ENTERING THE DELEGITIMATION PHASE OF THE WORLD ORDER CYCLE:
CHINA’S DISCURSIVE RESISTANCE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES’ GLOBAL
AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER
BY
DORUK AKIN
A thesis submitted to The University of Amsterdam for the degree of Master
Political Science (International Relations)
SUPERVISOR
MW. DR. J. (JULIA) BADER
Research Project China’s Foreign Relations in an Age of Change Course Catalogue Number: 7324C256ZY
Admin. Code: POLA Student number: 5616204 Word count: 21.139
2 ABSTRACT
This thesis analyses the way China is constructing a delegitimation discourse with regard to the United States’ global authority and international order by literary study. As a method of research a critical discourse analysis of three speeches and one report of Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Xi Jinping was conducted, from 1974 - 2014.
The results of the critical discourse analysis show that the Chinese leaders disseminated a delegitimation discourse of United States’ global authority and international order, which is achieved by means of a variety of discursive strategies.
3 TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract ... 2 Table of contents ... 3 CHAPTER 1 ... 5 INTRODUCTION ... 5 1.2 Research question ... 7
1.3 Aims and objectives ... 7
1.4 Case study background: China’s changing political discourse ... 8
CHAPTER 2 ... 14
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 14
2.1 The linguistic origins of discourse... 14
2.2 Discourse ... 15
2.3 Discourse and the role of ideology ... 19
2.4 Political discourse ... 20
2.5 Presidential speech and communication ... 21
2.6 Hegemony ... 23
2.7 Counter hegemony ... 26
2.8 Legitimation and delegitimation ... 27
CHAPTER 3 ... 29
METHODOLOGY ... 29
3.1 Critical disourse analysis ... 29
3.2 Analytical framework ... 30
3.4 Data collection ... 32
4
ANALYSIS & RESULTS ... 35
4.1 Text 1 Speech by the Chairman of the Delegation of the People’s Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping, At the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly, April 10, 1974. ... 35
4.2 Text 2 Jiang Zemin's Report at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. .... 45
4.3 Text 3 Speech by H.E. Hu Jintao President of the People's Republic of China at the Opening Ceremony ... 51
4.4 Text 4 Xi Jinping's speech at opening ceremony of Boao Forum (Xinhua), April 7 2013. ... 55
CHAPTER 5 ... 61
CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION ... 61
References ... 65
Appendix ... 72
5 CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The political and economic rise of China is the most significant occurrence in world politics in the twenty-first century. Its rapid economic growth, military modernization and increasing influence in world affairs has instigated political discussion, particularly concerning the question whether its power portends a threat to international security, hence the political status and preponderant power of the United States in the future (Mittler, 2008).
The familiar scene of an unipolar world structure that was dominant since the end Cold War, has changed. China’s rise can be considered as the first sign of the shift towards a multipolar world structure, which could undermine the hegemonic position of the United States. The transformation from unipolarity to multipolarity is believed to instigate violent power struggles between the hegemon and its peer competitors by means of ‘hard’ balancing (Layne, 2006; Schweller & Pu, 2011). This view excludes alternative means or even the idea of balancing. For this reason, scholars might end up making wrong observations, conclusions and predictions in their analysis of rising powers and their aspiration to challenge the hegemon or the international order through counterbalancing (Layne, 2006).
Recently, this traditional definition of balancing has been challenged, and new ways of thinking concerning balancing started to emerge. Instead of ‘hard’ balancing, states engage in new forms of balancing which do not present signals of an immediate ‘threat’. These new forms of balancing involve non-coercive or non-military means of power and relate to the terms such as soft balancing and the use of soft power. Soft balancing measures do not directly challenge the hegemon’s military preponderance. Instead, as Layne (2006) explains, it involves “the use of diplomacy, economic statecraft, international institutions and law to constrain and delegitimize the actions of a hegemonic [power]” (p. 8).
Schweller and Pu (2011) hold similar views as Layne. They state that today’s international order does not encourage the use of traditional means of power, but it necessitates states to adopt a strategy which is focused on constituting economic relationships, building political alliances and gaining recognition and legitimacy. In their article After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline (2011), they explain that because of the emergence of these alternative strategies, analysis of counterbalancing behaviour has become more difficult and for this reason such signalling has been less recognized by academics or policymaker. This, however, does not mean that resistance of other powers
6 against the United States (U.S.) is completely absent. They suggest that, if powers seek to challenge or overthrow the hegemon in an unipolar system, this must be preceded by a delegitimation phase1. The authors explain:
“For active and intense balancing campaigns to commence (…) peer competitors to U.S. power and prestige must first undermine the legitimacy of the American order. Otherwise, they risk being portrayed as dangerous threats to international order. Moreover, without the requisite power to balance against the United States, the other major powers have little choice but to employ ‘weapons of the weak’: dissident rhetoric and cost-imposing strategies short of actual balancing behaviour. These antihegemonic discursive and diplomatic strategies lay the groundwork for the more formidable revisionist project of dislodging the United States from its preeminent position” (Schweller & Pu, 2011, p. 70).
Thus, even though relatively weak actors (in terms of military power) are unable to confront the hegemon directly, they can still delegitimize the ideational foundation of that hegemony through the strategic use of rhetorical diplomacy that infuse alternative visions, symbolic language, divergent ideologies, and “discourse with shared values and pathways for action” (Schweller & Pu, 2011, p. 48).
This thesis exams the role that discourses and discursive struggles play in the process of (de)legitimation and resistance (Mumby, 2004). Therefore, this thesis employs analytical framework to discover discursive strategies aimed at the delegitimation of the current international order and American global authority and ideology. Ideologies are embedded in discourse, therefore a critical discourse analysis of ideology from representational point of view is relevant.
The main objective of critical discourse analysis is to deconstruct the explicit and implicit ideologies of discourses that “help produce and reproduce (unequal) power relations in society” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, pp. 258–284). In other words, vague and ambiguous, but also seemingly clear statements are illuminated in order to discover their possible role in articulating relations of power in society. Critical approaches see politics as sites of struggle over knowledge, meaning and identity, and address the complexity of power relations; meaning that they aim to make explicit and visible the ways that discourse functions ideologically (e.g. Broadfoot, Deetz, & Anderson, 2004; Van Dijk, 2003b, 2006; Zoller & Fairhurst, 2007). In this thesis China as a political international power is the focus, due to its rising power that is challenging America’s hegemony.
7 1.2 Research question
This leads to the following research question:
Is China constructing a delegitimation discourse against the United States’ global authority and international order?
1.3 Aims and objectives
Firstly, the growing importance of language and discourse in international politics in today’s information age needs more attention and recognition in the field of international relations. By drawing the attention to the dialectic relationship between states, a re-evaluation of dominant international relation theories is in fascinating in our times.
