Fear Management in Counter-Terrorism –
A Study of Framing Approaches during the Second Intifada
Master Thesis in Crisis and Security Management Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs
Leiden University
Name: Johanna Pohl
Student ID: S1624083
E-Mail: jpohl@icct.nl
Date: 9 June 2016
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 3
2. Literature Review 7
2.1 The Fear of Terrorism in its Psychological Context 7
2.2 The Influence of Threat Communication on the Fear of Terrorism 11
3. Theoretical Framework 16
3.1 Framing and Sense Making in the Aftermath of Crises 16
3.2 Research Question & Hypotheses 17
4. Methodology 20
4.1 Research Design 20
4.2 Limitations 23
5. Background: The Second Intifada, September 2000 – February 2005 25
6. Analysis 29
7. Discussion 55
7.1 Unity Framing 55
7.2 Divisive, ‘Us vs. Them’ Framing 56
7.3 Resilience Framing 58
7.4 The Blame Game 58
7.5 Summary of Findings 59
8. Conclusion 61
1. Introduction
“The threat from terrorism is real, but we will overcome it. We will destroy ISIL and any other organization that tries to harm us. Our success won't depend on tough talk, or abandoning our values, or giving into fear. That's what groups like ISIL are hoping for. Instead, we will prevail by being strong and smart, resilient and relentless […].”1
Barack Obama, 7 December 2015
Addressing the American people after the terror attack in San Bernardino in December 2015, President Obama emphasized that the determination of success or failure of the terrorists depends first and foremost on the citizens themselves: Terrorists could not fulfill their deathly mission so long as the targeted society will not abandon its principles of freedom, tolerance and human dignity, and refuses to succumb to fear by uniting around its common values.
The above quote thus aptly illustrates the goals and dynamics underlying successful counter -terrorism efforts. More than just incapacitating an enemy and thereby preventing physica l attacks, an important part of public leaders’ responsibilities in counter-terrorism lies in limiting the impact of an attack on their constituencies, in other words, to manage the fear that the terrorists want to spread.
In his appeal to strength and resilience in the face of the fear spread by terrorism, Obama echoes European leaders, such as French President François Hollande and British Prime Ministe r David Cameron, who, after both the terror attacks in Paris in November 2015 and in Brussels in March 2016, identified the objective of the attackers as “sow[ing] fear in order to divide us”2
and called for citizens to “stand together and show that we will never be cowed by terror”.3
1 ‘Transcript: President Obama's address to the nation on the San Bernardino terror attack and the war on ISIS’,
CNN, 7 December 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/12/06/politics/transcriptobamasanbernardinois is -address/index.html (accessed 8.5.2016).
2 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Development, ‘Speech by the President of the Republic
before a joint session of Parliament, 16 November 2015’, http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/parisattacks -paris-terror-attacks-november-2015/article/speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-before-a-joint-session-of-parliament (accessed 22.03.2016).
3 ‘David Cameron: UK must defend Christian values against terror’, BBC News, 27 March 2016,
While this current wave of Islamist terrorism has only quite recently increased its foothold in Europe, other societies have been experiencing outgrowths of the very same violent extremis t ideology for decades. Looking at the case of Israel, in particular, one can observe how both politicians and citizens have made sense of being confronted with terrorism on a fairly regular basis, and how they have dealt with a challenge that many European societies and politicia ns have yet to grasp.
Small and close-knit societies, such as the Israeli one, are, in theory, particularly vulnerable to terrorism: When an attack happens, there is a much higher probability of knowing a victim than in larger and more loosely connected societies.4 Figuratively speaking, the impact of an attack
‘hits closer to home’, is felt more strongly through the personal connection. This heighte ned second-hand exposure was recorded, for instance, 19 months into the protracted violence of the Second Intifada, with 16.4% of Israelis being directly exposed to an attack and 37.3% in an indirect manner, by way of personally knowing a victim.5 By comparison, only 10% of
Americans reported knowing someone who was hurt or killed in the 9/11 attacks.6
It has been suggested that a period of protracted conflict providing both continuous and extensive exposure to traumatic events would result in an increasingly negative impact on society with regard to stress levels and anxiety.7 And yet, studies conducted during the Second
Intifada paint a different picture: Although 58% of respondents reported feeling depressed about the security situation, optimism about respondents’ personal futures was recorded at 82%, and 74% of respondents indicated that they would be able to function during an attack. Moreover, the prevalence of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) among respondents was recorded at just 9.4%, which is low compared to those rates reported two months after 9/11 for persons living near the World Trade Center (20%) and even those living outside of New York City (17%).8 Likewise, only 5.3% of respondents indicated that they had sought professiona l
4 Close-knit is used here to refer to the degrees of separation felt by Israeli Jews, who often share acquaintances
throughout large social circles, rather than a lack of societal cleavages, which are of course, highly present in that country.
5 D. Waxmann, ‘Living with Terror, not Living in Terror: The Impact of Chronic Terrorism on Israeli Society’,
Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 5, no. 5-6, 2011, pp. 4-26, p. 9.
6 Pew Research Centre, ‘Americans and 9/11: The Personal Toll’, 5 September 2002,
http://www.people-press.org/2002/09/05/i-ame ricans-and-911-the-personal-toll/ (accessed 22.03.2016).
7 A.P. Schmid, ‘Links between Terroris m and Migration: An Exploration’, The International Centre for
Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 7, no. 4, 2016.
8 S. Galea et al., ‘Psychological sequelae of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York City’, New England
Journal of Medicine, vol. 346, 2002, pp. 982-987; R.C. Silver et al., ‘Nationwide longitudinal study of
psychological responses to September 11’, The Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 288, 2002, pp. 1235-1244. Note that the PTSD rate in the Israeli sample is also lower than a general rate given by Bakker & De Graaf, indicating the prevalence of PTSD at 23% - 29% of a population that experienced an attack: E. Bakker &
help due to anxiety.9 These findings led the authors of the study to conclude that, given the
length and nature of the traumatic experience, the resulting psychological impact on Israelis was only moderate.
Many factors may influence the degree of terrorism impact and the resulting fear within society: The authors of the above-cited study suggest that positive coping mechanisms and an accommodation effect probably play a significant role.10 Schmid points to a row of other, more
objective variables, such as the source of the terror, the likelihood of an attack occurring again, the object of victimization and a person’s relationship to it, the phasing of the attack(s), and one’s ability to deal with or avoid terror-prone situations in the future.11
While it is difficult to determine a general dominant factor, we know that public leadership and discourse play a significant role in how a constituency perceives and interprets a crisis situation,12 under which, as will be argued later in this thesis, a terrorist attack falls. Yet, most
research on the impact of terrorism has so far focused on the prevalence of psychopathologica l disorders within a society after an attack,13 and while crisis management scholars have
examined the general role of leadership and communication in the crisis management process,14
few studies actually focus on public discourse and framing as a means to manage fear in the aftermath of a terrorist attack.15 To this author’s knowledge, no such study has been conducted
on Israeli leaders’ rhetoric, despite the interesting case that this country presents for both terrorism research and counter-terrorism practice.
