Federal Europe or a Europe of sovereign states?
MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School of Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam
Carlotta Nardone 12304042
Mw. Prof. Dr. L.A. Luiza Bialasiewicz Dr. Marjet Brolsma
Table of contents
Abstract ………..…………..……....2
Acknowledgments ………..………….2
List of abbreviations and acronyms……….3
List of figures………...5
1. Introduction ………...6
2. The idea of Europe ………..12
2.1 - European identity ………....23
2.2 - European symbols ………...29
2.3 - Europe without citizens ………...33
3. Federalism………...……….40
3.1 - Nationalism v. Souverainism ……….……….42
3.2 - The federal idea……….………...50
3.3 - The 2019 European elections.………..62
4. Conclusions...………...65
Bibliography: Primary sources………...………...67
Bibliography: Secondary sources………...…...………...72
List of interviews……….…..73 Appendix……….73 Appendix 1……….73 Appendix 2……….79 Appendix 3……….84 Appendix 4……….90
Abstract
The principle aim of this thesis is to critically address the contemporary challenges facing the European Union, particularly in relation to the historic development of the ‘idea of Europe’ and federalist visions for integration. In the first chapter, the idea of Europe is examined - from its origins in Ancient Greece and Rome to the present day - retracing the most important and relevant steps in the evolution of this concept over the centuries. Subsequently in the second chapter, the idea of Europe is interpreted through an analysis of European symbols and research into a common feeling of belonging at a European level. In order to understand the profound cultural and educational deficit affecting the European Union, the issue is explored through a series of first-person interviews with European politicians and specialists who deal with EU issues on a daily basis. In the third chapter, federalism is the central topic and is addressed through both a historical and theoretical lens. Subsequently, and after a comparative analysis of nationalism and souverainism, the last European elections (2019) are discussed in terms of the future of federalism. Conclusions are then drawn on the uncertain future of Europe and whether it will increasingly resemble a federation or a group of sovereign states.
Acknowledgments
To all of my family. First of all, to have the opportunity to write this thesis and to study in Amsterdam is thanks to the efforts and sacrifices of my family. I am eternally grateful to all of them for their trust and for encouraging me to follow my dreams. To my parents, Andrea and Montse, who have always motivated and helped me. To my ‘little’ brother and sister, Flavio and Maria Lourdes, who, although we are not living in the same country, made the distance just a number. To my Spanish aunts, Rossana and Macarena, who are my rocks. To my grandparents, Valerio and Paola and my uncle Paco who are always there. To Giacomo, who is awesome for supporting me anytime, anywhere. To my supervisor Professor Luiza Bialasiewicz, I would like to express my sincere gratitude for her amazing support during the entire programme - I could not imagine having a better mentor. Last but not least, to all my
List of abbreviations and acronyms
CEEC - Committee for European Economic Cooperation CoE - Council of Europe
EC - European Commission ECB - European Central Bank
ECSC - European Coal and Steel Community EEC - European Economic Community EDC - European Defence Community EHEA - European Higher Education Area ERP - European Recovery Programme EMU - European Monetary Union EP - European Parliament
EU - European Union
EUNIC - European Union of National Institutes for Culture HEIs - Higher Education Institutions
MEP - Member of the European Parliament
OEEC - Organization for European Economic Cooperation SEA - Single European Act
TEU - Treaty on the European Union
TFEU - Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union UEF - Union of European Federalists
UN - United Nations
UNESCO - United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization YEF - Young European Federalists
List of figures
Fig. 1 - European citizens’ sense of belonging...24
Fig. 2 - Changes in the feeling of European belonging over the years (2010-2018)...24
Fig. 3 - Feeling of European belonging divided by member states…………....…...……....25
Fig. 4 - National or European citizenship?………..………...26
Fig. 5 - Items intended to promote a feeling of community in the EU.……….…..27
Fig. 6 - Focus on shared values………..………..27
Fig. 7 - Speed of European integration………...………..28
Fig. 8 - UNESCO World Heritage Sites……….………..33
Fig. 9 - EP and Eurosceptics between 2018 and 2019………..………...……... 64
Chapter 1 - Introduction
Over the course of many centuries, the European continent has evolved from a geographical entity to a shared cultural system, and from a historical space to a political and social venue that reflects the society that populates it. Throughout time, Europe has been synonymous as the cradle of Western civilisation and culture but also with wars and massacres, culminating in a unique idea that eventually materialised with the creation of the European Union (EU). This came as the result of a new representation of Europe which, following the destruction of the Second World War, is built upon on various supranational and federalist theories that have arisen throughout the continent’s history. The EU is therefore the result of a long and still ongoing process which over time became a response to the risk of new wars. To introduce this research, it seemed appropriate to start with a speech from Pericles (495 - 429 BC), given in 461 BC by the Athenian statesman. As Thucydides points out in the Stories (II, 34-36), it is right and proper to begin with the ancestors giving them the tribute of remembrance, especially in circumstances of crisis. Pericles states:
‘This is what we do here in Athens.
Here our government favours the many instead of the few: and that is why it is called
democracy.
That is what we do here in Athens.
The laws here ensure equal justice for all in their private disputes, but we never ignore the
merits of excellence.
When a citizen distinguishes himself, then he will be, in preference to others, called to serve the State, but not as an act of privilege, as a reward for merit, and poverty is not an impediment.
This is what we do here in Athens.
The freedomwe enjoy also extends to our daily lives; we are not suspicious of one another and we never bother our neighbour if our neighbour likes to live in his own way.
An Athenian citizen does not neglect public affairs when he or she waits for his or her own private affairs, but above all he or she does not deal with public affairs to resolve his or her private affairs.
That is what we do here in Athens.
We have been taught to respect the judiciary , and we have also been taught to respect the law and never forget that we must protect those who receive offense.
And we have also been taught to respect those unwritten laws that reside in the universal feeling of what is right and what is common sense.
This is what we do here in Athens.
A man who is not interested in the state we do not consider him harmless, but useless; and although few are able to give life to a policy, well everyone here in Athens is able to judge it.
We do not see the debate as an obstacle to democracy.
We believe that happiness is the fruit of freedom, but freedom is only the fruit of value. In short, I proclaim that Athens is the school of the Ellade and that every Athenian grows up developing within himself a happy versatility, self-confidence, readiness to face any situation and that is why our city is open to the world and we never hunt a foreigner.
