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The External Dimension of the EU’s Migration Policy:

the Tunisian Case

MA Thesis in European Studies Programme: Identity and Integration

Graduate School of Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam

Author: Maarten B. Koopmans Student number: 10091408 Supervisor: prof. dr. L.A. Bialasiewicz

Second reader: dr. M.E. Spiering

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Table of Contents

List

of Abbreviations ... 4

Introduction ... 5

Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework ... 8

1.1Introduction ... 8

1.2The Copenhagen School ... 8

1.3The Paris School ... 12

1.4Critical Geopolitics ... 16

1.5Conclusion ... 19

Chapter 2. Migration in EU External Relations ... 21

2.1Introduction ... 21

2.2Background ... 22

2.3Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ... 25

2.4European Neighbourhood Policy ... 27

2.5Tampere Summit ... 29

2.6Global Approach to Migration and Mobility ... 30

2.7Mobility Partnership ... 32

Chapter 3. EU-Tunisia Relations ... 34

3.1Introduction ... 34

3.2Tunisian Political Context ... 35

3.3Migration in Tunisia ... 38

3.4EU-Tunisia Economic Cooperation (1969-1995) ... 42

3.5Increased Cooperation and Assistance (1995-2010) ... 44

3.6Cooperation on Migration and a Privileged Partnership (2010-2015) ... 46

Chapter 4. Discourse Analysis ... 49

4.1Introduction ... 49

4.2Policy Documents ... 49

4.3Interviews ... 53

Conclusion ... 57

Appendices ... 60

Appendix 1. Interview IOM Netherlands Chief of Mission ... 60

Appendix 2. Interview DG Home Affairs ... 62

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Appendix 4. Interview Tunisian ambassador to the Netherlands and Denmark ... 69

Appendix 5. Chronological list of relevant policy documents ... 76

Bibliography ... 78

Policy documents ... 78

Websites ... 79

Literature ... 80

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List of Abbreviations

CG Critical Geopolitics

CS Copenhagen School (of security studies) CSDP Common Security and Defense Policy EEAS European External Action Service EEC European Economic Community EMP Euro-Mediterranean Partnership ENP European Neighbourhood Policy ENI European Neighbourhood Instrument

ENPI European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument

EU European Union

FTA Free Trade Agreement

GAM Global Approach to Migration

GAMM Global Approach to Migration and Mobility GMP Global Mediterranean Policy

ICMPD International Centre for Migration Policy Development MEDA MEsures D’Accompangement

MENA Middle East and North Africa

MP Mobility Partnership

NGO Non-governmental organization PS Paris School (of security studies) RMP Renovated Mediterranean Policy

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Introduction

‘We should be helping countries like Libya, Egypt and Tunisia, the departing nations, to attack people smugglers’1 - Lord Ashdown

‘I think that in this very fragile framework of our region and the Mediterranean sea we have sufficient and enough issues to resolve with dialogue and in political ways to not act with more violence’2 - Tunisian ambassador Ben Becher

On 19 April 2015, a boat carrying migrants from Tripoli to Italy capsized some 100 kilometers of the Libyan coast. It claimed 800 lives, resulting in one of the biggest recorded disasters in the context of migration in the Mediterranean to date.3 Unfortunately, it is not a unique event, as more and more migrants set out to reach Europe by using unstable and overcrowded boats run by unreliable human traffickers. A proper alternative however is not easily accessible, which led former Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmström to argue that new legal routes must be opened to allow refugees to come to Europe, instead of resorting to illegal channels.4 Regrettably, in the aftermath of a previous 2013 migrants crisis, she has argued that EU Member States focus more on border security aspects than on protecting refugees and asylum seekers.5 Correspondingly, after the latest disaster, which brought migration once again under the attention of the public, remarkable proposals, such as the EU’s plan to use the military action to stop people from reaching Europe, have been made. Other policies directed at migration include partnerships with countries from which migrants often depart or transit, such as recently have been agreed between the EU an Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan in the Middle East and North Africa region (MENA).

This thesis examines the EU’s efforts to regulate migration and stop irregular migrants from reaching Europe. The definition of irregular migration in this sense can be unclear as a distinction should be made between economic migrants without a legal right to reside in the EU and refugees fleeing from conviction or humanitarian crises. However, this is often hard to determine, and EU external policies often appear indiscriminate. A long history of different types of policies in an attempt to deal with this question has evolved since the 1980s, applying various strategies, such as tackling root causes or 1

The Guardian, ‘Lord Ashdown: destroy migrant smugglers’ boats before they leave port’,

http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2015/apr/21/lord-ashdown-strategy-needed-to-attack-north-african-migrant-smugglers, accessed on 30-06-2015.

2

See interview with the Tunisian ambassador to the Netherlands and Denmark Mr. Ben Becher (Appendix).

3

The Guardian, ‘UN says 800 migrants dead in boat disaster as Italy launches rescue of two more vessels’, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/italy-pm-matteo-renzi-migrant-shipwreck-crisis-srebrenica-massacre, accessed on 30-06-2015.

4

The Local, ‘Open legal routes to refugees’: Malmström’, http://www.thelocal.it/20140708/we-must-open-legal-routes-to-refugees-malmstrom, accessed on 30-06-2015.

5

Euractiv, ‘EU countries downplay ‘humanitarian visas’ for migrants’, http://www.euractiv.com/east-mediterranean/little-enthusiasm-eu-migrant-pro-news-532176, accessed on 30-06-2015.

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increasing cooperation on border controls. One of the countries that has developed the most advanced cooperation with the EU is Tunisia. It has received generous support for its democratic reforms since the fall of Ben Ali in 2011, has concluded a new action plan to form a Privileged Partnership granting increased access to the EU market, and has very recently signed a Mobility Partnership with the EU and ten of its Member States. Because of this advanced partnership and the close relations between these two actors, and the fact that Tunisia is regarded as one of the model partners of the EU, this case is chosen of which the period since the end of 2010 will be examined in more detail. It allows for examining the direction in which cooperation between the EU and other Southern Mediterranean countries could develop into. In particular, it will study the subject from the perspective of the ‘securitization’ theory. This theory, in short, argues that migration has increasingly become a security concern in Europe, as it is a perceived threat to national identity. What is then looked at is how this plays out in practice, and how it is perceived other actors, such as the government of Tunisia.

The thesis is divided into four chapters. The first chapter provides the theoretical framework, and determines from which perspective this study will be conducted. It outlines the development of security studies after the Cold War, since the 1990s, one which widened the sole focused on military threats, to include perceived threats to identity. The constructivist securitization theory which developed against this background, grew from relatively marginal theory, as compared to the realist theories, to one that has become ubiquitous in research on migration policies.6 An attempt has been made to describe the developments in this theoretical debate, and subsequently provide a theoretical and methodological framework for carrying out this research. Additionally, to this end the theory of Critical Geopolitics has been applied as it relates closely to the constructivist turn in security studies that has occurred since the 1990s.

