The common agricultural policy : influence of alternative food networks

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Ilona Kemps 6348084 University of Amsterdam Supervisor: dr. L.W. Fransen Second reader: dr. R.J. Pistorius

The Common Agricultural Policy: Influence

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List of Abbreviations

AFNs Alternative Food Networks

ARC Agricultural and Rural Convention CAP Common Agricultural Policy

CFS Conventional Food System EC European Commission

EEB European Environmental Bureau EP European Parliament

EK Expert Knowledge

IDEI Information of Domestic Encompassing Interests IEEI Information on European Encompassing Interests

IFOAM International Federation for Organic Agricultural Movements

NGO Non-Governmental Organisation SFN Slow Food Netherlands

SF IN Slow Food International WWF World Wide Fund for Nature YFM Youth Food Movement

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1. Introduction

Alternative Food Networks (AFNs) are the chains and links between producers of food and consumers. They represent a turn away from industrialist, product oriented and standardised conventional food systems (CFS) towards a system were notions of nature, region and quality are central. It is not hard to notice the growth of these networks when you look around you. Only in Amsterdam there are several box schemes available like the Biobox and Grasgrazers. It seems that the Youth Food Movement is everywhere now and the populairaty of organic food is growing fast. When we looked at the literature we see that a lot is written on how, why and where alternative food

networks (AFNs) emerge (Treager, 2011; Sonnino and Marsden, 2005), the forms AFNs can have (Renting, 2002), the role of re-socialisation and re-localisation of products through AFNs and on the role of space in the development of AFNs (O’Neill, 2014). Less is written on how AFNs might influence politics and especially the effect AFNs can have on intergovernmental decision-making like the CAP reforms of 2013. Therefore the main question of this research will be: how do Alternative

Food Networks (AFNs) influence inter-governmental agricultural decision-making?

To be able to answer the main question the following sub-questions have been used:

1. How do AFNs organise themselves in order to influence political decision-making? 2. What political strategies (activities, resources and access) do IFOAM EU and ARC2020

develop?

3. How are these strategies used in the process of the CAP-reforms of 2013? 4. What is their goal achievement in the process?

5. What is their goal achievement in the outcome?

The focus of the first question lies on the organisational form of AFNs. It is important to look at how they organise themselves since this influences the strategies chosen. It is the first step towards a process of influencing political decision-making. The second and third question are about the resources, activities and access of Bionext and Slow Food Netherlands and focus on how they were used in the process of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms of 2013. Both questions cover the first dimension of influence, the intentional transmitting of information (Betsill and Corell, 2001). The last questions is about the goals of the organisations, and how they were achieved during the process and in the outcome. Hence, this question deals with the second dimension of influence, alterations in behaviour in response to that information (Betsill and Corell, 2001).

The next chapter describes the theoretical framework used in this research, it will discuss the used concepts and relevant theories. After that a chapter on the methods used for gathering emperical data will follow. Chapter four will discuss the background of the CAP. Following this the results will

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be presented. In the final chapters of this research a conclusion is drawn and limits of the research and predicitions of the future are discussed.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 Concepts

Considering that the main focus of this research lies on Alternative Food Networks (AFNs) and their influence, it is important to understand what is the meaning of these concepts within this thesis before useful theories will be discussed later in this section. Below I will explain the concepts Alternative Food Networks (AFN) and influence (and power). After revealing the meaning of the two concepts, the next section of this chapter will explore the relevant theories related to the lobby process in the European Union and NGO strategies to influence the decision making process.

2.1.1 Alternative Food Networks (AFNs)

The emergence of AFNs is commonly conceptualised in the literature as a ‘quality turn’ by both consumers and producers (Sonnino and Marsden, 2005, p. 183). It is a turn away from industrialist, product oriented and standardised conventional food systems (CFS) towards a system were notions of nature, region and quality are central. One of the key characteristics of these AFNs is: ‘their capacity

to re-socialise or re-spatialise food, which comes to be defined by its locale. By drawing upon an image of the farm or the region as a source of ‘quality’, alternative food networks ‘re-localise’ food – in other words, they link it more directly with local farming practices, rural nature, landscapes and resource (Ibid)’. AFNs seek to develop more direct relations between consumers and producers, this

as opposed to the more distant and highly commercialised relations between consumers and producers in the CFS. The re-localisation of alternative food networks offers a closer connection with the production and thereby the quality of products. It restores public confidence and trust in food

production and provisioning by providing consumers with information on all attributes of the product (Higgins et.al., 2008, p. 17) According to Higgins et.al (2008, p. 17) these networks operate through local and regional frameworks of associations and consist of notions of trust which are not based on economic dimensions. This is opposed to the more bureaucratic and formalised relations of governing found in the conventional food system. Thus, AFNs re-socialise food through the re-location of production and relationships between consumers and producers. This reconnection re-socialises and re-spatialises confidence and trust in the food system and develops new relationships between associations and institutions.

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There are many forms these networks can take. In order to describe the variety of producer-consumer relations within AFNs1_{Renting (2002) identifies two interrelated dimensions (p. 399). The} first dimension is concerned with the organisational structure and the mechanisms AFNs entail to extend relations in time and space. The second is concerned with definitions and conventions of quality.

The first dimension can be spilt into three categories. The first category of AFNs is based on face-to-face interaction. Here consumers buy products directly from the producers. Through personal contact authenticity and trust are mediated. Examples of AFNs within this category are: farmer marktes, road sales and farm shops. Through the internet new ‘face-to-face’ networks emerge such as box schemes and mail orders (Renting, 2002, p. 399).

The second category of AFNs goes beyond face-to-face interaction and is based on what Renting (2002) calls relations of proximity. In order to extend AFNs over longer distances more complex institutional arrangements need to be created. Here it is most common that producers cooperate for example through the combination of products under a regional hallmark. Mostly, these networks are based on spatial proximity, meaning that products are sold within the region of

production and consumers are made aware of the locality. However, networks can also be based on cultural proximity, such as the sale of regional specialties to emigrants. Here you can think of local shops and restaurants for regional products (Renting, 2002, p. 400).

The third category includes AFNs with extended relations over time and space. Here networks sell their products to consumers outside the region of production, sometimes products are sold all over the world, like fair trade or organic products. According to Renting (2002) for these networks it is not the distance which these products travel that is important ‘but the fact that it is embedded with

value-laden information when it reaches the consumer, for example, printed on packaging or communicated at the point of retail. This enables the consumer to make connections with the place/space of

production and, potentially, with the values of the people involved and production methods employed’

(p. 400). When this information is successfully translated and if the information is given value by consumers, it allows producers to demand premium prices for their products. In order to do so, most extended AFNs work with the creation of formalised codes such as labels that specify rules for processing, productions and rules for all other stages in the agro-food chain (Renting, 2002, p. 401).