Consequently, this thesis attempts to introduce classical political theory and conceptualisations of political power, and concentrates on hegemonic power especially. Aim is to focus upon the dialectic nature of politics and the discursive practices, and the linguistic aspects inherent to power struggles among states. Dominant perspectives in international relations - in particular the neo-neo paradigms - often neglect to provide a clear understanding of the concept of power, this thesis tries to fill that gap. In the evaluation of China’s rise and its ‘growing power’ conceptualization is often lacking or power is measured by absolute means. Within the discussion of China’s growing international influence, the exact meaning of it is also often unspecified. It is often assumed that China’s growing capabilities and activities on the international scale ‘naturally’ leads to more influence, but that connection remains unproven. A reconceptualization of power is necessary in order to fill this gap that is the connection of power and influence. The understanding of power as influence is certainly not new and its explanation can be found in, for instance, Aristotle’s power of rhetoric, Gramci’s hegemony and ideology and Foucault’s power, knowledge and discourse.
Secondly, critical discourse analysis provides insight into the study of international politics as the aim is to study the relationship between the broader social and cultural structures, relationships and processes, and discursive practices, events and texts (Norman Fairclough, 1995).
Thirdly, although there are a number of scholars that have studied legitimacy and (de)legitimation, these stem mainly from organizational studies where legitimacy is analysed in the context of organizational restructuring and processes of organizational power. Nevertheless, critical scholars of discourse are more and more interested in understanding the dynamics of discursive struggles and pull their work into the study
8 of world politics. Hence, based on the above mentioned research gaps in regard to the role of linguistics, discourse, and discursive practices in contemporary international relation studies, this thesis will make use of the contributions of critical discourse approach and methodological framework. Furthermore, it will draw on canonical theorists such as Gramsci and Derrida, among others, to evaluate their concepts of hegemony and counter hegemony, and the role of legitimacy and resistance in the discursive struggle over power in world politics with regard to the rising international power ‘The People’s Republic of China’.
1.4 Case study background: China’s changing political discourse
China suffered from a political‘identity crisis’ following its continuous defeats by Western powers in the 19th century during Colonial wars. From here on, the Chinese elites have struggled with their national image and with defining ‘Chinese cultural identity’. This resulted in a constant redefinition of its national identity, whenever this was challenged and endangered. For China was the time of Western imperial invasion a crucial moment in contemporary. Since thereon, Chinese officials and intellectual elites have coped with the ‘Western threat’ question by following extreme ideological traditions, whether Confucian or, later Marxist-Leninist tradition. The response with a counter-ideology to an external threat is, however, not only unique to China. Similar processes can be observed with both great powers, such as the US showing a similar ideological response to the ‘China threat’, as well as rising powers, but also those from the past such as Germany and Russia. As Meissner (2006) explains:
“Nations suffered from Western oppression, occupation, and/or expropriation tended to move to and fro between extreme ideological orientations: either fending off Western modernity or selectively integrating parts of it into their own, frequently overdrawn, traditional worldviews, or even dismissing their own culture in part or in whole and replacing ti with radical ideologies’ (Meissner, 2006 p. 4).
This could be seen as a familiar process for China,. The loss of hegemony in Asia, as a result of Western colonial occupation in the tribute states (such as Annam, Siam, Burma, Laos and Korea) and the imposition of ‘unequal treaties’ left deep scars in the nations collective memory. This era is marked as the ‘Century of Humiliation’, and has since become a critical part of China’s national identity (Meissner, 2006), as well as a decisive discourse theme used by the political elite to ensure the ruling class political legitimacy, authority, and power (Renwick & Cao, 1999).
9 China’s search for a response to the Western ‘threat’ unfolded in a number of periods. Starting in mid-nineteenth century with the classic paradigm of ‘Chinese learning as essence (or substance), and Western learning for application (or as) function’. This paradigm was marked by the adoption of Western civilisation so it could ‘learn from the superiority of the foreigners in order to rein in their superiority’ (Zhang Zhidong, 1837-1909), which included technological and scientific aspects. This attempt, to modernize China, failed. However, what followed by alternative ideas to reform the political structure into a constitutional monarchy guided by the ‘teachings of old times’, that is Confucianism. Then as well, it was believed that Confucianism, as a political ideology, could contribute legitimacy for political reform. This attempt to rebuild China, marked as ‘Hundred Days of Reform’ (1898), could not revive China’s political system. However, Confucianism remained the esteemed ideology guiding the Chinese intellectuals, whose ideological values was placed in contrast to the Western ideology of ‘materialism’. As Meissner (2006) points out, Western civilization was believed to be a ‘material monster’ that would destroy the Chinese superior ‘spiritual’ (jingshen) civilisation from within - like a ‘trojan horse’.
From here on, around the 1930s, China became keen on protecting its ‘superior’ cultural traditions from trends of ‘Westernization’. Also in the domain of science, this superiority was maintained. While adopting Western scientific discourses, connections were made in order to propose a ‘world’s common knowledge and wisdom’. As Meissner (2006) again summarizes:
“The discourse on science, ut also on liberalism, the European enlightment, and the future model of the Chinese state, was embedded in the general discourse of Westernisation (xihua 西化)… The dispute about the supposed necessity to Westernise or about the similarly asserted necessity to take one’s own path independently of the West became the red thread of all discussions... in the 1930s… and returned in the 1980s” (p. 7)
During the rule of Mao Zedong (1949-1978) Marxism-Leninism became the dominant discourse. This period was labelled as the ‘New Philosophy’ (xin zhexue 新哲學) that contributed to the articulation of an official identity for the individual and the nation. The Party eradicated all Western influences, along with the dismissal of Western/European culture, but also Chinese culture and traditional thought. Other alternative views were prohibited (e.g., liberalism, positivism, pragmatism, idealism, and religion), and a communist ideology ruled the Chinese people. The only exception was, hence, Marxism and natural
10 sciences (Meissner, 2006). The era of the ideology and class struggle saw its end in 1970 and was followed by an ideological shift towards the post-Mao era, which emerged in 1976 and was continued by Deng Xiaoping. Deng had attained its position as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China (CPC) under Mao’s rule, but gained more influence in the CPC after the failure of Mao’s Great Leap Forward and his Cultural Revolution (1966-1976)2. This paved the way for Deng’s reform policy, which typifies the next ideological shift and political discourse in China (Lu, 1999; Meissner, 2006). Deng’s approach propagated a China that follows a low profile and pragmatic attitude on the world stage (Kejin, 2011). This period, from 1980s onwards, was characterized by three developments: “The renaissance of Confucianism; the renaissance of Western thought; and the emergence of various nationalist movements” (Meissner, 2006, p. 8). Especially since 1990s, China has pursued a policy of not carrying the flag, not taking the lead, and not pursuing world hegemony under the guidance of Deng Xiaoping’s strategic approach of ‘Hiding one’s capabilities and keeping a low profile’ (Tao Guang Yang Hui 韬光养晦) (Kejin, 2011). This strategy was a response to the Tiananmen revolt and final crackdown (June 4, 1989) and the ending of the Cold War (Zheng & Tok, 2007). Deng reintroduced the traditionalist thought of Confucianism as again the guiding political ideology. Deng’s greatest achievement was his program of economic reforms, the so called ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ in 1978, also referred to as the ‘Opening up’ of the country to the international community. Since then, China tries to maintain its low-key attitude and puts great effort to improve its national image by refining its ideology and enhancing its political discourse to exert its ‘discourse power’ of Marxism domestically, which after Deng became of great importance to China on the international stage as well (Kejin, 2011). Deng’s objectives were domestically oriented and focused on the economic development and the enrichment of the nation. This approach positioned China as a passive player in world affairs. This changed however with the initiatives of Jiang Zemin in the mid-1990s. Jiang Zemin had the desire to move China forward to ‘gear with the world’ (Yu shijie jiegui), make China a comprehensive power and ‘build a new international order’. Jiang’s strategies transformed China from an inward-looking nation, into a nation: “recogni[zed] its need to ride the wave of globalization”, and the benefit of the neoliberal international economic system (Zheng & Tok, 2007, p. 6). During this time, China became more and more embedded in the network of international relations and increased its engagement in multilateral institutions and organizations: “(…) to the extent that China had become a signatory member of
11 almost all major international regimes by the late 1990s, rounding off this massive effort with a celebrated move to join the World Trade Organization in 2001” (Zheng & Tok, 2007, p. 7).
