A
C
OUNTRY
O
F
I
MMIGRANTS
N
O
M
ORE
?
THE SECURITIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA BETWEEN 2002 AND 2017Student name: Desirée Colomé Menéndez Student number: S2277719
Program: Crisis and Security Management MSc Supervisor: DJ Weggemans, MSc
Second reader: Prof. dr. JA Koops June, 2019
Wordcount: 23,546
i
A
CKNOWLEDGEMENTSGoing back to the student life was an extremely exciting experience.
I must first thank the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs of Mexico (SRE) and Mexico’s National Council on Science and Technology (CONACYT) for the opportunity to study this Master’s degree within the Scholarship Program for Members of the Mexican Foreign Service. I trust that the knowledge I acquired at the Crisis and Security Management MSc will allow me to continue working on behalf of Mexico with commitment and responsibility. It has been an honor.
I must also thank my supervisor, DJ Weggemans, for helping me throughout the process and making sure I did not lose my path. His advice was key to (try to) remain unbiased in a subject I am so passionate about.
Finally, my deepest appreciation for everyone who joined me and borne with me through this process: my family, my friends, Javier and Dartagnan. A piece of this thesis belongs to all of you.
ii
A
BSTRACTThis thesis studies the securitization of immigration in the United States of America (U.S.), through the analysis of the National Security Strategies (NSS) published by the last three presidents, George W. Bush, Barack Obama and Donald Trump between 2002 and 2017. This is done using a two-layered theoretical framework that combines securitization theory and agenda setting theory, as laid down in the explanatory model developed by Johan Eriksson and Erick Noreen to study security agendas. A discursive analysis of each of the NSS published by these three presidents allowed to understand how immigration and immigration-related issues appeared, were removed or were prioritized in the security agenda, and how they were framed (or not) as a threat to the national security of the U.S. The context in which each of these policy documents were published was also studied, focusing on shocking events that impact national security, changes in the political and institutional context, shifts in the conception of the American identity, and the prevailing public opinion on immigration. The main findings demonstrate that the securitization of immigration is not new and is not static. It should be understood as a dynamic process that depends on a variety of factors that change from time to time.
iii
T
ABLE OFC
ONTENTSACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ... i
ABSTRACT ... ii
1.INTRODUCTION ... 1
1.1 Researching immigration and security: why it is relevant ... 2
1.2 Research question and relevance... 5
1.3 Methodology ... 6
1.4 Reading guide ... 7
2.BACKGROUND ... 8
2.1 Globalization, security studies, and migration ... 8
2.2 Immigration and national security in the U.S. ... 10
2.3 The U.S. National Security Strategy and immigration... 12
2.4 Chapter conclusion ... 14
3.THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 15
3.1 Securitization theory and the Copenhagen School ... 16
3.2 Post-Copenhagen studies and critics ... 18
3.3 Agenda setting theory... 20
3.4 A model for security agenda analysis ... 22
3.5 Chapter conclusion: a two-layered framework ... 25
4.METHODOLOGY ... 26
4.1 Case selection: why the NSS ... 26
4.2 Studying securitization through discourse analysis ... 28
4.3 Contextual analysis ... 30
5.GEORGE W.BUSH: THE 2002 AND 2006NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES ... 32
5.1 Cognition and framing: Bush, national security, and immigration ... 33
5.2 Events and context: domestic debate on immigration and security ... 35
5.3 Identity: freedom, democracy, and the American way of life ... 38
5.4 Opinion: terrorism, the war, and immigration... 39
5.5 Chapter conclusion ... 41
6.BARACK OBAMA: THE 2010 AND 2015NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES ... 43
6.1 Cognition and framing: promises vs. reality ... 44
6.2 Events and context: Obama vs. Congress ... 47
iv
6.4 Opinion: it’s the economy ... 51
6.5 Chapter conclusion ... 52
7.DONALD TRUMP: THE 2017NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY ... 54
7.1 Cognition and framing: immigration as a threat ... 55
7.2 Events and context: a political turmoil ... 58
7.3 Identity: “America First” ... 60
7.4 Opinion: the president and the policy ... 62
7.5 Chapter conclusion ... 63
8.CONCLUSION ... 65
8.1 Immigration as threat: how and why? ... 65
8.2 Immigration and security from Bush to Trump ... 67
8.3 Limitations and future research ... 68
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES ... 70
APPENDIX I ... 81
1
1.
I
NTRODUCTIONImmigration and security policies are closely intertwined. State sovereignty, understood as control over territory and population, entails the authority to decide who is allowed to cross the border and under what criteria.1 Bigo defines this relationship as “[t]he metaphor of the body politic embedded in the sovereignty myth—in the need to monitor borders to reassure the integrity of what is “inside”.”2 There is, thus, a symbolic dimension that brings together security as the state’s raison d’être and the immigrant as a threat not only to that security, but to the state’s role as its provider. Immigration policy and border control are a way for state authorities to show that something is being done to safeguard those inside their borders. This is an act of domestic nature3 with “enormous political and symbolic capital.”4
While the framing of immigration within national security policies has occurred before, it seems to have preponderance in recent times. A simple overview of news headlines in Western countries attests to the notoriety of this debate. Over the last months of 2018, leading news sites published stories with flashy titles such as: “Trump is Right On the National Security Threat from Caravans,”5 “Migrants are not a threat: US Aid Groups Brace for Fight With Trump,”6 “Denmark Plans to Isolate ‘Unwanted’ Migrants on Remote Island,”7 or “Belgium Identity Crisis Isn’t about Immigration.”8 The migration-security nexus remains as a constant in the political debate, media coverage and public opinion.
A case in point is the United States (U.S.), where President Donald Trump has based his campaign and the first years of his Administration on a strong anti-immigrant agenda.9 From stating Mexican migrants are criminals and rapists,10 passing through the Muslim ban during his first month of tenure11 and repeated attempts to change immigration policy through executive actions,12 the persistence of the migration-security nexus keeps deepening the polarization between expansionists and restrictionists,13 while pushing immigration up in the
1 Bosworth, “Border Control and the Limits of the Sovereign State,” 201. 2 Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” 67.
3 Broeders and Hampshire, “Dreaming of Seamless Borders,” 1202. 4 Aas, “Analysing a World in Motion,” 292.
5 Brewer, “Trump is Right On the National Security Threat from Caravans.” 6 Delgado, “Migrants are not a threat.”
7 Gargiulo and Guy, “Denmark Plans to Isolate ‘Unwanted’ Migrants on Remote Island.” 8 Verschelden, “Belgium Identity Crisis Isn’t about Immigration.”