The second chapter then presents an extensive overview of the development of the EU’s external policies directly or indirectly aimed at reducing irregular migration towards Europe. The EU’s external migration policy was only officially decided upon in 1999, after a considerable run-up, at the Tampere Council Summit, the conclusions of which formed the basis for the 2001 common external migration policy. Subsequent developments include the Global Approach for Migration and the its successor, the Global Approach for Migration and Mobility, of which the main policy-instruments will be set out. Besides this dimension of policies directly concerned with migration, other policies which attempt to tackle the root causes of migration are outlined. These forms of extensive cooperation with the EU’s neighbouring countries really took shape with establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, which consisted of economic, social and political dimensions – a big contrast with the previous agreements which focused mainly on trade relations. This then developed

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6

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

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into an even more comprehensive approach, and new strategies, which are aimed at stabilizing and developing the region.

In the third chapter, the above forms the context for the outline of the developments in EU-Tunisia relations, specifically concerning migration. To this end, the chapter also provides a brief history of the political developments in Tunisia and an overview of the phenomenon of migration in Tunisia. The chapter clearly illustrates an increase in intensity and areas of cooperation between the EU Member States and Tunisia, specifically in the area of migration. Because it can be observed that regulation and cooperation on migration has increased and the measures preventing, or ‘combatting’ as the official EU rhetoric claims, irregular migration extended, at first glance this development appears to correspond favourably with the securitization theory.

The fourth chapter serves as an analysis of the dynamics of cooperation between the EU and Tunisia. It attempts to critically apply the securitization theory, and find what the intended goals of the EU are, and how these are perceived by Tunisia. The EU for instance, appears to attempt to involve Tunisia in its own structures of migration policies, and make certain issues, such as readmission agreements, conditional on others, such as easier visa-access for Tunisians. Interestingly, the analysis shows that the Tunisian government describes this differently, as well as the European Commission acknowledging that Tunisia makes it agreements only after a rational analysis.

Finally, an attempt is made to critically assess the securitization theory and a conclusion is then drawn using the case of Tunisia and the theoretical framework. A number of observations are consequently made which aim to clarify the dynamic that is at play in the cooperation between the EU and its Southern neighbour Tunisia.

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Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework

1.1 Introduction

In order to formulate a theoretical and methodological framework for studying the external migration policies of the EU, it is first necessary to examine the theoretical work that has previously been conducted in the field of migration research in a broader sense. As Sarah Léonard, lecturer in politics at the University of Dundee, mentions, the issue of migration has, since the ban on policies attracting ‘gastarbeiters’ to work in Europe in the 1970s, been the topic of passionate debate in EU Member States. Moreover, it has been linked to a ‘wide array of socio-economic or political problems such as criminality, breaches of law and order, unemployment, abuse of social benefits, epidemics, cultural and religious threats, social unrest, and political instability’.7 In other words, migration in Europe has increasingly been perceived as a danger to stability and welfare since the 1970s. An even more explicit framing of migration as a threat, to the point of an existential one some authors argue, has occurred since the 1990s, as exemplified in the findings of numerous scholars in the field of migration.8 This chapter will focus on the theoretical debate that has emerged alongside this phenomenon of ‘migration as a threat’; an empirical overview of the development of EU migration policies in general and specifically in relation to Tunisia can be found in the subsequent chapters.

1.2 The Copenhagen School

The ‘securitization of migration’ has, according to Léonard, become ‘ubiquitous in the recent academic literature on this subject’.9 In an attempt to capture this development, which had shifted the previously dominant discourse on human rights of migrants to a dominant discourse of migration as a threat to states and nations, the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School (CS) has become a leading theory in the field of security studies.10 In explaining this security framing of migration theory, the CS has developed into ‘one of the important conceptual tools in migration

7

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

School’s Framework, Turin: SGIR 2007, p. 3. (see also: Huysmans (2000), p. 754)

8

Diez and Huysmans (2007) p.22, Seeberg (2013) p. 159, Romeo (1998) pp. 24-26, Léonard (2007) p. 5, Togral (2012) p. 66, Hammerstadt (2014) p. 1, Huysmans (2000) p. 751, Karyotis (2012) p. 394.

9

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

School’s Framework, Turin: SGIR 2007, p. 6.

10

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studies’.11 Hammerstadt clarifies that the emergence of this school of thought can be placed into a wider conceptual debate in the late 1980s and early 1990s ‘between realist scholars and their critics on the fundamental question of ‘what is security?’.12 This question had become a crucial one for scholars in this field to answer as, according to Weldes (et al.), ‘the end of the Cold War, almost overnight, dissolved the structure around which security studies had crystallized in the latter years of the 1980s and promptly precipitated a paradigmatic crisis’.13 The main point of focus for security studies during the Cold War, and perhaps before, had been on militaries and military tactics, objective and real threats as the realist scholar would have argued, whereas cultural or other factors were largely ignored as elements influencing feelings of security. Consequently, in the 1990s most works in this field of security studies recognize that neorealism had ‘oversimplified their objects of analysis’.14 Thus, concerns over economics, the environment and identity became of similar importance to state sovereignty as military force had been during the Cold War.15 Accordingly, the conceptual debate took a constructivist turn, as security appeared to be ‘not an objectively given fact’16, but a social construction; in hindsight, even the threat of nuclear weapons depended to a large extent on how the beholder of these weapons was characterized and perceived.

Weldes (et al.) clarifies the dynamic of security studies that had been applied within the realist approach by conveying how the structure of knowledge in security studies usually took the form of positing the existence of certain entities—often but not always states—within an environment in which they ‘experience threat(s)’.17 The paradigmatic shift to a constructivist approach in the late 1980s and early 1990s reshaped the object of research. Instead of taking a ‘set of pre-given entities and ask(s) “how can they be secured”18, the securitization approach turns this around and focuses on the question of ‘what are the processes through which security threats are constructed’.19

The CS came with a specific theoretical and methodological framework in order to capture these processes. Its main interpretation of security is that security threats are constructed through ‘speech acts’, public statements or speeches.20 In this sense, there exist no security threats other than those

11

Burcu Togral, ‘Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices’, Turkish Journal of International Relations, no. 2 (2012), p. 66.

12

Anne Hammerstadt, The Securitization of Migration, Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online 2014, p. 2.

13

Jutta Weldes (et al.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999, p. 3.

14

Ibidem, p. 4.

15

Anne Hammerstadt, The Securitization of Migration, Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online 2014, p. 2.

