Brexit and the consequences for the EU’s balance of power : what role does the UK play in the Council of the EU?

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Brexit and the consequences for the EU’s balance of power: What role does the UK play in the Council of the EU?

Lisanne Kielema – 11261382

Master thesis MSc Political Science – International Relations University of Amsterdam

Subject: Master Thesis European Politics & Policy in Times of Crisis Supervisor: Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado

Second reader: Dr. Sebastian Krapohl Date: 22 June 2018

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List of abbreviations AFSJ Area of Freedom, Security and Justice CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy

DK Denmark

EC European Commission

EMPL Employment and social affairs EP European Parliament

EPPO EU Public Prosecutor’s Office

EU European Union

GB Gigabyte

IR Ireland

LIBE Civil liberties, justice and home affairs MFF Multiannual Financial Framework PESCO Permanent Structured Cooperation QMV Qualified Majority Voting

RLAH Roam-Like-At-Home

TTIP Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership

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Acknowledgments

The first person I would like to thank is my supervisor Dr. Rosa Sanchez Salgado who provided me good feedback on all sections of my thesis. I specifically struggled with the structure of the content analysis and finally thanks to feedback by Dr. Sanchez Salgado, I managed to understand how I could best structure the content analysis and therefore my thesis.

Secondly, I would like to thank the interviewees I spoke to. As this thesis is part of the thesis project European Politics and Policy in times of crisis, indicating that the EU currently deals with crisis, I want to thank the interviewees for providing some of their time to me. Their answers helped me to answer the sub-questions and the research question of this thesis.

Thirdly, I want to express gratitude to my fellow students and friends, several of who proofread my thesis and gave me feedback on aspects I was struggling with or how I could improve other sections of my thesis. I also want to mention my parents who encouraged me to work hard and learn from my mistakes.

Without all the people I mentioned, my thesis would not have resulted in the thesis that lies in front of you.

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Abstract

This thesis investigates with which countries and in which policy areas the United Kingdom (UK) plays an influential role in the Council of the European Union. The purpose of this study is to identify UK partner countries to discover which European Union (EU) member states are likely to be negatively influenced by Brexit. Furthermore, an indication of the affected policy areas can indicate in which areas a loss of representation is likely to arise. Through triangulation of a descriptive analysis, content analysis and interviews, the UK mainly influences the Council of the EU through its large size and voting weight. The departure of the UK from the EU means that smaller countries will gain more power in coalitions and can gain the leadership position the UK held, but these alliances are likely to have less influence because larger member states have more power than smaller member states.

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formation of an alliance to counteract the presumable far-reaching implications of the integration of Euro countries (Cats 2018; Peeperkorn 2018; Schmidt 2018). The move was intended to counter the French-German axis, which received new momentum and energy with the election of pro-European French President Macron and the forthcoming Brexit (Cats 2018; Peeperkorn 2018; Schmidt 2018). With the plea, the eight countries declared to France and Germany that the future of the EU will be determined by its 27 member states and not solely by the two most powerful countries of the bloc (Cats 2018; Peeperkorn 2018; Schmidt 2018).

The United Kingdom’s (UK) decision to leave the EU presents a major challenge to the Union. Several authors expect that beyond excluding one of the EU’s largest countries and most significant financial contributors (Macdonald 2017; Chassany, Wagstyl, Robinson & Milne 2016; Oliver 2016, p. 1321-1322), Brexit will transform the EU’s current balance of power (Chryssogelos 2016; Kirsch 2016; Hix, Hagemann & Frantescu 2016, p. 3; Patel & Reh n.d.). The UK, France and Germany regularly hold triumvirate meetings in which high-level initiatives and projects are discussed. That the three members rarely wholly agree facilitates opportunities for smaller states to create coalitions and influence EU decisions (Ham, van. 2016). As Van Ham (2016) contended, the UK departure could ultimately damage EU democracy because France and Germany’s bilateral agreement on a topic will leave little space for other member states to

meaningfully engage in EU policy making. Therefore, Brexit could affect the balance of power in the EU as well as the interest representation of individual member states.

Various authors (Alonso & Kranenburg 2018; Macdonald 2017; Mercik & Ramsey 2017; Chassany et. al. 2016; Ham, van. 2016; Hix et. al. 2016, p. 3; Oliver 2016, p. 1323; Irwin 2015, p. 5) have identified the Netherlands, Ireland, Poland and Nordic countries as countries whose interests have been well represented by the UK and for which Brexit could mean a decrease in representation of their preferences and interests. However, it remains unclear in the literature whether the above-outlined countries will indeed be the most affected by Brexit, which policy

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areas will be affected and therefore to what extent Brexits will challenge the current balance of power in the EU.

The aim of this thesis is to contribute to the ongoing debate on which countries and policy areas will be predominately affected by Brexit and to confirm whether the previously identified countries are indeed likely to be most affected by the UK decision. This thesis focuses in particular on the role of the UK in the Council of the EU, examining which partners the UK has and in which policy areas the UK is most influential.

This topic is urgently socially relevant as Brexit presents a dramatic shift in European affairs, a setback in European integration and possibly a consequence for the influence of certain member states and policy areas. Moreover, understanding which areas and countries will be most affected by Brexit is practically relevant for the governments of the affected countries. As noted, various authors (Alonso & Kranenburg 2018; Macdonald 2017; Mercik & Ramsey 2017;

Chassany et. al. 2016; Hix et. al. 2016, p. 3; Oliver 2016, p. 1323; Irwin 2015, p. 5) have predicted that countries such as the Netherlands, Poland and Nordic countries will lose

significant influence because of Brexit. Nevertheless, the literature has not strongly confirmed this prediction, nor has it clarified in which policy areas these countries will be most affected. This gap in the literature creates compelling academic relevance for this research.

Furthermore, the present work will combine researching affected countries and policy areas in the Council of the EU, which has not been done before. In examining an EU institution where member states are represented rather than EU institutions such as the European

Commission (EC) and the European Parliament (EP), this research can effectively address the influence of a member state on other member states and the functioning of the institutions. Future research could expand on the present work by further examining the influence of the UK on other EU institutions, such as the EC, the EP and the European Council. As it is often argued that the UK, France and Germany determine European affairs (Alonso & Kranenburg 2018; Macdonald 2017; Mercik & Ramsey 2017; Middelaar, van 2017; Chassany et. al. 2016; Hix et. al. 2016, p. 3; Oliver 2016, p. 1323; Irwin 2015, p. 5), it is important to comprehensively consider the implications of the absence of one party.

This thesis attempts to identify which countries and policy areas Brexit will

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thesis posits the following the research question: To what extent does the UK affect the balance of power in the Council of the EU?

This question is further divided into the following sub questions:

- Which countries and policy areas are most important for the UK? - Which factors contribute to coalition building between countries? - How has the presence of the UK affected the bargaining process?

