Corporate framing and news media framing of the Volkswagen crisis
Khadija Aoulad Abdellah 5966116
Master’s Thesis
Graduate School of Communication Master’s programme Communication Science
Supervisor: mw. Dr. L.A. van Oortmerssen 11-01-2016
Abstract
The goal of present research was to examine how the Volkswagen crisis was framed by the news media and how it’s framed by the organization. For this, the organizational press releases, the articles from three newspapers and articles from a German press agency were analyzed through a qualitative content analysis. To get a more elaborate view on the way of framing by the news media and by Volkswagen, this research also aimed to answer how the framing of the Volkswagen crisis differs over time, and to what extend the crisis
communication is differentiated towards customers and employees. The results show that the news media initially adopt the crisis response strategies of Volkswagen, but after a week, the news media frame the crisis in different ways. Also, crisis communication towards employees is mainly in the bolstering strategy, with frames like reminder and ingratiation. With these strategies, Volkswagen praises stakeholders and reminds them of the good work of the organization. Crisis communication towards customers is framed in a reassurance frame, to reassure these stakeholders, and to restore the damage and the broken trust.
Key words: crisis communication, framing, Volkswagen, VW, diesel cars, emissions,
Introduction
This research is a case study about the framing of the crisis of the German
Volkswagen (VW). The crisis started when researchers at West Virginia University found out that VW used illegal equipment to cheat on the emissions test. The actual emission level was 40 times higher than permitted. VW cheated on the emission testing, claiming that their cars are clean and environmental friendly (“The academic paper that broke the Volkswagen scandal”, September 2015). VW has not been honest about the testing results. Worldwide, 11 million diesel vehicles are rigged with software that alters the engine to a low-emissions condition during laboratory tests. Due to this cheating, VW could claim to engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). This false claim of being a social responsible corporation is called greenwashing (Furlow, 2010; Laufer, 2003; Palmer, 2008).
A crisis can affect the corporate reputation (Coombs, 2007b; Fombrum & Shanley, 1990). This reputation is dependent on the information the public can find that is coming from the organization and/or from the media (Duhé & Zoch, 1994). Communication about the crisis can be placed in a certain context, and this context or frame, then determines how a subject or issue is interpreted (De Boer & Aiking, 2009; Entman, 1993; Van Gorp, 2004; Hallahan, 1999; Jin & Han, 2014). Communication about the crisis can be coming from the organization and/or from the news media. Since this communication can influence the
interpretation of a crisis and the organizational reputation, organizations need to manage their crisis communication. This can be through the implementation of crisis response strategies. For understanding and anticipating the interplay between crisis, response and reputation, the Situational Crisis Communication Theory offers a framework. This theory provides
guidelines about when to use which crisis response strategy, while taking into account the level of attributed responsibility (Coombs, 2007b).
This case study of VW contributes to the knowledge about in what way organizations and news media frame a CSR crisis like greenwashing. Framing has been extensively
researched. Previous research focused on framing in health, in finance, framing in the film industry, political framing, framing in advertising, framing in communication about climate change, framing in games, and more. The framing of CSR crises has also been researched, for example the BP crisis (Schultz, Kleinnijenhuis, Oegema, Utz & Van Atteveldt, 2012). The study showed for example that there is an interplay of corporate framing and news media framing. Research on framing of a greenwashing crisis in the automotive industry has not been conducted before. Therefore, it’s interesting to find out how the VW crisis is framed and
to be able to contribute to the research gap regarding the way that a greenwashing crisis in the automotive sector is framed.
The research of this VW greenwashing case is also interesting because of the fact that VW is a popular brand in the automotive industry. In 2015, VW is the second biggest car company in the world, after the Japanese Toyota (Forbes, 2015). In Europe, VW is the biggest car company. This case can be interesting and relevant for other car companies and companies in general. Research on framing in crisis communication can provide insight and guidance for organizations’ crisis communication strategies and help understand the role of framing in crisis communication, in order to diminish the reputational damage that can be caused by a (greenwashing) crisis (Coombs, 2007b; Jones, Temperley & Lima, 2010).
