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Common(s) sense for our universities : a guide to cultivating commons systems and commoning in and around our universities

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Common(s) sense for

our universities

A guide to cultivating commons systems and

commoning in and around our universities

Michael Vermeer (10470727)

THESIS ALTERNATIVES TO CAPITALISM: MODELS OF FUTURE SOCIETY Supervisor: Annette Freyberg-Inan

June 2019

Master Thesis Political Sciences UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM

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Table of Contents

Acknowledgements Preface

1.   Introduction

Part 1 – Economic, critical and historical perspectives 2.   Common Goods and Common Pool Resources 3.   Capitalist capture and the politics of the Common 4.   Commons histories – a tale of enclosures

5.   Implications for the university Part 2 – Patterns and Systems

6.   Commoning - the social dimension of commons 7.   Categories and patterns of commoning

8.   Social system analysis Part 3 – Commons and Capital

9.   Relations between commons and capitalist social systems 10.  Structural analysis of the capital-commons relation

11.  Commons working within market contexts

12.  From commodities to common wealth – aiming for distance between commons and commerce

13.  Educating subjects between commons and commercial systems

14.  Escaping the power of capitalist capture – potential roles of the university Part 4 – Prefigurative University Commoning

15.  An education in university commoning

16.  Applying commoning social labour to an urban university 17.  The trust university

18.  Designing research according to commoners’ value practices 19.  Conclusion 4 5 6 9 15   19   25         29   31   33         37   38   42   44     47   55         60   63   67   71     74    

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Acknowledgements

Thank  you,  Yvonne  and  Wilco,  for  all  the  care  and  space  that  you  have  given  me  in  the  past   months  so  that  I  could  research  and  finish  this  thesis.  This  paper  talks  a  lot  about  

reproductive  labour,  and  I  am  well  aware  that  you  have  put  a  lot  of  such  loving  effort  into   taking  me  back  in  your  house.  I’m  proud  that  my  family  has  been  the  place  in  which  I  picked   up  many  of  the  ‘commoning  patterns’  I  mention  in  my  writings.    

 

I  am  also  hugely  grateful  for  all  the  support  and  insights  that  my  fellow  commoners  at   Commoning  UvA  have  given  me.  Joining  this  research  group  with  you  has  changed  me   forever.  Especially,  Soheila,  you  have  been  so  generous  with  sharing  your  knowledge  and   wisdom.  Danna,  Sepp,  Koen,  Anna,  Max,  Geertje,  Ernst  and  Thijs,  I  have  learnt  so  much   working  with  you  and  hope  to  continue  commoning  with  you  all.  

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Preface

Commoning  goes  down  deep  in  human  history  in  all  civilisations.  As  a  practice,  it  has   adapted  and  transformed  itself  to  stay  alive  through  empires,  genocides  and  waves  of   enclosures  taking  away  lands,  dwellings,  rivers  and  coastlines  to  put  them  in  the  hands  of   some  profitable  or  military  enterprise.  It  developed  across  generations,  it  moved  from  rural  

places  to  cities  and  vice  versa,  always  bringing  memories  and  resources  of  all  types  which   were  pulled  into  new  contexts:  on  shop  floors  among  co-­‐workers,  in  lavatories  among   women,  along  rural  roads  being  mended  by  entire  communities.  It  gave  birth  to  children,  it  

nurtured  them,  it  healed  them,   it  cared  for  them,   it  played  with  them,  

it  fed  them,    

it  educated  them.    

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1.   Introduction

On  a  February  night  in  2015,  I  rushed  to  the  city  centre  of  Amsterdam  to  witness  an  event  that   changed   my   life:   The   Maagdenhuis,   central   administrative   building   of   the   University   of   Amsterdam,   had   been   occupied   by   students   and   staff.   Some   of   them   had   occupied   other   university  buildings  in  the  weeks  and  months  before  in  resistance  to  proposed  budget  cuts  to   the  humanities  faculty.  Others  had  only  just  joined,  like  me.  Many  people  harboured  a  long   frustration  with  a  gamut  of  policies,  which  undermined  their  autonomy  and  rationalised  the   operations  of  the  university  to  the  detriment  of  disciplines  that  could  not  justify  themselves   in   economistic   terms.   Apart   from   a   resistance   to   such   neoliberal   policies   at   the   UvA,   the   protests  also  created  a  common  space  to  articulate  critiques  of  the  broader  economic  and   political  trends  in  society.    

 

I  was  unsuspecting  at  the  time,  just  very  curious  what  was  going  on,  but  this  event  and  its   reverberations  in  the  weeks  and  years  thereafter  changed  my  life.  About  a  year  later,  I  met   Soheila,  Sepp  and  Koen,  who  had  organised  themselves  as  an  embryonic  social  group  of  what   was  to  become  Commoning  UvA.  Their  burning  question  was  what  would  happen  at  the  UvA,   if  nothing  happened.  This  was,  admittedly,  a  vague  question,  yet  it  was  a  question  that  set  us   on  an  open  ended  journey  of  inquiry  and  experimentation.  Meanwhile,  things  were  happening   at  the  UvA.  The  public  pressure,  anger  and  joyful  energy  of  the  occupation  had  translated  into   three  commissions  that  had  a  mandate  and  widespread  public  support  to  research  the  origins   of   the   protest   and   recommend   changes.   A   commission   on   Democratisation   and   Decentralisation   proposed   four   governance   models,   which   were   then     subjected   to   a   university-­‐wide  referendum.  One  of  the  models  was  termed  ‘the  self-­‐organising  university’  Its   ‘organizational  design  and  arrangements  of  units  at  the  basic  level’  would  be  ‘developed  by   employees  and  students.’  The  point  of  departure  for  this  model  ‘is  as  much  self-­‐management   and  distributed  leadership  as  possible  (Commissie  D&D,  2016,  p.  136).  Three  years  down  the   road,  such  visions  have  not  materialised  at  the  UvA.  Yet  since  I  joined  Commoning  UvA,  I  have   spent  much  time  together  with  other  members  researching  what  a  self-­‐organising  university   may   mean   in   theory   and   practice   and   how   we   could   transform   the   university   into   that   direction.    