To answer these questions, an analysis is conducted on the position of member states on issues discussed in the Council of the EU. The analysis identifies which countries have similar interests to the UK and in which policy areas these similar interests lie. The analysis consists of a review of the voting results of the Council of the EU a review of articles on EU news websites, and interviews with two EU officials. Defining which countries share similar interests with the UK and on which topics allows a valid prediction of which countries and policy areas will most likely be affected by Brexit.

This thesis is organised in six sections. First, the literature review presents rational choice and constructivist theories on the Council of the EU andincludes an analysis of previous

research on the role of the UK in the Council of the EU. Following the literature review, the theoretical framework justifies the choice of rational choice theory in this thesis. The research design section discusses the methodology employed to answer the research questions. The results of the selected research design are then presented in chapters 5, 6 and 7. Each chapter aims to answer one of the sub-questions. Chapter 5 identifies countries with similar preferences to the UK and in which policy areas these similar interests lie. Chapter 6 uses this information to examine which factors contribute to collaboration by these countries in these policy areas. Chapter 7 then presents an analysis on the role of the UK in the EU’s bargaining process. Finally, chapter 8 provides an answer to the research question and discusses the implications of the results as well as recommendations for future research.

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2. Literature review

This chapter reflects on the theoretical contributions to the topic of rational choice theory, constructivist theory and the role of the UK in the Council of the EU. First, the theoretical framework for viewing the EU is described. Secondly, the existing literature on rational choice and constructivist theories regarding the Council of the EU are explored. Finally, this chapter examines existing theories on the role of the UK in these institutions.

2.1 Theoretical framework for considering the EU

The European Union (EU) can be studied from different perspectives, for example as a political system or as a unique or hybrid institution. This thesis adopts the approach of international relations, which views the EU as an international organisation and utilises theories such as intergovernmentalism and regionalism to study member states and the Council of the EU (Sanchez Salgado 2018). The EU in this view is understood as an organisation of sovereign states that have applied for membership voluntarily. This understanding is aligned with the subject of this thesis, as the focus is on the Council of the EU, an institution in which member states are represented.

2.2 Balance of power theories

The Council of the EU can also be studied according to various perspectives. This section offers a review of previous literature that has used rational choice theory to examine these institutions. Pollack (2006, p. 38) and Mattila (2004, p. 29) argued that most rational choice theory on the Council of the EU revolves around voting behaviour and coalition building, the north-south division, debates on Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) and the increase of unanimous voting. These subjects will be further explored in the upcoming paragraphs, which will also include a section on bargaining.

In their research, Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18) and Bailer, Mattila & Schneider (2015, p. 439) demonstrated that geographically close countries are likely to vote in a similar way because they have corresponding interests. Next to proximity, also size is an important factor. This factor has been highlighted by press.Kirk (2017) has cited Swedish MP Hans Wallmark who has said because of Brexit it would be natural for Sweden to build new alliances with ‘Finland and Denmark, but also the Netherlands and hopefully Germany.’ In addition, Kirk has noted smaller states are currently building alliances to counter the possible recurrence of a strong French-German axis, which can also be found in the alliance created by eight Northern EU

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countries to counter further integration of Euro countries, as noted in the introduction. These observations demonstrate that next to proximity, a large geographical size also supports the creation of coalitions and confirms the previously addressed research.

Tallberg & Johansson (2008, p. 1237) have argued that member states’ governments form blocs based largely on interests, creating different coalitions for different interests. Through the concept of a power block, Sabet (2015, pp. 120-121) further explained that member states unite in blocs that are big enough to overpower opposing member states. Häge (2012, p. 501) similarly contended that several coalitions are formed to block a decision.

Some of the most frequently studied coalition-building theories are the notions of a north-south division and a left-right division. Naurin & Lindahl (2008, p. 25), Naurin (2007, p. 20) and Zimmer, Schneider & Dobbins (2005, p. 418) argued that a strong north-south divide is

pervasive in the EU over issues such as market regulation, protectionism and subsidies. Kaeding & Selck (2005, p. 275) found that a ‘north vs. south’ mentality dominates over a Franco-German axis. The north-south division has been present for decades. However, since the 2004

enlargement of the EU, an eastern cleavage has been added to the division, creating a north-south-east division (Mattila 2009, p. 855). This notion is affirmed by the research of Hosli, Mattila & Uriot (2011, p. 1266), who ascertained significant differences in voting behaviour between states which have been EU members for a significant period and states which gained membership in 2004. These new member states are less likely to vote ‘no’ than their older counterparts. However, Hosli et. al. (2011, p. 1266) expected this difference to disappear in the future, as new member states ‘adjust to the prevailing culture of Council decision-making.’ Plechanovová (2010, pp. 102-103) contested this additional added division, arguing that although states more publicly oppose a vote, ‘the general coalition-building patterns remain similar’ (Plechanovová 2010, p. 87).

Left-right differences also often appear in the literature. Aspinwall (2016, p. 112), Hagemann (2008) and Hagemann & Hoyland (2008, p. 1217) found that governments create coalitions based on ideological preferences rather than national preferences. However, Tallberg & Johansson (2008, pp. 1229-1230) demonstrated that most coalitions are based on specific topics, indicating that national interests prevail. This lack of clarity in the literature on voting behaviour by left- and right-wing governments is extensive. For example, Hosli et. al. (2011, pp.

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1266-1267) presented evidence that leftist governments oppose more Council majorities. Meanwhile, Mattila (2004, p. 46) found that right-wing governments oppose more decisions.

Qualified majority voting (QMV), which is used in the Council of the EU, is an additional topic that is often studied in rational choice theory. QMV requires 74% of member states' weighted votes, cast by a majority of member states that represent 62% of the EU's total population (European Parliament 2014, p. 1). Sabet (2015, pp. 120-121), Häge (2012, p. 481), Plechanovová (2010), Mattila (2009) and Mattila & Lane (2001) have argued that unanimous decisions are still the norm instead of QMV. According to Sabet (2015, pp. 120-121), many authors expected the EU enlargement to result in a change in unanimous voting as the norm because negotiating became harder; however, the preference has not changed. Nevertheless, in the absence of consensus, Mattila & Lane (2001, p. 40; p. 43) contended that it is more likely that one country will oppose a majority instead of three or four member states. Bailer (2010, p. 747) and Naurin & Lindahl (2008, p. 47) revealed that larger member states have more extensive communication links with other Council members than smaller states.