The second dimension is concerned with definitions and conventions of quality. Quality does not refer exclusively to the attribute of the food itself, but also to the ways these attributes are achieved (Sonnino and Marsden, 2005, p. 184). According to Renting (2002) AFNs operate ‘on the principle

that the more embedded and differentiated a product becomes, the scarcer it becomes in the market. Product differentiation implies the construction of transparent market relations around specific sets of

1_{Renting (2002:399) uses the concept Short Food Supply Chains (SFSC), however there are many names these networks can}

have. In this research Alternative Food Networks is used because it covers all sorts of networks alternative to conventional food systems.

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quality that are shared by all parties involved, and are sufficiently communicated to consumers to convince them of paying premium prices’(p. 401).

Renting (2002, p. 401) identifies two main categories of quality definitions. The first category links the quality of the product to the place of the producer or production. Critical parameters to define the quality of the product are specific characteristics of the place of production. These could be cultural traditions and natural conditions or the production process: farm based, artisanal or traditional production processes. In many cases it is claimed that these specific characteristics result in how products look or their (typical) taste. The second category links the production and consumption of food with bioprocesses. In response to public concerns on conventional agriculture, these products are distinguished by environmentally sound production methods such as integrated and organic

production.

Thus, there are many forms AFNs can have, from farmer markets to extended AFNs with labels. And there are many ways in which the quality of the products can be expressed. This can be done through links with the characteristics of the place of production or through links with

bioprocesses like organic farming.

Moreover, according to Scrinis (2007) AFNs can be divided into two forms of political strategies that sometimes overlap: oppositional and constructive strategies (p. 123). Oppositional political activities are primarily civil society movements and campaigns aimed to oppose or challenge existing practices, structures and institutions in order to reform or transform aspects of the CFS. Examples include: trade reform movements, World Trade Organisation (WTO) movements, anti-Genetically Modified Organisms OGM and pesticides movements, farmers’ unions and peasant movements (Scrinis, 2007, p. 123). These movements are associated with promoting development strategies with political frameworks using concepts like ‘food security’, ‘food sovereignty’ and ‘food justice’. In contrast to oppositional political activities constructive activities are more focused on directly supporting and implementing alternatives to CFS practices. Examples include: faire trade schemes, organic and sustainable farming movements, the Slow Food Movement (SFM), Community Supported Agriculture schemes (CSA) and box delivery schemes. Important to note is that

oppositional and constructive approaches might intertwine because oppositional approaches open up spaces for alternative practices and institutions to flourish or to be maintained (Scrinis, 2007, p. 124).

In the rest of this thesis I will use the term non-governmental organisation (NGOs) as an umbrella term, also for the AFNs under research. I know and accept that there are different forms and names these organisations can have. Some of them represent business interests, others advocacy networks focussing on the environment. I use the term NGOs for all of them as long as they are not governmental institutions.

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2.1.2 Influence

Even though influence is a common term in political science, it is difficult to define. Historically power and influence are defined in terms of states. State A has power if it can make state B do something it would otherwise not do. However, studies show that non-state actors can also influence political outcomes (Keck and Sikkink, 2007; Lowery, 2007; Pappi and Henning, 1999). NGOs are capable of influencing political outcomes. When they are experts in their work field, they can use their knowledge and information to modify the actions of decision-makers by altering their formations of interests (Bestill and Corell, 2001, p. 74). Knowledge and expertise are valuable because international agricultural issues are complex and decision-makers ask NGOs for information on the nature of problems, policy implications and alternatives policies. The knowledge and expertise of NGOs makes them legitimate, it gives them access to important negotiations and it can be used as a resource (when used for leverage).

Information is the most important currency NGOs possess to influence political outcomes. Therefore, in this thesis and in line with Bestill and Corell (2001, p. 74) it can be said that: ‘influence

have occurred when one actor intentionally transmits information to another that alters the latter’s actions from what would have occurred without that information’. This definition helps identify the

different types of evidence, that indicate NGOs influence in the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reforms. In order to say something meaningful about the influence of NGOs on political decision-making it is important to define NGO influence and differentiate influence and power. In this research influence has two dimensions: ‘1) the intentional transmitting of information by NGOs and 2)

alterations in behaviour in response to that information (Bestill and Corell, 2001, p. 72)’.

The concept of power is closely related to influence, but it must be noted that it is distinct from influence. ‘Power means capability; it is the aggregate of political resources that are available to an

actor (…) power may be converted into influence, but it is not necessarily so converted at all or to its full extent (Arts and Verschuren, 1999, p. 414)’. Power can be seen as the general ability to influence.

It is the ability of an actor to achieve or prevent outcomes against the will of others.

According to Arts (2003) we can separate three faces of power: 1) decisional power, which is related to policy-making and political influence; 2) discursive power, related to the framing of discourses; and 3) regulatory power, which is related to institution building and rule-making.

‘Together, they constitute of power of agents, i.e. the capacity to achieve outcomes in social interactions, embedded in institutional and ideological contexts’ (p. 16).

In this research only the first two faces of power will be used. It should be noted however that NGOs can have regulatory power. NGOs can set up expertise based voluntary standards for labour, processing and production methods, organic farming etc. It could be true that when an NGO has the role of standard setting, this NGO already gained trust and confidence of politicians and therefore has more power to influence than other NGOs. In the next paragraph, the first two faces of power are described.

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In most studies on the influence of NGOs on political decision-making, researchers rely on: evidence regarding NGO activities (such as lobby methods or the provisioning of information or draft decisions to negotiators in special positions), their access to negotiators (access to negotiations or participation) and their resources (such as knowledge, financial resources and number of supporters) (Bestill and Corell, 2001, p. 69). However, these types of evidence only tell us how NGOs behave in intergovernmental negotiations, not what the effects of their behaviour are.

It is clear that NGOs need activities to let their opinion be heard but activity, access and resources don’t automatically translate into influence. It is possible that NGOs are really active during the process of negotiations, that they have access to important negotiations and/or that they have enough financial assets to put lobbyist on the issue but that the negotiators do not change their behaviour in response to these activities (Bestill and Corell, 2001, p. 69).

In order to get a more accurate indication of NGOs influence we must also consider whether or not the NGOs were successful in shaping the process of negotiations. Political influence is not just the modification in decision-making, it includes something that is of value to the actors involved such as: ethical rules, the achievement of material or immaterial goals, a service, or a solution to a problem. These possibilities are called goals and goal achievements. These can be either negative or positive.