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This  thesis  represents  my  most  sustained  account  of  those  inquiries  to  date.  It  maintains  that   universities  have  the  potential  to  be  common  goods  for  society,  yet  are  currently  surrounded   by  systems  and  infiltrated  by  mechanisms  which  extract  valuable  knowledge  for  private  or   individual  profit.  My  central  thesis  is  that  a  perspective  and  application  of  commons  systems   and   patterns   of   commoning   may   provide   a   genuine   path   forward   out   of   this   impasse,   by   generating   possibilities   for   new   alliances   between   a   growing   commons   ecosystem   and   university   faculties   which   reorient   their   mission   and   internal   organisation   to   serve   this   commons  system.  Commoning  universities  thus  carries  a  double  meaning  –  the  patterns  of   commoning   can   be   applied   both   internally   and   externally.   By   choosing   commons   as   my   interpretation  of  ‘self-­‐organised  university’  suggested  in  commission’s  report,  I  ground  my   proposals  for  the  university  in  a  wider  field  of  expertise  and  empirical  studies.  

 

In  part  one,  therefore,  I  investigate  scholarly  traditions  surrounding  common  pool  resources   and  the  Common.  To  gain  a  more  in  depth  understanding  of  my  subject  matter,  I  enquire  how   self-­‐organising  and  cooperative  efforts  break  down  or  persist  in  relation  to  capitalist  pressures   from  a  historical  and  environmental  perspective  and  I  integrate  key  insights  from  feminist   economic  thought  in  my  analysis.  Out  of  this  first  inquiry,  I  sketch  a  preliminary  research  and   action  agenda.  

 

In  part  two,  I  delve  into  the  intricacies  of  commoning  as  social  practice.  I  discuss  its  patterns   and  elaborate  upon  a  systemic  perspective  on  commons.  This  social  systems  perspective  then   allows  me  to  return  to  the  central  theme  of  this  thesis,  in  part  three,  which  is  the  fraught   relation  between  commons  and  commercial/capitalist  systems.  I  argue  that  these  should  be   kept   at   a   distance   from   each   other   in   order   to   prevent   the   enclosure   or   appropriation   of   commons.  From  here,  I  question  how  the  university  can  play  a  role  in  invigorating  commoning   practices  and  producing  cooperative  ‘commoner’  subjectivities  with  a  commons  transition  in   mind.  

 

For  the  final  part,  I  take  the  position  that  some  commoning  practices  are  already  present  in   contemporary   universities.   Taken   as   prefigurative   instances   of   what   could   become   a   commoning  university,  I  investigate  two  cases.  The  first  deals  with  an  example  in  which  social  

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labour   of   students   is   mobilised   for   commoning.   They   thereby   reproduce   basic   university   services  as  commons  and  may  acquire  a  sense  of  what  it  means  to  be  a  commoner.  The  second   case  deals  with  establishing  joint  research  agendas  and  practices  between  staff,  students  and   urban  commoners.  I  apply  both  cases  to  the  UvA  and,  drawing  from  the  previous  theoretical   discussions,  I  present  possible  difficulties  with  their  implementation.  Lastly,  I  give  an  indication   of   other   case   studies   and   proposals   that   could   be   investigated   or   experimented   with   in   a   similar  way.  

 

Throughout   my   research,   I   synthesise   the   latest   insights   into   commoning   practices   and   commons   systems   with   my   own   experiences   and   the   particular   environment   of   university   research   and   education.   The   scholarly   novelty   of   this   thesis   lies   in   its   argumentation   for   commoning  as  a  new  paradigm  for  universities,  as  also  the  application  of  the  theory  to  case   studies  which  prefigure  such  a  university.  The  research  has  its  main  applicability  on  social   sciences  and  humanities  faculties,  since  I  know  these  best  and  they  are  well  covered  by  the   literature  which  I  consult.  I  have  chosen  an  approach  in  which  I  oscillate  between  critiques   and  proposals  for  universities  in  general  and  the  University  of  Amsterdam  in  particular.  This  is   necessary  for  two  reasons.  First,  much  of  the  literature  that  I  use,  deals  with  analogous  trends   in  university  (systems)  elsewhere  and  thus  allows  me  to  abstract  from  the  UvA  to  a  more   general  picture.  Second,  sometimes  the  discourse  on  commoning  compels  me  to  locate  the   exact  environment  of  a  commons  system  and  its  practices,  and  in  those  cases  I  resort  to  the   UvA  if  not  stated  otherwise.  

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Part 1 – Economic, critical and historical perspectives

2.   Common Goods and Common Pool Resources

In  this  chapter,  I  recount  economic  scholarship  on  common  pool  resources  and  discuss  the   problems  with  the  popularly  known  account  of  the  tragedy  of  the  commons.    Then  I  present   Elinor  Ostrom’s  enduring  contribution  to  the  field  of  commons  scholarship.  I  argue,  however,   that   her   research   in   the   tradition   of   rational   choice   theory   has   several   weaknesses   and   is   unsuitable  as  a  general  method  for  my  inquiry.    

 

The  most  prevalent  way  in  which  commons  are  understood  in  our  society  is  through  defining   them  as  common  goods.  This  classification  stems  from  the  work  of  economists  Samuelson  and   Musgrave,  who  were  preoccupied  with  translating  the  macro-­‐economics  of  Keynesian  welfare   states  to  goods  provision  in  the  1950’s.  In  capitalist  countries  after  World  War  Two,  states   took  upon  themselves  the  task  to  provide  large  quantities  of  public  services  –  examples  are   national  healthcare,  pension  systems,  expanded  and  accessible  higher  education,  and  large   infrastructure   projects.   The   economists’   efforts   to   categorise   the   various   types   of   goods   provided  a  framework  to  define  which  goods  normatively  should  be  provided  as  public  goods   and  which  ones  would  need  to  be  private  (de  Angelis,  2017,  p.  37).  

 

They   devised   a   model   based   on   whether   goods   were   rivalrous,   ‘in   the   sense   that   each   individual’s  consumption  of  such  a  good  leads  to  no  subtraction  from  any  other  individual’s   consumption  of  that  good’  (Samuelson  1954:  386).  The  other  axis  consists  of  the  feasibility  to   exclude  others  from  using  the  good.  Ostrom  has  more  recently  revised  this  model  from  four   binary  options  to  a  gradient  scale,  resulting  in  the  following  matrix:  

 

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It  is  important  to  realise  that  this  matrix  only  classifies  goods  on  the  basis  of  how  they  are   consumed,   and   so   this   does   not   say   anything   about   the   conditions   under   which   they   are   produced  (de  Angelis,  2017,  p.  37).  In  this  classic  economic  distinction,  the  category  in  which   goods  fall  have  normative  consequences  for  their  governance  or  access  regime.  Lighthouses,   pavement,  fire  protection  and  public  order  non-­‐rivalrous  and  non-­‐excludable  –  it  therefore   does  not  yield  any  business  model  for  private  enterprise,  and  the  provisioning  needs  to  be   facilitated  by  the  state.    