The extent to which QMV influences the use of bargaining remains unclear. Golub (2012, p. 1311) and Arregui & Thomson (2009, pp. 671-672) argued that member states bargain differently; thus, little can be said about the procedure. In contrast, Naurin (2009, pp. 46-47) suggested that decisions in which QMV is utilised are more prone to bargaining than unanimous decisions. Tallberg & Johansson (2008, pp. 1229-1230) argued states bargain by forming

coalitions with countries that share the same interests, which can differ by policy area. A divide between rationalism and constructivism is apparent in bargaining strategies. According to Dür & Mateo (2010, p. 682), several bargaining distinctions can be made,

including distributive versus integrative bargaining (common interests versus private interests) and bargaining versus problem solving (striving for interest preservation versus trying to find a common ground; rationalism versus constructivism). Dür & Mateo (2010, pp. 682-683)

differentiated between soft (constructivism) versus hard (rationalism) bargaining. They argued that soft bargaining uses proposals, accommodations and promises (signalling flexibility, making a conciliatory statement, praising the other side, seeking partners for compromise and making a proposal for compromise), while hard bargaining is expressed through retractions, commitments and threats (taking an explicit stance at the beginning of the negotiations, making a commitment not to compromise, criticising the other side, forming a defensive coalition and issuing a threat).

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They defined soft bargaining as ‘the use of friendly tactics’ and hard bargaining as ‘the reliance on conflictual or aggressive tactics.’

Dür & Mateo (2010, pp. 683-687) defined three bargaining strategies that countries can employ: power resources, preferences and culture. A state’s power resource revolves around material capabilities; therefore, large countries are better at using this strategy (Dür & Mateo 2010, pp. 683-685; Tallberg 2008, pp. 687-693). Dür & Mateo further stated that a preference that is considered important will more likely result in the use of hard bargaining than a

preference that is less important, which would result in soft bargaining. Furthermore, culture can influence the bargaining process, as some cultures find hard bargaining to be inappropriate.

Tallberg (2008, pp. 688-702) noted two additional sources of power beyond a state’s source of power: institutional and individual. Institutional power sources include access to a veto, which gives each state a possibility to block consensus and strengthens their bargaining options, and the rotating Presidency, which empowers the country that holds the Presidency. Meanwhile, individual power emphasises personal authority: whether someone has a personality, how personal preferences can influence bargaining, and expertise: whether heads of state possess enough information or more information than a different member state.

2.3 Constructivist theories

Less literature has viewed the Council of the EU from a constructivist perspective. This is arguably chiefly due to corresponding results on this view. Hagemann, Hobolt & Wratil (2017, p. 855), Novak (2013, p. 1091), Hagemann (2007, p. 282), Hayes-Renshaw (2006, p. 161), Aken, van & Wallace (2006, p. 178), Heisenberg (2005, p. 66), Mattila (2004, p. 844), Neyer (2004, p. 26), Lewis (2003, p. 121) and Aspinwall & Schneider (2000, p. 26) have argued that the EU (including the Council of the EU) is still dominated by a culture of consensus. They have affirmed that consensus is the norm and voting (or QMV) rarely occurs. This notion contradicts rational choice literature on the importance of voting power and coalition building. Only Bailer et. al. (2015, p. 448) have suggested that the culture of consensus merely pertains in certain contexts. They argued when member states experience increased economic development, they are more likely to oppose EU legislation. This is because rich member states want to protect their economy and to demonstrate to domestic voters that they tried to defend their interests by voting ‘no’ or abstaining from voting (Bailer et. al. 2015, p. 448).

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Regarding norms, Mattila (2004, p. 844) found that new member states have been quick to internalise the ‘prevailing EU norms’ and the ‘culture of consensus’. Lewis (2003, p. 121) similarly discovered evidence of informal norms that ensure member states cooperate instead of solely strive for their own interests. Lewis argued for the notion of the underlying normative environment rooted in the EU’s culture of consensus (2003, p. 121).

The previously addressed research by Aspinwall (2016, p. 112), Hagemann (2008) and Hagemann & Hoyland (2008, p. 1217) on ideology can also be understood to support the constructivist perspective. The authors stated that governments bond over ideology, which indicates that identity and ideology are large influences within the Council of the EU. According to this perspective, the UK’s position in the Council of the EU on which government is in place in the UK.

Warntjen (2010, p. 675) and Mattila (2004, p. 841) proposed that both rational choice theory and constructivism can be applied to study the Council of the European Union because interpretation depends on the perspective and level of the analysis. In short, they are

complementary. Nevertheless, this thesis employs rational choice theory rather than constructivist theory. The justification for this choice is detailed in chapter 3. 2.4 Theories on the role of the UK in the Council of the EU

This section examines established theories on the role of the UK in the Council of the EU. For example, Mattila & Lane (2001) demonstrated that the UK and Germany almost never vote together against a Council proposal. Furthermore, Mattila (2004, p. 845) and Mattila & Lane (2001, p. 43) found that the UK, Sweden, Germany and Italy are among the countries who most often vote ‘no’ in the Council of the EU. Hagemann (2016, p. 3), Hix et. al. (2016, p. 3) and Felsenthal & Machover (1997, p. 37) also affirmed that the UK opposes the most Council majorities of all member states.

Hagemann et. al. (2017, p. 855) and Hagemann (2016, p. 3) contended that the UK opposes many votes because a large part of the UK public is sceptical towards the EU. A vote against a proposal sends a signal to the government’s domestic audience. Hagemann (2016, p. 3) concluded that governments oppose more proposals that possibly override EU authority if their domestic audience is Eurosceptic. The UK, for example, opposes many proposals because they expect this will satisfy their audience. ‘Rather than interpreting the occasional British No vote in the Council as a sign that Britain is on the ‘losing side’ in Brussels, it is more likely that British

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governments are simply more motivated to oppose EU legislation in order to appeal to their more Eurosceptic domestic constituents’ (Hagemann 2016, p. 3). As the UK most often opposes votes on policies such as budget, foreign policy and foreign aid issues, such topics will likely be affected by Brexit (Hix et. al. 2016, p. 3).

Oliver (2016, p. 1323) suggested that the UK’s behaviour in the Council of the EU gave other EU citizens the idea shortly before Brexit that the UK had become a problem in the EU. Lewis (2003, p. 166) clarified that this negative view has existed long before Brexit with EU citizens and other EU country officials due to the UK’s ‘selective willingness (…) to play according to the informal norms of EU decision making’.

Additionally, Oliver (2016, p. 1323) has argued that an EU without the UK possibly loses a transatlantic-orientated state, which includes the view that trade is important. An interesting example of this dynamic is the promotion of free trade, which several authors have addressed. This area is important for Ireland and Denmark, as mentioned by the Irish and Danish

representatives in chapter 5.3. In their articles found through the content analysis, Grant (2018) and Kirk (2017) have named several reasons why the UK’s departure would change the EU’s position on trade. Grant (2018) writes countries such as ‘Sweden, the Netherlands, Denmark, Ireland, Portugal, Italy, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and possibly Spain’ are not comfortable with the tough stance of France, Germany and the EC towards the UK. The ten countries have mentioned that UK trade with the EU is substantial. Kirk (2017) has cited Swedish MP

Wallmark, who has addressed the ‘common values the countries have’ (i.e., Sweden and the UK) and has posited that UK-Nordic cooperation will grow as a result of Brexit. Wallmark has stated ‘We have balanced the UK against Germany, and we have been in the middle. With the UK out of the EU, we suddenly risk looking like the “extremists” on issues like being pro-market economy, pro-free trade - the kind of things that the UK has promoted’. Kirk (2017) has also cited Andre Postema, a deputy who represents Labour in the Dutch senate and is currently president of the Benelux parliament. Postema has said, ‘There was always a balance of power between France and Germany, and Great Britain, which had a more transatlantic view. Now that they are leaving, we will be missing a partner in that because that's also the case for the

Netherlands and for many Nordic countries - of course we are Europe-oriented, but we are also Atlantic-oriented. With Brexit we lose a powerful partner … that's a reason to join hands

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referred to is Estonia's Deputy Minister for EU Affairs, Matti Maasikas, who has noted, ‘The UK has been standing up very firmly for strengthening free trade and the internal market. Estonia and the Nordic countries have been and remain very strong proponents of free trade and there has been coordination among the like-minded group.’

