Understanding conviviality : the normalized landscape of counter-terrorism in Central London

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Un de rs ta nd in g Co nv iv ia lit y Ma st er of U rb an a nd R eg io na l P la nn in g. 2 01 8 . H ol ly H ix so n. 1 1 7 44 0 7 3 U N IV ERS ITY OF A MS TERD A M

UNDERSTANDING

CONVIVIALITY

THE NORMALIZED LANDSCAPE OF COUNTER-TERRORISM IN CENTRAL LONDON

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Understanding Conviviality: The normalized

landscape of counter-terrorism in Central London

Holly Hixson

11744073

hollyrhixson@gmail.com

Supervisor: Federico Savini

Second Reader: Sara Özogul

University of Amsterdam

Master of Urban and Regional Planning

Submission date: June 11, 2018

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ABSTRACT

As terrorism against densely populated, mixed-use, places of symbolic impor-tance has become increasingly part of the urban consciousness, debate on the effects of securitization has challenged the traditional understanding of the purpose of public space. It has also spurred discussion of the appropriate ap-proach to designing and maintaining the public realm. Through the mobiliza-tion of conviviality as an analytical tool by which to understand nuances in the public realm, this work interrogates the intersection between meaningful interaction, comfort, aesthetics and security objects in the built environment. This work attempts to understand how the security objects, both physical and symbolic, that are erected into urban space in Central London, alter how indi-viduals interact with the built environment and each other. This work argues that interactions between individuals and rigid security objects reflects the naturalization of surveillance and control, as well as a general pasteurization of spontaneity through control of movement. Understanding the effects of se-curity on public space informs better solutions for how to plan in the future, and allows for deeper understanding of contemporary urban social dynamics.

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I. INTRODUCTION

Over the last 40 years, more than 12,000 incidents of terrorism amassing over 73,000 casualties have occurred in cities around the world (Savitch, 2008: 3). In studying terrorism from an urban perspective, the association between terrorist acts and cities is obvious: while public spaces are symbols of democracy when they are alive, diverse and accessible to all (Mitchell, 2003), targeting these ar-eas can create widespread panic, fear, and a feeling of mass vulnerability (Sav-itch, 2008).

Because terrorism has largely located itself in urban space in recent years, the future of our public spaces in a context of counter-terrorism has become an increasingly important topic in academic scholarship and popular media. The targeting of non-combatants, a key feature of terrorism, means that areas that are densely populated and of high symbolic importance are viewed as primary arenas for attacks. This threat requires city officials to consider how best to protect their people and assets, jumpstarting a conversation about the level of livelihood and inclusivity that is possible within a context of fear, vulnerability, and uncertainty.

In part, this conversation examines the purpose of public space as a whole as well as the methods that should be employed in order to counter this threat, creating a landscape of contradictions. The purpose of public space is often thought of as intended to encourage “the greatest possible number of meetings, encounters, [and] challenges between various persons and groups” (Mumford, 1964). Well designed public spaces are strategically developed and maintained to foster tolerance, sociability, and delight among individuals who occupy them. However, within a landscape where the public sphere is viewed as an inevitable target, counter-terrorist security can have a similarly negative effect on public space as terrorism itself; leaving spaces feeling sterile, dull, and open only to those who don’t fit a “risk profile” (Barker, 2017).

As Western cities attempt to appropriately respond to the threat of terrorism to avoid becoming the site of a future attack, there is much to be learned about how physical and symbolic tools of security are being utilized in public space. Of specific interest is how these tools affect how individuals interact with each other as well as the built environment, ultimately begging the question ‘how do the symbolic and physical alterations made in response to terrorist attacks undermine or affect the conviviality of public space?’

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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

BEYOND SECURITY IDEOLOGIES

As every major city has plans to prevent a terror attack, increasingly, counter-terror securitization is manifesting in symbolic and physical changes to busy and crowded public spaces. In order to preserve the livelihood of the public realm, context-sensitive solutions that are inclusive by design must be implemented to provide adequate security while balancing sociability. Calling on alternative perspectives of security, this work frames the problem of sterilizing and dehumanizing public space in the name of security, and employs a holistic analytical tool to understand the effects securitization has on public space. The meaning of public space has long been discussed in academic literature and various approaches exist; each advances the analysis of public space with a different focus intended to promote understanding and give meaning to the planning and design of the public realm. Each lens provides something valuable to the conversation of how counter-terror planning measures can affect public space. However, each perspective is limited on its own. This work proposes an alternative lens through which to analyze public space that encompasses important aspects from different ideologies and intertwines them together. This interconnectivity is important in analyzing public space because the factors which shape the public realm are deeply and inextricably linked. In other words, you can’t talk about one particular factor as the most important without acknowledging its connections with other factors. The following section will make the case for good public space within a counter-terror security context and for the most useful and dynamic tool by which to determine it.

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CONVIVIALITY

Conviviality is an encompassing analytical tool which offers a dynamic view of practices of sociability within the context of difference. Used in this work as a lens through which to assess the effects of securitization in public space, conviviality has the conceptual capacity to “capture the unpredictable inconsistencies in experiences of and responses to urban multiculture” (Neal et al., 2018: 6). This capacity sets it apart from alternative discourses of sociability, inclusion, power, or aesthetics in security planning. Developments in the concept over the last century as a useful device for “analyzing and understanding the contemporary social relations of urban multicultural” (Neal et. al., 2018: 2) has further carved out its place as a distinct concept that attempts to understand the processes of ‘working things out’ among individuals within context of social harms, tensions, and inequalities (Erickson, 2011: 124). Conviviality can be seen as an experience of space that can make individuals aware of belonging to a larger social fabric while giving a sense of participation, access, and sustainability (Admin, 2008), and fits into broader sociological discussion of what practices, processes, and things connect people (Neal et al., 2018). The concept has been ‘bumped into’ and used interchangeably with related notions attempting to understand how urban sociability plays out in the context of difference; cosmopolitanism, super-diversity, urban encounter, and civility, among others. The notion of community has also been found to strengthen this concept, bringing an affective and performative aspect to the explanation of what connects some and excludes others (Neal et al., 2018). Community can be thought of as a performance of daily urban practices through which individuals develop shared experiences and symbols (Blokland, 2017). Past alignment of conviviality with community has sought to elevate the conceptual seriousness and status of conviviality to that which community has. Beyond being used as simply a descriptive term of pleasant, social experiences between culturally different people, conviviality is the most relevant analytical tool for capturing and comprehending the complex and precarious nuances that shape interaction and social interdependence (Neal et al., 2018). On the whole, conviviality is political feature of urban life which carries a “deep sense of interconnectedness” (Boisvert, 2010: 60) and materializes in discussion about how to make spaces more interactive and positive (Nowicka & Vertovec, 2013) while building upon difference, rather than erasing or subjugating it (Heil, 2015). Within this understanding, the concept connects related domains and attempts to bring these differing approaches to a convergence, allowing for meaningful analysis of space from multiple angles and allowing the researcher to find interconnectivity among multiple factors that shape and perpetuate a space.

