officially approved by civilians. After 2004 these kinds of independent internal military interventions have disappeared. One of the reasons is that civilian institutions have been
working on political, economic or other solutions for the different internal problems, which do not involve the TNI. (Mietzner, 2011, 275-276).
These fundamental issues with the TNI show that the civilians have not gained total control over the military. While democratic governance has been reached, the conditions for the other
foundations have yet to be met. The military lacks parliamentary oversight or other institutions to check them, and soldiers are not adequately punished for human right abuses (Mietzner, 2011, pp. 275). The territorial organization also makes the army a potential hazard to the civilian regime with which they could enforce their power on regional and local levels, which the officers do not seem to let go (Crouch, 2000, pp. 129). This means that the need of functioning
operating mechanisms of government, countervailing powers and the will of the military to reform are not adequately met.
Analysis
Taiwan and Indonesia faced similar challenges in their democratic transition. Both were civilian autocratic regimes in which the military was held in high regard by the population and had extensive powers to keep the regime in control. These regimes fell at the end of the 20th century and what followed was a peaceful regime change. The newly formed democratic regimes then had to face the power of their own militaries and followed similar strategies to reduce this. The main measures that were taken were getting the military out of the political sphere, to split internal defense from external defense and to control internal military policy. In Taiwan it was relatively easy to get the military out of politics; in just a few years all military personnel in high civilian positions were replaced. The only exception was the Ministry of Defense in which it took longer for civilians to fill all their respective positions. In Indonesia this process also was a success. In a few years the number of (retired) soldiers who held public office was reduced drastically and it was later even forbidden for military personnel to hold office. However, through their territorial command structure, socio-political role and influence in the institutions that should control the military these reforms were not as effective as it would seem. The TNI does not influence domestic politics directly but still has significant means to do this indirectly.
The other measure, removing the responsibility of internal security from the military, had similar outcomes. The Taiwanese military did not object to releasing internal security from their duties and lost border protection, the police force and intelligence to other civilian institutions. In Indonesia, the military never lost their role as internal security force and actively tried to stop these reforms. The whole organizational structure is built around the territorial management function which exists to protect national unity. While the police force did split from the army, the main focus of the TNI is still internal security instead of external defense.
The last measure is getting civilian control over internal military policy, which means controlling the decision-making process. In Taiwan the military resisted for some time, for example by resisting reforms that would cut back on ground forces, or to not work with a civilian minister of defense. After some time the military lost the power to resist and now the parliament even decided to make it an all volunteer force. This would have been unacceptable for the military a decade ago. In Indonesia, the military still is self-regulating and it believes that it needs to be to fulfill its national duties. Even parliamentary oversight is something that has not been reached successfully because the institutions that exist which need to do this are heavily influenced by retired officers.
The threat environment has had its effect on the difference in outcome between Taiwan and Indonesia. While all three main measures were implemented relatively easily in Taiwan, which suffers from an existential threat due to China, the opposite is true for Indonesia. This state is
gave the military a clear goal, protecting the Taiwanese state against China. A direct consequence was that the military did not object too much against giving up their internal security role and (socio-)political power. It also helped that the civilians had a incentive to keep the military well-equipped which was a reason less for the military to be unhappy with the civilian government. The whole military quickly adapted towards a role completely focused around the external defense policy which created a situation in which it was less willing to give up that sector to the civilians. As time passed the military lost more political power, which meant that in the end the external defense policy also became controlled by the civilian government. In Indonesia the process took a different turn. While the democratization process overall can be considered a success, the transition towards a fully civilian controlled military has not been made yet. Especially the territorial management function of the TNI is hard for the civilian
government to reform, while this system has severe implications for the military's’ role in internal security, regional and local politics. This function is still seen as one of utmost importance by the military itself. They believe it gives them the means to protect the national unity, by being able to battle against separatist movements or intervene in ethnic/religious fights. When these threats became more pressing, the TNI historically reacted with a force of power and without civilian consent. In recent years the national government has passed a lot of autonomy to regions which reduced the intensity of internal threats, but this has not led to any reforms in the internal
security role of the TNI. It still sees the protection of the Indonesian state from threats within as one of its most important tasks and is not willing to give up power in that regard.