16

Ibidem, p. 2.

17

Jutta Weldes (et al.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999, p. 10.

18

Ibidem, p. 10.

19

Anne Hammerstadt, The Securitization of Migration, Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online 2014, p. 3. (see also: Weldes (et al.) (1999) p. 10.)

20

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which are constructed by certain actors, designated as ‘securitizing actors’.21 Ole Waever, one of the leading theorists linked to the CS alongside Buzan, puts it as follows:

‘In this usage, security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act. By saying it, something is done (as betting, giving a promise, naming a ship)’.22

Hence, the CS adopts the constructivist’s take on security quite literally and narrowly. The object of analysis for security issues thus lies in the ‘discursive production of security’.23 Through the speech acts by securitizing actors, ‘existential threats’ are invoked upon an established and pre-given entity, namely the state. As a matter of fact, in this sense the CS appears to have not broken completely with the traditional, realist security studies, since the threatened ‘object’ remains similar, namely the state. However, as opposed to the objective threats of its conceptual predecessor, issues in the CS are only securitized when the audience of the securitizing actor accepts the specific speech act. Success depends on several internal and external factors. These hold, according to Léonard:

‘The internal conditions are linguistic-grammatical: the speech act must follow the grammar of security, i.e., it must contain a plot with an existential threat, a point of no return, etc. The external conditions are contextual and social. Firstly, the securitizing actor must be in a position of authority, i.e., possess social capital in a Bourdieusian sense. Secondly, and this is only a facilitating factor, the persuasive power of the enunciator increases if (s)he can refer to certain ‘object’ generally considered threatening, such as tanks or polluted waters.’24

Successful securitization according to the CS, of framing an issue as ‘existential threat’, establishes that a matter is a priority and is therefore taken out of normal politics and into ‘emergency politics’. In line with what Léonard contends, following the CS, it can be observed that the threat of nuclear warfare, from the end of the Second World War, to the collapse of the Soviet Union, possessed the ‘most favourable’ external conditions in this respect. On this premise, security studies were built, and it can furthermore be argued, as neo-realists would, that if the possibility of a military confrontation of similar proportions would arise, it might overtake other perceived threats to the state or collective identity. However, that does certainly not abate the need to further investigate the processes of securitization as this process can have far-reaching effects for the framing of a wide range of issues, such as migration. Through this mechanism migration can be constructed as an existential threat to a state, the CS would argue. In fact, this mechanism of the construction of an

21

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

School’s Framework, Turin: SGIR 2007, p. 7.

22 Ibidem, p. 7. 23 Ibidem, p. 25. 24 Ibidem, pp. 7-8.

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Other, as a threat to the collective identity, and as a means to reassert collective identity, as determining what it is not, has gained prominence in the 1990s alongside the development of the CS. Weldes (et al.) argue that

‘Identity (…) can only be established in relation to what it is not—to difference. Difference, in turn, is constituted in relation to identity. Identities, then are always contingent and relational, and they are “performatively” constituted.’25

This observation manages to capture both the security situation during the Cold War, and the emergence of other security issues from the 1990s in a similar framework. Furthermore this adds to the CS the notion that not only states are subjected to threats but also collective identities and people can. This notion however will be further elaborated below. Nonetheless, successful securitization, in both cases then justifies urgent response and accordingly also exceptional measures.26 Myron Weiner already in the early 1990s made an according empirical observation concerning migration (the CS did not apply it to migration immediately), in which migration became the concern of ministries involved in defense, internal security and external relations, and moved into the area of ‘high international politics’.27 A more recent, and striking, case in point, is the recently proposed plan for EU military intervention aimed against human traffickers to prevent migration from Libya to Europe,28 albeit it can of course also be argued that it is to protect the migrants from undertaking the risky affair.29 This particular action has been proposed in the framework of the new European Agenda on Migration, presented in March 2015 by the European Commission.30 Besides important proposals in the area of asylum, the agenda stipulates the involvement of the High Representative Mogherini,31 which brings a new set of policy measures related to the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to the table, according to the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD). This organization questions whether the ‘emphasis of CSDP measures to the detriment of broader foreign policy measures is the right approach’.32 However, in Europe, not only state actors like the European Commission have taken this role of securitizing actor in the sense presented by the CS. Other examples include media,

25

Jutta Weldes (et al.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999, p. 11.

26

Anne Hammerstadt, The Securitization of Migration, Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online 2014, p. 3.

27

Myron Weiner, ‘Security, Stability, and International Migration’, International Security, no. 3 (1992-1993), p. 91.

28

Euractiv, ‘EU leaders to consider military crackdown on Libya traffickers’,

http://www.euractiv.com/sections/global-europe/eu-leaders-consider-military-crackdown-libya-human-traffickers-314020, accessed on 05-06-2015.

29

See interview with the officer in charge of relationship with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in the field of migration and security DG Home (Appendix)

30

European Commission, A European Agenda on Migration, COM(2015) 240 final.

31

Ibidem, p.5.

32

ICMPD, ‘The ‘European Agenda on Migration’: quotas and external action’, http://www.icmpd.org/News-Detail.1668.0.html?&cHash=ff5638e3ad&tx_ttnews%5btt_news%5d=293, accessed on 15-06-2015.

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think tanks, and opposition parties – not only right-wing as one might expect but socialist parties as well, as Spehar (et al.) show.33 Taking the CS approach, Diez and Huysmans argue that the normatively preferable thing for scholars in this field to do then is to desecuritize issues and bring them back from emergency to normal politics, where they are susceptible to political debate.34 In addition to the assumption that doing scientific research and gaining knowledge is something valuable in itself, it is important to stress the societal value of doing this type of research. In order to elaborate on this slightly I will borrow from the, more related than not, field of geography, where a prominent scholar has strikingly captured his idea. Generally, geographers, specifically scholars of Critical Geopolitics, concerned with a wider field of study in relation to narratives that are established by and for power relations, adopt a slightly more nuanced take on the notion of ‘desecuritizing’ or deconstructing narratives and the framing of specific issues. Ó Tuathail contends that:

‘Critical Geopolitics is a seductive promise, a putative claim that one can get beyond a baleful geopolitics and recover the real beyond the categorical, the ideological, the dogmatic, the imperialist and the hyperbolic. But in exposing geopolitics as a convenient fiction, Critical Geopolitics reveals itself as a similarly convenient fiction of opposition. It is merely the starting point for a different form of geopolitics, one hopefully burdenend less by nationalism and chauvinistic universals and more committed to cosmopolitan justice and self-critical analysis.’35

1.3 The Paris School

Although the CS’s securitization theory has become a mainstream theory in security studies, it has certainly attracted much criticism and caused many responses.36 This critique is focused on two main points, namely the ‘speech acts’ as sole securitizing instruments and the CS’s narrow understanding of the ‘object’ of (in)security which, as previously mentioned, came out of the realist approach without many alterations.