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These overly simplified explanations of urban interactions needs to further engage in cultural difference, inequality, and power relationships to accurately understand social dynamics (Rishbeth et al., 2018). Further, the fortification of the built environment can threaten the public sphere as a site of open expression and diversity by exacerbating and institutionalizing class, race, gender, geography, and citizenship (Murakami Wood, 2006). Public space inevitably reflects a societal hegemony where people are perceived differently based on intersections of identity, thus, sociability and power must be considered in tandem within the implementation of security measures in order to respond appropriately to the dynamics of inclusion, access, and comfort in public space. Further, analysis through a convivial lens provides a mode of sociability that explicitly engages in difference and the ways in which encounters and interactions are experienced (Neal et al., 2008)

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Architecture and Security as Symbols

The feelings and perceptions provoked by a space determine whether or not people will want to stay, linger, pass through or avoid the space completely. These perceptions are profoundly shaped not only by the design and aesthetics of a place but also the symbolism that has shaped the space and its context. In relation to security planning, the combination of these three factors can be applied to the physical objects that are erected to secure a space. Similar to how architectural icons can act as powerful signifiers of social order (Castoriadis, 2003; Kaika, 2011), the complex social, cultural, and economic practices that produce security objects, shapes how the architecture and feel of a space overall are received by the public. Work by Kaika (2011) notes that the “aura that an art or architectural object possesses” cannot be contributed solely to the design quality of the object but to the structures of power that produce its character and ownership. (Kaika, 2011: 982). Thus, secured public spaces and the particular objects that are employed in them for security purposes, carry the weight of political, social, and cultural meaning as well as aesthetic affiliations. Security measures also serve a ‘performative’ and symbolic purpose for the government, implying a level of control and power that a government has over the public realm. The types of security measures, where they are placed, and how visible or obtrusive they are, constructs a narrative intended for a particular audience. Performance in this sense acts not just as behavior that is made up of dress, sequence, form, and location of action, but as a set of conducts that face an audience in order to send a message (Amante, 2017). The intended audience within security planning is often the public, media, or terrorists themselves. The presence of armed guards or physical bollards, for example, creates both a narrative of a space as impenetrable and secure to the audience of potential terrorists and reactionary and responsive to the media and public. This performance creates a relationship between “being,” “doing,” and “showing doing,” (Amante, 2017; Schechner, 2002). This is important to potential attackers to feel that their efforts are being anticipated and potentially

Social Interaction and Power

Within this thesis, public space is referred to as a place that is open to the general public which generates use and social behavior (Mehta, 2014). Social behavior within a space is commonly undertaken through an urban sociological perspective of ‘sociability,’ which discusses public space in the context of social dynamics (Mehta, 2014). Sociability theories promote the importance of social interaction and connection in public space (Rishbeth, Ganji & Vodicka, 2018). With the city acting as a meeting place, this work assigns importance to social exchanges that happen in active and lively city spaces, including passive activities like having hearing and seeing contact with others which may springboard other forms of interaction. Sociability theories tend to focus on the generative possibilities that a ‘brush with multiplicity’ may create (Admin, 2008). With community cohesion as a dominant theme for social policy in the UK (Askins & Pain, 2011), transformative social interaction in public space may be the platform to facilitate ‘invitations’ in city spaces that springboard to meaningful interaction and understanding of the Other. Research as far back as Allport (1954) advocates for the transformative abilities of social interaction through the ‘contact theory,’ the idea that where social groups experience discrimination or conflict, relations can be built and improved through everyday, casual encounters. The basis of this argument is that people are uncomfortable with the unknown and thus feel anxiety about encountering difference. Providing casual contact with that difference can effectively reduce prejudice because it increases the familiarity of the Other, thereby altering the perceived amount control one possesses and reducing unpredictability (Valentine, 2008). Similarly, the ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in thinking about public space, reflects the idea that everyday encounters have the ability to be scaled up to form mutual tolerance and meaningful interaction among diverse communities (Valentine, 2008). Looking at the city on a micro-scale, low-level sociability or ‘mundane friendliness’ (Thrift, 2005) that is observed in everyday interaction such as sharing a bench or holding a door open for someone, can suggest that there is a level of togetherness inherent in sharing space. Other contemporary methods posit that sociability and engagement among individuals can be facilitated through factors such as aesthetics, accessibility, and human-scaled design (Gehl, 2010). These factors are viewed as imperative in providing protection, comfort, and delight to a diverse mix of people. However, while these theories celebrate hybridization of culture and ways of living with difference, they fail to address how conflict and cultural differences will be resolved in practice (Young, 1990; Valentine, 2008). Cosmopolitan sociability theories are often based on a homogenous vision of public life, leading to complacency and lack of criticality in planners and urban designers (Rishbeth et al., 2018) and a lack of attention to the strong and unavoidable power relations tied to existing in the public realm.