B. de Graaf, ‘Towards a Theory of Fear Management in the Counter-Terrorism Domain’, The International
Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 5, no. 2, 2014, p. 5.
9 A. Bleich et al., ‘Exposure to Terrorism, Stress -Related Mental Health Symptoms, and Coping Behaviors
Among a National Representative Sample in Israel’, The Journal of the American Medical Association, vol. 290, no. 5, 2003, pp: 612-620.
10 Ibid.
11 A. Schmid, ‘Terrorism as Psychological Warfare’, Democracy and Security, 2005, pp. 137-46.
12 A. Masters & P. ‘t Hart, ‘Prime ministerial rhetoric and recession politics: Meaning making in economic crisis
management’, Public Administration, vol. 90, no. 3, pp.759-780, p. 17.
13 S.J. Sinclair & D. Antonius (eds.), The Psychology of Terrorism Fears. Oxford, Oxford University Press,
2012, p. 79.
14 See for example A. Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management: Public Leadership under Pressure , New
York: Cambridge University Press, 2005; P. ‘t Hart, ‘Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management’, Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, vol. 1, no. 1, 1993, pp 36-50.
15 See for example M.J. Canel & K. Sanders, ‘Crisis Communication and Terrorist Attacks: Framing a Response
to the 2004 Madrid Bombings and 2005 London Bomb ings’, in T. Coombs & S. Holladay (eds.), The Handbook
of Crisis Communication, Wiley-Blackwell, 2012, pp. 449-466; T. Christensen et al., ‘How to cope with a
terrorist attack? – A challenge for the political and administrative leadership’, COCOPS Working Paper No. 6, June 2012, http://www.cocops.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/COCOPS_workingpaper_No6.pdf (accessed 3.4.2016).
Investigating a case in which public leaders have already gained experience in responding to terrorist attacks, this thesis will examine the fear management efforts of Israeli governme nt actors during the Second Intifada, aiming to answer the following question:
Which fear management framing approaches did Israeli government actors use in their responses to terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada and how do these relate to the body of knowledge on fear management?
In the absence of a fully-developed theory on fear management, this paper first synthesize s literature from the crisis management, psychology, and communications fields, and thereby intends to contribute to the development of such a theory. It then derives three fear manageme nt framing approaches from the literature in three hypotheses to be tested in the analysis of this thesis. Following this theoretical part and the introduction of the research design, a short background on the Second Intifada is given, after which the cases are examined, in which official responses and media commentaries after a selected number of terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada are analyzed for the three framing approaches that literature suggests to be favorable to fear management purposes. Subsequently, a discussion evaluates the findings of the thesis.
2. Literature Review
Fear management as a theoretical concept stands at the nexus of three major academic disciplines: It forms part of political science, or more particularly, public administration in its crisis management literature, it draws on psychology in the study of fear, and it relates to communication studies in how the messages of terrorists and those countering them are transmitted and received. Thus, much like the study of terrorism itself, fear management as a part of counter-terrorism is by nature an interdisciplinary concept and warrants an analytica l approach that adequately reflects its multiple dimensions. Research on fear management as a strategic practice of counter-terrorism is, perhaps due to this interdisciplinary nature, yet to be fully developed, and listed among Schmid’s 50 un- and under-researched topics in the field of terrorism studies.16 Analyzing governmental practice in the fear management domain, Bakker
and de Graaf use the following definition for the term, which presents a starting point also for the research presented in this thesis:
“The efforts, undertaken by governmental institutions, prior, during and after situations of emergency and recovery, relating to a terrorist threat or attack, to manipulate the human capital in society in order to improve the positive, collective coping mechanisms of that society.”17
While this definition clearly reflects a public administration-centric approach, it is necessary to first take a closer look at the psychology of terrorism in order to understand both individual and collective reactions to terrorist attacks, and consequently, to be able to analyze the nature and dynamics of governmental efforts in their aftermath.
2.1 The Fear of Terrorism in its Psychological Context
Despite the contested nature of the term ‘terrorism’, fear is widely regarded to be one of its constitutive elements. For instance, spreading fear forms part of Schmid & Jongman’s academic consensus definition of terrorism, as well as of the majority of all definitions that were reviewed
16 The list of topics refers, in particular, to two central aspects of fear management, i.e. responsible crisis
communication before, during and after terrorist attacks, and strengthening public resilience. A.P. Schmid, ‘50 Un- and Under-researched Topics in the Field of (Counter-) Terrorism Studies’. Perspectives on Terrorism, vol. 5, no. 1, 2011, pp. 76-78.
to arrive at the above.18 Terrorism is thus never the mere use of violence, but violence with the
purpose to provoke reactions on part of both politicians and publics in order to achieve a political or religious goal. Spreading fear is essential for terrorists in order to reach their intended targets, who lie beyond the immediate circle of victims in the constituencies that these victims have emerged from and their public leaders. Richard Jackson’s definition thus accurately captures the essence of terrorism from the angle of spreading fear, as
“violence or its threat intended as a symbolically communicative act in which the direct victims of the action are instrumentalized as a means of creating a psychological eff ect of intimidation and fear in a target audience”.19
As a basis for this thesis, fear is defined as “a feeling of agitation and anxiety caused by the presence or imminence of danger”.20 From a biological perspective, fear is an essential physical
reaction, enabling our bodies to react with ‘fight or flight’ responses in dangerous situatio ns. The basic fear instinct is what allows human beings to survive in the face of threats to our existence and adapt and evolve as a species.21 However, in particular with regard to terrorism,
it has been repeatedly observed that fear within society often reaches levels disproportionate to the actual risk of victimization,22 with studies suggesting that people may alter their behavior,
political beliefs and support for their governments as a result of that fear.23
Terrorism, in turn, is sustained by these disproportionate levels of fear and anxiety. Review ing psychological research on the relationship between terrorism and fear since the attacks of 9/11, Sinclair and Antonius find three general patterns: First, psychiatric disorders and general levels of stress increase following an act of terrorism; second, this impact is felt more strongly by populations directly exposed, but carries over to a significant extent to populations outside the epicenters of attacks; and third, psychological distress generally declines over time in most populations. It is important to note, however, that most scholarship on the psychologica l
18 See for example: A.P. Schmid (Ed.), Handbook of Terrorism Research. London, Routledge, 2011, pp. 86-87;
B. Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision-Mak ers. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2005, pp. 16-17.