Many authors have argued that the EU’s balance of power will change due to Brexit. Kirsch (2016, p. 2) and Kóczy (2016, pp. 5-6) predicted that after Brexit, the distribution of power in the Council of the EU will favour larger countries, whose voting power will increase, while the power of smaller countries will decrease. For example, Oliver (2016, pp. 1323-1324) and Irwin (2015, p. 5; p. 6; p. 15) have proposed that Brexit will offer France the opportunity to make the EU more like France’s model and could increase the already dominant position of Germany. However, Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18) argued the opposite, predicting that small countries will gain more power and large countries less. Göllner (2018, p. 3) similarly suggested that Visegrád countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) in particular will see their voting power increase after Brexit.

Regarding vulnerabilities, Irwin (2015, p. 5) concluded that although ‘Brexit will be a loss to all member states’, the Netherlands, Ireland and Cyprus will be most exposed after Brexit, because they have strong UK links on trade, investment and finance. The UK, the Netherlands, Ireland, and Nordic countries are all very economically liberal states and Irwin anticipates the representation of this interest will change (2015, p. 5). Oliver (2016, p. 1323) similarly concluded that Ireland, the Netherlands and Sweden should expect a transition in the EU’s balance of power towards ‘a less economically liberal, outward looking and Atlanticist union’. Heath (2016a) has written in a newsletter that several countries want a Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) deal, including Ireland and the UK.

Hix et. al. (2016, p. 3) also posited that the Netherlands and Nordic countries are the closest UK allies in the Council of the EU and therefore will be most affected by Brexit. Articles found in the content analysis add to predictions for most affected countries: In a newsletter, Heath (2016b) discussed a new report that found that Ireland is one of the countries which will ‘face the biggest impact of Brexit’. Zalan (2016) contended that Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands often supported the UK in the Council of the EU, and these countries will lose an important partner.

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The diversity in opinions on the countries and policy areas to be affected by Brexit is likely a result of the limited research that exists on Brexit. The secrecy of the Council of the EU, for example, (Banks 2017; Hübner 2017; O’Sullivan 2016), inhibits researchers from

determining how countries vote in each policy area. The current predictions can therefore be considered more as opinions.

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3. Theoretical framework

This theoretical framework outlines the concepts of rational choice theory and constructivist theory and explains why rational choice theory is the most suitable theory for use in this thesis.

As proposed in the introduction, the research question posed in this study is the following: To what extent does the UK affect the balance of power in the Council of the EU?

The sub questions that are further examined are the following:

- Which countries and policy areas are most important for the UK? - Which factors contribute to coalition building between countries? - How has the presence of the UK affected the bargaining process?

These sub-questions are founded upon rational choice concepts, such as coalition building and bargaining. As such, rational choice theory is introduced first in this section. Constructivism is subsequently introduced and compared to rational choice theory. Finally, the theoretical framework justifies this study’s expectations for the answers to the research questions at hand. 3.1 Rational choice theory

Rational choice theory argues that individual actors, such as states, should be understood as utility maximisers and aspects of social being should be ignored (Kurki & Wight 2016, p. 22; Pollack 2006, p. 32). According to rational choice theory, actors are goal-driven and have pre-determined preferences (Warntjen 2010, p. 667; Pollack 2006, p. 32). They strive to maximise their interests and to make outcomes fit their interests as much as possible (Zhelyazkova & Torenvlied 2009, p. 37). Rational choice theory suggests that states are motivated to ensure that results correspond to their interests. Because consensus is preferred in the Council of the EU, each state has significant power to accord outcomes to their wishes. Furthermore, according to the concept of balance of power, under which one state is not strong enough to dominate all others, the Council of the EU’s preference for consensus over voting means that no country or group of countries can dominate, as all have to agree. This balance could lead to one country setting exceptionally high standards. Various researchers (Hix et. al. 2016, p. 3; Mattila 2004, p. 845; Mattila & Lane 2001, p. 43; Felsenthal & Machover 1997, p. 37) have found that the UK was one of the EU members that most often voted ‘no’. The UK in this way demonstrates the behaviour of a rational actor.

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3.2 Constructivist theory

Constructivist theory focuses on norm-guided behaviour and deliberation, which is particularly relevant to the EU’s ‘culture of consensus’ (Finke 2017, p. 340; Gruisen, van.

Vangerven & Crombez 2017, p. 10; Warntjen 2010, p. 666; Heisenberg 2005, p. 68; Neyer 2004, p. 26). Constructivism studies objects as social constructions. Through social construction, objects receive a meaning and become associated with certain social values, norms and

assumptions (Fierke 2016, pp. 162-163). While rationalists think that the interests of states are pre-determined, constructivists argue that state interests evolve and adapt, such as when citizens elect a new leader. Notable examples include French President Macron, who provided an impulse to EU affairs through his pro-European campaign (Erlanger 2017; Corre, Le 2017; Rothwell, 2017) and Sorbonne-speech (Briançon 2017; Chrisafis & Rankin 2017; McAuley 2017) and Austrian Chancellor Kurz, who has a tougher view on migration than his predecessor (Atkins 2017; Barkin 2017; Grabbe 2017; Schultheis 2017). These shifts in interests influence state negotiations.

3.3 Rational choice theory vs. constructivist theory

In many ways constructivism can be viewed as the opposite of rationalism (Fierke 2016, p. 163; Barnett 2014, p. 157). Adopting a rationalist theoretical framework enables the analysis of national interests, preferences and bargaining. In contrast, a constructivist framework

emphasises consensus, which does not address the targeted research questions in this study. As this thesis focusses on state preferences and bargaining and joins a body of literature that predominately addresses the shift in the EU’s balance of power and changes in voting power, rationalism is the most suitable theoretical framework.