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stopped, as well as to the public and media who can see that something is being done to respond to and protect them from the threat of terrorism. This idea of performative action brings about a contradiction that is inescapable in securitization: the ‘struggle of visibility’ (Thompson, 1995). While security measures are important to physically altering the possibility or severity of an attack, they also are important in creating a narrative of security that will deter attackers from an asset or space because of the heightened security. However, as a by-product, rigid security measures can make space feel uncomfortable or even dangerous because the threat of an attack is immediately obvious. The struggle of visibility in securitization lies in wanting security and control of a space to be obvious but not to the point where it makes a space unattractive and uncomfortable to its users. While it’s impossible to escape the political context that heightened security is created by, it is possible to use physical and aesthetic measures in public space to shape the narrative of security in the context of a city. Throughout history, collective identity has been shaped by symbolic expressions intended to exemplify the aspirations and values of a society, define moments in history, and signify a new order of functioning (Kaika, 2011: 970). From Egyptian pyramids, grand fortresses, and American skyscrapers which function as architectural icons, to contemporary security measures, the same purpose is achieved: the embodiment of a particular historical moment and responding to needs and desires of cities and institutions. More recently, scholars have also underscored how ‘aesthetic domains’ of architecture, art, and literature may also offer insights into the symbolic and emotional effects of terrorism and help in understanding the relationship between politics and aesthetics (Coaffee, 2009, Bleiker, 2006). These aesthetic domains, architecture, in this case, define particular moments in history and embody the ambitions, social order, and aspirations of powerful organizations and their elites (Koepnick, 2001). Architecture and other symbols that are instituted in these significant moments of change are important for signifying a new order and for constituting this new order as real (Kaika, 2011). Thus, the security features are not just a way of protecting individuals from a potential attack but also a way of symbolically asserting an ideal reality where people are safe from terrorism. It’s important to note that the role of architecture as a symbol does have very real outcomes on a space beyond creating a collective imaginary. Just as the language that we use to reflect reality also profoundly shapes our reality, features that are employed to project an image of absolute control will do so to not only potential terrorists but also to regular users of space. New pieces of infrastructure can determine the likelihood of people occupying it, feeling comfortable in the built environment, and their openness to other people within the space. So, while elements serve as symbolic assertions of control, their outcomes on the quality and conviviality of space can be immense and transform the space greatly. This can manifest in feelings of discomfort, exclusion, and sterilization in the name of security and regulation, ultimately minimizing the likelihood of invitations for interaction or meaningful encounters among individuals.

Flexibility, Ambiguity, and Inclusion

Strong regulations can undermine the purpose and human-centeredness of a public space by limiting the variety of activities which allow users participate in public the way they choose, or ‘be’ in space without being a consumer. Flexibility and ambiguity in the regulation of a space, alternatively, allows for spontaneous and flexible interactions among individuals and with the built environment and is deeply intertwined with the inclusivity of a place. The extent to which the regulating governance of a place is inclusive to people of different abilities and identities should be matched alongside the ability to engage in a variety of activities within the space. Loukaitou-Sideris & Ehrenfeucth (2009) assert that public space should be thought of as ‘ambiguous and flexible’ in order to accommodate the desires and behavior of the people who occupy it. Regulations can be based on the types of activities or the amount of ambiguity allowed to a space, or the types of people that are allowed in a space based on risk factors or behaviors. Inclusivity in urban space is thought to be under siege wherein securitization methods determine, undermine, legitimize, and police who has the right to the city (Mitchell, 2003). This perspective asserts that counter-terror planning is simply the latest turn in the struggle between social groups, public and private interests, citizens, and regulating authorities (Mehta, 2014) over the contested and valuable territory of public space. Further, regulation on the types of activities that are allowed to occur in public space has frequently acted under the guise of security in order to exclude particular individuals from accessing or using a space. For example, while people may have the formal right to sleep, to protest, or to speak, these rights can be undermined by spatial regulations on where individuals are allowed to express these rights (Mitchell, 2003) or physical alterations that make it impossible to do so. Public space, therefore, is the primary stage which should allow meaningful engagement and democratic participation, as well as a platform for individuals to express the rights afforded to them. The Right to the City approach embraces this vision of public space, as the platform for social conflict and democracy to unfold (Mitchell, 2003). Struggles over rights that have played out in public space throughout history such as the free-speech fights, union strikes, and feminist activism, indicates the deeply political character of public space (Mitchell, 2003). Current day restrictions on acceptable behavior often privilege wealthy and often White people, reinforcing “social boundaries ideologically and materially through social status, political identity and the ability to consume” (Van Deusen Jr., 2002). In essence, public space should be a stage upon which people from a multitude of backgrounds and socio-economic statuses should be able to come into brief contact with one another. Beyond the design of the space which either facilitates or hinders the likelihood of ‘invitations’ among individuals, this ‘brush with multiplicity’ is also highly dependent on the flexibility of governance in public space. Within a counter-terror security context, allowing people to enjoy a space as they wish requires alternative management strategies that will keep the space and people safe while not dehumanizing it overall.

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One potential alternative management style that exists in contrast to heightened security, is ‘mediated conviviality’ (Barker, 2017). The proposed security mentality reframes the topic of security in public space away from punitive measures, arguing that the tense relationship between convivial public space and enforcement must be negotiated with minimal rules and enforcement only as a last resort (Barker, 2017: 849). This ideology is borne out of the critique that everyday urban spaces have become militarized and fortified as governmental authorities try to ‘design-out’ crime, thus leading to hyper-regulation and ultimately stripping public space of “spontaneity, sociality, and cultural diversity” (Barker, 2017: 848). Past research has also suggested that the fortification of the built environment can harden users’ attitudes towards others in public space, ultimately producing a counter-productive effect which requires even greater security demands and more intolerant forms of policing (Crawford, 2008; Barker, 2017; Bannister & Kearns, 2013). Rather than viewing crime and insecurity as the central concerns in public space, mediated conviviality recognizes safety as one of many important factors in the development of a convivial public realm. The philosophy seeks to improve urban tolerance and employ responsive and harm-based regulations in public space rather than a pre-emptive reaction against potential threats. Rather than employing policing agents who have coercive power inherent in their position, mediated conviviality calls on skilled mediators to facilitate interaction and conflict in public space, prioritizing voluntary compliance with the rules, and symbolic management (Barker, 2017). This method of facilitating conflict is also partially a reaction to an important folly of the Right to the City approach which is the absence of mediation and regulation over the inevitable (and encouraged) diverse conflicts that exist in public space (Barker, 2017). As a result of mediated conflict, rules are minimal and based on actual harm that could be done to the users or the physical environment, not as a way to regulate unfavorable conduct in space. Additionally, the mentality attempts to appeal to normative standards of reasonable conduct and find ameliorative strategies that make the behaviors and actions of the public more tolerable for the collective. An example from the work of Barker et al., (2014) details a local authority management response to public drinking. In response to a ban on glass items because of the risk of broken glass ending up in a fountain that children play in, local authorities began providing plastic cups to drinkers and advice about the potential harm of using glass items in this context. By offering the plastic cups, the behavior of drinking is adapted to be less harmful to others, while also mitigating concerns that parents had about the danger this particular behavior would cause. Rather than imposing a ban or enforcing strict regulation, the authorities adapted the behaviors that people wanted to engage in to make it suitable for the public. Further, this type of flexibility in the management of public space is quite responsive and allows for a wide range of lifestyle preferences to occur in public, thus making the space more inclusive.