 

Toll  or  club  goods  are  often  non-­‐rivalrous  up  to  a  certain  point,  like  motorways.  Their  use  by   one  individual  does  not  subtract  from  the  use  by  another,  up  to  the  point  that  there  is  too   much   ‘consumption’,   a   situation   we   know   as   congestion.   For   these   goods,   the   economist   Buchanan  argued  that  it  is  best  to  gate  keep  their  use  with  pricing  mechanisms.  In  such  a  way,   membership  to  use  a  good  can  be  regulated  to  an  optimum  (1965).  If  organisations  succeed   in  building  barriers  to  exclude  people  from  public  goods,  these  can  become  toll  goods.  Thus   this  goods  category  can  be  used  to  extract  rent  from  goods  that  could  easily  also  be  provided   in   the   public   realm.   In   any   case,   ‘most   tangible   goods,   both   durable   and   non-­‐durable,   are   subtractable  goods’  which  means  that  the  use  by  one  person  subtracts  for  the  amount  that  

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can  used  by  another  (de  Angelis,  2017,  p.  39).  If  they  are  also  excludable,  like  a  banana  that   can   only   be   eaten   once   or   a   house   that   owned   and   occupied   by   one   person,   the   matrix   classifies  them  as  private.  If  they  are  non-­‐excludable  yet  subtractible  goods,  they  are  common   pool   resources   (CPRs).   Fisheries,   irrigation   systems,   forests   and   alpine   pastures   are   prime   examples  of  goods  that  are  subtractable,  prone  to  depletion  upon  use,  while  there  is  no  way   to  exclude  people  from  using  them.  For  decades,  neo  classical  economic  doctrine  has  argued   either  for  their  privatisation,  or  for  a  public  regulation  of  access.  This  ensures  that  people  are   excludable  –  ownership  either  by  private  individuals  or  by  the  state  would  prevent  resource   depletion.  

 

At  the  heart  of  this  argument  to  privatise  CPS  lies  of  the  most  cited  works  on  commons,  a  1968   paper   by   Garreth   Hardin   titled   The   Tragedy   of   the   Commons.   The   article   describes   an   economic  scenario  of  an  open  grazing  land  for  which  no  individual  herdsman  has  an  incentive   to  limit  the  number  of  cattle  which  they  allow  to  graze  on  this  land.  Every  single  herder  is   rationally  inclined  to  maximise  their  amount  of  cows,  and  use  the  land  as  much  as  possible.   There  is  no  fence  around  the  pasture,  and  so  no-­‐one  can  be  stopped  from  making  use  of  it.   This  set-­‐up  inevitably  leads  to  the  overgrazing  of  the  land  and  a  breakdown  of  the  ecological   services  that  the  pastures  originally  provided.  This  parable  can  be  applied  to  numerous  cases,   such  as  the  use  of  ‘fossil’  water  from  aquifers  or  overfishing.  A  solution  on  the  basis  of  ethical   principles  is  unattainable,  Hardin  argues,  since  collective  action  among  these  rational  farmers   is  undermined  by  the  famous  free  rider  principle:  ’Whenever  one  person  cannot  be  excluded   from  the  benefits  that  others  will  provide,  each  person  is  motivated  not  to  contribute  to  the   joint  effort,  but  to  free-­‐ride  on  the  efforts  of  others’  (Ostrom,  1990,  p.  6).  In  this  atmosphere   of  generalised  distrust,  a  solution  cannot  be  found  in  common.    According  to  Hardin  such  a   common  solution  would  even  be  ‘too  horrifying  to  contemplate’  (1968,  p.  1247).  The  only   incentives  able  to  deal  with  this  collective  action  problem  are  to  either  privatise  the  resource   into  private  property  rights  or  to  regulate  it  through  a  public  institution  and  state  ownership.      

Hardin’s  account  of  the  commons  is  flawed  in  the  deployment  of  the  concept  of  commons,   the  generalisability  of  the  scenario,  and  in  its  empirical  accuracy.  Firstly,  the  assumption  that   every   actor   is   rational   in   this   very   narrow   self-­‐serving   way   vastly   underestimates   the   cooperative   traits   that   humans   can   cultivate   among   each   other.   We   find   common   self-­‐

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governed  solutions  among  friends,  in  co-­‐housing  (the  cleaning  schedule)  or  in  project  teams.   Hardin  does  not  explain  why  the  behavioural  patterns  of  those  conditions  could  not  transfer   onto  a  governance  of  CPRs.  Secondly,  while  he  makes  this  case  for  the  regulation  of  natural   resource  CPRs  through  private  or  public  property,  his  description  is  not  of  a  commons  but  of   an  open  access  regime  (Dietz,  et  al.,  2002,  p.7-­‐8;  Bollier,  2014,  p.3).  Commons  are  precisely  a  shared  

property  relation  which  prevents  the  resource  depletion  of  a  CPR.  This  misnomer  has  created   much  confusion  among  economists  and  the  general  public.  His  paper  should  have  been  called   the  tragedy  of  the  absence  of  commons,  or  tragedy  of  open  access  to  ungoverned  natural   resources.   Lastly   then,   this   theorisation   is   typical   of   broad   swiped   generalisation   through   stylised   scenarios,   instead   of   meticulous   fieldwork   and   thus   lacks   empirical   grounding,   especially  if  contextualised  (Dietz  et.  al.,  2002,  p.9).  

