Phenomenological Traditions: The Diversity of Consciousness Philosophy from East to West

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UNIVERSITEITVANAMSTERDAM

Phenomenological

Traditions: The Diversity

of Consciousness

Philosophy from East to

West

An

exploration

and

comparison

into

the

use

of

phenomenology

within

the

work

of

Jean-Paul

Sartre

and

Vasubandhu

.

UvA 2015

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Introduction

Thisworkssetsouttoexploreandanswerthequestionofthehowphenomenological

methodology hasbeenusedacrossphilosophical history toexaminetheissueofconsciousness.

Inparticular,itwillcomparethedoctrinesofJean-PaulSartreandVasubandhuinanattemptto discover boththesimilaritiesanddifferencesthatphenomenologycanharbouracrossradically differentphilosophicaltraditions. Indoingsowewillattempttodiscoverthewaysinwhich historical differences -in terms ofcontrastingphilosophicalbeliefs - createadisparityintheir

viewstowardsconsciousness,despitethecommon useofphenomenology. Wewillcometo

findthat,in this case, it is beliefsintermsoftheselforthesubject thatcausethegreatest dividebetweentheirphilosophies,causingustodeterminetheirtheoriesascontrasting doctrines. In general, this comparison will hopefully leadustoaninsightintothewaysthat

phenomenologyhasbeenusedtowardsdifferentendsthroughoutintellectualhistory,

beginningwithinancienteasternBuddhistphilosophyandleadingtomoderndayphilosophy.

ThisresearchwillstartbyinquiringintowherebothSartreandVasubandhuareplacedin history,intermsofthephilosophicalmovementsthatsurroundthem. Inparticular,wewilllook

atthishistoricalplacementintermsoftheinfluencetheygainedfortheirconsciousness philosophy. ForSartrewewillspecificallyexplorehisrelationshipwiththetranscendentalist

philosophyofKant, whichguideshimtowardsaconnectionwiththe Husserlianschoolof transcendentalphenomenologyandthephilosophyofHeidegger. Furthermore,wewill

investigatethewaysSartre’sexistentialistviewsdeterminehisbeliefstowardstheselfandthe subject,whichwewillseedeeplyaffecthisphenomenologicalinvestigationinto

consciousness. Vasubandhu’s philosophy of consciousness takesusintothewider history of Buddhistphilosophy. Webeginbyexaminingthetraditional conceptofconsciousnessthatcan befoundwithintheearly ancientBuddhisttexts,thePaliCanon. Weshallfindthatitspriority

oftheelucidationofconsciousnessleadstotheconstructionofamuchlaterschoolof Buddhism,theYogacaraSchool. ItiswithinthephilosophyoftheYogacaransthat

Vasubandhu’s greatest influences lie. This will turn us towards Jay Garfield’s argument that Vasubandhu should be seen, not as an idealist, but as a phenomenologist.

ThisbriefexaminationintotheinfluencesonbothSartreandVasubandhu, and the argument for Vasubandhu as a phenomenologist,setsthestageforafulleranalysisoftheirtheoriesof consciousnesswithinthenexttwochapters. Thesechapterswilldirectlyusetheliteratureof

bothphilosopherstosetoutindetailtheirphilosophyofconsciousness. ForSartreweuse

severalchaptersofBeingandNothingness,whichlayouthisarguments. ForVasubandhuwe

useStefanAnacker’sbookSevenWorksofVasubandhu:TheBuddhistPsychologicalDoctor

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Vimsatika-Karika,Trimsatika-KarikaandtheTri-Svabhava-Nirdesa. These texts are known to be

Vasubandhu’s consciousness trilogy, in which a full explication of consciousness is found through reading each text, following from the Vimsatika-Karika through to the

Tri-Svabhava-Nirdesa. Taken together we find the core of Vasubandhu’s philosophical beliefs on

consciousness, and, as his supposedly last ever works, they remain highly influential on Buddhist consciousness philosophy in general.

From this outline of their phenomenological approaches to consciousness, wemovetoalast chapterinwhichwefullycompareandanalysethetheoriestogether,anddiscoverthewaysin whichdistinct philosophical traditions haveaffectedtwophenomenologicalphilosophiesof consciousness. Itiswithinthischapterthatwediscoverthewayinwhichbothphilosophersuse

thesamephenomenologicalmethodtobeginanalysingconsciousness. Indoingsowefindthat thephenomenologicalmethodleadsbothphilosopherstodiscoverthetwo-foldconsciousness;

a consciousness that firstly includes the basic conscious experience itself, whilst further holding within itself a part of consciousness that causes and sustains this basic conscious appearance.Yet,itisthehistorical philosophical differencesthatwehavepreviouslyexplored, thatcausethetwo-foldstructuretoincorporatewithinitverydifferentthingsforthetwo

philosophers. This,weshallsee,isdependentupontheirviewstowardstheselfandthesubject.

Theremainingcomparisonofthetwodoctrinesofphilosophy,therefore, highlightsthestriking differencesthatarebroughtaboutthroughthephenomenologicalmethod,withtheonly

remainingsimilaritybetweenthetwobeingthatofthenotionofabsencewhichwefindtorun throughoutbothideologies. The conclusion that we shall reach from this, is, hence, that

differing historical values, in particular ideas of the self, affect phenomenological

investigation so greatly that it can cause two strikingly different forms of phenomenology to appear.

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Sartre’s Philosophical Roots: Existentialism and Consciousness

Jean-PaulSartre’sexistentialist philosophyisimbued with an interest inhuman consciousness.

Thestructureoftheworldasgiventhroughtheconceptsofnothingness,thebeing-for-itself versusthebeing-in-itself,theideaoffreedomandtherealizationoftheother,are all

establishedthroughanelucidationofthehumanconsciousness,whichwewillseeinfulldetail later. Sartre’sphilosophyofconsciousnessisbestunderstoodas beingestablishedwithina

muchwidertraditionofphilosophy. Despitemuchdebateontheexactstartingpointforthe Westernphilosophyofconsciousness,wefindSartrefirmlyplacedinthehistoryof

philosophersexploringthenatureofconsciousness,alongsideotherssuchasJohnLocke,Rene DescartesandImmanuelKant, and more specifically within a group of philosophers including Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Tyingthesephilosophers togetheristheattempttocreateaphilosophybasedon the investigation ofthestructureof consciousness,developingaprooforexplanationoflifeitself. Specifically,wefindSartretobe

amongagroupofconsciousnessphilosophersthatwereinfluencedbythephilosophyof ImmanuelKant and his transcendentalist philosophy. TheytookfromKant’sphilosophy,

within the Critique of Pure Reason,thenotionthattheexploration of the structures of reason leads to an understanding of the structure of our experiences. This leads to his discovery of the transcendental conditions imposed by consciousness through ones reasoning that allow us to comprehend objects. Thisgroupofphilosophersbecametheirownschoolofphilosophy,

namedthephenomenologist’s,frontedbyEdmundHusserl,MartinHeideggerandMaurice Merleau-Ponty. Beginningwiththehumansubject,thesephilosophersaddressthenotionof consciousappearanceasgiventotheconsciousbeingwiththehopeofdeterminingits

structuralfoundations and the way in which it functions in relation to the experienced world.

Sartre’sphilosophy takes further influence from the philosophy of Heidegger, in terms of the way in which his philosophy is rootedwithina concern with ontology,astudyofthehuman being and the wider structures of existence and being itself. Due to these numerous influences,

Sartre’sphilosophyisconsideredasanexistentialphilosophywithaphenomenological approachtoconsciousnessestablishedwithin.