The primary alternative to mediated conviviality is pursued through inflexible and ‘risk’ minimizing philosophy, ‘preventative exclusion’ (Crawford, 2011; Barker, 2017). This method is strongly opposed to facilitated management of space, or the belief that everyone has equal Right to the City. Rather, preventative exclusion designs bias into space intentionally; manifesting physical and symbolic measures intended to secure the city through the preemptive exclusion of individuals and behaviors believed to pose a threat. This mentality rests on a general distrust of everyone as a potential threat to safety and an assumption that social order requires the exclusion of particular people from public space who may eventually be risky, even if the harm is uncertain. Preventative exclusion differs greatly from mediated conviviality in that it makes no effort to seek voluntary compliance and is selectively exclusive rather than open to all, in order to manage and minimize risks. Practices of preventative exclusion are both physical and legal tools that can be targeted at particular groups such as young people, People of Color, or homeless people. Further critique of preventative exclusion claim that it functions in order to serve corporate and private interests, excluding those most marginalized and those without buying power (Barker, 2017; Crawford, 2011). Universal forms of preventative exclusion can be found in almost all counter-terror planning strategies in cities around the world (Barker, 2017). The Traffic Advisory Leaflet (CPNI, 2017) prepared by the CPNI and the Department for Transport, details a plan of securing vulnerable public spaces in London from potentially hostile vehicles by excluding them within a certain distance of busy public places. The leaflet calls for increasing passive perimeter protection such as fixed bollards or structures as well as maintenance of Vehicle Access Control Points (VACP) wherein only official vehicles are allowed to enter a vulnerable space. In this case, the security experts have deemed vehicles to be of the biggest threat for a potential attack so excluding them from largely pedestrian areas is intended to increase safety. Excluding vehicles from a space has positive impacts on almost all other relevant factors of conviviality, however, the same mentality can be oppressive and exclusionary when applied alternatively to exclude users of a space based on whether or not they fit a risk profile.

Physical Outcomes of Security

While the physicality of an object input into space doesn’t account for the wide range of social and political factors that the objects possess, aesthetics do have an impact on the perceptions and feelings that can be experienced in the presence of such an object. Further, the type of security that is used in a public space makes a tremendous difference in the space itself and how it is received by others. Work by Savitch (2008) outlines a framework for examining security measures or general surveillance based on where they fit along a continuum ranging from least to the most physically obstructive. Obstructive, in this sense, is the extent to which human movement is blocked, altered or prevented (Savitch, 2008: 126).

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The first and the least obstructive category of surveillance are the “eyes on the street” (Jacobs, 1961); citizens, neighbors, workers, and pedestrians in an area that casually and normally provide surveillance to ensure public safety. This category of security relies on the eyes and senses of everyday people to absorb and respond to their environmental surroundings. By greeting people, looking at the street, and being present, everyday citizens build safety through a sense of territoriality (Savitch, 2008). This method is highly regarded as important to public safety on a basic and minimum level, however, is unlikely to stop a calculated and determined attack from occurring. This category could be expanded upon through the lens of mediated conviviality by adding skilled facilitators into space that not only mitigate conflict but provide an alternative security presence that is not punitive

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The next minimally obstructive type of surveillance is panoptic devices; CCTV operations, cameras and one-way mirrors. The power of this type of surveillance has been long discussed throughout philosophy, perhaps none more famously than in the idea of the ‘Panopticon.’ The Panopticon is an institutional structure designed by Jeremy Bentham which allows for control of many to be held by a few. This idea is facilitated by the design of a building wherein individuals who are being contained are organized in a circle of cells around a central tower that is occupied by guards. The guards at the center can observe the conduct of the prisoners, without the prisoners being able to see who is observing them (Savitch, 2008). In other words, the amount of security that is needed to control the prisoners is limited because the power that contains them is understood, yet unverifiable. The design of the building itself gives rise to specific interactions and perceptions within it that are calculated and intentional. The relations within it are also shaped by the power dynamic inherent not only between a prisoner and guard, but of the object and the subject, or the seen and unseen (Foucault, 1975). This idea for this structure of control has been further generalized as a model of functioning, ‘panopticism’ (Foucault, 1975) which can be applied to security overall. London famously operates under a sort of panopticism through the widespread implementation of more than 9,000 CCTV cameras (Savitch, 2008: 128) throughout the city. Public spaces are under a constant and watchful eye by the government through digital security techniques that can provide the same panoptic effects; in theory, individuals will alter their own behavior because they know they are being seen. Cameras can act as powerful symbols of control and because the power is unverifiable, for a security camera to create this effect, it doesn’t even have to necessarily be turned on. The effectiveness of these methods and their ability to actually mitigate harm though is still uncertain. Some studies suggest that video surveillance doesn’t actually stop crime but rather displaces it to less observed locations (Williams et al., 2000; Savitch 2008). Video footage collectedon CCTV cameras of the London bombers on the day of the 7/7 attack carrying backpacks onto buses and through the underground “reminds us that suicide attackers risk very little when being taped” (Savitch, 2008: 128).

The presence of cameras doesn’t reduce the likelihood of an attack as much as they serve as symbols of control. Further, the complexities of security in a digital age are ever increasing and the concept of panopticism requires some updating to fit within the technological infrastructures that exist today which are dramatically different than the examples Bentham studied (Graham & Wood, 2003). Poster (1990) notes that changes in technology and communication have generated a ‘superpanopticon’ system of surveillance which exists without towers, guards, or walls at all. Current day disciplinary surveillance is “no longer limited to single buildings, and observations no longer limited to the line of sight” (Gandy, 1993: 23). As technology advances to become more sophisticated, the effect that it can have on conviviality in a space is immense. On one hand, the technological advancements allow the possibility to eliminate discrimination and human error (Marx, 1995: 238). Graham & Wood (2003) note, for example, that a facial recognition system can correct a racist police officer from arresting any Black male by determining if the particular individual, is in fact, wanted. However, digital surveillance can also intensify problems of conventional surveillance by removing human discretion from the equation altogether. While technology is meant to be unbiased, it can still prioritize and reflect a social or political hegemony that privileges some over others. As public spaces are more commercialized and privatized, social exclusion can become automated based on an assessment of an individuals’ profitability and socioeconomic demographic (Graham & Wood, 2003). Ultimately, the automation of surveillance techniques raises serious concerns for public space; ideologically it’s problematic simply in applying a parallel dynamic to that of a prisoner and guard and exacerbating a trend away from viewing people in public space as people and instead viewing them as data subjects. A related category is that which connects panoptic devices to sophisticated databases of advanced technological detection. This category of surveillance involves collecting biometric data that can identify people based on their retinas, irises, or hand geometry, using motion or thermal sensors, and scanning for entry and exit typically thought of as airport security level of precaution. How this type of security fits into urban environments is complicated because, despite the invisible intrusion of collecting intimate data on people, most of the public is unlikely to see or feel the effects of these measures, especially in their early stages (Savitch, 2008: 130). In that way, these measures are less obstructive and have the ability to be highly accurate, signaling the most dangerous targets. Still, these methods deserve caution and discipline in their widespread use in cities. More obstructive measures such as movable barriers, guards, police patrols, and fortress construction, are the cornerstone of modern counter-terror planning. Although they might seem benign in comparison to gathering individuals’ biometric data without consent, the presence of physical security officers can be threatening or intimidating to individuals and can negatively affect the inclusivity of a place (Mehta, 2014).