9 See Pierce and Selee, Immigration under Trump.
10 TIME staff, “Here’s Donald Trump’s Presidential Announcement Speech.” 11 Chishti and Bolter, “The Travel Ban at Two.”
12 Chishti et al., “Even as Congress Remains on Sidelines, the Trump Administration Slows Legal Immigration.” 13 Woods and Arthur, Debating Immigration, ix.
2 political agenda. This, of course, affects large communities of immigrants (including second and third generation). Being immigration “a matter of homeland security and international competitiveness—as well as a deeply human issue,”14 the consequences of this shift, both for the U.S. and the world, are yet to be seen.
Although the securitization of immigration is not new, current forms of the debate and their implications for public policy and international politics require continuous research and problematization. As Wood and Arthur argue, “[t]he idea that immigrants negatively affect the country comes to mind so easily today partly because it came to mind so often in the past.”15 Historically, there has been a linkage between waves of newcomers and concerns regarding public safety, job stability and the erosion of ethno-cultural values, inserting immigration policy into debates surrounding different dimensions of security. The “migrant phobia”16 has always been present in Western societies but has become stronger since the terrorists attacks of September 11, 2001, in the U.S. and subsequent attacks in Europe. Well into the 21st century, the linkage has not faded and more references to immigrants as threats are found in policy documents such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) of the U.S. How this has happened constitutes an interesting, yet largely unexplored, field for research.
1.1 Researching immigration and security: why it is relevant
The relation between immigration and security has been long studied. Bigo characterizes both as “contested concepts[…] used to mobilize political responses, not to explain anything,”17 making their study necessarily embedded on broader political debates and agendas. Within the academic literature, a discussion prevails about the convenience of linking these issues together and its implications for state policy.18 With the end of the Cold War, the broadening of the security agenda made the more important to ask four basic questions: whose security is at stake? What security entails? What is the threat? And, how is security to be achieved?19
Considering the state as the referent object, much of the scholarship has focused on the different dimensions of security that seem threatened by immigrants. For instance, scholars have looked into the potential implications of the lack of integration of migrant communities for societal security. Defining culture and identity as relevant traits for a nation’s stability, the
14 Hass, “Foreword,” ix.
15 Woods and Arthur, Debating Immigration, xiii. 16 Chebel d’Appollonia, Frontiers of Fears, 6. 17 Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” 71.
18 See, for instance, Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies.” 19 Browning, “Security and Migration,” 41.
3 securitization of migration in these realms deepens the divide between “us” and “them.”20 However, the benefits of immigration have also been recognized in an enduring debate between multiculturalism and Huntington’s “clash of civilizations.”21
A second dimension pertains to the economic effects of migration, particularly in the labor market and welfare policies. As Woods and Arthur explain, this is perhaps the most poignant debate with evidence favoring both sides.22 What has become clear is that the analysis of the effects of immigration on wages and possible displacement of workers needs to consider additional elements such as globalized chains of production, free trade agreements, and automation.23 Scientific and student exchanges have also been included in this discussion. While the most recent NSS published by Trump in 2017 claims that foreign students in American universities are “non-traditional intelligence collectors,”24 others have signaled how immigrants contribute to scientific and technological advancements in the U.S., key factors for global leadership and national security that would be risky to lose.25
A third instance in which immigrants are perceived as threats is public safety. There is a prevailing equation at the political level between migrants and criminals. Much research has been done to contest such equivalence and evidence suggests that there is not a direct correlation between immigration and criminal activity.26 The internal dimension of security has been increasingly important in what Andreas and Price described as a fundamental shift in state policing and military policies from war fighting to crime fighting,27 in which migrants have been targets of surveillance and mechanisms of social control.28
Finally, the immigration-terrorist frame is one that has gathered most of the attention in political and academic discussions. Both in Europe and the U.S. scholars have focused on policy changes regarding immigration and national security after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, as well as later attacks on some European capitals.29 One particular trend has been the
20 Bigo, “Security and Immigration,” 80; Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration,” 170; Browning, “Security and Migration,” 51-52.
21 See Prizel, “Identity Discourse in Western Europe and the United States.” 22 Woods and Arthur, Debating Immigration, 13-18.
23 LeVine, “Robots May Have Given Trump and Edge in 2016;” Pritzker and Engler, “Trade With China Isn’t Our Top Economic Challenge;” and Miller, “The Long-Term Jobs Killer Is Not China.”
24 Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 22.
25 Browning, “Security and Migration,” 49-50; Bush and McLarty III, U.S. Immigration Policy, 21-22.
26 Woods and Arthur, Debating Immigration, 7-9. For an extended account of recent studies in the U.S., see Nowrasteh, “Illegal Immigrants and Crime.”
27 Andreas and Price, “From War Fighting to Crime Fighting.”
28 For example, Bosworth presents a very complete account of these developments in the UK (“Border Control and the Limits of the Sovereign State,” 206-210) while Ibrahim’s article reflects on the Canadian experience (“The Securitization of Migration.”).
29 Woods and Arthur, Debating Immigration; Hing, “Misusing Immigration Policies in the Name of Homeland Security;” Kerwin, “The Use and Misuse of ‘National Security’ Rationale;”
4 comparison of approaches on both sides of the Atlantic, and how European and American societies handle the immigration debate in relation to a perceived threat of terrorism.30 While there are sufficient elements to conclude that 9/11 marked an inflection point,31 there is also wide agreement that the securitization of immigration is a trend that predates the War on Terror.32 In the end, immigration, terrorism, and national security have become increasingly linked through the convergence of “restrictive immigration measures to combat or prevent terrorism and the use of counter-terrorism policy to control immigration.”33
Although it is a theoretical perspective more frequently used by European than American scholars, the linkage between immigration and national security is usually explored through the lens of the securitization theory. While there are nuances, it is agreed that the securitization of a controversial issue like immigration ultimately responds to political interests.34 The configuration of an existential threat is rarely objective and depends on the interests and power position of the actor intending to do the securitizing move. Within this framework, there is still fertile soil to apply traditionally European approaches to analyze the evolution of the national security agenda in the U.S., particularly after the attacks of 9/11 and the current anti-immigration rhetoric promoted by Trump.
