NIOD INSTITUTE FOR WAR, HOLOCAUST AND GENOCIDE STUDIES
Amber van Suijlekom
Supervisor: Kjell Anderson (NIOD) Second reader: Thijs Bouwknegt (NIOD)
amber.vansuijlekom@student.uva.nl
11154187
MASTER THESIS
Democracy and Violence in Myanmar
The connection between the democratic transition in Myanmar and the violence and discrimination aimed against the Rohingya Muslims
University of Amsterdam Graduate School of Humanities
MA. Program Holocaust and Genocide Studies December 2016
ABSTRACT
This thesis analyzes the process of democratization in Myanmar. One of the countries’ minorities, the Rohingya Muslims, suffers from increasing discrimination and violence. The aim of this thesis is to examine if there is a correlation between the democratic transition in Myanmar and to the institutional discrimination of the Rohingya Muslims. The emphasis in several parts of the thesis will be on the role of ethnicity and nationalism throughout the history of the country. In addition, there is a focus on the question how Buddhism is being used to build a national identity. There are nationalist Buddhist movements in Myanmar and they are building a populist case on fear of immigration and fear of Muslim minorities taking over control in the country. Another key point in this thesis is the examination of whether there is a connection between democratization and violence in Myanmar. The thesis explores whether the colonial era, the military rule, the road to independence and the process of democratization in Myanmar have created breeding grounds for violence and discrimination and if the democratic freedoms, including freedom of expression, are a tool for incitement to hatred and violence. The thesis eventually concludes that Myanmar’s transition towards democracy correlates with the institutional discrimination of the Rohingya Muslims on multiple levels. The discrimination of the Rohingya has its roots in the colonial era. During that time, the first emphasis on the distinction of ethnic groups in Myanmar was made and it had its influence on the political arena nowadays. Therefore, the conflicts in the country can be seen as a product of the country’s historic transition. In addition, the thesis concludes that the active role of the government in the anti-Muslim violence, the discriminatory laws and policies and the hate fueled speeches which incite hatred and violence, will continue to undermine the process of democratization in Myanmar. Thus, the discrimination and violence against the Rohingya Muslims can also be seen as obstacles to the transition of the country towards a stable democracy.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank my supervisor, Kjell Anderson, for his advice and feedback on this thesis. I appreciate the time he made free to discuss the thesis and to navigate me in the right direction when needed. Without his expertise, patience and support, this thesis would not have been possible. I am also grateful to Thijs Bouwknegt, for supporting this thesis and accepting to be the second reader.
I must thank the history faculty of the University of Amsterdam and the NIOD staff for the interesting courses, lectures, literature and discussions. I also want to thank my dear friend Hiba Al-Jarah for her critical view on my writing. My parents and sister deserve special mention for their advice and moral support. I am very grateful – thank you.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction 9
I. The Rise of Democracy in Myanmar 17
History………. 17 Democratic transition……….. 21 Nation building and Nationalism………... 23
II. Buddhist nationalism 26
Buddhism in Myanmar 26
Buddhist nationalism……… 28 969 Movement……… 29 Hate Speech and Propaganda……… 31
III. The Rohingya in Myanmar 37
The Rohingya………. 37 The Government……… 40 Violence……….. 43
Conclusion 48
9
Introduction
In the fall of 2015, Myanmar took an important step towards democracy. The country held general parliamentary elections on the 13th of November, which can be seen as a cautious transition away from decades-long military rule. This transition to democratic governance is widely known on an international level.1 During and even before this transition, Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of General Aung San, has become an international and national symbol of peaceful resistance in the face of oppression. She has been fighting for human rights and democracy in Myanmar for decades and she won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. As the leader of the National League for Democracy (NLD) she won a victory at the 2015-elections, taking 86 percent of the seats in the Assembly of the Union.
The transition of the country towards a stable democracy in the last few years has been widely lauded and has got much international attention.2 New policy initiatives, the sincerity of elite actors about the need for consensus on the transition towards democracy, progressive economic policy changes and the sentiment for social and political change are but a few indicators that the country is on a democratizing path.3 This might have overshadowed reasons for concern, such as the human rights situation in the country or the marginalization of minorities. Myanmar is engaged in conflicts with several different ethnic minority groups that seek self-determination and political inclusion. In addition, Myanmar’s transition to democracy is even beset by state-sanctioned violence, mostly against members of Muslim-minorities.4
There is a particular group that suffers most from the still increasing anti-Muslim violence. This group are the so-called Rohingya anti-Muslims. They face severe discrimination, abuse and violence. Atrocities against this group include rape, murder, limits on the right to bear children, limits on movement, forced labor and
1 Barany, Z., “Moving toward democracy: The 2015 parliamentary elections in Myanmar”. Electoral Studies (2016).
2
Eck, K. (2013), Myanmar’s democratic transition: Doomed to stall, at:
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/02/2013211111131805524.html/indepth/opinion/2013/ 02/2013211111131805524.html
3 Wilson, T., “Debating Democratization in Myanmar”, in: Cheesman, N, Farrelly and T. Wilson, Debating Democratization in Myanmar (Singapore, 2014), 12.
4 Abdelkader, E., “Myanmar’s democracy struggle: the impact of communal violence upon Rohingya
10 segregation.5 The conflict with the Rohingya Muslims rests on their statelessness.6 The United Nations has labeled the group as “the world’s most persecuted minority”.7 What is the impact of the violations against the Rohingya Muslims on the transition of Myanmar towards a strong democracy? This thesis focuses on the correlation between the democratic transition in Myanmar to the institutional discrimination of- and the violence against the Rohingya Muslims.
The urgency of the situation in Myanmar makes it necessary to look into the conflicts surrounding the Rohingya and the process of democratization in Myanmar. At the end of June 2016, religious tensions in the country were running high again after a Buddhist mob destroyed a mosque.8 This is one of the latest flare-ups of anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar, which has seen several outbursts in the last decades. Since the elections, religious and ethnic violence and anti-Muslim agitation are aspects of competition for political power. The underlying distrust between ethnic groups in the country is thus exploited by powerful political actors.9
At the end of August 2016, the new government of Myanmar sought international expertise to try and find solutions to the conflict between the Buddhists and the Rohingya Muslims. Former U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan will be the head of a nine-member commission that will look at the issues in the country. However, already at the beginning of September, hundreds rallied against this advisory commission.10
On the one hand, Myanmar has been praised for its achievements in creating stability, a degree of democratic politics and a relative stable economy, but on the other hand, the effects of the violence and policies against Muslims in the country have been negative and exclusionary. The causes of these exclusionary policies in Myanmar may lead back to the colonial era, as chapter one of this thesis examines. Myanmar gained independence from Great-Britain in 1948, and since then, the country has known continuous conflicts, internal strives and discrimination of ethnic
5 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Burma – The Plight of the Rohingya”, at:
http://www.ushmm.org/confront-genocide/cases/burma
6 Kipgen, N., “Conflict in Rakhine State in Myanmar: Rohingya Muslims’ Conundrum”, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (2013).