3.4 Expectations

As most research in the field illustrates (Hix et. al. 2016, p. 3; Oliver 2016, p. 1323; Irwin 2015, p. 5), the countries closest to the UK are likely to be most affected by Brexit in the Council of the EU. Many studies have specifically identified the Netherlands, Denmark, Sweden and Ireland as likely to be most affected. Therefore, this research expects these countries to most frequently oppose a Council of the EU majority along with the UK. Beyond effects on countries, there is limited established research on which policy areas will be most affected by Brexit. Hix et. al. (2016) proposed that budget, foreign policy and foreign aid issues will be most affected. Meanwhile, Oliver (2016, p. 1323) predicted a shift toward ‘a less economically liberal, outward

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looking and Atlanticist union’ among several EU member states. As a result, this research does not have a clear expectation on which policy areas will be most affected. Regarding coalition building, this thesis expects proximity and interests to be the most important determining factors to build coalitions. Moreover, this study expects the UK to use hard bargaining more often than soft bargaining, as the UK has demonstrated a tendency to oppose consensus.

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4. Research design

This section details the manner in which this research is conducted. The chapter first discusses research methodology and subsequently explains the employed methods in this thesis:

descriptive analysis, content analysis and interviews. 4.1 Methodology

This thesis employs quantitative and qualitative research. The research adopts an embedded single-case design (Grünbaum 2007, p. 86; Yin 2003). This design uses one context and several cases (Yin 2003). This approach is aligned with this thesis, as the Council of the EU is studied with different methods.

Three types of methods are used to analyse the role of the UK in the Council of the EU: descriptive analysis, content analysis and interviews. The descriptive analysis serves as an effective filter for the content analysis. That is, the content analysis uses a case selection with only countries and policy areas that the descriptive analysis indicates are most likely to be affected by Brexit. The result is a focus on extreme/deviant cases (Grünbaum 2007, p. 86; Yin 2003), as only the most affected countries and areas are studied further. To examine the policy areas that will be most influenced, deductive categories are created from the policy areas that are established by the Council of the EU.

Using both descriptive analysis and content analysis counters the limits of each analysis, as explained in chapter 4.3, and allows for the generalisation of results. This study employs triangulation by interviewing one person from each affected country, and pairing interviews with data from the descriptive analysis and content analysis (Bryman 2012, p. 392). Triangulation allows for the effective understanding of how and to what extent Brexit will influence each country and how the UK departure will affect the Council of the EU.

4.2 Descriptive analysis

The descriptive analysis examined votes in the Council of the EU registered by

VoteWatch (VoteWatch.eu). Voting behaviour in each policy area was analysed and documented in an Excel sheet. The data was limited to the period 2015-2018 to limit the number of

documents to be studied and to ensure up-to-date information.

The descriptive analysis indicates which countries and areas will be most affected by Brexit. In the analysis, no distinction is made between an abstention and a ‘no’ vote, as an abstention and a ‘no’ vote both indicate opposition to a consensus decision. Treating an

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abstention and a ‘no’ vote as the same also simplified the analysis process. Abstentions or ‘no’ votes were coded with a ‘1’, which provides a clear view of which countries most regularly vote together with the UK and in which areas they do so.

Furthermore, the descriptive analysis analysed policy areas in order to investigate in which areas the UK most frequently opposes a vote in the EU, and with which countries. In this case only documents where the UK and one or more other countries abstain or vote ‘no’ were coded. Votes in which other countries (not the UK) abstain or vote ‘no’ were not included because the focus is on the role of the UK. As all reported votes are of countries who opposed together with the UK, the UK is not featured in the list of member states.

The Excel sheet registers the policy area, name of the country and the date of the vote. Figure 1 offers a screenshot of the Excel document. The stacked tables are subsequently addressed in chapter 5 of this thesis.

Figure 1: Excel sheet of VoteWatch results

The goal of the descriptive analysis is to reduce data (Bryman 2012, p. 13) to discover which countries most often collaborate with the UK and in which policy areas. The result of this analysis subsequently informs the content analysis.

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4.3 Content analysis

After defining which countries and areas will be most affected by Brexit, EU news websites were monitored to find articles on these countries and policy areas. The content of these articles was then analysed to ascertain whether the reports confirm the observed data of the descriptive analysis.

For each country, this research analysed three EU news websites to produce a good spread of data: EUobserver.com, EurActiv.com and Politico.eu. The three websites focus on EU affairs and are among the largest EU news websites. The most affected countries and areas were used as search terms to locate articles that provided more information about abstentions, ‘no’ votes and agreements. Each selected article was analysed for topics of agreement/disagreement, involved countries and the specific agreements/disagreements and their justifications. This analysis was limited to the period 2016-2018 to reduce the scope of study and ensure that the data is not outdated.

The search terms generated multiple articles that were not relevant for the analysis of this thesis. Each article was therefore individually reviewed to determine relevance. After all articles were reviewed, the recurring themes were analysed. Further information was then researched to provide a comprehensive analysis of the themes and links to the descriptive analysis.

Combining content analysis and descriptive analysis addresses a limit of content analysis: researcher interpretation of the data (Bryman 2012, p. 306). Because the descriptive analysis filtered which countries and areas will be most affected, the content analysis serves as a check to confirm whether this conception is also reflected on EU news websites. In this way the

interpretation of the researcher is controlled. Furthermore, as both types of research entail longitudinal analysis (Bryman 2012, p. 304), combining them allows the long process of decision-making to be reviewed twice, which contributes to the reliability of this thesis. 4.4 Interviews

Based on the combined results of the descriptive analysis and content analysis, interviews were conducted with the Permanent Representation to the EU of the countries that would be most affected by Brexit. The number of interviews was based on the number of countries predicted to be most affected by the UK departure. As the VoteWatch analysis identified Ireland and

Denmark as likely to be the most affected countries (see chapter 5), two interviews were conducted. An interview with a UK representative was not possible, as referenced in Figure 2.

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Figure 2. E-mail to Permanent Representation of the United Kingdom to the EU on denied access

The selection of interviewees was done by a press officer of the EU department of each country. The researcher send an email to the Brussels’ departments of the countries asking for an

interview. After several attempts, the request was accepted and the press officers contacted an EU official to conduct an interview with. The interviews were conducted over the phone and recorded. The questions were based on the themes that are entrenched in the research question and sub-questions: affected countries and areas, factors for cooperation (culture, interests, proximity, ideology) and the use of bargaining strategies and techniques.

The interviews were semi-structured in order to leave space for flexibility for the interviewer and the interviewee to address subjects that are significant for each interviewee (Bryman 2012, p. 212). Both interviewees do not want their names to be featured in this thesis. Therefore, they are referred to as ‘representative’, ‘official’, or ‘interviewee’.

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5. Important countries and policy areas for the UK

In the forthcoming three chapters, the three forms of research conducted for this thesis are connected and compared to understand which countries and policy areas are most important to the UK, which factors contribute to these determinations, and the role of the UK in the EU’s bargaining process. The three chapters each address one of the sub questions posed in this study. By combining the results of the VoteWatch analysis, content analysis and interviews, this

research establishes a comprehensive analysis of the countries, policy areas, factors and bargaining process that characterise the UK’s influence in the Council of the EU.