While the word “immigrant” or any variation (immigration, migrant, alien, illegals, undocumented) does not appear a single time in the NSS published by George W. Bush’s Administration in 2002, Trump’s 2017 NSS dedicates a large part of its first chapter to immigration, signaling immigrants (documented and undocumented) as existential threats to American security. Although Bush’s NSS and its enunciation of the preemptive defense have been long studied, the absence of immigration as a security threat in that specific document has not. In security studies, one can argue, what is framed as threatening is just as important as what is not;35 omissions can be as enlightening as inclusions to understand how security perceptions develop.
30 Key to this discussion has been the work of Chebel d’Appollonia based on her academic and personal background and connections, as a European immigrant currently living in the U.S. See, for example, Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich (eds.), Immigration, Integration and Security; and Chebel d’Appollonia Frontiers of
Fear.
31 Messina, “Securitizing Immigration in the Age of Terror,” 533.
32 Friman, “Migration and Security,” 130; Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich, “Immigration. Tensions, Dilemmas and Unresolved Questions,” 321; Sampaio, Terrorizing Latina/o Immigrants, 51.
33 Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich, “Immigration. Tensions, Dilemmas and Unresolved Questions,” 337. 34 Bigo, “Security and Immigration,”68; Boswell, “Theorizing Migration Policy,” 91; Browning, “Security and
Migration,” 56.
5 If there was a moment to completely securitize immigrants and signal them as fundamental threats to U.S. security, the wake of the terrorist attacks was it. Yet, this securitizing move did not materialize until the publication of Trump’s NSS. There is not enough academic research regarding this process and how presidents have distinguished between documented and undocumented immigrants in the NSS. Furthermore, the enunciation of threats and priorities in the NSS has implications for ulterior political debates and the development/modification of security and foreign policies. The NSS can be studied as a mechanism to set a particular agenda and promote policy change. A comparative study of the incorporation/exclusion of immigration in the U.S. NSS as an agenda setting mechanism has not been produced so far. This thesis, therefore, aims to fill these gaps and apply securitization and agenda setting theories to the analysis of these policy documents.
1.2 Research question and relevance
The purpose of this thesis is to answer the following question:
To what extent have immigrants been securitized in the U.S. and how can this be understood?
To answer it, I will focus on the U.S. NSS from 2002 to 2017, where there has been an incremental attention to the issue of immigration, signaling a process of securitization at the most strategic level of national security politics in that country. Beyond the identification of migrants as an existential threat at the discursive level, their incorporation and/or prioritization in the NSS serves ulterior purposes towards policy change. The NSS is therefore a securitizing move and an agenda setting mechanism from the Executive Branch, seeking to convince Congress and the American public of the existential nature of threats and the need of extraordinary measures in the form of legislation change or authorization of resources.
My main goal is to uncover the process that leads from zero mentions of immigration in the first NSS published after 9/11 to a strong focus on the threats posed by immigrants to American sovereignty 15 years later. A secondary goal is to determine how this securitization process functions as an agenda setting mechanism to ignite dialogue and negotiation and produce policy changes. The time frame proposed for the analysis allows comparing the security rhetoric of three presidents (two Republicans and one Democrat) in a period marked by different contextual factors, such as the War on Terror, an economic crisis, and various attempts to pass a comprehensive immigration reform.
6 This endeavor is academically relevant because it will permit to fill identified gaps in scholarly research about the link between immigration and national security in U.S. politics. Answering the aforementioned question will allow combining the theories of securitization and agenda setting as two interpretative layers to understand if and how the securitization of an issue is not only a speech-act on its own, but also serves the purpose of introducing (or removing) elements to the process of agenda definition, conditioning policy outcomes.
1.3 Methodology
There are five NSS published between 2002 and 2017 (Bush 2002 and 2006; Obama 2010 and 2015; and Trump 2017). I will utilize Eriksson and Noreen’s explanatory model36 to analyze security agendas, which constitutes a two-layered analytical framework. The first layer consists of a cognitive and discursive analysis to establish how immigrants have been securitized, i.e. how they are perceived as an existential threat and what the specific referent object is. The second layer focuses on external factors that condition this process of securitization and how immigration becomes incorporated, removed or prioritized in the security agenda.
I will rely on securitization theory to study how immigrants went from zero mentions in Bush’s 2002 NSS to becoming a fundamental part of Trump’s 2017 NSS. According to this theory, security is socially constructed and existential threats are those framed as such by a securitizing actor through a speech-act. Successful securitization depends on an audience accepting the framing of certain phenomena as existential threats that justify extraordinary measures.37 This becomes particularly relevant for my research since the NSS serves as a basis for the Executive to present to Congress its vision about the main security concerns the U.S. faces, for the purpose of passing new legislation, if necessary, and allocating resources. The Legislative Branch, thus, becomes the enabling audience to be convinced to securitize migration and develop policy accordingly.
Following Balzacq’s propositions regarding the relevance of agency, audience and context,38 it is not enough to state what the policy documents say, but to establish why they say it and why they say it in a particular way. Given the political nature and function of the securitization of migration, the NSS can be conceived as a securitizing move by the Executive Branch which could only be complete if Congress follows lead and acts accordingly. Although
36 Eriksson and Noreen, “Setting the Agenda of Threats.” The model will be explained in detail in the theoretical framework developed in Chapter Three.
37 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 23-26. 38 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization.”
7 the president has some powers to limit access to the country to identifiable groups of people while also being tasked with the enforcement of immigration law, any modification to legislation and budget allocation to increase border control and law enforcement must necessarily pass through Congress.
The aforementioned discursive analysis will be complemented by a contextual explanation of the political environment in which each NSS was published. According to Eriksson and Noreen, shocking events, the political and institutional contexts, the conception of national identity and changes in public opinion can influence the development of security agendas and which issues are incorporated, excluded or prioritized in a given time. Hence their model helps to analyze the factors that explain the removal of immigration in the 2002 NSS, its reincorporation in 2010 and its prioritization in 2017.
1.4 Reading guide
After this introduction, Chapter Two presents a general background on the relation between immigration and security, focusing on American politics in the last 20 years. Chapter Three lays the theoretical bases for the empirical analysis. The theory of securitization established by the Copenhagen School is explained, including precepts of the post-Copenhagen critical schools and some basic notions of agenda setting theory relevant for Eriksson and Noreen’s model. Chapter Four explains the methodology used for the analysis, detailing the case selection and data gathering process. Chapters Five, Six, and Seven constitute the main analysis of Bush’s, Obama’s and Trump’s NSS, respectively. Finally, Chapter Eight summarizes the main findings of the thesis, as well as the limitations identified and opportunities for future research.