7
Philips, A., “The World’s Blind Spot”, Harvard International Review (2013).
8 ABC News. 26 June 2016. Myanmar: Tensions high after Buddhist mob attacks village mosque, at
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-06-26/myanmar-religious-tensions-mosque-destroyed/7544392
9 Nilsen, M., and Tonnesson, S., “High Risk of Electoral Violence in Myanmar”, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014).
10 The Wire. 07 September 2016, “Hundreds Protest in Myanmar Against Kofi Annan-led Panel on
11 or religious groups.11 Myanmar is one of the most ethnically and religiously diverse and complex countries in the world. In colonial times, the notion of ethnicity became politicized and the biggest ethnic group controlled, next to the colonial administration, all state powers and governing systems.12 The country was divided into administrative regions: a southern region which became ‘Ministerial Burma’, and a northern region which was not considered civilized. The Bamar or Burmese people – the dominant ethnic group – was privileged by the British rulers in the southern region. Anthropologist Michael Gravers states:
The colonial power thus divided the country according to a mountain-valley dichotomy, which was both political and cultural. The mountains compromised ‘the frontier areas’ with their ‘tribal’ peoples, who had not yet reached sufficiently civilized state to be included under the same administration policy as ‘Ministerial Burma’ […].13
This multi-ethnic model of colonial administration contained an acknowledgement of ethnic, religious and cultural differences and became “the yardstick of national identity and political power”, according to Gravers.14
Nowadays, Myanmar continues to have ethnic and religious divides. The current government regards political claims based on ethnicity as a major problem for the stability of the state. In addition, the many different ethnic groups in the country and particularly their elites, consider the lack of ethnic rights and democracy to be the main problem. Michael Gravers argues that the politicized role of ethnicity, combined with nationalism in the building of the colonial and post-colonial state is the root of conflict in Myanmar.15 The transition to democracy in Myanmar is thus a big challenge for the multi-ethnic population. In addition, in general, according to political scientists Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder “democratizing states are more likely to fight wars than states that undergo no change in regime”.16
Dr. M. Nilsen, senior researcher at the Peace Research Institute in Oslo has said:
11 Callahan, M. P. Political Authority in Burma's Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation and Coexistence (Washington 2007), 83.
12 Sakhong, L.H., “The Dynamics of Sixty Years of Ethnic Armed Conflict in Burma”, Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies (2012).
13 Gravers, M, Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma (Surray 1999), 25. 14
Ibid, 30.
15 Gravers, M., Exploring Ethnic Diversity in Burma (NIAS Press, 2007), vii.
12 For an already civil war-torn country like Myanmar, where the […] majority constitutes roughly 65% of the total population and where the democratization process has been slow and tedious, and by all probability will continue to be so, there are good reasons for concern. In fact, since the start of the democratic transition in 2010 we have already seen a significant rise in battle-related deaths in Myanmar17
In general, with the process of democratization, often ethnically based political parties emerge. Former American Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stresses the point that democratization exacerbates ethnic conflict.18 Political parties based on ethnicity allow people to differentiate themselves from others with a different ethnic or religious affiliation.19 In the process of democratization in Myanmar, ethnicity as well as religion and the notion of citizenship are important. Donald Horowitz states that when citizenship corresponds to a common origin, ethnicity makes a significant political difference.20 In addition, he states that ethnicity is based on a myth of collective ancestry which reinforces the identity of a group.21 The first and second chapter of this thesis examine how national identity in Myanmar is formed through history, ethnicity and by a process of inclusion and exclusion. Group identities are often transferred into the political system and strengthen collective self-esteem. This provides people with a sense of belonging but it can also create more divisions in society because it is often unconsciously determined who belongs and who does not belong.
Buddhism is also used to build the national identity in Myanmar. It is the prevalent religion and it has a dominating role in the official description of national culture and identity. Therefore it is a highly salient factor in society and politics.22 The increasing anti-Muslim violence in Myanmar goes hand in hand with the emergence of extreme Buddhist nationalism.23 This contradicts the idea of Buddhism as a peaceful and non-violent religion. Buddhism is often connected to concepts such as peace, non-violence, monks, asceticism and meditation. The principle of non-violence
17 Nilsen, M., “Will Democracy bring Peace to Myanmar?”, International Area Studies Review (2013). 18
L.E. Peterson and S. Sayari, Democratization and Ethnic Conflict, Summary of Two Meetings (Washington, 1992), 3.
19
Ibid.
20 D.L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 1985), 52.
21 L.E. Peterson and S. Sayari, Democratization and Ethnic Conflict, Summary of Two Meetings. 22 Gravers, M., “Spiritual Politics, Political Religion, and Religious Freedom in Burma”, The Review of Faith & International Affairs, (2013).
23 Dukalskis, A., “Transitional Justice in Burma/Myanmar: Cross-national Patterns and Domestic
13 and the promise not to kill are known as having a larger place in Buddhism than in any other religion.24 Buddhism may often be associated with these concepts with a positive connotation. However, around 1999, a radical Buddhist movement emerged, propagating defense and violence against Islam and Muslims.
Ashin Wirathu is the controversial political-religious leader of this radical Buddhist anti-Muslim movement, called the ‘969 Movement’. This movement is known for its public speeches about defending Buddhism against Islam and Muslims. The speeches of the monks of the 969 Movement are full of violent rhetoric and have much influence on the Buddhist population.25 The dangers of this influence of extreme Buddhist nationalism are described in the second chapter of this thesis. Due to the violent rhetoric in the speeches of the popular Buddhist monks of the 969 Movement, hatred is incited and some form of Islamophobia is created in the predominantly Buddhist nation.26 The tensions that build up often escalate into violence, which is carried out in the name of the movement or in connection to other anti-Muslim propaganda.
Not only do the Rohingya Muslims suffer from stigmatization, harassment and violence; it even goes further into systematic weakening of the group through institutionalized discrimination which results in forcibly living in camps, a lack of health care, sporadic killings, psychological destruction and malnutrition. In Myanmar, there is a legal basis for the exclusion of the Rohingya Muslims from citizenship in the form of the 1982 Citizenship Law.27 The situation of the Rohingya Muslims is further described in chapter three of this thesis. Democracy advocate Maung Zarni describes the conditions the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar are living in as a “slow-burning genocide”.28 Zarni was not the only one to view the violence against the Rohingya that way.
In September 2015, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, part of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, placed Myanmar at the top of
24 Strathern, A., “Why are Buddhist Monks Attacking Muslims”, Colombo Telegraph (2013). 25 Gravers, M., “Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism in Burma and Sri Lanka: Religious Violence and
Globalized Imaginaries of Endangered Identities”, Contemporary Buddhism: An Interdisciplinary
Journal (2015).