As a result, alternative approaches have been suggested, for instance by scholars advocating a more sociological approach. Huysmans, in ‘The Politics of Insecurity’, argues that ‘even when not directly 33

Andrea Spehar (et al.), ‘Ideology and Entry Policy: Why Center-Right Parties in Sweden Support Open-Door Migration Policies’, in Umut Korkut (et al.) ed., The Discourses of Migration in Europe, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 171-172.

34

Thomas Diez, and Jef Huysmans, Research Report: Migration, Democracy and Security, Swindon: ESRC 2007, p. 25.

35

Laura Jones, and Daniel Sage, ‘New directions in critical geopolitics: an introduction’, GeoJournal, no. 1 (2010), p. 316.

36

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spoken of as a threat, asylum can be rendered as a security question by being institutionally and discursively integrated in policy frameworks that emphasizes policing and defence’.37 Here, he captures, concerning the first point of critique, the rationale behind new framework for security studies that was established by Didier Bigo and his colleagues at the Centre d’étude sur les conflits located in Paris. This school of thought came to be known as the Paris School (PS), and was a direct reaction on the CS.38 Instances of institutionalized securitization cannot, according to the Paris School, be identified simply through discourse analysis. Bigo argues, putting it more simply than Huysmans, that ‘[i]t is possible to securitise certain problems without speech or discourse and the military and the police have known that for a long time. The practical work, discipline and expertise are as important as all forms of discourse’.39 Léonard concludes from this that what follows is that the bureaucratic structures and networks that are linked to security practices, mostly governmental, possibly play a greater role in the process of securitization than security speech acts. Worth quoting is Bigo as he links this structure of securitization specifically to migration:

‘The securitization of immigration then emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals (…). It comes also from a range of administrative practices such as population profiling, risk assessment, statistical calculation, category creation, proactive preparation, and what may be termed a specific

habitus of the “security professional” with its ethos of secrecy and concern for the

management of fear or unease’.40

Methodologically, Léonard contends, this leads to the conclusion that it is more useful for researchers to investigate the daily practices of experts in the field of security and bureaucracies that correspond with that field, than to focus solely on the macro-level political discourse. Similarly Ó Tuathail argues that the constructivist approach allows for discourse analysis, developed by him as the Critical Geopolitics (CG) approach, which holds that discourses are the parameters within which actors act, while simultaneously influencing the discourse by their acts. In order to study how discourses are produced and how this affects policy-making in a very basic way, producing certain political scripts that are deemed necessary concerning the prevailing discourse, it is appropriate to adopt a Meso-level discourse analysis.41 This stands between the Macro and Micro-level discourse

37

Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU, Abingdon: Routledge 2006, p. 4.

38

Ibidem, p. 4. (see also: Togral (2012), p. 66).

39

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

School’s Framework, Turin: SGIR 2007, p. 14.

40

Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, Alternatives, no. 27 (2002), pp. 65-66.

41

Georóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the United States’ response to the war in Bosnia’, Political Geography, no. 1 (2002), p. 606.

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analysis, and is in line with Léonard as being a combination of a study of the two levels, being the everyday practices, and the macro-level political discourse, which legitimizes the former, which may thus best reveal the dynamic of the securitization process.

The second point of critique is that of ‘the Copenhagen School’s (…) rather narrow and extreme understanding of security’ which in line with the security studies during the Cold War and its ‘traditional military-political understanding’ is limited to a question of existential degree.42 This narrow explanation was ‘aimed to prevent an endless expansion of the concept of security, which might ultimately render it meaningless and jeopardise the coherence of the discipline of security studies’.43 However, in doing so the CS transposes the logic of the military sector of the classical security studies as being preferable. According to Léonard, Doty best captures this critique44:

‘Waever wants to rethink the concept of security “in a way that is true to the classical discussion.” The problem with this is that it implicitly assumes that the logic captured by the classical security field regarding state security is the logic that is operative in the realm of societal security and is, indeed, the only logic worth considering if one is to contribute to existing conversations on security. This precludes consideration of the possibility that important and relevant logics that cannot be placed entirely within the classical security logic may be operative.’45

Thus, scholars are open to the idea of applying different approaches and adapting different dynamics. Buzan however, the CS’s other prominent scholar, seems to have left the door open to put this logic in perspective, which would otherwise lead to a strict dichotomy between ‘normal’ politics, and the ‘emergency’ politics mentioned earlier.46 He does this by applying security not only to states, but also shortly mentioning concepts such as identity and societal security. These forms of security he defines as ‘the sustainability, within acceptable conditions for evolution, of traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity and custom’.47 Notwithstanding that Buzan here approximates the classical realist form of security studies by taking a pre-given entity in ‘need’ to be secured against threats, he does mention identity to be a possible factor, and the sustainability implies the possibility for gradations in perceived threats. Weldes (et al.) follow a similar, albeit slightly more nuanced logic. As is established above, they contend that identity can only be constructed in relation to what it is not. However, they go on to argue that an identity can be

42

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

School’s Framework, Turin: SGIR 2007, p. 11.

43

Ibidem, p. 11.

44

Ibidem, p. 12.

45

Roxanne Lynn Doty, ‘Immigration and the politics of security’, Security Studies, no. 8 (1998), pp. 79-80.

46

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

School’s Framework, Turin: SGIR 2007, p. 12.

47

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‘insecure or threatened not merely by actions that the other might take to injure or defeat the true identity but by the very visibility of its mode of being as Other’.48 Gradations in the perception of migration as a threat could thus capture the attitudes in Europe to migration since the 1970s in a single framework.

Hammerstadt, corresponding to Léonard’s external factors mentioned above, clarifies in relation to migration that different factors, such as how insular and traditionalist a society is, but also how culturally different migrants are from the host societies and in what numbers they arrive, can alter the level in which migration is perceived as a threat.49 Similarly, Léonard argues that this allows for the adoption of a ‘more open-ended definition of the concept [of security]’.50 This would allow for security threats to be placed on a ‘continuum from normalcy, to worrisome/troublesome to risk and existential threat – and conversely from threat to risk and back to normalcy’, and understanding securitization as gradual and incremental’.51 Similarly, Abrahamsen and Huysmans respectively argue, in line with Weldes (et al.), that through securitization, political authority is able to distinguish a community on basis of the assumption of a possible threat to their own community,52 and consequently ‘integrate (..) society politically by staging a credible existential threat in the form of an enemy’.53

For the purpose of this thesis, the above is important to take into consideration, as it might not necessarily be an increase in migration, or other link of migration to negative statistics such as crime, that could constitute migration as a threat. Of course, if such were to be the case it could be included in the discourse and speech acts on migration, as ‘favourable’ conditions that allow for the construction of threats. However, the idea is that even in the case of a decline of these type of statistics, or real consequences caused by migrants, migration could possibly move up the continuum towards ‘existential threat’. Following the outline of these constructivist approaches and their critiques, this thesis will combine the research of ‘speech acts’, or discourse, with research on practices, in the form of policies and the daily work of professionals. This corresponds to the earlier mentioned Meso-level discourse analysis.