ItisthisbackgroundofphenomenologythatwillhelpustounderstandSartre’sstructuresof consciousness,and,furthermore,groundsacomparisonofhisphilosophywiththe non-existentialistaccountofconsciousnesspresentedbyVasubandhu. Thischapterwillbuildour

understandingofthewayinwhichSartre’sconceptofconsciousnessrepresentsaspecial accountofphenomenologicalconsciousnessphilosophy,byexploringthe influencesof the school of phenomenology,Kant’s transcendentalism and Heidegger’s ontology. Later, this

willhelpustopenetratethecomplexstructureofconsciousnessaselaborated bySartrein

BeingandNothingnessandhelpusinacomparisonofconsciousnessphilosophygivenina verydifferenthistorical periodofphilosophy,thatofBuddhistphilosopherVasubandhu.

To begin we turn to an understanding of Kant’s transcendental idealism, whereby human experience of the world is given through a subject-relation to the world rather than a direct comprehension of objects in themselves. Kant’s aim is to explicate the way in which our reason imposes conditions upon our experiences by exploring the conditions that are imposed by the mind, prior to our knowledge of these objects. By this Kant means that the conscious

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being experiences appearances that are subjected to conditions of space and time by the structure of reason. In this sense, we experience only our perceptions of objects, and the objects in themselves are not experienced by the human mind as purely objects in themselves. What Kant takes from this, is the idea that our reason imposes space and time conditions upon appearances of the object through human intuition. Thus we find, to some degree, that our experience of the world is idealistic, where our perceptions are so structured through concepts imposed onto basic sense impressions that we cease to perceive things in themselves. Our knowledge of objects in themselves, on the other hand, is given through an understanding of the structures imposed by reason. We see within both Sartre’s philosophy and

phenomenology in general, the weighty influence of Kant’s transcendental idealism. In particular, it is the phenomenology of Husserl that reinterprets the transcendental idealism of Kant. Husserl himself describes his phenomenology as the exploration of transcendental phenomena, and as such explores the idea of the transcendental conditions of consciousness through the phenomenological method; an inquiry into the understanding of phenomena given to consciousness with the aim of discovering the underlying causes and conditions that allow human experience. As we shall now see, this phenomenological exploration of appearances given to consciousness allows the discovery of the invariable conditions that affect each phenomena, and allow each particular thing to be constituted within consciousness as an appearance. This influence will be further elaborated upon in a fuller discussion of phenomenology itself.

OurunderstandingofthewayinwhichphenomenologyentersintoSartre’sphilosophybegins bylookingatthedescriptionofphenomenologygivenbyManasRoyinPhenomenological Existentialism1_._Here_Roy_describes_{phenomenology}_as_a_philosophy_of_appearances,_whereby

ourattemptsatbuildingaconceptualframeworkoflifeitselfbeginswiththestudyof

appearances;anappearanceischaracterizedas“anythingofwhichoneisconscious“2_._The_first

philosophertobeginhisinvestigationswiththestudyofappearanceswasEdmundHusserl, nowrepresentedastheforefatherofphenomenology. ItisHusserlwhoarguesthatwemust beginwiththeimmediateexperience,ratherthanattempttounderstandlifethroughanexistent materialworld; this initiatesaphilosophythatimmediatelytakesupconsciousnessasthetrue wayinwhichtostudyexistence. Thisapproachisadoptedbyeveryphenomenologistand throughastudyofthephenomenagiven,oneattemptstodiscovertheunderlyingstructuresto anysingleappearance. This is represented as the phenomenological method, and the

performance as such begins with an eidetic reduction; a system by which the single appearance is taken and studied to discover the conditions that underlie each and every appearance to consciousness, whilst setting aside all beliefs or questions previously

contemplated about being or reality. Thesestructuresarethusthestructuresofconsciousness, andtheyexplaintheworldintermsofthewayourconsciousnessallowstheworldtobeviewed andconstructedbythesubject. The concept of such underlying structures is taken from the

transcendental conditions advocated by Kant.Husserl’s phenomenological investigation delivers him to theidea thatconsciousness in terms of the conscious appearance, or perception, has atwo-partstructure,whichhecallsthe“twopolesofexperience,noemaand noesis”3_._The_noesis_is_the_act_itself_of_the_perceiving_performed_by_{consciousness}_and_the

noemaistheperceived;puttogethertheseformeverymomentofconsciousnessexperienced bythesubjectandareresponsiblefortheworldgiventothatperceiver. 4

1_{Roy (2010: 52)} 2_{Roy (2010: 52)} 3_{Roy (2010: 53)} 4_{Roy (2010: 51-53)}

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The concept of embodiment provides a further influence to Sartre’s existential

phenomenology. The study of embodiment can be found within the philosophy of Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, whereby instead of presuming the idea of the mind in contrast to the separated body, as given by dualist philosophy, there is the belief that the mind is itself embodied within the world through the physical body. This means that the body and the mind are conjoined together and live within the world always from a firsthand standpoint of ‘here’. Our bodily experiences of the world are hence directly experienced by the embodied

experiencer as a conscious being. Highlighted within Husserl’s investigation of the embodied mind is the idea that bodily experiences of the subject, including perception, are always guided by a personalistic attitude, where our experiences are shaped by certain social or personal beliefs. This emphasizes the idea that our lived body is the position from which all possibilities of movement and exploration of the world are centered, and it projects the subject towards much more than just the current perception. Instead, the subjects world is opened towards possibilities and is shaped by past experiences. The phenomenological reduction leading to this discovery of the embodied subject allows Husserl to identify several crucial things. Firstly, the body is given as the center of orientation, meaning that the subject experiences the world as an orientated space where the body is the central point of any contact with the world. Within this there is a sense of the ‘I’, where the body is linked to the mind in terms of giving movement a personal element of belonging to the subject. Most importantly, the kinaesthetic consciousness is discovered through the reduction. This is given as the “if-then” structuring of appearance given to the embodied mind; the structuring of different possibilities and their outcomes dependent on certain given movements within the world which are given in all appearances. Further studies of embodiment found within Heidegger’s work, suggests an additional source of influence in terms of Sartre’s attention to embodiment within his work. Heidegger takes the conscious being as incorporated with an existential spatiality that is linked to one’s embodiment within the world; meaning, that for one to

consciously manoeuvre within the world, one must also recognize one’s embodied physical

position. Through the philosophy of embodiment found within Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, we can trace the way in which Sartre approaches the being-for-itself as a situated being within the world. But we must take a deeper look into the works of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty to fully grasp Sartre’s philosophy of consciousness as a whole.

The philosophy of Husserl shaped the school of phenomenology, in which we find Sartre. But we must also consider the philosophy of Heidegger, another member of this school, when considering Sartre’s influences. In fact, it is as perhaps as the first existential

phenomenologist that we can consider Heidegger. We have seen the way in which Kant’s philosophy inspired and helped shape the phenomenology of Husserl, and ,similarly, we shall find that the philosophy of Husserl shapes Heidegger. Yet as an existential phenomenologist, Heidegger’s phenomenology takes a different route, for existentialist phenomenology differs from the transcendentalist phenomenology, employed by Husserl. Existentialist

phenomenology is a study of both human existence and experience through applying the phenomenological method to human existence in its concrete state. This is in opposition to transcendental phenomenology’s study of the way in which objects are constituted in consciousness. Hence what sets these apart is the way in which the natural world is considered within their approaches. The existentialist phenomenologist takes into

consideration the relations that human existence has to the world around I -, for example, the relation of action - whereas the transcendentalist phenomenologist purposefully puts aside all

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questions of such relations. We shall discover this difference through a brief overview of existentialism in general.

Existentialism takestheindividualsexperience and being asthecentralconceptofits philosophy. Itisaterm that Sartrehimself adoptedafterstudying thephilosophyof

Kierkegaard,NietzscheandDostoyevsky,inwhichtheyallput“anemphasisontheexisting individual,andacallforaconsiderationofmaninhisconcretesituation”5_._{Existentialism}_takes

manalreadyinhissituation,alreadyestablishedasasubject withaconsciousnessandlivingin theworld. Existentialisminallformsis, firsthand, concernedwiththeideaofhumanexistence

andittacklesthissubjectonlyfromtheinside. Itisphilosophyperformed“fromthestandpoint

oflivedlife”6_{and works to do so by discovering the true authenticity of human life}_._Some_of

thefirstexamplesofexistentialthoughtarediscoveredwithinKierkegaard’sworkwherebyhe statedthattheexistentialphilosophymusttakeintoregardeveryhumanexistence,whichis totallyuniquefromoneanother. Inbeinguniquewediscoveraresponsibilitytoact;forour

actionsareone’sownchoicefromtheuniquestandpointofexistencethatthe individuallives.