This chapter examines which countries share interests with the UK and in which policy areas the shared interests lie. This provides a clear picture of which countries have the closest preferences to the UK, and in which areas. Chapters six and seven subsequently delve deeper into the reasons for cooperation and the evolution of the cooperation process. The results of chapter five offer an answer to sub-question 1: Which countries and policy areas are most important for the UK?

First, the countries with similar opposing votes to the UK will be studied. This chapter then recognises the specific areas of cooperation. Finally, a conclusion to sub-question 1 is formed.

5.1 Collaboration with the UK in the Council of the EU

To examine the relationship of the countries with similar preferences to the UK, the VoteWatch analysis identifies which countries most often oppose a vote together with the UK. An opposing vote with the UK presumably indicates a coalition with the UK and thus a positive relationship.

According to research carried out by Hosli et. al. (2011, p. 1266), the voting behaviour between states admitted to the EU in 2004 and older member states is significantly different. New member states, for example, are less likely to vote ‘no’ than established member states. Mattila & Lane (2001 p. 40; p. 43) found that when no consensus can be reached, it is more likely that one country will oppose a majority instead of three or four. They also demonstrated that the UK and Germany almost never vote together against a Council proposal.

Research by Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18), Irwin (2015, p. 5) and Hix et. al. (2016, p. 3) proposed that Brexit will significantly affect the Netherlands. Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18) and Irwin (2015, p. 5) also named Ireland as a country that can expect dramatic changes as a

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consequence of Brexit. In addition, Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18) and Hix et. al. (2016, p. 3) predicted that Brexit will significantly affect Denmark. Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18) also named Poland.

The prediction of countries that are likely to be most affected can be confirmed or rejected based on the results of the VoteWatch analysis and the content analysis. The results of the VoteWatch analysis are featured in Table 2.

Table 2. Number of times a country opposed a Council vote together with the UK per policy area

Table 2 depicts seven policy areas in which countries opposed a vote in the Council of the EU together with the UK. Although all 22 policy areas were analysed, only seven areas revealed an opposing vote of the UK and one or more other countries. Several other policy areas were associated with opposing blocs, but these cases did not include the UK and are therefore not featured in the table. Fourteen countries are included in the table. The remaining thirteen countries do not have a registered vote together with the UK in the database of VoteWatch.

Table 2 demonstrates that the UK most often opposed a vote together with Ireland (17) and Denmark (16). These votes were predominantly in the area of civil liberties, justice and

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home affairs (LIBE). The Netherlands voted together with the UK five times. The difference between the voting records of these three countries is that the Netherlands collaborated with the UK in more policy areas than Ireland and Denmark. Austria and Poland joined forces with the UK four and three times respectively, while Belgium and Italy voted together with the UK two times. The Czech Republic, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Portugal, Sweden and Slovenia

collaborated with the UK once.

The support of other member states in opposing a vote together with the UK raises the question how often the UK opposes a vote in general. As noted in the literature review,

Hagemann (2016, p. 3), Hix et. al. (2016, p. 3) and Felsenthal & Machover (1997, p. 37) argued of all member states, the UK opposes most Council majorities. The Irish and Danish

representative contest this vision and argue the UK does not often oppose a Council decision. The Irish official states this is true for all member states. He states in company of the UK, Ireland opposed a Council decision less than half the time of all opposing votes (Permanent

Representation of Ireland to the EU 2018, interview, 25 May). The Danish representative could not answer how often Denmark has opposed a decision with the UK but does argue the UK is very rarely in opposition to measures. ‘Of all member states, they are one of the least frequent member states to be opposing something’ (Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU 2018, interview, 29 May). This rejects research by Hagemann (2016, p. 3), Hix et. al. (2016, p. 3) and Felsenthal & Machover (1997, p. 37) who argue the UK opposes Council majorities most often.

In summary, the UK most often opposed a vote together with Denmark and Ireland. The Netherlands, Austria and Poland also regularly opposed votes along with the UK. This finding for Ireland was confirmed by the Irish interviewee, who emphasised that the UK is Ireland’s closest ally (Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU 2018, interview, 25 May). UK-Denmark cooperation was also affirmed by the Danish representative, who stressed that ‘it is no secret that we are a close partner of the UK. We entered the EU together in 1973 and you can say Denmark joined the EU because the UK joined’ (Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU 2018, interview, 29 May). The proximity of both Denmark and Ireland is a possible reason for cooperation. This notion is further discussed in chapter 6.

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5.2 Areas of cooperation

The analysis of policy areas is subsequently limited to the countries indicated through voting behaviour. No previous literature has drawn conclusions on which policy areas Ireland, Denmark and the UK collaborate. Irwin (2015, p. 5) discussed UK-Ireland cooperation broadly, arguing that Ireland will be one of the most exposed countries by Brexit because they have ‘strong UK links on trade, investment and finance.’ Oliver (2016, p. 1323) stated that Ireland expects the EU to become ‘a less economically liberal, outward looking and Atlanticist union’. This indicates that trade is an important area for the UK and Ireland, which was confirmed by the Irish and Danish representatives, who argued that other member states are comparatively less interested in (the promotion of free) trade (Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU 2018, interview, 25 May; Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU 2018, interview, 29 May).

The VoteWatch analysis and the interviews shed light on which policy areas Ireland, Denmark and the UK work together. Although the Irish and Danish interviewees both stated that all policy areas are important to their country (Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU 2018, interview, 25 May; Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU 2018, interview, 29 May), the analysis below reveals two specific areas that are more important to Denmark, Ireland and the UK than to other countries.

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Table 3: Number of opposition votes per policy area by countries that voted together with the UK

As Table 3 depicts, the policy area in which the UK has most often received support from other member states is civil liberties, justice and home affairs (LIBE). Legal affairs gathered seven additional opposing votes, while budget and agriculture gathered five and four

respectively. Economic affairs, employment and social affairs (EMPL) and transport and tourism respectively correspond to three, two and one joining opposing votes.

The area with most UK-supporting votes from other states, LIBE, is also the area in which Denmark and Ireland most often registered a vote together with the UK. In this area, the three countries most frequently joined forces on issues such as the rights of third-country

nationals (such as Ukraine and Georgia), decisions to combat terrorism, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) and Schengen (of which only Denmark is a member). The area of legal affairs also included an opposing vote on Schengen. In budget, the UK opposed drafts and regulations of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the general budget. MFF and the budget are issues that the Danish interviewee also highlighted as important shared areas

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opposing Danish vote. Meanwhile, on agriculture, the UK opposed an aid scheme for the supply of fruit, vegetables and milk in educational establishments and the Animal Health Law. The Irish interviewee noted agriculture as an important area for his country, although this finding is not present in the VoteWatch analysis (Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU 2018, interview, 25 May). In employment and social affairs (EMPL), the UK opposed a vote that would empower the protection of workers and their free movement. Furthermore, economic and monetary affairs saw an opposing vote for European Statistics and a railway safety proposal was opposed in transport and tourism. In addition to MFF, budget issues and agriculture, the Irish interviewee also emphasised fishing, migration and institutional issues as important interests for Ireland and the UK (Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU 2018, interview, 25 May). The Danish representative similarly stressed that institutional issues are important for Denmark (Permanent Representation of Denmark to the EU 2018, interview, 29 May).