This is what we do here in Athens’ (Pericles’ discourse to the Athenians, 461 BC in Tucidide, 1971).
Pericles delivered this speech on democracy to the Athenians as well as to other civilisations which may be considered today as an immortal piece of classical European culture. The thesis is introduced with this statement by the Athenian leader for two different reasons. The first is to identify classical culture as the root from which Europe was born. The second is the desire that in the near future we might say, ‘This is what we do here in Europe’,
when witnessing the sharing of common principles and values among all Europeans.
A similar appeal was made by the Italian writer and journalist Paolo Rumiz, in his book Il filo infinito (2019). In the book, the writer describes the historical period of the Middle Ages, ranging from the fall of the Roman Empire in 476 AD until the end of the 15 th
Century, focussing on a unifying thread that links the whole of European history - the Benedictine Abbeys. According to Rumiz, the Benedictines, disciples of Benedict of Norcia -
the patron saint of Europe - managed to save Europe with the sole force of faith with the assistance of a very simple formula, ora et labora (pray and work). They began their mission
during the hardest of times, in the years of violence and disorder that followed the fall of the Roman Empire. Those years are also known for the mass movement of pagan tribes such as the Huns, Vandals, Visigoths, Lombards, Slavs and Hungarians in waves across the continent. The Benedictines Christianised them and made them European by the sole force of their example whilst saving a millenary culture and reordering a devastated and abandoned territory. In their monasteries, they built resilient and formidable garrisons of faith. In his book, Rumiz recounts Benedictine life and above all, the enduring values of their mission (Rumiz, 2019). In the Middle Ages, the monks had to face many of the same problems as today, for example, how to accept and integrate foreigners and ‘European barbarians’ (the Europeans who have lost a sense of civilisation) at the heart of European history and culture? Or even, how to build Europe? However, there is a strong contrast between the commitment of that time to build and today’s impetus to break it up, as well as between the enthusiasm of that time and the contemporary bureaucracy that can be seen to immobilise everything, but also regarding the values of hospitality, sharing, and a current culture of selfishness (Rumiz, 2019). Despite these differences, Rumiz draws parallels:
‘Like the monks who re-founded Europe under the impact of the barbarian invasions. Like the founding fathers of the Union that after two World Wars restored dignity and wealth to a continent on its knees. They knew that Europe was not a free gift, but an achievement, and often a dream born of despair at its absence. They dared to dream on it when everything seemed lost. Let’s imitate them, let’s build a network with our brothers and sisters in other countries to make those who do not resign themselves to a return of walls and the language of violence feel less alone’ (Rumiz, 2019: 174).
Also during the Middle Ages, another inspiring phenomenon came through the birth of the first European universities (e.g. Bologna in 1088, Cambridge in 1209, Salamanca in 1218, Sorbonne in 1253, etc...). They originally arose from the need of small communities of individuals who were willing to learn and spread culture and science through their different fields. The mobility of professors and students allowed them to study or teach in different
teachers were able to move from one country to another, thus creating a cultural union within and throughout Europe. As this thesis will suggest, education as it was throughout history, is still a key to opening the door to a new future for Europe.
As a final note, approaching Europe from a more literary angle, a certain parallel can be observed between Antoine de Saint-Exupéry’s The Little Prince and the modern-day citizens of the European Union. The narrator of the book, exhausted by the request of his diminutive companion to depict a sheep, draws a house and claims that the sheep is inside. Instead of protesting, the Little Prince manages to see his sheep inside the house (Saint-Exupéry, 2014). Perhaps European citizens too should recover that capacity for vision and astonishment within a common home, and build a Europe in which they can live as active citizens. Currently, the drawing of Europe that has been inherited is the one that Mario Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank (ECB), described in the following passage at the awarding of a laurea honoris causa in Law from the University of Bologna.
‘The European Union has been a political success built within the international order that emerged after the Second World War. It has been a faithful interpreter of the values of freedom, peace and prosperity on which that order was founded.
The European Union has been an economic success because it has provided an environment in which the energies of its citizens have created widespread and lasting prosperity founded on the Single Market and protected by the single currency. The last decade has dramatically highlighted the shortcomings of national policies and the need for cooperation to evolve both within the EU and beyond’ (Draghi, 2019).
In relation to Draghi’s words in the last paragraph and considering the current zeitgeist in Europe as one of troubled societies and strengthening and growing self-declared anti-European forces, is it relevant to ask what idea of Europe has been consolidated throughout history? And moreover, as one of these ideas, can federalism be seen as a solution to European integration? In particular, this thesis focuses on trying to understand the historical reasons that prompted the leaders of different countries, each emerging from a bloody conflict which saw them arm themselves and fight against each other, to overcome differences and hatred in order to achieve a higher common goal of peace and prosperity.
Starting from the analysis of the ‘idea of Europe’ and with a specific focus on federalism, this thesis will identify the main bases on which a new European project might be re-imagined. In Chapter Two of this thesis, the development of the idea of Europe will be evaluated, from Ancient Greece to the establishment of the EU following the destruction of the early 20th Century. Subsequently, the role of European symbols in the making of a
European identity will be discussed. This will be linked directly to the challenge of building a Europe ‘without citizens’ - a challenge identified by a number of the EU officials that were interviewed as part of the research for this thesis. Building on these complex histories, I will begin to interrogate various contemporary visions of Europe in Chapter Three, focussing specifically on the difference between souverainism and nationalism, secondly I will explore the development of the federal ideafrom the mid 1200 until the present days with a specific focus on the 2019 European elections.
A strong Europe, in its values and institutions, is beneficial for member states themselves but also for the rest of the world (Draghi, 2019; Prodi, 2018; 2019). In a globalised system, having a political, social and economic area like the European one, characterised by a set of democratic political systems, social welfare schemes and economic structures open to the market, is highly advantageous. It can also point the way or be a model for emerging or transitional countries (Draghi, 2019). In these terms, the EU can also represent an intermediate and dialogic entity between the different global powers.
