Is Arjen Robben also selfish outside the field? : is there a correlation between soccer qualities and players’ behavioural characteristics?

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Name

: Daan Hamaker

Student number : 6084486

Study track

: Game theory and Behavioural Economics

Number of ECTS

: 15

“Is

Arjen Robben also selfish outside the field?”

Is there a correlation between soccer qualities and players’ behavioural

characteristics?

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2 1. Introduction

According to Arjen Robben, currently one of the best1 soccer players in the world:

“Occasionally, attackers must be selfish on the pitch, but it's important not to exaggerate. Selfishness is a quality and not necessarily a bad thing." Robben, for instance, frequently displays selfish behavior on the pitch. Does his selfishness imply a relation with his behavior off the pitch? It’s very interesting to investigate whether there is a connection between the selfishness and the position of a player.

Glenn Helder, Luc Nilis and David Bentley have some features in common. All three

can be characterized as former, male professional soccer players. Moreover, they were all considered as offensive players during their soccer career. Oddly enough, there is one more remarkable similarity: all of them have or had a gamble addiction, which implies risk seeking behavior. Could this be a coincidence?

If offensive soccer players are more risk seeking and better players are more selfish

than average players, would it lead to the conclusion that a certain category of players have

a higher chance for a gamble addiction? As described previously, striker Glenn Helder2 had a

gamble addiction. He was talented and played for the Dutch national team and Arsenal. On the field he was known as a risk seeking player, off the field he had a gamble addiction. Perhaps his gamble addiction could have been prevented, if signals of high risk seeking combined with high selfishness in his youth, would have been recognized.

To investigate the connection between the selfishness & the type of player and the connection between risk attitude & the type of player, research will be done about characteristics and soccer qualities.

This paper consists of an introduction, related literature, methodology, results,

discussion & conclusion and an appendix. The introduction contains a motivation, research question, contribution, a brief summary of findings and the setup of this thesis. In related literature, literature is described as well as the contribution of this paper to existing studies. The methodology consists the data set, design and hypothesis. This is followed by results which contains the results of the experiment in tables, boxplots and in words.

The discussion & conclusion describes the summarized main findings, conclusions and possible steps for future research. The paper ends with an appendix.

1 Number 4 ranked in Ballon D’or 2014, most important award for individual football players by the world of the FIFA. 2 Interview with Glenn Helder about this paper in the appendix.

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3 Research question3

Is there a relation between soccer qualities and characteristics? This main question has

been divided in three sub questions.

- Is there a connection in the level of selfishness and soccer skills?

- Is there a connection between the level of selfishness and the type of soccer player?

- Is there a relation between the level of risk seeking and the type of player?

With ‘type’ is meant: the behavior of soccer players on the field. To simplify this category, there are two types of players: defensive players and offensive players.

Contribution

There have been many papers about ultimatum games, dictator games and risk seeking games. Nonetheless, these games hasn’t been done in relation to soccer. Soccer clubs could be interested to see whether it’s possible to recognize a specific type of player based on his character outside the field. Clubs could get better insight in the abilities of soccer players.

Since influence of statistics4 in soccer is rising, this alternative method could provide clubs

with another research method to optimize the use of a player. Soccer can be described as big business. There are about 3.5 billon soccer fans all around the world and it’s the most popular sport in the world. Deloitte (2015) discovered that the revenues of Real Madrid in 2014 were 549.5 million euro. Therefore Real Madrid noted the highest revenue of all soccer clubs in the world. Besides the popularity of soccer, there is also a link with the economic situation of a country and the performance of the national team. Hence, soccer and economics can be considered as intertwined.

This paper might be a start for other researchers to investigate if it’s possible to

recognize children who are susceptible for inordinate selfish behavior. If higher skilled children are more selfish in the ultimatum game and the dictator game, this might be an indication of more selfish behavior in other situations. This could be useful for parents to take notice of and to anticipate on this selfish behavior. With this assumption parents might

3 In this thesis I can combine three different personal interests. Soccer is my passion and I play for almost twenty years. For my Master Economics I chose “Behavioral Economics and Game Theory”. In this Master, several aspects of economic behavior are linked with psychological influence. In this Master the courses experiment Economics & behavioral economics threated different experiments which were very interesting. During my Bachelor, I graduated the minor Education Economics, which gives me the authorization to teach children in Economics. Therefore soccer, game theory, behavioral economics and working with children have led to this Master thesis subject.

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implement this knowledge in their upbringing. It is fine to be selfish on the field during a game, but in real life it isn’t a good quality to be selfish. Like Arjen Robben said: ‘’sometimes it’s good to be selfish’’.

Summary

Younger, higher skilled soccer players have more self-confidence and are less interested in other people’s opinion, compared to lower skilled youth soccer players. Young, better soccer players keep significantly more money for themselves compared to young, less skilled

players in the ultimatum game and in the dictator game. This shows that young but better skilled players are more selfish than young less skilled players. There haven’t been significant results for differences between defensive and offensive players in the ultimatum game, dictator game and the risk seeking game. When children get older, the influence of soccer on children becomes less significant.

Setup

An experiment isconducted at the soccer club F.C.Castricum (FCC). In this experiment

different groups will be selected on their level of skills and their age. Two groups of children

can be categorized between 8 and 10 years old. These children are playing in the E pupillen5.

The better skilled soccer players play in de highest team: the E1. The boys that are less skilled players, are playing in a lower E team: the E low. To analyze the development of youth players, the same experiment will be conducted on children between 12 and 14 years old. These children are playing in the C junioren. The C1, with the better soccer players, is compared to the C low, which has less skilled soccer players involved. When using this setup, it is possible to investigate if there are differences in behavior between higher skilled players and less skilled players and to analyze whether there is a difference between choices of children in different ages. The experiment is divided in three parts. The ultimatum game, the dictator game and a situation regarding risk holding. Those three parts include incentivized questions, because some choices of the participants will lead to a payout.

5 In the Netherlands children between 8-10 years old are playing in the E pupillen and children between 12-14 years old are playing in the C junioren. This translation isn’t literal because in every country the youth team have different names.

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5 2. Literature

This paper includes research that hasn’t been done before, which makes it impossible to consult papers of existing studies. Thus, this paper can be considered unique in its setting. Literature about ultimatum games, dictator games and risk seeking games exists, but not in relation to soccer. Some literature can be used to increase the validity of parts of the hypothesis.