The emphasis of the interviewees on institutional issues is closely linked to the policy area of civil liberties, justice and home affairs, in which both Ireland and Denmark share multiple opposing votes with the UK. As noted, this policy area addresses issues such as free movement of people and proposals on Schengen and Frontex, which can be categorised as institutional issues. Moreover, the employment and social affairs policy area registered a vote on protection of workers and their free movement, which can also be classified as an institutional issue. Thus, the areas LIBE and EMPL can be studied together to understand on which

institutional issues Denmark, Ireland and the UK cooperate, whether such collaboration is confirmed by the VoteWatch analysis and which factors contribute to cooperation between these three member states. These concepts are discussed in chapter 6.

Table 3 shows the area of legal affairs also gathered a significant number of joined votes, of which one presented an opposing vote on Schengen. This suggests this area can also be studied together with LIBE and EMPL. Despite this, legal affairs will not be studied further because this issue could be very complicated as it involves EU legislation and time limits the scope of the analysis.

The Irish and Danish officials agree the previously addressed areas will be affected by Brexit because dynamics between member states will change. The Danish representative states the UK has always been budget sceptic and their departure will shift the balance on this issue. ‘This means other countries that have a restricted approach to budget issues have to carry this

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issue more by themselves.’ The importance of the UK on budget is illustrated in Table 3, where five UK supporting votes by four member states are registered. The Irish official also argues the addressed areas will be ‘hugely’ affected:

‘I think particularly in the area of promotion and protection of free trade. The UK has been on the forefront of that. Also, they are a big member state. In the group of like-minded countries on free trade, we lose our largest member. This makes it more difficult for these groups to block measures we are opposed to’ (Permanent Representation of Ireland to the EU 2018, interview, 25 May).

5.3 Conclusion

This section has sought to determine which countries have similar interests to the UK and in which policy areas these shared interests lie. Hosli et. al. (2011, p. 1266) argued that voting behaviour between new and older member states differs as new member states vote ‘no’ less often than their older counterparts. Table 2 indeed demonstrates that more (older) Western European countries voted together with the UK than (newer) Eastern European member states. They also opposed more votes. Based on the information presented in Table 2, the findings of Hosli et. al. (2011, p. 1266) can be partially confirmed, as the VoteWatch analysis only addresses votes together with the UK.

Mattila & Lane (2001, p. 40; p. 43) presented research on the number of countries that oppose a consensus in the EU. They found that it is more likely that one country will oppose a majority instead of three or four. This claim is also partially tested by this research as only a small portion of Council votes were registered. On budget affairs, the UK often opposed a vote independently. However, as Table 2 indicates, VoteWatch registered 56 votes in which more than two countries opposed a vote. Nevertheless, as their definition of ‘likely’ is unclear, Mattila and Lane’s research cannot be confirmed nor rejected by this thesis.

Mattila & Lane (2001, p. 40; p. 43) further argued that the UK and Germany do not vote together. Germany is not featured in Table 2 because they do not share an opposing vote with the UK; thus, this thesis can confirm this finding.

Various authors (Göllner 2018, p. 3; Hix et. al. 2016, p. 3; Oliver 2016, p. 1323; Irwin 2015, p. 5) have identified the Netherlands, Ireland, Denmark and Poland as countries that Brexit

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will most likely affect. The VoteWatch analysis indeed reveals that Ireland and Denmark most often join forces with the UK. The Netherlands votes significantly less often with the UK, but notably collaborates with the UK in multiple policy areas. Further, representatives of both Denmark and Ireland stated in the interviews that the UK is an important partner for them. As such, Ireland and Denmark can be confirmed as countries for which the UK is an important partner in the Council of the EU and which will likely be affected by Brexit. Three previous researchers have predicted the Netherlands as the most affected country and two authors named Ireland and Denmark as countries to be significantly affected. The VoteWatch analysis in this chapter reveals that Ireland and Denmark rely more on the UK in the Council of the EU than the Netherlands.

Countries that are not confirmed by the research in this chapter are Poland and Sweden. Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18) identified Poland as a country which will also be significantly affected by Brexit. As this chapter revealed that Poland only joined forces with the UK three times on three policy issues, it is not likely that Poland will face severe consequences of Brexit. In addition, since this research only identified one Swedish-UK vote, it is unlikely that Brexit will seriously affect Sweden in the Council of the EU.

As depicted in Table 3, a jointly opposing vote with the UK and another member state most often appeared in the area civil liberties, justice and home affairs (LIBE). This shared opposing vote occurred most frequently with Denmark and Ireland. Meanwhile, the area employment and social affairs (EMPL) included one opposing vote on an issue similar to those registered in LIBE. These issues can be collectively categorised as institutional issues, which the Danish and Irish interviewee emphasised are important topics for their countries. Therefore, LIBE and EMPL are used as search terms in the content analysis combined with Ireland and Denmark as countries.

This chapter addressed the following the sub-question Which countries and policy areas are most important for the UK? The results revealed that Ireland and Denmark most often cooperated with the UK and thus their preferences are closer to the UK than any other member states. Ireland-Denmark-UK cooperation mainly occurs in the policy areas LIBE and EMPL.

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6. Factors for cooperation: Why do Ireland, Denmark and the UK cooperate in LIBE and EMPL?

The previous chapter designated which countries share interests with the UK and in which areas this has been the case. The findings have raised several questions about why these countries and areas can be linked to the UK’s interests and which factors contribute to this collaboration. Therefore, this section will provide a narrower and more in-depth analysis of the reasons why Ireland, Denmark and the UK have worked together, and this examination will explain how cooperation has developed and how the UK has influenced this process. By

knowing the details of this collaboration, an answer can be provided in response to sub-question 2: Which factors contribute to coalition-building between countries?

This chapter is divided in two sections. First, the reasons for cooperation between these countries regarding civil liberties, justice and home affairs (LIBE) will be examined. Second, the reasons for this cooperation regarding employment and social affairs (EMPL) will be studied. The final section will conclude with the findings and answer sub-question 2.

6.1 Civil liberties, justice and home affairs (LIBE)

Chapter 5 showed LIBE issues received most opposing votes by the UK and other member states. Civil liberties, justice and home affairs addresses issues such as the free movement of people and proposals on Schengen and Frontex. Each of these matters can be categorised as institutional issues, which the Irish and Danish interviewees characterised as important for their countries. This section will examine whether these issues are also present in the articles found through the content analysis and which factors can be ascribed to cooperation on these issues. One factor for collaboration in the area of LIBE has been found: corresponding interests.