This research was conducted at a highly relevant time, due to the tumultuous nature of the political and social systems of Europe in recent years. Therefore, in regards to my approach, it was appropriate to write this thesis in order to analyse, study and fully comprehend what has been done so far, including possible errors and potential solutions. Methodologically building on this, the research utilises academic texts as well secondary sources including first-person interviews with key contemporary figures in the European institutions. This research method was chosen for two reasons. Firstly, it aims to explore in-depth both the origins of the idea of Europe and federalism from a historical point of view, using key academic texts. Secondly, by taking an inductive and adaptable approach, the themes and concepts could be related to the first-person interviews with politicians and technocrats who deal with European issues on a daily basis. A limitation of this research is
Eurosceptics. Nevertheless, I believe that the choice of focus on explicitly pro-European (and, indeed, ‘federalist’) agendas and policy-makers allows the thesis to still raise a series of important points regarding Europe’s current condition and future.
Chapter 2 - The idea of Europe
Whilst the construction and existence of Europe is under threat, as it has been for the almost last ten years stemming from the eurozone crisis, and exacerbated by large arrivals of non-European migrants and most recently due to Brexit, we must return to questioning ourselves about its (and our) origins. Europe is unconventional, an adventure from its inception. The attempt to create a union between different states by putting the ‘gentleness of rights and civility’ before the ‘force of weapons and instinct’ was the first step towards a unique path (Padoa-Schioppa, 2004). In these terms, it is necessary to remember that the belief in a European project was born before the institutions and the wars. Within the fields of education and culture at a European level, one of the most relevant figures is the Italian Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Silvia Costa. She was both president and a member of the Committee on Culture, Youth, Education, the Media and Sport (CULT Committee) elected for the first term in 2009 and subsequently re-elected in 2014. Due to her expertise, I interviewed Costa as part of the data collection of this thesis. According to Costa, the feeling of Europe, as described by Padoa-Schioppa, is one of being ‘crossed’. Europe was always crossed by migrants, traders, artists, religious travellers and mutual acquaintance, especially when the borders were much more ephemeral. Therefore it is after the establishment of nation states that this issue has become more rigid. However, before it was much more fluid and was in essence, a European culture (Costa, 2019). According to Costa, Europeans must rediscover this past. Indeed, they must start from all the various great seeds of civilisation (e.g. the Roman legal civilisation, the Greek philosophical civilisation) but they must also not forget what the European social model represents in a globalised world where the protection of human rights, asylum of migrants, protection of minors, the right to social protection are the acquis communautaire that needs to be updated.
Considering the various crises that are afflicting Europe (which are mainly economic and developmental in nature), it is vital to discuss the idea of Europe and why we should care
about it, especially nowadays. The birth of the EU and the adoption of the single currency are two of the most important acts at an international level in recent decades, with the union of many countries - who were historically often at war with one other - characterised in large part by mature parliamentary democracies and developed economic systems, being unique to
the rest of the world. In these terms, the recent financial and debt crisis has resuscitated the debate about the EU, the notion of European identity and the possibility of a federation: ‘A theme that seemed not to have survived the painful constitutional adventure that ended with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009’ (Borriello and Crespy, 2015: 502). Within a wider context of global instability, the EU and the institutions are also facing a re-conceptualisation in terms of strategic priorities as well as through new definitions of Europe and Europeans. Within a historical, political and economic framework of analysis, the creation and the enlargement of Europe was the consequence made inevitable by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the aspiration for a divided continent to come together in peace. Whilst it was a seismic event, it interrupted what was supposed to be the leap towards a more integrated political Union and therefore also affected the delicate balance between the market economy and social spheres respectively (Costa, 2019). But, what was this idea of Europe that lead some European countries to come together into the EU, and where it come from?
According to the historian Federico Chabod (1901-1960), European consciousness means differentiating Europe, as a political and moral entity, from other entities, continents or groups of nations (Chabod, 1961). Therefore, the concept of Europe must be formed in opposition to something else: something that is not Europe. In this way, it acquires its characteristics and is defined in its elements (Chabod, 1961). The first known contrast between Europe and something that is not Europe arises in Ancient Greek philosophy. Indeed, between the 5 th and the 4 th Century BC, the idea of European consciousness arises
against an Asian one. Afterwards, in the long period between the Persian Wars and the age of Charlemagne in the Early Middle Ages, the sense of a Europe continues in its fundamental opposition to Asia, especially in terms of customs and political organisation: for example, a Europe that represents freedom in opposition to Asian despotism. If, at the beginning, it was created as a defence awareness, later it will also acquire an expansionist offensive character (Chabod, 1961). The central element here is Greek political freedom, which implies the presence of citizens, and not subjects, who live according to the law and not according to the despot’s will. This would also result in military superiority because they are more motivated to fight. In his writings, Isocrates, (436 BC - 338 BC) an Athenian orator, refers to a
European policy as opposed to an Asian one, to which first Philip II of Macedon (382 BC - 336 BC) and then Alexander the Great (356 BC - 323 BC) should have conformed, having been both invited to form a European power to stand against Persian power in Asia. The
unification of the Hellenistic ecumene, including all the known world, prevented the use of geographical binaries within Greece and pushed in the direction of European/non-European, and subsequently Roman/Barbarian opposition. This contraposition was also the basis for the Christian/Pagan binary. Moreover, during the Carolingian age where Charlemagne (742-814) was Rex pater Europae, Europe was still merely a geographical concept, whilst the ideological binding agent came from religion (Chabod, 1961).
Thanks to the Italian poet Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) it is possible to notice more curiosities that lie beyond the boundaries of modern Europe. According to him, Europe is the Central-South Western part of the continent - the block of Romano-Germanic peoples. In this perspective, the Greeks are pushed back towards the Asian area. This is probably due to the process of separation within the Church, between Roman Catholicism and the heresy of Byzantium. This contrast culminates in the religious field with the schism of the East in 1054 and the definitive separation of the Greek Church from the Roman Church, in the political field with the Crusades and the projects of Western conquest in the East. At this point, the ‘Europeans’ were called Latins or Franks as opposed to Greeks or Byzantines. The literature at the time even ascribed psychological traits to the two opposing characters. The former were described as brave, loyal and faithful knights, whilst the latter were portrayed as greedy, cunning and perfidious, resulting in Ulysses being punished as a traitor in Dante’s Inferno (Canto XXVI).
Following the development of the idea of Europe among the centuries, the Renaissance introduced the standard of cultural affinities, moral and spiritual criteria, as well as customs as an identifying criterion of belonging beyond religion. During this period, many discussed a cultured Europe being constituted of a network of universitas (Chabod, 1961). In these terms, one of the leading figures was Erasmus from Rotterdam (1466-1536). However, the religious factor remained the dominant identifier, whilst the Barbarian moved further and further away, and became the non-European (see Bartolomè de las Casas 1484-1566).