19 R. Jackson, ‘In defence of terrorism: finding a way through a forest of misconceptions’, Behavioral Sciences
of Terrorism and Political Aggression, vol. 3, pp. 116-130, p. 123.
20 The Free Dictionary, 2015, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/fear (accessed 01.6.2016). 21 Sinclair & Antonius, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears. p. 49.
22 See for example: R. Marshall et al., ‘The psychology of ongoing threat: Relative risk appraisal, the September
11 attacks, and terrorism-related fears’, American Psychologist, vol. 62, no. 4, 2007, pp. 304-316;
E. Bakker & T. Veldhuis, ‘A Fear Management Approach to Counter-Terrorism’, The International Centre for
Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 3, no. 1, 2012; Bakker & de Graaf, ‘Towards a Theory of Fear Management in
the Counter-Terrorism Domain’.
reactions to terrorist attacks has focused on the prevalence of psychopathological disorders, such as PTSD, within targeted populations. The researchers make a convincing argument that there is still a lack of knowledge about the impact of an ongoing, anticipatory fear related to terrorism in society today, distinct from discrete forms of psychiatric illness, which continue s to be present even when rates of PTSD are declining.24
This underlying sense of fear is also referred to by Furedi in what he terms a ‘culture of fear’. Describing contemporary society’s tendency to interpret its environment through a narrative of fear, Furedi paints a critical picture of a world in which all of human experience is being perceived as risk to be managed. The continuous presence of largely individuated, low-grade fears in public spaces, such as the fear of an abstract terrorist threat, is perpetuated by a media that communicates risk information to its audiences, as well as by governments increasingl y disseminating messages focusing on public health and safety. A heightened self-perception of vulnerability leads to an inflation and multiplication of intangible threats, resulting in a perpetual state of fear within society. Thus, independent of a threat’s feasibility, fear has become an objectified threat itself, detrimental to people’s actual well-being and, on a larger scale, potentially resulting in suboptimal policy decisions.25
Emphasizing the subjective nature of the perceived terrorist threat, many researchers have, for instance, explained the psychological effects of terrorism from the perspective of Cognitive-Behavioral Theory.26 According to this line of thought, fear, including the fear of terrorism, is
the result of complex processes of interaction between an individual and his environment. As a result of experiencing a terrorist attack, whether first-hand or through media exposure, fundamental beliefs about safety are called into question, and schemata about personal safety and security are damaged. Disproportionate fear of terrorism, it is argued, is a cognit ive distortion that manifests when people are constantly confronted with terrorist attacks through the media as well as government communications, as arguably is the case in present-day society. Through distorted cognitive filters, information about the threat of terrorism is often
24 Ibid, p. 79.
25 F. Furedi, Invitation to Terror: The Expanding Empire of the Unk nown . London: Continuum, 2007; F. Furedi,
'Fear and Security: A Vulnerability-led Policy Response', Social Policy & Administration, vol. 42, no. 6, 2008, pp. 645–661.
26 Cognitive-behavioral theory relies on the work of A. Beck, see for example: A.T. Beck, Cognitive Therapy
and the Emotional Disorders. New York: Basic Books, 1979; A. T. Beck, Cognitive Therapy of Depression.
New York: The Guilford Press, 1979. For a recent application of CBT, see Marshall et al., ‘The psychology of ongoing threat’; Sinclair & Antonius, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears.
construed in all-or-nothing terms, producing both a sense of helplessness within people, as well as an inability to stop focusing on the potential threat.27
Marshall expresses similar notions in his concept of ‘relative risk appraisal’,28 arguing that risk
estimates increase in situations with both a high level of perceived threat and a greater sense of unpredictability, as is the case with the threat of terrorist attacks. This propensity to distort risk is also described by Kahnemann and Tversky in what they term the ‘psychophysics of chance’.29 According to these authors, people have the tendency to give excessive weight to
improbable events, often leading to extreme risk-averse behavior in response to rare but sensational threats. This dynamic is caused, among others, by ‘availability heuristics’ and ‘affect heuristics’, the former describing the tendency of people to think events more likely if they have occurred recently, and the latter referring to the distortion of that same probabilit y due to vivid media coverage triggering emotional responses (for instance real-time coverage of terrorism victims).30
Sinclair and Antonius aptly visualize the impact of a heightened fear of terrorism on the individual, both on the psychological and the physical level, in Figure 1.31
Figure 1: A Cognitive-Behavioral Theory Model of the Psychological Impact of Terrorism.
27 Sinclair & Antonius, The Psychology of Terrorism Fears, p. 60. 28 Marshall et al., ‘The psychology of ongoing threat’.
29 D. Kahneman & A. Tversky, (eds.). Choices, values and frames. New York: Cambridge University
Press and the Russell Sage Foundation, 2000.
30 B. Forst, ‘Managing the Fear of Terrorism’, in B. Forst, J. Greene and J. Lynch (eds.), Criminologists on
Terrorism and Homeland Security. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 273-299.
Attempting to explain the psychological mechanism that underlies people’s reaction to terrorist attacks, Terror Management Theory, as put forward by Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg, argues that human awareness of their own mortality is a powerful determinant of behavior in the wake of terrorism. Terror Management Theory holds that when people are made aware of their own mortality, as is the case when witnessing a terrorist attack either directly or indirect l y through media coverage, they react with actions that render their lives meaningful, in particula r validating their cultural worldview and boosting their self-esteem, in order to create a buffer against the extreme fear of death and reduce anxiety. Accordingly, fear within a society after an attack has been linked to increased nationalism and patriotism, intolera nce for out-groups and a desire for revenge, as well as support for hawkish counter-terrorism policies.32 In the
same vein, public discourse following a terrorist attack often sees an upsurge in patriotic symbolism and stereotyping of the perceived enemy – both are mechanisms bolstering a society’s existing cultural worldview and make sense of a confusing social world, thereby suppressing the fear of death.33
2.2 The Influence of Threat Communication on the Fear of Terrorism
As noted before, threat communication, whether through media or official outlets, is a key determinant of people’s perception of the dangers of terrorism.