This research aims to find out how VW frames the crisis and how the news media frame the crisis. This study also aims to find out to what extend the framing of the crisis communication changes over time, and to what extend the crisis communication differs towards different stakeholders. This leads to the following research question: How is the VW
crisis framed by the news media and by VW and how does this framing differ over time and for different stakeholders?
Theoretical Framework
Crisis and corporate reputation
As mentioned before, a crisis can damage the corporate reputation. A crisis can be defined as “the perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders related to health, safety, environmental, and economic issues, and can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generate negative outcomes” (Coombs, 2014, p.3). In the example of the VW crisis, the event can be called unpredictable, because VW most likely didn’t expect that the deceit and the false claims of being environmental friendly would become known.
Corporate reputation, as well as the overall business benefits, can be enhanced by CSR (Brown et al., 2010). However, when an organization claims to be social responsible when it’s not, this can have counterproductive effects and can lead to negative outcomes concerning the reputation (Brown et al., 2010; Chen & Chang, 2012). A false claim of CSR is called greenwashing (Furlow, 2010; Kapalko, 2010; Laufer, 2003; Palmer, 2008).
Greenwashing can also be defined as: “the act of misleading consumers regarding the environmental practices of a company or the environmental benefits of a product or service”
(Kapalko, 2010, p. 317). Greenwashing is also called disinformation, which means that organizations are deliberately providing the wrong information to consumers about CSR (Laufer, 2003; Palmer, 2008). Another explanation of greenwashing is that it is the act of distributing vague, inaccurate, and/or incomplete information concerning CSR (Furlow, 2010). Acts of CSR that are not genuine or not perceived moral, can therefore lead to destruction of the corporate reputation (Brown et al., 2010). In other words, a greenwashing crisis like in the VW case, can lead to damage of the organizational reputation.
Managing crisis communication
Companies in crisis should respond to a crisis, by providing three types of information necessary in a crisis; instructions about what actions stakeholders should take to protect themselves from physical harm, information that helps people cope with the crisis
psychologically, and information that the public can use to form an image of the organization regarding CSR, safety, and compassion (Duhé & Zoch, 1994). These priorities are also mentioned by Coombs (2007b), who states that in a crisis, an organization should provide instructing information, adapting information, and express concerns. This is called the ethical way of responding to a crisis. Achieving and maintaining ethos can be by behaving as the public expects the organizations to behave, and, for example, by keeping the promises that are made (Ihlen, 2002). Providing information is necessary, because a crisis leads to
questions from stakeholders and the lack of information can induce the uncertainty caused by a crisis. Therefore, it is recommended that an organization should first address these aspects of showing sympathy and informing stakeholders in their crisis communication, and then focus on their reputation and diminishing the potential reputational damage (Coombs, 2007b).
To prevent damage or diminish the reputational damage that can be caused by a crisis, an organization has to deal with this crisis and manage its crisis communication (Coombs, 2007b; Seeger, 2006). The Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) provides guidelines for organizations to manage their reputation through crisis communication. The SCCT distinguishes the type of crisis by crisis clusters, and crisis response strategies (Coombs & Holladay, 2002; Coombs, 2007b; Laufer & Coombs, 2006), that provide corporations different possible responses in different situations. The key variable in SCCT, and therefore in choosing a response, is the attribution of responsibility by stakeholders. SCCT offers a framework for matching and combining the crisis response strategy to the level of attributed responsibility. During a crisis, stakeholders search for information in order to make their own interpretation and perceptions about the crisis, and they want to find out
what caused the crisis. The attribution theory (Coombs, 2007a; Weiner, 1985) explains how stakeholders search for causes of an event and for the one(s) responsible. These attributions of responsibility can have positive or negative effects on the organization’s reputation. If the organization is perceived responsible, this can lead to angry stakeholders, who in turn can end the relationship with the organization, and /or start negative word of mouth. Organizations should therefore prevent these negative outcomes and communicate with stakeholders to provide them with specific information, and to be able to influence their interpretations or attributions (Brown et al., 2010; Coombs, 2007a; Duhé & Zoch, 1994) and manage these perceptions to protect and strengthen the corporate reputation (Brown et al., 2010).