Othercommonideaswithinthevaryingphilosophiesofexistentialismincludetheideathatthe individualisthrownintosituationwithintheworld,andthatthereisagivenstateofexistence forthesubject. Thehumanbeingisalsogivenwithotherindividualswithintheworld;they, hence,takeuponthemselvesastateofbeing-with-others. Theindividualislikewisegiven

amongotherobjects intheworld;otherobjectstakeonsignificancefortheindividualsdueto thepossibilitiestheyrepresentforthatperson. Yettheseobjectsintheworlddonotexist themselveswithabeing-in-the-world,theyarepurematterandwithinitselfhasnoworldfor itself. Furthermore,thehumanbeingisfiniteandholdswithinitselfitsownnothingness;this

nothingnessbringsabouttheindividual’schoicesandtheirfreedominthefaceofthesechoices.

This is because freedom is the ultimate practice of one’s nothingness; it is the action in the face of one’s possibilities, which are given through its own nothingness. Nothingness is given to oneself as the possible choices that one can make in the future. Thesecommonthemes whollypresenttheideaoftheexistentialiststhat“truth‚isfound‘in-the-world’and,thereby, alwaysbeginswiththeconcrete;thatis,inexistence”7_.8

Wefindthe use of the phenomenological method within much of the work of existentialist philosophers. In particular the philosophy of Heidegger is the first major work in terms of the embrace between phenomenology and existentialist thought. Steering away from the stricter mathematical reductionist methodology of Husserl, whereby Husserl aims to discover the constitutional meaning of the things given within consciousness, we find in Heidegger the phenomenological reduction instead applied to the concept of being itself. Heidegger here believes that the aim of the philosophical approach should be turned towards what it means for a conscious being to exist as such. Thedeparturefromstandardphenomenology by existentialphenomenology,thus comesfromtheexistentialist’sphilosophybeingtakenfroma subjectlivingwithinaworldthathecannotbeseparatedfrom,ratherthandetachingthesubject fromtheworldandanalyzingthepureconsciousstructureofasingleexperience. For

Heidegger this existentialist phenomenology entails the phenomenologicaltaskofdiscovering thestructuresofconsciousnessthatcauses the subject to be situated within the world as a conscious being. This very activity of the subject existing, and being situated in the world, is

5_{Roy, (2010:53)} 6_{Roy, (2010: 55)} 7_{Roy, (2010: 56)} 8_{Roy, (2010: 53-58)}

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termed by Heidegger as ‘being-in-the-world’ It is this idea of being-in-the-world that becomes central to Heidegger’s work. The Dasein, the human existence, is an existence of being-in-the-world whereby it actively exists in the world and does not merely have the property of residing within the world. In this sense, it should be understood as standing in a relationship towards the world. Part of the relationship that the Dasein holds with the world is the fact that it can be moved within the world by other Dasein’s as part of its facticity. Yet most

importantly, the Dasein has a being-in-the-world that is being-amidst-the-world, the sein-bei. By this we find the Dasein to inhabit the world, where the world is no longer an object but is part of the human subject which forms its relations to the world and its object as other than a subject-object relation. 9

Hence Heidegger finds himself unable to gain knowledge through the unattached study of the world without acknowledging the subject’s involvement. To do so would to lead us to a study of the world as a subject, detached from the objects we observe, for it would force a

distinction between inner and outer experience. Instead, Heidegger employs the

phenomenological method; it takes the standard everyday appearance and attempts to “see where consciousness and its intentional content fit in”10_{. What Heidegger discovers through}

this reduction is that “human experience (Erfahrung) discloses the world and discovers entities in it”11_{without merely relating to objects via mental states. In contrast to Husserl, who}

believes that perception is joined with a mental activity that allows the subject to give meaning to the object, Heidegger finds that the objects are already endowed with meaning because the world is pre-organized through possibility. This reverses the idea, given by both Husserl and Kant, that the original sense impression is first perceived and then supplied with further meaning, or content, through a mental conditioning. Hence what must be stressed within Heidegger’s philosophy, is the idea that practical activity is not a relation between the mind and the world, but is instead part of the being-in-the-world of the Dasein. The

phenomenological method is here employed in terms of understanding the performance of intentionality, for he claims that “the person exists only in the performance of intentional acts”12_{. As already shown, the idea of intentionality, in terms of the mental state of the subject}

towards the object, has been dismissed. Instead Heidegger believes the Dasien’s relation to the object comes in terms of ‘comportment’, which describes our intentional activity as a directing-oneself-toward. Hence Heidegger stresses that intentionality is part of the existence of the Dasien itself, rather than merely an act of consciousness. What this explains is the way in which our activity within the world is intentional, without it being referred to a mental intentionality; hence our actions are deliberate without even entering into our consciousness.13

The preceding accounts of the ever-developing philosophy of consciousness in the

phenomenological tradition, has given us insight into the way in which each philosopher has influenced one another. Through this we are able to detail the way in which Sartre’s account of philosophy has been influenced through this chain of consciousness philosophy. As an existential phenomenologist, the philosophy of Kant, Husserl and Heidegger have left their mark on Sartre’s work. Kant’s influence, as the first philosopher to investigate metaphysics and epistemology through the study of consciousness, can be traced through Sartre’s general

9_{Dreyfus, (1991: 40-45)} 10_{Dreyfus, (1991: 45)} 11_{Dreyfus, (1991: 45)} 12_{Dreyfus, (1991: 49)} 13_{Dreyfus, (1991: 45-54)}

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tie to the phenomenological philosophy; Sartre takes from Kant the idea that to gain knowledge one must recognize the way in which our consciousness is the only standpoint from which we can know the world. So, like Kant, Sartre believes that it is the way in which we analyze our perceptions of the world that we come to understand the way in which our mind structures our experiences of the world. However, unlike Kant, Sartre turns away from the idealist position that is given through the imposing transcendental structures of

consciousness. Instead, here Sartre is persuaded by Heidegger’s philosophy of the being-in-the-world. It is from this point that Sartre’s existential roots begin, for he takes from

Heidegger’s philosophy the idea of man situated within the world, referred to by Heidegger as a living amidst-the-world. Furthermore, Sartre’s concept of intentionality is taken from the philosophy of Heidegger, rather than Husserl; Sartre understands human activity to be intentionally performed within the world, through a directing-oneself-toward rather than purely through a mental state that separates the subject from the object. In this sense, Sartre answers to the way in which the for-itself, human being, is able to act intentionally whilst unconscious. Yet Husserl’s influence in Sartre’s philosophy is also significant, for it is the phenomenological method, first introduced into philosophy by Husserl, that features in Sartre’s work. Sartre employs the phenomenological method of analysis and reduction to the standard perception or belief, to understand the structure of consciousness and its effect on our experience. Furthermore, the concept of embodiment becomes crucial to Sartre; for it is as a conscious embodied subject that we maneuver within the world, as the being that is amidst-the-world.

Hence we see here the way in which this historical chain of consciousness philosophy has inspired Sartre’s work. We have found that it is Kant’s analysis of perception, Husserl’s phenomenological method and ideas on embodiment, and Heidegger’s being-in-the-world amidst-the-world that Sartre has applied to his own existential phenomenology. It is from here that we must place Vasubandhu’s philosophy within its own historical context before we can begin a genuine comparison between the two philosophers.