26 Beech, H., “The Face of Buddhist Terror”, Time, (2013). 27 Human Rights Watch, “Discrimination in Arakan” (2000), at:
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burma/burm005-02.htm
28 Zarni, M. and Cowley, A., “The Slow-Burning Genocide of Myanmar’s Rohingya”, Pacific Rim Law and Policy Journal (2014).
14 their list of countries where genocide is at risk.29 According to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, genocide is defined by “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such (…).30 In the case of Myanmar, the targeted group are the Rohingya Muslims. Can the atrocities in Myanmar then be labeled as a genocide? In October 2015, the International State Crime Initiative (ISCI) also gave a warning about the organized violence against Rohingya Muslims turning into genocide in Myanmar.31 The ISCI Report on the situation of the Rohingya in Myanmar, says the “ISCI concludes that genocide is taking place in Myanmar and warns of the serious and present danger of the annihilation of the country’s Rohingya population”.32
The Non-governmental organization United to end Genocide, marked Myanmar as “the number one country that is susceptible to state-led mass killing”.33 This proves that the atrocities in Myanmar do not go unnoticed. The ongoing conflicts have led to much criticism and condemnation from the international community. The word ‘genocide’ carries a heavy load. When one defines certain acts as genocide, often immediate response or a reaction is expected.
In what way is the process of democratization in Myanmar connected to this genocidal violence? Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder argue:
Democratization typically creates a syndrome of weak central authority, unstable domestic coalitions, and high-energy mass politics. It brings new social groups and classes onto the political stage. Political leaders, finding no way to reconcile incompatible interests, resort to short-sighted bargains or reckless gambles in order to maintain their governing coalitions. Elites need to gain mass allies to defend their weakened positions. Both the newly ambitious elites and the embattled old ruling groups often use appeals to nationalism to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions. Needing public support, they rouse the masses with nationalist propaganda but find that their mass allies, once mobilized, are difficult to control.34
29 United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, “Early Warning Project Ranks Countries at Risk for
Mass Atrocities”, 2015, at http://www.ushmm.org/information/press/press-releases/early-warning-project-ranks-countries-at-risk-for-mass-atrocities
30 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Article 2,
1948, at: https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021-english.pdf
31 Green, P., MacManus, T. and De La Cour Venning, A., “Countdown to Annihilation: Genocide in
Myanmar”, International State Crime Initiative (2015), at http://statecrime.org/state-crime-research/isci-report-countdown-to-annihilation-genocide-in-myanmar/
32
Ibid.
33 United to end Genocide, “Burma”, at http://endgenocide.org/conflict-areas/burma/
15 Political scientists Rudolph Rummel, Barbara Harff and Ted Gurr have written about the scope and character of genocides in correlation to politics, especially democracies. In their studies, they seek explanatory variables that can assist in identifying the countries where genocide is at risk.35 According to research of Harff and Gurr, Myanmar is one of the countries with the highest risk of genocide.36 Barbara Harff states:
Genocides occur with alarming frequency during or shortly after the revolutionary takeovers. Especially dangerous are situations in which long-standing ethnic rivalries erupt and radicalized groups armed with a revolutionary ideology gain the upper hand.37
Myanmar has known a revolutionary takeover in 1988. In 1962, general U Ne Win staged a successful coup and installed a repressive military regime.38 By 1988, citizens had enough of the failing military rule and protested and demonstrated against the reign of U Ne Win. Eventually, after these mass demonstrations with many fatalities, U Ne Win resigned.
As previously mentioned, this thesis answers the question of whether there is a correlation between the democratic transition in Myanmar to the institutional discrimination of- and the violence against the Rohingya Muslims. To answer this question, the first chapter focuses on the history of Myanmar, the rise of democracy and the process of democratization. On some levels of the process of transition to democracy, there are historical parallels. Throughout the thesis comparisons are made with the process of transition to democracy of Rwanda, from roughly 1960 until 1990, to address the similarities or differences of democratization.
The first chapter discusses the role of ethnicity and nationalism in politics and the forming of a national identity. First a short history of the country is presented, but the emphasis of this part will be the risks of the multi-party democracy in the country. Theories of Donald Horowitz, Lars-Erik Cederman and Zygmunt Bauman are used. The second chapter of the thesis looks into the role and power of Buddhism in Myanmar in the context of Buddhist nationalism. It gives more insight to the consequences of Buddhist nationalism and incitement as a form of propaganda. The
35 A. Jones, Genocide: A Comprehensive Introduction 2nd Edition (New York, 2011), 446-448.
36
Ibid,, 449.
37 H. Fein, Genocide: A Sociological Perspective (London, 1993), 40. 38
16 chapter describes the anti-Muslim sentiment and discusses the purposes of propaganda and hate speeches. In addition, the question whether the acts of the Buddhist nationalists can be considered genocidal, is examined. In this chapter theories of Catarina Kinnvall, Rohan Jayasekara and Mark Juergensmeyer are used.
The overarching theme of the thesis is the connection between democratization and violence. In Myanmar, the transition towards a stable democracy is the guiding principle of the country’s politics and policies. The third chapter shows the history and the current situation of the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. It discusses the discrimination and examines whether the ongoing violence against the group threatens the democratization process. The focus of this chapter is on the function and purpose of the violence aimed at the Rohingya Muslims. In what way is the violence a result of the process of democratization in the country? In addition, the chapter gives insight to the implications of the violence for the process of democratization in Myanmar. Theories of David Weissbrodt, Daniel Feirestein, and Nick Cheesman are used.
To progress towards a successful democracy, Myanmar has to address the situation of the Rohingya. Aung San Suu Kyi has made it clear that democracy is unquestionably her goal for Myanmar. Due to this, she has been criticized for not responding to the violence against the Rohingya. She has become a larger voice in Myanmar’s parliament and the issue of the Rohingya Muslims is very politicized. Therefore, she has been careful in her statements about the Rohingya issue in the country, trying to not further escalate the situation. The question rises then whether the Rohingya issue undermines a steady transition towards democracy. The situation in Myanmar, with on the one hand many steps towards a democratic transition and on the other hand the hate-fueled speeches, discrimination and violence against Muslims, seems somewhat contradictory. The discrepancy of these proceedings asks for further research about the democratization of Myanmar and the almost synchronous plight of the Rohingya Muslims. This thesis therefore examines the process of the democratic transition in Myanmar and the connection between democratization, nationalism, religion, propaganda and the violence and institutional discrimination aimed at the Rohingya Muslims.
17
I. The Rise of Democracy in Myanmar
This chapter provides an overview of the history of Myanmar, covering the pre-colonial era, the pre-colonial era, the independence and the military rule. In addition, it provides insight to the democratic transition and other recent developments in the country, describes the importance of ethnicity and national identity in politics and compares the political situation in Myanmar to other cases of democratization in the past.
