Criminalizing immigration policies in
the United States and the Netherlands
Commonalities and differences between countries with regard to
the support of restrictive immigration policies
Marieke de Wilde
10003124
Research Master Social Sciences
University of Amsterdam
Thesis supervisors:
Dr. W.J. Nicholls
Mw. dr. K.M. Rusinovic
26-06-2015
Amsterdam
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ABSTRACT
This research paper focuses on theories of criminalization in the immigration literature. These theories suggest that nation states have increasingly merged immigration law with criminal justice law in order to control populations. Authorities have established restrictive immigration policies in order to be able to have economic prosperity, but at the same time keep unwanted immigrant flows out. It is argued that Western nation-states are converging when it comes to restrictive and punitive immigration policies, because authorities in different countries pursue similar harsh measures to control immigrants. This argument is countered by other literature that suggests that there are still national differences because of distinct penal systems and different traditions of citizenship and identity. The disagreement on convergence and/or divergence across Western countries with regard to strict immigration policies forms the scope of research of this paper. It is examined to what extent claim-makers in the United States and the Netherlands support strict immigration policies and how they frame their support of or resistance against such measures. A mixed methods approach is pursued in which claims have been gathered from newspapers according to the political claims analysis method, and the data then has been analysed by using descriptive techniques and logistic regressions. The results indicate that both countries differ with regard to their support of strict immigration policies as well as the usage of different legitimization and protest frames. Claim-makers in the Netherlands more often approve of strict immigration measures compared to their counterparts in the United States. Dutch claim-makers often point at the threat immigrants pose to national unity to legitimize strict immigration policies, whereas Dutch opponents often stress the inhumanity and infeasibility of strict measures. American claim-makers on the other hand emphasize the national security and the issue of immigrants clandestinely entering the country to legitimize strict immigration policies, whereas opponents point at the inhumanity of policies and the economic contribution immigrants make to the country.
Introduction
The globalization of the world economy has made it possible to move flows of money, goods and people around the world in a relatively short amount of time (Castles, 2000; Hollifield, 2006). And although national governments like to improve the economic prosperity of their country by international flows of money and goods, they are unwilling to accept large flows of immigrants (Hollifield, 2006; Varsanyi, 2008). In order to remain a part of the global economy but keep the unwanted immigrants out, nation-states have established strict
immigration policies in order to control for the flows of people (Bigo, 2004; Castles, 2000; De Giorgi, 2010; Stumpf, 2013). Researchers argue that a trend of criminalization of immigration is apparent, in which immigration law and criminal law are merged together (Legomsky, 2007; Stumpf, 2013) and punishment is used as a tool to control populations (Inda &
Dowling, 2013). Some researchers argue that these criminalization strategies are apparent in several Western nation-states (De Giorgi, 2010; Melossi, 2003; Palidda, 2009; van der Woude, van der Leun, & Nijland, 2014), and that these countries are converging when it comes to their restrictive and punitive immigration policies. However other researchers disagree with this argument and state that there are still national differences caused by different penal systems (Lacey, 2008; Whitman, 2003) as well as different national traditions of citizenship and identity (Koopmans & Statham, 2003). Thus there is disagreement with regard to the convergence and/or divergence of Western nation-states when it comes to their restrictive immigration policies.
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This thesis tests the convergence and/or divergence of Western countries by comparing the United States and the Netherlands with regard to their approval and framing of strict immigration policies. The examined research question is “To what extent are strict immigration policies (dis)approved and which arguments are used to legitimize the (dis)approval of these policies?”. By investigating the support of restrictive immigration policies in the United States and the Netherlands, it becomes possible to gather more
information on the commonalities and differences between Western countries with regard to immigration measures. And by also examining how supporters and opponents of strict
immigration policies frame their claims, more insight will be gained into how differences and commonalities between these two countries have developed and are maintained.
First different theories with regard to globalization, the establishment of strict immigration policies and criminalization of immigration will be discussed in the theoretical section of this paper. Then the research problem will be defined and the research question and
accompanying hypotheses will be discussed. This part is followed by an explanation of the research methods that have been pursued to examine the research question. In the results section the qualitative and quantitative analyses that have been performed will be discussed. And finally the conclusion and discussion part of the paper is used to draw conclusions from the obtained research results and improvements of the study as well as further possible research options will be discussed.
Theory
Globalization and immigration
The globalization of the world economy is an important factor that influences migration and the ways in which migration is acted upon (Bigo, 2004; Castles, 2000; Hollifield, 2006). The trend of globalization can be defined as: “the widening, deepening and speeding up of
worldwide interconnectedness in all aspects of contemporary social life” (Castles, 2000, p. 271). However transnational migration is not exclusively related to globalization and it is also not a new phenomenon, because centuries ago there were already people migrating all over the world. But since the 1950s and 1960s the flows of transnational migration has accelerated, and immigration flows to European countries and the United States have increased
considerably (Bigo, 2004; Castles, 2000; Chavez, 2008a). Globalization is facilitated by huge advances in communication and travel technologies, which not only eases the transnational flows of commodities and capital, but also makes it possible for individuals to travel all over the world in a relatively short amount of time (Hollifield, 2006). So although it is not the sole cause of immigration, globalization has contributed to a huge increase in international
migration flows since the 1960s.
According to Bigo (2004) the control of international immigration flows is associated with the globalization of the world economy. In order to facilitate an international economy, nation-states have to pursue a more open border system. Economic growth is made possible by less strict national frontiers, and the main function of the borders is no longer to protect against the territorial neighbour (Bigo, 2004). Because the territorial neighbour is not the ‘natural enemy’ anymore (Bigo, 2004), instead transnational flows of immigrants are now regarded as the main target and the ‘new enemy’, that should be controlled by national governments. Although the circulation of commodities and finance are much favoured by national
governments, the flows of people are often perceived as a potential threat to sovereignty and national identity (Bigo, 2004; Castles, 2000). This poses a problem for governments, because
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if they aspire to fully control immigration and close off their borders, they put economic prosperity at risk (Bigo, 2004). This tension between political closure to protect the nation-state, and economic openness to facilitate the world economy is defined as the ‘liberal paradox’ (Hollifield, 2006) or the ‘neoliberal paradox’ (Varsanyi, 2008).