48

Jutta Weldes (et al.), Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press 1999, p. 11.

49

Anne Hammerstadt, The Securitization of Migration, Oxford: Oxford Handbooks Online 2014, p. 3.

50

Sarah Léonard, The ‘Securitization’ of Asylum and Migration in the European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen

School’s Framework, Turin: SGIR 2007, p. 13.

51

Rita Abrahamsen, ‘Blair’s Africa: The Politics of Securitization and Fear’, Alternatives, no. 30 (2005), p. 59.

52

Ibidem, p. 61.

53

Jef Huysmans, ‘The Question of the Limit: Descuritisation and the Aesthetics of Horror in Political Realism’,

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The thesis will not, as Togral propones in his article ‘Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices’, ‘privilege practices over “speech acts”.54 Togral goes on from here that she does not completely ignore the role of discourse, but instead links discourse to a wider context, ‘in which practices precede and pre-structure political framing in significant ways’.55 It is necessary, for the completeness of this theoretical framework, to take note of the fact that a part of the PS adopts this solely sociological approach, and this is what Togral is referring to here. Balzacq proposes the move away from ‘discourse and towards the ‘empirical referents of policy’ – policy tools or instruments – that the EU utilizes to alleviate public problems defined as threats’.56 However, exclusively focusing on the EU’s tools, would make it harder to comprehend how these policies are publicly legitimized; this thesis will thus examine both. It is important to take notice of the fact that the approach of CG that emerged from the field of geography, which was mentioned above, closely relates to Bigo’s approach of an interplay between discourse and practice.

1.4 Critical Geopolitics

In short, the basic rationale behind this approach is that ideas are constructed by political leaders and intellectuals of statecraft which influence a wide audience and make some policy choices seemingly more favourable than others. 57 The assumption that discourse is used to legitimize policies, and thus holds the power to change policy, is something which has intensively been studied in the field of CG. According to Ó Tuathail, one of its main theorists, CG ‘is a seductive promise, a putative claim that one can get beyond a baleful geopolitics and recover the real beyond the categorical, the ideological, the dogmatic, the imperialist and the hyperbolic.’58 Seeberg furthermore relates the explicit securitization of migration, which followed the period of the ‘gastarbeiter’ understanding of migration, to ‘a widening of both the actual geopolitical and the conceptual interpretation of migration’.59

Ó Tuathail has developed a theoretical framework to study the working of practical geopolitical reasoning, drawing upon the work of the argumentative approach in public policy and social

54

Burcu Togral, ‘Securitization of Migration in Europe: Critical Reflections on Turkish Migration Practices’, Turkish Journal of International Relations, no. 2 (2012), p. 66.

55

Ibidem, p. 66.

56

Thierry Balzacq, ‘The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies’,

Journal of Common Market Studies, no. 1 (2008), p. 76.

57

Gearóid Ó Tuathail, and John Agnew, ‘Geopolitics and Discourse: Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in American Foreign Policy’, in Simon Dalby (et al.) ed., The Geopolitics Reader, London: Routledge 1998, p. 81.

58

Laura Jones, and Daniel Sage, ‘New directions in critical geopolitics: an introduction’, GeoJournal, no. 1 (2010), p. 316.

59

Seeberg, P., ‘The Arab Uprisings and the EU’s Migration Policies—The Cases of Egypt, Libya, and Syria’,

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constructivist perspectives of the field of International Relations. 60 However, rather than the practical policy solutions arising straight from the construction of certain geopolitical narratives, they are made within the context of this narrative. Specific policies of intervention, of approaching a certain issue, gain or lose a sense of plausibility according to the dominant political narrative. Consequently, Jeffrey emphasizes the importance of the institutional context, in which decisions are made, opposing the rational-choice model of decision-making.61 This here corresponds with Bigo’s practice side of the dynamic with discourse. Continuing, Jeffrey explains that this ‘shares with path-dependency approaches an appreciation of the importance of history, that decisions made in the past shape the possibilities of the present’.62 Cassarino has done similar findings specifically in relation to the EU’s external migration policy towards Tunisia which supports Jeffrey’s claim. He argues that ‘the hierarchy of priorities that has codified for decades the interactions between Tunisia, on the one hand, and the EU and its Member States, on the other, continues to orient policy concerns on migration matters’.63 Jeffrey furthermore argues that it is possible to object to the eventual dominant political narratives by utilizing post-structural political theory, and establishing a CG analysis of the conflict. This refers to the competing and coexisting discourses and narratives that framed the eventual policy-solutions, such discourses of the Tunisian government or NGOs.64 Cassarino appears to be inclined towards a similar conclusion. He contends that the radical changes that have been taking place in Tunisian society in the past years might ‘raise a host of new challenges, particularly given the unprecedented sense of advocacy, of citizens and NGOs, that today characterizes Tunisian society’.65 Dominant discourse does not immediately cause specific policy-solutions, that would be a rather deterministic conclusion. Instead, it makes some policy-solutions seem more favourable and reasonable, and is constantly challenged by actors with other visions. For instance humanitarian intervention to guarantee the protection of human rights or military actions against migrants smugglers, while others are deemed irrational within the dominant discourse, such as a full-scale military intervention in ‘sending’ countries of migrants, such as Libya or Syria. Correspondingly, Campbell mentions that narratives are created through ‘emplotment’, whereby facts are structured in such a way that that they form a particular story. He concludes that history itself does not provide a preferred way of structuring facts, on the contrary, when capturing the historical records there are no objective grounds to prefer one way over the other.66 As a 60

Georóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the United States’ response to the war in Bosnia’, Political Geography, no. 1 (2002), p. 601.

61

Alex Jeffrey, ‘ The Geopolitical Framing of Localized Struggles: NGO’s in Bosnia and Herzegovina’,

Development and Change, no. 2 (2007), p. 253.

62

Ibidem, p. 253.

63

Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Channeled Policy Transfers: EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters’, European

Journal of Migration and Law, no. 16 (2014), p. 123.

64

Alex Jeffrey, ‘The political geographies of transitional justice’, Transactions of the Institute of British

Geographers, no. 3 (2011), p. 348.