The SCCT consists of three crisis clusters, that are based on the level of attribution of responsibility, which determines the reputational threat and with this the type of situation (See Table 1, Appendix A). The three crisis clusters are; victim cluster, accidental cluster, and preventable cluster. Each one of the clusters consists of different crisis types. The clusters and types include whether the crisis was caused internally or externally, accidentally or intentionally, and whether the crisis was caused by technological or human error. In the
victim cluster, the organization is also a victim of the crisis, and the level of attribution of
crisis responsibility is low. This cluster involves the crisis types natural disaster, rumor,
workplace violence, and product tampering / malevolence. The second cluster is the
accidental cluster, with a moderate level of attributed responsibility. In this cluster, the crisis
types are unintended. The crisis types here are; challenges, technical-error accidents, and
technical-error product harm. In the preventable cluster, the attribution of responsibility is
strong, and the organization intentionally took action that led to the crisis. The crisis types in the preventable cluster are; human-error accidents, human-error product harm,
organizational misdeed with no injuries, organizational misdeed management misconduct,
and organizational misdeed with injuries.
Crisis response strategy is what management says and does during and after a crisis
(Coombs, 2007b). For example, by compensating the victims or showing concern and
compassion. The primary crisis response strategies are divided in three categories (See Table 2, Appendix A), depending on the organizational acceptance of responsibility. The strategies are; denial, diminish, and rebuild (Coombs, 2007b). A denial strategy refers to statements that the organization has nothing to do with the crisis or the cause of the crisis. Strategies in this category are; attack the accuser, denial, and scapegoat. Diminishing strategies refer to minimizing the damage that is caused by the crisis, and/or minimizing the organizational responsibility. The strategies in the diminish category are; excuse and justification. The third
category in the primary strategies is the strategy of rebuilding, where the organization accepts the responsibility and tries to repair the damage via compensation and/or apology. The
secondary, or supplemental, crisis response strategies are in the fourth category called
bolstering. Bolstering happens when an organization refers to previous good reputation
and/or the good relationship with stakeholders, by praising the stakeholders for example. The bolstering strategies are; reminder, ingratiation, and victimage. With the reminder strategy, an organization tells the stakeholders about the good work that is done by the organization. The ingratiation strategy is used to praise stakeholders and can be combined with the
reminder strategy. With the victimage strategy, an organization communicates to the
stakeholders that the company is a victim of the crisis.
Organizations in crisis often apply the denial strategy and then evaluate how to proceed and/or to change the strategy (Hearit, 2001). Pressure and/or skepticism from the public or the news media can result in the change of a strategy. This means that these strategies are not static and can be changed and combined with each other strategies according to the changing phases of an organizational crisis (Ihlen, 2002).
Corporate Framing
As mentioned before, with the crisis response strategies, organizations can match their responses to the nature of the crisis and to the level of responsibility (Coombs, 2007a; Kim, Avery & Lariscy, 2009). Responding to a crisis with a crisis response strategy, can be used as an underlying tool for developing crisis communication. Each strategy is defined and can be seen as a frame (See Table 1, Appendix C), because each crisis strategy emphasizes certain aspects of the crisis aspects (Coombs, 2007b), and each strategy focuses on the selection and the disclosure of certain information (See Table 2, Appendix A). Framing refers to the selection of specific information, in order to influence the publics’ interpretation about an issue (Entman, 1993; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). An acclaimed definition of framing is: “to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a
communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. This definition
emphasizes the selection and salience of specific aspects in a text. This means that there is a selection of which aspects in a text are not present, less present or more present, and this places the information in a specific context, in a frame. This frame determines how a subject or issue is interpreted (De Boer & Aiking, 2009). Frames in communication shape frames in thought (Coombs, 2007a). Crisis frames can therefore lead to a certain interpretation by
stakeholders. An organization can use a crisis response strategy to frame the crisis and with this framing try to influence how the crisis is interpreted. With a crisis response strategy as a frame, an organization can reduce the reputational damage, and/or prevent negative outcomes. An organization can communicate with its public about the crisis, through press releases on their website for example.