In soccer, statistic science and research have not developed as much as in other

worldwide sports like baseball of basketball, although sporadic clubs and organizations are innovating. Van Haaren & op de Beéck (2014) described the importance of statistics and emphasize that it will become more important in the future. The Danish soccer club FC Midtjylland won the Danish league for the first time, thanks to the structure in the club, which means that every decision is based on statistic models. They have merely scouted players based on their statistic results and try to exclude every form of subjective influence. This vision may arguably be considered as unique in the soccer world. Anderson and Sally (2013) describe the rise of statistics and analyses. During the Champions League final Bayern München - Inter Milan, Opta, one of the largest companies in analyzing statistics, has

reported 2842 events, which means every 1 or 2 seconds there was an action reported. Hence, the influence of statistics in soccer grows. However, research of performances in relation to behavioral characteristics off the field seems to be rare. Analyzing statistics is mostly done about the performances on the field. This thesis is about the relation between qualities on the field and players’ behavioural characteristics off the field.

Selfishness

Hoffmann et al. (2009) concluded that cultural differences could influence the level of selfishness. In their experiment they have compared Malaysian subjects to UK subjects and found differences in their offer level in the ultimatum game. Hoffmann et al. explained these differences in the ultimatum game due to their different cultural backgrounds. Johan Cruijff (2013), the best Dutch soccer player ever, notes that some players are important in the locker room, because a different culture with special behavior exists there. If it’s true that different levels of soccer skills have different environmental backgrounds, the results could also be different in the ultimatum game.

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Dirk Kuijt is considered a successful Dutch offensive soccer player. Only 5 players played more matches for the Dutch national team. In NUsport (2013), Kuijt told that he occasionally has to make selfish choices in life. His life was dedicated to soccer, making it top priority. Other (commonly known) important elements of life came in second place. Sometimes he considers his behavior pretty selfish, for example: he wasn’t able to be home when his wife was heavily pregnant. He chose to play his soccer game.

An article in Trouw (2013) had the following headline ‘’Topsport is selfishness’’. This

article had been written about the Olympic Games in Russia. In some parts of Russia, civil rights were seen to be violated. Therefore, some people wanted to boycott the Olympic Winter Games in Sochi, to show their anxiety about those circumstances. This newspaper tried to translate the opinion of some athletes. The athletes expressed that performing is the only thing that matters, all the rest should disappear, so they can function in an optimal sports environment. This might lead to the conclusion that sport is all about

competitiveness, which has elements of selfishness that can contrast the (mentioned) social elements in life.

There are differences in selfishness for different ages. Benenson et all. (2007) did

research to the altruistic behavior of children in the age of 4, 6 and 9, which led to the conclusion that when children get older, they become more altruistic. In their experiment older children had given more stickers to other children than the younger children. Fehr et all. (2008) concluded that when children are getting older, they are more willing to share with other children. Andreoni and Bernheim (2009) discovered that the social image could be a reason to propose a fairer offer in the dictator game.

Risk

Although there is a lack of research in soccer with regard to risk, some papers have written about risk behavior differences among groups. Stewart and Roth (2001) conclude that the risk propensity of managers is lower compared to entrepreneurs. In this paper we

investigate whether there are differences in risk taking behavior between different types of soccer players.

However, some misunderstandings about taking risks exist:

Koudstaal et all. (2014) described in their paper that people often think that entrepreneurs make multiple risky decisions. They conducted a large lab-in-the-field experiment comparing entrepreneurs to managers and employees. The first experiment wasn’t incentivized. In the

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results, entrepreneurs scale themselves as more risk seeking than managers and employees. However when Koudstaal et al. incentivized the experiment, their conclusion was that differences between entrepreneurs versus managers & employees were more subtler. The paper proves the differences between believes and reality. Such a misunderstanding could be solved when this experiment shows differences between defensive & offensive players related to taking risks. Perhaps offensive players are more risk averse on the field than defensive players are.

Children

Lerner et al. (2005) described that children around 8 years old have a global,

undifferentiated perception about themselves. When their self-respect, generally speaking, is considered positive, they believe that they are better in all kinds of things. That’s the reason to expect that young children with more soccer skills have more self-confidence and care less about other people’s opinion compared to less skilled soccer players. However when children grow up, this method of reasoning isn’t applicable. Arsh & Ayotte (2003) found that at a higher age, the aspect of self-respect becomes more complex. For example, when an older child is skillful with computers, he doesn’t directly believe he’s also good in mathematics. Thus, older children who have more soccer skills don’t necessarily have more self-respect.

Twenge & Campbell (2001) described the development of self-respect of children. Approximately on the age of 12 years, there is a decrease in their self-respect. After this period their self-respect will slowly increase.

Papers are written about gender differences and the relation with economic decisions. Charness and Gneezy (2012) proved that there are gender differences in risk taking. Eckel and Grossman (1998) described that female participants propose less for themselves than male participants. However, Bolton and Katok (1995) weren’t able to conclude that there was any difference between genders for generosity, although in this

experiment all participants were boys6.

6 Explained in methodology

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8 3. Methodology

Table 1

Dataset soccer players

Team N Team N

E1 8 C1 15

E low 8 C low 11

Total E pupillena 16 Total C juniorenb 26

a the E pupillen are between 8 and 11 years old b the C junioren are between 12 and 15 years old

In total 42 soccer players of FCC participated in the experiment. There were 8 participants playing in the E1, 8 participants playing in the E low, 15 participants playing in the C1 and 11 participants playing in the C low. To create equal circumstances, the experiment was held for

every group after the soccer training. Research7 has proven that the human body responds

if the body has been subject to exercise. In their experiment they measured a different plasa norepinephrine value before training compared to the post-training values. The moment of conducting the experiment could influence the results. In this experiment every group has experienced the same circumstances.

In this experiment all participants were boys.There aren’t enough girls who are

playing for FCC to create the same setup, since there are fewer female soccer teams at FCC. When a girl signs up, she is automatically placed in the highest team. It’s not possible to analyze the difference in skills between teams, because less skilled girls are in the same team as higher skilled girls. Every category of girls soccer at FCC has 1 team. Children are playing soccer in a team with children who have more or less the same age. The teams consisting children between 8 and 10 years old are called E pupillen. This group of children is divided in teams based on their soccer skills. The E1 is the best and highest team in the E pupillen. The less skilled children are playing in lower E pupillen teams. They are called the E low. To analyze the development there is also an experiment for children between 12 and 14 years

7 Peronnet et al. (1981)

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old. In these C teams the results of good players versus less skilled players will be compared. The good players are playing in the C1 and the less skilled players are playing in lower C junioren teams and are called the C low. With this setup it is possible to check if there is a difference in behavior between better skilled players and less skilled players, to analyze the development of the children. The participants fill in the questionnaire what type of players they are. As mentioned in the introduction, there are two types: defensive & offensive. With this distinction it’s possible to compare the different type of players.