Guest worker programs initiated by national governments to ease labour shortages illustrate the tension between wanted economic prosperity and unwanted flows of immigration. In the United States the Bracero program was established to meet labour demands, however when this program was abolished a huge population of ‘undocumented’ immigrants was created because the Mexican workers kept coming to the United States (De Genova, 2013; Massey & Pren, 2012). These immigrant workers were legally moving across the US-Mexican border for years, but now suddenly became unwanted aliens. So the expectation of the government that workers would behave like commodities, and would come and leave according to the supply and demand functions of the economy, turned out to be wrong (Bigo, 2004; Hollifield, 2006). This is also apparent in European countries like the Netherlands, where immigration and integration turned into a problem when the first welcomed guest workers did not return to their countries of origin, but instead turned into uninvited guests that wanted to stay in the Netherlands (van der Woude et al., 2014). This made it difficult for governments to manage these people, and these initiated migration programs thus became a problem. The inability of governments to manage border-crossings, results into the perception that the sovereignty of the nation-state is threatened. The presence of a large amount of immigrants that do not share the same history, culture and language, makes it difficult for the nation-state to maintain its ‘shared history and origin’ discourse on which the legitimacy of the nation-state is based (Hollifield, 2006).
International flows of immigrants thus increasingly became perceived as a threat by national governments from various Western countries. In the United States immigrants, especially Mexican immigrants, were portrayed as invaders and criminals overrunning the border (Massey & Pren, 2012). And in various European countries immigrants were perceived as welfare abusers and criminals (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007). This posed the (neo)liberal paradox to Western national governments, because they want to regulate these immigration flows that endanger their sovereignty, national identity and management of people, but did not want to jeopardize their economic prosperity. According to De Giorgi (2010) governments try to deal with the paradox by complementing the ‘debordering’ of Western nation-states to facilitate the international economy, with a process of ‘re-bordering’ against international immigration flows. Thus countries on both sides of the Atlantic have come up with various strict immigration policies to manage the international immigration flows. In several Western nation-states similar strict immigration policies have been created with regard to the
narrowing of legal channels to enter the country, non-citizens being increasingly excluded from social services, and immigrants often facing (preventive) detention, all to enable governments to control the immigration flows (De Giorgi, 2010).
Criminalization of immigration
Authorities have established several immigration measures in order to maintain power of their territory and its population. It could be argued that there is a ‘punitive turn’ against
international immigration present within Western nation-states. Since the late 1970s authorities have come up with measures such as increasingly restrictive immigration laws, administrative detention, deportations and militarized borders (De Giorgi, 2010). This trend is also defined as the ‘criminalization of immigration’, which holds that the criminal justice model has been imported into the domain of immigration law (Legomsky, 2007). Or as
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defined by Stumpf (2013) the merging of criminal and immigration law to a degree that the line between them has almost disappeared. Both immigration law and criminal law are systems of exclusion and inclusion, because these systems are employed by the government as gatekeepers of membership in society (Stumpf, 2013).
The integration of criminal law into immigration law is apparent on five fronts. First of all criminal consequences have been attached to immigration violations. This means that the list of immigration offenses has been expanded, and that punishments with regard to these
offenses have become more strict (Legomsky, 2007). So civil violations have now turned into criminal offenses (Stumpf, 2013). Secondly immigration consequences have also been
attached to criminal convictions. This means that a criminal conviction can harm someone’s immigration status. Thirdly it is now also common practice to use criminal enforcement theory in immigration law. Thus before people were mainly returned on the basis of their way of entry. Since the 1980s governments are focussing on post-entry crime-related deportation grounds (Legomsky, 2007). Then fourthly, strategies of criminal law enforcement have been imported. This means for instance that (preventive) detention is increasingly used as a sanction within immigration law (Legomsky, 2007; Stumpf, 2013). And the use of plea-bargaining is also increasingly common, where noncitizens cooperate with the government in the criminal prosecution of others, but also judges who offer noncitizens the withholding of removal if they withdraw their asylum application (Legomsky, 2007). The fifth and final front is that of using the same players, which means that governmental organizations are both responsible for the criminal justice system as well as immigration control (Legomsky, 2007). Examples are state and local enforcement officials that are also charged with immigration control, but also the Department of Homeland security that both focuses on terrorism and immigration control (Stumpf, 2013).
It can thus be argued that punishment is increasingly used in the U.S. to control populations, and that there is a trend of the criminalization of immigration apparent (Inda & Dowling, 2013). There are several researchers who argue that this is not an exclusively American phenomenon, and that the criminalization of immigration is also apparent in Europe (De Giorgi, 2010; Melossi, 2003; Palidda, 2009; van der Woude, van der Leun, & Nijland, 2014). Also in Europe the criminalization of immigrants has intensified and become generalized in the last quarter of the twentieth century (Palidda, 2009). So Western nation-states have
become more restrictive with regard to immigration, and one of the primary pursued tactics to achieve the goal of increased strictness is the criminalization of immigration. To illustrate the criminalization of immigration policies on both sides of the Atlantic, a few examples of strict immigration measures that criminalize immigrants from the United States and the Netherlands will be discussed.
In the United States the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) was established in 1996, and this policy tightened up the requirements for
immigrants to enter the United States and also increased the resources for border enforcement (Massey & Pren, 2012). This way it became more difficult for immigrants to enter the country by legal channels, and a growing population of ‘illegal’ and ‘law-breaking’ noncitizens was created. The criminalization of immigrants on the basis of their way of entrance was further implemented in 1996 by the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act (PROWA) (Massey & Pren, 2012). Large groups of non-citizens were now excluded from certain entitlements, because of their status as a non-citizen. Then in 2001 the USA PATRIOT act made it possible to deport noncitizens without due process, Homeland Security was created and deportation and surveillance of noncitizens was increasingly funded. This way
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immigrants were criminalized by linking them to the threat of terrorism (Massey & Pren, 2012). In 2007 another strict immigration policy was established called the Secure
Communities Program, which aimed at identifying and deporting criminal noncitizens with the assistance of local and state authorities (Massey & Pren, 2012). Thus criminalization of immigration in this instance occurred by making local authorities responsible for both criminal and immigration law and merging them together.
In the Netherlands the government is trying to increase its influence on the immigration process since the 1990s (Doomernik, 2008; van der Leun, 2006). Exclusion and
discouragement policies are increasingly used to supplement border controls (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; van der Leun, 2006). In 1991 a social fiscal number was introduced, which could only be obtained by people who have a residence permit. This made it very difficult for people without documents to get access to the legal Dutch labour market (Broeders &
Engbersen, 2007; Doomernik, 2008), and thus criminalized a large group of immigrant workers in the Netherlands. Then in 1994/2005 the Compulsory Identification Act was established, which requires all employers to be able to identify their employees (Doomernik, 2008). Hiring people without proper identification thus became a crime, and further
criminalized the noncitizens in the Netherlands. The Marriage of Convenience Act in 1994 had to made sure that immigrants were not just marrying someone to get a residence permit (Doomernik, 2008). This way the legal channels of entering the country were narrowed, and (trying) to obtain a legal status under false pretences became a crime. In 1998 the Linkage Act was established, which excluded all people without a residence permit from benefits
(Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Doomernik, 2008). This policy reinforces the idea that
noncitizens do not have (certain) rights, because of their status as a noncitizen. Besides these national measures also policies on European level were created, such as the digitalization of the border by establishing immigration databases on the EU-level that contained identities and biometric identifiers (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007). This way European countries try to narrow the legal channels to enter the EU member states, criminalizing non-European (and unwanted) immigrants that try to enter.