 

In  decades  of  empirical  studies,  Ostrom  set  out  to  prove  Hardin  wrong.  She  analysed  how  CPRs   are   used   and   maintained.   From   this   she   drew   the   conclusion   that   these   goods   could   be   sustainably   used   without   having   to   turn   them   into   private   goods,   or   regulate   their   use   by   government  oversight  (1990).  Importantly,  Ostrom  and  the  research  tradition  she  initiated   view  commons  as  a  tripartite  system  consisting  of  a  CPR,  a  community  using  the  CPR  and  the   institutional  framework  (norms,  rules,  sanctions)  devised  by  the  community  to  maintain  the   CPR.  For  her  commons  are  ‘a  self-­‐governed  common  property  arrangement  [CPR]  in  which  the   rules  have  been  devised  and  modified  by  the  participants  themselves  and  also  are  monitored   and  enforced  by  them’  (1990,  p.  20).  She  abstracted  ‘design  principles’  for  commons  from  a   multitude  of  case  studies  to  get  a  sense  of  the  internal  workings  of  commons  systems,  and   what  were  general  factors  for  their  successful  governance  of  CPRs.  These  are  the  eight  design   principles:  

 

1.  boundaries  are  clearly  defined  (effective  exclusion  of  external  unentitled  parties);   2.  rules  regarding  the  appropriation  and  provision  of  common  resources  are  adapted   to  local  conditions;  

3.  collective-­‐choice  arrangements  allow  most  resource  appropriators  to  participate  in   the  decision-­‐making  process;  

4.  effective  monitoring  is  carried  out  by  monitors  who  are  part  of  or  accountable  to   the  appropriators;  

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5.   there   is   a   scale   of   graduated   sanctions   for   resource   appropriators   who   violate   community  rules;  

6.  mechanisms  of  conflict  resolution  are  cheap  and  easy  to  access;  

7.  the  self-­‐determination  of  the  community  is  recognised  by  higher-­‐level  authorities;   8.  in  the  case  of  larger  common-­‐pool  resources,  organisation  takes  the  form  of  multiple   layers  of  nested  enterprises,  with  small  local  CPRs  at  the  base  level.    

(Ostrom  1990,  p.  90;  de  Angelis,  2017,  p.  158)    

Since   their   publication,   an   entire   framework   for   abstracting   institutional   regulations   has   developed   around   the   governance   of   CPRs,   called   institutional   analysis   and   development   (IAD).  It  seeks  to  encapsulate  ‘the  ways  in  which  institutions  operate  and  change  over  time.   The  IAD  framework  assigns  all  relevant  explanatory  factors  and  variables  to  categories  and   locates  these  categories  within  a  foundational  structure  of  logical  relationships’  and  under  the   assumptions   of   behavioural   rational   choice   theory   (McGinnis,   2011,   p.   169).   This   rational   choice   theory   takes   the   actions   of   individuals   and   their   inclinations   to   decide   one   way   or   another.  It  ‘incorporates  effects  of  visual  and  verbal  cues,  norms  of  reciprocity  and  fairness,   and   willingness   to   sanction   rule   violators’   (ibid.).   The   framework   that   Ostrom   and   fellow   researchers  have  provided  is  exceptionally  detailed,  and  provides  a  methodology  grounded  in   empiricism   which   is   exemplary   for   the   discipline   of   economics   and   has   proven   Hardin’s   generalising  theorems  on  ownership  and  goods  access  wrong.  For  her  efforts,  Elinor  Ostrom   was  the  first  and  to  date  only  woman  awarded  the  Swedish  Central  Bank’s  Nobel  Prize  for   Economics  in  2009.  For  a  number  of  reasons,  however,  I  will  not  use  her  methodology  for  my   further  investigations.  

 

Firstly,   rational   choice   theory   is   premised   upon   methodological   individualism   which   foregrounds  individual  actors  and  institutional  arrangements.  David  Bollier  and  Silke  Helfrich   argue  that  commons  represent  a  different  worldview,  that  should  not  be  analysed  in  this  way   because  they  question  neat  arrangements  of  objects  of  individuals  (2015).  Ostrom’s  resort  to   methodological  individualism  carries  within  it  the  assumption  that  ‘in  order  for  research  to  be   scientific  it  must  base  political  rationality  on  economic  logics  of  choice’  (Hardt  and  Negri,  2017,   p.   42).   A   political   rationality   is   a   ‘condition   of   possibility   and   legitimacy   of   its   [governing]   instruments’  and  ‘the  field  of  normative  reason  from  which  governing  is  forged’  (Brown,  2015,  

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p.  116).  I  seek  to  foreground  social  relations  and  systems  to  break  with  normative  scientific   standards  that  reproduce  our  worldview  of  rational  individuals.  In  this  investigation  I  assume   that   individual   subjects   with   their   specific   choice   patters   become   those   subjects   through   collective  processes  of  subjectification  (Lazzarato,  2014).  Helfrich  and  Bollier  explain  that  this   rationality  ‘points  to  a  dynamic  in  which  my  development  presupposes  the  unfolding  of  others   and   vice   versa.   The   term   thus   forms   a   counterpoint   to   an   (…)   orientation   in   which   it   is   considered  "rational"  to  act  at  the  expense  of  others’  (2019,  p.  85).  The  name  she  has  in  mind   for   this   rationality   is   Ubuntu   rationality.   My   research   methodology   needs   to   reflect   these   insights.   I   therefore   adopt   a   methodological   understanding   that   departs   from   individual   choice  as  the  baseline  of  theorisations  in  favour  of  systems  analysis,  a  pattern  language  of   cooperative   (commoning)   behaviour   and   a   relational   definition   of   humans   as   commoners,   whenever  they  participate  in  commons  systems.  

 

Secondly,  in  this  investigation,  I  seek  to  connect  to  people’s  intuitive  experience  of  commons   and  commoning,  as  a  central  argument  of  mine  is  that  the  majority  of  humans  have  practiced   it   in   some   way   or   another.   The   IAD   framework   provides   a   comprehensive   and   empirically   grounded   codification   of   rules   and   institutions,   and   yet   its   mathematical   and   sign   based   codification   may   provide   impractical   for   connecting   theoretical   insights   with   practice.   McGinnis  admits  that  ‘although  designed  as  a  tool  to  simplify  the  analytical  task  confronting   anyone   trying   to   understand   institutions   in   their   full   complexity,   over   time   this   [IAD]   framework  itself  has  become  quite  complicated’  (2011,  p.  169).  Instead,  in  my  case  studies  I   loosely  refer  to  patterns  of  commoning  and  the  relational  dynamics  in  the  commons  system.   The   downside   of   the   approach   I   choose   is   that   it   loses   intellectual   rigour,   and   yet   for   my   specific  purposes  this  is  fine.  While  the  IAD  framework  has  its  own  merits,  I  am  not  trying  to   draft  a  policy  paper  on  the  legal  and  administrative  requirements  of  (access  to)  commons.   Instead,  I  grapple  with  patterns  of  commoning  and  intend  to  shed  light  on  how  to  mobilise   overlooked  social  dynamics  for  new  cooperative  cultures.  