Design

The experiment consists of introduction questions, three main questions and two questions about feelings. Before the start of the experiment the participants have been told that the results are completely anonymous. It is not allowed and useful to crib, since their own answers are the right answers. Their participation is well appreciated.

In the appendix a letter has been added, which has been given to the participants

after the experiment. The letter contains approval of the Ethics Committee Economics and Business (University of Amsterdam), the chairman of F.C. Castricum, and the coach of their team.

After the introduction questions, the setup of the first three questions is being

explained: this means situation, example, and control question. If the participant’s answer to the control question has been checked, he will receive the real question. In the experiment, a control question is included to check whether the participants understand the question. To get more realistic results of every group in the ultimatum game, dictator game and the risk seeking game, rewards will be paid out by an anonymous lottery. The (price-) money gives the participants an incentive to make choices more realistic, because there is a material consequence. After the experiment every participant will come to a special office, will get the letter and the chosen ones may receive some cash related to their choices by lottery. There are 4 groups that participated in the experiment: the E1, E low, C1 and C low. In all groups the ultimatum game, dictator game and the risk seeking question are paid out once. So in every group there could be a maximum of 5 participants who are paid out. The amount of 5 participants has been chosen, since in the ultimatum game, the divider gets paid

contemporaneously with the other player who could get a payout when accepting the deviation. After acceptation 2 participants get paid out and after rejection zero participants

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while in the risk seeking game there could be only one player who gets paid out. In round 1 the participants play the ultimatum game. This game is being played by two players who have an amount of money to divide. For example this could be ten euro. These are the rules in the ultimatum game: Player one makes an offer that consists X between 0 - 10 euro. Player two can accept or refuse this offer. If player two accepts this offer, player one receives X and player two receives 10 – X. If player two refuses the offer, both players get nothing. The E pupillen are allowed to divide 100 eurocent and the C junioren are allowed to divide 500 eurocent.

In round 2 the participants play the dictator game. This is a similar game compared to the ultimatum game with only one difference: in this game player two can only accept the offer of player one. As described in the ultimatum game, the E pupillen are allowed to divide 100 eurocent and the C junioren are allowed to divide 500 eurocent.

In round 3 the participants play the risk seeking game. This game obtains more information on the risk preferences of the participants. The participants could choose between option 1 and option 2. Option 1 gives a certain amount and option 2 gives an uncertain amount of money to win. The E pupillen could choose from option 1 and win a certain amount of 2 euro or they could choose option 2 and get 4 euro with 50% chance. The C junioren could make a choice for option 1 and win a certain amount of 5 euro or they

could choose option 2 and get 10 euro with 50% chance. In 20138, 10 year old children get 2

euro allowance money on average and 14 year old children get approximately 5 euro allowance money. The expectation is that older children receive a larger amount of money. Older children sometimes receive clothing allowance or are having a part-time job in which they can earn some extra money. That’s the reason why C junioren play this experiment with more money comparing to the younger players. Thus, the relative value can be considered as more or less the same. The disadvantage of these differences could be that it is harder to compare both groups. However, the advantage to obtain more realistic results is more important than to get results which contain a higher validity.

8 Research by Nibub

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The experiment ends with questions about their self-confidence and the importance of other people’s opinion to them. These two questions are expressed in self-confidence and social image. These questions have a scale from 1 to 7. The scale 1 to 10 has generally been used in the Dutch education system, in which all participants are part of. Scale 1 to 7 is a better scale to use, because using scale 1 to 10 the participants could get the impression that their value is regarded as a grade.

Hypotheses

This paper focuses on three main aspects: a connection between the level of selfishness and soccer skills, a connection between the level of selfishness and the position in the field and the relation between the level of risk seeking and the type of player. It is about their selfishness and risk seeking behavior outside the field. This leads to the following three hypotheses.

The first hypothesis is that players with more soccer skills are different in their

selfishness compared to less skilled soccer players outside the field.

The second hypothesis is that offensive players are different in their selfishness than

defending players outside the field.

The third hypothesis is that offensive soccer players are different in their way of risk

seeking in games compared to defensive soccer players.

The first hypothesis is that boys with more soccer skills are different in their

selfishness compared to less skilled soccer players. In the higher teams, not everybody gets the same amount of playtime during the matches, since their playtime is based on their skills and performances. In less skilled teams there is a more social perspective and everybody will get the same amount of playtime. In higher teams players have to make a strong effort to develop their skills and the perspective is less social. In better teams there could be

somebody hunting for their spot. This might lead to selfish choices. For example, if there is only one bottle of sports drink, they could keep it for themselves instead of sharing it. This selfish choice could be profitable, for this sports drink could generate new energy and their competitor can’t.

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The second hypothesis implies that offensive soccer players are different in their selfishness outside the field than defensive players are. As mentioned in the introduction, Arjen Robben thinks his selfishness in the field is a quality. During a soccer match it’s needed to be very selfish with the team. In a soccer match there is only one winner and a choice between winning and losing can be considered as a selfish choice. Winning means the other team loses. Hence, when the stakes are getting higher, winning gets more important.

The third hypothesis is that offensive soccer players behave different in risk seeking

games compared to defensive soccer players. With risk seeking on the field is meant: the chance of losing the ball. An offensive soccer player could be risky, to create space, an assist or a goal. He’s more allowed to be risk seeking. When offensive soccer players lose the ball there are still some defensive soccer players to intercept the ball before the opponent could score. For example, if a defensive soccer player would lose the ball, the chance that the opponent scores is higher, because there are less team players to intercept the ball.

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13 4. Results

Boxplot 1

Selfishness related to soccer skills for E pupillen.

In boxplot the

differences between the E pupillen are

immediately visible.

Especially the

differences between the E1 and the E low are visible in the ultimatum game and the dictator game.

Boxplot 2

Selfishness related to soccer skills for C junioren

In this boxplot the main differences between C junioren are immediately visible.

However the boxplots with C junioren are more similar than the boxplots considering E pupillen.