Since then, the Chinese government recognized that China should improve its political discourse because its rapid economic growth and international involvement began to raise suspicion and threat perceptions among other members of the international community, especially the United States. In order to divert the ‘China threat theory’, Beijing turned its focus to the power of discourse. The central concept guiding China’s foreign policy and is publicly referred to by Beijing, is China’s soft power strategy, which is recognized as the key to China’s successful rise. This concept entered China’s mainstream discourse in early 2000s, first in international politics and then in domestic policies and eventually in corporate governance (Cao e.a., 2014) . It was Hu Jintao’s who officially introduced the concept to the public in a political report to the 17th CCP National Congress in 2007. In this report, Hu stresses the crucial role of culture in international competition: “In today’s world, culture has increasingly become a crucial source for national cohesion and creativity. It is an essential factor in the competition for comprehensive national power” (Hu Jintao, 2007; as cited in Cao et al., 2014, p. 176). According to Hu the Party should: “enhance the national soft power as a strategic goal in the new century” (Hu Jintao, 2007; as cited in Cao e.a., 2014, p. 176). For Hu, culture is central to the strategy of soft power, and refers frequently to ‘cultural power’ and ‘culture as influence’. He therefore stresses the urgency: “to enhance Chinese culture’s international influence”(Cao e.a., 2014). This definition of soft power, as Cao et al. (2014) explain “is subsumed under the broad concept of culture, defined not only in terms of instrumental values in international competition, but more substantially its communicative values in reinforcing national cohesion, identity and solidarity” (p. 176).
According to Cao et al. (2014), Chinese political discourse is “rich in metaphor and allusion… [and these] metaphoric references often trigger formulaic memories of the grand narrative of the day” (p. 3) and can be characterized by three discursive strategies: consensus building (gongshi); to unify (tiannjie) and education (jiaoyu). These features are similar to the concept of hegemony explained earlier, where consensus (or consent) to the hegemony (or discourse) is achieved through the construction of ‘political truth as historical truth’ (i.e., constructing the ‘common sense’), necessary to establish legitimacy, authority and political power. ‘Unity’ is achieved by a comprehensive discourse aimed at reducing resistances and “external contestation through discursive closure, at a textual level, persuasion at an institutional level and
12 propaganda at the public level” (Cao et al., 2014, p. 3). Education serves to as a channel to which “discursive consensus is promoted, transmitted sustained and reproduced” (Cao et al., 2014, p. 3).
For China a comprehensive discourse that is focused on culture and ideology is one of the most important components of national power and thus the CCP invests very much in its ‘external propaganda’ in order to improve its image and to ensure the most efficient way to disseminate China’s ideology. Zhao Quzhen, director of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee illustrates this importance. Zhao considers CCP’s foreign propaganda as an‘(…) undertaking of winning over public opinions’ and a ‘struggle’. He says: “During this struggle, [we] need to make best use of the favourable opportunities, actively launch the campaign, favourably control the warfare, try to take pre-emptive measures, and try to dominate the overseas media. Our goal is to have the overseas media follow our steps… We need to actively promote China to the United States and other important Western countries so as to guide the world media; this needs not only a higher mastery of the art, but also a unified overall strategy. It should be even more so that we intentionally allocate our resources to the important regions and countries, make a full play of our strengths, focus on important aspects, make unremitting efforts, so as to make breakthroughs in those important countries, targets, and media, etc.” (Zhoa Quzhen, z.d.; as cited in An Investigation Report..., z.d., p. 4). This importance is illustrated in what Zhao Quzhen, director of the Foreign Propaganda Office of the CCP Central Committee, propagates. Zhao considers CCP’s foreign propaganda as an “undertaking of winning over public opinions” and a “struggle”. He says, “During this struggle, [we] need to make best use of the favourable opportunities, actively launch the campaign, favourably control the warfare, try to take pre-emptive measures, and try to dominate the overseas media. Our goal is to have the overseas media follow our steps… We need to actively promote China to the United States and other important Western countries so as to guide the world media; this needs not only a higher mastery of the art, but also a unified overall strategy. It should be even more so that we intentionally allocate our resources to the important regions and countries, make a full play of our strengths, focus on important aspects, make unremitting efforts, so as to make breakthroughs in those important countries, targets, and media, etc.” (Zhoa Quzhen, z.d.; as cited in An Investigation Report..., z.d., p. 4).
This thesis is structured as follows. Following the introductory chapter, the theoretical framework that elaborates four concepts will be in chapter two. The concepts are: linguistics, discourse, hegemony and
13 legitimacy. Methodology and data are in chapter three. Chapter four contains the results whereas conclusions and suggestions for further research are in chapter five.
14 CHAPTER 2
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
In this chapter the following topics will be elaborated: linguistics, discourse, hegemony and legitimacy.