In its basic sense, one can understand terrorism as a form of communication. Tuman argues that an act of terrorism fits neatly into a simple model of communication, with the terrorist organization or individual as the sender, and the target public at large, an organization, a government or a state as the receiver of a message. That message, however, is not the act of violence or destruction itself, but rather lies within such activity, to be decoded by the intended audience.34
In order to get their message across, terrorists rely by and large on the news media. However, media coverage of terrorist attacks is often criticized for playing into the hands of the terrorists
32 T. Pyszczynski, S. Solomon & J. Greenberg, In the wak e of 9/11: The psychology of terror. Washington DC:
American Psychological Association, 2003, p. 101; C. H. Miller & M. J. Landau, ‘Communication and Terrorism: A Terror Management Perspective’, Communication Research Reports, vol. 22, no. 1, 2005, pp. 79-88.
33 Miller & Landau, ‘Communication and Terrorism’, p. 83.
34 J. Tuman, Communicating terror: The rhetorical dimensions of terrorism, Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications,
by providing a stage for their atrocities to reach the wider public. This notion was famous ly proclaimed by then-British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in 1985, who cautioned against the excessive presentation of terrorist violence and brutality in the media, which she called the terrorist’s “oxygen of publicity”.35 The symbiotic relationship between terrorism and the media
– whereby the media reaps the profits of the mass audience which the terrorist aims to intimida te – has been remarked upon by numerous scholars in the field.36 Important here is to recognize
that the way in which modern media covers terrorism and attracts its audiences, namely by eliciting emotional responses through sensational and continuous coverage of violence and brutality,37 is not only detrimental to their audience’s risk assessment capabilities, as the
frequency and length coverage is disproportional to the actual prevalence of attacks, but is also likely to increase fear of terrorism among viewers, as ample evidence suggests in the case of crime.38
However, not only terrorism, but also counter-terrorism should be seen as an act of communication. Bakker and De Graaf, for instance, maintain that counter-terrorism measures are always communicative in character and have an impact on the “war on influence” between the terrorist group and the state, whether intended or not.39 De Graaf and de Graaff
conceptualize this communicative character of counter-terrorism as “performative power”,40
arguing that governments, through the way in which they choose, frame, and present their counter-terrorism measures, necessarily influence not only the impact of terrorism on a society, but also the likelihood of potential future attacks. Specifically, the authors recommend that governments should refrain from anxiety- increasing measures, such as inflaming public discourse on terrorism with military rhetoric, or tapping into existing fears and rifts within society.41
35 M. Thatcher, ‘Speech to the American Bar Association’, 15 July 1985. Margaret Thatcher Foundation,
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/106096 (accessed 30.3.2016).
36 See for example A.H. Miller, Terrorism, the Media and the Law, New York: Transnational Publishers, 1982;
G. Weimann, ‘The Theater of Terror: The Psychology of Terrorism and the Mass Media’, Journal of Aggression,
Maltreatment & Trauma, vol. 9, no. 3-4, 2005, pp. 379-390; B. Nacos, Mass-Mediated Terrorism: The central role of the media in terrorism and counterterrorism. Rowan & Littlefield Publishers, 2007; A. P. Schmid & J.
De Graaf, Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media . London and Beverly Hills: SAGE Publications, 1982; Ganor, The Counter-Terrorism Puzzle: A Guide for Decision-Mak ers.
37 Schmid & De Graaf, Violence as Communication, p.75. 38 Forst, ‘Managing the Fear of Terrorism’, p. 283.
39 Bakker & De Graaf, ‘Towards a Theory of Fear Management’, p. 8.
40 B. de Graaf & B. de Graaff, ‘Bringing Politics back in: The Introduction of the ‘Performative Power’ of
Counterterrorism’, Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 261-275.
The communicative aspects of counter-terrorism have, of course, also been analyzed through a crisis management perspective. Boin et al. define crisis as “events or developments widely perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute urgent threats to core communit y values and structures”.42 It is easy to argue that terrorism fulfills these conditions: Especially
since the attacks of 9/11 and the rise of the global jihadist movement, terrorism is on the minds of publics, politicians and the media. For example, recent polls in the US have assessed that about 51% of citizens are very or somewhat worried that they or a relative will become a victim of terrorism,43 with the collective level of worry remaining 10-20% above pre-9/11 levels.44
Moreover, the current brand of jihadist terrorism is widely perceived as counteracting Western values of democracy and personal liberties, as expressed by multiple politicians and public figures in reaction to recent terrorist attacks.45 Thus, in line with understanding a terrorist attack
as a crisis, also counter-terrorism, and fear management in particular, should be looked at as an example of crisis management.
A prominent approach to the crisis management process by Boin and colleagues46 categorizes
the (re)actions of public leaders during crisis situations into three phases: sense making, decision making, and meaning making.47 While sense making involves appraising the threat
and deciding what the essence of a developing crisis is about, decision making then concerns the allotment of resources and deployment of measures to react to the crisis. Lastly, meaning making comprises both the communication of “accurate, clear and actionable information”48 on
part of the leadership, as well as a rhetorical effort to make the public accept their definition of the situation and answering questions as to the nature and causes as well as the remedies of a crisis.
42 A. Boin, P. ‘t Hart & A. McConnell, ‘Crisis Exploitation: Political and Policy Impacts of Framing Contests’,
Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 16, no. 1, 2009, p. 83.
43 J. McCarthy, ‘Trust in Government to Protect Against Terrorism at New Low’, Gallup, 11 December 2015,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/187622/trust-government-protect-against-terrorism-new-low.aspx?g_source=Politics&g_medium=newsfeed&g_campaign=tiles (accessed 15.3.2016).
44 J. Woods, ‘Framing Terror: An Experimental Framing Effects Study of the Perceived Threat of Terrorism’,
Critical Studies on Terrorism, vol. 4, no. 2, 2011, p. 199.
45 See for example the speech by French President Hollande reacting to the Paris attacks of November 13, 2015
or former British Prime Minister Blair’s speech in reaction to the London Bombings on July 7, 2005, at http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/french-foreign-policy/defence-security/parisattacks -paris-terror-attacks-november-2015/article/speech-by-the-president-of-the-republic-before-a-joint-session-of-parlia ment and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4689363.stm, respectively (both accessed 22.03.2016).
46 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, p. 10.