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Table 2

Age, ultimatum game, dictator game, social image and self-confidence for E pupillen & C junioren

Age Ultimatum game (sd) Dictator game (sd) Social imagec Self-confidencec

E1 10.75 61.88 (11.93) 81.13 (19.28) 3.25 6 E low 9.5 42.5 (11.65) 50.63 (18.41) 3.75 5.25 Differences 1.25 19.38 (5.90) 30.5 (9.42) -0.5 0.75 P-valued 0.005*** 0.006*** C1 13.47 298.67 (81.14) 415.53 (86.57) 3.87 5.4 C low 13.64 268.18 (9.25) 370.91 (95.86) 4.18 5.82 Differences -0.17 30.48 (34.30) 44.62 (35.95) -0.31 -0.42 P-valued 0.38 0.22 c Scale 1 to 7

d Results of tests for differences in offers (independent sample T test) between groups ***significant at α< 0.01

A notable aspect in this table is the difference in age between E1 and E low and the

differences in the ultimatum game and dictator game in the category of E pupillen. This will be amplified later in the paper. However, those striking differences amplify the hypothesis that E1 soccer players are more selfish than E low soccer players.

Ultimatum game E pupillen

The mean difference between the E1 and E low is 19.38 eurocent in the ultimatum game. The average proposal of an E1 player is almost 20 eurocent higher than the proposal of an E low player. With a p-value of 0.005, the hypothesis that the proposal of E1 isn’t different than the proposal of the E low players, can be rejected. Because the average of E1 is higher, it can be concluded that their proposals are significantly higher than the E low proposals.

Dictator game E pupillen

In the dictator game the average division of a player of the E1 is 81.13, while on the other hand the average division of a player in the E low is 50.63. Thus, the average difference is 30.50 eurocent. The hypothesis that the average division of an E1 player isn’t different than the division of an E low player, can be rejected. With a p-value of 0.006 can be concluded that the average division of an E1 player is significantly different than the division of an E low player in the dictator game. These results lead to the conclusion that E1 players keep more money for themselves in the dictator game compared to E low players.

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15 Ultimatum game C junioren

In the ultimatum game, the average proposal of a C1 player is 298.67 eurocent, while the average proposal of a C low player is 268.18 eurocent. Thus, the average difference in this category is 30.49 eurocent. The hypothesis that the proposal of a C1 player isn’t higher than the proposal of a C low player, can’t be rejected. With a p-value of 0.38 the conclusion can be drawn that the average proposal of a C1 player isn’t different from an average proposal of a C low player in the ultimatum game.

Dictator game C junioren

The average division of a C1 player in the dictator game is 415.53 eurocent, whereas the average division of a C low player is 370.91 eurocent. The average difference between both type of players is 44.62 eurocent. The hypothesis that the average division of a C1 player is higher than the average division of a C low player, can’t be rejected. With a p-value of 0.22 it can’t be concluded that the average division is significantly higher in the dictator game. Nevertheless the difference in the dictator game is more significant than the difference in the ultimatum game.

Difference between E pupillen and C junioren in the ultimatum game

The difference between E pupillen is 19.38 eurocent, whereas the difference between C junioren is 30.49 eurocent. This makes the discrepancy between the difference, 11.11 eurocent. The E pupillen were able to divide 100 eurocent and the C junioren were able to divide 500 eurocent. The relative development of the difference in the ultimatum game between E1 & E low and C1 & C low has been decreased.

Difference between E pupillen and C junioren in the dictator game

In the dictator game, the difference between E pupillen is 30.50 eurocent and the difference between C junioren is 44.62 eurocent. This creates a dissimilarity between the differences of 14.11 eurocent. The relative development of the difference between E1 & E low and C1 & C low has been decreased.

Self-confidence & social image

There could be a relation between the self-confidence and the average proposal of a E pupil, since the average self-confidence for E1 players is 6.00 and 5.25 for E low players. It is possible E1 players have more confidence, because they are playing in a higher team. They might assume their offer will be accepted in the ultimatum game, to keep more for

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opinion at an average of 3.25. As described earlier, the scale is from 1 to 7 for

self-confidence & social image. The average of E low players is 3.75, which is slightly higher than the E1. The experiment has been conducted anonymously. Although the lower value for E1 players could lead to higher offers for themselves, they care less about other people's opinion. E low players are more worried about these opinions, which could be the reason that they make an offer that’s more equally divided, to act more friendly in the dictator game.

C1 players value their self-confidence at 5.4 on a 7 point scale, whereas a C low

player values his self-confidence at a 5.8. These results can lead to the conclusion that C low have more self-confidence than C1 players. This difference is smaller than the difference between E pupillen. The E1 pupillen have more self-confidence on average than C low junioren, so the C1 have more confidence than E low.

C1 players value other people's opinion at an average of 3.87, whereas C low players

value this at 4.18. This is a smaller difference compared to the difference between E pupillen. C low players have a little more self-confidence and C1 players care less about other people's opinion. It’s more difficult to find a strong relation with the proposals they make, because soccer has more influence on children when they are younger.

Age

The average age of an E1 player is 10.75 and on the other hand the average age of E low player is 9.50. On average the E1 player is 1.25 year older than the E low player. The average age of a C1 player is 13.47 and the average age of a C low player is 13.64. These figures are closer to each other, so obviously the difference of ages between C1 and C low is not that much. When children are getting older, trainers do select more on specific soccer skills. When children are around 8, 9 or 10 years old, one year can make a big difference. Children

in that age develop motorial skills more quickly on a yearly9 basis which can be an advantage

in soccer. This probably isn’t a reason why players in the E1 are more selfish. As mentioned in the literature, the difference in age between E1 and E low players isn’t an explanation for the difference in offers between both groups. It’s the opposite of the expectation that E1 players (since they are older) are more willing to share than the E low players. The thought that E1 players are more selfish than E low players, gets more significant.

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17 Table 3

Defensive players versus offensive players related to selfishness.

E pupillen N Ultimatum game (sd) Dictator game (sd) Self-confidencec Social-imagec

Defensive 9 54.44 (15.09) 65.56 (21.28) 5.56 4.44 Offensive 7 49.29 (15.92) 66.29 (29.06) 5.71 5.43 Differences 5.15 -0.73 - 0.15 -0.99 P-valued _0.5185 _0.9545 C junioren N Defensive 13 279.23 (67.23) 393.85 (94.12) 4.54 5.46 Offensive 13 292.31 (104.28) 399.46 (91.61) 3.46 5.69 Differences -13.08 -5.61 1.08 -0.20 P-valued 0.7067 0.8794 c scale 1 to 7

d Results of tests for differences in offers (independent sample T test) between groups

Defensive players versus offensive players in the ultimatum game

The offensive players propose an average of 49.29 eurocent and the defensive players propose an average of 54.44 eurocent. By comparing defensive players versus offensive players in the E pupillen, the difference in their proposals during the ultimatum game is 5.15. Using a p-value of 0.5185, the hypothesis that defensive players in the E pupillen make different proposals than offensive players, can’t be rejected.