 

Thirdly,  a  blind  spot  of  Ostrom’s  literature  is  that  it  does  not  generally  evaluate  the  failures  of   commons  in  relation  to  capital  and  its  enclosures,  but  rather  in  terms  of  ‘combinations  of   outcomes  that  can  be  measured  by  efficiency,  sustainability  and  equity  criteria’  and  improved   with  better  designed  institutions  (Caffentzis,  2004,  p.  25).  To  answer  my  question,  how  self-­‐

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organising  and  cooperative  efforts  break  down  or  persist  in  relation  to  capitalist  pressures,   and  how  the  university  can  play  a  role  in  revitalising  commoning  of  privatised  services  and   producing  cooperative  subjectivities,  I  need  to  look  at  a  much  more  broad  scope  than  just  a   perspective  on  goods,  such  as  CPRs  and  rules  to  appropriate  them.    

 

In  the  tension  between  an  ‘interpretation  of  commons  as  endogenous  social  systems,  and   commons  as  systems  influenced  by  external  social  forces  or  capitalist  social  forces’,  I  pursue   the  second  direction.  This  has  consequences  for  my  line  of  analysis:  In  the  tradition  of  Ostrom,   ‘whether   a   commons   fails   or   succeeds   to   reproduce   itself   depends   on   its   management   principles.  In  the  second  case,  it  depends  on  the  power  relations  vis-­‐à-­‐vis  the  enclosing  (which   simply  destroys  commons)  or  co-­‐opting  (which  sucks  surplus  value  by  using  commons  as  a   way  to  keep  social  wages  down)  force  of  capital’  (de  Angelis,  2017,  p.  169).  In  the  coming   chapters  then,  I  investigate  production  processes,  the  reproduction  of  commons  systems  and   the  feedback  loops  that  exist  between  commons  and  capital  systems  from  contemporary  and   historical  perspectives  and  then  conceptualise  the  behaviour  of  human  actors  that  are  formed   by  commons  as  they  navigate  through  them  and  create  them.  

3.   Capitalist capture and the politics of the Common

This  chapter  discusses  the  commons  in  explicit  relation  to  capitalism,  through  the  particular   perspective  of  Michael  Hardt  and  Antonio  Negri’s  concept  of  the  Common.  I  show  that  this   tradition   of   scholarship   gives   numerous   inventive   ways   to   critique   the   appropriation   of   knowledge  and  labour  at  universities.  The  critiques  of  Lazzarato,  who  operates  in  the  same   autonomist  Marxist  tradition  as  Negri,  remain  highly  significant  throughout  this  paper,  yet  the   concept  of  the  Common  proves  to  be  too  unwieldy  for  a  fine-­‐grained  analysis  of  pathways  to   transform  the  university  and  its  surrounding  society.  

 

In  their  efforts  to  analyse  contemporary  economic  and  political  structures,  Hardt  and  Negri   reframe  basic  shared  functions  of  our  planet  and  human  cooperation  as  a  global  Common  –   using  the  term  in  singular,  and  sometimes  capitalised.  To  distinguish  between  other  uses,  I   capitalise  the  term  whenever  I  use  Hardt  and  Negri’s  conception.  They  agree  with  Ostrom  that    

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‘the  common  must  be  managed  through  systems  of  democratic  participation.  We  part   ways  with  her,  however,  when  she  insists  that  the  community  that  shares  access  and   decision-­‐making  must  be  small  and  limited  by  clear  boundaries  to  divide  those  inside   from  outside.  We  have  greater  ambitions  and  are  interested  instead  in  more  expansive   democratic  experiences  that  are  open  to  others,  and  we  will  have  to  demonstrate  the   feasibility  of  such  a  new,  fuller  form  of  democracy.’  (Hardt  and  Negri,  2017,  p.  99)    

They   depart   from   the   empirical   framework   of   CPRs   in   favour   of   an   investigation   of   potentialities  for  ridding  the  Common  from  privatisation.  The  Common  is  understood  as  both   our   global   environmental   system   (productive   forces   of   life),   and   also   as   the   result   of   humanity’s   aggregate   creativity,   shared   culture,   language   and   our   ‘immaterial’   production   (the   productive   forces   of   social/cultural/technical   systems).   They   highlight   the   parallels   between  both  types  of  Common  and  the  way  in  which  (neoliberal)  capitalism  appropriates   them:  The  former  are  turned  into  profit  through  resource  extraction,  mining,  plantations  etc.,   and   the   latter   through   a   different   kind   of   extraction:   for   instance,   by   privatising   public   or   indigenous  knowledge  through  intellectual  property  rights  and  turning  social  interactions  into   marketable  data  on  platforms  like  Facebook.  In  the  new  economy  of  immaterial  production,   capital   is   not   directly   involved   with   production   processes,   since   ‘every   intervention   of   the   capitalist  in  the  processes  of  the  production  of  the  Common,  just  as  every  time  the  Common   is   made   property,   reduces   productivity’   (Hardt,   2010,   p.   351).     Whereas   in   industrial   capitalism,  the  factory  was  the  means  of  production  with  which  capitalists  could  achieve  the   accumulation  of  their  capital,  the  new  production  occurs  as  spontaneous  ideas,  generative   interaction  or  transmission  of  affects  like  a  storm  of  public  outrage  on  social  media,  which   then  only  needs  to  be  ‘captured’.    

 

Some  scholars  even  go  a  step  further  in  their  analysis  of  this  soft  core  of  the  ‘common’,  which   is  surrounded  by  processes  of  capitalist  capture  and  accumulation.  Lazzarato  argues  that  the   productive  interactions  that  humans  forge  together  with  machines  in  a  ‘machinic’  whole  are   impossible   to   account   for   in   the   traditional   Marxist   and   economic   distinction   of   labour   (workers)   and   means   of   production   (factories,   machines,   raw   material   etc.).   This   machinic   dimension  of  production  arises  for  instance  in  the  interaction  between  driver  and  car,  or  an   office  worker  with  a  computer,  the  data  cataloguing  system  accessed  through  the  computer  

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and  the  built  office  environment  in  which  these  interactions  take  place.  Humans  and  their   surroundings   are   jointly   integrated   into   a   production   in   which   both   are   cogs   in   a   larger   productive   and   machinic   whole.   In   contemporary   capitalism,   ‘children,   the   retired,   the   unemployed,   television   viewers,   etc.’   have   also   become   integrated   in   such   machinic   processes.  As  producers  of  data,  they  provide  surplus  labour  for  free,  which  is  accumulated   and  sold  for  profit  (2014,  p.  49).  ‘In  these  circumstances,  users  (of  unemployment  insurance,   television,  public  and  private  services,  etc.),  like  all  consumers,  tend  to  become  "employees."   "Consumer   labor"   epitomizes   a   productivity   that   no   longer   adheres   to   the   "physico-­‐social   definition  of  labor."’  (ibid.).  This  user  activity,  captured  and  repackaged  as  data  sets,  is  an   evocative  example  for  Hardt  and  Negri’s  account  of  the  Common.  