In short, it seems that the external threat has created an environment in which the
democratization process becomes easier. The ambitions of the military and the civilian elite are limited because an unstable country would lead to a high risk situation for the whole country, which would be dangerous to both. This makes the process of establishing civilian control over the military easier. An internal threat, however, has the opposite effect. A military can use this threat to underline how it important is for the state and has the possibility to itself a bigger role than just external defense policy. The threat is also not big enough to be an initiative for the military and civilian elites to work together extensively. This means that this makes a successful transition towards civilian control less likely.
Conclusion
This research focused on two cases of states that made the transition towards a democratic regime at the end of the 20th century and looked into how the threat environment influenced the process of getting civilian control over the military. Based on the cases of Taiwan and Indonesia it can be said that the threat environment has significant influence on this process.
How a threat influences the likelihood that civilian control can be established is entirely dependent on the nature of the threat. This thesis looked into the current literature about establishing civilian control, and while there are many theories of how this should be done or which factors could determine success or failure, a workable framework emerged. This
framework showed that institutions on all government levels need to be reformed to successfully subject the military to civilian control and that the support of the military itself is crucial. Then we selected and described two cases that have taken similar measures that fit this framework: Taiwan and Indonesia. Both started the transition in the same time period and have had a civilian authoritarian regime for the most part of the 20th century. What makes them different is their success in reforming their civilian-military relations and their threat environment.
The presence of an external threat makes controlling the military easier. Such a threat would be a danger to the elites of both parties, the military and the civilian regime, which means that they can not afford instability. This creates incentives to work together and to take each others needs into account. The case of Taiwan confirms this argument. Civilians took control of the military relatively easily, because it did not object to giving up their internal security or their
socio-political role and started focusing on external defense policy. While the military resisted on some policy matters, overall the civilian power grew which paved the way for full civilian control over the armed forces in the end.
A threat environment dominated by internal threats makes gaining control over the military harder. The is a high probability that the military had a role in protecting the old authoritarian regime from this threat before the transition which brought them considerable domestic power. With the regime gone but the threat still in place, it is hard to imagine that the military would give up this domestic power easily. In the case of Indonesia, this is precisely what happened. While the military has given up a lot of political power, the direct control of regions via their territorial management system is something that the civilian regime barely has been able to reform. The armed forces see this as an essential institution for their role in protecting Indonesia, which shows that the army does not look outward but inward.
A third case without any threats at all would have been a welcome addition to this research, but is very rare. It could have given more insights by acting as a base-line. However, the lack of the case does not have further implications for the research.
The influence of the threat environment of the establishment of civilian control over the military has clear implications for democratization all over the world. In a world where global security has been improving for decades, the amount of external threats for states have been dwindling. This is of course a good development overall, but means that there is one factor less that could ease the process of democratization. The same goes for internal threats, a considerable amount of autocratic regimes keep together states that harbour multiple ethnicities, religions and even nations. If they start a democratization process these may turn into internal threats which
militaries can use to protect their powers. Policy-makers should keep these effects in mind when a state starts the transition process and try to simulate the effects of a external threat while mitigating the effects of possible internal threats.
While this thesis makes it clear that there is a significant effect of the threat environment on the likelihood that civilian control over the military can be established, the intensity of this effect is unclear. By comparing it directly with other factors, such as actors, military structure, etc., the relative importance of the threat environment could be assessed. Another step would be looking into other cases and regions. Is the mechanism uncovered in the cases of Taiwan and
Indonesia an universal phenomenon? One would expect that it is, as threats are universal and the outcomes of threats barely differ, but this should be confirmed. Depending on the outcome of these steps, it may be time for a shift in focus in the research around civilian control over the military and acknowledge a bigger role of international relations in the process.
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