65

Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Channeled Policy Transfers: EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters’, European

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66

David Campbell, ‘MetaBosnia: Narratives of the Bosnian War’, Review of International Studies, no. 2 (1998), p. 262.

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consequence, recent political developments in Tunisia possibly allow for a certain different discourse on migration to dominate and influence Tunisian policy-developments in the future, but this is too early to evaluate as Cassarino mentions.67 Similarly, EU policy-making may be affected by changes in discourse on an EU and Member State-level, although recent developments only appear to be evidence of this discourse on migration moving up on the continuum for securitized issues. Accordingly, deconstructing the dominant discourse and placing it in a context of institutional composition, everyday practices, and policy-development, is necessary to understand this dynamic. Subsequently, what is established by Ó Tuathail to deconstruct this dominant discourse is a methodological framework of four parts, functioning as a road-map of how dominant discourses are formed and how it results into political action. Media coverage of the conflict, in the form of a series of images, reports and stories, functions as the initial and constant input into the framework, providing the fuel for the discursive development. The four phases that follow consist of

categorization and particularization, story-line construction, performative geopolitical script, and foreign policy as problem solving. These four phases will briefly be outlined below.

The categorization and particularization phase sets out to understand the ‘grammar’ of geopolitical reasoning, questions that need answering before a more specific storyline can be constructed. It consists of the very basic and somewhat shallow categorization of different aspects of the conflict. These can be divided into five questions of where, what, who, why and, so what? Although seemingly obvious questions, their importance, in line with Campbell’s above statement on the creation of narratives, should not be underestimated.68

Those five questions that have to be addressed during the framing of the conflict, are necessary building-blocks for the more detailed and all-encompassing storylines that are then constructed. These storylines are there to make sense of the different elements and incorporate them into a coherent and convincing geopolitical narrative. The result is an even easier to grasp explanation and characterization of the conflict. Often competing storylines exist, and dominant narratives are in turn challenged compelling narratives by those of people with opposing interest.69

The storylines are followed by the performative geopolitical script, referring to the ‘coherent sequences of events expected by individuals’. In contrast to the storylines, which try to characterize the conflict and distinguish a set of motives, actors, and events, scripts explain the direction and the way in which leaders are then expected to perform geopolitics, and strategies that are necessary in 67

Jean-Pierre Cassarino, ‘Channeled Policy Transfers: EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters’, European

Journal of Migration and Law, no. 16 (2014), p. 122.

68

Georóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the United States’ response to the war in Bosnia’, Political Geography, no. 1 (2002), pp. 601-628.

69

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order to address the challenges that arise with certain storylines.70 Besides constructing a vision of geopolitical discourse, the ‘grammar’ of geopolitics also involves practical problem-solving discourse. Divided into four categories, they work to establish policy towards solving the problem that was established by the previous three stages. These categories consist of: problem definition, geopolitical strategy, geopolitical accommodation, and problem closure.71

1.5 Conclusion

Concluding, Bigo’s approach of an interplay between discourse and practice will be adopted, as the earlier quoted contends: ‘securitization of immigration (…) emerges from the correlation between some successful speech acts of political leaders, the mobilization they create for and against some groups of people, and the specific field of security professionals’.72 This is done for two interrelated reasons. Firstly, since discourse has the possibility to change practice, and secondly since (de)securitizing certain issues by scholars could eventually aid in ‘interrupt[ing] dominant thinking and practice’.73 This practice has the ability, as has been established above, to bring issues that have been securitized back on the continuum from ‘existential threat’ and ‘emergency’ politics to normal politics where these are susceptible to political debate. To this end, the CG’s methodological framework complements Bigo’s approach, as it lends itself best for the purpose of this thesis. This leads to the following structure of the thesis. The second section, which constitutes chapter 2 and 3, contains an analysis of the bureaucracies and policies that are necessary to ‘understand how discourses work in practice’,74 and establishes how migration policies have developed through history, specifically in relation to Tunisia. This will furthermore provide the reader with an overview of the field as well as form an adequate background against which to understand the third section, which constitutes chapter 4 of the thesis, namely that of a policy-document analysis, which aims to establish the EU’s dominant discourse. This discourse analysis will contain several of the most prominent policy documents in the field of the EU’s external migration policy in regard to the country of Tunisia. Furthermore, this discourse analysis is complemented by several semi-structured interviews with key-actors in the field of migration, namely from the institutions of the European Commission, the International Organization for Migration, and the Tunisian government. Bigo has highlighted that this is necessary in order to understand the ‘day-to-day practices, of the 70

Georóid Ó Tuathail, ‘Theorizing practical geopolitical reasoning: the case of the United States’ response to the war in Bosnia’, Political Geography, no. 1 (2002), p. 619.

71

Ibidem, pp. 622-623.

72

Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, Alternatives, no. 27 (2002), pp. 65-66.

73

Jennifer Hyndman, ‘Introduction: The Geopolitics of Migration and Mobility’, Geopolitics, no. 17 (2012), p. 243.

74Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, Alternatives, no 27 (2002), p. 73.

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bureaucracies (…) to understand how discourses work in practice’.75 Moreover, this section provides the justification for the selected policy documents and interviews.

75Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’, Alternatives, no 27 (2002), p. 73.

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Chapter 2. Migration in EU External Relations

2.1 Introduction

‘Migration and refugee issues, no longer the sole concern of ministries of labor or of immigration, are now matters of high international politics, engaging the attention of heads of states, cabinets, and key ministries involved in defense, internal security and external relations.’76

This chapter will discuss the historical background of the EU’s migration policy and the developments toward an external dimension. As the above quote by renowned scholar Myron Weiner, professor of internal and international migration at MIT, demonstrates, it can be argued that a shift in the characteristics of migration policy has taken place from a Home Affairs issue to a matter for international ‘high’ politics. The timing of his conclusion could not have been more appropriate; in that same year of 1993, international cooperation between EU Member States on migration and asylum was officially consolidated in the Maastricht Treaty (the Treaty on European Union). This was the direct result of the wish of being able to achieve ‘the objectives of the Union, in particular the free movement of persons’, and took into account the common interests of the Member States in the area of asylum policy, rules governing the crossing of person of the external borders, immigration policy and policy regarding nationals of third countries.77 Thus, following the adoption of the Schengen Agreement by the EU with the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), which abolished the internal borders, increased attention was given to the external borders. This culminated in the formulation of an external migration policy, which was aimed at preventing irregular migration flows towards EU territory by cooperation with the EU’s neighbouring countries.

First the background leading up to this ‘securitizing’ shift of migration policy is described, after which its development as an EU policy will be outlined. This outline is constructed following an approach by Christina Boswell, professor of politics and international relations at the University of Edinburgh. She distinguishes between policies directed at direct symptoms of migration flows, the irregular migrants themselves, and policies aimed at the tackling the underlying causes of this irregular migration.