The first formulation of Europe as a community that has specific characteristics separate from a specific geographical area and involving non-religious characteristics was articulated by Niccolò Machiavelli (1469-1527) therefore having a political connotation. In his bookDell’arte della guerra he describes with the following statement how European men
are admirable and virtuous because of the Republic (Chabod, 1961: 49; Machiavelli, 1971: 65-66).
‘Cosimo: I would desire to learn from you, if you have ever pondered this with yourself, whence such baseness and disorganization arises, and such negligence of this training in our times? Fabrizio: I will tell you willingly what I think. You know of the men excellent in war there have been many famed in Europe, few in Africa, and less in Asia. This results from (the fact that) these last two parts of the world have had a Principality or two, and few Republics; but Europe alone has had some Kingdoms and an infinite number of Republics. And men become excellent, and show their virtu, according as they are employed and recognized by their Prince, Republic, or King, whichever it may be. It happens, therefore, that where there is much power, many valiant men spring up, where there is little, few. In Asia, there are found Ninus, Cyrus, Artafersus, Mithridates, and very few others to accompany these. In Africa, there are noted (omitting those of ancient Egypt) Maximinius, Jugurtha, and those Captains who were raised by the Carthaginian Republic, and these are very few compared to those of Europe; for in Europe there are excellent men without number, and there would be many more, if there should be named together with them those others who have been forgotten by the malignity of the time, since the world has been more virtuous when there have been many States which have favored virtu, either from necessity or from other human passion. Few men, therefore, spring up in Asia, because, as that province was entirely subject to one Kingdom, in which because of its greatness there was indolence for the most part, it could not give rise to excellent men in business (activity). The same happened in Africa: yet several, with respect to the Carthaginian Republic, did arise. More excellent men come out of Republics than from Kingdoms, because in the former virtu is honored much of the time, in the Kingdom it is feared; whence it results that in the former, men of virtu are raised, in the latter they are extinguished. Whoever, therefore, considers the part of Europe, will find it to have been full of Republics and Principalities, which from the fear one had of the other, were constrained to keep alive their military organizations, and honor those who greatly prevailed in them. For in Greece, in addition to the Kingdom of the Macedonians, there were many Republics, and many most excellent men arose in each of them. In Italy, there were the Romans, the Samnites, the
Tuscans, the Cisalpine Gauls. France and Germany were full of Republics and Princes’ (Machiavelli, 1971: 65-66).
For the first time, Machiavelli introduced the idea of a necessary multiplicity of states.
This notion was formulated as a necessary condition for maintaining European balance and ensuring freedom for its citizens (Chabod, 1961).
Subsequently, it took until Voltaire (1694-1778) for this concept of multiplicity to appear again. For the Enlightenment writer and philosopher, Europe appeared ‘as a kind of great Republic, divided into various states, some monarchical, others mixed, some aristocratic, others popular, but all connected with each other, all with the same religious foundation, even if divided into various sects, all with the same principles of public law and politics, unknown in other parts of the world’ (Chabod, 1961: 56; Voltaire, 1994: Cap. II). The principle of public law to which Voltaire refers to represents a great step forward compared with Machiavelli’s which was resolute in the evaluation of political and military virtue. Although Europe always has had its own political characteristics, these are no longer enough: the European political type is linked to a different type of civilisation from that of the other continents. The decline of the Christian role as an identifying element contributed the discovery of America and the resulting evangelism (and when they found themselves to be Christians on both sides of the ocean, together with Protestant reformation) contributed to the smoothing and delimiting of the borders (Chabod, 1961). Alongside Voltaire during the Enlightenment, Montesquieu and Rousseau were also significant figures for their political visions of the time. Highlighting the necessity of cosmopolitanism in the sciences, courteousness in customs, and a general secularism (which largely went against the European ideal), these ideas characterised the Enlightenment and were built into the nationalistic ideal from the second half of the 18 th Century. This ideal was reaffirmed through the protection of
the specificity of the individual as Rousseau made explicit in his assertion that there were no more French, Germans or Spanish - there were only Europeans, because all of them have the same tastes, the same passions and the same costumes (Chabod, 1961). Rousseau was against a European idea that did not respect the national characteristics and that was against the uniformity and standardisation of attitudes, ideas and customs.
With the arrival of Romanticism, Novalis, pseudonym of the German philosopher and poet Friedrich Leopold von Hardenberg (1772-1801) and a scholar of Friedrich von Schlegel, took up the ideal of medieval Christianity as the principle of ordination. The ideas of Novalis significantly clashed with those of the Austrian politician Metternich (1773-1859). Metternich’s principle idea is best summarised by the concept of Restoration which necessitated Europe to be a balance of states (Chabod, 1961). Metternich’s conservative vision of Europe meant the rejection of nationalities, the homeland and the underlying ideal of freedom. Subsequently to that, the two visions were reconciled by Italian politician Giuseppe Mazzini (1805-1872), the ‘anti-Metternich’. According to Mazzini, the homeland was the instrument to progress from the individual to humanity. For him, the term humanity could be reimagined as Europe: a young Europe, a Europe of peoples that was about to triumph, succeeding an old and dying Europe of principles. Furthermore, the Italian observed that each nation has a mission to accomplish that could place it in harmony with humanity. The idea of this mission was a way of attributing the development of individual national identities and aspirations to a wider civil community (Chabod, 1961).
Throughout the 20th Century, from the World Wars to the fall of the Berlin Wall and
the end of the Soviet Empire, Europe was hit by several catastrophic episodes. As a result, both the European political sphere and the general public started to question the future of Europe and its people. In fact, the idea of Europe was once again placed at the centre of various discourses where many prominent figures expressed their opinions and hesitations. Towards the beginning of the 20 th Century, the French historian and professor Marc Bloch
(1886-1944) was one such contributor to these debates. In 1932, after an invitation from the Royal Academy of Italy on behalf of the Volta Foundation, he arrived in Rome to discuss the current state of Europe, its future and the meaning of its existence. After this event in 1935, he published his paper, Problèmes d’Europe. According to Bloch, the notion of Europe was a notion of crisis, even panic: ‘Panic of death from starvation, the competition from all sides of which threatens the great European industries; panic of revolts that plunge into the old colonial hegemonies; panic of seeing our nations invaded by social forms that for the moment are very different from our own’ (Bloch, 1935: 40). This is meant as the reason for historical individuality rather than the condition of Europe’s political experience. The notion to which Bloch referred to was a state of mind on which Europe had built its territorial physiognomy. Moreover, he pointed out that from this panic ‘good Europeans can be born’ (Bloch, 1935).