Thus it could be argued that Western nation-states are converging with regard to their strict immigration policies (De Giorgi, 2010). The examples of strict immigration measures show that on both sides of the Atlantic governments are pursuing similar criminalization strategies by narrowing the legal channels of entering, excluding noncitizens from entitlements because of their status as noncitizens, and blocking them from the labour market. However other researchers have argued that Europe and the United States are very different when it comes to the penalization system, and even though it might seem that there are some commonalities, the two sides of the Atlantic remain mainly different (Lacey, 2008; Whitman, 2003). Thus the merging of immigration and criminal law would work out different in nation-states, because the national penal systems differ. It is argued that the penalization system in the United States is more harsh compared to the systems in European nation-states, which leads to quite some differences between those countries (Lacey, 2008; Whitman, 2003). In this regard it could be stated that at least European countries and the United States diverge with regard to strict immigration policies because of different penal systems. However De Giorgi (2010) counters this argument by stating that the selectivity of the penal practices (targeting
immigrants) indeed points at a common criminalization trend among Western countries that is comparably severe at both sides of the Atlantic. Thus there is disagreement with regard to the convergence or divergence of strict immigration policies in Western nation-states.
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Legitimization of policies
Immigration often takes place at the same time as economic restructuring and social change, and native residents can then blame the newcomers for the insecurity that has emerged (Castles, 2000). According to Bigo (2004) the fear of immigrants is based on people’s
conception of the state. This is caused by the dominant discourse that the nation-state is based on the belief that there is cultural and political unity. Native residents of a state are considered to share ethnic homogeneity, which consists of a common language, history, traditions and culture (Castles, 2000). The natives are the people who ‘belong’ in the nation-state, whereas the immigrants with different ethnic origins ‘do not belong there’ (Bigo, 2004). The
immigrants pose a threat to the ethnic homogeneity, because of their different cultures, histories and languages (Castles, 2000). As argued by Stumpf (2013) the criminal law and immigration law both work as systems of exclusion, and decides who belongs and who does not, who is an insider and who is an outsider. The restrictive immigration policies that are part of the criminalization of immigration trend, reflect the division between wanted and unwanted immigrants (Engbersen & Leun, 2001). And by drawing this sharp line between citizens and noncitizens (wanted and unwanted), authorities make it possible to legitimize the different treatment of criminal offenders and ‘criminal aliens’ (Miller, 2005), because the latter ‘does not belong here’. So the criminalization of immigration works as a process that defines for the public who is a threat and what strategies are justifiable to combat this problem.
Thus immigrants are perceived as a threat to national unity, and besides that immigrants are said to also be framed as a threat to national security. Because a lot of measures with regard to terrorism are aimed at noncitizens or immigration, a link is created between terrorism and immigration (Legomsky, 2007). The Department of Homeland Security in the United States illustrates this for the United States, because this department both deals with terrorism and immigration control, thereby linking this two phenomena (Stumpf, 2013). Besides this the fact that the 9/11 hijackers were foreigners, just as that immigrants were involved in the terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, increased the perceived intrinsic link between flows of immigration and terrorism (Chavez, 2008b; De Giorgi, 2010; Inda & Dowling, 2013). Then immigrants are also blamed for ‘stealing jobs’, either by taking a job of a citizen or by turning to criminal activities (such as identity theft, document fraud and Social Security fraud) in order to get a job (Inda, 2006). However immigrants without a job are also perceived as a threat, because immigrants are often framed as ‘invaders’ who want to settle in a prosperous nation-state to (fraudulently) benefit from the welfare state (Bigo, 2004; Broeders &
Engbersen, 2007). And finally ‘illegality’ itself is also perceived as a threat, because lack of legal authorization is often seen as synonymous to ‘lawbreaker’. By clandestinely crossing the border or overstaying their visas, undocumented immigrants have at least violated one law, and are thus perceived as essential criminals and a threat to a system built on the ‘rule of law’ (Inda, 2006).
According to the literature strict immigration measures can thus be legitimized by making an appeal to the national unity, national security, steal jobs, burden on welfare and/or
clandestinely enter the country frames. However the existence of certain legitimization frames does not mean that all people believe that strict immigration measures are legitimate. As argued by Broeders & Engbersen (2007) nation states have not achieved full control of immigration flows, and that is partly caused by the counterstrategies of migrants and intermediary organizations. For instance in the United States undocumented university students (DREAMERS) have successfully campaigned for their right to stay in the country (Nicholls, 2014). By emphasizing their “Americanness”, their innocence with regard to entering the country clandestinely (because their parents made that decision when they were
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children), and their contribution to the economy as the best and brightest students, they have tried to convince the public of their deservingness of being in the United States (Nicholls, 2014). Besides the protests of migrants and organizations against strict immigration policies, there are also conflicts between central and local authorities. In the Netherlands for instance considerable discussions have taken place between the national government and
municipalities about the implementation of strict immigration measures (Doomernik, 2008; van der Leun, 2006). The national government actively promotes discouragement, whereas local workers perceive undocumented immigrants as a fact of life (van der Leun, 2006). Local authorities blame the central government for the inability to effectively expel undocumented immigrants, and they are also responsible for maintaining the public order, which can become quite difficult when for instance undocumented families need to be evicted from their houses (Doomernik, 2008; van der Leun, 2006). Thus besides the different ways of legitimizing strict immigration policies, there are several actors that pursue protest frames to resist these
restrictive measures.
Problem definition
The (neo)liberal paradox that requires authorities to combine economic openness with political closure, thus has among other things resulted in the criminalization of immigration (De Giorgi, 2010; Legomsky, 2007; Stumpf, 2013). The establishment of strict immigration policies is one of the strategies that has been chosen by authorities to manage their territory and populations. These strict immigration policies and laws can have quite some influence on the public discourse on immigration, because ‘laws’ are often perceived as natural. So the criminalization of immigrants can then go unquestioned because ‘it is the law’ (Menjívar & Abrego, 2012). This gives authorities a powerful instrument to frame immigrants as a threat to the nation-state, and legitimize the need for (more) strict immigration policies. Several
legitimization frames are being pursued by both the government as well as other actors in the field to explain the need for strict immigration measures. However there are also different actors that protest against these strict policies by countering them with their protest frames (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Doomernik, 2008; Nicholls, 2014; van der Leun, 2006). So there are both supporters and opponents of strict immigration measures, and the question is to what extent the support of restrictive immigration policies is influenced by national features such as history, culture and institutional systems.