News media framing
In case of an organizational crisis, the news media also inform the public about the crisis. Like organizations, the news media also frame their messages about the crisis. Different news frames can be identified from previous research on framing. For example; conflict frame, human interest frame, economic frame, responsibility frame, and remedy frame (Liu, 2014; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000; De Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001). In the
conflict frame, the news media mention a conflict or dispute between groups, individuals,
governments, or institutions. This can also be a conflict between an organization and the stakeholders. In a human interest frame, the message is personalized and/or emotionalized. There is a mention of personal characteristics and/or emotions. In the economic frame the economic consequences are mentioned. This refers to material costs and benefits, a financial gain or loss for individuals, groups, or organizations. In the responsibility frame, there is a mentioning of who is perceived responsible, or who is to blame for a conflict or an issue. This frame is also referred to as the attribution of responsibility frame (Semetko &
Valkenburg, 2000). Finally, in the remedy frame, a solution is suggested for the conflict or issue. The remedy frame is also called a counter frame, because the news media can offer remedies for, or improve, a precarious event, and not only identifying or framing a particular event (Entman, 2003). These news frames ((See Table 1, Appendix C) are not exhaustive or deterministic. An article can contain one or more frames at the same time and other types of frames and/or sub frames are also possible (Liu, 2014; De Vreese, 2005).
Mass communication research shows that media frames affect judgments and emphasize certain facts or beliefs. Through crisis communication, an organization can have influence on the media framing and the construction of the media messages (Duhé & Zoch, 1994). Carroll and McCombs (2003) also mention this influence between corporate and news media framing. They state that the corporate agenda and the news media agenda can
influence each other. Framing by an organization, through online press releases for example, is important to place an issue in a specific context in the media (Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2005).
This means that corporate frames can be adopted by the news media and news media frames can be adopted by organizations.
Crisis timing strategy
In sum, in a crisis it’s important to communicate with stakeholders and provide them with information. A lack of information or a response from an organization during a crisis can result in uncertainty with the stakeholders (Laufer & Coombs, 2006). Not only a lack of information, but also delayed information in a crisis can cause frustration (Heinzelman & Waters, 2010). Organizations in crisis should react by providing information to the public, but it’s important to react as quickly as possible. Reacting on time can reduce uncertainty and speculations (Duhé & Zoch, 1994). This shows that a crisis response is as important as the timing of the crisis response for organizations when dealing with a corporate crisis (Claeys & Cauberghe, 2012). Organizations in crisis can benefit from providing accurate, continuously and timely information during and even after a crisis (Sweetser & Metzgar, 2007). This can lead to a more positive image of the organization. This means that organizations can use this accurate, timely and constant flow of information in their crisis communication.
During a crisis, more and more information becomes available over time. For example by experts, legal authorities, and journalists who try to find out as much information as they can about the issue. New findings can raise new questions with stakeholders. Therefore, it’s necessary for organizations to keep their stakeholders updated with the latest crisis
information (Arpan & Roskos-Ewoldson, 2005). A proactive crisis communication strategy can enhance the communication flow between an organization and its public (Arpan & Pompper, 2003). This proactive way of communicating can result in the perception of a credible organization. Accurate and up-to-date information can reduce the confusion about the situation (Militello, Patterson, Bowman & Wears, 2007). This shows the necessity of a periodically information flow during a crisis situation. “Textbook crisis communication strategy underscores the value of releasing information as quickly as possible” (Arpan & Pompper, 2003, p. 292). This means that organizations can benefit from continuously
revising their crisis response strategy, in order to provide the latest information to the public.