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The ‘material inscription’ of a society through urban design can serve to exclude certain individuals from city spaces through environmental determinism (Sennett, 1994) and arguably, condition identity and insecurity through the built form (Coaffee et al., 2009). Moving beyond the discussion of urban design or legality of behavior as distinct concepts, this discussion of urban space connects these concepts with perceptions and feelings that are transmitted through symbolic cues embedded in the environment. While perceptions and feelings are hard to quantify, these subjective characteristics are what separate successful public spaces from dull, sterile, and arguably failed public spaces. The ‘struggle of visibility’ must be reemphasized in the context of aesthetics because the contradictions inherent in how security objects perform for both the public and potential terrorists are based on subjective interpretations. Secured landscapes are intended to project a message of impenetrability and safety to the public, and of fortification and control to potential attackers. However, the messages received by the public may not be the ones that are intended: security measures may actually cause more fear in the public by drawing attention to the fact that their safety is threatened (Coaffee et al., 2009: 496). The effect of these messages may be an unintentional filtering of activities and people who show up to a space (Coaffee et al., 2009) leading to more sterile, dull, and insecure public spaces. These unintentional consequences highlight how complicated attempting to design-out terrorism is. The UK government claims that contemporary terrorism aims to make lively and crowded places ‘empty,’ though trying to protect the public against threat through various counter-terror planning measures, can ultimately have the same effect (Coaffee et al., 2009). Criticism on similar grounds has lead to increasingly covert security features being embedded into urban environments (Coaffee et al., 2009). Further, different perceptions and feelings experienced within a space can be thought of as varying based upon where an object falls along a continuum of overt, stealthy, or invisible (Coaffee et al., 2009). Invisible, or covert security features are those which do not clearly serve counter-terrorism purposes, such as street furniture or landscaping. Stealthy security features are visible but not necessarily identifiable as serving security purposes to the unaccustomed eye, and overt features are hardened targets or those which clearly serve military and security purposes such as gates, fortress construction, and fortification around places of critical importance. Overt elements have been found to contribute to more negative or threatening perceptions of space, while more covert and invisible elements embedded into space, may decrease how threatening a space feels. Finally, security objects have been criticized as calculated attempts to heighten and manipulate awareness of the threat of terrorism in order to promote passivity and compliance (Marcuse, 2006; 921). Features that are designed to be more responsive to context and aesthetically pleasing can challenge the assertion that visible security features are dis-assuring and induce anxiety in the public (Coaffee et al., 2009) and creative and thoughtful design can challenge security contradictions, improving how measures are received by the public. Temporary physical barriers, bollards, and an increased presence of police are often used on an

emergency basis or in the wake of an attack to secure an area from threat. For example, following attacks in Moscow, citizens were required to carry identity cards and were routinely stopped. This type of strategy goes beyond passively assessing the public, to engaging in direct confrontation often motivated by factors of identity such as race, ethnicity, and citizenship. In Moscow, the searches were focused particularly on people who fit a risk profile: dark-skinned and presumed to be from the Caucuses (Savitch, 2008: 131). In the wake of al Aqsa terror in the early 2000’s, troops were placed in critical spaces of Jerusalem, behind temporary barriers and outside of restaurants and cafés allowing customers to enter only after they were patted down and identified (Savitch, 2008). Similarly, a growing body of evidence about intensive street patrolling and routine traffic stops as a result of racial profiling in the US suggests that unjust targeting of minorities by police is not simply an unsubstantiated feeling, but an uncomfortable reality (Simmons, 2011). Within this punitive context, from entering a café to walking down the street, a culture of fear and awareness of threat is created and it’s unlikely that factors of sociability, flexibility, and voluntary cooperation can exist at all. Despite forms of surveillance and fortress construction underscoring the existence of our cities, obstruction in the built environment as a result of security certainly alters the condition of a space as open, tolerant, and diverse. Even when surveillance is meant to be unobtrusive through creative design of security elements, the effects can still stifle the built environment and spontaneous interaction among visitors (Savitch, 2008). In particular, the shrinkage of space as a result of bollards, barriers, fences, and street furniture can have immense effects on how people act and interact through providing a high level of predictability to the urban landscape. While a barrier or gated entrance may not dramatically alter how people feel while in a space, these measures channel people into predictable directions, funneling mixed crowds of people into uniform and compliant lines, ultimately so that they can be controlled and inspected (Savitch, 2008). People may adapt to these changes causally and without being bothered, but the freedom to move around a space organically and the possibility of spontaneity are lost when such behaviors are shaped by the design of the built environment. Furthermore, analyzing securitization of the built environment through the lens of aesthetics reveals how visual aspects of counter-terror measures are perceived differently among individuals (Coaffee, O’Hare & Hawkesworth, 2009). This perspective examines how these perceptions can lead to emotional reactions and how interventions in the built environment mirror larger political ideologies. For example, policy discourse of security has been “written in ways that privilege the worldviews of political leaders at the expense of ordinary citizens” (Coffee et al., 2009: 492; Jackson, 2005; Croft, 2006). Along with transmitting and performing a narrative of control, aesthetic domains of architecture and the built environment have the ability to transmit dominant ideologies to users of space that illustrate “how a particular society is materially inscribed into space” (Coaffee et al., 2009: 493).

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III. METHODOLOGY

This work utilized in-person observation in Central Westminster in order to assess the security measures that have been put in place in a highly target-prone area of the London and answer

the question,

‘How do the symbolic and physical alterations made in response to terrorist threat affect the conviviality of public space?’