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Buddhism and Consciousness

ThroughouttheBuddhistreligionwefindanequalconcernforthatwhichtheBuddhistscall thevijnana,whichcanbetranslatedasconsciousness,lifeforce,ormind. A discussion of the history of vijnana within Buddhist philosophy will help us to better understand Vasubandhu’s influences for his own consciousness philosophy. We will begin with the earliest concepts of consciousness found in the Sutta Pitaka, and then move to a general discussion of

consciousness philosophy within the Yogacara school of Buddhism, to which Vasubandhu belongs. Furthermore, we will outline some of main concepts that will be found within Vasubandhu’s own work, and examine the way in which his thoughts on consciousness converge or diverge from the Yogacara School. Lastly, with the help of Jay Garfield’s work, we will discuss a more modern interpretation of the Yogacara concept of consciousness as a phenomenological philosophy of consciousness, and determine whether Vasubandhu’s philosophy falls under this definition.

TheearliestBuddhistwritingsoftheSuttaPitakaarepreservedwithinthesecondpartofthe

PaliCanon, a compilation of textswritten downin29BCE,butpreviouslyremembered throughmemorysincetheBuddha’sdeathin400BCE. We find in this text consciousness is

referred to in three associated circumstances. Firstly, consciousness is given as one of the six sense bases. The first five are given as the five physical senses, these being the senses of sight, sound, smell, taste and touch, all of which pertain to a particular bodily function. The sixth sense base is that of the mind, which causes the emergence of mental objects. Each sense has pertaining to it a mental factor as a class of consciousness; these are thus given as ear-consciousness, mind-consciousness and so forth. What the early Buddhist teachings postulated from this was that when the sense organ was to be stimulated there was an arising consciousness associated with that sense base. Hence each experience within the world has a correlating inner and outer sense base, the outer sensation paired with the inner consciousness of that sensation. We find that consciousness, vijnana, is represented as the result of the senses, which takes place within the mind, and becomes aware of the sense base, including the mind and its mental objects.

WearealsogivenwithintheseearlyBuddhistteachingstheconceptofconsciousnessasoneof thefiveaggregates. Theaggregates,alsoknownastheskandhas,arethefiveaspectsthat

establishanysentientbeing, alsoknownasbeingswithconsciousness. In doing so the sentient

being is established with a false sense of self, which in reality is an assembly of separate aspects - the aggregates. Eachbeing,accordingtothePaliCanon,ismadeupoftherupa

(materialform),thevedana(sensation),sanna(perception),sankhara(thefacultythat conditions)andtheskandha(consciousness). Eachaggregateisthecauseofaparticular functionofthesentientbeing;perception, for example,isthatwhichperceiveseach

appearance, whilst the material form is externally the physical world and internally the body and the organs. Itisthroughtheconsciousnessaggregatethateveryrecognitionofwarmth, cold,sweetness,orpainetc., iscognized. It is recognized as an introspection, within the mind, associated with perception, but not perception itself. What must be realized here, is that consciousness is given as anatta, empty of a self. Hence consciousness is given as an aspect of the sentient being that is dependent on the cause and conditions of the other aggregates.

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We find that this concept of consciousness, as a cognizing arising from the other aggregates, is linked with the chain of dependent origination that is the third conception of consciousness found in early Buddhism. Dependentorigination,thepratityasamutpada,isthatbywhichall thingsintheworldareconditionedascomplexentities, and we find consciousness to be one of the twelve causes. Dependent origination states that everything arises from an organization of

several causes and conditions, and as such does not exist as an individual existent object.One of these causes is consciousness, for itisresponsiblefor cognizing the object to be given certain psychological elements, such as a value or approval. Itisthisparticularconsequenceof

consciousnessthatcauseskarmaandrebirth,forthroughdependentoriginationcomesa cravingandclingingforthecomplexwholes.

TheseteachingsofthePaliCanon,inparticulartheAbhidhammaPitaka,influenceda

collectionofBuddhistschoolsknownastheAbhidharmaSchools, and in particularly the Pali

Canon‘s philosophyonconsciousness. YetitistheYogacaraSchool,derivingfromthelater

MahayanatraditionofBuddhism,thatwewillconcentrateonasVasubandhu’sgreatest influenceintermsofhisconsciousnesstheory. Theseschools,stronglyinfluencedbythe

earliestBuddhistwritingswithinthePaliCanon,aredistinctivefortheirmorein-depthand uniquetreatmentofthephilosophyofconsciousness. TheMahayanabranchofBuddhismis responsiblefortheYogacaraSchool’sparticularinterestwiththepathofenlightenment,and turnstowardsananalysisofpsychologyforitsteachingsonhowtoachievethis. Vasubandhu’s

conversion to the Mahayana tradition came later in his academic life, when he developed an interest in the Yogacaran concepts of psychology, phenomenology and ontology. It is after Vasubandhu’s conversion, that we find his writings to focus on the mind and the structure of consciousness, and, in particular, the texts that we shall study later, the Vimsatika-Karika, the

Trimsika-Karika, and the Tri-Svabhava-Nirdesa, are an in-depth working of the Yogacaran

position.

One significant concept within the majority of Yogacara writings is the idea that everything is given as vijnapti-matra, consciousness-only or mind-only. This doctrine of philosophy has caused much controversy in its translation as to whether this concept is idealist or not. According to Thomas A. Kochumuttom this term means, more suitably, that all is given as a

representation-only and alludes to “the emptiness of the subject-object distinction”14_{. This}

suggests that the world appears to us merely in the representation of consciousness, as opposed to the idea that we are perceiving objects directly. This means that no claim can be made as to the metaphysical reality of the physical world, for our position as viewing the world from consciousness means that we cannot gain knowledge as to the reality of what we perceive. No judgment can be passed then as to the status of the world as real or non-real, and hence the idea of everything given as vijnapti-matra is given neither as an idealist or realist stance. Instead what Kochmutton claims, is that the Yogacarans begin from a similar position as the Western phenomenologist’s; by approaching what we know as given through

consciousness and suspending all further judgments as to the metaphysical status of the objects within consciousness. This idea we have already considered in the previous chapter in relation to the philosophy of Husserl. This controversy should be kept in mind during the rest of the discussion on Vasubandhu’s consciousness philosophy, for the Yogacara concept of

vijnapti-matra is employed throughout Vasubandhu’s work. In fact we can further recognize

this idea in terms of Nagarjuna, who is treated as the controversial founder of the Mahayana tradition, of which the Yogacara school was a part. Nagarjuna taught that we cannot consider

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the reality or unreality of anything; instead we are forced to merely acknowledge everything with a relative truth. This idea we will explore further in a direct link to the philosophy of Vasubandhu below.

The Yogacara school further elaborated on its consciousness philosophy by positing that the mind was made up of eight consciousnesses, which help to construct what we experience. These include the six consciousnesses already given within the early Pali Canon. According to Yogacara philosophy these six consciousness are posited through basic cognition of the sensory data experienced. The seventh consciousness is that of the deluded awareness which is a self-grasping, in terms of emotion or attitude, which appear as the personality traits. This is given through an inferential cognition of the mind, in combination with the previous six consciousnesses. Lastly, the eighth consciousness is the store-house consciousness, where the seeds of experience are stored for future experiences. In this it is the founding consciousness which generates all new experience, through the past seeds that it has gained and stored. These seeds should be understood as karmic impressions or traces of experience. The seeds help build, through the eighth consciousness, a mind-stream, whereby there is a continuum of experience and awareness through the past karmic seeds. It is also known as a citta-santana, a consciousness-continuity.

A further important notion that appears throughout the Yogacaran philosophy, is the idea of three natures, the sva-bhava, the three basic modes of perception. These are the imaginary nature, where things are perceived as a conceptual construction, the dependent nature, through which we understand the nature of the dependent origination of objects, and the absolute nature, where we perceive things as they are in themselves unconceptualized. Within each three of these we will find the feature sunyata or absence, for each of these three modes of perception has within it a nature of emptiness. The imaginary natures holds within it the absence of the true characteristics, the dependent is absent of the arising of the dependent and the absolute has the absence of the ultimate.