Stakeholders
Organizations in crisis need to differentiate in the way they maintain relationships with different stakeholders. Good relationships with stakeholders can help overcome many challenges during and after a crisis. Stakeholders can be divided in internal and external
stakeholders for example. Employees are an example of internal stakeholders, and the external stakeholders are the customers, among others (Ulmer, Seeger & Sellnow, 2007). Organizations need support from their customers to keep purchasing their products and support from their employees to keep the organization functioning (Coombs, 2007b; Ulmer et al., 2007). Just like a good reputation can attract customers and ‘top-employee talent’, a bad reputation can scare off these stakeholders. Differentiating between stakeholders is also important because different stakeholders have different expectations and stakes. Internal and external stakeholders communicate, interpret, and react differently to an organizational crisis. The impact of a crisis can also be different for various stakeholders. This means that
stakeholders cannot be seen as one group and crisis communication should be differentiated to be more effective (Coombs, 2007a; Frandsen & Johansen, 2011).
Method
Design
The research question was: How is the VW crisis framed by the news media and by
VW and how does this framing differ over time and for different stakeholders? To answer this
question, a qualitative content analysis was conducted. The essential goal of such an analysis is to describe events and to identify the meaning of these events (Erickson, 2012). For present research, this can be translated in discovering and describing the way of framing in VW’s crisis communication. According to Erickson (2012), this method is meant for describing patterns that can be found in texts and for describing changes over time. This case study also researched if the way of framing changes over time. Another purpose of qualitative research is ‘discovering kinds of things’ (Erickson, 2012, p. 1451). The data was manually analyzed to investigate what kinds of frames could be found in the texts. Other methods are less efficient in answering the research question. With this content analysis, it was researched if the mentioned frames from the literature were recognized in the data, and if there were other types of frames that could be deducted from the data.
VW Case description
On September 20, 2015, the German auto manufacturer Volkswagen (VW) officially confirmed the findings of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency which stated that VW used illegal software to manipulate the emission testing of VW’s diesel cars. In this
so called ‘defeat devices’, VW could cheat the emission tests, while actually discharging up to 40 times the allowed (in the U.S.) emissions of the pollutant nitrogen oxide (N2O). The device also manipulated the carbon dioxide (CO2) levels. CO2 emissions are related to the fuel efficiency and thus fuel consumption. The ‘defeat devices’ are equipped with a
programme that can identify when the car is being tested on a rolling road in a testing facility, which makes the car switch to a cleaner driving mode. This means that VW used these
devices to make the diesel car engines look cleaner and environmental friendly than they really were. Worldwide, 11 million diesel cars are affected and fitted with these devices, including 8,5 million cars in Europe. The affected cars are from 2009, and include at least the VW Beetle, Golf, Jetta, Passat, and the Audi A3. All these cars have to be recalled, which makes it the biggest recall in the automotive history.
Sample
The sample (See Appendix B) consists of news articles and press releases about the VW crisis. In Lexis Nexis prominent international and national news articles were selected to retrieve the information from. Initially, the amount of articles was dependent on the time available for coding, but approximately 80-100 units. Three newspapers were selected. The most popular Dutch quality newspaper De Volkskrant. A second newspaper is The London Times; this is a national and quality daily newspaper in the UK. The third newspaper is The New York Times, which has the second highest circulation in the U.S., after The Wall Street Journal (“Top 10 newspapers by circulation”, November 2013). The latter mentioned
newspaper is a more business and economic focused newspaper, rather than a general newspaper, and the choice was made not to select the newspaper in the U.S. with the highest circulation. Also, news articles from the German press agency, the Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA) were selected to retrieve news articles from Germany, but in the English language. This could be useful since VW is a German and in Germany based auto manufacturer. The choice for using newspaper articles was made based on the fact that traditional media like newspapers have a bigger influence on public opinion and a wider reach towards the public, compared with news on social media (Etter & Vestergaard, 2015). Therefore, the choice was made not to select press releases on social media like Facebook, but via official press releases on VW’s corporate website.