Among these Europeans the historian noted intellectuals and politicians who were well aware of the profound crisis that had been threatening Europe since the beginning of the 20 th
Century. A notable colleague of Bloch from this period was Lucien Febvre (1878-1956), a French historian and professor at the Universities of Dijon, Strasbourg and the College of France. He exerted a considerable influence on the French historiography during the 20 th
Century, not only from his research but also from the journal Annales which he founded in 1929 together with Bloch. Moreover, he addressed the concept of Europe by ridding it of myths and falsifications. Febvre analysed this concept through the same categories that guided him in his research, inscribed in the framework idea of civilisation, a term full of ambivalences. According to Febvre, what the war destroyed needed to be rebuilt. His notion of Europe, which represented the homeland of freedom, was a refuge for those who still believed - even after the destructions and infamies of the World Wars - in a respectful society of citizens’ rights within a peaceful system of national states (Febvre, 1999).
Therefore, it was natural that the years following the Second World War, including the years of the German Katastrophe, the end of Italian fascism, the recognition of the Shoah, and the beginning of the Cold War, represented an crucial moment for the reopening of the debate about Europe that, as previously mentioned, found its roots in the texts and works of great philosophers and historians throughout history, from Ancient Greece to the present day. An important aspect to underline is that during that period there was a particular urgency for the revival of this debate. European governments, together with other countries, were involved in the creation of the Western bloc in order to create forms of economic and political integration. From this context came the domination of Western Europe in the character and tone of almost all the European debate from 1945 until the fall of the Berlin Wall.
Even before the end of the Second World War, and during the Cold War, Europe did not resemble a cohesive political system and referring to Europe during those years did not allude to an artificial political construction but rather to European national states themselves. According to Touraine (2005) in Primizie e Memorie d’Europa , with the exception of the United Kingdom, which played an active role in defeating Nazi Germany, neither France nor any other ally of the ‘winners’ coalition’ of Western European states played a significant role. Germany was divided in two and dishonoured, while Italy slowly rebuilt its political
disappearance of independence or political autonomy became the main concern of European leaders. The statements by respective French and German leaders General De Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer were aimed at expelling the spectre of war from the European continent because clearly no European country was in a position to manage war again (Touraine, 2005). But these declarations made it evident that the different states wanted to find a certain capacity for political coexistence. At the same time, it is clear that this new European project could only have a limited ambition. Considering that Europe aligned itself reasonably spontaneously with the United States, allusions can be made to the contradictory nature of European integration. However, the ideas for a new Europe focussed around a political construction that could restore a capacity to intervene to all European countries, particularly in matters that concern them closely. However, this kind of Europe could only have limited
sovereignty, since the Europe that was liberated was also a Europe in ruins. Here then, is a formulation that, without opposing it, clearly differed from the status quo. From the very beginning, Europe was a political project that strengthened and took shape quickly, also becoming an economic project but only ever reaching limited sovereignty (Touraine, 2005). Moreover, Europe and the wider post-war world were dominated by an almost unique model of social and political organisation that can be called ‘models of integrated national development plans’. This model has obviously taken strikingly different forms in communist and social-democratic countries, but it is important to stress the two fundamental factors that are at the heart of this type of management: the role of the state and the close association of economic, social and political objectives (Touraine, 2005). In Europe, this model of economic cooperation was also favoured by the Marshall Plan (1947) proposed by the Americans. The Plan provided that the European nations, in order to obtain some funds, would form the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) established in 1948 (Martin de la Torre, 2019; Bache et al., 2011).
Returning to the disastrous effects of the war, the priority became that of reconciliation between Germany and France. In fact, the decision to push the coal and steel industries of six European countries into a union led to the ratification and signing of the 1951 Treaty of Paris. This was a historic event that would forever symbolise the birth of a common mission and market towards genuine European integration. Subsequently in 1957, the Treaty of Rome consolidated this desire for a common future (Novak, 2017).
Since the ambitious European project started it was followed by the institutions’ (European Parliament, European Commission, Council and the Council of Europe) intention to create and build a ‘European sense of belonging’. The first step towards achieving their goal occurred in 1973. This year was also particularly significant because it saw the first enlargement of the Union leading to a total of nine member states overall. Moreover, during the same year the ‘Nine’ established during the Copenhagen Declaration that:
‘The time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe’ (Copenhagen Declaration, 1973: 2).
This desire to create a European identity did not end in Copenhagen but continued when the Belgian politician Leo Tindemans (1922-2014) received instructions by the member states to edit and publish a report on how the European Union might be understood. In the publication’s third chapter it is possible to find references to a Citizen’s Europe(Tindemans, 1976). In his report, Tindemans outlined that Europe must be closer to its inhabitants and that ‘the construction of Europe is not just a form of collaboration between States. It is a rapprochement of peoples who wish to go forward together, adapting their activity to the changing conditions in the world while preserving those values which are their common heritage’ (Tindemans, 1976: 26).
Following this conceptualisation of the EU, Europeans waited until the formulation of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty for the first official introduction of some cultural competences (the first inception of the EU was an economic endeavour). In the meantime, during the 1980s, EU institutions tried different cultural implementations, for example introducing the European City of Culture programme. In this context, European citizens became conscious of their identity within a common culture (Littoz-Monnet, 2012). 1985 was another relevant year regarding the construction of a European identity because during a conference in Fontainebleau, a member of the European Council stated that ‘the Community should
promote its identity and its image both for its citizens and for the rest of the world’ (Adonnino Report, 1985: 5). On this basis, an Italian MEP chaired a working party on a
People’s Europe. The result of the team’s work stressed the importance of culture and the creation of key communitarian symbols to build social cohesion, exemplified by the European flag and anthem (Adonnino Report, 1985). At the heart of the report, stood the idea that the integration project should not exclusively involve market-making but also a project of community building. Thus, the broader European project could promote a sense of European identity amongst its citizens (Littoz-Monnet, 2012; Adonnino Report, 1985). Another turning point can also be considered the 1987 Declaration of Santiago de Compostela, whereby the Council of Europe launched the Cultural Routes programme. All of these initiatives could be considered to constitute an arterial system that, through physical and ideal paths, connects distant European places that contribute with their vitality to preserve the European identity (CoE, 2018).