6.1.1 Corresponding interests

In LIBE, corresponding interests have been found as coinciding factor for cooperation between Ireland, Denmark and the UK on several issues. As previously noted, Mercik & Ramsey (2017, p. 18) and Bailer, Mattila & Schneider (2015, p. 439) have argued that countries with similar interests often work together. For example, several articles analysed for the content analysis show that the UK and Ireland have corresponding wishes in tax affairs. Eriksson (2016) has written that Ireland is a tax haven and together with the UK, opposes EU practices to tackle

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tax evasion. Gotev (2017c) has published an article on the UK and Ireland, which both oppose the creation of a blacklist featuring tax havens. Eriksson (2016) and an author in IFC Review (2017) have argued the UK opposes the creation of a blacklist because this would also affect their overseas territories, which could be marked as offshore tax havens. O’Leary (2017) has written that Ireland will lose a key ally in shaping the EU’s corporate tax policy because of Brexit.

Exemptions

The factor of corresponding interests can also be observed when examining the exemptions that the three countries share. The UK, Denmark and Ireland each have exemptions in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), while Denmark has an additional opt-out on the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Another instance of exclusions for the UK and Ireland is related to their non-participation in the Schengen zone, an area that currently includes 26 European countries that abolished border controls for their mutual borders. As this analysis will ascertain, Denmark, Ireland and the UK acquired these exemptions because they individually opposed further EU cooperation on the issue. Hence, their shared interest to reject involvement in EU cooperation on this particular issue led to shared exemptions.

Nielsen (2017) has noted Ireland, Denmark and the UK ‘have special statuses in the area of justice and home affairs in EU law’ and refers to the exemptions in AFSJ. Ireland and the UK have a flexible opt-out, which enables them to decline the acceptance of legislation on a case-by-case basis. This opt-out was included in the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 and was retained in the 2008 Treaty of Lisbon (Miller, 2011). Denmark has an opt-in ability regarding participation, and when legislation in AFSJ is introduced, the country has six months to decide whether to implement the new measures. If Denmark declines to enact the proposed rules, it can face exclusion from the Schengen area (Peers, 2011). During negotiations for the Treaty of Lisbon, Denmark obtained the possibility to change their opt-in ability to the same flexible opt-out held by Ireland and UK, but this option was rejected in a referendum (Ibolya, 2015).

The AFSJ exemptions are related to areas such as immigration, visas and external border controls (Emmott & Guarascio 2015). These matters are in line with the issues Ireland, Denmark and the UK voted in opposition to, as shown in Table 2: Free movement of people and proposals on Schengen and Frontex.

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Most articles in the content analysis on AFSJ exemptions address the establishment of the EU Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). The proposed office would be an independent body within the EU that would investigate and prosecute fraud and other crimes against the EU budget the organisation’s financial interests (Keating 2017; Segenhout 2017). These tasks have always been performed by member states, and the EPPO is intended to centralise this assignment. Gotev (2017b), Stupp (2017), Valero (2017) and White (2017) have mentioned Denmark, Ireland and the UK will not be a member of the EPPO, but no reason has been provided for why these nations would decline membership, only that the three countries have ‘opt-outs on judiciary matters’ (ASFJ). Hungary, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland and Sweden will not join the office either (Valero 2017). Germany was reluctant to join the initiative but ultimately decided to participate. Even though these countries do not have opt-outs that allow them to reject specific pieces of legislation, it could be argued that these countries still had the option to reject

involvement in the EPPO and most deliberately chose to do so.

A reason countries refused to join the EPPO is perhaps because they did not want to lose governance over the prosecution of financial crimes. Valero (2017) has written that in 2016, 18 of the 28 EU member states had agreed on rules for the office. Despite this, Commissioner Jourová (Justice) continued to push the European Commission’s (EC) initiative for the

establishment of the EPPO, but ‘the member states still [had] doubts about handing over control to a centralised EU agency’ (Valero, 2017). Leaders from EU countries eventually submitted a proposal to establish the EPPO, which was hailed as ‘a victory of multi-speed Europe, because it will free countries that opposed the new set-up to drop out’ (Valero 2017). Valero (2017) has written that the Netherlands, Sweden and Malta are not eager to be part of the prosecutor’s office because they ‘are wary of the negative impact it may have on their national judiciary systems’. Because member states fear losing control over the prosecution of financial crimes when it is dealt with at the European level, they have expressed concerns regarding this matter and have declined to participate.

Another set of articles on AFSJ exemptions addresses asylum. Crisp (2016a; 2016b; 2016c) has published three articles in which he briefly mentions that Denmark, the UK and Ireland can opt out on asylum issues. A recent example of this dynamic was the decision by the three countries to decline involvement in new asylum rules related to relocating ‘migrants’ in response to the ‘refugee crisis’ (Aisch & Almukhtar 2015). This issue of asylum can be

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connected to the Irish interviewee who named migration as an issue that is important for Ireland and the UK. In addition, the opposing votes on the free movement of people by Ireland,

Denmark and the UK as shown by the VoteWatch analysis (Chapter 5.3) also demonstrates cooperation on this issue.

Along with an exemption for AFSJ, Denmark also has an exemption for the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The implementation of CSDP revolves around military or civilian missions within and outside the EU. Common Security and Defence Policy activities include peace-keeping, conflict prevention and the strengthening of international security (Vimont 2015; Olsen & Pilegaard 2005, p. 340; European Union External Action n.d). One of CSDP’s initiatives is Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), which was launched in 2016 and seeks to integrate the national armed forces of EU member states (Emmott 2017; Sengupta 2017). In their articles, Tamma (2017) and Gotev (2017d) mention the UK, Denmark, and Malta will not be part of PESCO, though the latter wants to see how PESCO will develop (Deutsche Welle 2017; Times of Malta 2017). Denmark has opted out of cooperation using its CSDP exemption, and the UK declined membership because the country is scheduled to leave the EU in 2019 (Deutsche Welle 2017).

Unlike issues related to the basis of AFSJ exemptions, it is clear the Danish decision to decline membership in PESCO is based on the country’s CSDP exemption. Similar to AFSJ exemptions, it is likely the Danish have established the opt-out to defend their sovereignty and interests.

A third issue that deals with another instance of an exemption is the Schengen agreement. Ireland and the UK are the only EU member states who are not part of the Schengen zone, which, as several authors have written, has consequences for legislation regarding the free movement of people (Gotev 2016a; 2016b; 2017a; AFP 2017a; AFP 2017b). An example of the impact on movement is the lifting of visa requirements in May 2017 for Ukrainian citizens traveling to EU countries. Non-Schengen EU countries were exempted from the updated travel rules, which included the UK and Ireland (Rankin 2016).

In the three articles by Gotev (2016a; 2016b; 2017a) and one by AFP (2017b), the authors elaborate on the exclusion of Ireland and the UK in the new visa requirements. An unknown author states the UK and Ireland have not acquired an exempted status (AFP 2017a), which is incorrect as both countries have obtained exemptions.

Brexit and the consequences for the EU’s balance of power : what role does the UK play in the Council of the EU?

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