As we shall find in the comprehensive description of Vasubandhu’s works on consciousness within the next chapter, the concepts of consciousness, found within the Yogacara works, heavily influenced Vasubandhu’s own consciousness philosophy. Firstly, we find within the

Twenty Verses the idea that everything given is through appearance-only. This is often

interpreted as the idea that everything given is illusory, and, as we can see above, this concept has already featured heavily within the Yogacara school of thought. We should here, of course, bear in mind the controversial view of Vasubandhu as an idealist; it is argued that the concept of appearance-only is mistakenly taken as a concept of illusion, and is thus

mistakenly taken as an idealist philosophical stance in both Vasubandhu’s work and the Yogacara writings in general. We will discuss this matter a little further on in the chapter where we shall find that, in agreeing with Kochumuttom’s idea that the concept of

vijnapti-matra is a concept of representation-only, we can claim Vasubandhu’s philosophy to be of a

phenomenologist standpoint instead.

For now we can point towards further influences of the Yogacara thought to be found within Vasubandhu’s work. We have, in particular, the notion of the three own-beings, or three natures, found within both Yogacara and Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu elaborates upon the idea of the three natures found within reality which are the fabricated nature, the dependent nature

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and the perfected nature. Here Vasubandhu uses the idea that each thing in reality is made up of three interconnected, yet independent, natures, which cause the object to be given as a conceptual construction within the mind. In being a conceptual construction Vasubandhu claims that the concept of the self is posited within each and every object, including persons. Yet the three natures themselves prove that the object is void of a self or a single inherent nature, for an appearance of the self is falsely given through the work of the three own-beings. We shall find later, that Vasubandhu’s philosophy on the three natures leads him to a

comprehensive analysis of the false duality of subject and object found within reality; in particular the falsity between the subject/object distinction. We find that the Yogacara philosophy of the three natures leads to this crucial position in Vasubandhu’s work.

Having placed Vasubandhu within a historical timeline of consciousness philosophy, we can now turn to an argument that places both the Yogacara school of Buddhism and Vasubandhu himself within a phenomenological framework of philosophy. It is to Jay Garfield in

Engaging Buddhism that I turn to for this interpretation of Vasubandhu’s work. Garfield

encourages us to recognize phenomenology as a philosophy of both experience and cognition, which studies the “cognitive processes and structures that enable experience”15_{, all taken from}

the view of subjectivity. In this respect, he argues that we must disassociate ourselves from the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the subjectivist stance employed

throughout the most prominent Western works of phenomenology. Yet what Garfield stresses is that the philosophy of the Yogacara and Vasubandhu can be viewed in terms of a

connection with the Western phenomenologist’s, through a recognition of phenomenology as above all else a study of subjectivity, experience, and cognitive processes. 16

This general definition of phenomenology that ties together all diversities throughout the subject is central to Garfield’s argument for the phenomenology of Vasubandhu, for it highlights the way in which Buddhist philosophy and phenomenology come together. Just as phenomenology is the study of experience, and the cognitive processes that allow it, Garfield argues that Buddhist philosophy as a whole is “about the transformation of the way we experience the world…the cognitive and intentional structures that constitute that mode of comportment”17_{. In this sense, Garfield claims Buddhist philosophy, as a study of what}

enables cognitive experience, precisely falls under the term of phenomenology. Throughout Buddhist philosophy we find attempts to explore the processes behind perception, memory, and suffering etc., through the analysis of the processes that cause them within consciousness; Garfield claims that an analysis of such things amounts to a level of phenomenology. This can be seen where Garfield says that “one of the most important features of Buddhist

phenomenology is its identification of a variety of cognitive processes as kinds of consciousness”18_{. In general then, we find a certain approach towards phenomenological}

analysis within the Buddhist doctrine. Even within an analysis of the meditational states of consciousness that some Buddhist philosophers explore, we find a certain level of

phenomenology, according to Garfield. For example, some Buddhists hold that meditation reveals to oneself that consciousness is the object of concrete and immediate awareness.

15_{Garfield, (2015: 175)} 16_{Garfield, (2015: 175-179)} 17_{Garfield, (2015: 179)} 18_{Garfield, (2015: 183)}

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Hence we find through a phenomenological analysis of experience and subjectivity through meditative introspection, a certain structure and process of consciousness. 19

Garfield argues that it is in Vasubandhu’s Tri-Svabhava-Nirdesa where the most explicit example of phenomenology within this Buddhist tradition resides. Vasubandhu claims that our perception of external objects is like a magical illusory trick that cause us to perceive an elephant when in reality it is made out of sticks and piles of wood. Our perception of external objects, like the elephant, arises from the three natures of perception. Firstly, the imagined nature is the projected and illusory nature of the elephant within perception, and in this sense is the “nature that we superimpose on our experience in virtue of our cognitive processes”20_.

We are also given the dependent nature of perception, meaning that perception depends on the “structure of our perceptual and conceptual apparatus”21_{for the way in which it is perceived}

as the elephant. In this sense, we supply the perception of the elephant with all the qualities given to it through our cognitive processes. Lastly, the consummate nature is the nature residing within perception that means that it could be perceived as the real pile of sticks instead of the elephant. It is thus the real absence of the imagined absence that is given by the dependent natures and Garfield thus characterizes it as “the fact that since our introspectible experience depend on mind, it is empty of those qualities we superimpose”22_.

What then causes Vasubandhu’s elucidation of the three natures to be considered a phenomenological approach to the philosophy of consciousness? Garfield claims that the phenomenological inquiry begins with the reflection of that which is given to consciousness, in a hope of discovering the underlying cognitive processes that cause our subjectivity. Yet, this, according to Garfield, depends on the idea that our experience, and hence our

consciousness, is all that can be reflected upon. This is because we are ‘subjects of experience’ whereby our consciousness supervenes upon ourselves as beings. And this Garfield argues is due to the fact that we are “dependent on input systems under the control of external forces that generates my experiences”23_{. As discussed earlier, we find that the}

doctrine of mind-only that lies within the Yogacara philosophy shows an inquiry beginning with what is purely given in consciousness. As asserted by Kochmutton this shows that what we investigate in the Yogacaran’s philosophical enquiries is that which is given to experience, in opposition to an enquiry into a subject-object reality. We find the idea of this also lies within Vasubandhu’s work, in terms of his karmic theories, for it is the previously given seeds of experience that cause the current perception to be given as such within the consciousness-stream. Hence we find that within Vasubandhu’s philosophy that it is the cognitive and sensory processes that causes the access to the reality given within experience. It is the restriction to the experience given through the cognitive processes that Garfield claims to be a phenomenological stance within Vasubandhu’s work. Garfield, furthermore, claims that this gives us the approval to recognize the link between Vasubandhu and Husserlian

phenomenology, for “to restrict ourselves in analysis to what we know immediately is to perform Husserlian epoche”24_{. We find that Vasubandhu’s philosophy then applies an epoche}

similar to the one performed by Husserl; for Vasubandhu takes conscious experience - or as he names it, the percept - as all that is available for analysis in the attempt to discover the underlying structures to consciousness. We shall see this below in Garfield’s explication of

19_{Garfield, (2015: 179-184)} 20_{Garfield, (2015: 188)} 21_{Garfield, (2015: 188)} 22_{Garfield, (2015: 188)} 23_{Garfield, (2015: 189)} 24_{Garfield, (2015: 190)}