8
2.
B
ACKGROUNDThe U.S. ended 2018 with a partial government shutdown—the longest in American history— amid disagreement between Congress and the president to fund a wall at the border with Mexico.39 After the government reopened, on February 15, 2019, President Trump declared a national emergency “to confront the national security crisis on [the] southern border.”40 This is one more episode signaling the sensitive, complicated relation between national security, border control, and immigration policies.
This chapter presents the main debates in academic literature surrounding the interrelation between immigration and national security, and the shape they have acquired in the U.S. I will briefly focus on the evolution of security studies at the end of the Cold War and how immigration entered the discussion as a dimension of national security. I will then concentrate on the particular case of the U.S., in which this debate has been particularly poignant since the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Finally, I will present the main debates about the nature and utility of the U.S. NSS to lay the foundations for the design and implementation of American national security, defense and foreign policies.
2.1 Globalization, security studies, and migration
The end of the Cold War brought an intense debate about the nature of security and the role of the state.41 Traditionalist scholars like Stephen Walt insisted on upholding the constraint of security studies to focus on “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force,”42 arguing that the overly expansion of the conception of security would “destroy [the] intellectual coherence [of this field of study] and make it more difficult to devise solutions.”43 Other voices advocated for a security framework that encompassed more than the military. Scholars proposing the broadening of security studies insisted that this should be in terms of the referent object (vertical dimension) to include from the individual to life on earth; and also in terms of the source of threats (horizontal dimension) to encompass those of military nature but also
39 The government shutdown started on December 22 and ended on January 25, lasting a total of 35 days. (Restuccia et al., “Longest Shutdown in History Ends after Trump Relents on Wall.”).
40 Trump, “Remarks by President Trump.”
41 Andreas and Price, “From War Fighting to Crime Fighting,” 31.
42 Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” 212. (Emphasis in the original). 43 Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” 213.
9 economic, social and environmental hazards.44 Beyond the academic debate, policymakers and state actors “have increasingly embraced a much more expansive security agenda,”45 sometimes blurring the line between external and internal (in)security. It is within this context that the relationship between immigration and security acquired a new dimension.
Immigration and security are complex processes with multiple interconnections.46 As a result of an expanding security agenda in a globalized world, their relation has become harder to ignore by international security scholars and policymakers.47 Perhaps one of the first academic challenges to approach this matter is that “when talking about security and immigration it is not always clear if one is referring to national security, public safety, the security of migrants or border security.”48 The study of the securitization of immigration lies at the intersection of different academic and policy fields analyzing the interconnection between migrants and states, such as international relations, foreign policy, immigration policy, national security, border control, economic development, transnational crimes and human rights, to name a few.
Paradoxically, the expansion of the security agenda meant a bidirectional relation in which both migrants and the state could be placed as the referent object and/or the threat. With the introduction of the concept of human security by the United Nations Development Program,49 immigration scholarship split between those who saw the state as a threat to the security of individuals and those who saw certain type of individuals (immigrants, refugees, asylum-seekers) as a threat to the state. As Adamson argues, “while human security and national security paradigms need not necessarily be diametrically opposed, each does suggest a particular analytical lens through which one can assess the security impacts of international migration flows.”50
Focusing on the nation-state as the referent object threatened by immigration, the academic debate is still widespread. As referenced in the introduction, different streams of the literature have studied the relationship between immigration and national identity, economic security, welfare services and public safety. In each subfield, debate abounds on the real
44 Ney, “Environmental Security,” 18. See also Martinovsky’s typology of security studies at the end of the Cold War, where he identifies three groups: traditionalists, wideners (expanding only the source of threats to the state) and deepeners (expanding the referent object and the source of threats). (Martinovsky, “Environmental Security and Classical Typology of Security Studies”).
45 Andreas and Price, “From War Fighting to Crime Fighting,” 35. 46 Délano and Serrano, “Flujos migratorios y seguridad”, 509. 47 Adamson, “Crossing Borders,” 167.
48 Herrera-Lasso and Artola, “Migración y seguridad,” 19.
49 United Nations Development Program, Human Development Report 1994. 50 Adamson, “Crossing Borders,” 167.
10 positive and negative effects of the securitization of immigrants and possible implications for national development. There is a recognition of the different types of migrants and how they are differently perceived in host countries. Messina distinguishes between labor, secondary, irregular and humanitarian migration flows, signaling the differentiated benefits and costs they have for the sending and receiving countries.51Regardless of this practical (technical) distinction, the widespread perception portrays all immigrants as a threatening “other.” As Anderson puts it, “political discourse on immigration tends to homogenize migrants until they are a mere figure[…] manipulated easily for demagogic purposes.”52
The securitization of migration is not new, but recent scholarship has paid greater attention to the interaction between immigration control and enforcement, within the framework of the fight against terrorism and international organized crime. Although the 2001 terrorist attacks in the U.S. and those in European capitals (Madrid, 2004; London, 2005) sparked a shift in border control and immigration policies, the literature points to many continuities in national policies originated during the 1990s. A major point of cleavage is the different effects the War on Terror has had in Europe and the U.S. The volume edited by Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich shows how dissimilar policy responses at both sides of the Atlantic have been due to historical backgrounds, institutional design at the (supra)national level and current demographic trends.53 Similarly, Givens explains how the focus in the U.S. has been on curtailing immigration, while European policies have considered the integration of migrants, including language and cultural competency.54
2.2 Immigration and national security in the U.S.
Historically, there have been swings between more welcoming and more restrictionist approaches in American migration policy based on security concerns. Considering the effects of 9/11 as just another inflection point in the immigration debate brings forward the changes on historical discourse and policy that were based on the arrival of new waves of immigrants
51 Messina, “Migration as a Global Phenomenon,” 18-24.
52 Anderson, Us and Them? As paraphrased by Urso, “The Politization of Immigration in Italy,” 369. 53 Chebel d’Appollonia and Reich, Immigration, Integration, and Security.
11 and ethnic tensions,55 economic cycles of bonanza and/or struggle,56 and an increased perception of external threats.57
Academic scholarship has also studied the ambivalent rhetoric towards migration in U.S. official discourse and popular psyche. Childers, for instance, reflects on President Theodore Roosevelt’s portrayal of immigrants as either being of the good or bad type, fit or unfit to integrate into American society, claiming the U.S. should welcome the former and reject the latter.58 Likewise, Chebel d’Appollonia mentions a series of “mixed messages” by President George W. Bush while pushing for a comprehensive immigration reform at the same time that his Administration targeted immigrants with surveillance and law enforcement mechanisms designed to curtail the terrorist threat. These examples show the underlying dynamics of immigration policy and legislation in American contemporary history.