When comparing the offensive C junioren versus the defensive C junioren in the

ultimatum game, there is a difference of 13.08 eurocent. The average proposal of a defensive player is 279.23, while the average proposal of an offensive player is 292.31 eurocent. Using a p-value of 0.7067, the difference isn’t large enough to conclude that the average proposal of an offensive player is significantly different compared to the proposal of a defensive player.

Offensive players versus defensive players dictator game

Comparing the differences between offensive players and defensive players in the dictator game regarding to E pupillen, will result in a difference of 0.73. Offensive players offer 66.29

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eurocent on average, whereas the defensive players offer 65.56 eurocent on average. These small differences aren’t enough to conclude that there is a significant difference between defensive and offensive players in the dictator game for the E pupillen.

Analyzing the offers of defensive and offensive players in the ultimatum game in the

C junioren category, leads to a difference which says that on average, offensive players propose 5.61 eurocent more than defensive players. The average offer of a defensive player is 393.85 eurocent and the average offer of an offensive player is 399.46 eurocent.

Therefore, offensive players keep more money for themselves. This allows room for the thought that offensive soccer players make more selfish choices off the field. In the dictator game the offensive E pupillen & C junioren keep more money for themselves, though the difference isn’t large enough to conclude that defensive and offensive players are offering different in the dictator game.

Table 4

Defensive players versus offensive players related to risk seeking.

E pupillen N Meanf C junioren N Meanf

Defensive 9 1.33 Defensive 13 1.38

Offensive 7 1.29 Offensive 13 1.31

P-valuee 0.317 0.564

e Results of tests for differences in offers (Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test) between groups

f For example: if the mean would be 1.00 all the offensive E pupillen have chosen option 1 and the conclusion would be the offensive E pupillen are risk-averse. When the mean would be 1.91 for the defensive C junioren the conclusion is that defensive C junioren are risk seeking

The last hypothesis is that offensive players show different behavior in risk seeking games compared to defensive players. In the experiment the participants were able to choose between two options. The mean consists the average of the two options for defensive & offensive players. Option 1 is getting acertain amount of money and option 2 is getting an amount depending on 50% chance. Both options have the same expectation. The E pupillen could get a certain 1 euro or win 2 euro with 50% chance. The C junioren could get 5 euro for sure or win 10 euro with 50% chance.

The average for defensive players is 1.33, whereas the average for offensive players in the E pupillen is 1.29. This contains a difference of 0.04 which leads to a p-value of 0.317 and is too low to reject the hypothesis, that E pupillen defensive players show different risk seeking

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behavior than offensive players. The average for a defensive C junior player is 1.38, while the average for an offensive C junior player is 1.31. With a p-value of 0.564, the hypothesis that defensive players in the C junioren show different behavior in the risk seeking game

compared to offensive players in the C junioren, can be rejected. There is a small difference in the behavior of defensive players compared to offensive players. Remarkably, in the categories E pupillen & C junioren, the defensive players are a little less risk averse. When children are getting older they become slightly more risk seeking, which is the case for defensive and offensive players.

E pupillen and their self-confidence & social image

Defensive players value their confidence at 5.56 and offensive players value their confidence at 5.71. The difference between defensive and offensive players in

self-confidence is 0.15 on a 7 point scale. This small difference is not an explanation for their difference in behavior. Nonetheless, the difference between defensive and offensive players related to social image, is 0.99 on a 7 point scale. This on the other hand could be an

explanation for the behavior of E pupillen. Since offensive players care less about other people's opinion, they keep more money for themselves in the dictator game. They have less self-confidence, compared to offensive players and in the ultimatum game their average proposal is a little lower. This might be their anxiety that their proposal would be rejected.

C junioren and their self-confidence & social image

In the C junioren the defensive players care less about other people's opinion compared to offensive players. However, defensive players value their self-confidence at 4.54, whereas offensive players value their self-confidence at 3.46.

Table 5

Self-confidence & Social-image related to the risk game for E pupillen.

Self-confidence N Meanc Social-image N Meanc

Risk averse 11 5.55 Risk averse 11 4.73

Risk seeking 5 5.8 Risk seeking 5 5.2

Differences -0.25 -0.47

c scale 1 to 7

The E pupillen who chose for option 1, value their self-confidence with 5.55 and the E pupillen who chose option 2 value it at 5.80. It could be the case that there is a connection

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between self-confidence and risk behavior. Perhaps children with more self-confidence have more belief that they will win a 50% chance game. However, analyzing the data of the gamble game and combining it with the social image, it results in a bigger difference. The difference of 0.47 could be explained that way. If children care more about other people's opinion, then the thought could occur that it’s cool to gamble and choose option 2 to brag about their courage.

Table 6

Self-confidence & Social-image related to the risk game for C junioren.

Self-confidence N Meanc Social image N Meanc

Risk averse 17 4.12 Risk averse 17 5.65

Risk seeking 9 3.78 Risk seeking 9 5.44

c scale 1 to 7

Analyzing the results of C junioren, it’s striking that the results are quite the opposite, since the risk averse E pupil values his confidence lower than the risk seeking E pupil. The risk seeking E pupil cares more about other people's opinion. The C junioren counter those results. The influence of soccer decreases when children are getting older, so the connection that was found in the E pupillen will decrease or even disappear.

Table 7

Self-confidence & social image per category.

Self-confidence N Meanc Social image N Meanc

E pupillen 16 5.63 E pupillen 16 4.88

C junioren 26 4 C junioren 26 5.58

c scale 1 to 7

The differences between E pupillen & C junioren for their self-confidence & self-image could be related to the average of self-confidence and social image of the total amount of soccer players in a particular category. The 16 E pupillen value their self-confidence at 5.63 and the 26 C junioren value their confidence at 4.00. That is a decrease of 1.63 in

self-confidence. The development of the decreases is analogous to the increase of other people's opinion about the individual. The C junioren value other people's opinion 0.70 more than E pupillen.

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21 5. Discussion & conclusion

When children are young, in general they have been raised in a small and protected environment. Kerkhoven (1978) described the development of children. When children become nine years old, the domestic environment will get less important. This environment includes family, but also the sports club. Children visit the sport club around three times a week and play even more soccer in their spare time.