Several researchers have argued that the criminalization of immigration trend is apparent in both the United States as well as in European countries (De Giorgi, 2010; Melossi, 2003; Palidda, 2009; van der Woude et al., 2014). And it is also argued that integration policies are increasingly converging across Western nation states (Joppke & Morawska, 2003; Joppke, 2007). The emphasis is shifting from ‘rights’ of immigrants towards a focus on obligation (Joppke, 2007). Thus it could be expected that there is convergence across Western nation-states when it comes to the immigration policies and discourses. However this argument is countered by Koopmans & Statham (2003) who argue that globalization indeed does make nation-states more global, but that does not automatically mean that differences between nation-states disappear. The ways in which immigration appears in the public discourse is influenced by national traditions of citizenship and national identity (Koopmans & Statham, 2003). And Joppke (2007) also mentions differences between Europe and the United States when it comes to the emphasis on socioeconomic integration in Europe, because immigrants in Europe would be more often unemployed and dependent on welfare compared to
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Thus it is argued that there is a trend of criminalization of immigration apparent in several Western countries, but there is disagreement among researchers when it comes to the convergence or divergence of immigration measures in Western nation-states. On the one hand it is stated that Western nation-states are adopting similar harsh punitive policies
towards immigration (De Giorgi, 2010; Inda & Dowling, 2013; Melossi, 2003; Palidda, 2009; van der Woude et al., 2014), whereas on the other side it is argued that penal systems and different systems of national identity and citizenship lead to national differences (Koopmans & Statham, 2003; Lacey, 2008; Whitman, 2003). The research question therefore is “To what extent are strict immigration policies (dis)approved and which arguments are used to
legitimize the (dis)approval of these policies?”. By comparing the United States and the Netherlands with regard to the acceptance and legitimization of strict immigration policies, it becomes possible to see how strict measures that criminalize immigration play out in different nation-states. Examining the approval of strict immigration measures as well as the
legitimization of viewpoints with regard to these policies, offers the possibility to see if two Western nation-states on different sides of the Atlantic are converging or diverging with regard to their immigration approaches. Five hypotheses have been established in order to investigate the research question.
H1: The support of strict immigration policies will be similar among claim-makers in the United States and the Netherlands
H2: Claim-makers in the Netherlands will more often pursue the national unity frame to legitimize strict immigration policies
H3: Claim-makers in the United States will more often pursue the national security and clandestinely enter frames to legitimize strict immigration policies
H4: Claim-makers from the Netherlands will more often use the infeasible frame to protest against strict immigration policies
H5: Claim-makers from the United States will more often pursue the economy and we belong here frames to protest against strict immigration policies
The first hypothesis deals with the question of convergence or divergence among Western nation-states when it comes to strict immigration policies. According to several researchers (De Giorgi, 2010; Melossi, 2003; Palidda, 2009; van der Woude et al., 2014) a similar criminalization of immigration trend is apparent in both the United States and the
Netherlands, thus it could be expected that if that is the case the support for strict immigration measures will be roughly the same in both countries. Then the second and third hypotheses focus on the usage of legitimization frames in the two countries. Because of the prominent ‘failed-integration’ discourse in the Netherlands with regard to the inability of immigrants to adjust to the Dutch culture and values (Bigo, 2004; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Joppke, 2007), it could be expected that (the need for) strict immigration policies is more often legitimized by pointing at immigrants as a threat to national unity. In the United States on the other hand the prominence of the fear of terrorism and the heated debate about the
US-Mexican border (Chavez, 2008b; De Giorgi, 2010; Inda & Dowling, 2013; Inda, 2006), result in the expectation that claim-makers will more often legitimize (the need for) strict
immigration policies by pointing at immigrants as a threat to the national security or blaming them for clandestinely entering the country.
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Then finally the fourth and fifth hypotheses deal with the usage of protest frames to resist strict immigration policies. In the Netherlands several discussions have taken place between municipalities and the national government, because according to municipalities the national policies only worsen the immigration problems. National policies would be infeasible because immigrants often cannot be deported and municipalities would not be able to maintain public order when implementing harsh immigration measures (Doomernik, 2008; van der Leun, 2006). Therefore it can be expected that claim-makers in the Netherlands will more often use the infeasibility protest frame to resist against strict immigration policies. On the other hand in the United States the popularity of the DREAMERS, who argue that they are “American” and belong in the country and emphasize the contribution they could make to the national
economy (Nicholls, 2014), leads to the expectation that claim-makers in the United States will more often pursue the ‘we belong here’ and economy frame to resist against strict
immigration policies.
Methods
A mixed methods approach is pursued to answer the research question. It is the best option to use a mixed methods design, because the qualitative part of the research enables the
researcher to examine how actors legitimize or protest against strict measures by pursuing different frames. The quantitative part of the study on the other hand makes it possible to create models and statistically test which factors influence the (dis)approval of strict
immigration policies as well as the usage of different frames. Thus by combining quantitative and qualitative research methods it becomes possible to qualitatively examine different claim-makers and the claims they are making, and then complementing this by establishing
quantitative models that offer the possibility to test if the results found by descriptive analyses lead to significant differences as well as including several predictors into a model to explain the (dis)approval of strict immigration policies and the usage of different legitimization and protest frames. In order to examine the approval of strict immigration measures and the accompanying legitimization and protest frames, two databases based on claims from newspaper articles have been constructed. By investigating claims from different actors it becomes possible to see if a claim-maker supports or opposes strict immigration policies and also to look at how claim-makers legitimize their claim. The specific methodology that has been pursued is the ‘political claims analysis’ method (Koopmans & Statham, 1999). This methodology extends protest event and political discourse analysis, by broadening the range of actors and forms of action that are included into the research. This way not only protests and institutional actors are included, but instead all institutional and non-institutional actors and all sorts of claims making by these actors in the public domain are included into the research (Koopmans & Statham, 1999).