 

The   preferred   way   in   which   capital   accumulates   this   initially   shared   productivity   is   by   extracting  rent,  for  instance  through  patenting  knowledge  and  then  demanding  rent  for  usage   (Hardt,  2010).  In  cognitive  capitalism,  there  is  an  ‘external  position  of  capital  with  respect  to   the  production  of  the  Common’  (ibid.,  p.  351).  In  this  line  of  reasoning,  the  Common  serves  as   a   potential   source   of   emancipation.   ‘Through   the   increasing   centrality   of   the   Common   in   capitalist  production  -­‐  the  production  of  ideas,  affects,  social  relations,  and  forms  of  life  -­‐  are   emerging  the  conditions  and  weapons  for  a  communist  project’  (Hardt,  2010,  p.  355).  Since  if   we  can  find  ways  to  cut  off  extractive  circuits  surrounding  production  in  the  Common,  and   attribute   this   shared   productivity   to   all   who   were   involved,   we   are   moving   beyond   this   capitalist   capture.   This   possibility   implies   new   strategies   for   popular   and   transformative   struggles  in  which  the  ‘multitude’  of  people  involved  in  production  in  common  recognise  their   mutual   interests   –   from   indigenous   communities   bent   on   preserving   their   knowledge   and   practices,  to  farmers  protecting  communal  seed  commons,  to  researchers  publishing  their   knowledge  open  source,  to  cultural  workers  or  Uber  drivers  forming  social  unions  (2017).  In   sum,  the  framing  of  the  Common  in  Hardt  and  Negri’s  work  serves  to  articulate  a  language  of   common  ownership  and  democracy  on  a  much  larger  scale.    

 

This  perspective  sheds  an  interesting  light  on  the  productivity  located  in  universities.  If  the   productivity  of  machinic  assemblages,  such  as  research  units  really  is  a  shared  affair,  what   then  are  the  justifications  for  a  stark  hierarchy  in  pay-­‐scale  and  job  security  between  tenure   track  professors  on  the  one  hand  and  PhD  and  post  docs  on  the  other?  Lazzarato  addresses  

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this  question  by  expounding  on  a  second  power  mechanism  in  which  human  subjectivity  is   melded  together.  Not  only  are  there  machinic  de-­‐individualising  pressures  in  which  individuals   become  mere  cogs  and  data,  but  subject  formation  also  needs  a  corresponding  process  of   social   subjection.   This   latter   power   consists   of   narratives   and   discourse   that   delineate   categories  and  hierarchies.  It  ‘mobilizes  signifying  semiotics,  in  particular  language,  aimed  at   consciousness   and   mobilizes   representations   with   a   view   to   constituting   an   individuated   subject  ("human  capital")’  which  is  marked  for  instance  by  a  professional  position  of  post  doc   or   tenured   professorship   (Lazzarato,   2014,   p.   39).   While   universities   have   historically   developed  this  hierarchy  of  seniority  under  other  discursive  traditions,  for  instance  etatism   (organising  hierarchy  like  a  state),  these  categories  are  now  mobilised  in  a  widespread  social   subjection  that  demands  that  we  make  the  most  of  our  human  capital.  This  redeployment  of   traditional  hierarchies  in  market  terms  legitimises  the  stark  difference  in  pay-­‐scale  and  job   security  at  contemporary  universities.  

 

For   universities,   another   important   strand   of   argumentation   using   the   concept   of   the   Common  lies  in  the  critique  of  intellectual  property  rights.  These  days,  one  can  argue  that  they   function  as  a  form  of  capitalist  capture  of  publicly  funded  research.  The  soft  core  of  un(-­‐der-­‐)   capitalised   work   at   universities   is   surrounded   by   layers   of   capture   mechanisms   bent   on   monetising   it.   This   ranges   from   extraction   of   social   relations   data   on   Academia.edu   and   ResearchGate.com,  to  monopolistic  publishing  conglomerates  like  Elsevier  that  categorise  and   rank  research  and  extract  a  rent  by  turning  their  databeses  into  for-­‐pay  club  goods.  In  some   cases,  the  capitalist  capture  surrounding  universities  even  assumes  a  geographic  spatial  form,   comprised   of   start-­‐ups   and   spin   offs   encircling   university   campuses.   Wendy   Brown   writes   about  this  trend  in  the  context  of  American  universities:    

 

…   on   the   horizon   are   new   “enterprise   zones”   encircling   public   universities,   where   businesses  large  and  small  will  make  direct  use  of  university  goods,  including  research,   technology,   consultants,   and   cheap   student   labor.   Not   only   does   this   vision   pose   a   striking  contrast  with  the  classic  university-­‐town  ambiance  of  cafés,  bookshops,  pubs,   and  thrift  stores,  it  literalizes  as  it  spatializes  the  domination  of  the  university  by  the   needs  and  purposes  of  capital  and  spatializes  as  well  the  merging  of  business,  state,   and  academe.  (2015,  p.  198)  

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So   all   in   all,   this   angle   of   looking   at   common   production   before   it   is   individualised   and   marketed  yields  interesting  critiques  that  are  applicable  to  universities.  Yet  I  will  not  use  the   term  common  in  the  sense  of  the  Common,  since  its  scope  is  too  broad.  It  has  a  number  of   marked  downsides,  which  are  addressed  by  an  emphasis  on  patterns,  boundaries  and  local   specificity  of  practices.  I  am  more  interested  in  investigating  a  commons  transition  at  and   around  universities  from  the  perspective  of  commons  as  social  systems,  centring  the  roles  of   reproductive  labour  and  an  awareness  that  commons  are  comprised  of  and  constituted  by   commoning  practices.  Before  I  turn  to  commoning  practices,  however,  I  find  it  important  to   draw  a  connection  between  contemporary  capture  of  commons  production  and  its  historic   precedents.   The   following   chapter   will   demonstrate   the   salience   of   thinking   the   dynamics   between  commons  and  capitalism  in  terms  of  ‘enclosures’.  