2.1 The linguistic origins of discourse
“Language is no longer regarded as peripheral to our grasp of the world we live in, but as central to it. Words are not mere vocal labels or communicational adjuncts superimposed upon an already given order of things. They are collective products of social interaction, essential instruments through which human beings constitute and articulate their world’’ as Harris and Taylor (2005, p. ix) introduce the linguist Saussure.
Saussure’s main theoretical contribution to the development of linguistics is his view of language as a system of mutually defining entities. For Saussure, language is the consists of an array of signs. Each sentence is a sequence of signs, and each sign contributes something to the maintaining of the whole, and contrast with all others; that in turn results from the association of the signified with the signifier. Whereas signified refers to actual referential reality, signifier refers to a meaning which is contained within human consciousness (it has only meaning within a particular language system). Lingual signs, according to Saussure, are conventions that are socially constructed. They are arbitrary, but the meanings of those signs are imposed on us by our linguistic surrounding (Harris, 1990).
Building upon this work, the structuralist Robert Barthes practised the ideas of Saussure to a wide range of social issues (e.g., commercials, cinemas), and emphasized on the same fact that language involves more than only words (Guimarães, z.d.). In his book Mythologies, Barthes (1972) reveals the reason of interest in semiotics. That is, with the aim of “unmasking particular pieces of cultural material which in his opinion were being used by the bourgeoisie as tools to impose their values on others” (Guimarães, z.d., p. 3).
Essential in his view, is the concept of myths, which refers to a popular culture, or “a system of communication, that is a message [not defined] by the object of this message, but by the way in which it utter this message” (Barthes in Guimarães, p. 3). Extending Saussure’s notion of meanings, Barthes explains that “meanings can develop beyond their linguistic properties”, developing into myths (Laughey,
15 2007, p. 57). From this, we understand that meanings constructed by systems in which a particular language operates, and that these meanings (whether based on real fact or not) can preserve for a very long time as they turn into myths.
Another structurlist’s work is that of Halliday, who developed the Systemic Functional Linguistic model of language. Key to his approach is his account of ‘systemic grammar’, which describes the semiotic account of grammar as it involves choice. Every act of communication involves choice, and the choices available in any language variety are mapped in system networks. Systemic grammars draw on system networks as their primary representation tool. He sees language as ‘social semiotic system’ although “not in the sense of a system of signs, but a systemic resource for meaning” (Halliday, 1990, p. 192). His study revolves around the question of “how people exchange meanings by ‘languaging’”(Halliday, 1990, p. 193), and the way these meanings are conveyed through generalized or neutralized metafunctions that connects language to the outside world where interactants and their social roles matter (Haratyan, 2011)3.
Halliday’s theory on the characteristics (or functions) of language, laid the foundation for the significant development of semiotics and our understanding of contemporary discourse studies. His model has been most significant to the critical approaches of discourse studies, as it explains the connection between linguistic structure, social values and ideologies (See for example Wodak & Meyer, 2009; Norman Fairclough, Mulderrig, & Wodak, 2011). Additionally, the Halliday’s model concentrates on revealing discursive practices in discourse, by focusing on the discursive strategies by which these practices are achieved (Halliday, 2003). Hence, his ideas provide useful insight in topics that are covered in this thesis, particularly on the discursive practices inherent to political discourse per se.
2.2 Discourse
Since its introduction, the term 'discourse' has taken various, sometimes very broad and vague meanings. Originally the word discourse comes from Latin ‘discursus’ which denoted ‘conversation, speech’, and it is commonly understood as ‘language in use’. Generally the term discourse is understood as “language [that is] structured according to different patterns that people’s utterances follow when they take part in different domains of social life” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1), such as ‘educational discourse’ or ‘political discourse’. ‘Discourse analysis’ is the analysis of these patterns, as Jørgensen and Phillips (2002) explain in their book Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method. They, as well, recognize that providing a clear
16 definition of discourse is a difficult task. Such common sense definition as mentioned above does not cover the overall understanding of “what discourses are, how they function, and how to analyse them” (p. 1). The reason for this, as explained by the authors, is: “discourse analysis is not just one approach, but a series of interdisciplinary approaches that can be used to explore many different social domains in many different types of studies. And there is no clear consensus as to what discourses are or how to analyse them. Different perspectives offer their own suggestions and, to some extent, compete to appropriate the terms ‘discourse’ and ‘discourse analysis’ for their own definitions” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1). The authors do provide, as they call it, a preliminary definition of discourse, which description is relevant to each study dealing with discourse. That is, the understanding of “discourse as a particular way of talking about and understanding the world (or an aspect of the world)” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 1).
According to Laughey (2007) discourse can be understood “as a system of signification governed by rules that structure the ways in which we classify and divide its different meanings” (p. 74). Or in other words, as Torfing (1999) describes it, emphasising on the changing nature of language: “a differential ensemble of signifying sequences in which meaning is constantly renegotiated” (p. 85). This is similar to Foucault’s (1980) perspective and analysis, which main focus is on how discourse evolves and changes over time in the form of discursive practices. According to him, discourse (i.e., language use in speech and writing) is a form of ‘social practice’. This definition has been further developed by Fairclough and Wodak (1997) who argue that “discourse is socially constitutive as well as socially conditioned” (p. 258). Consequently, the discursive practices inherent to it, “help to produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people” (Fairclough & Wodak, 1997, p. 258)
Foucault’s (1989) view on discourse makes particular values and ideas present, but at the same time making others absent. Discourse constitutes a hierarchy, a division in groups, by giving the power and knowledge to those whose ideas are present, and exerts power and knowledge to those whose values and ideas are absent. It is because of this function that a certain discourse upholds. The different categorizations (e.g., good versus evil) – as a consequence of the historical division of meanings and practices – ensures “the infinite continuity of discourse and its secret presence to itself in the interplay of a constantly recurring absence” (Foucault, 1989; as cited in Laughey, 2007, p. 74).
17 Thus, linguistically, it is important to recognise that ‘[t]he absence of a sign can be a sign’ (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 44). Within a dominant discourse, various concepts are taken for granted. Certain concepts, such as identities, exist in a dichotomy where the contrasting category is commonly not named in a particular discourse. As a consequence, the ‘unnamed’ exist within ‘linguistic gaps’, as Galvin (2003) explains. By this he means that: “The absence of a signifier for the norm exists, because the signified (the concept) is hidden within neoliberal discourse which takes for granted the privileged position. Thus, within the gaps between what is sayable lies an oppressive concept which grants one group dominance of another” (p. 14). Here, Galvin (2003) tries to clarify that certain categories are default categories, and therefore not explicitly named. As a consequence, these categories obtain their strength and force. At the same time, when these absent and taken-for-granted concepts are called upon (for example by creating new metaphors) they lose their position and become object of scrutiny.