History
Myanmar, with a population of over 50 million, is a multi-ethnic state.39 It is one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world.40 No one knows exactly how many ethnic groups there are in Myanmar, but the Burmese (the old “Bamar” people), are the largest group. Buddhism is, with roughly 88% of the population, the main religion in the country, followed by Christianity and Islam, both around 5% of the population.41
The cause of the ethnic, cultural and religious diversity in Myanmar lies in the country’s history. Some scholars say that since the independence in 1948, Myanmar had major problems with the formation of a national identity, but that started long before. Throughout the country’s history there were always ethnic minorities actively rebelling against the ruling elite. The colonization of Myanmar by Britain seems to have played a crucial role in the polarization of the ethnic groups in the country. The traces of current Myanmar go back to the ninth century. At that time, multiple kingdoms ruled side by side in the area that is now Myanmar. During the ninth century there was a fierce battle between the Mon-people and the Bamar-people.42 The Bamar won and this led eventually, in the eleventh century, to the first kingdom of Myanmar, led by Anawrahta. This kingdom lasted from 1044 to 1287 and it unified the country for the first time. This was the golden age for Myanmar – it was the period in which hundreds of temples were built in Bagan.43
39
Snitwongse, K. and Thompson, W.S., Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (Singapore 2005), 67-68.
40 Smith, M., State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma (Singapore 2007), 8. 41 The World Factbook (2014), “Burma”, Central Intelligence Agency, at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html
42
Myanmar, “Periodical History of Myanmar”, at http://www.myanmars.net/myanmar-history/myanmar-periodical-history.htm
18 In 1287 the Mongols attacked Myanmar and the country disintegrated into several small states. In the sixteenth century, king Bayinnaung succeeded in conquering some of these small states and founded the second kingdom of Myanmar. This lasted until 1752, when the Mon revolted and took power. After a short time, the Mon were overcome by Alaungpaya who proclaimed to be king of the third kingdom of Myanmar. The capital of the kingdom often shifted from place to place, but in 1861 Mandalay became the capital. 44
In the nineteenth century, the British were quite active in the region from India to current Myanmar. At that time, the area that is now Myanmar, was seen as a province of British India. Several disputes about borders and trade with the British Empire on the borders of India led to three wars between the British Empire and Myanmar in 1824, 1852 and 1885. In 1885, the British Empire had full control over Myanmar.45
In an attempt to ensure control, the British rulers weakened the customs of the indigenous peoples by imposing British traditions and hierarchy. In addition, the British destabilized aspects of the previous political and societal structure and imposed their own administration as an attempt to further economic and social development of the area.46 The country was divided into two administrative regions. The lower area of Myanmar was governed from Rangoon by British Indian government officials and was considered the most important territory. The surrounding, higher areas were decentralized and were led by indigenous leaders.47 Thus, in order to govern the country well, the British rules have used and exploited the differences in ethnicity of the colonial society in Myanmar. This shows that during the colonial era, the first emphasis on the distinction of ethnic groups in Myanmar was made.48 This has contributed to the differences between – and the forming of identities of several ethnic groups in Myanmar nowadays.49
In the 1920s and 1930s the British government made more concessions with elites in Myanmar to their demands for more self-government. During that time, a gap
44 Myanmar, Periodical History of Myanmar.
45 Encyclopaedia Britannica, Anglo-Burmese Wars, at
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Anglo-Burmese-Wars
46 Clifford, R., “The Rise and Fall of British Investment in Burma”, Asian Affairs (1975). 47 Walton, M., “Ethnicity, Conflict and History in Burma: The Myths of Panglong”, Asian Survey
(2008).
48
Clifford, R., “The Rise and Fall of British Investment in Burma”.
49 Holliday, I., “Ethnicity and Democratization in Myanmar”, Asian Journal of Political Science
19 emerged in the community of Myanmar between the nationalist politics of the elite and the ethnic politics of the grass-roots.50 The (educated) elite bargained with the British rulers for governmental influence and therefore they became increasingly separated from nationalist activity at the grass-roots level. There were class differences in colonial Myanmar, which reinforced the ethnic tensions. Buddhist elites were unsatisfied with the way the British rulers implemented an unequal tax-system and an unequal education system. The British missionaries created even deeper ethnic divisions when they favored teaching to minority groups they converted. Michael Gravers states that this “distorted development is an important factor that has augmented the ethnic race-related oppositions […]”.51
The Buddhist elites formed movements such as the “Young Men’s Buddhist Association” and the “Dobama Asiayone”, which means “We Burmese Association”.52
These movements began to integrate xenophobic slogans in their rallies against the British colonial rule. The emphasis of these movements was on the rejection of all foreign influence, which, in the eyes of the elites, generated greed, hatred, drunkenness and theft.53
This nationalist activity emphasized the threat posted to the Buddhist religion by British rule and immigrant domination of the economy.54 The uprisings and riots at the beginning of the twentieth century were as much directed against the non-Burmese people as against the British authorities.
During the Second World War, the Japanese expelled the British rulers. Initially, most of the peoples of Myanmar chose therefore the side of the Japanese, but they did not have the best intentions either. Therefore, Myanmar chose the side of the Allied forces after the Japanese were defeated at the end of the Second World War.55 Immediately after the Second World War, Bogyoke Aung San, father of Aung San Suu Kyi, gained power. He won the elections in 1947, but he was assassinated before
50 Christie, C.J., A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism.
(New York, 1996), 58-59.
51 Gravers, M., Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma (Surrey 1999), 28-29. 52
Christie, C.J., A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism. 58-59.
53 Gravers, M., Nationalism as Political Paranoia in Burma, 30-31.
54 Christie, C.J., A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism,
58-59.
55 BBC History, The Buma Campaign 1941-1945, at
20 he could take office. In 1948, Myanmar became officially independent, with U Nu as the first Prime Minister of the country.
In 1962, general U Ne Win staged a coup, because the government of U Nu was plagued by economic stagnation, ethnic-minority insurrections and administrative inefficiency. U Ne Win imprisoned U Nu and established the Revolutionary Council of the Union of Burma.56 He installed a repressive and communist military dictatorship. The military in Myanmar is called the Tatmadaw. This military regime has been characterized by xenophobia and a fear of being removed from power. There have been many extensive threats to self-rule of Myanmar throughout history, such as the British colonization, and even before that with the invasion of the Mongols, the Chinese, the Shan and the Siamese. Therefore, during the military rule of U Ne Win, citizens were taught that ethnic minorities and foreigners would take over the country if it were not for the protection by the Tatmadaw.57 U Ne Win and the military started a socialist economic program, formulated a new constitution and made Myanmar into a one-party state in 1964. At that time, the sole party permitted to exist was the “Burmese Socialist Program Party” BSPP.