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Vasubandhu’s three natures, for we find that Vasubandhu compares an illusion to the everyday experience of consciousness. What this tells us is that an analysis of experience begins from an epoche that takes only what is given to consciousness; to discover the underlying foundations we must only consider the given experience. In Vasubandhu’s example, he only considers what is given in the illusion, which is analogous to our everyday experience; Vasubandhu’s bracketing shows that “only the percept appears”25_{and this percept}

is what we analyze to discover consciousness fully. 26

Hence we should not be considering Vasubandhu from an idealist standpoint according to Garfield, for an interpretation of Vasubandhu as idealist comes purely from Vasubandhu’s argument from the incoherence of the concept of matter, yet not itself the argument for a totally mentally constructed reality. We find that through applying an epoche, Vasubandhu is not denying the reality of a body, of the brain, or of the world that both operate within, but is instead limiting himself to our experience. Garfield contends that we should further prevent ourselves from believing in Vasubandhu as an idealist for two reasons. Firstly, because by arguing that an experience is an inner event, Vasubandhu cannot hope to be proving that it is

only an inner event in itself rather than an inner event with a causal interaction with an

outward object. And secondly, Garfield argues that we “cannot treat our inner experiences as things in themselves known apart from our inner sense - or, as Vasubandhu would call it, our introspective consciousness – manas-vijnana”27_{. In this sense, we cannot claim the outer}

world as nonexistent, because our knowledge of the outer world comes from perception, whereas our knowledge of the inner is immediate and hence real. Our inner states are as subject to the conversions or transformations of our cognitive processes as the perceptions that give us the external world. In this sense, the outer and the inner cannot be viewed

separately, for our perceptions and our inner sense are subject to one and the same processes. What is given here is an ontological neutrality, whereby the philosopher cannot hope to prove a distinction between outer and inner; all that is achieved is a distinction between the

experience and the casual object. The ontological status of either the experience or object cannot be proved, for they are both subjected to the same conscious processes. 28

The claim that both consciousness and our perceptions are subject to cognitive structuring, might perhaps suggest that Vasubandhu’s view of consciousness should be seen as having a transcendental structure, as opposed to the skandha structure that he clearly advocated. Yet a transcendental consciousness would suggest that there is an ongoing subject, or self-like thing, that is responsible for the cognitive processes that are impinged onto both perception and consciousness as a whole. Vasubandhu, however, vehemently argues that the self does not exist, and that each moment of consciousness is a spontaneously generated new moment in consciousness time. Thus, what we are faced with, is a purely skandha structured

consciousness, whereby the skandhas, in particular the eighth skandha of the store-house, cause each new moment to be subjected to certain structures. This is seen as the karmic consequence of the skandhas. Each new moment of consciousness is conditioned, in this sense, by the previous seeds of experience within the consciousness-series. The cognitive conditioning of both consciousness and perception is, hence, explained without the assertion of a stable on-going transcendental self that resides throughout consciousness.

25_{Garfield, (2015: 191)} 26_{Garfield, (2015: 189-193)} 27_{Garfield, (2015: 191)} 28_{Garfield, (2015: 189-191)}

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Garfield argues that Vasubandhu’s writings on the three natures should be read from this standpoint. We find that Vasubandhu compares the imagined nature with the falsely given elephant that is made out of sticks and wood. This means that the imagined nature is thus unreal. Later, Vasubandhu takes the elephant to be a duality, and we can interpret through this that the imagined nature is also a duality. Garfield argues that this means that the subject-object distinction, presented through the concept of duality, is itself unreal. This means that the subject-object distinction that we experience, is given through our cognitive processes brought on by consciousness. We find that this distinction between subject and object is brought about through the dependent nature. It begins with the material wood and sticks, yet through its cognitive processes of the dependent nature brings about an intentional object, the elephant, which is a falsely given subject-object duality. What Garfield strongly argues here, is that “(w)hile the intentional object of perception is denied existence independent of the mind, neither perception nor the external world that occasions it is even interrogated ontologically here”29_{. This, Garfield claims, is Vasubandhu’s argument that what we}

experience is a confusion between what is the fundamental nature of reality and the nature of experience itself. Our cognitive processes cause our experience to be given with a false subject-object duality that is bestowed upon the real reality by our consciousness. By claiming that Vasubandhu is idealist, we miss the distinction that is given between construction and discovery; for we wrongly take Vasubandhu to be claiming that what we experience is a false discovery of reality. Instead, Garfield claims we must recognize Vasubandhu to be claiming that our experience is given to us by a false construction. Hence Vasubandhu’s work on consciousness gives to us the structure of consciousness. It shows us that experience is “the joint product of a reality that I never directly apprehend and a set of psychological processes that are opaque to me”30_{. What this purports is that the subject is separated from the}

experiences, that I have yet never fully encountered reality due to my cognitive processes that cause the subject-object duality that appears to me.

Thus, we find that Garfield has shown the philosophy of Vasubandhu to be a

phenomenological investigation of consciousness and we can now move to a further detailed description of his consciousness philosophy. Paired with the description of Sartre’s

consciousness philosophy, we can launch into a comparative analysis of the two philosophers. As we have seen during the last two chapters, which place them within their historical

frameworks of philosophy, both philosophers fall under the name of phenomenological philosophers. This will lead to further enquiry into the way in which their philosophies converge through their phenomenological investigation and the distinctions that cause a monumental separation between the two.

29_{Garfield, (2015: 192)} 30_{Garfield, (2015: 193)}

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Chapter: Structures of the For-Itself: Consciousness

AdetailedcomparisonbetweenthephilosophiesofJean-PaulSartreandVasubandhu,canonly beundertakenwithanoverviewofthemainthemesandstagesthatarelaidoutwithinboth systems. Herewefindthatthenotionofconsciousness,forbothphilosophers,initiatesand comprisesthemajorityofeachdoctrine. Itisthus,throughadetailedexplorationofthe

structuresofconsciousnesswithinbothphilosophies, thatwehopetodiscovertheintricacies involvedinacross-culturalcomparison,andwhethercomparisonispossibleinthisparticular situation.

TofullyunderstandthestructureofSartre’stheoryofconsciousnesswemustfirstlookupon thebasicthemesandtheirorganizationthatleadhim toafullerelucidationofthestructuresof consciousness. ThisbasicoutlineisgiventousinPart1,Chapter1,Section5:TheOriginof

Nothingness31_,_where_Sartre_lays_out_a_path_from_negation,_through_freedom_and_possibility,_to

theideaofconsciousness.

Webeginourunderstandingoftheworldwiththediscoveryofnegation. Negationisgiven

withinBeingandNothingnessasanontologicalandphenomenologicalconcept,meaningthat itisthroughtheexplicationoftheroleofnegationwithinourconsciousnessthatwecometo understandthatwhichseparatesthefor-itselfwiththein-itself. Negationis,hence,givenasa consciouspowerthataffectstheworldwhenputintoplay,andallowsonetogainfurther knowledgeofthenatureofourexistenceasconsciousbeingsversustheexistenceofthe in-itself. Thisisachievedwhennegationisconceivedthroughourabilitytoquestionthein-itself thatisgivenasthesurroundingworld;byaskingquestionsaboutwhatsurroundsus,we suggestthattheworldcouldbeotherthanitis,andwethusinfecttheworldwiththeideaof nothingness. Yettheworlddoesnotholdnothingnessinitself. Theworldismadeupof permanentobjectsthatareeachanin-itself;eachobjectisonlyfullyandconcretelywhatitis, and“thenotionofBeingasfullpositivitydoesnotcontainNothingnessasoneofits

structures”32_._{Hence it}_is_here_that_the_first_idea_of_{consciousness}_is_given_to_us_by_Sartre;

nothingnessmustcomefromabeingthatisotherthanfullpositivityandthathastheabilityto supportnothingnesswithinitself. Thisbeing,namedthebeing-for-itself,mustbeaffectedby

thenothingnessitholdswithinitself,aswellasinfectingtheworldwithit,for“TheBeingby whichNothingnessarrivesintheworldmustnihilateNothingnessinitsBeing”33_.34

Thisbeingasanothingnessforthefor-itself,ismadepossiblebyaskingquestionsaboutthe world. ThequestionerdetacheshimselffromtheseriesofBeing-in-itselfthatmakesupthe

worldandgiveshimselfoutsideofthecausalorderoftheworld. Thisdetachmentfrom

Being-in-itself,givestothequestionerthepossibilityofnon-being,andalongwithnon-beingthe positingofaconsciousness. Thissuggestionofconsciousnessiselaborateduponthroughthe examinationofthenegationasatranscendentreality,givenbythebeing-for-itself. Sartregives

theexampleofdistance,whichweimposeuponthebeing-in-itselfintheworld,andordersthe worldforthefor-itself. Yetitdoesnotexistwithintheworldin itself,itisatranscendentreality

31_{Sartre, (2010)} 32_{Sartre, (2010: 46)} 33_{Sartre, (2010: 47)} 34_{Sartre, (2010: 45-47)}

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forcedupontheworldbyconsciousness,thatsetsuparelationbetweenmanandtheworld.

