Continuity and change : the changing policy position of populist radical-right parties in government

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Continuity and Change:

The changing policy position of populist

radical-right parties in government.

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A Master Thesis Presented to

The Faculty of Social and Behavioural Science University of Amsterdam

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In Partial Fulfilment

of the Requirements for the Degree of MSc Political Science, International Relations Track

Supervisor: Dr. van der Brug Word Count: 8841

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By

Oline Sofie Bråten Bergan Student Number 12176826

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Regulations and plagiarism statement

I hereby declare that I have read and understood the university regulations of plagiarism. The work contained in this project is solely my own, and all the sources used

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Acknowledgements

Til alle dere hjemme i Norge som heier på meg, dere vet hvem dere er. Til mamma for at du hver dag inspirerer meg til å følge drømmen i utlandet slik du selv gjorde, og til pappa fordi du er så god og snill og kan så mye om alt, noe som har gjort at jeg også vil være en person

som kan mye alt.

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Acronyms and abbreviations

BZÖ – Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs

CHES – Chapel Hill Expert Survey Dataset DF – Dansk Folkeparti

FPÖ – Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs FN – Front Nationale

LAOS – Laïkos Orthodoxos Synagermos LN – Lega Nord

LPR – Liga Polskich Ropzin PiS – Prawo I Sprawiedliwosc PS - Perussuomalauset

PVV – Parteij voor de Vrijheid PRM – Partidul România Mare PRR – Populist Radical Right SD – Sverigedemokratarna

UKIP – United Kingdom Independence Party VB – Vlaams Belang

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Abstract

This thesis assesses the extent to which European populist radical right-wing parties alter their policy platform upon entering government, a topic analysed in much of the existing academic literature. The word populism was named “Word of the Year 2017” by Cambridge Dictionary, proving that the topic aggregate much attention from the media and academia alike. Assuming that, as the populist radical rights’ core focus is taking the power back for the people from the political elite, they are mainly office-seeking. It is therefore somewhat paradoxical when a non-elitist party enters the highest rank in the non-elitist establishment. The core argument of this thesis is that as they seek to maintain their position in government, the parties are also likely willing to alter their policy platform in order to maintain this position. The quantitative analysis reveals that there indeed is a correlation between government participation and changes to policy attitudes. However, due to lack of statistically significant results, this thesis will conclude that it is partially true that populist radical right-wing parties alter their policy position as a result of being in government – in the case of immigration policy.

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1. Introduction

Populism, the word, was named “Word of the Year” by the Cambridge Dictionaries in 2017. In the dictionary entry, it is defined as “political ideas and activities that are intended to get the support of ordinary people by getting what they want” (“Populism”, 2019). It is remarkable how this definition can, so eloquently, capture the essence of populism, whilst simultaneously failing to reveal what it’s really about. Populism is indeed a political movement for the people, the pure people, but this definition implies that all populist parties seek the same thing. And they do to some extent, but their actual policies can vary greatly. At the core of populist ideology lies protection of the masses from the violations of the political elite. As more and more populist radical right-parties (PRR-parties) are entering more and more governments, the political rhetoric and policy preferences of such parties are of increasing societal relevance. The aim of this thesis is to analyse the policy preferences of European right-wing populist parties towards salient issue areas, detect how they have developed in the time frame 1999-2014, and explore how the policy has changed when said parties enter government. This is particularly interesting as populism is perceived as a grass-root response to oppressive political elites, aiming to take the power back to the people by adapting policy to fit the general will of the people – the volonté générale. It is paradoxical then, that a party which so strongly opposes the political elite simultaneously aims to seek the highest rank in the political establishment.

The topic, as something for academics to study and for media to comment on, has experienced increasing popularity in the last few years. The inauguration of the President of the United States Donald Trump, Britain’s vote to leave the European Union and the increasing support for UKIP, and finally Hungarian president Victor Orbán’s increasing popularity are all high-profile cases of PRR-parties within the established national party structures. It is perhaps due to the high volume of cases like this over a relatively short period of time that has generated the mass attention from the media and from academics that has led to the hype of the populist phenomenon. This thesis will provide a new layer to this debate, as it explores the changes in policy of PRR-parties towards salient issues over time, and establishes differences between PRR-parties in and outside of government. Mudde quite famously contributes to the literature by defining the presence of populist movements and parties in the current era. Others, such as de Lange, Roodujin, Hakhverdian and Kuhn focus on the supporters of such movements and their electoral behaviour – what unites them and how they differ, which underlying socio-economic factors that drive their increasing support for PRR-parties.

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This thesis uses correlation- and regression analysis to measure the relationship between government participation and the policy preferences of PRR-parties throughout the selected period, but also changes to such policy preferences over time. The analysis is based on Müller & Strøm’s (1990) hypothesis of how different parties operate based on various goals. The interpretation of data is based upon the assumption that all PRR-parties are office-seeking. The analysis concludes that PRR-parties in government are, on average, still very much in favour of tough immigration policy & hard Eurosceptic, but less so than their oppositional counterparts. Moreover, parties in government are much more supportive of religious principles in politics. These positions can be explained using both Heinisch’s (2012) explanation of PRR-parties being torn between efforts to maintain their radical, policy profile whilst simultaneously partaking in parliamentarian activities that require interactions with more moderate parties. Also Greven’s (2016) account of how government participation for PRR-parties is antithetical to the core values of such parties and also Zaslove’s (2013) theory of a combination of lacking governmental experience and access to competent MP’s make PRR-parties more susceptive to pressures to moderate their policies by mainstream parties. When analysing changes to policy preferences whilst in government, it is clear that PRR-parties deepen their opposition to the European Union, as opposed to non-government parties that dim their euroscepticism. This aligns with Somer-Topcu’s (2009) hypothesis that PRR-parties strategically alter their policy position to gain electoral support, and also Bawn & Somer-Topcu’s (2012) theory of how PRR-parties gain more support in government by taking more radical stances on salient issues. The thesis will conclude that the data allow us to partially dismiss both zero-hypotheses. The hypotheses are as following:

H1: There is a difference in the average policy platform of PRR-parties in government and in opposition.