47 The authors add two more post-crisis stages, namely terminating and learning. Ibid, p. 10. 48 Ibid, p. 12.
It is this last aspect of the crisis management process that is of particular importance to this thesis, as successful fear management during and after a terrorist attack depends on how the public interprets the event. Research confirms the essential role that leaders play in this process, with evidence suggesting that astute rhetorical leadership shapes the public’s interpretations of a crisis, as well as its emotions and attitudes.49
Emphasizing that crises are subjectively constructed realities, ‘t Hart advances a ‘symbolic action perspective’ of crisis management, defining crisis as “a breakdown of familiar symbolic frameworks legitimating the pre-existing socio-political order”.50 Tying in with arguments of
Terror Management Theory, the author argues that the challenges that crises pose to previously-held worldviews generate anxiety within a population, which is exacerbated by witness ing either directly or indirectly the human and material damage that crises, and especially terrorist attacks, can bring about. From this symbolic action perspective, ‘t Hart draws five interrela ted analytical dimensions of crisis management, the third of which – affective control – relates to “the management of individual and collective emotions generated by the breakdown of routine symbolic order”.51 In order to manipulate these emotions, crisis management actors use a
variety of strategies, which ‘t Hart summarizes as framing, rituals, and masking. While the rituals category includes acts of symbolic behavior showing solidarity, reassurance or animosity, both framing and masking refer to rhetorical strategies used to define the crisis and mitigate its impact.52
Specific framing strategies include for example what Smith and Smith call the ‘Strategy of Inclusion’ and the ‘Strategy of Division’, the former relating to a message aimed at a larger audience in order to gain support from a broad coalition, and the latter involving the situating of the adversary within prejudices and rejections of the constituency.53 A similarly divisive
strategy is conceptualized by Van Dijk’s ‘Ideological Square’ approach, where relations between characters are portrayed in binary opposition to each other, as in ‘us vs. the Other’.54
49 Masters & ‘t Hart, ‘Prime ministerial rhetoric and recession politics’, p. 17.
50 ‘t Hart, ‘Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management’, p. 39. 51 Ibid, p. 41.
52 ‘t Hart refers more generally to rhetorical strategies as framing, whereas masking denotes more specifically
attempts at dampening the impact of crises, obscuring them, and communicating a ‘business as usual’ image. Ibid, p. 44.
53 C.A. Smith & K.B. Smith, The White House speak s: Presidential leadership as persuasion, Westport: Praeger,
1994, p. 231.
Reviewing research on the framing of terrorist attacks, there is not yet a general consensus of what works best with regard to fear management. Studies on crisis communication in response to terrorist attacks emphasize the effectiveness of culturally congruent and inclusive frames,55
frames that underscore resilience as well as unity56 and those that convey empathy and
understanding,57 as well as, in general, the importance of trustworthy and competent leaders.58
On the other side, inciting, war-like rhetoric and an exaggeration of the crisis are evaluated as counter-productive to successful fear management.59
55 Canel & Sanders, ‘Crisis Communication and Terrorist Attacks’, p. 463. 56 Ibid, p. 458.
57 M.W. Seeger, ‘Best Practices in Crisis Communication: An Expert Panel Process’, Journal of Applied
Communication Research, vol. 34, no. 3, 2006, pp. 232-244.
58 Smith & Smith, The White House speak s; Forst, ‘Managing the Fear of Terrorism’, p. 295. 59 Bakker & De Graaf, ‘Towards a Theory of Fear Management’, p. 15.
3. Theoretical Framework
3.1 Framing and Sense Making in the Aftermath of Crises
Any attempt to analyze the impact of terrorism needs to take into account that different stakeholders, at the very least both the terrorist organization and the government of the targeted public, are trying to construct their narrative of events in the aftermath of an attack. Writing about social movements, Snow and Benford conceptualize this dynamic construction of subjective reality as “framing” – an “active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality construction”.60 Despite disagreement among researchers
whether framing refers to communication content,61 internal cognitive structures,62 or both,63
this thesis will build on the communication-centric approach taken by Entmann, defining framing as
“select[ing] some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.64
Frames provide individuals with a set of ideas that enable them to interpret occurrences within their social reality and render them meaningful.65 According to Snow and Benford, the framing
process can be divided into three core framing tasks: Diagnostic framing, prognostic framing, and motivational framing.66 Diagnostic framing seeks to identify a problem and clarify the
question of attribution. Examples for diagnostic frames include so-called ‘injustice frames’,67
attributing a perceived injustice to specific actors responsible, and ‘adversarial frames’, a set of attributional processes that construct the collective identity of a constituency’s members, the
60 R.D. Benford & D.A. Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements: An Overview and Assessment’,
Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 26, 2000, pp. 611-639, p. 614.
61 J. Woods, ‘What we talk about when we talk about terrorism: Elite press coverage of terrorism risk from 1997
to 2005’, Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, vol. 12, no. 3, 2007, pp. 3-20.
62 M. McCombs et al., Communication and democracy: Exploring the intellectual frontiers in agenda -setting
theory. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1997.
63 T. Gitlin, The whole world is watching: Mass media in the mak ing & unmak ing of the new left , Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1980.
64 R.M. Entmann, ‘Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm’, Journal of Communication, vol. 43,
no. 4, 1993, pp. 51-58, p. 52.
65 Benford & Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’, p. 614.
66 D.A. Snow & R.D. Benford, ‘Ideology, Frame Resonance, and Participant Mobilization’ in B. Klandermans,
H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow (eds.), From Structure to Action: Social Movement Participation Across Cultures. Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1988, pp. 197-217, p. 199.
‘in-group’, as opposed to its antagonists, the ‘out-group’.68 Prognostic framing is concerned
with proposing a solution to the previously identified problem, with prognostic frames often varying between different factions of a constituency. Motivational framing finally provides a rationale for engaging in collective action.69
The framing approach ties in with the concept of meaning making as set out by Boin and colleagues, as politicians deliberately choose frames communicating their answer to the questions of the causes and nature of, as well as the remedies to, a crisis.70 However, while fear
and impact management is certainly one aim that politicians pursue in their framing efforts in the aftermath of a crisis, it is unquestionably only one among many others, including advocating for the pursuit of preferred policies or challenging political opponents. One should thus approach the analysis of political leaders’ framing efforts with caution, duly taking into account the context and political agenda that may have been at play.
3.2 Research Question & Hypotheses
As already stated in the introductory part, this thesis intends to analyze the fear manageme nt effort of Israeli politicians during the Second Intifada, and will therefore aim to answer the following research question:
Which fear management framing approaches did Israeli government actors use in their responses to terrorist attacks during the Second Intifada and how do these relate to the body of knowledge on fear management?
In the absence of a fully developed theory on fear management, it is useful to synthesize the findings of the literature analyzed in the previous section in order to establish themes and assumptions from which to construct several hypotheses to be tested in this thesis.
68 W.A. Gamson, ‘Constructing Social Protest’, in H. Johnston & B. Klandermans (eds.), Social Movements and
Culture, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1995; For similar concepts, see also: van Dijk, Ideology. A multidisciplinary approach; A. Moghadam & B. Fishman, ‘Introduction: Jihadi “Endogenous” Problems’, in A.