The American debate on national security necessarily changed after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. As Bigo emphasizes, the real novelty was the transgression of the American mainland, but “it was not the birth of a new form of terror in the global age.”59 Nonetheless, for many scholars these attacks mark a watershed in U.S. policy towards national security, immigration and border control. For instance, Critelli argues that the events of that day created “a new world order;”60 for Adamson, they signal the beginning of migration being handled as a “top national security”61 issue; and Woods and Arthur state that they “marked a turning point in immigration policy discussions,”62 given the unprecedented response by the American government.
On a more nuanced stance, there is another current in the literature stressing a continuum of tougher immigration controls and enforcement since the decade of 1990. For
55 One of the most cited examples is the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, banning the entrance of Chinese nationals to the U.S. for ten years, as a result of popular concerns about a possible loss of national identity, understood as homogeneity and whiteness (See Sampaio, Terrorizing Latina/o Immigrants, 37; Woods and Arthur,
Debating Immigration, 49; and Ironside and Corrigan, “Constituting Enemies Through Fear,” 164).
56 For instance, the Bracero Program, conducted between the Mexican and American governments from 1942 to 1964, admitted 4.6 million temporary Mexican workers to work mainly in agricultural activities. The life of this program was conditioned by both national and economic interests: World War II and the following efforts to support the recovery of Europe demanded additional labor force that the American market could not supply; once it was not needed anymore the program was unilaterally canceled by the American government (See Durand, “El Programa Bracero (1942-1964); and Tuirán and Ávila, “La migración México-Estados Unidos”, 110).
57 Two examples include the “Great Red Scare” in 1919, when thousands of foreigners were arrested and deported based on accusations of radicalism (Critelli, “The Impact of September 11th on Immigrants in the United States,” 146); or the internment of more than 100,000 Japanese-Americans in concentration camps after the attacks on Pearl Harbor (Sampaio, Terrorizing Latina/o Immigrants, 45; and Ironside and Corrigan, “Constituting Enemies Through Fear,” 169-170).
58 Childers, “Defining the Right Sort of Immigrant,” 185-189. 59 Bigo, “The Emergence of Consensus,” 70-71.
60 Critelli, “The Impact of September 11th on Immigrants in the United States,” 142. 61 Adamson, “Crossing Borders,” 165.
12 example, Délano and Serrano recognize that the 2001 attacks brought a change of the security paradigm, but underline the continuity of policy with the addition of an antiterrorist component to the two decades-old coupling of immigration and border security to combat drug trafficking.63 Similarly, Friman argues that it is best to understand the securitization of immigration in the aftermath of the attacks as an “outgrowth of earlier politics, policy and practice.”64 For both sides, however, 9/11 has become a (nearly) sine qua non referent to analyzing the immigration-security nexus in the U.S.
There is a persisting perception that “[i]mmigration and terrorism are linked—not because all immigrants are terrorists but because all, nearly all, terrorists in the West have been immigrants.” Although the European experience with home-grown terrorism might put this assumption into question, the perception still lingers in American public opinion. Therefore, what started as an issue of border control, was later equated with terrorism, to finally be conceived as a menace to American identity, culture and way of life. As a result of shifts in considerations in domestic politics,65 the securitization of immigration, mainly confined to restrictionists and xenophobes before 9/11, has become more closely woven in the discourse of national security and vital interests.
2.3 The U.S. National Security Strategy and immigration
A country’s national security strategy is a “plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state power—nonmilitary as well as military—to pursue objectives that defend and advance the national interest.”66 These documents ought to be based on established goals and the necessary means to achieve them, resulting in a “public, authoritative declaration about the manner in which [the nation] intends to achieve its security objectives within both the international system and its own domestic security environment.”67 Stolberg underlines the official and public nature of these documents and how they can serve many purposes, including: 1) create “internal consensus on foreign, defense, diplomatic, economic and homeland security strategy;”68 2) present to legislative bodies the resources requirements; and 3) function as communication tools for domestic and external audiences.69 The national
63 Délano and Serrano, “Flujos migratorios y seguridad”, 486. 64 Friman, “Migration and Security,” 130.
65 Herrera-Lasso and Artola, “Migración y seguridad,” 11.
66 Dupuy, International Military and Defense Encyclopedia, as quoted by Doyle, “The U.S. National Security Strategy,” 624.
67 Stolberg, How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents, 13. 68 Stolberg, How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents, 3. 69 Stolberg, How Nation-States Craft National Security Strategy Documents, 3.
13 security strategy is a comprehensive governmental approach from where to derive other security-related strategies at lower levels.
In the U.S., the Executive Branch is mandated by Section 603 of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 198670 to produce the National Security Strategy (NSS) on a yearly basis. In this document, the Administration defines the main threats faced by the country and the strategies to fight them. Although there is debate about the actual utility of the NSS,71 it is a fundamental policy document to delineate an Administration’s worldview, interests, values and the challenges it foresees to attain its objectives.72 The NSS should be consistent with the president’s discourse and the policies he/she promised to deliver, while its content should be analyzed considering the social, political and economic context. Additionally, the NSS is a fundamental mechanism for negotiations with Congress towards legislative reform and budget allocation; it is a starting point of an agenda setting process vis à
vis Congress, who is ultimately responsible for allocating the necessary resources to attend
different policy fields and priorities.
Although the NSS serves to design the National Defense Policy,73 commentators and scholars usually highlight its character as the foundation for American foreign policy, based on an Administration’s perception of the world and the role of the U.S.74 Most of the analyses of different NSS identify a continuity in American presidents’ interests and values as enshrined in this policy paper. The main critique tends to be its lack of actual strategic character. As Goldgeier and Suri point out, strategic planning necessarily includes priorities, goals and the resources to achieve them; it means to “align U.S. capabilities behind core national interests.”75 Concurring with this criticism, although conceding that it could be due to the public character of the document, Hemmer contends that the NSS is just a list of desired ends that remain greatly unchanged from one Administration to another.76
While the majority of the NSS published since 1986 have included some mention of immigration, there is not a consistent pattern.77 The incorporation, exclusion or prioritization
70 “Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act” (PL 99-433 1 October, 1986) 100 United
States Statutes at Large, 992-1075b.