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2. Theory

This chapter aims to explore the current, ongoing debate within the relevant field. Firstly, populism will be defined, in order to set the terms for which this analysis will operate within. Additionally, we will explore why participation of populist parties in government is particularly interesting, and why the populist case is special. Moving on, plausible explanations for why policy position change will be explored. Additionally, an account of what might happen to the policy platform of a party when entering government is provided. This section finishes by looking at what happens to the policy of PRR-parties when entering government.

2.1 The populist radical right

In academia, the debate about whether or not we have now entered the era of populism – the populist zeitgeist (Mudde, 2004) – strongly defines the frames of which populism is being researched. For decades, populism was understood to be the daughter of fascism, that clung itself to the very outcasts of western societies, whilst spreading more in Latin America (Urbinati, 2018, pp. 62). By framing something as being ‘populist’, one would also stigmatize such movements and its leaders to be “reclaiming the liberal-democratic model as the only valid form government can take” (Muller, 2016 as cited in Urbinati, 2018, pp. 62). The connotations of populism have transformed tremendously since then, and populism is no longer necessarily seen as the desperate ideology of the mere periphery. To Mudde (2004) and his “zeitgeisters”, populism is defined as “(…) an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two antagonist groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale of the people” (Ibid., pp. 542). Mudde’s focus is the nature of populist movements and how they position themselves in the established social order. An extension of Mudde’s definition is provided by Roodujin, de Lange & van der Brug (2012), what is meant by ‘the pure people’ is deeply contextual, and mean different things within different contexts – it can be the electorate, the nation, certain social classes, people with specific employments or other forms of minorities (Rooduijn, de Lange, & van der Brug, 2012, pp. 564). Heinisch (2003) points out that populists’ reference to ‘the people’ can be expressed as ‘hard-working Americans’, ‘the moral majority’, ‘the decent Austrians’, to mention a few (pp. 92), and that populism is “(...) taking the hue of the environment in which it occurs” (ibid., pp.92). In fact, most scholars seem to support the notion that populism is in fact a thin-centered ideology (Mudde, 2004), that can attach itself to any other ideology. Throughout this text, populism will therefore be understood as an add-on to any pre-existing ideology, where the

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‘people’, depending on the definition of the populist movement itself, is antithetical to the current established political order, including government and parties. Regardless of political preference, populists dismiss any rule of the existing elite, and want to take the power back to ‘the people’.

The merge of ‘populism’ and ‘radical right’ adds a new layer to this debate. The new generation of PRR-parties seems to focus on the social security and quality of life of ‘the pure people’; radical right movements rejects enlightenment traditions such as liberalism, universalism and humanism (Heinisch, 2003, pp. 96). PRR-parties therefore seek to represent and support the pure (ethnic) people, as expressed through nativist nationalism and authoritarianism (Zaslove, 2012, pp. 432). In Austria for example, FPÖ rally against immigrants as they pose a threat to the job security and quality of life of the average Austrian (Heinisch, 2003, pp. 97). As a result, FPÖ have become increasingly eurosceptic, protectionist and unsupportive of immigration. In Italy, Lega Nord fairly successfully criticised the more mainstream parties, by discrediting core aspects of their policy platforms to their own gains (ibid., pp. 97; Zaslove, 2012, pp. 432). The populist radical right is therefore a new layer in the left-right debate, which tactically appeal to the forgotten pure people in efforts to overcome the corrupt elite, favouring political minorities. These tactics include negativity, disruption, political incorrectness and disrespecting the formal and informal rules of political communication with the intention of reaching its supporters on an emotional level.

The following definitions of populism and far right, as derived from the PopuList are used to indicate PRR-parties in the coming analysis:

«Populist parties: parties that endorse the set of ideas that society is ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people» (Mudde, 2004 as found in “ThePopuList”, 2019).

«Far right parties: parties that are nativist (which is an ideology that holds that states should

be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group and that non-native elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state) and authoritarian (which is the

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belief in a strictly ordered society, in which infringements of authority are to be punished severely)” (Mudde, 2007 as found in “ThePopuList”, 2019).

2.2 Salient Issues to PRR-parties

In his book “Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe” Mudde’s (2007) maximal definition of the ideological platform of PRR-parties include three core elements; populism, nativism and authoritarianism. Right-wing populism is defined extensively in the paragraphs above and will therefore not be discussed again here. Nativism, Mudde (pp.19) defines, is an ideology which “(…) holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.” Nativism, ethno-nationalism, anti-pluralist nationalism et cetera all refer to the same aspect of PRR ideology; the aspiration to become a nation where alien elements (both in a racial and cultural context) does not exist, nor co-exist. Authoritarianism refers to a segment of PRR ideology in which punishment and governmental control is highly appreciated.

Altemeyer (1982, pp. 147) defines authoritarianism by dividing it into three separate, yet interlinked aspects; authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression and conventionalism. Authoritarian submission refers to submissiveness to the state; the state is to be perceived as the highest instance of power and authority. Authoritarian aggression refers to the competency of the state to use violence against those who defy the establishment; the state can use power to gain control over its population – an aspect that lies at the core of authoritarianism. And finally, conventionalism refers to the aspirations of being a society where everyone conforms to traditional values and societal norms (ibid.). In addition to this definition, Alfonso (2014, pp. 275) provides an interesting argument; as the majority of the PRR core voters stems from a group whom often are protected by social insurance and welfare policy, “welfare chauvinism” is a salient issue to such voters. Welfare Chauvinism refers to aspirations of having welfare policies and an established welfare state, where the social insurance and benefits are limited to those native to the respective society. These aspirations are somewhat paradoxical to the right-wing, neoliberal preferences of PRR-parties, but assuming that PRR-parties are office-seeking it makes sense for said parties to sacrifice aspects of their policy platform to remain in favour with its core supporters.