Positive goal achievement means that the actor, whose influence we want to measure, achieves

something, either by reaching his own goal or a goal opposite to what the competitors want. Negative goal achievement means that the actor, whose influence we want to measure, prevents something that is opposite to the actor’s goal or that is in line with the competitor’s goal (Arts and Verschuren, 1999, p. 413).

To get a more accurate picture of the influence of NGOs we must not only focus on the activities, resources and access of NGOs but also compare NGO goal achievements (Bestill and Corell, 2001, p. 69). Important to note here is that goals can focus on the outcome of the negotiation process, such as the implementation of a text in the treaty, or the process of the negotiations, such as getting issues on the agenda. Therefor we must look at both.

In the context of the first face of power, decisional power, the outcomes NGOs strive for are decisions echoing their preferences as much as possible and decisions that have political relevance. When this is achieved we can speak of political influence that is defined as ‘preference-realisation in

political decision-making due to one’s own intervention(s) in the political process (Arts, 2003, p.17)’.

Important to note is that decisional power and political influence are related but not synonyms. Decisional power means the capacity to achieve an outcome. Political influence means the actual achievement of the outcome. In order to have any effect, NGOs must intervene, directly or indirectly, in the policy process. NGOs can have different strategies, namely: direct lobbying, grassroots

lobbying, advocacy, participation, protest and monitoring. These strategies are analytically separated, but in fact can be used simultaneously by different NGOs. This will be discussed later in this section.

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The second face of power, discursive power, means that NGOs have the capacity to (re)frame discourses. Here a discourse refers to ‘a more or less coherent set of values, norms, ideas, concepts,

buzzwords, testimonies, etc., produced, reproduced or transformed by a group of societal actors, to give meaning to a certain practice (Hajer, 1995 in Arts, 2002, p. 22)’. The argument is, that NGOs

co-determine the behaviour of actors by shaping and framing political relevant values, norms, theories and stories. In line with the definitions it means that when NGOs frame a political discourse, like sustainable development, they formulate new values, ideas and concepts or re-interpret old ones. They do this to position themselves in relation to others and to give meaning to the world around them. Discursive practices like interpreting and defining are inherent to all policy phases. Discourse is instrumental to that (Arts, 2002, p. 24). Framing a discourse is different from striving to influence policy decision-making, which is mostly straightforward, intentional and rational. Discourses develop over time, they develop collectively unintended and sometimes intended. They exist because we need them to make sense of the world around us, to know what is ‘good’ and what is ‘bad’. Discourses are used to persuade others and convince them of the appropriateness of their world-views. Having said that, according to Arts (2003, p. 25) a political strategy related to discursive power follows three elements: naming, which refers to defining properties, events and processes; framing, meaning the process of forming a coherent story by linking the important elements of a discourse; and

campaigning, meaning the process in which the stories are being spread to society and the political arena to challenge and change existing dominant discourses (Arts, 2002 p. 25). The strategy of naming, framing and campaigning is less focused and targeted then decisional strategies like direct lobbying and advocacy, which aim at specific policy outcomes. As a result the effects are diffuse and hard to predict. However, this strategy may be able to change values and norms over time and can therefore contribute to a more wide and deep change. Lobbying, advocacy and monitoring do not have this far-reaching aim since they are concerned with strategies aimed at short-term policy achievements (Arts, 2002, p. 25).

There are three key factors determining the succes of discursive power strategies: moral authority, access to mass media and the legitimacy of the discourse that is challenged. Moral authority is related to the informal or formally granted legitimate right of an actor to speak about topics in public. Its moral authority is related to given integrity, reliability and knowledge of the actor on the topics. The more moral authority an actor has, the more persuasive it can be. The second factor is acces to mass media, which is important when organisations want to mobilise support and convince large parts of society (Arts, 2002, p. 25). The third factor is the legitimacy of the current dominant discourse that is challenged. If the dominant discourse is still seen as legitimate by the majority of a society, changing this discourse will be hard. However, when more people are starting to question the dominant discourse it is possible that challenging discourses will become dominant. An example is the discourse on agriculture. Due to a number of crisis (Mouth and Foot Disease, BSE, pollution etc) more people are questioning the legitimacy of the dominant discourse of modern agriculture with its

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emphasis on growth, efficiency, large farms etc. As a result more alternative discourse on organic farming, sustainable agriculture and eco-ecology are gaining more prominence (Arts, 2002, p. 25).

In short, the definition of NGO influence, suggested in this research consists of two

dimensions 1) the intentional transmission of information and 2) the change of actions and behaviour in response to this information. The first dimension can be studied by gathering data on activities, resources and access to negotiations of the NGOs. This data can be used to demonstrate the types of information and whether or not NGOs transmitted this. For the second dimension evidence

concerning goal achievement (outcome and process) is needed. The most direct evidence of NGO influence is whether or not ideas from the submitted information during negotiations are translated into the actual agreement. Besides decisional power, NGOs can have discursive power using the strategy of naming, framing and campaigning. The three factors of determining the success of this strategy are: moral authority, access to mass media and the legitimacy of the challenged discourse.

2.2 Theoretical Discussion

To answer the research question, in this section theories on NGO influence on intergovernmental decision-making will be discussed.

In this research the text of Bouwen (2002) Corporate lobbying in the European Union: the

logic of access is of special importance. In his research Bouwen (2002) investigates the logic of lobby

behaviour of private interests. Through a developed theoretical framework Bouwen (2002) explains how business interests gain acces to the European institutions. The degree of access to these

institutions is explained through the theory of access in which the demand and supply of access goods play a crucial role. He uses the organisational form as a unit of analysis, he studies business action in relation to two other organisational forms: individual company action and third party representation. His insights into the lobby behaviour of companies are important for our analysis since it can be translated into lobby behaviour of NGOs. As said earlier, the first dimension of influence is concerned with the participation of NGOs including their resources, activities and access to institutions. NGOs need access to the important European institutions in order to influence the outcome. How this works is explained below.

2.2.1Theory on Access

To gain influence in the European legislative process, a conditio sine qua non is access to the EU institutions. Access is therefore one of the indicators in measuring influence. In order to understand lobbying activities of interest groups in the European institutions, private and public interactions are conceived as an exchange relationship between two interdependent organisational groups (Bouwen, 2002, p. 386).

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14 Access goods

There is a two-way dependent relationship in the provisioning of information by interest groups on the one side and the demand of information by EU institutions on the other. Interest groups need access to the EU institutions to exert influence and EU institutions need information on policy formation from the work field in order to create well-developed policies. The resources needed for this mutual depend relationship are what Bouwen (2002) calls ‘access goods’ (p. 369). Access goods are defined as: ‘goods provided by private actors to the EU institutions in order to gain access. Each access good

concerns a specific kind of information that is important in EU decision-making process. The criticality of an access good for the functioning of an EU institution determines the degree of access that the institution will grant to the private interest representatives (Bouwen, 2002, p. 370)’.