4.   Commons histories – a tale of enclosures

Commons  have  been  established,  practiced,  experienced  and  theorised  differently  during  the   ages.  In  this  subchapter  I  touch  upon  the  pre-­‐capitalist  history  of  this  type  of  social  system  and   their   enclosures   through   privatisation.   I   argue   that   framing   pre-­‐capitalist   commons   as   backwards   and   socially   repressive   through   Marxist   or   modernising   perspectives   is   not   justified.  In  order  to  reimagine  what  it  means  to  be  a  commoner  today,  that  is:  to  be  a  part  of   a  commons,  we  can  draw  on  a  long  lineage  of  commons  to  demonstrate  the  viability  of  such   social  systems  for  people  and  the  environment.  Based  on  this  assessment,  we  can  rid  the  term   of  its  negative  connotations  by  remembering  how  democratic  values  were  practiced  as  part   of  systems  of  common  property  ownership  in  the  past.  

 

The  English  word  commons  originally  refers  to  collectively  owned  pastures,  forests  and  ponds,   from  which  villagers  throughout  the  countryside  sustained  their  livelihoods  for  a  large  part.   The  Magna  Carta,  a  set  of  feudal  rights  recognised  by  the  English  monarch  in  1215,  ‘restricted   the  King’s  absolute  power  and  settled  a  number  of  long-­‐standing  disputes  in  early  thirteenth-­‐ century  English  society’,  notably  between  the  court  and  local  aristocracy  (Weston  &  Bollier,   2013,  p.  107).  It  was  soon  followed  by  the  Charter  of  the  Forest  in  1217,  which  guaranteed  and   reaffirmed  the  right  for  free  men  to  use  forests  and  pastures  as  their  commons  throughout   England.    

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The  rights  were  essentially  rights  of  subsistence,  because  the  commoners  depended   on  the  forests  for  food,  fuel,  and  economic  security  through  their  traditional  rights  of   pannage  (pasture  for  their  pigs),  estover  (collecting  firewood),  agistment  (grazing),  and   turbary  (cutting  of  turf  for  fuel),  among  other  practices.  (ibid,  from:  Linebaugh,  2008)    

According  to  Linebaugh,  we  should  interpret  the  Charter  of  the  Forest  not  as  a  listing  of  rights   but  a  grant  of  perpetuities.  As  long  as  the  collective  labour  processes  with  obscure-­‐sounding   names  continued  to  use  and  maintain  the  commons,  this  law  would  grant  these  practices  and   their  locally  crafted  rules  a  degree  of  legitimacy  and  protection  from  state  terror  (2008).  In  a   time  marked  by  feudal  hierarchies,  this  less  well  known  addition  to  the  Magna  Carta  ensured   free   men   and   their   communities   a   measure   of   autonomy   from   aristocratic   wealth   accumulation   which   we   usually   associate   with   feudalism.   This   is   just   one   local   and   Anglo-­‐ centric  example  of  historical  commons  rights  and  practices.  In  the  Netherlands  these  social   forms  were  called  meent,  and  in  German  speaking  lands  they  were  called  Allmende.  In  fact,   these  types  of  common  land  tenure  existed  across  the  entire  globe  and  they  supported  a  range   of   egalitarian   and   democratic   cultural   practices.   With   the   entwined   rise   of   capitalism   and   colonialism,  many  forms  of  commons  –  in  Europe  and  overseas  –  were  enclosed,  privatised  or   colonised.  By  recognising  the  enormous  regression  that  took  place  during  that  violent  process,   we   can   recuperate   valuable   lessons   for   today’s   visons   of   commoning   in   society   and   the   university.  In  the  next  paragraphs  I  will  substantiate  this  regression  in  opposition  to  narratives   about  progress.  

 

Beyond  Europe,  the  pre-­‐colonial  Americas  and  Africa  were  home  to  many  civilisations  in  which   commons  formed  a  core  source  of  sustenance  –  both  in  terms  of  resources  and  for  sustaining   cultural   practices   and   social   continuity.   In   many   of   these   societies,   the   concept   of   private   property  was  limited  to  a  small  number  of  objects,  if  it  even  existed  at  all.  In  these  commons   based  systems,  a  gendered  division  of  labour  and  governing,  with  men  in  power,  women  in   subordinate  positions  and  the  existence  of  trans  or  intersex  people  erased,  was  less  frequent   or   ‘necessary’   than   in   (early)   capitalist   and   colonial   societies.   When   the   Native   American   Montagnais-­‐Naskapi  people  encountered  French  settlers,  the  latter  were  impressed  by  their   sense  of  cooperation  ‘and  indifference  to  status,  but  they  were  scandalized  by  their  “lack  of  

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morals”’   (Federici,   2004,   p.   111;   from:   Leacock   1981:34—38).   Morals   for   these   French   merchant-­‐settlers  and  traders  meant  French  upper  class  standards  of  private  property,  male   superiority  and  monogamous  marriage.  Jesuits  were  instructed  to  ‘educate’  the  Montagnais-­‐ Naskapi  people  with  French  morality  so  that  they  would  become  reliable  partners  in  the  fur   trade.  Thus  Native  American  men  were  enticed  ‘to  provide  themselves  with  some  chiefs,  and   bring   “their”   women   to   order’,   by   instilling   profound   inequalities   upheld   by   violence   in   marriage  and  between  adults  and  their  children  (ibid.).  The  women  who  resisted  were  to  be   branded  as  ‘possessed  by  the  devil’  -­‐  a  move  reminiscent  in  many  ways  of  the  witch  hunt  of   independent-­‐minded  women  on  similar  grounds  in  Europe.  

 

This  is  just  one  of  many  examples  of  how  the  shift  from  a  common  property  regime  to  one   that   produces   for   (global)   markets   actually   entailed   a   violent   repression   of   values   such   as   equality,   reciprocity,   equal   standing   and   co-­‐governance   prevalent   in   societies   structured   around   commons.   Linebaugh   highlights   these   values   as   closely   related   to   re-­‐productive   capacities  of  commons.  ‘The  commons  of  the  past  has  not  been  an  exclusively  male  place.  In   fact,  it  is  one  very  often  where  the  needs  of  women  and  children  come  first.’    Decision-­‐making   and  responsibility  often  also  lay  in  hands  of  women  ‘from  the  neighborhoods  of  industrial   slums  to  the  matriarchy  of  the  Iroquois  confederation  to  the  African  village’  (Bollier,  2015,  p.   17).  This  is  because  ‘in  a  commons,  care  work  or  “affective  labor”’  -­‐  also  called  reproductive   labour   -­‐   ‘is   primary’   (ibid.).   In   late   medieval   Europe,   common   property   regimes   and   the   practices  that  maintained  these  forms  of  collective  local  ownership  played  an  important  role   in  ensuring  women’s  autonomy:  