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The policy areas most salient to PRR-parties, based on the above definition, therefore consist of European integration, immigration policy, assimilation or integration of minority groups, rights for ethnic minorities, law and order, traditional and religious principles and provision of universal welfare through social insurance. These are also the policy areas that will be analysed in the coming analysis.

2.3 When policy positions change

In the attempt of uncovering whether or not the policy preferences of PRR-parties change as a result of participation in government, this theoretical section aims to explore surfacing theories on how and why parties alter their policies.

Müller & Strøm (1990) presents the idea that parties seek three things; votes, policy and office. Universal for all parties is seeking votes, but parties tend to be either policy-seeking or office-seeking. Policy-seeking parties are parties that prioritise gaining support for their policy-platform and implementing their ideological vision over pursuing office. These kinds of parties, one would assume, are less willing to alter their policy platforms in order to gain votes. Office-seeking parties, on the other hand, are parties that, simply put, prioritise growing their electoral support in order to take office and are more willing to make sacrifices to make that happen. It would therefore be fair to assume that office-seeking parties are much more willing to alter their policy platforms, as such parties wish to enter office trumps its dedication to maintaining its policy positions. As determined in the chapters above, PRR-parties are in general concerned with overthrowing the current political elite and taking the power back to the “true” people. Categorically speaking, in this instance PRR-parties therefore seem to fit best Müller & Strøm’s description of an office-seeking party.

If Müller & Strøm’s predictions are applicable to PRR-parties, the conclusion that is presented in the analysis will demonstrate that PRR-parties policy preferences can indeed change, once a party has gained the support to be in office and working to maintain their position as a government party.

Budge’s (1994) research on the topic is one of the first publications to discuss why and how parties change their political positions. He argues that it is normal for parties’ positions to fluctuate between elections due to circumstantial factors, but that party positions seem to remain stable over time. Budge concludes that, as there is uncertainty tied to the future electoral

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performance of a party if a party changes its platform, parties seem to be hesitant to alter their polices extensively. In other words, parties are often not willing to take the risk that comes with changing their policy preferences as it can disrupt the electoral outcome they aspire to achieve. In this sense, Budge’s theory fits Müller & Strøm’s description of office-seeking parties, in that they both believe parties chose to or chose not to alter their policy platform in an attempt to maximise electoral success. Budge’s research fails, however, to describe the reversed strategy; for parties to alter its policies based on the preferences of a larger share of the electorate in order gain more votes. The question is therefore; how and why do parties alter their policies to appeal to a larger share of the electorate?

Ezrow et al. (2011) demonstrate that as parties seem to be responsive to shifts in preferences of the electorate, mainstream parties tend to be more concerned with the average voter’s policy preferences. Niche parties, such as issue-specific green parties, communist parties and also radical right-wing parties tend to be much less responsive to changes in the preferences of the average voter. Instead, these parties are sensitive to changes in the policy preferences of their chunk of the electorate. If we apply Müller & Strøm’s logic, office-seeking mainstream parties seem to be responsive to the more centrist and mainstream voters and are most likely to alter their policies in a less radical manner as they aspire to reflect the preferences of the such voters. Office-seeking PRR-parties, on the other hand, are likely to do the opposite; as their supporters tend to be more radical in their policy preferences, PRR-parties are unlikely to dim their radical political message political message but instead deepen their policy in the voters’ most salient issues. Somer-Topcu’s (2009) concludes her article by saying that “(...) changes to parties’ policies can be explained through parties’ strategic incentives to safeguard or advance their positions within the system by showing that parties respond to past election results” (as cited in Schumacher, de Vries & Vis, 2913, pp.4). This theory supports what is discussed above; office-seeking parties that perform poorly in elections are more likely to strategically alter their policy positions, in order to gain more votes in the following elections. Therefore office-seeking parties should be more willing to alter their policy platforms once in government, in order to maintain their governmental position. Therefore, if we follow the logic of Ezrow et al. and Somer-Topcu, the expected conclusion to this thesis would be that office-seeking PRR-parties who either seek to perform better in elections or maintain their governmental position are likely to alter their policy platform in accordance with their core supporters on their most salient issues. This trail of thought, however, assumes that parties are equally concerned with all issue areas, and that parties put equal effort into pleasing its supporters in all aspects of its policy

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platform. We can therefore ask; do parties give equal attention to all salient issue areas when altering its policy platform?

Rovny (2013) approaches exactly this issue. His study is narrowly focused on radical right-wing parties in 20 European countries, but does regardless provide a useful theory in this instance. Instead of describing a party’s attempt to increase its vote share by altering its policy preferences, Rovny concludes that radical right-wing parties seem to take a clear stance on outlying authoritarian issues that seem to be less prioritized by the mainstream parties, whilst blurring their positions on more popular socio-economic issues. This is used as a strategy by said parties to gain votes by tackling niche issues without driving the average, mainstream voter away with what is perceived as radical and/or unpopular policies on topical, popular issues (ibid., pp.20). If we follow the logic of Rovny in the coming analysis, we can conclude that as PRR-parties are a part of the European radical right, such parties are also perhaps likely to dim their political message on issues at the core of their ideology in order to not drive potential voters away, whilst altering their policy on “outlier” issues, such as environment to appeal to a larger share of the electorate.

2.4 What happens to policy when parties enter government?

One way to explore the extent to which a party’s policy platform changes when in government is to analyse the congruence between party rhetoric as expressed in pre-election promises to the actual outcome of policy-making whilst in government. If a party stays true to its pre-election promises whilst in government, their policy platform has remained unchanged. As Bischof (2018) concludes, there seems to be a consensus in academia that a party’s rhetoric in between elections and leading up to elections are good predictors of behaviour once in government (pp. 311). Instead of representing the reality of post-election policies, manifesto pledges reflect the potential of policies that can be implemented after an election (ibid.). In a way, pre-election promises are goals for how a party aspires to shape the country. When analysing several parties’ policy attitudes towards nuclear energy in the US, Belgium, Canada, France, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, Bischof concludes that only in 7.89% of all cases there is no match between pre-election promises and policy outcome once in government (pp. 319). His study, however, is limited as it only looks as one policy area. Policy on nuclear energy is rarely based on the core ideological values of a party, making it less suitable for making generalised arguments about changes to parties’ policy platforms once in

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government. However, despite these limitations, Bischof’s research on the fulfilment of election pledges does give valuable pointers on the relationship between promises made through pre-election manifestos and implemented policies once in government. By following Bischof’s logic, we expect to find little difference between parties in government and parties in opposition.