For interest groups to gain ‘access’ to the EU agenda setting and policy-making process, EU institutions need certain resources (access goods). There are three types of access goods, Expert

Knowledge (EK), Information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) and Information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (IDEI). All three access goods are concerned with

information, which is the most important access good (Bouwen, 2002, p. 369).

The first access good, Expert Knowledge (EK), concerns the expertise and the know-how of the policy fields by the private sector. In order for the EU to develop effective policies it is dependent on this kind of information (Bouwen, 2002, p. 369). An example is the technical advice and expertise of agricultural/environmental interest groups to help EU officials to understand the implications of certain policies.

The second access good concerns the information about the European Encompassing Interest (IEEI) by the private sector. In this research IEEI consists of the interest and needs of the organic sector and social food movements within the European agriculture. An example is the information provided by the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements IFOAM and ARC2020 on the needs and interests of its members with regard to new policies on agriculture (Bouwen, 2002, p. 369).

The third access good (IDEI) concerns information about the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI) by the private sector. In this research DEI consists of the needs and interests of the organic sector and social food movements in the domestic market (Bouwen, 3003, p. 369).

Access goods play an important role in the European decision-making process. It gives the EU democratic legitimacy whereas expert knowledge leads to more efficient policies. Furthermore, when policies are framed with the inclusion of encompassing interests, compliance with policies is more likely (Bouwen, 2002, p. 371).

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The three access goods (EK, IEEI, IDEI) have an important role in the exchange between private actors and the EU institutions. It is possible to make a scheme of the supply-and- demand of access goods (see figure 1).

The private actors are responsible for the supply of access goods and only gain access to the European institutions when there is a demand for that. In order to analyse the access private actors have to European institutions it is necessary to explain the figure. I’ll start with the supply chain of access goods and later discuss the demand side.

Supply of access goods

The organisational form of lobby activities of the interest group determines the supply of access goods. If an interest group wants their interests to be represented they need to choose whether or not to create a specific branch within the group to represent their interest or to buy them through a third party. Another choice is whether or not to take individual political action or become member of an association i.e. collective action. Finally, interest groups need to decide whether or not they want their interests to be represented at the European level or national level. Thus, the organisational forms are: individual actions, national associations and European associations (Bouwen, 2002, p. 370).

The size, strategy and the domestic institutional environment of the interest groups determine the organisational form of lobby activities. The size of the interest group is an important variable regarding lobby activity. Large interest groups are more likely to use more resources for undertaking political actions then smaller groups. They have more resources available to them to invest in

individual political actions; they can open a representative office in Brussels and are capable to invest in direct lobbying strategies. This political action takes place at the national and European level. Smaller interest groups are more likely to take part in collective action because it takes fewer

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resources. Hiring a third party is another smart solution to the resources problem. It is less expensive than building a permanent office in Brussels.

The second variable in determining the organisational form is the economic or political strategy of interest groups. For national niche players like the organic sector, the European political level seems less relevant. However, European agricultural legislation has its effects on national markets as well. Therefore, being informed about the developments at the EU level is important. Through membership of their national associations, these niche players become members of their European associations.

The third variable is the domestic institutional environment of the interest groups. A positive domestic attitude towards lobbying makes it more likely for interest groups to lobby at the European level (Bouwen, 2002, p. 375).

Demand of access goods

In order to describe the demand of access goods by the European institutions it is important to note that each institution has different demands. The demands are determined by the formal power of the institutions and the phase within the policy process (Bouwen, 2002). In the process of the CAP

reforms of 2013 three European institutions where of importance: the European Commission (EC), the European Parliament (EP) and the European Council.

The European Commission (EC)

Within the European decision-making process the Commission is seen as the most supranational institution. The EC role is that of initiator of new policies and the Commission needs to draft proposals. In order to present first drafts the Commission needs expert knowledge from external resources since it doesn’t have the capacity to go in to detail with every new policy. Besides expert knowledge the EC needs European encompassing interests since it represents the common interest of the EU. It needs to develop policies for the whole EU therefore it needs a solid foundation. Because de EC also plays an important role in trade negotiations with the WTO it needs to know the common European interests. The Commission is divided into several departments and services. The

departments are known as Directorate-Generals (DGs). Each DG is concerned with a particular policy area, industry, agriculture, health etc. Domestic encompassing interests play a small role, since the Commission is there to represents the common European interests and develop policies at the EU level (Bouwen, 2002, p. 379). Thus, the Commission is in the first place interested in EK, after that in IEEI and then IDEI.

The European Parliament (EP)

The task of the Parliament is to make amendments to the policy drafts provided by the Commission and to make decisions. Because the Commission already drafted a technical proposal, the Parliament is

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less interested in expert knowledge. The parliament needs information on the European encompassing interests in order to assess the legislative proposals made by the Commission. Especially the appointed rapporteur needs the information on European actors interests and needs. The other members of the Parliament will be informed about the new policy proposals by a report of the rapporteur. Each political party also appoints a shadow rapporteur who will follow the policy process up close. Besides the IEEI the Parliament is interested in domestic encompassing interests. Members of Parliament are elected in their countries, in order to stay in position they represent their domestic interests as well (Bouwen, 2002, p. 381). Thus, the Parliament is in the first place interested in IEEI, then in IDEI then in EK.

The European Council

The Council is the European supreme decision-maker. It consists of the Head of States and Head of Governments of all EU Member States plus the President of the Commission. Influence of national interest is the most important in the Council whereas the minister of the Council brings national interests into the policy process. Members of the Council are mainly interested in domestic

encompassing interests. Because the Council tries to reach an agreement with domestic and European interests and needs it is also interested in the European encompassing interests. Thus, the Council is in the first place interested in IDEI, then in IEEI then in EK.

In the above it is explained how interest groups gain access with access goods to European

institutions. There is a two-way dependent relationship in the provisioning of information by interest groups on the one side and the demand of information by EU institutions on the other. Interest groups need access to the EU institutions to exert influence and EU institutions need information on policy formation from the field in order to create well-developed policies.

Interest groups like NGOs have the information that plays such a crucial role to influence decision making. However, knowing you’re right doesn’t means things will be done your way. In the next session different strategies that NGO use for lobbying are described. After that something will be said on goal achievement.