Linton (1998) elaborates on the effect of addressing the absence of a qualification through the creation of new metaphors. He illustrates this with the concept disabled versus non-disabled (i.e., the unnamed default category), of which the latter has not been defined. He states: “The use of non-disabled is strategic: to centre disability... This action is similar to the strategy of marking and articulating ‘whiteness’. The assumed position in scholarship has always been the male, white, non-disabled scholar; it is the default category. As recent scholarship has shown, these positions are not only presumptively hegemonic because they are the assumed universal stance, as well as the presumed neutral or objective stance, but also under theorised. The non-disabled stance, like the white stance, is veiled. "White cannot be said quite out loud, or it loses its crucial position as a precondition of vision and becomes the object of scrutiny" (Haraway 1989). Therefore, centering the disabled position and labelling its opposite non-disabled focuses attention on both the structure of knowledge and the structure of society” (Linton, 1998; as cited in Galvin, 2003, p. 14).
This process exposes the structure of dissonance, which by doing so forces us to look at are world in a new way. By making the invisible visible, those positions or categorizations we take for granted are revealed and force us to rethink the values and beliefs presented in a hegemonic discourse which we as a society collectively support. As a society we take part in upholding the biased hegemonic values and beliefs, as we belief as to be common sense. Here, we can see the vulnerability of language and that a particular discourse can be broad to scrutiny or even destruction by making the invisible, visible. This can allow “to reverse the stigma of “‘otherness’ and throw it back at the oppressor”, according to Hughes and
18 Paterson (1997, p. 333). Similar to what Galvin (2003) states: “The gaps in language, the silence of the Other, are already filled with the sense of something ‘not quite right’ and it is by allowing for its articulation that the opportunity for change is given breath” (p.14).
This is similar to what Derrida (1998) calls deconstruction, which is based on the notion that language is unstable. Like De Saussure (1989), Derrida (1998) argues that language gains its meaning through differences, that is, series of binary distinctions . He further argues that this is inherent to Western thinking: the logic of binary oppositions, such as absence/presence, man/woman, West/East, mind/body, rational/emotional. Such structure of dissonance, or what he calls difference, can at all times be deconstructed as they are inherently unstable (Ives, 2004).
Deconstruction has at least two aspects. Firstly, literary, which refers to the textual interpretation: finding the hidden alternative meanings in text. Second, philosophical, which concerns the main target of deconstruction, that is the ‘metaphysics of presence’ (Newman, 2001), as was earlier explained by Foucault (1989). According to Newman (2001), metaphysics creates dualistic opposition and constructs a hierarchy that privileges one term of each binary. Because of this, Derrida(1998) holds that binaries are unstable. Binaries cannot be seen as separate, as the privileged term’s identity is dependent on how it differs from the ‘secondary’ or ‘subordinated’ term. Deconstruction, then, refers to the attempt to transform the very structure of hierarchy and authority, through “a series of moves, which include the dismantling of conceptual oppositions and hierarchical systems of thought” (Norris, 1987; as cited in Norris, 1987, p. 4). Here, Derrida (1998) does not imply that the terms of the binaries should be inverted so that the subordinated term becomes the privileged, rather it involves revealing the hierarchical, authoritarian structure by reaffirming the place of power with the attempt to invoke a rethinking of that structure itself (Newman, 2001). It is to “challenge the orthodoxy of dominant belief systems and set in motion another shift in thinking that was not permitted before dislodging the ‘giveness’ of the fixed sign” (Pinkus, 1996, par. 4).
In addition, deconstruction involves looking at the rhetorical elements of text (or discourse) in order to reveal “the underlying logic of its argument…”, in order to “reveal [the] metaphor, figure, and rhetoric [that] play an important role in (…) political reasoning” (Balkin, 2009, p. 363). It deals with the multiple and often conflicting meanings that are existent in such texts. As Balkin (2009) further explains, deconstructive arguments do not necessarily destroy conceptual opposition or conceptual distinction…”(p.
19 363), rather they tend to disrupt and destabilize persisting hierarchical oppositions. Cornell (1992) argues that “deconstruction necessarily presupposes an ethical relationship to others; deconstruction requires us not only to recognize others as other but also to be open to them and their perspectives… Thus, deconstruction contains an ethical imperative both to question our own beliefs and to understand the situation and views of others” (Cornell, 1992; as cited in Balkin, 2009, pp. 365–366).
2.3 Discourse and the role of ideology
One of the most important elements of the establishment and maintenance of dominant discourses is the role of ideology. In classical Marxist approaches ideology was recognized as playing a crucial part in the legitimation of power abuse by dominant groups. Ideology, when accepted as common sense and neutral by subordinate groups, gives great power in the hands of the dominant groups (Van Dijk, 2006). Fairclough’s (2003) definition of ideology illustrates this, by explaining that: “Ideologies are representations of aspects of the world which contribute to establishing and maintaining relations of power, domination and exploitation. They may be enacted in ways of interaction (and therefore in genres) and inculcated in ways of being identities (and therefore styles). Analysis of texts [discourse]…is an important aspect of ideological analysis and critique…’’ (p. 218).
Van Dijk (2006) explains ideology as “the foundation of the social representations shared by a social group” (p. 729). This can be of any group (dominant or dominated), as ideologies are not exclusively something of the dominant groups, but can as well exists in the dominated groups (e.g., ideologies of resistance and opposition). Ideology, then, is a system of beliefs, which is expressed through “symbols, rituals, discourse and other social and cultural practices” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 26). Ideology, identity and discourse are inextricably intertwined. Van Dijk (2006) provides some clarification in how to position ideology and its role in the discussion of discourse: “Ideologically based social representations are general and abstract. In order to relate to concrete social practices and discourses about specific events, they need to become contextualized and specified in mental models. These (ideologically biased) mental models, stored in episodic memory, are the mental constructs that control discourse, interaction, and other social practices… It is through mental models that discourse are able to influence social representations and ideologies and reproduce these” (p. 730).
20 Hence, ideologies have a significant role in social struggle that is in situations of competition, conflict, domination, and resistance among groups and functions to strengthen the control over discourse. Ideologies unite members of a particular group by the repeatedly utilization of the shared belief systems that are stored in long-term memory (Van Dijk, 2001). These belief systems often involve categorization of difference and inequality stereotypes, prejudices, binary construction of identities, in-group and out-group differentiation (Van Dijk, 2003a) (Van Dijk, 2003a). These in turn function as legitimacy of one’s power and authority. In the context of resistance, ideology has two functions. First, it can ‘deconstruct’ the discourse of the dominant by the dominated. As ideologies “often operate by privileging certain features of social life while suppressing or deemphasizing others” (Balkin, 2009, p. 2). Deconstruction, then, can reveal the deemphasized, the overlooked, or the suppressed by making conceptual oppositions apparent or visible, in order to destabilize the taken-for-granted of the meanings (Balkin, 2009). Second, ideology can serve as legitimacy for the resistance towards a dominant discourse (Van Dijk, 1998).