Further, the research addresses the sub-questions: ‘What physical techniques of securing public space are employed in high density, mixed-use public space in London?’ and ‘What

symbolic features have been used in London to secure public space?’

Observations were primarily centered around two spaces, Trafalgar Square and Admiralty Arch in order to assess conviviality in the context of a highly secured space. This research was intended to explore what security elements exist, how people interact with the built environment and to discover how lively, inclusive and diverse the space is. In order to gather this data, the researcher conducted personal observation for a total of nine hours between the two spaces which are closely related but spatially disconnected by an arterial road. During the observation period, the researcher gathered qualitative data and from both locations and engaged in conversations with some individuals in Trafalgar Square in order to gain insight about how comfortable, welcome, and lively the space felt, as well as to gain an understanding of how people felt about the security measures that were present. Because the London Marathon finish line was nearby the Admiralty Arch site, this location had an influx of visitors, primarily the friends and family members of marathon runners. This created unique circumstances for the space during the observation period because it was incredibly crowded with people throughout the duration of the research. The space was used primarily to connect supporters with their runner when they had finished their race, however, the individuals who were approached to be asked questions all declined, stating that they were in a hurry or in the process of looking for someone. The researcher was still able to converse with three official authorities in the square in order to gain insights. Trafalgar Square was also operating on a higher level of security than normal due to the ‘Feast of Saint George’ event happening in the plaza. Beyond personal observation and interviews in the field, the researcher was included in a security briefing by the Head of Physical Security at the Center for the Protection of National Infrastructure, the organization in charge of planning and executing security measures throughout the UK. This highlighted the broader political context of terrorism and gave immense insight into how seriously the UK takes the threat of terrorism and the types of technologies that are being developed in order to combat this threat.

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This meeting concluded with a suggested walking tour in order to further understand the specific projects that were discussed in the meeting and see how the CPNI is working to integrate security measures into the urban design in more creative and aesthetically pleasing ways. Prior to personal observation, key factors were identified as important to the understanding of public space through a review of alternative works. Following the observational research, the data has been grouped into major dimensions that provide insight on how power, inclusion, flexibility, symbolism, and physical outcomes make up the concept of conviviality. With the chosen research site as a representative of larger social and political context, these site-specific observations placed into the lens of conviviality allow the researcher to learn something about the meaning of public space, security and further provide commentary on the social and political context.

SYMBOLISM

FLEXIBILITY

POWER

INCLUSION

PHYSICAL

OUTCOMES

AMBIGUITY POLITICAL/HISTORICAL CONTEXT SOCIAL DYNAMICS

PUBLIC SPACE AS A PLATFORM FOR REPRESENTATION

SENSUAL ELEMENTS PRACTICAL AMENITIES

PERCEPTION OF SAFETY

HARD OR SOFT SURVEILLANCE

OBSTRUCTION OF PATH

AESTHETICS

DESIGN ELEMENTS

INTERACTION WITH THE BUILT ENVIRONMENT

VISIBILITY OF SECURITY FEATURES

ACCESS AND USE PRESENCE OF DIVERSITY MOBILITY

PUBLIC SPACE AS A PLATFORM FOR REPRESENTATION

POLITICAL/HISTORICAL CONTEXT

REGULATION & MANAGEMENT OF SPACE

ANIMATION FEATURES COMFORT

DIMENSIONS OF CONVIVIALITY

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IV. BACKGROUND

With respect to becoming a target of terrorism, cities vary greatly based on size, function, importance, and symbolic value and thus, for a variety of reasons, different cities have different experiences with terrorism. Urban terrorism is a complex and multifaceted phenomenon, it can be tied to religious beliefs, local or international objectives, political movement or purely violent (Savitch, 2008). Cities can be targeted differently based upon where they sit on intersections of ethnicity, religion, or political ideology and some cities offer larger ‘payoff’ for terrorists in terms of sending a message and inflicting trauma and unrest. Global cities such as London are positioned at the heart of the world economy, where global capital is accumulated, converted, and traded, and attacks or threat of attacks on these cities have immense consequences. Because these cities are so international, they provide a large platform of global media outlets, an inventory of important assets, and large migrant communities (Savitch, 2008). Generally, the type of terrorism incurred upon a city can also vary within the categories of smart, mega, or catalytic terrorism (Savitch, 2008). Smart terror is aimed at the strength of a city, the economy, infrastructure, or resources; mega-terror attempts to inflict extensive damage to property and loss of life; catalytic terrorism attempts to elicit a grand response by shocking the public and garnering media attention. Contemporary urban terrorism contains all three types of mega, catalytic, and smart terrorism, increasing the repercussions and effect immensely.

National Response to the Threat of Terrorism

The targeting of global cities and their economic infrastructures became most notable in the early 1990’s. In London, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) successfully carried out attacks on economic assets with bombs exploding in the City of London square mile (April 1992 and 1993), a bomb found under the Canary Wharf Tower, and a bombing of the London Docklands in 1992 and 1996, respectively. These attacks were carried out in order to cause significant disruptions and severe insurance losses in London and the subsequent reactions to the events highlights the use of “territorial and technological approaches to counter-terrorist security” (Coaffee, 2004). One of the most astonishing acts of terrorism that occurred are the London attacks of 7/7, sometimes referred to as ‘London’s 9/11.’ The attack targeted the public transportation in London, the Underground which is used by nearly 3 million commuters, and the buses which carry an additional 500,000 passengers into central London everyday (Savitch, 2008: 28). In this instance, four bombs were placed in different locations, three were at Underground stations (Liverpool, Edgware and Kings Cross) and the fourth exploded in a double-decker bus at Tavistock Square. All of the explosions took place around morning rush