2.2.2 NGO strategies

The above makes clear that in order to influence state policy interest groups use the power of information. There are different ways to use this power. As said before in order to have any effect, NGOs must intervene, direct or indirectly, in the policy process. NGOs can have different strategies, namely: lobbying, grassroots lobbying, participation, protest and monitoring. In this research the focus is on strategies concerning lobbying. However, it is true that besides lobbying, NGOs can have a

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strategy to participate in the policy process as valuable stakeholders and even co-decision-makers. This means that NGOs are formally involved in the policy arrangements. And that NGOs use protests and monitoring strategies to get what they want. All these strategies can be used simultaneously, for example an organisation can have the role of ‘watch dog’ and while monitoring the activities of other companies it can activate the ‘public’ to take action. Besides these activities, the same organisation can have lobbyists in Brussels who are involved in the direct lobbying of politicians.

Direct lobbying

In the literature on EU lobbying a distinction is made between two types of lobbying. There are many names this distinction can have (direct/indirect, direct/grassroots). In this research the distinction is called direct and grassroots lobbying.

Direct lobbying is defined as: ‘any attempt to influence legislation through communications

with a member or employee of a legislative body, or with a government official who participates in formulating legislation’ (Internal Revenue Service USA, 2015). Direct lobbying can also include

attempts to influence the general public, but only through a referendum or similar processes. In direct lobbying communication must refer to the specific legislation and reflect a view on that legislation.

Direct contact with relevant decision-makers is seen as one of the most effective methods of lobbying. Important for the interest organisation is to know who to speak to, when and where. Another method is to speak on public hearings, meetings and advisory groups. In order to give relevant

information, interest groups need to present their positions through presentations and position papers and formulate clear arguments with an empirical basis (Mott Foundation, 2015).

Grassroots Lobbying

Grassroots lobbying is defined as ‘any attempt to influence legislation by attempting to affect the

opinion of the public with respect to the legislation and encouraging the audience to take action with respect to the legislation’ (IRS website, 2015). In both cases (direct and grassroots lobbying) all

communication must refer and reflect a view on the discussed legislation. And with grassroots lobbying it must also include a call for action. NGOs can activate third parties or the ‘public’ to take action and put pressure on public institutions to change their policies. They do this through the use of information-tactics or what Arts (2002) calls discursive power strategies aimed at naming, framing and campaigning. There are three key factors determining the success of discursive power strategies: moral authority, access to mass media and the legitimacy of the discourse that is challenged. Through the use of this strategy NGOs try to activate and inform the public on misunderstandings about certain issues. When the public get upset and starts to join demonstrations, protests and campaigns, policy makers will pick this up. When the pressure is big enough they might change their policies. An example of grassroots lobbying is an action alert urging recipients to contact their legislators about a specific legislation. Campaigning, demonstrating and the use of social media are commonly used tools.

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Networks using grassroots lobby techniques are what Keck and Sikkink (1999) call

transnational advocacy networks. ‘A transnational advocacy network includes those actors working

internationally on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse and dense exchanges of information and services’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 89)’. These networks do not only

try to change policy outcomes but also try to transform the terms and nature of the debate. In order to make issues comprehensible to target audiences, to attract attention and action and to fit in with specific political venues, transnational advocacy networks frame their issues. Framing means: the ‘conscious effort by groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves

that legitimate and motivate collective action (McAdam et al. 1996, in Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p.

90)’. Network activists can bring new discourses, ideas and norms into public policy debates and they serve as a source of information and testimonies. Norms describe the collective expectations of proper behaviour for actors with a given identity (Keck and Sikkink, 1999, p. 90).

Groups in a network frequently exchange information, services and ideas and share the same values. There is a dense network of informal and formal connections between these groups. The important characteristic of transnational advocacy networks is: the central role of values and/or principled ideas, the creative use of information tactics, the strong believe that individual actors can make a difference and the employment of non-governmental actors in sophisticated political strategies (Keck and Sikking, 1999, p. 92).

Besides sharing information, groups in networks use categories of frames to organise and generate information. This is used as a base for campaigns. Their most powerful weapon is the ability to generate and organise information quickly and accurately and to deploy it efficiently. According to Keck and Sikking (1999, p. 92) it is central to their identity.

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3. Methodology

As pointed out in the theoretical section, literature exists on how, why and where alternative food networks (AFNs) emerge (Treager, 2011; Sonnino and Marsden, 2005), the forms AFNs can have (Renting, 2002), the role of re-socialisation and re-localisation of products through AFNs and on the role of space in the development of AFNs (O’Neill, 2014). Less is written on how AFNs might influence politics and especially the effect AFNs can have on intergovernmental decision-making like the CAP reforms of 2013. Therefore the following research question will be asked: how do Alternative

Food Networks (AFNs) influence inter-governmental agricultural decision-making? This research is

based on an abductive research approach. This means that theory is highlighted in relation to the empirics. Here we go back and forth between theory and empirics and back and forth again in order to get theory and empirics in line with each other.

As the focus of this research is on the influence of AFNs on inter-governmental agricultural decision-making, the units of analysis are AFNs in the Netherlands. In order to analyse how AFNs influence inter-governmental decision-making and to get an accurate picture of how this influence works the cases chosen in this research are IFOAM and ARC2020/Slow Food International (SF IN) the two european umbrella organisations of two Dutch AFNs: Bionext and Slow Food Netherlands (SFN)2_{. We focus on these cases because it provides us a complete picture of the cycle of influence.} The observations are the activities, access and resources of Bionext and SFN and their goal

achievement. In order to analyse the process of influence of AFNs within the CAP reforms of 2013,

analysing policy documents, official reports and conducting interviews is the best way to answer the research question.

The specific case of intergovernmental decision-making in this research is the CAP reforms of 2013, which is chosen for several reasons. The CAP is one of the oldest and strongest policies of the European Union. It is also one of the most criticised policies because of its social and environmental impacts that affect the EU and beyond such as environmental destruction, social inequity and loss of farmer power in the food chain. These impacts have led many to question the sustainability of the CAP. In a response to the critics, the EU began a process to green the CAP. In 2013, the CAP underwent a series of major reforms. The reforms influence the way our food is produced, how the European landscape is shaped and the way our food is distributed on a global scale. They determine the future of our food.