Moghadam and B. Fishman (eds.), Fault lines in global Jihad: Organizational, strategic, and ideological
fissures, London and New York: Routledge, 2011, pp. 1-22.
69 Benford & Snow, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’, p. 614. 70 Boin et al., The Politics of Crisis Management, p. 10.
Starting from a crisis communication and management perspective, research points to the success of approaches using broad, inclusive frames that encompass multiple constituenc ie s and construct an identity that transcends rifts within society by emphasizing unity among all its groups. This approach is supported by, for instance, Smith and Smith’s ‘Strategy of Inclusion’,71 research findings by Canel and Sanders on political leaders’ rhetorical approaches
following terrorist attacks in Spain and the UK,72 as well as the findings by Christensen and
colleagues analyzing the Norwegian leadership in this regard.73 Thus, the first hypothesis this
thesis will test is:
H1: Government actors employ frames emphasizing unity among all groups of society.
However, analyzing the psychological underpinnings of the fear of terrorism, it seems that divisive strategies emphasizing the struggle of ‘us vs. the Other’ would be most successful in reducing fear among a constituency through rallying people around the defense of the values they identify with. This assumption is based, for instance, on the basic tenets of Terror Management Theory, according to which people engage in behavior affirming and defending their cultural identity when confronted, here through the violence of a terrorist attack, with their own mortality. Thus, frames underlining patriotism or even promoting the stereotyping of others can function as a buffer against anxiety and thereby present a positive coping mechanis m in the aftermath of an attack.74 Beyond Terror Management Theory, also van Dijk’s ‘Ideologica l
Square’ approach to framing,75 as well as Smith and Smith’s ‘Strategy of Division’76 lend
themselves to this line of argument. Accordingly, the second hypothesis is:
H2: Government actors employ frames emphasizing the difference of the enemy and the
importance of defending the values of the constituency against attack.
A last theme to emerge from the analyzed literature is that frames appealing to the strength and resilience of a population, and convey a ‘business-as-usual’ image, are beneficial to reducing fear and anxiety within a constituency. Research by ‘t Hart, for instance, maintains that politicians use masking strategies and ‘business-as-usual’ frames in order to counteract popular
71 Smith & Smith, The White House speak s: Presidential leadership as persuasion, p. 231. 72 Canel & Sanders, ‘Crisis Communication and Terrorist Attacks’, p. 463.
73 Christensen et al., ‘How to cope with a terrorist attack?’, p. 14-15.
74 Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, In the wak e of 9/11: The psychology of terror, p. 30. 75 Van Dijk, Ideology. A multidisciplinary approach, p. 43.
anxiety.77 Likewise, Bakker and De Graaf make the argument that emphasizing the self-efficac y
of a population enhance its positive coping mechanisms, whereas an exaggeration of the threat and a mobilization of the population around images of fear reinforces negative coping mechanisms.78 This line of argument is also supported by De Graaf & De Graaff, who propose
that appealing to the social resilience of the population can counteract terrorism’s negative impact.79 Taking the opposite perspective, this line of argument is also reinforced by research
on the effect of media coverage of terrorist attacks, with Forst arguing that sensational and continuous coverage of terrorist violence brutality is both likely to make people attribute a higher probability to terrorist attacks and lead to higher levels of anxiety,80 and De Graaf and
De Graaff maintaining that frames exaggerating the threat and tapping into existing fears lead to negative coping within a population.81 Therefore, the third hypothesis to be tested is:
H3: Government actors employ frames emphasizing the strength and resilience of a
constituency and communicate a ‘business-as-usual’ image.
77 ‘t Hart, ‘Symbols, Rituals and Power: The Lost Dimensions of Crisis Management’, p. 44. 78 Bakker & De Graaf, ‘Towards a Theory of Fear Management’, p. 15.
79 De Graaf & de Graaff, ‘Bringing Politics back in: The Introduction of the ‘Performative Power’ of
Counterterrorism’, p. 272.
80 Forst, ‘Managing the Fear of Terrorism’, p. 283.
81 De Graaf & de Graaff, ‘Bringing Politics back in: The Introduction of the ‘Performative Power’ of
4. Methodology
4.1 Research Design
This thesis employs a multiple case study design, analyzing the reactions of politicians who were part of the Israeli government to a selected 14 terrorist attacks that occurred during the time of the Second Intifada, by way of analysis of official speeches, statements and commentaries to the media. The choice to focus on Israel alone was made in order to be able to analyze in an in depth-manner the interesting case that the country presents for terrorism scholars, as it is quite unique in the duration and intensity of terrorist violence experienced by the population while at the same time providing comparatively easy access for scholarly analysis, as many official documents as well as prominent media sources are in the Englis h language. It is useful to keep in mind, however, that because the research design is focused exclusively on Israel, external validity and generalizability are limited, as the research undertaken is considerably context-specific.
Considering the limited scope of this thesis, an appropriate, but not necessarily statistica ll y significant sample consisting of 14 ‘mass-casualty’ terrorist attacks was created. These attacks were all those that occurred in Israel or the West Bank Territories between September 2000 and February 2005, and resulted in 15 or more casualties. In order to arrive at this sample, the database of the Israel-based International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (ICT) was consulted, which was chosen over other databases due to the proximity and context of the research. The attacks in Figure 2, all of which are incidentally also suicide bombing attacks, fall within the aforementioned parameters:
Nr. Target Date Place Casualties
1 Dolphinarium Discotheque 01.06.2001 Tel Aviv 21
2 Sbarro Restaurant 09.08.2001 Jerusalem 15
3 Haifa Bus 16 02.12.2001 Haifa 15
4 Park Hotel Netanya 27.03.2002 Netanya 30
5 Matza Restaurant 31.03.2002 Haifa 15
6 Rishon LeZion Game Club 07.05.2002 Rishon LeZion 15 7 Megiddo Junction Bus 05.06.2002 Megiddo Junction 17
9 Tel Aviv Central Bus Station 05.01.2003 Tel Aviv 23
10 Haifa Bus 37 05.03.2003 Haifa 17
11 Davidka Square Bus 11.06.2003 Jerusalem 17
12 Shmuel HaNavi Bus 19.08.2003 Jerusalem 24
13 Maxim Restaurant 04.10.2003 Haifa 21
14 Beersheva Buses 31.08.2004 Beersheva 16
Figure 2: List of terrorist attacks occurring in Israel between September 2000 and February
2005 with 15 or more casualties.