71 See for example Feaver, “Holding Out for the National Security Strategy” and Walt, “Why We Don’t Need Another ‘National Strategy’ Document.”
72 Feaver, “The Hardest Part of Trump’s National Security Strategy to Write.” 73 Ettinger, “U.S. National Security Strategies,” 116.
74 See, for example, Ettinger, “U.S. National Security Strategies;” Goldgeier and Suri, “Revitalizing the U.S. National Security Strategy;” and Hemmer, “Continuity and Change in the Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy.”
75 Goldgeier and Suri, “Revitalizing the U.S. National Security Strategy,” 37.
76 Hemmer, “Continuity and Change in the Obama Administration’s National Security Strategy,” 269-270. 77 See Appendix II.
14 of immigration in the NSS, thus, responds to the corresponding Administration’s priorities and interests, which condition if the issue is framed in positive or negative terms and how it is associated with other policy areas, such as national sovereignty, border security, economic development or opportunities for collaboration. This variance confirms the subjective and political nature of the linkage of immigration and national security in the U.S., constrained by contextual factors, party identities, and personal interests of American presidents.
2.4 Chapter conclusion
This chapter developed a contextual background about how immigration has become increasingly intertwined with national security, focusing on the path this process has followed in the U.S. The complex interaction of both policy areas in a variety of subfields, influenced by political interests and values, was identified as a fundamental factor that needs to be taken into consideration when studying the immigration-security nexus. In this sense, the chapter has explained how American policy has shifted between welcoming and restrictionist approaches to immigration, depending on national and international variables that affect how migrants are perceived within the American society.
The chapter also provided a definition of a national security strategy as a policy paper that delineates a nation’s interests, goals and means to attain them. In the case of the U.S., the NSS is a key document to evaluate an Administration’s perception of the international system and domestic phenomena that threaten American security. Immigration may or may not be included in the NSS as an existential threat. The chapter has signaled the relevance of this in terms of policy agenda setting, given the intended goal of the NSS to initiate a dialogue with Congress towards policy change and/or budget allocation. While immigration has been framed as a possible component of national security policy, the process of its incorporation in a document such as the NSS is understudied. The inclusion/exclusion of immigration in the NSS can thus provide a different dimension for the analysis of national interests and threats, but also of the agenda setting and decision-making processes inside the U.S. and the interaction between branches of government.
15
3.
T
HEORETICALF
RAMEWORKThirty years after the end of the Cold War, the study and practice of security keeps evolving, with new academic discussions regarding the subjects and objects of security at the national and international levels, involving states and non-state actors. As Gheciu and Wohlforth argue, “today the international security landscape is far more complex than it has been in a long time.”78 With an ever blurring line between internal and external (in)security,79 this also applies to the world of national security, the definition of threats, the politics of decision-making and the interaction among different actors at many levels. To complicate things further, the same authors conclude that “disagreements among scholars in this field revolve not only around the question of what is security, but also how to study it.”80
There are different theoretical and analytical tools available for the study of security81 that could be helpful to investigate the incorporation of immigration into the national security agenda of the U.S. I have chosen to utilize securitization theory as the main theoretical framework, due to its advantages to underline the intersubjective and political nature of the process. In this chapter, I will first explain the fundamental premises of securitization theory, as developed by what has been identified as the Copenhagen School. I will also explore some claims by securitization scholars who are critical of this particular school of thought. In this sense, I will mainly concentrate on the arguments presented by Balzacq on the relevance of the role of the audience(s), context and power relations to analyze processes of securitization.
Third, and as a second analytical layer, I will incorporate the theory of agenda setting, considering it a useful means to understand how and why an issue enters (or leaves) the security agenda of a state. The NSS developed by the Executive Branch of the U.S. is a mechanism to set a particular agenda before Congress with the aim of defining priorities, creating/changing legislation and allocating budgets to specific policy areas. For this purpose, this chapter will briefly explain the fundamentals of agenda setting theory, its premises and development, to finally focus on the model proposed by Eriksson and Noreen82 to analyze changes in security agendas.
The explanatory model designed by these authors constitutes a solid synthesis allowing to incorporate the basic premises of securitization theory to study different contextual,
78 Gheciu and Wohlforth, “The Future of Security Studies,” 3. 79 Bigo, “The Emergence of Consensus,” 67.
80 Gheciu and Wohlforth, “The Future of Security Studies,” 5. 81 Balzacq et al., “‘Securitizaion’ Revisited,” 498.
16 structural and psychological factors leading to the processes that they identify for an issue to appear, be removed, be blocked from appearing and be prioritized in security strategies.83 Given the varying treatment immigration has received in the NSS included in this thesis, the four possible outcomes identified by this model become extremely useful. This chapter will therefore lay down the theoretical foundation of the thesis, based on securitization and agenda setting theories, as combined into Eriksson and Noreen’s explanatory model, identifying concrete elements that will be further analyzed in the following chapters.
3.1 Securitization theory and the Copenhagen School
Imbedded in the debates surrounding the end of the Cold War and the broadening of the security agenda, scholars led by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde inaugurated what has been identified as the Copenhagen School in security studies. In their seminal work Security. A New
Framework for Analysis, they highlight the socially-constructed character of security and the
implications this has for its study and policymaking. They define security as “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a skeptical kind of politics or as above politics.”84 In doing so, they establish a continuum with non-politized issues on one side, non-politized issues in the middle and securitized issues at the other end. Moving a topic to the securitization end of the spectrum takes it out of normal politics by framing it as an existential threat whose unattendance would make anything else irrelevant.85
This move along the spectrum is not accidental. One of the main contributions of the Copenhagen School was to underline the political nature of securitization and “create awareness of the (allegedly) arbitrary nature of ‘threats’, to stimulate the thought that the foundation of any national security policy is not given by ‘nature’ but chosen by politicians and decisionmakers[…]”86 In this sense, although the foundations of this school of thought lean closer to a constructivist and poststructuralist approach, Williams has also identified a political realism component by equating the securitization process to Carl Schmitt’s idea of the political through the notion of exceptionalism and the “politics of the extraordinary.”87 Echoing this author, Gad and Petersen claim that while “[i]n securitization theory, exceptionalism is seen as a way to end normal politics; in Schmitt, politics is only realized in the exception.”88 Security
83 Eriksson and Noreen, “Setting the Agenda of Threats,” 4. 84 Buzan, et al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 23. 85 Buzan, et al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 24. 86 Knudsen, “Post-Copenhagen Security Studies,” 359. 87 See Williams, “Securitization as Political Theory.”