As mentioned before the United States and the Netherlands will be compared to examine the convergence or divergence on both sides of the Atlantic with regard to strict immigration policies. By including more European countries into the research it would have been possible to also investigate the divergence or convergence within Europe and compare that to the United States. However because of language and time constraints this research focuses on the Netherlands and the United States, but for future research it would be interesting to include more countries into the sample. The two databases are based on a national newspaper from each country, for the United States the New York Times has been used and for the Netherlands the NRC Handelsblad. These newspapers have a comparable political affiliation (center-left), which makes comparison feasible. Including more newspapers into the analyses would have been better, because then it would have been possible to see the influence of newspapers on
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the results. For instance now we do not know if certain results are biased, because a certain newspaper favours a certain claim-maker. However because of time constraints only one national newspaper for each country is analyzed in this paper. For the period 2000 up to 2014 digital versions of the newspapers have been searched by articles on immigration policy, immigration protest and immigration reform. All claims made by institutional and non-intitutional actors on immigration policies in those articles have been added to the databases, and the claims form the scope of analysis. Besides the actual claims, the databases contain information on the name and affiliation of the claim-makers, as well as information on the date, title, author and a brief description of the articles. The two databases have been coded based on a pre-established coding scheme which was not fixed, this means that codes have been added during the coding process when necessary. By allowing new codes into the pre-established scheme, the chance of leaving out essential information that was not known beforehand is reduced. Based on these coded databases descriptive tables have been created. In addition to the descriptive analyses, logistic regressions have been carried out. Two
multinomial logistic regressions have been performed. The dependent variable in these multinomial logistic models is the need for strict immigration policies (yes, n/a, no), and the independent variables are year (2000/2004, 2005/2009, 2010/2014), affiliation of the actor (government, organization, individual), political affiliation, and if immigration is perceived as a threat (yes, only undocumented immigrants, n/a, or no). Each country is investigated
seperately, and by including the variables ‘speaker’ and ‘political affiliation’ the influence of the composition of stakeholders can be measured. As argued in the theoretical part, the idea that immigration is a threat contributes to the establishment of strict immigration measures and also the maintance of such measures. Therefore the variable ‘immigration is a threat’ is included to measure to what extent this perception influences the acceptance of strict policies. Finally the variable ‘year’ gives an indication of the change over time during the fifteen year period that the claims were made. Then also additional logistic regressions have been
performed to examine the usage of different frames to either support or oppose strict immigration policies. The dependent variable in these models is a certain legitimization or protest frame, and the independent variables included in the models are year (2000/2004, 2005/2009, 2010/2014), country (United States or Netherlands) and affiliation of the actor (government, organization, individual).
Results
The total amount of claims that has been examined is 5374, of which there were 3837 claims from the United States and 1537 claims from the Netherlands. Table 1 gives an overview of the different claim-makers in the field. For both countries the central government is the most influential claim-maker, but the Dutch central government has a stronger position (42,12%) compared to the American central government (33,78%). For the United States the non-profit organizations (22,93%) forms the second most influential player in the field, whereas for the Netherlands this place is taken by the experts (16,01%). Thus the government is accountable for a large share of claims in both countries, but the Dutch government has more influence on the public debate than does the US government. The support of strict immigration policies and the usage of different legitimization and protest frames will be discussed below.
Support of strict immigration policies
The attitude score in table 1 presents the average attitude of claim-makers over the 2000-2014 period with regard to immigrants on a minus one to one scale. The total attitude scores for both countries indicate that the United States (0.22) has a slightly more positive attitude
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towards immigrants compared to the Netherlands (0.08). An interesting difference between the two countries is that the central government in the Netherlands (-0.34) has a clear negative stance towards immigrants, whereas the central government in the United States is almost neutral (-0.01). These scores thus indicate that the Dutch national government is more negative on immigration issues compared to the central government in the United States. Based on these different attitude scores it could be expected that Dutch claim-makers will more often support strict immigration measures, as their average attitude towards immigrants is less positive compared to American claim-makers. Table 2 presents the favourability of strict immigration policies, which means that the percentage scores are given that indicate to what extent claim-makers support or oppose strict immigration policies.
Claim-makers in the United States (25,62%) were less likely to support strict immigration measures compared to Dutch claim-makers (32,21%) in the 2000-2014 period. This finding is consistent with the attitude scores of both countries, which indicated that American claim-makers have a more positive stance towards immigrants compared to Dutch actors. However table 2 also indicates that claim-makers in the Netherlands (53,22%) were more likely than their American counterparts (47,62%) to oppose strict immigration policies. These results indicate that the strict immigration policy issue was more apparent in Dutch claims, and that American claims were more often coded ‘non applicable’. Thus there seems to have been more debate on this strict immigration measures issue in the Netherlands compared to the United States. When examining the different claim-makers in both countries it becomes clear that the central Dutch government more often favours strict immigration policies (23,03%) compared to opposing such measures (11,71%). In the United States on the other hand the central government only has a small preference for strict immigration measures (12,43%), but
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this number does not differ as much from the amount of claim-makers that opposed such strict measures (10,87%). The most influential non-governmental actors that resist strict
immigration policies are non-profit organizations (11,81%) in the United States and experts (11,58%) in the Netherlands. Thus there seem to be some differences between the Netherlands and the United States when it comes to the support of strict immigration policies. Two
multinomial logistic regressions1 have been performed in order to further examine the (dis)approval of strict immigration policies in the two countries. The dependent variable for both models is the preference for strict immigration policies. The outcome can either be ‘no’, ‘n/a’, or ‘yes’ and the category ‘no’ has been the reference category for both models. The included independent variables are time, affiliation of the claim-maker, political affiliation and if immigration is perceived as a threat. This last independent variable has been included because according to literature the idea that immigration is a threat leads to support for strict immigration policies (Bigo, 2004; Castles, 2000; De Giorgi, 2010; Stumpf, 2013).
The multinomial logistic regression model for the Netherlands is significant ( (22) = 970.3., p < .001), which means that the included predictors year, speaker, political affiliation, and ‘immigration is a threat’ significantly contribute to explaining an amount of variance in the preference for strict immigration policies. When examining the different year categories, it becomes clear that in 2005/2009 the odds of approving strict immigration measures instead of protesting strict measures decreases by a factor 0.33 (67%) compared to the period
2000/2004. The category 2010/2014 also has a score less than one (0.33), indicating that claim-makers in that period were less likely to approve of strict measures compared to
1
For both multinomial logistic regressions the standard errors have been adjusted (divided by the Pearson dispersion parameter). Because some claim-makers can appear in the database more than once,
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2000/2004. So in both periods the likelihood of approving strict immigration measures has declined in the Netherlands compared to 2000/2004.