The news articles were retrieved from the digital database Lexis Nexis. The search term in Lexis Nexis was a combination of the words ‘Volkswagen crisis’. This enhanced the chance that only newspaper articles that are about the VW crisis would be selected. In Lexis
Nexis, highly similar newspaper articles were excluded from the sample. Also, the articles had to be from the last two months and either in Dutch or English. The first news article about the crisis dates from September 21, 2015. The last news article selected for the analysis is from November 19, 2015. The results showed a total of 77 relevant news articles (See Table 1, Appendix B), after deleting the double and irrelevant articles. In De Volkskrant, 8 relevant articles were found. The DPA provided 5 relevant articles. In the London Times 39 relevant articles were found, and in the New York Times 25 relevant articles were found. 25 official press releases about the crisis were found and collected form the official international website of VW (See Table 2, Appendix B). The first press release about the crisis dates from September 20, 2015. The last press release that is used in this research is from November 20, 2015. Together with the 77 news articles, the data consist of 102 units.
Data analysis
For the analysis, every unit was manually analyzed. By reading each article, existing news media frames and existing corporate frames could be recognized. Also, new and striking frames could be found in the articles during reading (See Table 1, Appendix C). The main words and sentences that constructed a specific frame were then marked. The repetition of key words, or highly similar words, made the new frames more salient and this made it possible to assign a certain frame type. These new frames became more clear and obvious during the analysis, when the frames were used repeatedly in the press releases and in the news articles. The press releases were payed extra attention to when employees and/or customers were mentioned, to interpret in what frame this information towards these
stakeholders was placed. After the press releases and the four news outlets were analyzed and the frames could be distinguished, the frames that were found in each of the five media outlets were then listed up in a time table to be able to analyze the change of these frames over time. This gave a clear overview of the frame-use patterns for each media outlet.
Results The first week
In the first press release from September 20th, the CEO of VW responded to the crisis by apologizing to the customers and the public for the manipulations that were found in the diesel cars. The CEO also said that customers’ trust is important to the company and that VW will do everything to reverse the damage and restore the trust. This is expressed by the
‘I personally am deeply sorry that we have broken the trust of our customers and the public’ (VW press release, September 20).
This example shows that the first press release consisted of the following frames; apology,
human interest, promises, responsibility, and a trust frame (See Appendix C). VW explicitly
accepted responsibility in the third press release, by stating:
‘As CEO I accept responsibility for the irregularities that have been found in diesel engines’ (VW press release, September 23).
The CEO then announced his resignation. The data showed that the apology frame and
human interest frame were also present in the news media in the first week of the crisis. This
shows the interplay of the corporate framing and news media framing. Examples of these frames in the news media are:
‘The executives at Volkswagen have offered apologies’ (The New York Times, October 9).
‘It hurts me very much that we have broken the trust. I apologize’ (De Volkskrant, September 23).
Together with the apologies, VW started the crisis communication with promises that they will clarify the situation, using the sub frame promise to clarify. An example of this frame is:
‘Volkswagen is working at full speed to clarify irregularities concerning a particular software used in diesel engines’ (VW press release, September 22).
VW not only promised to clarify, but also promised to take action and to do things to reverse the caused damage, using the sub frame promise to act. This sub frame is represented in the following example:
‘We at Volkswagen will do everything that must be done in order to re-establish the trust that so many people have placed in us, and we will do everything necessary in order to reverse the damage this has caused’ (VW press release, September 20).
There is a clear and constant use of the promises frame by VW during the analyzed period of two months. The results showed that only the German press agency, the DPA, adopted this promises frame, but the newspapers did not. Instead, the newspapers focused on the lack of honoring these promises made by VW, which is represented in the need for
clarification frame:
‘Volkswagen declined to answer questions to clarify the wording in that statement’ (The New York Times, November 4).
This shows that the newspapers most likely reacted on VW’s crisis communication. As VW kept promising to the stakeholders that they will clarify and resolve the situation, at the same time, the newspapers got critical and asked for clarification and explanation. Another frame that was used by the news media, is the greenwashing frame. The London Times used this frame in the first week, by stating that VW made false claims concerning the emission testing. The greenwashing frame is illustrated by the following examples:
‘Yet the crisis, which involved the use of "defeat devices" to cheat air pollution tests, continued to grow’ (The London Times, September 24).