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hour time and within an hour, 700 people were injured and 56 were killed (Savitch, 2008). This attack was brutal and severe, causing the entire city to come to a halt. This, along with other attacks that have occurred in the past few decades in London has amassed an estimated number of 119 people murdered and more than 1,500 injured in over 300 incidents (Savitch, 2008: 29). In 2017, a hostile vehicle targeted pedestrians on the Westminster Bridge, killing six and injuring another fifty people (BBC News, 2017). Shortly following in June 2017, a hostile vehicle attack was carried out from the London Bridge to Borough Market, which left eight dead and forty-eight injured. Most of the attacks against the UK have been carried out by the IRA against financial, social, political, and transportation targets, however, attacks in more recent years, and the 7/7 bombings have been attributed to Arab and Islamic groups (Savitch, 2008). Further, over the last decade, central London has become emblematic of both the threat posed by terrorism and types of responses activated by local officials (Coaffee, 2004). Prior to 9/11, crime reduction strategies in London were under scrutiny for being intrusive and biased (specifically stop and search procedures), while at the same time intending to re-appropriate traffic management and environmental strategies that would increase the quality of life in the city (Coaffee, 2004). Aside from the attacks that London suffered itself, following the attack on the Twin Towers in New York City, city-wide counter-terror responses in London became activated to a level they had never previously seen. There was an increase of over 1,500 police patrolling the streets and instigating stop-and-search procedures at a much higher rate, as well as the fortressing of the most high-profile assets in the city. The city also focused on digital tracking of vehicles in the financial district through Automated Number Plate Recording (ANPR) technology making use of 450 cameras in 230 positions (Coaffee, 2004: 207) with the official purpose of capturing plate for congestion charging. In July 2003, a ‘ring of steel’ was implemented, reducing the number of entrances into the financial zone from over thirty to seven. Armed police were set up to monitor the entrances and exits and conducted road-checks, controlling traffic through the use of plastic traffic cones (Coaffee, 2004). This response served as a visible demonstration of control, eliciting a perception that the government was reacting appropriately to the threat of terrorism, and represented a symbolic approach to security rather than a purely physical and strength-based approach. This territorial approach was reinforced by an increasing presence of CCTV cameras around the city. London’s transportation system alone uses over 6,000 CCTV units and the financial district contains another 1,500 that monitor pedestrians on a daily basis (Savitch, 2008: 128); the average person in London is thought to be caught on CCTV 300 times a day (Sniffen, 2003). .

The extensive use of technological surveillance methods can be considered a continuation of the ring of steel, encircling central London in a ring of digital surveillance. Further, prominent and historic landmarks have been “crudely fortified against vehicle-borne bombs” (Coaffee, 2004: 206) with waist-high blunt concrete blocks such as those seen outside the Houses of Parliament intended to protect it from a vehicle used as a weapon. Most of the counter-terrorist attention has been dedicated to the financial center of the City and the London Docklands. These security measures in tandem create a zone of physical and technological control and surveillance under the guise of traffic and environmental improvement, and overt advertisement of their counter-terrorist agenda, maintaining an image of control and safety. As a result of the development of these many ‘rings of confidence,’ (Coaffee, 2003) the Westminster neighborhood, which houses some of the city’s most prominent and trafficked tourist destinations, is disconnected from the rest of the city. With extensive security throughout the area criticized for conditioning people to act and move in predictable and uniform patterns and becoming viewed as natural conditions of urban life in London.

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) is the chief organization making decisions about the types of security that will be put in place to protect the UK’s national infrastructures and vulnerable assets. CPNI provides integrated advice in the domains of physical, personnel, and cyber security to businesses and organizations that make up the UK national infrastructure (CPNI, 2014) including the sectors; Chemicals, Civil Nuclear Communications, Defense, Emergency Services, Energy, Finance, Food, Government, Health, Space, Transport, and Water. The advice they provide aims to secure national infrastructure from terrorism and other threats, reducing vulnerability in the UK’s essential services. CPNI encourages those responsible for planning and designing the public realm to consider security solutions at the earliest possible design stage, and acknowledge the need for innovation and design solutions that maintain pleasant aesthetics alongside functionality. The organization works closely with British Intelligence in order to understand the depth of the threat posed by terrorist organizations around the world and design solutions accordingly. They also publish inspirational documents to inform better planning and integration of security elements into the public realm for use by officials, businesses, and organizations around the world.

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RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

Integrated Security: A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (CPNI, 2014)

Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (HVM) measures are of the utmost importance given the emphasis in contemporary urban terrorism on targeting busy places and critical assets. Integrating HVM strategies into the public realm is a significant challenge for CPNI due to the numerous factors that successful integration requires such as aesthetics, traffic management, physical constraints, public access, health and safety, cost, and maintenance. The Integrated Security Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation offers holistic suggestions on how best to navigate and prioritize relevant factors in order to mitigate the threat from and limit the damage caused by a potential terrorist attack. Further, this guide encourages creative and positive responses to the challenges of counter-terrorism and protective security. The role of design in security planning is to ensure that the public realm remains open and inclusive and to ensure that HVM measures are embedded seamlessly into the environment. As security becomes an increasingly significant factor to those who manage and design the public realm, the guide calls for a holistic approach to develop balanced and appropriate responses to the threat of terrorism, catering to specific site requirements and context. A holistic approach, in this sense, is one that acknowledges and responds to the interdependence of physical measures with electronic and procedural measures to enhance overall security. Security should also be approached on multiple geographic layers, protecting both the wider site context that encompasses many sites and owners, down to the specific asset including the people and physical contents.

The Key Design Principles outlined in this document are

(1.) Consider forward planning and flexibility to counter developing threats, (2.) Provide mitigation measures proportionate to the threats,

(3.) Design to enhance the setting, (4.) Include multi-functional elements,

(5.) Ensure an accessible and inclusive environment, and (6.) Design with maintenance in mind.

Traffic management strategies should respond to the assessed threat of vehicle-borne attack and must take into consideration day-to-day site operations. The application of traffic management should create an “enforceable blast stand-off perimeter around the protected asset and minimize the amount of traffic requiring site access” (CPNI, 2014). In order to achieve this, a mix of options can be employed including: - Total vehicle exclusion, seen often in public spaces, enforced by Vehicle Security Barriers (VSBs); - Vehicle inclusion which allows authorized vehicles a level of access that is carefully managed

through a Vehicle Access Control Point (VACP);

- Temporary protection, including temporary VSBs at times of heightened threat level or planned events, these barriers tend to e more visually intrusive, overt, and provide less permeability by pedestrians than permanent solutions;

- Traffic calming methods, which reduce vehicle approach speed thus reducing the

effectiveness of a vehicle attack through the application of horizontal deflections such as bends or chicanes in the road.

Pedestrian movement is also of large consideration in this document. Spaces that have high volumes of pedestrian use must accommodate the movements of individuals safely while maintaining comfort and convenience of the pedestrian flow. How pedestrian movement is affected or influenced by the design of the built environment is important in planning and evaluating a HVM scheme, including the capacity of individuals that can move safely through a space, the amount of personal space allotted to them, the ability of a person to follow their preferred route at their own speed, and the conflicts that occur with the built environment or among pedestrians.