By 1988, the people of Myanmar became unsatisfied with the reign of U Ne Win. He had turned Myanmar into one of the world’s poorest countries.58
The people had enough of the failing military rule with its corruption and mismanagement. This led to mass demonstrations, that were often led by monks. These protests were violently suppressed, with many fatalities. After the demonstrations Ne Win resigned, but he remained politically active and he still had influence behind the scenes.59 The national elections in 1990, organized by generals, were won by the National League for Democracy (NLD). The Tatmadaw and its ruling body disregarded the outcome and arrested many democracy activists or placed them under house arrest. Aung San Suu Kyi, head of the NLD, was one of the people that were placed under house arrest.60 In this period, there were again many protests and demonstrations, mostly led by monks. These led, as before, also to executions of many civilians and monks.
56 Encyclopaedia Britannica, U Ne Win, at https://www.britannica.com/biography/U-Ne-Win 57 Bahar, A., Burma’s Missing Dots: The Emerging Face of Genocide: Essays on Chauvinistic Nationalism and Genocide in Burma; with the Popular Novel Rohingyama, (Indiana 2010), 16. 58
Encyclopaedia Britannica, U Ne Win, at https://www.britannica.com/biography/U-Ne-Win
59 Ibid.
21 Since 2010 Aung San Suu Kyi has been released and in 2012 she was elected as Member of the Parliament. Thein Sein was elected president of the new formed parliament. There may not have been military rule anymore, but the government still held the same people. This changed in 2015. On November 8th from that year, general elections were held and they gave the NLD a majority of votes.
Democratic transition
In the colonial era, the British rulers instrumentally politicized the different peoples in the country. Nowadays, the political factions are organized along ethnic or religious lines. There are numerous political parties, but the NLD and the USPD are the biggest in Myanmar. The NLD is the most popular political party among the majority of the people.61
Myanmar is, as said, one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world. Since the end of 2015, and a few years before that, the country is on its way towards democracy. The national elections on November 13 that year can be understood as part of a managed transition. Government officials of Myanmar openly advocated for a guided democracy and wished the country to be viewed as full participant in the international community.62
In 2011, a few years earlier, Myanmar’s military regime already started the democratic transition by organising multi-party elections to the Union assembly and the State and Region assemblies. These elections were largely controlled by the military and therefore boycotted by several political parties. In 2012, a few weeks after by-elections and a victory for the NLD, ethnic riots erupted in Rakhine state between Buddhists and Rohingya Muslims. The riots started after a group of Rohingya men allegedly raped and killed a Rakhine woman.63 The violence it resulted in, can be seen as part of retaliation – despite the fact that it was solely based on
61 Nilsen, M., and Tonnesson, S., “High Risk of Electoral Violence in Myanmar”, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014).
62 DuPont, S., Holzgrafe, M., Katyal, R., Kobiljar, E., Krejsa, H., Kumar, V., Burton, H., Elections and Political Transition in Myanmar (Project Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs),
2015.
63
Anderson, K., “Lighting the Spark: The Mobilization of Anti-Muslim Violence in Burma”, The
Sentinel Project, at https://thesentinelproject.org/2014/10/24/lighting-the-spark-the-mobilization-of-anti-muslim-violence-in-burma/
22 rumors. In October 2012, riots broke out again, leaving almost two-hundred people dead and more than hundred thousand people, mostly Rohingya Muslims, displaced.64 Professor Donald Horowitz of Duke University argues that ethnically divided countries such as Myanmar, are unlikely to see democratic transitions without conflict.65 Horowitz was, in the case of Myanmar, right. One of the country’s dark sides is the anti-Muslim violence, still increasing and especially aimed at the Rohingya Muslims. This anti-Muslim violence goes hand in hand with the emergence of extreme Buddhist nationalism.66 The question rises then, whether or not the democratic transition of Myanmar has triggered new conflicts through political competition. Professor Lars-Erik Cederman states “political competition produces winners and losers, and the destabilizing sequencing of democratic procedures”.67 The increasing problems of religious and ethnic violence in Myanmar can thus be seen as aspects of competition for political power.
According to Ian Holliday, professor of Social Sciences, studies on democratization highlight “potentially derailing problems such as warlike nationalism and violent ethnic conflict”.68 Myanmar has to change away from its authoritarian past and towards a more “normatively, desirable, inclusive, plural and liberal future, including the resolution of its outstanding ethnic conflicts”, argues Damien Kingsbury.69 The involvement of the military of Myanmar, the Tatmadaw, and its continuing role in the struggle for power is a challenge in the process of Myanmar’s political transition, according to Kingsbury. The military has an interest in remaining a political force and has strong ties with the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), the biggest opposing political party. The constitution of Myanmar reserves a political leadership role for the military as it allots 25% of the seats in parliament for sitting military officers and in addition, the military has a veto over constitutional
64 Nilsen, M., and Tonnesson, S., “High Risk of Electoral Violence in Myanmar”, Peace Research Institute Oslo (2014).
65 Horowitz, D.L., “Democracy in divided societies”, Journal of Democracy (1993). 66
Dukalskis, A., “Transitional Justice in Burma/Myanmar: Cross-national Patterns and Domestic Context”, Irish Studies in International Affairs (2015).
67 Cederman, L.E., Hug, S. and Krebs, L.F., “Democratization and Civil War: Empirical Evidence”, Journal of Peace Research (2010).
68
Holliday, I., “Voting and Violence in Myanmar”, Asian Survey (2008).
69 Kingsbury, D., ´Political Transition in Myanmar: Prospects and Problems”, Asian Politics & Policy
23 change.70 However, there also remains scope for closer collaboration to deal with the ongoing conflicts in the country and for maintaining state unity.
Nation building and Nationalism
During the process of modernization, the ideas of a modern nation state, identity, inclusion and exclusion play an important role. With the political transition of Myanmar, building a strong state unity was necessary.
In the colonial era, the British rulers did not engage in nation-building, but rather divided the entities of the country through a divide-and-rule policy. Benedict Anderson says that nations are imagined communities and that the nation, nationalism and national identity are constructed around certain lines.71 When creating national identity, it is often unconsciously determined who belongs and who does not belong. This form of social closure sets for a major part the identity of a nation state.72
According to sociologist Zygmunt Bauman modern nationalism divided the world into national domains, leaving no space for internationalism.73 In a modernizing society, a particular group can be constructed as alien – a non-national void. Already during the colonial period in Myanmar was determined who did and did not belong to the ‘main’ group in the country: the “Bamar”. The division of two administrative zones imposed by the British, one in the center and one in the peripheral area, ensured a social divide between the “real Burmese” and various ethnic groups long before the country’s independence.74
In the colonial era thus lays a foundation for the exclusion of certain ethnic groups. On the one hand, the elites of the center were influenced by European, secular concepts of a nation-state and they sought to develop a national identity which included all the peoples from Myanmar. On the other hand, the peoples from the peripheral area, the grass-roots, emphasized a more exclusive national identity which was more aimed at ethnic national symbols of Myanmar such as race, religion and a shared history.75
70 Huang, R.L., “Re-thinking Myanmar’s political regime: military rule and implications for current
reforms”, Contemporary Politics (2013).