2.4 Political discourse
According to Van Dijk (1997), political discourse must not be understood as a genre, but a class of genres that is defined by a social domain. That social domain can be divided into classes such as politics, science or education. Within the domain of politics, various genres can be detected: speech, party programs and parliamentary debates. The domain of politics covers a wide characterization: from science of Politics to all official and non-official acts by various actors engaging in politics. Or, as Van Dijk (1997) states: it includes “political processes (like `perestrojka'), political systems (like democracy and communism), political ideologies (like liberalism), and political (group) relations (such as power, inequality, hegemony, and oppression)” (p. 15).
In this thesis the focus is on the political discourse. Therefore, this thesis follows Van Dijk’s (1997) narrowly circumscribed characterization of politics, and focus on political discourse as ‘the discourse of politicians’. This narrows the characterization of politics down to the professional realm of activities of politicians. Political discourse can also be seen as a form of institutional discourse: “that is, only those discourses of politicians are considered that are produced in institutional settings, such as governments, parliaments or political parties, [which] must be produced by the speaker in her professional role of a politician and in an institutional setting” (Van Dijk, 2001, p. 20).
21 Politics can be defined as a “set of cooperation strategies carried out by some social institutions with a view to solving some social conflicts” (Chilton, 2004; as cited in Matić, z.d., p. 3). The properties inherent to politics are conflict of interests, persuasion and manipulation, imposition of opinions as ‘common sense’, and defining allies and opponents. In all these cases, the use of language is the crucial component. As Van Dijk (2006) states: “[p]olitics is one of the social domains whose practices are virtually exclusively discursive” (p. 728). Needless to say that intrinsic to politics is the use of language in creating the effects of authority, legitimacy and consensus. The important role of language is, among others, explained by Chilton (2003): “If the verbal business of political authority is characterised by the ultimate sanction of force (fines, imprisonments, withholding of privileges and benefits, for example), it needs to be also pointed out that such force can itself only be operationalised by means of communicative acts, usually going down links in a chain of command” (p. 4).
The notion that there is a strong connection between language and politics, is essentially rooted in the tradition of western political thought. Aristotle defined humans by their nature to live in a polis [(political community)], and by their exceptional capacity for speech (Chilton, 2003). He explains: “Speech (…) serves to indicate what is useful and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For the real difference between man and other animals is that humans alone have perception of good and evil, just and unjust, etc. (The Politics, 1253a7; as cited in Chilton, 2003, p. 5).
In addition to this, Aristotle clarifies that the perceptions of, for example, just and unjust, gains meaning through the common held view on these matters, which “makes the household and the state” (Chilton, 2003, p. 5) . What we draw from this, is that shared perceptions of ideas and values define political associations, and here language has a signifying function. Hence, political activity cannot exist without the use of language or speech. According to Beard (2000), studying language of politics is necessary and important, as it allows us to “understand how language is used by those who wish to gain power, those who wish to exercise power and those who wish to keep power” (p. 2).
2.5 Presidential speech and communication
Presidential speeches are a key instrument at a president disposal to influence the national and the international public. Presidents have become extremely active players ‘in the game of public opinion’ (Hart, 1987). Consequently, their public statements are constructed strategically so that support for their policies
22 by the public is attained. Presidential public activities, in particular their national and international addresses, have become an increasingly important part of modern-day governing. Speeches are a Presidents’ greatest and most influential weapon they have at their disposal. As Ragsdale (1997) states: “the key resource for presidents in their attempt to influence the public, other politicians, and the media... [is] through their major national addresses” (p. 176). Schaefer (1997), elaborates on this further by saying that “modern presidents (...) now regularly use the power of the pulpit as an important political and governing instrument (p. 97)... to mobilize and captivate the populace” (p. 98). Every speech performed by the president will be strategically well constructed in order to disseminate the message that will assist in the realization of the envisioned goal. And because of that “presidential speech is speech for the record, speech that cannot fade, speech whose echo will never cease…” (Hart, 1987, p. 6).
Presidential communication, as explained by Smith (1994), consists of a specific set of functions. Firstly, it has the function to unify a certain group or society by creating a “sense of inclusion and efficacy among its varied people, interests, values, and traditions” (p. 18). By blending a variety of symbols, myths, values in a speech, a sense of recognition and identification is evoked. Second, it serves to legitimize by justifying the distribution of power. According to Smith (1994), “power holders and aspirants to political power alike ground their claims in a socially accepted doctrine of legitimation that is created, learned, and applied through communication” (p. 18). Third, presidential communication serves to orient, which involves the practice to define objectives and problems in coherent discourses which respond to “interests, values, traditions, power distributions, and sphere of influence” (p. 18).
For language to be successful in fulfilling all the functions above, one must target a specific audience which interests or values within the text would likely have an effect upon. Or differently put, those audiences that would likely share the same values and interest and provide their support. Discourse analysts like Van Dijk (2003a, 2006) and De Wet (2009), recognize the function politically structured discourses serve as instruments of mind control. Mind control is exercised through the use of ideology, enforced with memory and mental models in order to control how an audience perceive and comprehend these discursive practices. If the speaker has the desire to stimulate movement that supports his political goal, he should communicate in such a way that constitutes a sense of community or unity among the target potential members. A sense of unity can be constituted when community members share common values, common interests and struggle with common problems. Responding to such needs and presenting them collective
23 reinforces cohesion and constitutes collective movement. A key element in such rhetorical strategies is the construction of a collective identity (Wendt, 1994). Wendt (1994) was the first recognizing the importance of collective identity in international politics. In his view, collective identity distinguishes collective groups in the international system and sees a country as a collective actor. Social discourse create these identities and new alliances are formed. Either by their own will or by third parties that assign an identity to a certain group, which in turn causes the countries to identify with each other in terms of their common position. This approach provides some insight as to why a state would prefer to put more effort in strengthening ties with one country or region over the other. China, for example, has shown a great increase of interest in developing countries such as countries in Africa, South-America and the Middle East in particular (People’s Daily Online, 2013). As
2.6 Hegemony
The term ‘hegemony’ is derived from the Greek word ἡγεμονία or hēgemonía (literally meaning leadership or rule), which is understood as “the pre-eminence or supremacy that a state, a social group, or even an individual may exercise over others” (Fontana, 2006, p. 24). The ancient Greeks had a slightly different perception concerning the concept of hegemony. Hegemony, in their view, involves reciprocal consent between the dominant and the subordinates. A well-known illustration of this, is the Peloponnesian War between the Peloponnesian League led by Sparta and the Delian League guided by the hegemonic Athens. Hegemony then, as Aristotle contended, was a means to prevent slavery and benefit the ruled and was a position that was achieved through consent of free citizens. Late nineteenth, beginning twentieth century the meaning of the concept changed. For Russian Social-Democracy movements it gained a meaning of domination in teaching Marxism (i.e., the domination of relations between social classes) (Williams, 1977). Thus, in the Marxist philosophy, hegemony was described as the domination of a culturally diverse society by the ruling class, who manipulates the culture of the society — the beliefs, explanations, perceptions, values, and mores — so that their ruling-class worldview becomes the worldview that is imposed and accepted as the cultural norm; as the universally valid dominant ideology that justifies the social, political, and economic status quo as natural, inevitable, perpetual and beneficial for everyone, rather than as an artificial social construction that only benefits the ruling class (Bullock, Stallybrass, &
24 Trombley, 1999, pp. 387–388). In addition, hegemony was not only for the higher classes, but could also be gained by the working classes through revolution and resistance (Carroll & Ratner, 1994).