National Counter Terrorism Strategy (HM Government, 2011)

The UK Government’s counter-terrorism strategy aims to allow people to go about their business freely and with confidence through reduction of risk from international terrorism. The latest UK Strategy for Countering Terrorism (CONTEST) publication states that the UK threat level determined by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre remained at ‘SEVERE’ throughout the duration of 2015, meaning an attack is very likely. Islamist terrorism remains the principal threat, although dissident republican groups also pose a ‘SUBSTANTIAL’ threat to Great Britain, conducting attacks primarily in Northern Ireland. Six terrorist plots were successfully disrupted in 2015 by British intelligence, security, and the police agencies. The strategy known as CONTEST is divided into four primary components: Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare. ‘Pursue’ involves the investigation and disruption of terrorist attacks, ‘prevent’ is working to stop people from becoming or supporting terrorists, ‘protect’ deals with improving the countries protective security to stop a terrorist attack, and ‘prepare’ is working to minimize the impact of an attack in order to recover as quickly as possible. The work of CPNI is categorized under the ‘protect’ strand, with primary concerns being reducing vulnerability of the UK and their interests internationally from a terrorist attack. The primary ‘protect’ objectives were to increase the resilience of critical infrastructure, improve protective security in key overseas locations, improve protective security for crowded places and people at specific risk from terrorism, reduce vulnerability of the transport network, and strengthen border security. ‘Crowded places and people at specific risk from terrorism’ are of particular interest for this work and this involves the constant review of security at events and regular review by police of the arrangements that have been made. Further, there was an increase in overt and covert security measures on some streets and at some locations such as major events and busy places in the UK’s largest cities.

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V. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS:

THE NEW NORMAL

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Results through the

dimensions of Conviviality

PHYSICAL OUTCOMES: COMFORT UNDER SURVEILLENCE

The physical manifestations of security measures can dramatically alter a space and the way that individuals interact with the built environment. It also alters how people feel within a space and their perceived level of safety. In the UK, criticism of counter-terror security mea-sures has led to pressure on authorities to employ more nuanced and aesthetically pleas-ing security features (Coaffee et al., 2009). The Westminster City Plan (2016) which en-compasses the research site, asserts that quality architecture and design can “contribute to feelings of safety, community identity, physical and mental well-being, raising aspirations, reducing inequalities and contributing towards social cohesion” (City of Westminster, 2016: 118). Further, the plan acknowledges strong links between the quality of the urban environment and wider determinants of health and sustainability, putting great importance on the design and aesthetics of a space. Thus, the design and implementation of security elements is becoming increasing-ly complex with security features necessariincreasing-ly serving multiple functions in the urban landscape. The observations within this dimension broadly named ‘physical outcomes,’ primarily seek to answer the sub-question “what physical techniques of securing public space are employed in high density, mixed-use public space in London?” These observations also seek to better understand how individuals interact with elements that have been put into the public realm for security purposes and if these interactions contribute to or hinder the possibility of conviviality. Aesthetic and physical factors that have been found to improve public space are: variety and complexity of elements within the space, sense of enclosure, attractiveness, and the presence of memo-rable architecture or landscape features (Mehta, 2014: 67). Further, a comfortable urban space differs from individual to individual but generally provides practical amenities (Francis, 2003) as well as opportunities to walk, sit, stay, stand, ‘play,’ and see (Gehl, 2010). Shaftoe (2008) even claims the “single most important provision to ensure a successful public space is a sufficient range of opportunities for sitting” (2008: 92). Comfort within public space also greatly depends on how safe a space is perceived to be. As discussed, counter-terror planning interventions have the ability to increase anxiety and awareness of the threat of danger. These feelings are of particular consideration within this work. A convivial public space should feel generally com-fortable to a variety of users and security elements should be embedded into the design so as not to draw attention to the possibility of attack. Within urban public spaces in London, com-fort is examined in planning for hostile vehicle mitigation, the primary threat type characteris-tic of contemporary urban terrorism. Comfort is thereby determined by the amount of personal space that is available to pedestrians and their ability to move freely among physical barriers and bollards. In other words, these bollards which secure the space from a hostile vehicle should not hinder the comfortable movement or desired path of pedestrians through the space (CPNI, 2014)

Understanding conviviality : the normalized landscape of counter-terrorism in Central London

UNDERSTANDING

CONVIVIALITY

Understanding Conviviality: The normalized

landscape of counter-terrorism in Central London

Holly Hixson

11744073

hollyrhixson@gmail.com

Supervisor: Federico Savini

Second Reader: Sara Özogul

University of Amsterdam

Master of Urban and Regional Planning

Submission date: June 11, 2018

Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

7

ABSTRACT

9

I. INTRODUCTION

11

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

13

CONVIVIALITY ...

SOCIABILITY & POWER ...

SYMBOLS ...

FLEXIBILITY & INCLUSION ...

PHYSICAL OUTCOMES ...

III. METHODOLOGY

31

DIMENSIONS OF CONVIVIALITY ...

33

IV. BACKGROUND

35

UK RESPONSE TO TERRORISM ... 35

CPNI ... 37

RELEVANT DOCUMENTS ... 35

V. RESULTS & CONCLUSION:

41

DIMENSIONS OF CONVIVIALITY ...

43

PHYSICAL OUTCOMES ... 43

THE ABILITY TO SHOW UP ... 48

THE POWER TO TAKE UP SPACE .. 52

FLEXIBILITY: EXPRESS YOURSELF 54

SYMBOLS ... 56

LIMITATIONS ... 63

CONCLUSIONS:

64

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ABSTRACT

I. INTRODUCTION

II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK:

BEYOND SECURITY IDEOLOGIES

CONVIVIALITY

.

Architecture and Security as Symbols

Social Interaction and Power

Flexibility, Ambiguity, and Inclusion

Physical Outcomes of Security

.

III. METHODOLOGY

SYMBOLISM

FLEXIBILITY

POWER

INCLUSION

PHYSICAL

OUTCOMES

DIMENSIONS OF CONVIVIALITY

IV. BACKGROUND

National Response to the Threat of Terrorism

The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)

RELEVANT DOCUMENTS

Integrated Security: A Public Realm Design Guide for Hostile Vehicle Mitigation (CPNI, 2014)

National Counter Terrorism Strategy (HM Government, 2011)

V. RESULTS & CONCLUSIONS:

THE NEW NORMAL

Results through the

dimensions of Conviviality

PHYSICAL OUTCOMES: COMFORT UNDER SURVEILLENCE

SYMBOLISM