The most important shift within the EU began during the 1980s and reached its peak in 1992 with the amendment of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU) in Maastricht. With its ratification, the treaty modified the former project and created a union based on three-pillars (the European Community (I), the Common Foreign and Security Policy (II) and the cooperation in the field of justice and home affairs (III)). In particular it moved away from deterministic and mechanistic models towards more culturalist approaches (Shore, 2000). In Brussels, many argued that the old neo-functionalist approach was no longer working and that the EU needed to invest more in culture in order to promote greater consciousness of European culture to involve its citizens in the making of Europe (Shore, 2000). The treaty presented its main aims under Title II ‘Provisions on Democratic Principles’ from art. 9 to art. 12 TEU (see Maastricht 1992; Bux, 2017) introducing the European citizenship.
Coinciding with the millennial turn and an ongoing cultural shift, the most elaborate part of the EU integration began. The establishment of coordination between the European Union National Institutes for Culture (EUNIC) in 2006 was also remarkable. In those years, there was a plan composed of three main aspects that held together the union: 1) the introduction of the euro; 2) the enlargement of the EU to include countries that in the decades of the Cold War had been part of Eastern Europe controlled by the Soviets; 3) the European Constitution signed by many EU countries in 2004 (Prodi, 2017). Despite that, in France and
the Netherlands, referenda took place to approve the treaty and when the majority voted against the process, it came to a definitive standstill. After intense negotiation stages, the constitution was ratified in 2009 and resulted into the revised version of the Treaty of Lisbon. One of the main obstacles to the ratification was the lack of a common European identity (Fornäs, 2012).
This deceleration of the integration process was the first sign that public opinion in the individual member states was shaken much before the crisis in Greece, the Brexit referendum and a general rise in Euroscepticism. Since there has been a resulting transfer of powers from the Commission to the national governments, the strongest ones have tended to win - Germany, for example. (Prodi, 2017). Mario Draghi, the President of the European Central Bank during a speech in Bologna, underlined that:
‘(The) tension between economic integration and political cooperation is fuelled by a powerful belief that there is an inherent trade-off between EU membership and the ability of countries to exercise sovereignty. In this way of thinking, if citizens want to be able to exert more control over their destinies, they have to loosen the EU’s political structures. But this belief is wrong. It is wrong because it conflates independence with sovereignty. True sovereignty is reflected not in the power of making laws – as a legal definition would have it – but in the ability to control outcomes and respond to the fundamental needs of the people (...). The ability to make independent decisions does not guarantee countries such control. In other words, independence does not guarantee sovereignty’ (Draghi, 2019).
After the failed European constitutional changes, there has been a little more development and encouragement of a free-market area with all the advantages that might be taken economically but less from a socio-cultural perspective (Borriello and Crespy, 2015). Of course, this process brought the EU further down the path towards a closer integration, although the process has been mostly economic. Thus, the EU has invested relatively little in the social sphere and more in a currency without a system of economic and financial governance in a situation of globalisation which has also greatly displaced the centrality of Europe, which has become part of a multi-centre world. It is also important that Europe instituted austerity policies of a financial and monetary nature and postponed social and
change as well (Costa, 2019). This was an EU strategic error because it weighed heavily, in economic and social terms, on the citizens, even if some of it was necessary. Therefore, Europe could be seen to not have used the years when countries had a different and more inclusive view of the EU in its favour. Today, the EU is at a crossroads, where Jean Monnet’s words seem to be particularly salient: ‘If we were to do it all again we would start with
culture’ (Costa, 2019; see also Shore, 2000).
Throughout the past twenty years, ‘Euroscepticism has been on the rise and exploited by anti-system parties, national leaders have to face a political hiatus and respond to increased needs for symbolic and discursive legitimation of further federalisation’ (Borriello and Crespy, 2015: 502). According to Tommaso Visone:
‘In recent political debate, it is considered natural to associate nationalism and Euroscepticism, specifically the association between anti-federalist nationalism and Euroscepticism as the ideological core of the Anti-EU discourse. From Marine Le Pen to Nigel Farage, Viktor Orban and Matteo Salvini, there is a unanimous affirmation of the necessity to defend national sovereignty against the threat posed by Brussels bureaucracy and institutions’ (Visone, 2018: 27). 1
2.1 - European identity
After exploring the evolution of the ‘idea of Europe’ that has continually developed and evolved over time, this section will address questions of European identity utilising Eurobarometer data from Spring 2018 that shines light on ideas of European citizenship and sense of common belonging.
From the following graph (fig. 1), it is possible to deduce that: ● 89% feel attached to their city/town/village;
● 93% feel attached to their country;
● 56% feel attached to the EU versus a 42% that not feel attached; ● 65% feel attached to Europe.
1 Some parts of chapter 2
-the idea of Europe are drawn upon the course paper: Nardone, Carlotta (2019) “European
Fig. 1 - European citizens’ sense of belonging
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 89 - Spring 2018
Fig. 2 - Changes in the feeling of European belonging over the years 2010-2018
After reading the bars of the Eurobarometer (fig. 2), 70% of respondents feel that they are citizens of the EU. The data did not change since Autumn 2017 and remains the highest number until now (Eurobarometer, 2018). However, to have a clearer idea of the singularity of each member it is possible to investigate it through another graph (fig. 3).
According to fig. 3, the respondents who identify themselves most as EU citizens are from Luxembourg (93%), Ireland (85%), Germany (84%). Contrastingly, Bulgaria (51%), Greece (51%) and Italy (56%) provide the lowest scores (Eurobarometer, 2018). Thus, it is suggested that the EU countries with the lowest scores are also the ones more affected by austerity policies. Despite this, it is still significant that more than half of the Greek respondents, for example, still feel European. In the last positions of the chart there are also those countries where the rising of populism is evident.
As illustrated by fig. 4, the majority of the member states’ citizens primarily recognise themselves as citizens of their country and secondly as Europeans (Eurobarometer, 2018). Only 2% of respondents define themselves as solely European. Despite these numbers and according to the treaties, European citizenship can be complementary to national identity (art. 9 TEU), therefore the most relevant data of the graph are the 55% (Nationality and European) and the 6% (European and Nationality) of identities.
Fig. 3 - Feeling of European belonging divided by member states
Fig. 4 - National or European citizenship?