Table 2 indicated that actors representing the government had the highest share of claims that supported strict immigration policies. The multinomial logistic regression confirms this finding, as the odds of supporting strict measures instead of opposing such policies decreases by a factor of 0.19 for organizations and a factor of 0.16 for individuals compared to the government. Thus claim-makers representing the Dutch government are more likely than other claim-makers to support strict immigration measures. Most of the political affiliation scores are non-significant, except the one of the VVD. So claim-makers representing the VVD are more likely (3.44) to support strict measures instead of opposing them compared to non-political actors. For the Netherlands the government is the most likely to support strict policies, and with regard to political affiliation the VVD can be named as a strong supporter of strict immigration measures.
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The model also confirms the theoretical argument that the opinion that immigration is a threat, contributes to the approval of strict immigration measures. The odds of supporting strict immigration policies instead of opposing such measures decreases by a factor of 0.001 for people who do not think that immigrants are a threat compared to people who do believe that immigration is a threat. So claim-makers in the Netherlands that hold the perception that immigration is a threat are more likely to support strict immigration policies. Just as claim-makers representing the Dutch government and the VVD more often favour strict measures.
For the United States the same multinomial logistic regression has been performed, only the included political affiliation categories are different. The model is significant ( (20) = 2786.0, p < .001), so the predictors significantly contribute to explaining an amount of variance in the preference for strict immigration measures. When examining the year
categories only the 2005/2009 category is significant. This means that the odds of approving strict immigration policies instead of protesting such policies increases by a factor of 1.86 in the 2005/2009 time period compared to 2000/2004. So claim-makers from the United States were more likely to support strict measures in 2005/2009 compared to 2000/2004. Also for
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the United States it is expected that the government is the most likely to support strict policies, as table 2 indicated that the government is accountable for the largest share of ‘yes, immigration measures are necessary’ claims. The model confirms this finding, as the odds of supporting strict policies instead of opposing such measures decreases with a factor of 0.54 for organizations and a factor of 0.38 for individuals compared to the government. Thus claim-makers representing the US government were more likely than individual claim-makers and actors representing organizations to support strict immigration policies.
When it comes to the political affiliation of claim-makers the model shows that Democrats (0.58) are less likely than non-political actors to support strict measures, whereas Republicans (2.98) more often support strict measures compared to non-political claim-makers. And also the theoretical argument that the perception that immigrants are a threat contribute to the approval of strict measures is supported. The odds of supporting strict immigration policies instead of opposing such measures decreases with a factor of 0.001 for people who do not believe that immigration is a threat compared to people who do belief that immigrants are a threat. Thus for the United States claim-makers representing the government most often support strict immigration policies, and when it comes to the political affiliation members of the Republican party are more likely to support strict measures. The idea that immigrants are a threat certainly contributes to the approval of strict immigration policies among claim-makers in the United States.
In both multinomial logistic regression models there appear to be differences over time, although for the United States the 2000/2004 and 2010/2014 period do not significantly differ. However the finding that American claim-makers were more likely to support strict
immigration measures in the 2005/2009 period compared to the 2000/2004 period is unexpected. Because of the terror attacks in 2001 it would seem logical that claim-makers would have more often supported strict immigration measures in the 2000/2004 period. The graphs below give an overview of the changes over the fifteen year time period for both the United States and the Netherlands with regard to the support of strict immigration policies. The graph of the Netherlands shows that throughout the years 2000 up to 2004 there is quite a steady and relatively high support for strict immigration measures. In the other years the percentage of claim-makers that support strict immigration policies is lower compared to those first five years, except for some peaks in the years 2008 and 2010. The high level of support for strict measures in the 2000 up to 2004 period is probably caused by events that occurred during that time, such as the popularity and murder of Pim Fortuyn, the terrorist attacks in the United States and Spain, as well as the murder of Theo van Gogh. In the United States on the other hand immigration policy related issues do not seem to be highly debated in 2000 and 2001, as not only the support for strict immigration policies is low but also the protest against such measures is small. The upsurge in support for strict measures in 2002 is probably caused by the terrorist attacks of 9/11. And after that the support level of strict immigration policies varies somewhere between 20 and 30 percent each year. Because strict immigration policies were not very much debated before 9/11 the average score of the 2000/2004 block is lower when compared to the blocks of 2005/2009 and 2010/2014, explaining why the multinomial logistic regression indicates that claim-makers more often support strict measures in later time periods.
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The main commonality between the United States and the Netherlands with regard to their support for strict immigration measures is the dominance of the central government as a claim-maker. In both countries the government is the actor that most often approves of strict immigration policies. However the descriptive statistics revealed that the central Dutch government more often supports strict immigration measures than does the national
government of the United States. In addition to this many more other differences between the two countries with regard to their support of strict policies have been found. Thus the first hypothesis that the support of strict immigration policies will be similar among claim-makers in the United States and the Netherlands should be rejected. Literature on the criminalization of immigration in Western nation-states argues that a similar trend is apparent in European countries and the United States, where governments establish strict immigration policies that criminalize (certain groups of) immigrants (De Giorgi, 2010; Melossi, 2003; Palidda, 2009; van der Woude et al., 2014). And although in both the Netherlands and the United States strict policies have been established that indeed criminalize immigrants (Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Doomernik, 2008; Massey & Pren, 2012; van der Leun, 2006), there are national differences. First of all claim-makers in the Netherlands more often support strict
0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00%
Netherlands - Strict immigration measures
No Yes 0.00% 10.00% 20.00% 30.00% 40.00% 50.00% 60.00% 70.00% 80.00%
United States - Strict immigration measures
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immigration policies compared to their American counterparts, and they also more often protest against strict measures. So the strict immigration measures issue has more often been debated in the Dutch public discourse during the 2000-2014 time period than it has been in the United States. There are also differences between the two countries over time, where Dutch claim-makers have quite strongly supported strict immigration policies in the 2000 up to 2004 period and in the years afterwards the support declined. In the United States on the other hand strict immigration policies were not that much debated before the terrorist attacks of 2001 and afterwards the support has increased and varied on a higher level over the last ten years.
Thus the argument that the support of strict immigration policies is similar among claim-makers in the United States and the Netherlands cannot be verified. There are indeed commonalities between the two countries, for instance with regard to the dominance of the central government and the influence of the immigrants are a threat perception. In both countries the idea that immigrants are a threat contributes to support for strict immigration policies. So as stated by Koopmans and Statham (2003) globalization indeed affect nation-states, but that does not mean that national differences disappear. Globalization has
contributed in an important way to the movement of large flows of people all over the world, and that has affected Western countries. These countries perceive immigration as a threat and therefore support strict immigration policies that criminalize (certain parts of the) immigrants. However the results from this research indicate that there are still differences between the Netherlands and the United States, for instance with regard to the influence of certain claim-makers in the field, the changes over time and thus also when it comes to the support of strict immigration policies.