Bawn & Somer-Topcu (2012) find that there is a difference between policy that appeals to voters when parties are in government versus when parties are in opposition, by analysing election results from 1971 to 2005 in Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK. They conclude that parties in government gain more support by taking a more extreme stance on issues, whereas parties in opposition perform better electorally when moderating its policies (ibid., pp. 443). This is a result of government parties being held responsible for setting the current political agenda, whilst simultaneously maintaining their image as innovative and tackling current issues out of their control. In a sense, they have much more to prove to their voters in order to stay relevant and trustworthy. If we then apply Müller & Strøm’s theory to this and assume that PRR-parties are office-seeking, the expected findings of the analysis would be that PRR-parties in government are more radical in their policy positions than non-government PRR-parties. Moreover, we could also expect to find that parties in non-government alter their policies by a larger share upon entering government.

2.5 What happens to the policy of PRR-parties in government?

If we look specifically at changes to policy platforms of PRR-parties, there is considerably more disagreement in academic literature. Zaslove (2012) demonstrates that, under certain conditions, PRR-parties can thrive; they are able to maintain their policy preferences whilst also their relationship to coalition partners. Heinisch (2003) on the other hand, concludes that PRR-parties thrive more in opposition and that once they enter a coalition government, the pressure of the coalition partners and lack of professionalism and ability to produce sound policies from within will force such parties to moderate their policy rhetoric. On paper, “PRR-parties in government” do indeed have a paradoxical tone to it; their success is vastly dependent on being in opposition to the established elites whilst demanding political change. Once in a position to make this political change happen, they are torn between efforts to maintain their radical, populist identity while also take part in parliamentary activities with the very same parties they so strongly criticise (Zaslove, 2012, pp.432). As Greven (2016) frames it, “(…)

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participation in actual government prevents right-wing populists from using their most important storyline of a political elite governing the country against the political will of the people, and of themselves speaking of a silent majority” (pp. 1). To him, populism adds a new layer to the left-right political debate by taking on the role as the antithesis of the corrupt elite favouring political minorities. Yet, he points out, there is a clear public dissatisfaction with PRR-parties in government in both the Netherlands and in Austria, as government participation as a coalition partner has forced them to explore their stances outside their original expertise (immigration, identity and sovereignty). In countries like Hungary and Poland where Fidesz and PiS are the only party in government, their political rhetoric on traditional populist issues seems to have deepened whilst becoming increasingly authoritarian overall (ibid., pp.2).

Some studies suggest that PRR-parties can, under the right circumstances, thrive in a coalition government, and undergo a successful transition from an opposition party to a government party in regard to their policy platform. Henisch (2003, pp. 100) makes the prediction that PRR-parties in government are likely to be less influenced by its coalition partners than centrist, mainstream parties, as they do not affiliate with external interest groups such as trade unions, farm lobbies, business groups and religion. Moreover, the add-on nature of populism allows PRR-parties to get away with unclear policies and inconsistencies in their policy platform (ibid.). Zaslove (2012) demonstrates that this has been the case for the Swiss SPV, and the Italian LN. The two parties manage throughout their time in office to maintain their reputation as a peoples party while co-operating with mainstream coalition partners; they were able to keep one foot in government and one foot out of it (pp. 443). In the highly consensus-based form of government in Switzerland, where the federal council must reach an agreement, SVP managed to exploit certain features to its benefit. As the federal council at all times will be a coalition government, government parties also have the competency to challenge the consensus reached by its coalition partners either through referenda or citizens initiatives. To SVP, this meant that the party was able to participate in a coalition government without forsaking its strong policy preferences, by challenging policy that does not align with their preferences (ibid., pp. 423). Zaslove (2012) therefore concludes that SPV successfully took part in a coalition government without having to alter its policy preferences and political rhetoric to the liking of its coalition partners.

The Italian Lega Nord, also rather successfully, managed to participate in a coalition government without forsaking its policy platform (Zaslove, 2012, pp. 438). The 2001 - 2006

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coalition lead by Berlusconi consisted of a mixture of both mainstream centrist and rightist parties (AN and Union of Christian Democrats), and two PRR-parties, Forza Italia and Lega Nord. Similar to SVP in Switzerland, LN managed to keep one foot in government whilst also positioning itself as an opposition party by distancing itself from its coalition partners. LN portrayed its partners, AN especially, as mainly concerned with preserving the southern national identity, neglecting the northern heritage. The Christian democrats were portrayed by LN as overly supportive of a centralized state and intervention for the south whilst simultaneously having very soft immigration policies (ibid., pp. 438-439). Lega Nord, on the other hand, positioned themselves as the only party truly concerned with the northern family values and moral order, maintaining its reputation as the one true representative for the people of the north of Italy (ibid.). PRR-parties in a coalition government can therefore both successfully and unsuccessfully maintain their policy platform, depending on how they position themselves amongst their coalition partners.