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 89 - Spring 2018
Conforming with the numbers of fig. 5, among a list of twelve items, the respondents choose culture (29%), history (23%) and values (23%) as their top three factors responsible for creating a feeling of community within the EU (Eurobarometer, 2018). The result of this graph (fig. 5) also complied with the idea of Europe observed in the above paragraph (see Chapter Two - the idea of Europe).
Moreover, this reasoning will be developed in Section 2.3 ( Europe without citizens). Despite that the respondents shown in fig. 5 attributed 23% to ‘values’, had they been asked to consider ‘shared values’ the result would have been likely to be completely different (fig. 6). According to the following chart (fig. 6) 53% see European member states totally ‘close’ against to 41% totally ‘distant’. It is worth noticing that the discrepancy between the two scores is just 12% (Eurobarometer, 2018).
Fig. 5 - Items intended to promote a feeling of community in the EU.
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 89 - Spring 2018
Fig. 6 - Focus on shared values
Fig. 7 - Speed of European integration
Source: Standard Eurobarometer 89 - Spring 2018
Finally, the last graphic (fig. 7) demonstrates that European citizens would like a ‘greater speed’ in the building of Europe and its integration (Eurobarometer, 2018).
On balance, considering fig. 1 to fig. 7, the feeling of belonging to a common identity as Silvia Costa stated, appears to be ‘partly there’ (Costa, 2019), but it is neither valued nor highlighted by any institution nor the national governments. Nowadays, the threads are now too intertwined, both because it is very complicated to leave the union (as exemplified by Brexit) but also to isolate oneself from it. Indeed, it is felt that Brexit will have great economic consequences for the UK but despite that, it could be interpreted as the biggest publicity coup ever made for the EU given that, for example, thousands of young British citizens have requested their continued participation within the Erasmus programme (Costa, 2019). So there is a widespread sentiment in favour of maintaining a general European consciousness although overall, citizens are disappointed by the lack of answers conveyed in Brussels. Before, the primary need was to respond effectively to the economic and financial crisis, but now is time for the EU to reopen the agenda that most directly affects its citizens.
2.2 - European symbols
After analysing and studying the data shown by the previous graphs and illustrations, it is clear that process of integration was not wholly successful – indeed somewhere there has been a miscalculation. As Gideon (2015) notes, resembling a house has been built without any foundations, Europe has been created without any real involvement of its citizens and especially with just economic integration in mind. In particular, as highlighted above, the economic integration combined with the fiscal efficiency and austerity of recent years have occupied a primary position in European institutional agendas, leaving aside developmental, social and cultural policy matters. Moreover, by observing issues of European sentiment more closely, two assumptions can be made. Firstly, it is a feeling of belonging to a community of law and values. Secondly, it represents a distinctive national sentiment. In this sense, how important are the symbols for a European nation?
The fact that there is not a widespread European sentiment is not a problem as it can be developed through time. Italian national sentiment offers a comparable example, as it was not ‘born’ until 1800, at least amongst the general population. Initially, it only took hold amongst the intellectual class living on the Italian peninsula that was divided into 1100 municipalities, grand-duchies and principalities. The Italian national sentiment developed from the programmatic political vision of the Renaissance intellectual class and, over the years and resulting in the conquests of the 19 th Century, nationalism became associated with
liberalism and resulted in the ideology of national liberation with its key values of self-determination, universal suffrage, etc. Nowadays, nationalism could be seen as something completely different, as a nationalism of ‘my land first’, ‘stay outside of my borders’ and may in fact be better defined as neo-nationalism (Putoto, 2019; Glück, 2019). It is evident (see Chapter Two on the idea of Europe) that Europe has a tradition of common values, common cultural and intellectual roots like Christianity or the Enlightenment. However, it is a space where, for example, European citizens have many different ways of understanding the rule of law, within an extremely diverse group of different member states. Are these elements enough to create a political community? Many modern nation states have consolidated their territorial boundaries and national identities through war and bloodshed, but can the EU achieve the same throughpeace? According to the executive board member of
the Young European Federalists (YEF), Sebastiano Putoto, this is the great challenge of federalism (Putoto, 2019).
In this section of the chapter, a potential solution to promote a sense of European consciousness will be critically explored, focussing on the the use of symbols to help increase a feeling of identity and belonging (Fornäs, 2012). In Building Europe, Shore (2000) states:
‘…The emphasis on culture as an integrative mechanism and possible solution to the riddle of European unification marks a fundamental shift in official EU discourses on integration… The role that symbols play in the articulation and formation of patterns of consciousness and identity is crucial to understanding how Europe is being constructed as a political community. (...) It is only through symbols that the meanings and ‘reality’ of ideas such as state, nation, citizenship and Europe itself can be rendered tangible and comprehensible’ (Shore, 2000: 36-42).
Shore puts the importance of symbols at the centre of the discussion, articulating them as an easier way for citizens to truly understand what unites and separates them and especially what kind of political area they want to create (Fornäs, 2012: 61-62). Currently, it is possible to recognise five clear European symbols: the flag, the motto, the anthem, the Euro currency and Europe Day (9th May). Unfortunately, despite the different initiatives of the European institutions, these European symbols are unrecognisable for many and not linked to a common identity. As various scholars have argued:
‘The principal EU symbols strive to promote an image of Europe as strong, united and beneficial for all. A closer interpretation, guided by comparing these symbols with other and sometimes oppositional symbols, has disclosed a series of inner tensions and contradictions in this signifying process. The cumulation of interpretations has resulted in a rich symbolic web of signification with a number of main themes that point at key facets but also tensions in European identity. One such tension runs between the strong hopes that shared symbols would strengthen the European project and their striking lack of success so far’ (Fornäs, 2012: 251).
The European identity will always be intertwined with other identities, it could never be just one single sense of belonging because of its multiplicity. In fact, it could be formed by different and contested identities, developing and overlapping with each other (Fornäs, 2012). Symbols certainly have a role to play in empowering identity and may also facilitate a sense of European nationalism. In terms of symbolism and the European experience, the Euro currency was a symbol that proved initially successful yet now is also considered the symbol of a failed European policy which has in turn, has negatively affected EU integration (Glück, 2019). Moreover, focussing on symbols through the lens of current challenges to Europe, Romano Prodi provoked Italian and European citizens by telling them to display the European flag from their balconies. Starting in 1999, during his five year team as President of the European Commission, the EU experienced some of its most significant historical moments such as the introduction of the Euro and the enlargement of the Union to twenty-five countries together with an effective and intense neighbourhood policy. Regarding the need for two separate flags in the build-up to the 2019 elections for the European Parliament, Prodi stated that:
‘In our houses we need two flags, the European and the Italian one. One next to the other. The European flag serves to guarantee our future, because when faced with giants like the USA and China, either we are in Europe or we cannot even guarantee our tricolour flag, which represents our identity, our welfare, our lifestyle. Paradoxically, sovereigns do not understand that by weakening Europe they are also weakening the sovereignty of the Member States’ (Prodi, 2019).