71
Anderson, B., Imagined Communities (New York 1991).
72 Wimmer, A., Nationalist Exclusion and Ethnic Conflict. Shadows of Modernity (Cambridge 2002)
3-9.
73 Bauman, Z., Modernity and the Holocaust (New York 2000), 53-55. 74
Nyein, S.P., “Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Burma”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (2009).
75 Christie, C.J., A Modern History of Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Nationalism and Separatism.
24 In Rwanda, colonized by Belgium from 1919 until 1962 , there was a similar system of colonial rule. The Belgian rulers, made, just as the British rulers in Myanmar, use of the existing distinction between different communities in the country. The differences between the communities were magnified and due to that, the ethnic distinction rooted in Rwandese society.76 The Hutus in Rwanda faced oppression, humiliation and socio-economic inferiority. Growing polarization resulted in increasing polarization of the different communities in the country. The Belgian colonial administration had thus a similarly significant role in Rwanda on the level of exploiting the existing ethnic distinctions in society as the British rulers in Myanmar have had.
In the case of Myanmar, the exploiting of different communities, the social closure and politicized ethnicity began during the colonial era. The colonial stratification also contributed to the creation of different ethnic nationalisms in Myanmar. Ethnic groups bring feelings of collectiveness, cohesion, long-term trust and support and may carry great benefits.77 However, with these multiple ethnic nationalisms in Myanmar, there is no unity – which is an important aspect of nation building.
A key factor of the process of nation building is that different ethnic groups within the nation state can also identify their group with the ideology and (cultural) symbolism of the country in some way. A key requirement for national unity is the acceptance of common history and the accompanying symbolism and myths about the creation of national unity. A common history is a strong nation building concept, because it gives a feeling of a shared past and a sense of collectivism and connectedness.78
The idea of a shared history as part of the process of nation building also has its downsides. Myths about the national history might conflict with stories of the past of minority groups, which can be a ground for creating distance between ethnic groups rather than creating unity. In addition, constructing national history can lead to a difference in perception of identity between the envisaged national myth and other indigenous views on the past. This contradiction applies to various ethnic groups in
76 Mamdani, M., When victims become killers: colonialism, nativism, and the genocide in Rwanda.
(Princeton 2001), 24.
77
Oberschall, A., Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence (New York 2007), 5.
25 Myanmar, and has reinforced the sense that some ethnic groups do not belong, because they lack the shared history and identity of Myanmar.79
Anthropologist Veena Das states about the process of nation-building the following:
There seems a fairly wide consensus among scholars that post-colonial ethnic conflicts can be traced to the colonial legacy of the arbitrary processes of drawing boundaries between states and subsequent failures in nation building80
During the colonial era, there was no nation-building in Myanmar, rather a division of the different ethnic groups. According to Das, it has been argued that “the association of particular regions within the nation state with particular ethnic groups led to sub-nationalism since these ethnicities got politicized in the process of nation making and democratic mobilization”.81
This sub-nationalism has been very recognizable with Buddhist nationalist groups from Rakhine state in Myanmar. The Rohingya Muslims mostly live in that region. At the same time, Rakhine state is also the region with the largest violent outbursts. The constitution of the “Union of Burma” which was signed in 1948, provided various and special rights for different ethnic groups, which showed acknowledgement of ethnic and cultural diversity in the country. In the 2008 constitution of Myanmar, even freedom of religion is mentioned, in article 34:
Every citizen is equally entitled to freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess and practise religion subject to public order, morality or health and to the other provisions of this Constitution.82
Political scientist Susanne Prager Nyein says this article has an underlying concept of “unity in diversity”, but it does not transcend ethnic differences or create political loyalty to the newly formed state.83 She states: “Instead, it reinforced the existing politicized ethnicity and fostered ideas about the unequal distribution of rights and
79 Walton, M., “Ethnicity, Conflict and History in Burma: The Myths of Panglong”. 80
Das, V., “Collective Violence and the Shifting Categories of Communal Riots, Ethnic Cleansing and Genocide”, in: Stone, D. The Historiography of Genocide (Palgrave, 2008), 98.
81 Ibid. 82
Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008, at
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs5/Myanmar_Constitution-2008-en.pdf
83 Nyein, S.P., “Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Burma”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (2009),
26 benefits”.84
In addition, the aforementioned article also seems to provide religious freedom for all religions. However, article 361-362 states:
The Union recognizes special position of Buddhism as the faith professed by the great majority of the citizens of the Union. The Union also recognizes Christianity, Islam, Hinduism and Animism as the religions existing in the Union at the day of the coming into operation of this Constitution.85
These articles show that Buddhism has a dominating role in the national culture and identity of Myanmar. In the country, nationality is often linked to Buddhism, since that is the main religion of the country. The following chapter gives more insight to Buddhism, how Buddhism is being used to build a national identity and the connection between the religion and the ongoing violence in the country.
84 Nyein, S.P., “Ethnic Conflict and State Building in Burma”, Journal of Contemporary Asia (2009),
128.
85 Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar, 2008, at
27
II. Buddhist Nationalism
This chapter provides an insight to Buddhism in Myanmar. As previously stated, the country has a religiously Buddhist majority and a minority of Muslims and other ethnic or religious groups. Over the last few years, violence against Muslims is increased. This anti-Muslim violence goes hand in hand with the emergence of extreme Buddhist nationalism.86 This chapter gives an overview of Buddhism in general, the role of Buddhism in Myanmar’s nationalism, anti-Muslim sentiment in Buddhist movements, propaganda and hate speeches.
Buddhism
There is no country in the world where every-day life is so influenced by Buddhism as Myanmar. David Steinberg, professor at Georgetown University and specialist on Myanmar, says “Buddhism is integral to Burman lives and government”.87
The religion is a provider of images and precepts for society, it is the foundation of the country and for the regulation of social life. It dominates every aspect of the society: the rites of passage, education and status in society for example. Monks are the among the most respected members of the society. They mediate problems between people and are always present at weddings and funerals. In addition, they have been largely involved in state administration throughout history.88
So Buddhism is prevalent in Myanmar and it is therefore a salient factor in politics as well. The religion is an ideological resource for the government. Divine Buddhist laws provide governing guidelines and are therefore inseparable from the laws of the state.89 In Buddhist cosmology, secular power protects the religious order. The sangha (the monastic community) cannot exist without the protection of the state. In return, the monastic community secures access of state rulers to religious merit (karma).90
As previously mentioned, one of the minority groups in Myanmar, the Rohingya, are religiously distinct from the majority of the people of Myanmar. They are predominately Muslim whilst the majority in Myanmar is Buddhist. There is
86
Dukalskis, A., “Transitional Justice in Burma/Myanmar: Cross-national Patterns and Domestic Context”.