17 and politics are closely intertwined and the study of security agendas necessarily has to consider the political dimension, power distribution and interests.
Another contribution of Buzan et al. is the introduction of the sectors variable to signal that the military realm is no longer the only relevant field for the security of a state, but one among others. The authors define five sectors of securitization: military, economic, political, societal and environmental. A different referent object corresponds to each sector as well as the nature and characteristics of their threats.89 The relevant sectors in which immigration and national security come related are mainly the political and the societal one, with the possibility of also considering the economic sector.
The political sector refers to political authority and sovereignty. Threats in this sector are not necessarily directed at the state as an abstract actor, but towards the political system and authorities exercising power at a particular moment. In this way, threats can come from within the state as a result of uprisings against the status quo, as they may come from outside destabilizing factors.90 Secondly, the societal sector refers to national identity and the particular traits that define a society.91 This concept, actually introduced before the 1998 book Security:
A New Framework of Analysis, is perhaps the most contested one of the Copenhagen School.92
Buzan and Wæver sustain that identity is to society what sovereignty is to states; once it is lost, the object can no longer exist and therefore, identities, while permanently being under construction and definition, can be defended.93 Finally, the economic sector relates to the stability of the financial system and economic viability of the state. As the authors themselves accept, identifying the referent object and threats in this sector may be a hard endeavor.94 A reintegration of all sectors needs to be done at the final stage of the analysis in order to establish the risks and security priorities of the state. Sectors are, therefore, an analytical tool to identify the components of the securitization process and outcomes.95
The securitization process means that someone (political actor, policymaker, institution) decides to present a particular subject as a security issue. Within this logic, the Copenhagen School identifies six relevant concepts: a securitizing actor makes a securitization
move through a speech-act seeking to convince an audience that a particular issue is an existential threat requiring exceptional measures. This securitization process, only successful
89 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 21-23. 90 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 141-162. 91 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 119-140. 92 See McSweeney, “Identity and Security.”
93 Buzan and Wæver, “Slippery? Contradictory? Sociologically Untenable?” 242-243. 94 Buzan et al., Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 95-117.
18 if the audience and the securitizing actor agree on the existential nature of the threat, is influenced by functional actors who, although not deciding the success of the securitizing move, affect the dynamics of a specific realm of policy and can bolster or hinder securitization.96
The securitization analysis developed by the Copenhagen School takes as a starting point the theory of speech-act proposed by John L. Austin: by saying something is a security threat, the actor is turning it into a security threat. Saying security means doing security; words not only describe a given reality, but have performative elements and realize specific actions.97 Buzan et al. categorize security as a “self-referential practice[…] not necessarily because a real existential threat exists but because the issue is presented as such.”98 The authors, however, underline that successful securitization depends on the acceptance of such act by an audience, making intersubjectivity (against mere subjectivity) the defining characteristic of security.99
3.2 Post-Copenhagen studies and critics
Two decades after the publication of Security: A New Framework for Analysis, securitization theory has positioned itself as one of the most successful approaches in the field of security studies and international security.100 Nevertheless, there has also been much academic debate on the basic precepts of the theory. Scholars have commented and criticized the explanatory power of the theory as a whole or have concentrated on specific components, trying to broaden their conceptualization and utility to understand security. Gad and Petersen identify three main “veins of criticism”: 1) the explanatory power of the theory, including analytical criteria and its applicability beyond Europe; 2) the normative implications on “the meaning and preference of desecuritization;” and 3) the combination of speech and practices in everyday bureaucratic activities to distinguish the normal from the exceptional.101 A review of critics of the Copenhagen School permits expanding and clarifying some of its core concepts in order to build a stronger analytical framework to study the incorporation of immigration in security agendas.
As explained above, the core of the Copenhagen School is the contention that threats are not objectively found, but rely on perceptions by actors who perform speech-acts to turn an
96 See Buzan et al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 21-47. 97 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 175.
98 Buzan, et al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 24. 99 Buzan, et al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 30.
100 Huysmans, “What’s in an Act?” 371; Wæver, “The Theory Act,” 126. 101 Gad and Petersen, “Concepts of Politics in Securitization Studies,” 316-317.
19 issue into a security-related one. One of the main criticisms of Balzacq in this regard is what he labels a “pervasive ambiguity:” security cannot be self-referential and intersubjective at the same time. While the former appeals to the illocutionary nature of the speech-act, if the completion of the securitization process requires the acceptance of the audience, then the perlocutionary nature becomes the most relevant.102
The role of the audience(s) has been one of Balzacq’s main contributions, arguing in favor not only of its relevance to accept and legitimize a securitizing move, but also on the necessity to see the actor and the audience(s) as immersed in a dynamic of shared language and meanings, conditioned by internal and external factors.103 In what he calls the “three faces of securitization,” the author underlines the interconnection between audience(s), context and power dynamics to explain securitization.104 The first argument lies in the acceptance that there may be multiple audiences, but among those there is an “enabling audience,”105 the one that ultimately needs to be convinced of the existential character of a threat. If convinced, this audience can provide moral and/or institutional support for the securitizing actor to take exceptional actions. The latter becomes crucial if the enabling audience is an institution, such as a Parliament or Congress, that needs to provide a specific mandate or authorize particular policy measures.106
Secondly, it is argued that further consideration needs to be given to power relations between securitizing actors and audiences, as well as the context in which they take place. Although Buzan et al. explain that the success of the securitization depends on the power position held by the securitizing actors,107 they do not provide further analysis as to how this power is affected by their linguistic competence108 and how they are perceived/accepted by the enabling audience. In other words, although a securitizing actor (traditionally government officials) may be in a power position to do security, the validity of her statements and the discursive strategy utilized for doing so may be conditioned by external and contextual factors.
Regarding context, Balzacq claims that it has an independent status, culturally and epistemologically configured.109 Context and power relations have an indirect relation: the more the context presents clues of the existence of a threat, the less the securitizing actor has
102 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 179.
103 Stritzel also emphasizes the need to distinguish internal and external factors conditioning the speech act, the relationship between securitizing actor, and the audience. (See Stritzel, “Towards a Theory of Securitization.”) 104 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization.”
105 Balzacq et al., “‘Securitizaion’ Revisited” 500. 106 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 184-185. 107 Buzan, et al. Security: A New Framework for Analysis, 31. 108 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 190.