A prominent Marxist thinker of the twentieth century, Antonio Gramsci, introduced a redefinition of the meaning of hegemony. Gramsci’s notion of hegemony is widely recognized of its significance and contribution to fields of philosophy, political science, sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies. His contribution to the studies of politics and discourse is briefly summarized by Carroll and Ratner (2010): “Gramsci’s great achievement was to bring to Marxism a language of politics that recognizes that the state is more than an apparatus of coercion, that the classes that compose historic blocs are not determined solely by the relations of production, and that popular forces and currents are often decisive in giving shape and form to the moralities by which we live… [By] [r]ejecting the economistic orthodoxies of his time, Gramsci’s open Marxism was a ‘philosophy of praxis’, an affirmation that the social world is constituted by human practice” (p. 7).
Central to Gramsci’s (1971) work is his concept of cultural hegemony, which explains the relations between culture and power under capitalism. Although his translated work shows some ambiguities about exact definitions, the commonly held definition describes Gramsci’s (1971) hegemony as, “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the great masses of the population to general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the world of production” (Gramsci, 1977; as cited in Lears, 1985, p. 568). According to Gramsci (1971), the dominant group imposes a direction of social life on the subordinates, which are thus manipulated and persuaded to accord with the dominant discourse. Gramsci (1971) argued that the dominant classes within society use discursive processes within the superstructure to manufacture popular consent for the unequal distribution of power and wealth, and used the term hegemony to describe this discursive construction of consciousness and identity (Lears, 1985).
The concept of hegemony implies that the superstructure is more than a simple reflection of material reality in that it may contribute to the creation of social reality itself, even if ultimately the base is the determinant of people’s interests and class. The persistence of hegemonic power relies on the dominant group “giving their domination an aura of moral authority through the creation and perpetuation of legitimating symbols, [and by seeking] to win the consent of subordinate groups to the existing social
25 order” (Lears, 1985, p. 569). Although realists equate power of the hegemony mere with its material capabilities, this alternative formulation of hegemony shows that hegemonies have the power to influence, that is the “power to shape the rules of international politics according to its own interests” (Mastanduno, 2005, p. 179). Thus, hegemony is not only gained with the use of coercion, it is with the consent of dominated that such position is maintained. Elaborating on Gramsci’s hegemony, Williams (1977) explains: “Hegemony is then not only the articulate upper level of ‘ideology’, nor are its forms of control only those ordinarily seen as ‘manipulation’ or ‘indoctrination’… It is a lived system of meanings and values – constitutive and constituting – which as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in the society, a sense of absolute because experienced reality beyond which it is very difficult for most members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives” (p. 110). Not only economic, also cultural and ideological factors are of importance for the hegemony to become powerful. According to Gramsci, a class cannot dominate in modern conditions by only advancing its own economic interests. Nor can it dominate only by the use of force and coercion. Hence, Gramsci’s central argument of that it is essential to the attainment of power that cultural or ideological hegemony is achieved first. As Lears (1985) explains following Gramsci: “[T]o achieve cultural hegemony, the leaders of a historical bloc [(i.e., the union of social forces guided by a spontaneous philosophy or ideology)] must develop a world view that appeals to a wide range of other groups within the society, and they must be able to claim with at least some plausibility that their particular interests are those of society at large” (p. 517).
Hegemony, then, is described as the discursive construction of consciousness and identity. This implies that the superstructure is more than a simple reflection of material reality in that it contributes to the creation of social reality itself, even if ultimately the base is the determinant of people’s interests and class. Through the use of discursive processes within the political and ideological superstructure, the dominant achieves popular consent for the unequal distribution of power and wealth on the (economic) base level (Rear, z.d.). This process, where hegemony becomes ideologically accepted as ‘common sense’ or ‘good sense’, serves in turn the legitimacy and justification for that hegemony. It is because of this process the dominant groups, or the dominant hegemony maintains the control. Emerging hegemony, can be fashioned by anyone or group. However, its hegemonic potential depends on how well it succeeds in forming alliances with other groups (or classes), and whether its world view appeals to a wide public (Lears, 1985).
26 Furthermore, as Van Dijk (1998) adds to this: “Ideological dominance and hegemony is ‘perfect’ when dominated groups are unable to distinguish between their own interests and attitudes and those of dominant group. In that case, they may not even be able to see conflicting ideologies (even when in their own interest) as viable or acceptable alternatives” (p. 102). However, this blindness for other alternative ideologies can be uplifted when movements of subordinate group ideologies take the form of a historic-bloc that is able to articulate alternative ideologies and can function as a balance against the hegemony.
2.7 Counter hegemony
Gramsci is known for his notion that counter-hegemonies may develop and emerge from rest of the world, that is civil society. Consequently, Gramsci recognizes the complex role of civil society (Lears, 1985). Global civil society has been often seen as the counterforce or reformist force of (neoliberal) globalization, which can spurge an alternative movement as a response to, for example, inequalities inherent to the international system (Katz, 2006; Taylor, 2004).
According to the Gramscian broader understanding, it is also a space where leadership and movement from the bottom up can emerge “when deprivation is mobilized through consciousness, and a revolution can be attempted” (Katz, 2006, p. 336). In addition, it is a space where subordinate (or subaltern) groups can unite, create a historic bloc and, as Katz (2006) connotes, “engage in a counter-hegemonic war of position to alter society” (Katz, 2006, p. 336; see also Sassoon, 1982). This does not only refers to, for instance, grass roots organizations (e.g., NGO’s), but extends its meaning to any resisting force whether an individual, a group or a state leadership (Katz, 2006). Again, their achievement to become powerful, or overrule an existing hegemony, depends on their “success in forming alliances and disseminating a coherent ideology” (Lears, 1985, p. 571). It depends on the ability to obtain a wide-range consent on general principles that ensures the supremacy of the dominant ruler and dominant classes. Yet at the same time, it has to provide some prospect of satisfaction to the subordinates (Lears, 1985).