Nothingnessisgivenhereasthebeingofman,bywhichmansetsuprelationstotheworld throughhisconsciousness. Thisallowsustocharacterizethestatusofthefor-itselfasa consciousbeing,forthepowerofnegationandthenothingnessthatisrecognizedasexistent amongstthein-itselfthroughthefor-itself,placesthefor-itselfinatranscendentrelationshipto thein-itself. Furthermore,thisshowsthenothingnesstobecharacterizedasthenihilationofthe in-itself,causingthefor-itselftoexistinastateofnon-beingthroughitsownnihilationand self-contradictionofthein-itself. Nothingnessis,thus,theverynon-beingthatissustained

throughthebeingoffor-itself,andissuchthroughbeingthenihilationofthein-itself. Thisis shownthroughthefactthatconsciousnesscanconceiveofalackofbeing,henceallowingthe for-itselftonihilatethein-itself,establishingthefor-itselfasitsownnothingness.35

Herewearegiventhefirstandsecondstagesleadingtowardsafulleraccountofconsciousness.

Weseethatabasicpresentationofnegationwithintheworldrevealstousthenothingnessthat resideswithinman,andsuggeststousatranscendentconsciousness,thatseparatesmanfrom being-in-itselfthroughhisrelationswiththeworld. Indoingso,manviewstheworldasa

totality,whereby“hemustbeabletoputhimselfoutsideofbeingand ... weakenthestructureof

thebeingofbeing”36_._Sartre_identifies_this_possibility_{of man}_{as freedom}_._Freedom_is_that_which

allowsmantobeputoutofreachoftheworlditself,andisthatbywhichmanstandsinrelation totheworldasoutsideofitscircuit,throughthedetachmentofmanfromthein-itself’scausal sequence. Thisdetachmentleadstothepossibilityofaction,viathenothingness,thatallowsthe for-itselftobeunconstrainedfromthedeterminationthatthein-itselfexistsin. Thisisthethird stageofourpathwaytounderstandingconsciousness. Wehaveseenpreviouslythatitisthe

humanconditiontobethatofabeing-for-itself,inrelationtothebeing-in-itself,asa

consciousnessoftheworld. Hencewearenowgivenfreedomastheessenceofthe being-for-itself;mansexistenceishisfreedom.37

Thefourthstageisthatofhavingconsciousnessofone’sownconsciousness. Withfreedom

nowgivenasthebeingofthefor-itself,andthisfor-itselfhavingbeenidentifiedasa consciousnessthroughthediscoveryofnihilation,wearenowlefttoquestionhowweare givenconsciousnessofourownfreedom. Sartreclaimsthisconsciousnessofourown

nothingnessandfreedomcomesintheformofanguish. Anguishisgivenas“themodeofbeing

offreedomasconsciousnessofbeing”38_._Anguish_allows_us_to_recognize_our_own_{self-distrust}_.

TheexamplegivenbySartreistheanguishwefaceatthepossibilitythatonemightthrow oneselfoveracliff. Itisanguishthatallowsonetorecognizeone’sownfreedom,andthus

recognizeourownconsciousnessina“reflectiveapprehensionoftheself”39_._It_is_the

anticipationofpossibleactions,andthefactthat“Isustaintheminbeing”40_for_myself_to

perform,thatcausesmetorecognizemyselfasabeingwithaconsciousness,abeingwith freedom. Furthermore,anguishgivestomemyownnon-being. Foranguish“ispreciselymy

consciousnessofbeingmyownfuture,inthemodeofnot-being”41_._Thus_I_am_handed_to_myself

35_{Sartre, (2010: 47-48)} 36_{Sartre, (2010: 48)} 37_{Sartre, (2010: 48-49)} 38_{Sartre, (2010: 53)} 39_{Sartre, (2010: 54)} 40_{Sartre, (2010: 55)} 41_{Sartre, (2010: 56)}

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throughmyanguishasamodeofconsciousnessofmyownnothingness,freedom,and consciousness,whichareoneandthesamethingasmybeing-for-itself.42

Thelaststepinourpathwaytounderstandingconsciousnesstakesustobadfaith,whereby understandingbadfaithallowsustofurtherunderstandconsciousness. Thisisbecause consciousnessistheprerequisiteconditionofbadfaith. Anguishhasrelayedtousthe

possibilitiesinthefaceofourownfreedom. Ourfreedomforcesthesepossibilitiestobecome

ourlivingpossibilities,andbyrecognizingitasmypossibilityIrecognizeitsexistenceasa possibleendformyfreedom. Itisthroughbadfaiththatwewishtofleefromouranguish,to

rejectthesepossibilitiesaspossibleendsofouractions. Itisanattempttofleefromone’sown

transcendenceoftheworld,toescapefromthenihilationofourconsciousness,thatbrings aboutonesfreedomofpossibilities. Henceitisanattempttoestablishoneselfasa being-in-itself,totearawayfromthatwhichmakesoneabeing-for-itself. Yet,withoutone’s

consciousness,onecannotattemptsuchanescape,itcanbeattemptedonlywiththe“projection offreedom”43_;_thus_Sartre_posits_{consciousness}_as_the_{pre-requisite}_condition_of_bad_faith_.44

Herewehavelaidouta5steppathintounderstandingconsciousnessandthepartsthat composeit. Consciousnesscomprisesofnothingness,freedom,anguish-asamodeof

consciousness -,andbadfaith,whichasaconsequenceofconsciousnessfurtherelaborateson thecomplexityofthestructureofconsciousness. Thesestudieshavethus“placedusina positiontoquestionthecogitoaboutitsbeingand ...enableustofindinthecogitoitselfthe meansofescapingfrominstantaneitytowardthetotalityofbeingwhichconstituteshuman reality”45_._It_is_to_Part_2,_Chapter₁_of_Being_and_Nothingness_to_which_we_now_turn_for_this

questioning.

Itisintheexpositionofthecogitoandtherelationitholdstothepre-reflectivecogitothatwe findthebeingofman. Thecogitoisthatwhichisimmediatethoughtorconsciousness,anditis

thepre-reflectiveconsciousnessthroughwhichwearegivenaself-consciousness,inrelationto thatimmediateconsciousness. Henceintheperception/cogitoofatableorchairwearegiven, throughthepre-reflectivecogito,thebeingofthatconsciousness,theself. Wehavealready seenthroughourstudyoftheabilitytonegate,thatthebeingofthefor-itselfisgivenasbeing “whatitisnotandnotbe(ing)whatitis”46_;_in_other_words,_we_are_given_a_being_that_is_not_in

fullcoincidencewithitself,anddoesnotfullyidentifywithitself. Thisrejectionofcoincidence comesintheformofarelationbetweenthecogitoandthepre-reflectivecogito;abeliefisnot onlyjustabelief,itisalsoaconsciousnessofbelief,andinthisconsciousnessofbeliefliesthe pre-reflectivecogito. Thispre-reflectivecogitoisgivenasseparatefromthepartof

consciousnessthatpositsanobject,asitdoesnotstepoutsideconsciousnessitself. Butitis

inseparablylinkedwiththereflectiveconsciousnessthattakesanobjectwithinit,andprovides toitselfthereflectiveconsciousnessandallowsconsciousnesstoseeitself. Wearetherefore givenatwo-foldstructureofconsciousness;firstlythecogito,forexamplethebeliefitself,and thenthepre-reflectivecogito,consciousnessofthebelief.47