Legitimization frames
The previous section has shown that there are some differences between the Netherlands and the United States with regard to the support of strict immigration policies. In addition to this it could also be expected that there are differences between the two countries when it comes to the framing of immigration. As argued in the theoretical section of the paper there are
different legitimization and protest frames that can be pursued by claim-makers to legitimize their stance towards the (dis)approval of strict immigration measures. The usage of these frames will probably differ between the United States and the Netherlands, because these countries have different traditions of identity and citizenship (Koopmans & Statham, 2003). In this section the legitimization frames will be discussed and the next section focuses on the protest frames.
The five different legitimization frames that were mentioned in the theoretical section (national unity, national security, immigrants take jobs, burden on welfare, and clandestinely enter the country) have been examined. Table 3 and table 4 give an overview of the usage of legitimization frames in the United States and the Netherlands. The two most prominent used frames in the United States are the ‘immigrants clandestinely enter the country’ (7,04%) and ‘immigrants pose a threat to national security’ (6,33%) frames. For the Netherlands there is one dominant legitimization frame, namely the ‘immigrants pose a threat to national unity’ (3,71%) frame. So there seem to be differences between the United States and the Netherlands with regard to the usage of legitimization frames. Binary logistic regressions2 have been carried out for the five different legitimization frames to further examine the usage of these
2
For all binary logistic regressions the standard errors have been adjusted (divided by the Pearson dispersion parameter). Because some claim-makers can appear in the database more than once, overdispersion would be a problem. This way the standard errors are not too small.
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frames. A certain legitimization frame has been used as the dependent variable, where the situation that a claim-maker used any other frame (coded zero) is compared to using that particular frame (coded one).
Table 3 indicates that the ‘national security’ and ‘clandestinely enter’ frames were most often pursued by claim-makers in the United States. The logistic regression model for the
‘clandestinely enter’ frame shows that the odds of using the clandestinely enter frame instead of using another frame increases by a factor of 8.97 for the United States compared to the Netherlands. This means that claim-makers in the United States were more likely to pursue the clandestinely enter frame to legitimize the need for strict policies compared to Dutch claim-makers. Further the model shows that the government is the most likely actor to use this frame, as the odds of using the clandestinely enter frame instead of another frame decrease by a factor of 0.53 for organizations and a factor of 0.47 for individuals. When examining the results of the ‘national security’ frame the logistic regression model shows that the odds of using the national security frame instead of other frames increases by a factor of 7.73 for claim-makers from the United States compared to Dutch claim-makers. Thus the national security frame is more often used to legitimize strict immigration policies in the United States compared to the Netherlands. Just as with the clandestinely enter frame claim-makers
representing organizations (0.15) and individuals (0.13) are less likely to pursue the national security frame compared to governmental actors.
For the Netherlands table 4 indicated that the national unity frame was most often used to legitimize strict immigration policies. The logistic regression model shows that the odds of using the national unity frame instead of another frame decreases with a factor of 0.10 for claim-makers from the United States compared to the Netherlands. So the national unity frame is indeed more often pursued in the Netherlands than it is in the United States to legitimize the need for strict immigration policies. Governmental actors are the most likely to
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pursue the national unity frame, as the odds of using this frame instead of another frame decreases with a factor of 0.31 for organizations and a factor of 0.45 for individuals.
Based on table 3 and 4 and the binary logistic regressions the second hypothesis that claim-makers in the Netherlands will more often pursue the national unity frame to legitimize strict immigration policies can be confirmed. Both the descriptive statistics as well as the logistic regression indicate that claim-makers from the Netherlands were more likely to pursue the national unity frame compared to American claim-makers. This finding is consistent with the literature that mentions the prominence of the ‘failed integration’ debate in the Netherlands, where the emphasis is on the threat immigrants would pose to the Dutch culture and society because these immigrants would be unable to adapt to Dutch culture and values (Bigo, 2004; Broeders & Engbersen, 2007; Joppke, 2007). Therefore the national unity frame is often used by Dutch claim-makers to legitimize strict immigration policies needed to protect the Dutch society and culture.
In the United States on the other hand the national security and clandestinely enter frames are more often pursued by makers from the United States compared to Dutch
claim-makers. These results are also consistent with the literature that emphasizes the struggle over the US-Mexican border with regard to unauthorized border crossings, as well as the fear of terrorism which received increased attention in the United States after the attacks of 9/11 (Chavez, 2008b; De Giorgi, 2010; Inda & Dowling, 2013; Inda, 2006). So the third
hypothesis that claim-makers in the United States will more often pursue the national security and clandestinely enter frames to legitimize strict immigration policies can be confirmed. And the confirmation of the second and third hypothesis shows that immigration appears in
different ways in the public discourse in countries, because the immigration histories of the two countries differ (Koopmans & Statham, 2003). Therefore claim-makers in the United States and the Netherlands pursue different strategies to legitimize strict immigration policies.
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The logistic regressions indicate that there were no significant differences (except for the national security 2010/2014 block) with regard to the usage of legitimization frames over the time blocks. However it should be mentioned that there are differences over time when it comes to the usage of legitimization frames, but further research would be necessary to examine if these differences are significant or not. In this study the numbers per year per legitimization frame are quite small, and thus three larger time blocks have been created. But the variation over time apparent when looking at the different years, is reduced when the years are collapsed to three different time blocks. Therefore these analyses could be improved if more data was included into the sample, by examining more newspapers. This way it could be investigated if there are indeed significant differences over time or not.
For now two graphs have been created3 that show information on the usage of different legitimization frames in each year included into the database. Despite the significance issue these graphs are still included into the paper to point out that the usage of legitimization frames is not the same over the fifteen year period. These graphs for instance show that the usage of the national security legitimization frame in the United States has declined over time, and that the national unity frame is more prominent in certain years in the Netherlands.
Further research would be needed to examine if there are significant differences over time and which strategies claim-makers pursue with regard to their choice of legitimization frames.
Protest frames
There are also claim-makers that resist against strict immigration policies, and five different frames pursued by claim-makers to protest strict measures are examined in this section. These frames are 1) economy; in which a claim-maker argues that strict immigration measures are bad for the economy as immigrants contribute to the economy, 2) ageing; where a claim-maker argues that immigrants are needed to combat ageing, 3) belong here; where is argued that immigrants are American or Dutch and belong in the country, 4) humanity; in which it is argued that strict immigration measures are inhumane, and finally 5) infeasible; where a claim-maker argues that strict immigration measures are infeasible. The usage of protest frames in the United States is displayed in table 5. The humanity protest frame is used the most often (20,25%), followed by the economy protest frame (9,90%). When examining the different actors it becomes clear that non-profit organizations (5,66%) in the United States are responsible for the largest share of claims with humanity frames.