 

The   commons   were   the   material   foundation   upon   which   peasant   solidarity   and   sociality   could   thrive.   All   the   festivals,   games,   and   gatherings   of   the   peasant   community   were   held   on   the   commons.   The   social   function   of   the   commons   was   especially  important  for  women,  who,  having  less  title  to  land  and  less  social  power,   were   more   dependent   on   them   for   their   subsistence,   autonomy,   and   sociality.   (Federici,  2004,  p.  71)  

 

While  there  is  abundant  historical  evidence  of  this  emancipatory  function  of  commons,  they   also  should  not  be  romanticised.  Hardt  and  Negri  warn  that  we  should  not  yearn  for  the  re-­‐

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creation   of   pre-­‐capitalist   social   forms   because   in   many   cases   they   were   ‘characterized   by   disgusting,  patriarchal,  hierarchical  modes  of  division  and  control’  (2017,  p.  98).  And  a  regress   to   any   pre-­‐capitalist   commons   is   illusory   for   another   reason.   All   contemporary   existing   commons  systems  (except  maybe  for  those  that  exist  among  fully  isolated  tribal  groups)  have   somehow  developed  alongside  or  in  reaction  to  the  capitalist  system  (Federici,  2011).    

 

Like  land  reclamations  [by  landless  Brazilian  peasants],  or  the  formation  of  tontines   [autonomous,   self-­‐managed,   women-­‐   made   banking   systems   in   Senegal],   these   practices  are  the  expression  of  a  world  where  communal  bonds  are  still  strong.  But  it   would  be  a  mistake  to  consider  them  something  pre-­‐political,  “natural,”  or  simply  a   product  of  “tradition.”  After  repeated  phases  of  colonization,  nature  and  customs  no   longer  exist  in  any  part  of  the  world,  except  where  people  have  struggled  to  preserve   them  and  reinvent  them.  (ibid.,  p.  5)  

 

The   Euro-­‐Atlanctic   cultural   memory   of   these   pre-­‐capitalist   social   forms   and   their   contemporary   cousins   has   been   cast   in   a   negative   light,   though.   Especially   narratives   of   progress,  to  which  both  liberal  and  Marxist  theorists  have  subscribed,  commit  this  fallacy.  This   becomes  apparent  in  the  conception  of  progress  for  Marx,  for  example,  in  which  he  posited   that  the  transition  from  feudalism  to  capitalism  was  a  necessary  and  ultimately  good  one  since   this  would  bring  socialism  or  communism  closer.  He  is  influenced  here  by  a  teleological  view   of  history  –  a  progression  with  a  clear  goal  which  justifies  earlier  ruptures.  As  key  aspect  of   the  transition  from  feudalism  to  capitalism,  he  describes  original  accumulation  of  capital,  the   process  by  which  the  British  commons  were  privatised  with  fences  to  provide  merchant  elites   with  a  source  of  wealth  which  they  could  subsequently  invest  in  more  projects  of  (colonial)   enclosure,  accumulation  and  industrialisation.    

 

From   a   feminist   or   de-­‐colonial   perspective,   it   is   not   at   all   apparent   that   Marx’   Hegelian,   teleological  perspective  holds.  Federici  challenges  Marx,  arguing  that  he  ‘could  never  have   presumed  that  capitalism  paves  the  way  to  human  liberation  had  he  looked  at  its  history  from   the  viewpoint  of  women’  (2004,  p.  13).  She  points  at  numerous  ways  in  which  the  promotion   of  private  ownership  and  enclosure  of  commons  led  to  reduced  autonomy  for  peasants  and  a   privatisation  of  reproductive  work,  so  that  men  could  pursue  productive  in  factories  or  the  

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exploitation  of  nature  on  an  industrial  scale.  This  relegation  of  care  work  into  the  service  of   productive   labour   for   the   benefit   of   global   markets,   as   the   Montagnais-­‐Naskapi   example   shows,  was  pursued  through  redrawing  boundaries  between  subjects  and  their  roles.  In  this   specific  case,  men  were  to  hunt  for  fur  and  build  hierarchical  governing  structures  for  reliable   trade,   while   women   should   shoulder   reproductive   tasks   of   child   bearing   and   rearing.   This   division   was   to   be   explicitly   hierarchical   and   gendered.   Federici   argues   that   racialized   hierarchies  were  introduced  in  similar  efforts  to  break  possibilities  for  solidarity  and  cultures   of   commoning.   She   observes   that   racial   lines   of   division   were   only   drawn,   enforced   and   culturally   solidified   in   the   18th   Century,   after   plantation   owners   in   the   Americas   had   experienced  multiple  rebellions  in  which  proletarian  white  indentured  workers  had  allied  with   black  and  native  American  slaves  against  their  common  exploiters,  for  instance  on  Barbados   and  Bermuda  and  in  Virginia  (2004,  pp.  106-­‐107).    

 

More   generally   speaking   then,   she   argues   that   capitalism   could   only   expand   through   an   ‘accumulation  of  differences  and  divisions  within  the  working  class,  whereby  hierarchies  built   upon  gender,  as  well  as  “race”  and  age,  became  constitutive  of  class  rule  and  the  formation   of  the  modern  proletariat’  (ibid.,  p.  63).  That  is  why  it  is  hard  to  maintain  that  the  process  of   original  accumulation,  with  the  institution  and  ‘accumulation’  of  these  differences,  was  a  good   or  necessary  step  towards  a  socialist  end.    

 

Critics   of   pre-­‐capitalist   commons   who   do   not   subscribe   to   the   Marxist   end   or   purpose   to   history   (telos)   have   other   grounds   for   their   historical   objections   to   or   contemporary   marginalisation  of  the  commons  as  viable  social  form.  A  commonly  levelled  argument  for  the   transition  from  commons  to  capitalist  social  systems  is  that  we  owe  a  lot  to  the  technological   innovation   of   industrialisation.   The   violent   enclosure   of   commons   and   establishment   of   market   relations   increased   productivity   and   innovation   of   various   sectors   by   enormous   amounts.  A  fine  grained  analysis  of  resource  systems  and  their  social  effects  helps  to  counter   these  modernising  positions.  Two  arguments  can  be  made  against  the  modernising  narrative   against   commons,   one   focussed   on   social   inequalities   and   the   other   on   environmental   degradation.  As  prime  example,  we  could  focus  on  agricultural  output  in  the  transition  from   farming   on   common   land   to   sixteenth   and   seventeenth   commercialised   and   privatised   agriculture.    

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