In a small setting, soccer can be experienced as really important and has a big

influence on their minds. Hence, almost every young soccer player dreams regularly about winning the World Cup in which they made a fantastic goal. Nevertheless, when children get older, they realize that winning the World Cup is only an option for a few extremely talented soccer players. This example symbolizes the importance of soccer for young children. It clearly implies that soccer can have a big influence on their self-respect.

In 1978 Kerkhoven described that younger children are less mistrustful than older

children. Younger children are experiencing life more fantastical and believe in the good human being. When children get older, they realize that not everybody in the world is nice to them. This could be an explanation for a higher value of other people's opinion about them. When children experience that other people's opinion isn't always positive, like they did when they were younger, it could affect their self-confidence.

E1 players value their self-confidence higher than E low soccer players. In contrast to the younger category, there is less difference between the C1 and C low.

Young children have the capacities to discover the world by themselves, which is probably one of the reasons why soccer has less influence on the results of the C junioren compared to the E pupillen. Older children do not get their self-respect solely by soccer, but in their world that's becoming more multidimensional, they can acquire their self-respect by all kinds of things and elements.

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22 Summarize main findings

In this research there a correlation has been found between soccer qualities and players´ behavioural characteristics. E1 players have given themselves significantly more money than E low players in the ultimatum game and the dictator game. This is a good indication to conclude that E1 players are more selfish than E low players. The difference between C1 players and C low players in the ultimatum game and the dictator game isn’t significant, although the offers of C1 players in the ultimatum game and the dictator game were higher, compared to C low players. All the better skilled teams gave more money to themselves in the ultimatum game and the dictator game.

The comparison between defensive players and offensive players resulted in the

same structure, in both groups. In the ultimatum game the offensive players proposed a larger amount for themselves, in both groups, whereas in the dictator game the defensive players proposed a higher offer for themselves in the E pupillen and C junioren. Perhaps this could be regarded as a trend. However, none of the results have been significant proven.

There hasn’t been much difference between defensive and offensive players in their

way of risk seeking. Although for both categories, the defensive players were slightly more risk seeking. However, this is not enough to conclude that there are differences in risk seeking between both types of players.

The results about self-respect in the experiment is corresponding with the earlier

described literature. Self-confidence has decreased for C junioren compared to E pupillen, due to children's awareness of other people's opinion. When children are playing in the E pupillen, soccer has more influence on their behavior off the field than when they are playing in the C junioren. These results for E pupillen seem to be a trend with some

significant results. In the C junioren the influences decrease and the results are more based on coincidence.

Ultimately, this paper has to end with reference to the coincidence mentioned in the introduction, about offensive soccer players and their gamble addiction. Although offensive soccer players are commonly known to have a gamble addiction, offensive players weren’t more risk seeking than defensive players. A possible relation hasn’t been proven in this research.

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23 Future research

To make this paper more representative and valuable, a youth team of a professional soccer club ought to be contacted to participate in this experiment. If this category would join this experiment, there would be a larger variety of groups: amateur players, good players and extremely talented players. Perhaps the differences between amateur players versus extremely talented players are larger, than the differences between the categories in the paper.

In the experiment a total of 42 male youth players participated. The participants have

their residence in the village of Castricum. The area of Castricum is known as a prosperous environment, in which there is a large social cohesion. Perhaps the conduction of an experiment on the population of Amsterdam would give different results. A larger amount of participants would improve the experiment. Furthermore it would be interesting to conduct an experiment with sports or to do the same experiment with girls. The experiment could be updated in the following way: play ultimatum game and dictator game for several rounds with 2 players, or different games could be played, for example the envy game that Fehr et all (2008) have used in their paper. Conduction of the experiment at another club would offer a solution to the following disadvantage of this experiment. Since the researcher of this paper is captain of the 1e senior team, the participants were familiar with the

researcher. This could have influenced the results. In what way is hard to predict, however expanding the experiment at another club could solve this possible issue.

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24 6. Appendix 1: Glenn Helder & publication newspaper

Glenn Helder

As mentioned in the introduction, Glenn Helder was a former professional soccer player. He played for the national Dutch team, Arsenal and other professional teams. Although he was a talented player, he frequently visited casinos during his soccer career to satisfy his gamble addiction. A comprehensive display of his private life, soccer career and experiences with

gambling has been described in his biography. 10

This paper consists of three hypotheses. It will be investigated whether there is a connection between soccer skills and selfishness, whether there is a connection between the type of player and their selfishness and finally whether there is a connection between the type of player and the way of risk seeking. Glenn Helder is an interesting figure for this research, because he contains several important elements: he is a former professional soccer player, had an attacking attitude during his soccer career and he was addicted to gambling.

On 19 June 2015 there was a personal meeting with the former Dutch international

to talk about this Master thesis and his permission to publish this interview and his vision about the experiment in this thesis. In the beginning of the conversation he didn’t know what this thesis was about and the experiment was similar to the other soccer players of F.C. Castricum (FCC). A few differences were implemented in the experiment, since Helder could win 100 euro, to conduct this experiment more realistically. In contrast to the participants of FCC, he couldn’t win any (real) money and his anonymity was not guaranteed. This might explain why he’s less selfish, now the money was fictive and these non-anonymous results could influence the public opinion about him.

The results

In the ultimatum game his proposal was 50/50 euro. He thought this was a fair offer and that the other player would easily accept it. When the opposite was offered and Glenn Helder was able to accept or reject a proposal of another player, he would have accepted every offer, even zero eurocent. His explanation was that the money wasn’t his and he would be satisfied with every little penny.

10 Glenn Helder Van Arsenal naar de Bajes written by Bert Nederlof

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For several years, the former striker has become more careful with money. In the past, he lent his money quite generously. Nowadays he realizes the real value of money. In the dictator game his division was 70/30 euro and in the risk seeking game made the choice to gain the certain amount of 50 euro. He values his self-confidence with the maximum of 7 and his social-image with the minimum of 1.