Prodi affirms that citizens should fly the European flag the first day of Spring, 21 st
March. Of course, the date is not coincidental: it is also the anniversary of the birth of Saint Benedict, Europe’s patron. Saint Benedict appealed to people to connect with common European values, starting with religion, to rebuild the soul of Europe, when the Roman Empire collapsed during the 5th Century. Prodi (2017) also states that ‘we need a new
Risorgimento’. After the rejection of the Constitution, division returned to Europe. In foreign policy, Europeans have been divided over conflicts in Lebanon, Syria and Libya. In the struggle for technological supremacy, the competition lies between the Americans and Chinese. Raising the blue flag with the yellow stars is a dedication to the existence of Europe
and Europeans. Beset with various challenges, Europe’s existence is increasingly in question. However, with its characteristics, it could be an effective force - not as a world power, but rather as an entity with a role of balance. Europe is a point of synthesis and balance where the greatest invention of the last century, welfare, is strongly grounded. It does not exist comparably in the United States or in China. For Prodi (2017), Europe is the value that people live in their daily lives.
It is evident that symbols are necessary in establishing a cohesive political community and that they also serve to raise citizens’ awareness of its meaning. For example, waving the European flag fosters understanding in not only what it represents (Europe) but also the objective of creating a political community. Currently, according to European Federalist Sebastiano Putoto, the great enemy of the federalist battle (of which the adoption of unifying symbols represents a crucial part) is the ‘Europeanism of the status quo’. This stresses that integration can continue on an intergovernmental basis where progress must be made, rather than a qualitative leap (e.g. defence policy) and where one day ‘everything else’ - a federation most likely - will come (Putoto, 2019). But the central point is different: if a nation-state has the capacity to safeguard the rights of its citizens, the EU is not necessary. Conversely if Europe does not serve an effective purpose, the question would be: How, in a hyper-globalised world, can the process of globalisation be guided in a direction that best serves its citizens, and how can its citizens be protected from the thrusts of other global powers. Therefore, if this represents both the diagnosis and the solution via the existence of a
European federation, integration must occur and citizens must be allowed to choose which Europe they prefer. In this context, a European constitution is needed, representing the most important symbol that one could have as a citizen. No advance in the integration process will have a stable and lasting life if it is not underpinned by a democratic and constitutive process (Putoto, 2019).
Building on this analysis, it is my belief that the cultural, natural and landscape heritage (for example, Europe is the continent with the most UNESCO sites - fig. 8), is another distinctive element in constituting identity of Europe (McCarthy, 2018). Based on this, the foundations can be laid for a genuine and heartfelt European citizenship that goes beyond what it is enshrined within the treaties, creating awareness among citizens. 2
Fig. 8 - UNESCO World Heritage Sites
Source: www.forbes.com - October 2018
2.3 - Europe without citizens
Nowadays, it is important to be aware of how difficult it is to communicate to citizens what the construction of the European Union has meant. Former President Prodi recounts that ‘when I tell young people that in Europe we have lived in peace for over seventy years, while just outside our borders we have witnessed bloody wars and ethnic persecution, they look at me like a dinosaur. Young people were born in peace, theirs is the first European generation to have no relatives dead in war’ (Prodi, 2019). However, the paradox is that the objective of the ‘founding fathers’ was to guarantee the new generations a free space for cooperation and development, without any fear of war and its devastation. The objective has been achieved, but the task of the ‘dinosaurs’ (Prodi, 2019) cannot be considered finished for the new generations. The inestimable value of peaceful coexistence must be remembered, and also that peace is never taken for granted or indeed guaranteed forever. Monnet, Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi all had the experience of two World Wars in common as well as a genuine desire to leave a legacy for future generations. The main achievement of these founding fathers was to recognise that peace and a common project stood above all personal or ideological differences between them and their countries. They succeeded in building a climate of trust in order to engage in the most audacious political adventure of all time
(Martin de la Torre, 2019). This has had wide-ranging consequences, for instance the Erasmus generation experiencing the privilege of freedom movement around Europe without the limits of borders, being able to live amongst a mixture of languages and knowledge that cannot be exhausted in a form of individual experience. For this reason, the European institutions must address this natural inclination of young people in the future and support it through new ideas and a new commitments. Therefore, European citizens must not only talk about the past, but also about the future, and can do this within fields such as education, as well as through focussing on the environment and rights. Only by sharing knowledge can Europe expect innovation and employment (Prodi, 2019).
During the interviewing process for this thesis, it was important to ask a variety of questions to different MEPs and Members of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) regarding their idea of Europe but, above all, to ask what is still lacking for the achievement of the integration process. Mostly, the respondents recognised a deficit in ‘European
education’.
Considering Silvia Costa’s political commitment to culture and education, it was appropriate to focus questioning - considering the current European scenario - on the value that symbols have and how they can help to create a sense of European belonging. During her ten years of work at the European Parliament, Costa devoted herself to cultivating a sense belonging and European citizenship from below. This process encourages citizens to practice a European dimension in their lives as well as strengthening European symbols as a structure or institution. Therefore, the Italian MEP has dealt with these issues and committed herself to building a European area of education through the development and increasing of funds for the Erasmus programme. However, it is not just about Erasmus, but also about building and allowing a system of equal opportunities, with the inclusion of the most disadvantaged and not only the most privileged in the creation of a European curriculum. Nowadays, as younger generations are those in the population who are chiefly invested in so-called progressive issues (e.g. environment, sustainability, languages, etc.), they are also more invested in achieving a sense of European citizenship (Costa, 2019).
According to Silvia Costa, some of the answers that have been given in recent years in the EP have been: 1) Firstly, trying to invest in the construction of a citizenship based on solidarity, thus enabling general innovation especially for those countries that do not have