42_{Sartre, (2010: 53-56)} 43_{Sartre, (2010: 66)} 44_{Sartre, (2010: 65-69 and 97)} 45_{Sartre, (2010: 98)} 46_{Sartre, (2010: 98)} 47_{Sartre, (2010: 98-99)}

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Yetwecannot,Sartreargues,findthecogitoofbelief,andthepre-reflectiveconsciousnessof belief,asentirelyseparatedpartsofconsciousness. Fortoseparatethemistomakethebeliefan objectofconsciousness,fromthesideofthepre-reflectivecogito,andtotranscendthebelief aboveconsciousness,allowingoneselftoassumeapositionregardingthebelief. Hence

consciousnessismadeupoftwoseparatedbutentirelyconjoinedparts,thecogitoand pre-reflectivecogito;onecannotbefoundwithouttheother. Sartrehereprovesthat“(t)he

consciousnessofbeliefwhileirreparablyalteringbelief,doesnotdistinguishitselffrom belief”48_.49

Herewearefacedwiththefirstpointofescapefromitself,thefirstpointofnothingnesswithin man’sbeing. Thisseparationbetweenthecogitoandpre-reflectivecogitosuggestsabreaking ofunitybetweenthebeliefandconsciousnessofbelief. Althoughtheyunitetogether,their

separationshowstherecognition ofoneselfasconscious,andgivesanescapingfromthebelief intoaself-consciousnessintermsofaconsciousnessofthebelief. Butwefindthat“assoonas wewishtograspthisbeing,itslipsbetweenourfingers,andwefindourselvesfacedwitha patternofduality”50_._We_cannot_grasp_our_own_{self-consciousness,}_our_own_{pre-reflective}

consciousnesswithoutfallingbackupontheoriginalbeliefthatisthecogito. Thisdualityis furtherexplainedasareflection-reflecting. Inthecogitowearegivenconsciousnessasa

reflection,butthepre-reflectivecogito,beingatunitywiththecogito,isareflectingofthis reflection. Intryingtograspthisreflectingweareimmediatelygiventhereflection;weare constantlyreferredbacktothecogitoandsteeredawayfromthepre-reflectiveself-conscious cogitoitself.51

ItistheselfthatSartrewillnowfocuson,forheclaimsthattheself“definestheverybeingof consciousness”52_._The_self,_given_by_the_{pre-reflective}_{consciousness,}_refers_the_subject_to

himselfwithoutdesignatingbeing,foriftheselfwerethesubjectthenthesubjectwouldstand inrelationtohimselfasanin-itself. Itispreciselyhisbeingasafor-itselfthatcausestheselfto

refertohimselfwithoutdesignatinghimself. Thustheself“allow(s)thesubjecthimselfto

appearbehindit”53_._Hence_the_self_is_not_given_as_a_real_existent,_for_the_real_existent_is_the

subject. Theselfinsteadisgivenasdistanceintermsofarelationbetweenthesubjectand himself,itisa“wayofnotbeinghisowncoincidence,ofescapingidentitywhilepositingitas unity”54_._This_relation_is_termed_by_Sartre_as_‘presence_to_itself’_for_the_subject,_and_is_the_way_in

whichthebeing-for-itselfissodrasticallydifferentfromthebeing-in-itself. Itisthispresence toitselfthatallowsustorecognizeandestablishconsciousnessofmanasadualityviaa detachment.55

Furthernothingnessispresentedthroughconsciousnesswiththispresencetoitself,asit impliesa‘fissure’oraseparation. Thisseparationisbetweenthesubjectandhimselfashe standsinrelationtohimself. Butthereisnothingwhichstandsbetweentheseparationofbeing

48_{Sartre, (2010: 99)} 49_{Sartre, (2010: 99)} 50_{Sartre, (2010: 99-100)} 51_{Sartre, (2010: 99-100)} 52_{Sartre, (2010: 100)} 53_{Sartre, (2010: 100)} 54_{Sartre, (2010: 101)} 55_{Sartre, (2010: 100-101)}

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tohimself. Thisisbecausebeliefisconsciousnessofbelief,andinbeingoneandthesamething

itcanonlybeanothingthatseparatesthetwo. Ifsomethingstoodbetweenthebeliefand consciousnessofbelief,thenconsciousnessofbeliefwouldbeconsciousofsomethingitwas not. Thusthisseparationisnothingandit“cannotbegraspedorevenconceivedinisolation. If

weseektorevealit,itvanishes”56_._The_fissure_remains_as_a_pure_nothingness,_it_merely_denies,

whilstneverbeinginitselfathing. Itresideswithinconsciousnessasnothing,andweakensthe verybeingofthefor-itselfandcausesthefor-itselftobewhatitisnotandtonotbewhatitis.

Hencewefindwithinconsciousnessanegativity,whichnihilatesitself,and aconsciousnessit resideswithin,andthuspresentsconsciousnessasanothingnessitself.57

Wehaveatthetimebeingaconceptofconsciousnessastwo-fold,withacogitoand pre-reflectivecogito. Inanalyzingtheirrelationwehavebeenreferredbacktoaself-consciousness fromwhichwefindthatthebeingofman,and,hence,thebeingofconsciousness,arisesfrom, andisconsumedby,anothingness. YetSartreremindsusinSection2'TheFacticityofthe

For-Itself’thatwecannotforgetthatthefor-itself,consciousness,alsohasanelementoffacticity.

Thefor-itselfisgivenasan‘is’inthestyleofanevent,foritisputintotheworldand

“abandonedina‘situation’”58_._This_state_of_facticity_is_the_for-itself_in_a_presence_to_the_world,

forasitstandsinrelationtotheworldthecogitorealizesthatthefor-itselfhasapresenceinthe worldthatitdoesnotfindinitself.59

Thefacticityofthefor-itselfallowsthefor-itselftofurtherreferbacktoitsstateasa

nothingness. Tobeabletopossessideasorquestionsaboutoneselfshowsthatthefor-itselfhas

notchosenthewayinwhichitexistspresently. HenceIcannotaccountformyownbeing

whilstIhavetheabilitytorecognizethedifferencebetweenwhatIamandwhatIconceive.

Yet,herewemustrememberthatSartrehasalreadypositedthefor-itselfasthefoundationof itsownnothingness,asitfoundsthecleavagebetweenthecogitoandpre-reflectivecogito. It

seemsthatthereisacontradictioninsayingthatthefor-itselfdoesnotfounditselfwhenit foundsitsownnothingness. Butbeingthefoundationofone’sownnothingnessisnotthesame

asfoundingone’sbeing. Thisisbecause“tofounditsownbeingitwouldhavetoexistata

distancefromitself”60_;_this_would_only_bring_about_the_foundation_of_the_being’s_nothingness_as

itcausesaseparationbetweenthesubjectandhimself. Thus,itwouldbeimpossibleforthe for-itselftofounditsownfacticityasapresenceintheworldandgivetoitselfthestatusofan in-itself.61

Thisfacticitygiventothefor-itselfremainsintheworldasthepossibilityofthefor-itself; “beinghasitspossibilityoutsideofitselfinthepureregardwhichgaugesitschancesof being”62_._Yet_it_is_one’s_own_being_as_a_nothingness_that_sustains_this_possibility_within_it;_the

possibilitythatImaychoosewhattoeatfordinnertonightisgiventomebythestateofthe world,butitismyownnothingnessthatpositsmyselfasaconsciousself-awarebeingthat allowsmetotakeonthispossibilityasmyownandactaccordingly. Thesepossibilitiesare whatfoundthebeing-for-itself,whilstitfoundsitsownnothingnessinthefaceofthisfacticity.

56_{Sartre, (2010: 102)} 57_{Sartre, (2010: 101-103)} 58_{Sartre, (2010: 103)} 59_{Sartre, (2010: 103)} 60_{Sartre, (2010: 104)} 61_{Sartre, (2010: 104-105)} 62_{Sartre, (2010: 105)}