Conclusions

Helder fits the theory that a rational person would always accept any offer, even if it’s zero euro. In the ultimatum game he proposed 50/50 euro, which is equally divided and in the dictator game he offered 70/30 euro. This offer leads to an increase of 20 euro for his own benefits. Perhaps his proposal was more selfish, because he does not depend on the other player’s proposals in the dictator game. Nevertheless both offers aren’t extremely selfish. Moreover, in the risk seeking game he chose the certain option, for he explained that his gambling attitude isn’t existing anymore. If the experiment was conducted 20 years ago, he would have acted differently. Helder explained: ‘ It would not be: do I have to make a choice between option 1 of option 2, but how many times can I play option 2’. The answer of 20 years ago compared to this current response shows he’s done with gambling. The

conclusion of the experiment is that Glenn Helder nowadays wouldn’t not be exemplary for this thesis, but 20 years ago he would be more symbolic for the hypothesis of this thesis. During the conversation Glenn Helder talked about his own soccer career. He described himself as a very quick soccer player with a good technique and dribbles to outplay his opponents. He developed to this type of player, not only because of his selfishness and risk seeking attitude, but also his skills suited this way of playing, so his teammates were stimulating it.

His opinion is that youth players of a professional soccer club would be even more

selfish, since the environment of these players are increasing their selfishness. Possible explanations for strikers and their gamble addictions, might be that strikers earn a better salary, more attention, and more glory and perhaps are looking for a greater kick.

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27 Appendix 2: Tables

Table 8 E1 players

Age N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

8 10 11 10.75 0.4629 Ultimatum Self 8 50 80 61.875 11.9336 Dictator Self 8 50 100 81.125 19.2757 Social-image 8 1 5 3.25 1.5811 Self-confidence 8 5 7 6 0.7559 Table 9 E low players

N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation

Age 8 9 10 9.5 0.5345 Ultimatum Self 8 30 60 42.5 11.6496 Dictator Self 8 25 80 50.625 18.4076 Social-image 8 1 6 3.75 1.4880 Self-confidence 8 2 7 5.25 1.4880 Table 10 C1 players

Age 15 12 15 13.4667 0.7432

Ultimatum Self 15 250 490 298.6667 81.1407

Dictator Self 15 273 500 415.5333 86.5653

Social-image 15 2 5 3.8667 1.2459

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28 Tabel 11

C low players

Age 11 13 15 13.6364 0.6742 Ultimatum Self 11 50 400 268.1818 93.2543 Dictator Self 11 250 500 370.9091 95.8597 Social-image 11 3 5 4.1818 0.8739 Self-confidence 11 4 7 5.8182 0.7508 Table 12

Differences E1 & E low players equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test.

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Ultimatum game 0.0037 0.9525 3.2860 14 0.0054 19.3750 5.8962 Dictator game 0.2793 0.6054 3.2366 14 0.0060 30.5000 9.4233 Table 13

Differences C1 versus C low players equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test.

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed)

Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Ultimatum game 0.0963 0.7590 0.8889 24 0.3829 30.4848 34.2951 Dictator game 0.3133 0.5808 1.2414 24 0.2264 44.6242 35.9461 Table 14

Ultimatum game E pupillen.

Defensive =1 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Offensive = 2

9 51.6667 15.41104 5.13701

1

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29 Table 15

Dictator game E pupillen.

Offensive = 2

1 9 72.1111 23.05127 7.68376

2 7 57.8571 24.64027 9.31315

Table 16

Ultimatum game C junioren.

Defensive = 1 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Offensive = 2

1 13 2.823.077 6.722.522 1.864.492 2 13 2.892.308 10.428.019 2.892.212

Table 17

Dictator game C junioren.

Offensive = 2

13 427.6923 82.8808 22.9870

1

2 13 365.6154 92.1770 25.5653

Table 18

Defensive players & Offensive player E pupillen.

Defensive =1

Offensive = 2 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Ultimatum game 1 9 54.4444 15.0923 5.0308 2 7 49.2857 15.9239 6.0187 Dictator game 1 9 65.5556 21.2786 7.0929 2 7 66.2857 29.0673 10.9864 Self-confidence 1 9 5.5556 1.5092 0.5031 2 7 5.7143 0.7559 0.2857 Social-image 1 9 3.7778 1.3017 0.4339 2 7 3.1429 1.7728 0.6701

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30 Table 19

Differences defensive & offensive players E pupillen. Equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test. F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Ultimatum game 0.0147 0.9052 0.6624 14 0.5185 5.1587 7.7882 Dictator game 1.0483 0.3233 -0.0581 14 0.9545 -0.7302 12.5567 Table 20

Defensive players & Offensive player C junioren.

Defensive =1

Offensive = 2 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Ultimatum game 1 13 279.2308 67.1393 18.6211

2 13 292.3077 104.0155 28.8487

Dictator game 1 13 393.8462 94.1221 26.1048

2 13 399.4615 92.6126 25.6861

Table 21

Difference defensive players & offensive players C junioren. Equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test.

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Ultimatum game 1.0729 0.3106 -0.3808 24 0.7067 -13.0769 34.3365 Dictator game 0.1278 0.7238 -0.1533 24 0.8794 -5.6154 36.6229 Table 22

Defensive & offensive players E pupillen. Risk seeking game.

Defensive = 1

Offensive = 2 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

1 9 1.3333 0.5000 0.1667

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31 Table 23

Difference defensive & offensive players E pupillen. Risk seeking game. Equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test.

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference

0.1497 0.7046 0.1909 14 0.8513 0.0476 0.2494

Table 24

Defensive & offensive players C junioren. Risk seeking game

Defensive = 1

Offensive = 2 N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

1 2

13 1.3846 0.5064 0.1404

13 1.3077 0.4804 0.1332

Table 25

Difference defensive & offensive players C junioren. Risk seeking game. Equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test.

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference

0.6095 0.4426 0.3974 24 0.6946 0.0769 0.1936

Table 26

Self-confidence & social-image E pupillen related to the risk game.

Self-confidence N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Risk averse Option 1 11 5.5455 1.3685 0.4126

Risk seeking Option 2 5 5.8 0.8367 0.3742

Social-image

Risk averse Option 1 11 3.2727 1.7373 0.5238

Risk seeking Option 2 5 4 0.7071 0.3162

Table 27

Differences self-confidence & social-image E pupillen related to the risk game. Equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test.

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Self-confidence 0.4522 0.5122 -0.3806 14 0.7092 -0.2545 0.6688 Social-image 4.6201 0.0496 -0.8894 14 0.3888 -0.7273 0.8177

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32 Table 28

Self-confidence & social-image C junioren related to the risk game.

Self-confidence N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean

Risk averse Option 1 17 4.1176 0.9926 0.2407 Risk seeking Option 2 9 3.7778 1.3017 0.4339

Social-image

Risk averse Option 1 17 5.6471 0.8618 0.2090 Risk seeking Option 2 9 5.4444 0.5270 0.1757

Table 29

Differences self-confidence & social-image C junioren related to the risk game. Equal variances assumed. Independent sample T test.