76

Myron Weiner, ‘Security, Stability, and International Migration’, International Security, no. 3 (1992-1993), p. 91.

77

European Communities, Treaty on the European Union, Brussels: Official Journal of the European Communities, no. C 191/2 (1992), Art. K.1.

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2.2 Background

Boswell distinguishes between two distinct approaches of EU relations and cooperation with ‘sending’ and ‘transit’ countries of migrants that aim to exercise control on migration flows. This division combines the literature on the EU’s more general neighbourhood policies on one hand, with the more specific policies on migration on the other. Both policies are characterized by a securitization of the issue of migration, as part of the same developments as Myron Weiner conveyed in the above quote. Both of these types of policies have been intensively studied, albeit the EU’s neighbourhood policies considerably more due to its longer history, and the recent nature of the EU’s external migration policy. The first type of policy is more of a particularly preventative nature and as such concerned with the underlying causes of migration. These include measures that aim to change factors that stimulate people to make the journey to Europe, such as political instability and poverty.78 Although prevention of (irregular) migration is one of the objectives in this approach, it must be noted that there are many other objectives and rationales that shape it. An example is the EU’s drive to open up markets, which requires stability and liberal reforms in the neighbouring countries. Another is the EU’s great emphasis on specific norms, such as human rights, democracy and rule of law, which are included in most agreements with the neighbourhood, albeit implementation is another question. The second type of policy is one most specifically and overtly directed at preventing migrants from crossing the border. This she considers to ‘essentially externalize traditional tools of domestic or EU migration controls’ and holds the direct cooperation between EU Member States and Non-Member States on issues of border-control.79 These types of policy are explained below.

The former type of policy has been implemented since the late 1960s. Agreements with non-Member States, mainly those on Europe’s southern border (as the Eastern border was effectively closed because of the Cold War), first solely focused on trade. The formulation of the Global Mediterranean Policy (GMP, 1972) however added social, economic and financial dimensions.80 Developments in the Maghreb region81 at the end of the 1980s, including a high birthrate, unsuccessful economic policies and political instability, nonetheless increased the gap between the EU and some of the major sending and transit countries of its immigrants in the Southern Mediterranean. Richard Edis argues that the ensuing political instability prompted the European Commission to express its concern for pressure on the EU countries because of increased migration, and consequently to develop a ‘Renovated Mediterranean Policy’ (RMP, 1990) of which the main 78

Christina Boswell, ‘The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy’, International Affairs, no. 3 (2003), pp. 619-620.

79

Ibidem, p. 619.

80

Richard Edis, ‘Does the Barcelona Process Matter?’, Mediterranean Politics, no. 3 (1998), pp. 93-94.

81

The term generally refers to the five North African countries of Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Mauritania, plus the disputed territory of Western Sahara - although it is most commonly used for Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia (source: European Commission).

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innovations was increased funding82.83 The attempts of tackling the root causes that lead to migration has continued into the present day and has grown enormously, not only in funding but also in scope and the number of participating countries. This has been pursued through ambitious frameworks such as the Barcelona Process (1995) and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP, 2004), which will briefly be outlined below. George Joffe even went as far as claiming that the ‘unspoken primary purpose’ of the former of the two was to ‘stem migration by fostering economic development in the southern countries, from Morocco to Turkey.’84 Of course, this can be challenged by arguing the importance for the EU of the opening of markets, and the EU as genuine promoter of human rights. However, the ‘Declaration on Principles of Governing External Aspects of Migration Policy’, which had been agreed upon by the Edinburgh European Council (1992), appears to be supportive of Joffe’s claim, arguing that:

‘It was convinced that a number of different factors were important for the reduction of migratory movements into the Member States: the preservation of peace and the termination of armed conflicts; full respect for human rights; the creation of democratic societies and adequate social conditions; a liberal trade policy, which should improve economic conditions in the countries of emigration. Co-ordination of action in the field of foreign policy, economic co-operation and immigration and asylum policy by the Community and its Member States could also contribute to addressing the question of migratory movements. The Treaty on European Union, notably its Titles V and VI, once in force, will provide an adequate framework for this co-ordinated action.’85

The other approach Boswell mentions, which seeks to engage non-Member States in ‘strengthening border controls, combating illegal entry, migrant smuggling and trafficking’86 was not officially agreed upon by the EU until 1999. However, advocates for such a strategy had been emerging since the early 1990s. Both the European Commission (in 1991) and the Edinburgh European Council (1992) expressed a need for integration of migration issues into external policy.87 And as was established in the quote above, the Maastricht Treaty (1993) had set out two factors which seem to have been contributing to the perceived need for such policies. First, as previously mentioned, the political instability in the late 1980s was perceived as a pressure for migration to Europe.88

82

Rym Ayadi and Salim Gadi, ‘EU Development Funding in the Southern Mediterranean: Diagnosis and Prospects’, European Institute of the Mediterranean Panorama, (2011), p. 240.

83

Richard Edis, ‘Does the Barcelona Process Matter?’, Mediterranean Politics, no. 3 (1998), p. 94.

84

Mary Lister, Reinvigorating Europe’s Mediterranean Partnership: Priorities and Policies, Canterbury: University of Canterbury Online Publications, p. 1.

85

European Council, Declaration on Principles of Governing External Aspects of Migration Policy, Edinburgh: European Council 1992, pp. 46-47.

86

Christina Boswell, ‘The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy’, International Affairs, no. 3 (2003), p. 619.

87 Ibidem

, pp. 620-621.

88

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Additionally, Boswell mentions the ‘lifting of restrictions on movement from the former communist bloc’.89 This effectively constituted a perceived increase of migration flows to the EU from both borders of the European Union, South and East.