Despite Heinisch’ (2003) predictions, he concluded that government participation for PRR-parties can lead to inevitable challenges for such PRR-parties to maintain their policy platform. In the case of FPÖ’s participation in the 2000 - 2002 Austrian government, the party was outmanoeuvred by its coalition partner ÖVP, due to lacking experience with being in government and professional cabinet members (ibid., pp. 112). FPÖ was therefore unsuccessful in developing a coherent policy platform that would have provided them with broadened support and increased trustworthiness. In fact, for PRR-parties, the pressure on their policy platform will be much more significant in a coalition government with experienced mainstream parties as they will face an even stronger pressure to moderate their policies. Henisch (2003) therefore concludes that PRR-parties, by default, will be more successful in opposition and in elections than they will ever be in government, as they manage to fill a void that “has emerged as a result of the growing discrepancy between popular and constitutional democracy” (ibid., pp. 124). Zaslove (2012) presents similar findings; as FPÖ amounted nearly a half of its coalition, it was unable to take the role as both coalition partner and an opposition party (pp. 441). As a result, the contradictions to the party’s policy were more exposed (than in comparison to LN and SVP), which again creates tension from within the party to take a stance on unclear issue areas. For example, FPÖ at some point supported neoliberal reform and tax cuts, whilst simultaneously demanding an increase in government spending on family policies (ibid.). With the tensions arising from within the party, it somewhat lost control over its own political agenda whilst being in a power position (ibid., pp. 442). Greven (2016, pp. 1) supports

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this notion as he points out that, in Austria especially, PRR-parties had to come up with policy outside their expert area, forcing them to compromise with coalition partners.

If we assume that PRR-parties are office-seeking, which they seem to be, they are more likely to alter their policy platform in order to remain relevant to the electorate. The above literature does not consider policy area, but lead us to the following hypotheses:

H1: There is a difference in the average policy platform of PRR-parties in government and in opposition.

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3. Methods

3.1 Methods and operationalisation

This study is limited to the 1999-2014 period and is focused on 16 European populist far right parties. The aim is to track the long-term changes to parties’ policy preferences as measured by the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2012; Polk et al., 2017), and identify if there are any changes in the period in which a party has participated in government. The study consists of a quantitative comparative analysis, using descriptive and regression methods. The pre-existing CHES dataset will allow for an objective and systematic analysis of changes to the policy preferences of each of the parties, whilst simultaneously managing a larger quantity of data.

The “Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend Dataset 1999-2014” (Bakker et al., 2012; Polk et al., 2017) measures party position on a wide range of issues and ideological continuums. The aim for experts to “(...) synthesize their knowledge of a party system and assign positions to parties in specific dimensions of interest” (Lindstädt, Proksch & Slapin, 2018, pp.1). The CHES serves two purposes; firstly to trace the ideological positions of parties on a general left-right continuum, and has done exactly this since 1999, and secondly to facilitate research on party positions to specific issue areas in the long-term (Polk et al., 2017, pp. 2). A score is assigned to each party in the year of the survey, describing the position of said party on the respective issue. The CHES dataset therefore enables a long-term analysis of changes to a party’s policy platform within specific issue areas. The score represents the mean score as rated by each of the experts. In the following analysis, 13 variables from the dataset each representing different issue areas tracked. An exhaustive list of these are presented in the coming section.

In order to determine which parties are to be considered the populist, radical right, I will be applying The PopuList’s (Mudde et al., 2019) measure of such parties. The PopuList is an initiative by the Guardian, with the aim of standardizing the classification of populist, far right, far left and Eurosceptic parties. It has been peer-reviewed by over 30 academics and is under constant revision, ensuring party classification to be considered accurate and reliable. The list contains parties that fits the following definitions, and have obtained 2% or more in at least one parliamentary election since 1998.

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3.2 Data Collection

The variables listed above represents the variables that will be assessed in the analysis.

Table 1. Chapel Hill Expert Survey Variables

VARIABLE DESCRIPTION MEASURE

POSITION Overall orientation of the party leadership towards the European Parliament

0 = Strongly opposed, 10 = strongly in favour

ETHNIC_MINORITIES Position towards ethnic minorities 0 = strongly support more rights for ethnic minorities, 10 = strongly opposes more rights for ethnic minorities

MULTICULTURALISM Position on integration of immigrants and asylum seekers (multiculturalism vs. assimilation)

0 = strongly favours multiculturalism, 10 = strongly favours assimilation

IMMIGRATE_POLICY Position on immigration policy 0 = strongly opposes tough policy, 10 = strongly favours tough policy

RELIGIOUS_PRINCIPLE Position on role of religious principles in politics 0 = strongly opposes religious principles in politics, 10 = strongly supports religious principles in politics.

CIVLIB_LAWORDER Position on civil liberties vs. law and order 0 = strongly promotes civil liberties, 10 = strongly supports tough measures to fight crime SPENDVTAX Position on improving public services vs. reducing

taxes

0 = strongly favours improving public services, 10 = strongly favours reducing taxes

3.3 Case selection

The case selection used in this analysis derives from the parties available in the dataset and has been narrowed down using The PopuList to identify European populist, radical right-wing parties. Parties whose policy positions have only been measured in one instance have been excluded from this list, as the dataset in these cases does not allow for an analysis in changes in policy preferences. The parties listed below will be referred to as PRR-parties throughout the analysis.

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Table 2. Party Selection

Country Party Name Acronym

be Vlaams Belang VB

dk Dansk Folkeparti DF

gr Laïkós Orthodoxos Synagermos LAOS

fr Front Nationale FN

it Lega Nord LN

nl Parteij voor de Vrijheid PVV

uk United Kingdom Independence Party UKIP

aus Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs FPÖ

aus Bündnis Zukunft Österreichs BZÖ

fin Persussoumalaiset (True Finns) PS

swe Sverigedemokratarna SD

hun Fidesz-M FIDESZ

hun Jobbik Magyarorszagert Mogzalom JOBBIK

pol Prawo i sprawiedliwosc PiS

pol Liga Polskich Ropzin LPR

rom Partidul România Mare PRM

The independent variable in the analysis is government participation. As CHES is conducted once every four years, there is no guarantee that a party’s government participation will fall at the same time. Listed below are the PRR-parties that have been in government, in which period they were in government for and also which surveys will be used to assess changes to their policy platform.