The main sources of information are the activities of AFNs within the process of the CAP reforms in 2013. Three data sources are used to gather information, namely primary documents (draft decision, statements, NGO lobby material, the final agreement, secondary documents (media reports and press) and interviews with representatives from these networks. We conducted the analysis by a combination of process-tracing and counterfactual analysis (Betsill and Corell, 2001). Process tracing

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helps to build a logical chain of evidence, linking the (whether or not) transmitting of information and the effect (whether or not) of the information. For this research, it means that we need evidence of what IFOAM and ARC2020 were doing (their activities and resources), how they tried to transmit knowledge and information (access) and whether or not the responses of negotiators were consistent with the position of IFOAM and ARC2020 (goal achievement) (Betsill and Corell, 2001, p. 77). The first step is to demonstrate that IFOAM and ARC2020 engaged in the intentional transmitting of information. What proposals, letters, research were done etc. The second step is to verify that there was communication between IFOAM/ or ARC2020 and the actual delegates. Influence is not possible without communication, if the important people within the commission/parliament had no knowledge of the whereabouts of IFOAM or ARC2020 then no influence could have occurred. The third step is to demonstrate that there were changes (or not) in the behaviour of the actors in line with the transmitted information (both during the process and the outcome of the agreement).

In addition, it is also important to consider what would have happened if IFOAM and

ARC2020 were absent in the process of the CAP reforms of 2013, to rule out other explanations. This method is called counterfactual analysis. It is an imaginative construct on what might have happened if certain variables were left out of the logical chain of evidence. It is a good way of ruling out alternative explanations. It gives room to think about alternative explanations. If IFOAM and

ARC2020 did not lobby for certain agreements, would the outcome or the process of the CAP differ? What would the negotiations look like if they did not enter the debate? If it wouldn’t differ then it is likely that they did not have influence. You can do these thought experiments yourself but it is also helpful to ask the interviewees.

In order to assess the influence of IFOAM and ARC2020 on the CAP reforms we use a set of indicators developed by Betsill and Corell (2001a, p. 90). These indicators relate to the types of evidence of influence regarding NGO participation (activities, access and resources) and NGO goal-attainment (both negotiation outcome and process) as described earlier.

If IFOAM and ARC2020 were to influence the reforms of the CAP we would expect to observe IFOAM and ARC2020: (1) to be present at conferences and negotiations; (2) to provide written information on their position (such as positions papers, research reports, newsletters) to the relevant government institutions or the relevant negotiation sessions; (3) to provide verbal information on their position (through meetings, seminars or statements); and (4) to provide advice through direct contact with relevant government delegations. These first four indicators are related to the aspects of NGO participation ‘which is necessary but not sufficient evidence of NGO influence. NGOs cannot be

said to have influenced a negotiation without having fulfilled at least some of the first four indicators (Betsill and Corell, 2001a, p. 90)’.

What we further expect to find is that IFOAM and ARC2020 would have had: (5) the opportunity to put issues on the negotiating agenda and (6) the ability to ensure that specific texts supporting their positions are incorporated in the final agreement. These indicators relate to the effects

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of NGO participation and are ‘ultimately the most significant factors in judging levels of NGO influence in any particular case (Betsill and Corell, 2001a, p. 90)’.

These indicators, standing on their own, cannot point to specific levels of influence. However, when aggregated, these indicators indicate low, moderate or high levels of NGO influence. When IFOAM and ARC2020 had low influence this means that they participated in negotiations but that it had no effect. Moderate influence means that they participated in the negotiations and that they had some success in shaping the negotiating process. The distinction between moderate and high levels of the influence of NGOs relates to the effects on the outcome of the negotiations. When IFOAM and ARC2020 participation can be linked to specific effects in the final agreement it can be said that they exerted a high level of influence. Important to note is that the analysis in this research doesn’t say anything on the relative influence of IFOAM and ARC2020 compared to other groups. Thus, in line with Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 80) we argue that influence is complex and highly intangible and a precise quantification of it is futile and can lead to a false impression of measurability. Instead in this research it is preferred to assess influence in a qualitative matter in terms of high or low levels of influence that are based on the types of evidence used to indicate influence.

In order to get an accurate assessment on the influence of NGOs it is important to use

triangulation. Here this means that different data sources are used to collect data on activity, resources, access and goal achievement. Instead of ‘measuring’ influence, we are looking to make some

qualitative assessments of influence in terms of high to low influence based on the evidence. Primary documents (final agreements, official proposals, statements and reports and lobby material) are used. For secondary documents we used publications of IFOAM and ARC2020 in which their positions are expressed. The third data source is interviews with people from Bionext/ IFOAM and Slow Food/ ARC 2020, important observers, other experts in the field, and a MEP.

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Framework for analysing NGO influence in international environmental negotiations (cells contain examples of questions researchers might ask)

Research task: Gather evidence of NGO influence (two dimensions)

Triangulation by: 1) intentional transmission of information

2) behaviour of other actors

Data type NGO participation

Activities

What did NGOs do to transmit information to decision makers?

Goal attainment

Outcome

Does the final agreement contain texts drafted by the NGOs? Does the final agreement reflect NGO goals and principles?

Access

What opportunities did NGOs have to transmit information?

Resources

What sources of leverage did NGOs use to transmit information?

Process

Did negotiators discuss issues proposed by NGOs (or cease to discuss issues opposed by NGOs)? Did NGOs coin terms that became part of the negotiating jargon?

Data source Primary texts ( e.g. draft decisions, country position statements, the final

agreement, NGO lobbying material)

Secondary texts (e.g. Earth negotiations bulletin, media reports, press

releases)

Interviews (government delegates, observers and NGOs)

Researcher observations during the negotiations

Research task: Analyse evidence of NGO influence

Methodology Process Tracing

What were the causal mechanisms linking NGO participation in international environmental negotiations with their influence?

Counterfactual Analysis

What would have happened if NGOs had not participated in the negotiations?

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3.1 Sample and Case Selection

The population for this research are Dutch AFNs who are represented by a European organisation. Even if this is done mostly due to the limits of this thesis, the Netherlands serves as a good population for research for some additional reasons. Firstly, the Netherlands is one of the biggest exporters of agricultural products besides the VS, Brazil and France (Rijksoverheid, 2014). Hence, the reforms of the CAP have a great impact on Dutch farmers. Secondly, using two Dutch AFNs and their European umbrella organisations, means that both AFNs work in a similar institutional environment thus a similar context. This makes comparing easier.

Finally, the Netherlands also provides us with a great variety of AFNs. These can range from large professional AFNs to smaller farmer markets or city farms.

One norm for choosing an AFN to be analysed was the necessity that the AFN acts within the process of the CAP reforms. This means that the AFNs chosen are AFNs who have organised

themselves and are politically active. The selected AFNs are Bionext and Slow Food Netherlands and their umbrella organisations IFOAM EU and ARC2020.

3.1.1 Bionext/IFOAM

Bionext is the Dutch chain organisation for sustainable, organic agriculture and food and consists of organic farmers and horticulturists of Biohuis. The producers and retailers of Vereniging Biologische Producenten (VBP), and organic stores started Bionext. It stimulates the consumption of organic products for a healthy and ecologically, economically and socially sustainable food chain. Through work on legislative issues, market developments and research, the organisation is actively supporting consumer-producer contact.