Secondly, the implementation of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, by the countries of Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, abolished internal borders for the Schengen countries. Following the incorporation in the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997, the Schengen area was extended to the EU as part of its Acquis Communautaire.90 Consequently, state-borders became secondary to common external borders, posing a new perceived need for stronger border policies.91 This was the background against which a more specific anti-irregular migration policy developed in the late 1990s and 2000s, in order to strengthen border controls, and ‘to prevent and combat illegal migration and human trafficking’.92 As mentioned, calls for a common external migration policy were made since the early 1990s as a reaction to different developments. It was to compliment the agreements on common internal migration policy that were already made in 1990 under the Schengen Implementation Agreement and the Dublin Convention, specifically for regional cooperation for the handling of refugees.93 Furthermore, these developments toward a common EU migration policy coincided with wider changes in the EU’s approach towards its ‘neighbourhood’, as part of the first form of policies Bosswell has mentioned (those designed to be of a more preventative and stabilizing nature). These developed into ever more encompassing policies in the 1990s when the more traditional bilateral trade relations had proven to be ineffective in stabilizing Europe’s border region. The first major policy framework to be implemented towards Europe’s neighbouring countries concerned the countries along its Southern and Southeastern borders. This was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), initiated by the Barcelona Process which was established in November 1995 by the Barcelona Declaration.94 As opposed to the bilateral trade relations, known as the Trade and Cooperation Agreements, which had been concluded with almost all Mediterranean countries, the EMP consisted additional social and political dimensions. An even more comprehensive approach was taken in 2004, when the ENP was initiated. This ensued in response to the EU’s 2004 and 2007 Eastern enlargement and, according to the official communications from the European Commission, to ‘avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and 89

Christina Boswell, ‘The ‘External Dimension’ of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy’, International Affairs, no. 3 (2003), p. 621.

90

The body of common rights and obligations which bind all Member States together within the European Union.

91

William Walters, ‘Mapping Schengenland: denaturalizing the border’, Environment and Planning D: Society

and Space, no. 1 (2002), p. 566.

92

Council of the European Union, Global approach to migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the

Mediterranean, Brussels: Council of the European Union 2005, p. 6.

93

Sandra Lavenex, ‘Passing the Buck’: European Union Refugee Policies towards Central and Eastern Europe’,

Journal of Refugee Studies, no. 2 (1998), p. 126.

94

European External Action Service, ‘The Barcelona Process’,

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to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union’.95 These two policy frameworks will be shortly outlined in the following paragraphs, since for further consideration of the EU’s external migration policy it is important to understand the context of the EU’s wider relations with its neighbourhood.

2.3 Euro-Mediterranean Partnership

From the start of the process of European integration, the Mediterranean region has played an important role. The Treaty of Rome (1957) for instance, which established the European Economic Community (EEC), the EU’s predecessor, left room for Mediterranean countries, such as Greece, Spain and Portugal to apply for membership. Currently, only Turkey is still officially an aspiring member. However, before 1989 cooperation in the region only took place in the form of bilateral relations. In the 1960s, the EEC concluded a number of agreements with Mediterranean countries in which arrangements were made to reduce trading restrictions.96 In the 1970s, a global framework for relations with the Mediterranean was introduced, the GMP. As part of the GMP, bilateral Trade and

Cooperation Agreements were concluded with most of the Mediterranean countries, except for Libya

and Albania. The first agreements were signed between the EU and Israel in 1975, followed by Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in 1976. Although the primary focus was still mainly on economic cooperation and trade, some attentions was also paid to social cooperation concerning the position of the ‘gastarbeiters’ in the Member States.97 In agreement with Cristina Boswell and Richard Edis, Michelle Pace, professor at the University of Birmingham, argues that a number of developments in the 1980s have contributed to the decision to expand the framework of cooperation with the Mediterranean.98 Around this time, shortcomings in the EU’s economic cooperation became visible; a combination of a high birthrate, unsuccessful economic reforms and political turmoil in the Maghreb region created a greater imbalance between the EU and the Southern Mediterranean.99 This was reason to implement the Renovated Mediterranean Policy (RMP) in 1990, with a bigger budget. However, without additional dimensions in the cooperation with the Southern neighbourhood, the bigger budget appeared to be insufficient to tackle the problems. Consequently, five years later the EMP was established.

95

European Commission, Wider Europe — Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern

and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, p. 4.

96

Michelle Pace, ‘The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European Union’, Journal of European Area Studies, no. 10 (2002), p. 196.

97

Medea Institute, ‘Euro-Mediterranean Cooperation: Historical’, http://www.medea.be/en/themes/euro-mediterranean-cooperation/euro-mediterranean-cooperation-historical/, accessed on 10-04-2015.

98

Michelle Pace, ‘The Ugly Duckling of Europe: The Mediterranean in the Foreign Policy of the European Union’, Journal of European Area Studies, no. 10 (2002), p. 197.

99

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The signing of the Barcelona Declaration in November 1995 by the Member States of the EU and twelve Mediterranean third countries, established the framework for both bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The twelve Mediterranean third countries were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, the Palestinian Authority (nowadays the State of Palestine), Syria, Tunisia and Turkey. The so called Barcelona Process, which was to be initiated by the Barcelona Declaration, would become the basis for the EMP.100 In contrast to the previous, relatively limited, relations of the EU with the region, there were ambitious goals to be found in the Barcelona Declaration, namely to create: “an area of dialogue, exchange and cooperation guaranteeing peace, stability and prosperity requires a strengthening of democracy and respect for human rights, sustainable and balanced economic and social development, measures to combat poverty and promotion of greater understanding between cultures, which are all essential aspects of partnership”.101

The EMP is comprised of multilateral cooperation in three different areas (political, economic and social), and was based on ‘comprehensive cooperation and solidarity’, according to the Barcelona Declaration.102 Within this framework, bilateral agreements were concluded between the EU and each partner country. The new Association Agreements replaced the previous bilateral Trade and

Cooperation Agreements which had been concluded in the 1970s. Furthermore, honoring the

democratic principles and human rights were announced to be essential elements within these agreements. The multilateral relations, which favor regional integration of the area, consisted of conferences, financed by the EU, which took place on the three different dimensions of the EMP. Although the Mediterranean third countries demanded equality within the partnership as a sine qua

non condition, it should be noted that the EU was still in a better position, due to its unified front and

the inability of the Mediterranean countries to present themselves as such.103

Despite the ambitious goals the EU set itself with the Barcelona Declaration, the literature on this topic reveals that the EMP took off slowly and with great difficulty.104 Not in the least, this was caused by the conflict between Israel and the Arab countries, causing Syria and Libya to veto the creation of a stability pact. This conflict strongly diminished the EMP’s capabilities on other issues as well. Furthermore, there was no clear advancement of the human rights situation, as formulated in the clauses of the Barcelona Declaration, to be observed, perhaps in great part because the EU was

100

EU Neighbourhood Info Centre, ‘The EuroMed Partnership’, http://www.enpi-

info.eu/medportal/content/340/About%20the%20EuroMed%20Partnership, accessed on 10-04-2015.

101

Council of the European Union, Barcelona Declaration, Barcelona: Euro-Mediterranean Conference 1995, p. 2.

102

Ibidem, p. 2.

103

Fulvio Attina, ‘The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Assessed: The Realist and Liberal Views’, European

Foreign Affairs Review, no. 8. (2003), p. 181.

104

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Neighbourhood Policy towards the Southern Mediterranean’, European Foreign Affairs Review, no. 10 (2005), pp. 17-18.

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