Table 3. Government Participation Party Period in government CHES surveys Lega Nord 1996 - 2001, 2001 - 2006 1999, 2002, 2006 FPÖ 1999 - 2002 1999, 2002 Fidesz 1998 - 2001, 2010 - 2014 1999, 2002, 2010, 2014 BZÖ 2002 - 2006 2002, 2006 PiS 2005 - 2007 2006 PVV 2010-2012 2010, 2014 LAOS 2009 - 2012 2010

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4. Results and Analysis

In the following chapter, the hypothesis as presented in the introduction will be tested using a regression analysis:

H1: There is a difference in the policy platform of PRR-parties in government and in opposition. H2: Government participation for PRR-parties causes a change in the respective party’s policy

First, a descriptive analysis of the data will be conducted in order to get an overview of the parties and issue areas that are being analysed. Moving on, general trends in attitudes towards each of the issue area are compared, using the mean scores for both parties that participate in government and parties that have not. This will reveal a generalized picture of how party attitudes towards the selected issue areas for PRR-parties in Europe have developed over time. The aim of doing this is to provide a general picture of developments in policy in the given time period. Following the descriptive analysis, a regression analysis will be done in order to test the extent to which the mean scores of parties in government differ from the mean scores of parties that are not. We will find that, in the majority of cases, there is a slight difference (with the exception of immigration policy and religious principles in politics, where there is a significant difference between government parties and non-government parties) between the two groups of parties. This is helpful as it demonstrates that there indeed is a difference in the policy of parties that are in government. Additionally, a second regression analysis is conducted in order to analyse the actual change in issue are score that change as parties enter government. The chapter concludes with a second regression analysis which will allow us to make statements about how the parties attitudes change once they become a government party, and as a result also provide a greater understanding of how government participation influence the policy attitudes of PRR-parties.

4.1 Descriptive Statistics

The analyses look at 16 PRR-parties, across 14 European countries, taking parties into account whose score is coded in CHES in two or more years. In total, there are 60 cases. Of these 60 cases, 10 are cases in which PRR-parties have been in government; Lega Nord, FPÖ, Fidesz, BZÖ, PVV, PiS and LAOS, in the time period of 1999 – 2014.

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Collected from Bakker et al. (2012). * parties that have participated in government

Table 5. Government Participation

Frequency Percent Valid Percent

Non-govt. 48 80,0 80,0

Govt. 12 20,0 20,0

Total 60 100,0 100.0

Collected from Bakker et al. (2012).

Table 4. PRR Party Selection

Party Frequency Percent Valid Percent

BZÖ* 3 5,0 5,0 DF 5 8,3 8,3 Fidesz* 4 6,7 6,7 FN 5 8,3 8,3 FPÖ* 5 8,3 8,3 JOBBIK 2 3,3 3,3 LAOS* 3 5,0 5,0 LN* 5 8,3 8,3 LPR* 3 5,0 5,0 PiS* 4 6,7 6,7 PRM 3 5,0 5,0 PS 4 6,7 6,7 PVV* 3 5,0 5,0 SD 2 3,3 3,3 UKIP 4 6,7 6,7 VB 5 8,3 8,3 Total 60 100,0 100,0

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Collected from Bakker et al. (2012).

0,00 2,00 4,00 6,00 8,00 10,00 12,00 1 2 3 4 5

Graph 1. Mean Issue Area Score

N.G. EU G. EU N.G Eth. Min

G. Eth. Min. N.G Mult. G. Mult.

N.G. Immi. G. Immi N.G. Relig.

G. Relig. N.G Civlib/law G. Civlib/law

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Graph 1. presents a picture of the mean scores of all PRR-parties both in and outside of government from 1999 to 2014. Positions on all issue areas are measured from 2006 - 2014, except on the position of the party leadership to the powers of the European Parliament. The graph demonstrates that, in the given time period, PRR-parties demonstrate high levels of opposition to the European Parliament. The score fluctuates from 1,93 in 1999 as the lowest score, to 2,83 as highest score in 2002, but does in the following years steadily decrease back to its initial position. This means that on average, PRR-parties are in strong opposition to the EP, and despite the fluctuations, this position remains stable. On the issue of rights for ethnic minorities, the average position remains stable from 2006 to 2010, with a slight increase from 2010 to 2014. The score went from 8,62 in 2006 to 8,85 in 2014, suggesting that PRR-parties in general become even less in favour of more rights for ethnic minorities. An issue dear to the hearts of PRR-parties is immigration policy and from the data it is clear that PRR-parties in general are strongly in favour of tough policies overall, with the average score increasing from 8,55 in 2006 to 9,06 in 2014. The graph above demonstrates a stable but slight increase in support of PRR-parties on the issue of religious principles in politics. The average score increases from 6,6 in 2006 to 6,97 in 2014. The parties demonstrate an overall high support for law and order to be prioritised over civil liberties and the position on this issue remains stable throughout the period. In general, PRR-parties prioritize to reduce taxation over improving public services. The generalized score increases from 5,17 in 2006 to 5,63 in 2010 but decreases slightly to 5,61 in 2014. There is no radical change in the score in the given time period, which suggests the PRR-parties attitude to this issue is relatively stable. This graph indicates that Müller & Strøm’s (1990) classification of office-seeking parties indeed can be useful when trying to understand the goals of PRR-parties, as we observe that the policy positions, on average, of all PRR-parties in Europe have shifted over time. If these parties had been policy-seeking instead of office-policy-seeking, this development likely would not have happened. Onwards, all interpretation of theory and analysis will be based on the underlying assumption that PRR-parties indeed are office-seeking.

The general changes detected in the attitudes of PRR-parties, regardless of governmental participation, can therefore be summarized as following:

• Opposition to the European Union

• Even less supportive of rights for ethnic minorities • Significantly sharpened immigration policy

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• A slight increase in support for religious principles in politics

• Stable, high support of law and order to be prioritised over civil liberties • Increase in support for reduction of taxation at the cost of public services

4.2 Correlation- and regression analysis

Table 6. Means comparison in score

Government

Participation EU Ethnic Minorities Multiculturalism Immigration Policy Religious Principles Civil liberties vs. law and order Public spending and taxation Non-govt. Mean 2,13 8,78 9,12 9,02 6,31 8,67 5,48 Govt. Mean 2,85 8,23 8,70 7,98 8,28 9,07 5,38 Difference in mean 0,72 -0,55 -0,42 -1,05 1,97 0,4 -0,1 Sig. 0,043 0,215 ,306 0,025 0,010 0,278 0,891