Bionext represents the collective interest of the organic sector at the national and European level (Bionext, 2015). One of the core tasks of Bionext is the lobby for legislative issues important for organic agriculture and food in the Netherlands and at EU level. In order to be successful in an

international context Bionext works within a large European network. Together with the International Federation of Organic Agricultural Movements (IFOAM) they are active in European position making. IFAOM is a worldwide network consisting of 700 member organisations in more than 100 countries (Bionext, 2015).

In this research Bionext is seen as a typical case of an AFN. First of all, organic agriculture is seen as a typical example of an AFN (Forssell and Lankoski, 2014, p. 63) with its focus on ecological, economic and social sustainability. Secondly, Bionext represents a typical example of an organised interest group that is political active at the national and European level. Finally, it represents a typical form of a political organisation.

In the remainder of this document we will only refer to IFOAM when referring to the umbrella organisation including Bionext.

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3.1.2 Slow Food Netherlands/ Slow Food International/ ARC2020

Slow Food Netherlands (SFN) is the Dutch part of the international grassroots organisation Slow Food. Slow Food was created in 1986 by Carlo Petrini as an answer to a growing fast food culture and the disappearing of local traditional, small food cultures. Now the movement is spread over 150 countries. Their approach is based on a concept of food that consists of three interconnected principles: good, clean and fair. Good means the quality, the flavour and healthy aspects of food. Clean means that the production of food should not harm the environment. Fair means that food should come with accessible prices for consumers and fair conditions and income for producers (Slow Food, 2015). SFN is an organisational structure at the national level, which has decisional autonomy but follows the political guidelines decided by Slow Food International (SF IN). SFN is made up of a network of local communities (called ‘convivia’), cooperations of local producers (called ‘presidia’) and the Youth Food Movement (YFM). The YFM is the youth department of Slow Food and is most active in the Netherlands. Other countries started youth departments as well, and these are called Slow Food Youth Networks (SFYN).

At the European level Slow Food joined the Agricultural and Rural Convention (ARC2020). This is an initiative of Groupe de Bruges, a think tank on agricultural policies, Forum Synergies, a European network of local projects concerning sustainable rural development and IHECS, the European school for journalists. It is a platform for concerned civil society organisations that wish to advocate a sustainable reform of the CAP. In this platform a variety of organisation is active on the local, national and European level that represent interests related to the environment, human rights, animal welfare, minorities, farmers, consumers and organic food. Its objectives are to give the grassroots a strong voice. They organise common actions, campaigns, congresses and mobilise

audiences beyond stakeholders’ interest (ARC2020, 2015). Slow Food is one of the main contributors. In this research we will look for both ARC2020 and SFN/SF IN in activities and outcome.

In this research SFN is seen as a typical case. With its focus on directly supporting and implementing alternatives to CFS practices, SFN can be seen as a typical case of an AFN. Secondly, Slow Food international and its connection to ARC2020 can be seen as a typical case of an interest organisation for political action.

Both cases show oppositional and constructive political strategies. They are involved in the

challenges to existing agricultural practices and try to reform or transform aspects of the CFS. Also they are involved in directly supporting and implementing alternatives to CFS practices.

By using two typical cases, the outcomes can probably be generalised to AFNs that are political active in influencing decision-making processes.

In the remainder of this document we will only refer to ARC2020 when referring to the umbrella organisation including Slow Food.

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3.2 Data Collection

Data was gathered through exploring information of the AFNs in order to find relevant documents and people to conduct interviews with. Most documents are found on the AFN websites. For Bionext it is on their own website and that of IFOAM. For SFN this is on their website, their international website and ARC2020. For the EU documents the EU website was used, looking for draft proposals,

proposals, definite proposals and the eventual legislations.

Interviews with representatives of the AFNs, experts and deputies of the EU were used as a secondary data source. Exploring the different data sources makes the data more robust and it is useful to understand the whole process of influence, as documents not always reveal the detailed information on how the process went. In selecting the interviewees, important criteria were that the representatives were involved in the process of the CAP reforms, that they were knowledgeable on the activities, resources and access of the organisation and on the outcome. To ensure this, an exploration on the people within the organisations was done.

The interviews were semi-structured in order to make the respondent talk openly and to assure the right topics were discussed. The questions were based on the sub questions of my research and focussed on goal attainment, the process of lobby, the activities, methods, resources and access.

3.3 Validity and reliability concerns of chosen data and method

Concerning the validity of the data, it is possible that some documents were left out of the analysis, causing the missing of important indicators. Another threat is that interviewees of the AFNs are biased in their answer, overstating or undervaluing their influence. This problem is hard to overcome,

however, in this research we tried to do this through interviews with people from all different angles of the influence cycle. Because the interviews are done in a semi-structured way, not all interviews have exactly the same structure. This also counts for the environment where the interview took place. Because some of the interviewees resided in Brussels, some interviews were done via the phone and Skype, which sometimes caused problems with understanding each other. In general answers cannot be taken directly at face value and have to be analysed critically.

Using counterfactual analysis is helpful to use this method when there are gaps in your chain of evidence. It gives you room to think about alternative explanations. However, since it is an imaginative construct on what might have happened if certain variables were left out of the logical chain of evidence, it might be different when used by different researchers.

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3.4 Theoretical and societal relevance

The outcomes of this research are relevant in a variety of ways. Theoretically, they will lead to more insight into how AFNs organise themselves politically and how they influence intergovernmental decision-making in specific. It thereby attempts to contribute to filling a literature gap regarding AFNs and political influence. This is of importance not only to learn more about the possibilities for AFNs to develop a strong say in policies, it is also meaningful to understand the impact they have on decision-making processes since the CAP is going to be reformed again in a couple of years from now. In addition, the research shall add to understandings on how influence can be studied in a qualitative matter. This is not only relevant to those who study AFNs but also for other political processes. Influence is hard to measure and is sometimes left out of analysis on political influence. Thus, a better understanding on how to look for evidence of influence and how to assess it in terms of the CAP reforms could help AFNs in the future to be (even) more effective.

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4. Background: the Common Agricultural Policy

The Common Agricultural Policy, which started in 1962, forms a partnership between agriculture and society, between Europe and its farmers. The main objectives are the improvement of agricultural productivity in order to maintain stable food prizes and supply a fair income for European farmers. The CAP is a common policy for all European Member States. It is managed on European level and financed with resources from the yearly EU-budget (EC, 2013, p.3).