In order to conduct the analysis, speeches, statements and media articles that included statements by Israeli government politicians or their spokespersons were collected, with the act of speech directly referring to the respective attack. This material was collected in its Englis h translation, retrieved mostly through the online archive of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as in English-speaking Israeli and international media. Israeli media outlets consulted were Ha’aretz, the Jerusalem Post, and Yedioth Ahronoth’s internet portal Ynetnews, international media outlets consulted were BBC Online and CNN. Additional internet searches were performed to add to the material collected in the manner above. In these searches, the search terms consisted of the target of a given attack, its date and names of Israeli governme nt politicians, in order to find statements and speech material that may have been published on websites not listed above. All material that was found, i.e. speeches and statements in reaction to any of the attacks listed, was utilized in the analysis. During the analysis, English translatio ns of the material in question were first analyzed, and where necessary, the framing analysis was verified by consulting the original Hebrew version. For two of the attacks listed above, number 11 and 13, insufficient material was available, leading to their omission in the follow i ng analysis. The amount of material available for the remaining attacks varies from case to case, with some cases being discussed at length in Prime Ministerial speeches, while others are only referred to in short statements. This heterogeneity in length and occurrence of speeches is understandable in the context of the very high frequency of attacks during the period researched: At its height, in March 2002, 12 suicide attacks were carried out, averaging to around one attack every two to three days.82 Given this rate of attacks, it is reasonable that
Israeli leaders did not react in length to every single attack, but that their communicat io n
82 G.M. Ben Israel & M. Shorer-Zeltzer, ‘Telling a Story by Dry Statistics: Suicide Terror Attacks’, in T.
Dronzina & R. El Houdaigui (eds.), Contemporary Suicide Terrorism: Origins, Trends and Ways of Tack ling it , Amsterdam: IOS Press BV, 2012, p.63.
focused on those standing out for specific reasons, such as the number of casualties an attack produced, its targets or the manner in which it was carried out.
The hypotheses were operationalized in the following way to allow for both the search of specific key terms within the material, as well as a more context-specific analysis:
Hypothesis Examples of Framing
Terms
Examples of Framing Contexts
H1: Government actors
employ frames emphasizing unity among all groups of society.
Unity, United, Together, Nation, Trust, Community
Key words and phrases are designated in this manner.
Referring to political discussion
Referring to Jewish Israeli Community, Arab Israeli Community or both
H2: Government actors
employ frames emphasizing the difference of the enemy and the importance of defending the values of the constituency against attack.
Enemy, Us, Them,
Humanity, War, Religion, Jewish, Defeat, Victory, Land, History, Capital, Jerusalem
Key words and phrases are designated in this manner.
Describing Israeli values and society
Describing Palestinian values and society Describing shared
narrative of identity / religious-historical context of Israel
H3: Government actors
employ frames emphasizing the strength and resilience of a constituency and communicate a ‘business-as-usual’ image.
Resilience, strength,
overcome, continue, strong
Key words and phrases are designated in this manner.
Describing the shared narrative of overcoming hardship
Referring to past wars and military conflict
Figure 3: Operationalization of the Research Design.
Thus, a statement by a public leader is counted as relevant to a category not only if it exhibit s one or more of the key terms in the second column, but also if that person’s speech materia l falls under a context enumerated in column three. This operationalization ensures that relevant
speech material is counted as such, even if the research design did not foresee the use of a specific term in certain contexts. While this somewhat broader operationalization is certainly an advantage of a qualitative analytical approach, it comes with the trade-off that the decision whether an act of speech falls under a relevant context is made at the discretion of the author. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this thesis, the benefits of this approach outweigh its costs, as it allows for the in-depth analysis necessary in this considerably context-specific case. Beyond the frames outlined in the hypotheses, the material was also analyzed for additional, non-factual83 content, in order to include potential themes that the literature did not point to.
In order to adequately reflect the relative importance of each framing approach in the various acts of speech, a non-binary method of analysis is adopted, indicating whether the use of a particular frame in the collected acts of speech after a specific attack was either ‘none’, ‘minor’, or ‘major’. The relative frequency is considered to be ‘none’ where no evidence of a framing approach is found; ‘minor’ where a specific framing approach is used marginally and represents a minor theme in an official’s rhetoric; and ‘major’, where a specific framing approach is used multiple times, representing a major, recurrent theme in the acts of speech. Just as with the categorization of speech into the different framing approaches, as elaborated above, also this method puts the judgment of the importance or centrality at the author’s discretion. This approach was chosen, as opposed to a more mathematical evaluation of frequency, to allow for a more detailed and context-specific evaluation of the importance of the framing approaches within the different acts of speech, delineating whether a certain type of frame is a marginal or a main theme in an official’s rhetoric.
4.2 Limitations
Naturally, the findings of this thesis should be understood within their specific sociopolitica l context. By analyzing cases during the Second Intifada, the findings apply in particular to fear management within a period of continuous terrorist attacks targeting a community with a well-defined identity narrative that is widely shared among its members. Likewise, one has to take into account that motives beyond fear management may have influenced the speech content of government actors, and therefore keep in mind the political developments at the time that a speech was held or a statement was made.
83 Within the context of this thesis, the term ‘non-factual’ is used to delineate any speech that contains opinions
Further limitations connected to the research design lie in the choice of attacks and analysis language: Analyzing only mass casualty attacks leads to the exclusion of other attacks with lesser numbers of casualties, but which may have other fear-inducing qualities, such as a high number of people wounded, or a low need of preparation, such as shootings or car ramming attacks. Likewise, conducting the initial search in the English language is likely to result in not all relevant statements being collected. A third limitation lies also in its analytical approach: The use of categories such as ‘none’, ‘minor’ and ‘major’ leads to a certain degree of subjectivity in the analysis, as this categorization is not based on mathematical percentages of the framing content within an act of speech, but rather a content analysis of the centrality of the framing approach to the theme of the speech.
These limitations notwithstanding, this thesis can certainly inspire both the academic and policy communities with key features of successful fear management approaches, provided that they are adapted to the specific context of the communities concerned. As such, further research on countries that are most similar or most different to Israel can confirm or further develop the findings set out by this thesis.
In the following, a short background section will present the reader with an introduction to terrorism during the Second Intifada and an overview of its military, political and social impact on Israel and its population. Subsequently, the speeches, statements and commentaries relating to the attacks in the list will be analyzed.