87 Steinberg, D., Burma/Myanmar: What Everyone Needs to Know” (New York 2013), 24. 88 Ibid, 33.
89
Friendland, R., “Religious Nationalism and the Problem of Collective Representation”, Annual
Review of Sociology (2001).
28 increasing violence against this group, especially in Rakhine state, situated on the western coast of Myanmar. The anti-Muslim violence has been led by a radical Buddhist nationalist group called the 969 Movement, with nationalist activist Ashin Wirathu as its leader.
The connection between the anti-Muslim violence and Buddhism in general is contradictory to the Buddhist reputation as a non-violent, spiritual and peaceful religion. Meghal Perera, Shri Lankan journalist, also describes this contradiction: “A violent fanatical Buddhist organization should be a contradiction in terms. The terrifying truth is that these groups are impervious to this irony”.91
However, like all religions, Buddhism has also been used as a justification for violence. Rohan Jayasekara, an English journalist and advocate of freedom of speech, states that Buddhism “[…] can be as prone to violent expression as any other faith”.92
In addition, Kjell Anderson, lecturer and researcher at the Netherlands Institute for War, Holocaust and Genocide Studies (NIOD), says that “the state will draw from whatever doctrine it deems suitable, […] in order to provide higher justification for its own acts of violence”.93
This is what is happening in Myanmar. Buddhist nationalism has emerged and is seen as a counter-movement to the “threat” of Islam.
Buddhist Nationalism
Due to the country’s transition towards democracy, many citizens were and are concerned about Myanmar’s future. After overcoming the military regime, the country went into a period of uncertainty and fear. After the Second World War, many Rohingya Muslims were fled to neighboring countries because of tensions between different ethnic groups. During that time, a jihadist movement, the North Arakan Muslim League (NAML) was formed.94 Shortly after the independence of Myanmar in 1948 this group committed armed attacks on government forces in an attempt to create a separate Muslim state and to join Pakistani territory.95 This created a perception of increasing Muslim power in Myanmar and many Buddhists felt like
91
Jayasekera, R., “Narratives of hate”, Index on Censorship, (2013).
92 Ibid.
93 Anderson, K., “Truth hand Tribe: Religious and Ethnic Nationalism in Burma”, The Sentinel Project,
at: https://thesentinelproject.org/2014/10/09/truth-and-tribe-religious-and-ethnic-nationalism-in-burma/
94
Anderson, K., “The Enemy Next Door: Hate Speech in Burma”, The Sentinel Project, at:
https://thesentinelproject.org/2014/10/17/the-enemy-next-door-hate-speech-in-burma/#_ftn8
29 this power could endanger their collective identity. This contributed to the sense that the Muslims, and especially the Rohingya, were a threat.
In times of such uncertainty, religion, and especially Buddhism can provide a “basis for a new national consensus”, according to professor Mark Juergensmeyer.96
In addition, religion – combined with nationalism, can support and reaffirm ones self-identity. People often approach collectives that reinforce the feeling of security and comfort, which often can be found in religion.97 Religious nationalism often becomes, particularly in the case of Myanmar, a movement aiming at the defense of a group identity. Since the transition towards democracy, Buddhist nationalism generated fear of change and fear of all foreign influences and imported ideas.98
The 1982 Burman Citizenship Law refuses to recognize the Rohingya Muslims as an ethnic group within Myanmar. Thereby, a growing number of Buddhist monks, government officials as well as regular citizens, legitimize and encourage discrimination against this minority. The discrimination and marginalization of the group has worsened by public expressions of hatred and anti-Muslim propaganda by a number of nationalist Buddhist movements or influential Buddhist people, mostly monks. Over the past several years, due to this marginalization, there have been many instances of violence directed at the Rohingya Muslims. This has resulted in destroyed mosques and shops, displaced people and many casualties.
969 Movement
In July 2012, rumors that a Muslim man raped a Buddhist woman triggered violence in Rakhine state. Since then, mostly in Rakhine but in the other provinces of Myanmar as well, there are waves of riots, rampage, killings, arson and property destruction of particularly Rohingya Muslims.
The rumors were repeatedly exploited and spread among Buddhists by Ashin Wirathu. Wirathu is a Theravada monk and founder and leader of the radical Buddhist 969 Movement. The numbers in the name of the movement refer to the nine special attributes of Buddha himself, the six distinctive features of his teachings – Dhamma,
96 Juergensmeyer, M., “The Global Rise of Religious Nationalism”, Australian Journal of International Affairs (2010).
97
Kinnval, C., “Globalization and Religious Nationalism: Self, Identity and the Search for Ontological Security”, Political Psychology (2004).
30 and the nine characteristics of monks – Sangha.99 The 969 Movement uses numbered stickers to differentiate Buddhist houses and businesses from Muslim ones.100 These numbers are helping to create a sense of apartheid in communities in Myanmar. The 969 Movement is a Buddhist nationalist movement. Its leaders claim that the movement is non-violent, and a response to foreign influence on the Buddhist society. The following description of the 969 Movement is on its webpage: “The 969 Movement is a social movement to preserve the cultural traditions of Buddhism in Buddhist countries”. The underlying theme of the rhetoric of the 969 Movement is the sense that the Islam is going to overrun Myanmar. According to the 969 Movement, Buddhists must stand up to the Islam and their willingness to take over the world, and save their Buddhist way of life.101
The 969 Movement has its roots in 1999, when U Kyaw Lwin, a functionary in the ministry of religious affairs, published a 40-page brochure with the brief title “969”. After U Kyaw Lwin, Ashin Wirathu became the leader of the movement, which organizes campaigns in support of mutual aid to Buddhists. On the webpage of the 969 Movement is explained why the movement is needed:
The community of people who accept the truth of the Buddha’s teachings are part of a spiritual family, with the Buddha as the spiritual father, Prajnaparamita as the mother, and the men and women of the sangha as brothers and sisters. As a family works to help each other and protect one another, so to do Buddhists guard the Dhamma and holy places of Buddhist peoples. Alarmingly, there has been a large increase of subversive elements which have taken advantage of the special character of Buddhist countries to dissuade our people from living in accordance to the Dhamma. We want to change the dissatisfactory condition of Buddhist people being taken advantage of and prevent further subversion or defamation of our heritage.102
The ideas of U Kyaw Lwin came to prominence in 2012, when a religious order began to invoke the ideas of “969” in local anti-Muslim campaigns.103
99 969 Movement, “What is 969 Movement?”, at http://969movement.org/what-is-969-movement/ 100 Hodal, K., “Buddhist Monk uses Racism and Rumours to spread Hatred in Burma”, The Guardian
(2013).