In general it can be stated that where hegemony exists, counter-hegemony exists. Separating the two would be difficult. Hegemony necessitates counter-hegemony, Katz (2006) explains following Gramsci’s ideas: “Hegemony and counter-hegemony are best seen as ‘simultaneous double movements’ that reciprocally shape one another[,] hegemony informs counter-hegemony, and counter hegemonic efforts cause hegemonic forces to realign and reorganize themselves” (p. 336). So how does the process of
27 transformation or reconfiguration from dominant ‘hegemony’ to a new one occur? Williams (1977) says: “The key to ‘revolutionary’ social change in modern societies does not therefore depend, as Marx had predicted, on the spontaneous awakening of critical class consciousness but upon the prior formulation of a new alliances of interests, an alternative hegemony or ‘historical bloc’, which has already developed a cohesive world view of its own”(p. 27). Occasionally there may develop “an organic crisis in which the domineering group starts to disintegrate, creating the opportunity for a subordinate class to transcend its limitations and build up a broad movement capable of challenging the existing order and achieving hegemony… But, if the opportunity is not taken, the balance of forces will shift back to the dominant class, which re-establishes its hegemony on the basis of a new pattern of alliances” (Stillo, 2002, p. 3). Therefore, a the group of resistance must already attained a ‘directing’ position afore its conquest of resistance for power, and maintain directive in order to secure its (new) dominant position (Merrington, 1968).
2.8 Legitimation and delegitimation
Legitimation can be characterized as a process operating simultaneously at two levels. At the ‘micro level’ it is understood as “a complex social act that is typically exercised by talk and text” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 260). At the ‘macro level’ legitimation is “a complex, ongoing discursive practice involving a set of interrelated discourses” (Van Dijk, 1998, p. 255). This definition reflects that legitimation is not only a key representative component of a more larger discourse, it also shows that it is a crucial component of the complex power relations in society. Hence, besides that it is a discursive (linguistic) act, legitimation is moreover a social and political act (Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997).
The study of legitimation, as a social and discursive practice, stands central to the tradition of critical discourse analysis. Scholars of critical discourse analysis have made significant developments in the linguistic analysis of micro-level discursive strategies used to legitimate controversial actions (Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997; Theo Van Leeuwen & Wodak, 1999). Critical discourse analysis examines the interplay of discourses, and the way language is used, ideologies of societal elites are deconstructed, and how relations of dominance by elite groups and institutions are “enacted, legitimated or otherwise reproduced by text and talk” (Van Dijk, 1993, p. 249).
From this discourse analytic perspective, legitimation provides us with insights into how particular discourse strategies function as legitimation strategies. Studies relating to legitimation strategies have
28 predominantly focused on the domain of political discourse, and how (controversial) political goals are legitimized (or justified) (Van Dijk, 1998). In politics, “legitimation plays a necessary role in the exercise of material and political power” (Swartz, 2012, p. 93), and in the maintenance of hierarchies of social inequality (Van Dijk, 1998). In politics, more than in any other domain, the strategic use of language is crucial in the achievement of legitimacy for one’s political ends, political decisions and proposals (Van Dijk, 2006).
Scholars of critical discourse analysis have worked on this specific ‘grammer of legitimation’, as Van Leeuwen (1995) describes it. He argues that “comparisons in discourse almost always have a legitimating or delegitimating function” (Theodoor Van Leeuwen, 2008, p. 111). In this sense, “legitimation implies the creation of a sense of positive, beneficial, ethical, understandable, necessary, or otherwise acceptable action in a specific setting… and delegitimation means establishing a sense of negative, morally reprehensible or otherwise unacceptable action or overall state of affairs” (p. 6).
Thus, political practice, and legitimation in politics specifically, cannot be seen separate from its linguistic, discursive, and interactional character (Rojo & Van Dijk, 1997). Critical discourse analysis oriented work on legitimation explains this crucial role of discursive practices and strategies in legitimation. In addition, critical discourse oriented analysis considers the connection between legitimation strategies and (political) ideologies. As Reyes (2011) puts it, legitimation involves “the discursive strategies social actors employ in discourse to legitimize their ideological positioning and actions” (p. 788). It furthermore, as Van Dijk (1998) points out, draws on and reproduces broader level discourses and ideologies. Vaara (2014) illustrates this by saying: “For example, pro-globalization discourses tend to reproduce neo-liberal (…) or global capitalist ideologies. From a discursive perspective, ‘nationalism’ in turn is a set of discourses based on nationalist ideology… It is closely linked with national identity building and is therefore an ever-present discourse, especially in cross-national setting... However, it may actually be the interdiscursive combinations of these discourses and ideologies that are most interesting in terms of understanding the discursive and ideological underpinnings of legitimation in specific settings” (p.6).
29 CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
In order to answer the research question Is China constructing a delegitimation discourse against the United States’ global authority and international order?, a critical discourse analysis will be conducted.
3.1 Critical disourse analysis
Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) regards discourse (language use) as social practice. What differentiates this type of analysis from other sociolinguistic approaches are the general principles of this social research approach. Those engaging in CDA are interested in discovering the connection between ideas, language, power and the ordering of relationship within society (Wodak, 2001; Van Dijk, 2003a, 2006; Wodak & Meyer, 2009b; Fairclough, 2013).
CDA assumes that all discourse are historical, and a comprehensive analysis can only be conducted if one considers the context in which that discourse presented itself. Furthermore, CDA investigates the relationship of texts with other texts, hence its use concepts of intertextuality and interdiscursivity. It can be said, that CDA is the most comprehensive discourse analytical tool in social sciences, because of its consideration and inclusion of all factors that might be of influence on texts (Meyer, 2001).
According to Van Dijk (2004), ”politics is usually discursive as well as ideological… In politics, ideologies specifically play a role to define political systems, organization, movements, political practices and political cognition, all enacted or reproduced by political discourse” (p. 739). Ideologies form the basis of political discourses, and political ideas are often persuasively defended (or legitimized) through ideological differences and are characterized by a polarized structure, “reflecting competing or conflicting group membership and categorization in in-groups and out-groups’’ (p. 734).
Because of the above mentioned reasons, CDA is an appropriate method to identifying underlying ideological strategies aimed to undermine or to delegitimize the US global authority and the international order. Van Dijk (2004) offers a list of the strategies that is useful to answer the research question of this thesis.