5. Background: The Second Intifada, September 2000 – February 2005
In a period of four years and five months, the Palestinian uprising that has become known as the Second Intifada or Al Aqsa Intifada cost the lives of an estimated 1000 Israelis and 3000 Palestinians.84 For the Jewish population, the death toll suffered as a result of terrorism was
unprecedented, exceeding that of all Israelis killed in terror attacks during the 35 years prior taken together.85
Although the visit of then-opposition leader Ariel Sharon to the religiously contested Temple Mount on 28 September 2000 is often seen as the trigger for the violent uprising, the underlyi ng dynamics leading towards it can be found within the political process between Israelis and Palestinians in the decade prior to the Second Intifada. The failure to implement the terms agreed upon in the 1993 Oslo Accords by the Netanyahu government (1996-1999), as well as the lack of negotiations towards a Permanent Status Agreement under his successor Ehud Barak, culminated in disappointment and frustration on both sides when also the negotiatio ns at the Camp David Summit in July 2000 did not produce a successful outcome.
A tactic of central importance to Palestinian militancy during this period was that of suicide attacks, their lethality and profound psychological impact making them an effective weapon for terrorist organizations.86 Research conducted by Moghadam found that between September
2000 and August 2002, suicide bombings accounted for less than 1% of all Palestinian attacks, yet produced 44% of all casualties during this period.87 Data from the Israeli Security Service
paint a similar picture for 2000-2009, stating that 43.8% of all fatalities during this period are attributed to suicide attacks.88
84 Estimates vary between 950-1100 Israeli deaths and 2000-4900 Palestinian deaths; B’Tselem, in ‘Intifada toll
2000-2005’, BBC, 8 February 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3694350.stm; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘The Situation on the eve of the Second Intifada (2000)’, n.d.,
http://mfa.gov.il/MFA/AboutIsrael/Maps/Pages/Situation -on-the-eve-of-the-Second-Intifada.aspx; ‘Total Casualties, Arab-Israeli Conflict’, Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.,
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/casualtiestotal.html (all accessed 16.4.2016).
85 D. Waxmann, ‘Living with Terror, not Living in Terror’, p. 9.
86 For an in-depth analysis of Palestinian suicide operations during the Second Intifada, see A. Moghadam,
‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational Aspects’, Studies in
Conflict and Terrorism, vol. 26, no. 2, 2003, pp. 65-92.
87 A. Moghadam, ‘Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motivations and Organizational
Aspects’, p. 65.
88 Israeli Security Service, ‘Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade – Suicide Attacks’, n.d.,
http://www.shabak.gov.il/SiteCollectionImages/english/TerrorInfo/decade/SuicideAttacks.pdf (accessed 16.4.2016).
While Palestinian militant groups such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad were already perpetrating suicide attacks during the years prior to the Intifada, as a means to stifle the peace process, the number and intensity of those attacks greatly increased after September 2000, and they would remain the “primary effective weapon”89 of all Palestinian militant groups, including Fatah,
their fighters being members of the Palestinian security apparatus. Figure 4 shows the frequency of suicide attacks throughout the Second Intifada:
Figure 4: Number of Suicide Attacks perpetrated by Palestinian Militants during the Second
Intifada, 2000 – 2005.90
As a result of the pressure to deal with a deteriorating security situation, Israel’s political life featured several key dynamics during the Intifada: The elections for Prime Minister in 2001 saw a change from a left-wing Labor to a right-wing Likud leadership, even though Ariel Sharon, who replaced Ehud Barak, headed a national unity government until 2003, in which both major parties were included. Dissatisfaction, among others, with Barak’s handling of the outbreak of violence in September 2000, led voters to push for a more security-focused approach, traditionally located with the political right wing. Despite pressure from both the public and politicians alike, however, a large-scale military initiative termed ‘Operation Defensive Shield’ was initiated only in March 2002, after 130 Israelis had been killed in attacks
89 Y. Schweitzer, ‘The Rise and Fall of Suicide Bombings in th e Second Intifada’, Strategic Assessment, vol. 13,
no. 3, October 2010, pp. 39-48, p. 39.
90 Israeli Security Service, ‘Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade – Suicide Attacks’.
4 35 53 26 12 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
during that month alone,91 followed by ‘Operation Determined Path’ in June 2002. Beyond
these military operations, Israel started to build the security fence in June 2002, in order to stop terrorists from the West Bank from carrying out attacks on Israeli territory. The Israeli security establishment claims that, taken together, the above mentioned measures were the primary cause for a decrease in suicide attacks after 2002. Thus, whereas 63% of all suicide attacks (92) occurred up until and including 2002, 2003 only saw 26 attacks and 12 attacks occurred in 2004.92
Despite a general deterioration in the security and economic situation during Sharon’s first tenure, he was reelected in a landslide victory in 2003, heading a coalition between Likud and National Religious, as well as secular parties. In explaining his paradoxical victory, commentators have pointed, among others, to the general public’s agreement with Sharon’s policy course, emphasizing the prominence of security needs, and the subjective attribution of the security and economic problems to factors beyond the Prime Minister’s control.93 It has also
been argued that his reelection was in fact the result of what has been called the ‘Rally round the flag’ syndrome,94 describing a dynamic by which criticism of political incumbents decreases
when external threats are present. More generally, the outcome of both the 2001 and 2003 elections indicate a shift to the political right within the Israeli public, in line with research suggesting that people respond with increased social conservatism during times of threat.95
Moreover, as a result of a prolonged period of attacks, Israeli Jews perceived peace with the Palestinians to be less likely, and support for more aggressive military measures became more prevalent.96
Beyond the military, political, and economic impact, the Second Intifada also affected the social sphere: As Waxmann observes, the sense of victimhood felt by the Jewish Israeli populatio n led to an increased sense of delegitimization of not only the terrorists, but also the constituenc ie s they claimed to represent.97 Thus, surveys conducted in late 2000 found that 68% of Israeli
91 Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Victims of Palestinian Violence and Terrorism since September 2000’,
n.d.,
http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/ foreignpolicy/terroris m/palestinian/pages/victims%20of%20palestinian%20v iolence %20and%20terrorism%20sinc.aspx (accessed 16.04.2016).
92 Israeli Security Service, ‘Analysis of Attacks in the Last Decade – Suicide Attacks’.
93 C.S. Brown, ‘Israel’s 2003 Elections: A victory for the moderate right and the secular center’, The Middle East
Review of International Affairs (MERIA) Journal, vol. 7, no. 1, 2003.
94 A. Pedahzur, Suicide Terrorism, Cambridge, Polity Press, 2005, p. 184.
95 J.T. Jost et al., ‘A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accumulat ed Evidence of Conscious and
Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo’, Political Psychology, vol. 5, no. 6, 2004, pp. 881-917.
9696 D. Waxmann, ‘Living with Terror, not Living in Terror’, p. 15. 97 Ibid., p. 12.