101
Thompson, N.H., “The 969 Movement and Burmese Anti-Muslim Nationalism in Context”,
Buddhist Peace Fellowship (2013), at http://www.buddhistpeacefellowship.org/the-969-movement-and-burmese-anti-muslim-nationalism-in-context/
102 969 Movement, “What is 969 Movement?”. 103
The Atlantic , “969: The Strange Numerological Basis for Burma’s Religious Violence”, at
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/969-the-strange-numerological-basis-for-burmas-religious-violence/274816/
31
Hate speech and propaganda
Ashin Wirathu, the current leader of the 969 Movement, was arrested in 2003 and was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison in connection to the killings of ten Muslims at an anti-Muslim rebellion, but was pardoned in 2012.104 After that, he gave numerous vocal campaigns against Muslims in Myanmar. Wirathu is known in and out of Myanmar as the famous monk who is “stoking religious hatred” across Myanmar.105 He shares his often hate-filled speeches through DVD’s, leaflets and social media such as Facebook and YouTube. International media is mostly critical about him. He was on the cover of Time Magazine with the headline “The Face of Buddhist Terror” and his critics make references of him as the “Bin Laden of Buddhism”.106
Features that Wirathu mostly focuses on in his speeches are nationalism and the protection of Buddhist culture. In footage filmed in 2013 from a monastery in the town Mandalay, Wirathu stresses the notion of nationalism: “Nationalism must be a routine in your life as you eat, move or do business”. 107
In addition he urges to “join the 969 Buddhist nationalist campaign”.108
Wirathu also makes political statements, accusing the Muslims minority for misuse of politics: “Today the NLD party is in a good position and now they support the NLD party. […] All the Muslims become members of the party”.109
Later on in his speech, Wirathu adds: What would happen if they become head of the party, become a member of parliament or become a leader of our nation? It is not easy. Think wisely, it is scary”.110
On the one hand, Wirathu accuses Muslims of interference in political affairs, on the other hand, he expresses how his followers should think about the meaning of Buddhism’s role in politics. Wirathu also calls for action on an economic matter: “Your purchases spent in their [Muslim] shops will benefit the enemy, so do business
104
Gravers, M., “Anti-Muslim Buddhist Nationalism in Burma and Sri Lanka: Religious Violence and Globalized Imaginaries of Endagered Identities”.
105 Hodal, K., “Buddhist Monk uses Racism and Rumours to spread Hatred in Burma”. 106 “Burma’s ‘Bin Laden of Buddhism’”, Telegraph (2013), at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/burmamyanmar/10177815/Burmas-bin-Laden-of-Buddhism.html
107 Mezzofiore, G., “Fanatical Buddhist Monk Saydaw Wirathu Calling for Boycott of Myanmar
Muslims”, The International Business Times (2013), at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/saydaw-wirathu-myanmar-969-burma-450375
108
Ibid.
109 Ibid. 110 Ibid.
32 or interact with only our kind: same race and same faith”, and: “If we lose now, they would form groups and by the support of Saudi Arabia oil money, they compete our businesses”,111 Near the end of his speech he adds: “Do not let your money go to the enemy. By using that money, they will marry and their children will be a threat to the country. They will destroy your religion”.112
In addition, Wirathu speaks about the threat Muslims are to women, to the resources of the country and encourages his followers to protect their people: “They [Muslims] use the power of money to get women, to attract women”, “[…] our enemy would become powerful and they are more dangerous for us. They would one day take our resources from us” and “we golden Burmese would win this fight. After that we can win more and by concentrating on the target, we have to protect our race”.113
With speeches like these, Wirathu and his 969 Movement depict a Myanmar on the verge of an Islamic invasion. Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder explain that:
The trouble intensifies when elites in a democratizing society try to recruit mass allies to their cause. Threatened elite groups have an overwhelming incentive to mobilize mass backers on the elites' terms, using whatever special resources they might retain.114
The elite groups thus try to gain support from the masses because their privileged position situation is perceived to be unsure due to the process of democratization in Myanmar. Maung Zarni argues that the elites are highly responsible for the ongoing conflicts in the country:
The all-encompassing conflict seen today is constructed by the elite, which exploits each group’s distrust and fear of the ethnic Other, rather than by the grass roots. Although Myanmar’s elite of all ethnic and class backgrounds have engaged in this ethno-political mobilization, the over-whelming public sentiment is that the generals and their powerbase, the Tatmadaw, must bear the lion’s share of responsibility for the continuing conflicts and their own spectacular failures at nation-building.115
111 Mezzofiore, G., “Fanatical Buddhist Monk Saydaw Wirathu Calling for Boycott of Myanmar
Muslims”, The International Business Times (2013), at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/saydaw-wirathu-myanmar-969-burma-450375
112 Ibid. 113 Ibid. 114
Mansfield, E.D. and Snyder, J., “Democratization and War”, International Security (1995), 91.
115 Zarni, M., “An Inside View Of Reconciliation”, in Rieffel, L., Myanmar/Burma: inside challenges, outside interests (Washington, 2010), 57.
33 In Myanmar, many of the elites are either connected with the old military regime, are in the local governments or have connections to the drug trade in the country.116 They live in luxury compounds with schools and hospitals and they enjoy modern technology, electricity and water, unlike a large part of the rest of the country.117 They also have access to modern entertainment facilities and internet. This is a privileged position in relation to the rest of the people of the country.
However, this privileged position can be affected by the level of democratization. Some democratic policies which do not correlate with the preferences of the elites, might have a positive outcome for the larger part of society, such as policies on public security, infrastructure, health care and labor programs.118 These policies might have an impact on – or even threaten - the privileged status of the elites. Therefore, as Mansfield and Snyder stated in their article “Democratization and War”:
Elites need to gain mass allies to defend their weakened positions. Both the newly ambitious elites and the embattled old ruling groups often use appeals to nationalism to stay astride their unmanageable political coalitions,119
The 969 Movement therefore uses nationalism in their populist speeches to gain many followers. The campaigns of hate speech actively dehumanize Muslims and call for their social exclusion. Due to this, the preachers and their followers are socially distancing themselves from the targeted group. Mansfield and Snyder say that in many previous cases in history “nationalism proved to be the way for elite groups to appear populist in a democratizing society while obstructing the advance to full democracy”.120
The speeches of Wirathu play a key role in sustaining violence across Myanmar, because Wirathu and his movement are very popular in Myanmar; he has more than 200.000 followers on Facebook and given the country’s limited access to internet, that is quite a number.121
116 Facts and Details, “Society, Rich Cronies and Poverty in Myanmar”, at
http://factsanddetails.com/southeast-asia/Myanmar/sub5_5c/entry-3065.html
117
Ibid.
118 Bandeira, O., and Levy, G., “Diversity and the Power of Elites in Democratic Societies” (2010), at
http://personal.lse.ac.uk/levyg1/diversityandpower.pdf
119
Mansfield, E.D. and Snyder, J., “Democratization and War”, International Security (1995).
120
Ibid, 86.
121 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net: Myanmar, at