The CAP is one of the oldest and strongest policies of the European Union. It is also one of the most criticised policies because of its social and environmental impacts that affect the EU and beyond. Critics argue that the CAP results in environmental destruction, social inequity and loss of farmer power in the food chain. These impacts have led many to question the sustainability of the CAP. These critics include environmental and agricultural organisations like Greenpeace, WWF, Birdlife, IFOAM, ARC2020, Platform ABC and many more.

In response to the critics, the EU began a process to green the CAP. Three recent changes indicate that the CAP is undergoing a process of greening. Firstly, in 2003 the CAP has moved from direct market intervention through subsidies to direct payments that are decoupled from production. This means that the direct payments are independent of levels of production and therefore deal with the formerly existing incentive to always produce more and more with no regard for the environmental impacts (Stoate et.al, 2009, p.2). Secondly in 2005 farmers were encouraged to adopt eco-friendly practices through the introduction of environmental cross-compliance that linked direct payments with basic environmental requirements (Gallet, 2011, p.10). Finally, since 2005 the Agricultural

Programme that operates under the Rural Development Programme has supported environmental-friendly methods of production. The latest post-2013 CAP reforms which took effect in 2014 sought to further green agriculture and the CAP, by further strengthening cross-compliance and incentives.

4.1 History

In the context of the Cold War and in elaboration with the Rome Treaty of 1957 the CAP was implemented in 1962. The essence was fair prices for farmers, food security and independence (EC, 2012, p.3). It was a time of modernisation and technology, hence agricultural productivity had to be increased by promoting technological progress ensuring further development of agricultural

production. This objective was reached through price support policies and direct interventions (Gallet, 2012, p.13). By the 1970s and 1980s farmers where so productive that more food was produced then needed which led to an overproduction crisis and the need for supply management (EC, 2012, p.3). In the first decades of the CAP environmental and social aspects of agriculture were neglected. Due to international and social pressure the EU had to rethink its agricultural policy.

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The first shift occurred in 1992 with the Mac Sharry reform. The CAP shifted from market support to producer support. To encourage farmers to be more environmental-friendly, price support was scaled down and replaced with direct aid payments (EC, 2012, p.3). By the mid-1990s the CAP was increasingly focused on the quality of food. New measures were taken to support investments in farms, marketing and training. During that time the first European organic farming legislation was implemented (EC, 2012, p.3).

This evolution was further consolidated in the ‘agenda 2000 reform’. In 2000 a new pillar was introduced with a focus on rural development (Gallet, 2012, p.13) and the CAP put more focus on the economic, social and cultural development of rural Europe. Now the CAP is organised around two pillars. The first deals with common market organisation and payments and deals with the ongoing reforms of 1992. The second pillar deals with the more diverse issues related to rural development (Gallet, 2012, p.13). Its aim is to transform the CAP from ‘a sectoral policy of farm community

support to an integrated policy for rural development’ (Sonnino and Marsden, 2005, p.193). This rural

development pillar is regionally implemented with 7-years territorially based plans. The measures contained in this pillar consist of about 20% of the overall CAP budget but they are co-funded by the Member States (Slow Food, 2010, p.17). Measures are adjusted to regional situations in the Member States and are situated among three different axes and one methodological axe. These are:

- improving the competitiveness of the agricultural and forestry sectors - improvement of the environment and rural areas

- improvement of the quality of life in rural areas and diversifications of the rural economy

- leader approach which encourages the attainment of objectives focused on local needs by involving local actors.

In comparison with the support producers receive from the first pillar, support from this second pillar varies from one state to another. However states are bound to allocate minimal percentages of the resources to the various axes in the rural development pillar. The minimums are 10% to the first, 25% to the second and 10% to the third.

In 2003 there was a second reform where the CAP cut the link between production and subsidies. Because of that, farmers had to deal with the Single Farm Payment (SFP) (first pillar). The first pillar of the CAP consists of market back- up measures, such as direct payments to farmers, stockpiling and support schemes. Every measure is funded by the European Fund of Agricultural Orientation and Guarantee (FEOGA) budget. Important to note here is that most of the CAP budget goes to direct payments of farmers, 80% (Slow Food, 2010, p.17). Income aid is given when farmers are in compliance with environmental and animal welfare standards and food safety

(cross-compliance) (Sonnino and Marsden, 2005:192). SFP is implemented on a regional level and can follow two methods. The first is SPS and consists of decoupled payments. This scheme is applied in old Member States and is paid through historical received payments (Sonnino and Marsden,

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Single Area Payment Scheme (SAPS) and is applied in new Member States. Here payments are received in sums per hectare of farming land in the Member State. It accounts for 9% (Slow Food, 2010, p.17) of the FEOGA budget.

The rules for policy-making in agriculture are deeply modified by the Treaty of Lissabon in 2007. Since then, the power of decision has been openly shared for the European Parliament. First, only the EC and the Council had the power of manoeuvre and enforcement. The EP had a consultative role and was not allowed to intervene in the budget or participate in the process. Now, co-decision is extended to agriculture. This means that the influence of the institution is as follows. First, the Commission starts the process and writes legislative proposals, and then these proposals can be amended by the EP and the Council. The EC can choose which of the amendments it wants to include or not. After that, the Council and the EP need to agree on the same version of the text in order for it to be approved. This created more space for lobbying by interest groups.

In 2008 there was a ‘health-check’ of the CAP. Again structural weaknesses and negative environmental impacts were revealed. In the context of a world food crisis, negotiations with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and environment degradation, the EU had to take up the challenge to make the CAP more sustainable (Gallet, 2012, p.14).

The 2013 CAP reform was aimed at strengthening economic and ecological competitiveness of the agricultural sector, deal with climate change, and stimulate growth and employment in rural areas (EC, 2012, p.3).

4.3 The post-2013 CAP reforms

Since the Treaty of Rome the main objectives of the CAP have stayed the same. However, following decades of reform, the policy structure has changed. Since 2000 the CAP is structured around two complementary pillars. The first deals with common market organisation and payments as mentioned above. The second pillar deals with more diverse issues related to rural development (Gallet, 2012, p.13).

4.3.1 Challenges

After 50 years of the CAP the EU is facing some persistent challenges: food security, environmental and climate change and the need for a vital rural economy. From many sides the criticism on the CAP grew. Environmental organisations argued that the current agricultural practices caused pollution of ground water by the use of pesticides. The ever expanding need for water fed agriculture in dry areas put too much pressure on water levels. Biodiversity loss through monocultures and lack of interest for green development from the side of the rural population and local decisions makers. All in all there was a consensus that serious reforms were needed.

The common agricultural policy : influence of alternative food networks

24-07-2015