Collected from Bakker et al. (2012). Table 3. above reveals the difference in mean score between parties in government to parties outside of government within each of the issue areas. It is clear that parties in government score higher, by 0,72, on the issue of support for the European Union. In other words, PRR-parties in government seem to be slightly less opposed to the powers of the European Union than parties who are not in government. There is a weak correlation between the two variables (0,262), and the difference is statistically significant, as p = 0,043 (see appendix for full tables). On the issue of rights for ethnic minorities, parties in government score lower by 0,55, meaning that parties in government are slightly less opposed to rights for ethnic minorities. There is a weak, negative correlation between the two variables (-0,198), and this correlation is found to be statistically insignificant as p = 0,215. Parties in government also score lower than parties outside of government on multiculturalism, by 0,42. This means that parties in government are less supportive of assimilation. There is a weak, negative correlation between the two variables (-0,160) and the findings are statistically insignificant, as p = 0,306. In the case of toughness of immigration policy, government parties score much lower than parties outside of government (-1,05). Such parties are therefore less supportive of tough policy, relatively speaking, than parties outside of government. The two variables correlate weakly (-0,345), and this correlation is statistically significant as p =0,025. On religious principles, parties in government score higher than parties outside of government by 1,97, making government parties much more supportive of religious principles in politics than non-government parties. There is also a significant correlation between the two variables (0,403), and p = 0,01. Parties in government score slightly higher on civil liberties versus law and order, meaning that they are slightly more supportive of tough measures to fight crime. The correlation between the two variables is weak

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(0,172) and this is statistically insignificant as p = 0,278. Last, but not least, parties in government are also ever so slightly less supportive of reducing taxation, as they score, on average, 0,1 below non-government parties. However, there is no correlation between the two and insignificant for the analysis.

In general, PRR-parties in government are (those marked with * are statistically significant): • A little bit less opposed to the powers of the European Union*

• Slightly less opposed to rights for ethnic minorities • Less supportive of assimilation

• Less supportive of tough immigration policy*

• Much more supportive of religious principles in politics* • Slightly more supportive of tough measures to fight crime

This analysis provides basis to dismiss an H1-zero-hypothesis partially, as it is clear that the policy of PRR-parties, on average, differs between government and non-government parties.

Table 7. Means comparison in changes to score

Government Participation EU Ethnic Minorities Multiculturalism Immigration Policy Religious Principles Civil liberties vs. law and order Public spending and taxation Non-govt. Mean 0,01 0,11 -0,17 0,13 0,06 0,31 0,13 Govt. Mean -0,67 0,29 0,56 0,71 -0,25 -0,02 -0,37 Difference in mean 0,68 0,18 0,73 0,58 0,31 0,33 -0,1 Sig. 0,017 0,646 0,152 0,062 0,588 0,689 0,526

Table 4. above describes the mean change in party score from one CHES year to another. The survey is conducted every four years, and a distinction has been made between parties that were in government in the respective time period (i.e. 1999 – 2002, or 2002 – 2006) and parties that were not. This table differs from Table 3 as it demonstrates how the two groups of PRR-parties attitudes changes from period to period and will therefore also provide basis for making claims about what happens to the policy of PRR-parties once they enter government. On support for the European Union, it is clear that there is little change in the policy of non-government PRR-parties over time. For government PRR-parties, however, there is a relatively large drop in score indicating that parties that enter government become more opposed to the European Union. This relationship is described as a moderate, negative correlation (-0,375), and as p = 0,017, this is statistically significant. Parties in government and parties outside government alike also

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become less opposed to rights for ethnic minorities, but government parties do so at a higher rate on average. There is, however, a very weak relationship between the two variables (0,092), and as p = 0,646, this is to be considered statistically insignificant. On the issue of multiculturalism, there is a big discrepancy between parties inside and parties outside of government (0,73), indicating that the two groups are significantly moving away from each other throughout the measured period. Government parties become more supportive of assimilation, whereas non-government parties become less supportive of it. There is a weak, positive correlation between the two variables, and as p = 0,152, this correlation is considered statistically insignificant. The immigration policy of both groups become tougher throughout the period, however government parties do so at a higher rate. The correlation between these two variables is moderate and positive, however as p = 0,062, this remains statistically insignificant. Additionally, non-government parties become a tiny bit more supportive of religious principles in government, whereas government parties move in the opposite direction. These correlate weakly (-0,122), and as p = 0,588, this correlation remains statistically insignificant. On the issue of civil liberties versus law and order, it is clear that non-government parties, on average, become more supportive of law and order in the time period. For government parties, on the other hand, support decreases slightly. These two variables correlate strongly, (-0,88), but as p = 0,689, this correlation is insignificant. Finally, on support for public spending versus support for reducing levels of taxation, non-government parties become, on average, more supportive of the latter. Government parties, on average, become more supportive of the former. There is a weak, negative correlation (-0,133) and it remains statistically insignificant as p = 0,526.

On average, the policy of PRR-parties changes by the following pattern (those marked with * are statistically significant):

• Government parties become more opposed to the powers of the EU, whereas non-government parties become less opposed *

• Both groups become more opposed to rights for ethnic minorities, but government parties do so at a higher rate

• Government parties become more supportive of assimilation, whereas non-government parties become less supportive

• Both groups become more supportive of tough immigration policy, but government parties do so at a higher rate

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• Government parties become a tiny bit more supportive of religious principles in politics, whereas non-government parties become less supportive

• Government parties become a tiny bit less supportive of tough measures to fight crime, whereas non-government parties become more supportive

• Government parties become more supportive of public spending, whereas non-government parties become more supportive of tax reduction

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6. Conclusion

This thesis has investigated the relationship between policy and government participation for PRR-parties in Europe in the time period 1999 – 2014 and contributes to a greater understanding of what happens when anti-elitist parties become the new political elite. We have seen that, on average, parties in government are less radical on issues such as immigration policy and they are also less eurosceptic than PRR-parties outside of government. The same parties appear, however, to be more conservative on religious principles and are more supportive of such principles to be present in policy. Simultaneously, the data reveals that in the same time period, parties in government become more eurosceptic over time.