F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference Std. Error Difference Self-confidence 2.1999 0.1510 0.7459 24 0.4630 0.3399 0.4556 Social-image 1.4726 0.2367 0.6411 24 0.5275 0.2026 0.3160 Table 30

Self-confidence & social-image.

Self-confidence N Mean Social image N Mean

E pupillen 16 5.63 E pupillen 16 4.88

C junioren 26 4 C junioren 26 5.58

Table 31

E pupillen & C junioren. Defensive players versus offensive players related to risk seeking. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test.

N Difference Z P-value

E pupillen 16 0.04 -1.000 0.317

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33

Appendix 3: Experiment & Letter

Experiment E pupillen

Number Age

Past season

Team you played most of your games Position you played most of your games

Are you more attacking or more defending in the field

Important

In this group, some participants get 1 round paid by lottery. So it’s important to think about your choices.

Your participation is not mandatory, but I appreciate your participation. Thanks for participating !

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34 Situation 1:

Someone gets the opportunity to divide 1 euro between himself and an unknown player of the E pupillen of F.C. Castricum

This E pupil can accept or reject the proposal. If he accepts, they both receive this proposal. If he rejects, they both receive zero euro.

Example 1 proposal is 50 cent for themselves and 50 cent for the unknown player.

Someone Unknown player E pupillen

Proposal 50 cent 50 cent

Accept 50 cent 50 cent

Reject 0 cent 0 cent

If this player accepts the proposal, they both receive 50 cent. If the proposal is rejected, they both receive 0 cent.

If this player accepts the proposal, someone receives 80 cent and the unknown player of the E pupillen receives 20 cent. If the proposal is rejected, they both receive 0 cent.

Control question

Someone does a proposal in which he gets 90 cent and the unknown player of the C gets 10 cent. Can you fill in the right numbers ?

Proposal …cent …cent

Accept …cent …cent

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35 Situation 2:

Someone gets the opportunity to divide 1 euro between themselves and an unknown player of the E pupillen of F.C.Castricum. This proposal is really going to happen. The other player can’t change it.

Outcome 50 cent 50 cent

The other player has no choice and has to accept the proposal. Someone receives 50 cent and the other unknown player of the E pupillen receives 50 cent.

Outcome 35 cent 65 cent

Control question:

Someone propose 90 cent for themselves and 10 cent for the unknown player of the E pupillen. Can you fill In the right numbers?

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36 Situation 3:

Option 1: You certainly receive 1 euro.

Option 2: You have 50% chance to win 2 euro. Someone throws a coin. If it’s heads you win 2 euro and if it’s tails you win 0 euro.

With option 2 someone throws a coin. The chance for heads is equal for the chance of tails. Both is a 50% chance.

Example:

Option 1 Option 2

Head 1 euro 2 euro

Tail 1 euro 0 euro

Someone choice for option 1. Can you fill In the right numbers?

option 1

How much does this person wins ? … Will someone throw a coin? …

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37

Number………..

Question 1:

You get the opportunity to divide 100 eurocent between yourself and an unknown player of the E pupillen of F.C.Castricum. He can accept the proposal or he can reject the proposal. If he accepts the proposal, you both receive the proposal. If he rejects you both receive 0 euro.

What’s your proposal?

Self Unknown player E pupillen

Proposal … cent …cent

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38

Number………..

Question 2:

You get the opportunity the divide 100 eurocent between yourself and an unknown player of the E pupillen of F.C.Castricum.

Self unknown player E pupillen

The other player has no choice and has to accept this proposal.

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39

Number………..

Question 3:

Option 1: You certainly get 2 euro

Option 2: You have got a 50% chance to win 4 euro. Someone throws a coin. If it’s heads you win 4 euro and if it’s tails you win 0 euro.

Option 1 or option 2 Choice

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40

Number………..

Ending

How important do you think what others think about you ? On a scale from 1 to 7.

1 means you don’t think it’s important at all, while 7 means you think it’s really important.

Circumscribe the number. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

How much self-confidence do you have on a scale 1 to 7?

1 means you feel no self-confidence, while 7 means you feel a lot of self-confidence.

Circumscribe the number. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

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41 Experiment C junioren

Number Age

Past season

Team you played most of your games Position you played most of your games

Are you more attacking or more defending in the field

Important

Of this group, some participants get 1 round paid by lottery, so it’s important to think about your choices.

Your participation is not mandatory but I appreciate your participation. Thanks for participating !

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42 Situation 1:

Someone gets the opportunity to divide 1 euro between itself and unknown player of the E pupillen of F.C.Castricum

This E pupil can accept or he can reject the proposal. If he accepts they both receive this proposal. If he rejects they both receive zero euro.

.

If this player accepts the proposal, they both receive 50 cent. If he rejects this proposal they both receive 0 cent.

If this player accepts the proposal someone receives 80 cent and the unknown player of the E pupillen receives 20 cent. If he rejects this proposal they both receive 0 cent.

Control question

Someone does a proposal in which he gets 90 cent for themselves, as well as for the unknown player of the C

Can you fill in the right numbers ?

Accept …cent …cent

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43 Situation 2:

Someone gets the opportunity to divide 1 euro between themselves and an unknown player of the E pupillen of F.C.Castricum. This proposal is really going to happen. The other player can’t change it.

Outcome 50 cent 50 cent

Outcome 35 cent 65 cent

Someone proposes 90 cent for themselves and 10 cent for the unknown player of the E pupillen. Can you fill In the right numbers?

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44 Situation 3:

Option 1: You receive certainly 1 euro.

With option 2 someone throws a coin. The chance for heads is equal for the chance of tails. Both is 50% chance.

Example:

Option 1 Option 2

Head 1 euro 2 euro

Tail 1 euro 0 euro

Someone chose for option 1. Can you fill In the right numbers?

option 1

How much does this person win ? … Will someone throw a coin? …

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45

Number………..

Question 1:

You get the opportunity to divide 5 euro between yourself and an unknown player of the C junioren of F.C.Castricum. He can accept the proposal or he can reject the proposal. If he accepts the

proposal, you both receive the proposal. If he rejects you both receive 0 euro. What’s your proposal?

Self Unknown player C junioren

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46

Number………..

Question 2:

You get the opportunity to divide 5 euro between yourself and an unknown player of the C junioren of F.C.Castricum.

Self unknown player C junioren

The other player has no choice and has to accept this proposal.