20 to hold a powerful position and strong linguistic competences to convince an audience.110 Based on this, the analysis needs to go beyond a unique utterance, a sole speech-act, and regard securitization as a process that “occurs between an antecedent influential set of events and their impact on interactions.”111
Beyond the mere discursive realm, a securitizing move is an attempt by a specific actor to change the course of the political debate. An analysis based on the main precepts of securitization theory pertaining the intersubjective definition of threats by actors in relative positions of power needs to incorporate the processes through which a particular (security) issue comes to be considered and introduced into a (security) policy agenda. In the field of public policy, this process is called policy agenda setting and has been developed by different scholars trying to understand how the attention and priority given to issues change over time leading to policy changes.
3.3 Agenda setting theory
The study of agenda setting is different than that of decision making, although they are interrelated being the former a first step to the latter. A political agenda is defined as “the set of issues that are subject of decision making and debate within a given political system at any one time.”112 Cobb and Elder differentiated between the systemic agenda, as the set of issues discussed within a society, and the institutional agenda, as those being discussed within a government institution.113 The analysis of agenda setting has focused on the process and factors enabling or disabling the incorporation of certain issues in policy agendas.
In order to lay some theoretical foundations to better explain the model proposed by Eriksson and Noreen (see below), it is necessary to briefly introduce some key concepts and/or developments of agenda setting theory. First, the academic literature usually highlights the relevance of Bachrach and Baratz’s 1962 article “Two Faces of Power” as an inflection point in the study of how issues become part of an agenda and public discussion. The authors introduced the concept of “nondecision-making” to signal the relevance of studying not only how policies are initiated, decided and/or vetoed, but also those processes and power relations that “limit the scope of actual decision making to “safe” issues.”114 The second face of power,
110 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 193. 111 Balzacq, “Three Faces of Securitization,” 193. 112 Baumgartner, “Agendas: Political,” 362. 113 Baumgartner, “Agendas: Political,” 362.
21 and probably a more fundamental one, is the ability to decide which issues do not make it into the agenda in order to preserve a particular status quo.
Another relevant development was Kingdon’s Agendas, Alternatives and Public
Policies,115 published in 1984. His multiple streams model has remained a referent in agenda setting studies, with several articles still being published to confirm its utility and applicability.116 According to him, public policy making follows this process: “(1) the setting of the agenda, (2) the specification of alternatives, (3) an authoritative choice among those alternatives, as in a legislative vote or a presidential decision, and (4) the implementation of the decision.”117 His model focuses on the first and second stages of this process to understand how problems become issues within a particular policy agenda.
The model contemplates three different and independent streams: the problem stream relates to societal problems within a community; the policy stream refers to the permanent discussion among experts about possible solutions; and the politics stream pertains to political factors or events, such as the national mood, the retirement of a minister or a change of government. For public policy change to happen, all three streams need coincide in what the author calls “policy windows” that might or not be taken by “policy entrepreneurs” to promote change.118
Finally, another greatly cited model of agenda setting analysis is the one developed by Baumgartner and Jones in their 1993 book Agendas and Instabilities in American Politics, in which they introduced their model of punctuated equilibrium.119 Their argument is that “attention and public policy are characterized by long periods of stability and short periods of dramatic change,”120 making it necessary to analyze long periods of time to identify those changes and the factors that led to them. This is what the authors named the analysis of “policy dynamics.”121
The basic notion underlying agenda setting theory is that attention is a scarce resource in public policy and there is only a handful of issues that can gather enough interest from policy makers to produce changes in policy. Thus, the study of agenda setting necessarily involves analyzing the context and political environment; the characteristics of the political system and
115 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. (Emphasis on the original) 116 Greer, “John W. Kingdon,” 8.
117 Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Polices, 2-3.
118 See Kingdon, Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies; Greer, “John W. Kingdon;” and Green-Pedersen, “Agenda Setting,” 358.
119 Baumgartner and Jones, Agendas and Instabilities in American Politics. 120 Green-Pedersen, “Agenda Setting,” 359.
22 the dynamic among branches of government; as well as power structures, personal preferences and particular interests of key actors that can influence the agenda. A comprehensive analysis considering these factors allows identifying the conditions that permit new ideas to emerge and also “the forces reinforcing the status quo.”122
In the case of security agendas perception and context play a role. The utterance of a speech-act as a securitizing move to frame a particular issue as an existential threat is only the beginning of a process towards agenda setting/modification and, ultimately, policy change. The combination of agenda setting theory and securitization theory results in a stronger analytical basis to study national security strategies and how specific issues move within them. The above mentioned mix of factors which contribute to the formation of an agenda in a specific policy area, including power politics and personal preferences, is the starting point for Eriksson and Noreen’s model to analyze security agendas,123 as will be explained in the next section.
3.4 A model for security agenda analysis
The following explanatory model was developed by Eriksson and Noreen as part of a research project on “Threat Politics” led by these scholars between 2000 and 2007 in the Department of Peace and Research Conflict at the University of Uppsala in Sweden. Their main goal was to explain “why certain threat images appear on the political agenda and others do not.”124 The underlying motivation for this endeavor, as recognized by the authors, was to apply different theoretical approaches of agenda setting to the field of security policy.125
The explanatory model proposed by these authors presents a multidisciplinary synthesis of different theoretical approaches to analyze threats incorporated in the security agenda of a state. The model has four main advantages: 1) the acknowledgement of security as an “exceptionally loaded” political concept;126 2) the incorporation of a multi-causal explanation which includes actor-related and structural factors;127 3) the applicability of the model to analyze the removal of a particular issue from the agenda or the conditions limiting its inclusion;128 and 4) the flexibility to apply the model as a whole or only partially, depending on the case study.129 Additionally, the model is based on many of the key concepts previously
122 Baumgartner et al., “Comparative Studies of Policy Agendas,” 960. 123 Eriksson and Noreen, “Setting the Agenda of Threats,” 1.
124 Eriksson and Nooren, Threat Politics,“Project Description.” 125 Eriksson and Nooren, Threat Politics, “Project Description.” 126 Eriksson and Noreen, “Setting the Agenda of Threats,” 11. 127 Eriksson and Noreen, “Setting the Agenda of Threats,” 20. 128 Eriksson and Noreen, “Setting the Agenda of Threats,” 20. 129 Eriksson and Noreen, “Setting the Agenda of Threats,” 7.