6.1 Discussion and reflection

From the summary above, we can deduct that PRR-parties in government are less radical on issues related to globalisation and the free movement of people, services and goods than parties outside of government. Both groups are strongly opposed to the powers of the European Union, but as is clear from the table above, parties in government are so at a lower rate. Moreover, parties in government, on average, are substantially milder in their approach to immigration policy. This effect aligns with Heinisch’s (in Zaslove, 2012, pp. 432) findings; the pressure of coalition partners and lacking experience of being in office will force PRR-parties to moderate their policies. They are torn between the efforts to maintain their radical, populist identity whilst part-taking in parliamentary activities. The analysis does not distinguish between forms of governmental participation but as the majority of cases are parties in coalition government, it also seems to make sense that being a coalition partner will dim radical policy further. Additionally, this analysis supports Greven’s (2016) storyline, that part-taking in government and becoming the new political elite is so paradoxical to the core values of PRR-parties that they see no alternative but to dim radical policies. Zaslove’s (2013) account of what specifically happened to each of the parties in government somewhat fits these results. In the case of FPÖ, due to lacking experience of being in government and also professional cabinet members, the party was unsuccessful in developing a coherent, populist radical-right policy platform, and were instead pressured to moderate by its coalition partners. Heinisch’s (2003) prediction that PRR-parties are more successful in maintaining a radical policy platform when in opposition cannot be fully confirmed but considering the results of the analysis seems to be true.

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Of all theories on how policy shifts when PRR-parties enter government, Bawn &Somer-Topcu (2012) provides the most appropriate account. They state that as different policy positions appeal differently to the voter, dependent of a party being in government or in opposition, parties in government gain more electoral support by taking a more radical stance on salient issues. One would therefore expect that parties in government are more radical than parties outside government, but the analysis has proven that not to be the case. It is however the case that parties in government become more eurosceptic, confirming the expectation outlined in the theory. Moreover, it potentially confirms Somer-Topcu’s (2009) hypothesis of parties altering their policy platform strategically in order to gain more votes. Ezrow et al.’s (2011) prediction of PRR-parties being responsive to shifts in the preferences on salient issues of its core chunk of the electorate also seems plausible, however the analysis conducted is not sufficient enough to make claims about shifts in voter preferences. The results simultaneously disregard Budge’s (1994), Rovny’s (2013) and Bischof’s (2018) theory, as they all predict parties will either become less radical whilst being in government, or that policy will remain the same. This analysis therefore provides basis to partially dismiss H20 as it is clear that the shifts that happen in the policy of PRR-parties in government differs from the shifts of parties outside of government, which can be accepted at a 95% level of significance. On the other hand, the analysis also concludes that PRR-parties in government are more in favour of religious principles in politics, which might indicate that PRR-parties which end up in government on average favours traditional values more than those outside of government. As Zaslove (2013) points out, Lega Nord managed to maintain a position of being an opposition party whilst also participating in government. Investigating this further provides an interesting topic for future research.

6.2 Limitations

This study is limited to the small amount of PRR-parties that have been in government in Europe and their positions as measured by CHES. Due to a small dataset that represents the reality of such parties in government in Europe, it is an inherent difficulty of the study to find significant results. CHES is also only measured every 4 years, and in 2018 only a flash survey was conducted on a very limited selection of issues. This means that cases that fit the criteria, such as Fremskrittspartiet participating in a coalition government with the centre-right party in Norway, could also have been considered but is excluded from doing so due to CHES’ limited survey in the relevant years. Moreover, the study is also limited to the salient policy areas that

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are presented. Establishing a more complete policy profile for each party would indeed have improved the position to make broader claims about the differences in salient and peripheral issues. Furthermore, the classification of right-wing populist parties is dependent on the definitions applied by the PopuList. Although this has been discussed to a minimal extent throughout this thesis, chances are that it will make an impact on the findings. Finally, the analysis and interpretation of data is based on one assumption of all PRR-parties being office-seeking. Perhaps it could have been fruitful to explore the idea of this not being the case further.

In regard to future research on this topic, I believe it would be very insightful to increase the scale of parties measured; all kinds of populism, more variables and countries outside of Europe. Moreover, an in-depth case study of parties with experience in participating in government would allow for deeper circumstantial analysis of how and why the policy of such parties differ, and how it changes over time. The whole analysis and interpretation of data is based on the assumption that PRR-parties are office-seeking, and therefore also willing to alter its policy in order to gain electoral success. Perhaps dismissing this assumption would lead to a very different form of interpretation in regard to the literature, and is certainly an interesting twist to make in future research. By conducting research described above, an even greater understanding of how policy positions of PRR-parties in government change can be obtained.

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Appendix

Appendix A. Average Party Positions

Government participation

Position on EU Pearson correlation ,262

Sig. ,043

N 60

Ethnic Minorities Pearson correlation -,193

Sig. ,215

N 43

Multiculturalism Pearson correlation -,160

Sig. ,306 N 43 Immigration Policy Pearson correlation -,345 Sig. ,025 N 42 Religious

Principles Pearson correlation ,403

Sig. ,010

N 40

Civil Liberties Vs. law & order

Pearson correlation ,176

Sig. ,278

N 40

Public Spending

vs. taxation Pearson correlation -,022

Sig. ,891

N 42

Appendix B. Average Change in Party Positions

Government participation

Position on EU Pearson correlation -,376

Sig. ,017

N 40

Ethnic Minorities Pearson correlation ,092

Sig. ,656

N 26

Multiculturalism Pearson correlation ,284

Sig. ,152 N 27 Immigration Policy Pearson correlation ,379 Sig. ,062 N 25 Religious

Principles Pearson correlation -,122

Sig. ,588

N 22

Civil Liberties

Vs. law & order Pearson correlation -,088

Sig. ,689 N 23 Public Spending vs. taxation Pearson correlation -,133 Sig. ,526 N 25

Continuity and change : the changing policy position of populist radical-right parties in government