Table 6 presents the usage of protest frames in the Netherlands. The most dominant protest frame in the immigration field is the humanity frame (22,25%), and the second most influential protest frame is the infeasible frame (13,86%). When examining the different actors the table shows that humanity protest frame is most often pursued by actors
representing the central government (5,66%), followed by the experts (4,03%). With regard to the infeasible protest frame it can be stated that this frame is most often used by experts (5,01%). Thus there seems to be a commonality between the United States and the
Netherlands with regard to the usage of protest frames, because the humanity frame is the most used frame in both countries. When it comes to the second most influential frame the countries differ, because for the United States the economy protest frame is pursued most often whereas for the Netherlands this is the infeasible frame.
3
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Binary logistic regressions have been performed in order to further examine the usage of the five different protest frames. The protest frames have been used as the dependent variable, in
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which a certain protest frame (coded one) is compared to the other frames (coded zero). The logistic regression table shows that the economy frame is more often used in the United States, as the odds for using this frame instead of other frames increases by a factor of 1.73 for claim-makers in the United States compared to the Netherlands. The ageing frame on the other hand is more often used by claim-makers in the Netherlands, as the odds of American claim-makers are decreasing by a factor of 0.18 compared to the Netherlands. The belong here frame is more often used by claim-makers representing the United States (5.92), which could be expected because of the hotly debated issue of legalizing the DREAMERS (Nicholls, 2014). The last two frames are both more likely to be used by Dutch claim-makers, as the odds of claim-makers from the United States decrease by a factor of 0.72 for the humanity frame and a factor of 0.20 for the infeasible frame
Based on the descriptive tables and the logistic regression the fourth hypothesis that claim-makers from the Netherlands will more often use the infeasible frame to protest against strict immigration policies can be confirmed. This finding is consistent with the literature, because there it was argued that there are often conflicts between Dutch municipalities and the central government with regard to strict immigration policies. Local authorities argue that national immigration policies are infeasible, because in practice it would be very difficult to deport immigrants and these measures at the same time disrupt the public order (Doomernik, 2008; van der Leun, 2006). So Dutch municipalities base their claims on a practical mindset, focussing on the feasibility of immigration policies in practice. In the United States on the other hand claim-makers emphasize the economic contributions immigrants make to the country. The DREAMERS are often presented (and presenting themselves) as immigrants that would contribute in a valuable way to the American economy because they are the best and brightest students (Nicholls, 2014). In addition to this the data shows that another often heard argument is that immigrants are needed for the jobs American citizens refuse to do, as the examples below illustrate.
“said that many illegal immigrants did jobs that Americans do not want and that legalizing such workers would help many businesses” (John McCain, New York Times, August 4th
2003) ''The jobs are highly local and supplement the work of permanent U.S. employees. They're temporary jobs with low pay and few or no benefits, and American workers aren't willing to accept them.'' (Edward M. Kennedy, New York Times, April 10th, 2004)
“We have three billion apples to pick this fall and every single one of them has to be picked by hand. It’s a very labor-intensive industry, and there is no local labor supply that we can draw from, as much as we try. No one locally really wants to pick apples for six weeks in the fall.” (Peter Gregg, New York Times, April 9th, 2007)
In addition to the economy protest frame American claim-makers also pursue the ‘we belong here’ frame more often than Dutch claim-makers. This could be expected based on theory because of the popularity of the DREAMERS, and their strategy to emphasize their
“Americanness” to claim that they belong in the United States (Nicholls, 2014). Thus based on these findings the fifth hypothesis that claim-makers from the United States will more often pursue the economy and we belong here frames to protest against strict immigration policies can be confirmed. However besides the differences it should also be mentioned that a
commonality between the United States and the Netherlands has been found, as in both countries claim-makers most often pursue the humanity frame to protest against strict immigration policies.
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Just as in the previous section two graphs4 have been created that give an overview of the change over time with regard to the usage of protest frames. The logistic regression already indicated that there are significant differences between the time blocks of the infeasible frame, but most other scores with regard to the year variable are non-significant. The odds of
pursuing the infeasible frame were higher in the 2005/2009 and 2010/2014 time period compared to the 2000/2014 period. The graph of the Netherlands shows that the usage of the infeasible frame varies over time, but that indeed this protest frame has been pursued more often in the 2005 up to 2014 period when compared to 2000 up to 2004 period. However just as mentioned in the legitimization section, further research would be needed to explore if there are any more significant differences over time and which strategies claim-makers deploy by choosing a certain protest frame.
Conclusion and discussion
There is disagreement among researchers with regard to the convergence or divergence of Western nation-states when it comes to strict immigration policies. Some argue that a global trend of criminalization of immigration is taking place, where immigration regimes in several Western countries become quite similar in their strict criminalizing policies towards
immigration (De Giorgi, 2010; Melossi, 2003; Palidda, 2009; van der Woude et al., 2014). On the other side there are researchers that emphasize the differences in penal systems between especially the United States and Europe (Lacey, 2008; Whitman, 2003), as well as the different traditions of citizenship and identity that lead to national differences (Koopmans & Statham, 2003). By comparing claim-makers in the United States and the Netherlands on their preference for strict immigration policies and the frames they pursue to legitimize or protest such measures, this research has focussed on getting more insight into the issue of global immigration, immigration policies, and the accompanying convergence and divergence among nation-states.
The analyses have shown that there are both commonalities and differences between the United States and the Netherlands with regard to the favourability of strict immigration policies and the pursued legitimization and protest frames. The examined research question of this paper is “To what extent are strict immigration policies (dis)approved and which
arguments are used to legitimize the (dis)approval of these policies?”. When it comes to the favourability of strict immigration policies it can be concluded that claim-makers in the Netherlands more often support strict immigration measures than do their American counterparts. A possible explanation for this could be the different composition of
stakeholders in the field in both countries. Although in both the United States as well as in the Netherlands the central government has a dominant position in the public discourse on
immigration, the Dutch central government has more influence in the field. According to literature it could be expected that claim-makers representing the government more often will support strict immigration measures, because these policies are an important tool for nation-states to control immigration flows (Bigo, 2004; Castles, 2000; De Giorgi, 2010; Stumpf, 2013). And because the Dutch government has a more influential position, it could be argued that there is less room for other actors to resist against strict immigration policies. However the analyses also showed that the Dutch central government strongly favours strict
immigration policies, whereas in the United States the difference between supporting and opposing strict measures is quite small among claim-makers representing the central government. Therefore both differences in the composition of stakeholders as well as the
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