‘Software that conned testers into believing that the cars met environmental standards’ (The London Times, October 7).
The second week
After the first week, VW shifted from the primary crisis response strategy of
apologizing to the secondary crisis response strategy, by using the bolstering strategy. With this strategy, VW tried to restore the damaged trust among the employees, customers, and other stakeholders. The results also showed that VW differentiated in the crisis
communication towards employees and customers. Towards the employees, VW used the
ingratiation and reminder frame, where the organization expressed its appreciation for the
employees. An example of this frame is:
‘And above all because we have the best automobile team anyone could wish for’ (VW press release, October 6).
The customers were addressed by using promises and reassurance framing, for example:
‘Volkswagen will subsequently inform the owners of these vehicles over the next weeks and months’ (VW press release, October 15).
The data showed that after the first week, the corporate and news media framing became more incongruent (See Appendix C). For example, regarding the impact of the crisis, VW looked mostly at the economic consequences, using an economic frame. This is illustrated by the following statement in a press release:
‘Investments to be reduced by 1 billion euros per year compared with planning’ (VW press release, October 13).
The news media looked into a different range of consequences, represented in the
ramifications frame. The ramifications and impact of the crisis mentioned in the news media,
was related to different aspects. For example; the national reputation, the global impact, the environmental impact, the impact on health and the legal consequences. This ramifications frame is illustrated with the following examples from the news media:
‘With the damage done to the "Made in Germany" brand by VW emissions scandal’ (The London Times, October 9).
‘Which poses a threat to human health’ (The New York Times, November 4).
‘The affair is now in the hands of lawyers around the world’ (DPA, October 7).
As mentioned before, the news media used different ways of framing the VW crisis. With regard to the greenwashing frame, The New York Times started using this frame after approximately one week into the crisis, and used this frame on a regular basis during the following months. In the news media, only The London Times and the New York Times used the greenwashing frame. DPA and De Volkskrant did not. Examples that represented this
greenwashing frame in The New York Times are:
‘Software that conned testers into believing that the cars met environmental standards’ (The New York Times, November 4).
After the second week
After approximately two weeks, in the press release of October 6th, VW started using the reassurance frame. The new CEO encouraged the employees and the customers to have faith in the organization:
‘At the same time he encouraged employees to take heart’ (VW press release, October 6).
‘We can and we will overcome this crisis’ (VW press release, October 6).
This change of framing can be seen as an answer to the skepticism of the news media, and most likely a result of the growing concerns of the customers and the public (Ihlen, 2002). In this stage of the crisis, the financial, practical and moral implications of the deceit were known and the news media were reporting extensively about the crisis. VW had to recall eleven million diesel cars around the world, costing a minimum of 6,5 billion euros. Other brands of diesel cars were also affected by the manipulation, and the reputation and trust among stakeholders was damaged according to the news media. Examples that illustrates the reputational damage are:
‘The disclosure marks the latest embarrassment for the company’ (The London Times, October 17).
‘Trust in the VW brand has all but been eroded’ (The London Times, September 30).
The news media were not only reporting about the damage to the organizational reputation, but also about the damage to the national and the car making industry of Germany, and recognized this crisis as the biggest in its form. Examples of this reporting by the news media are:
‘The biggest crisis in its 78-year history’ (DPA, October 1).
‘The crisis with the cheating device of the German Volkswagen seems to be mainly a problem for the label Made in Germany’ (De Volkskrant, October 6).
News media framing
The analysis also showed some results that relate to the way of framing in the news media and the way of framing of VW. There were some differences in the framing between the four news media outlets. First, The London Times is the only medium that used the
remedy frame, by stating how VW can solve and survive the crisis, and how to prevent such a
crisis in the future. The British newspaper looks at the crisis from a more constructive perspective. Another interesting outcome about this newspaper, is that there is some use of humor and irony in the articles. An example is:
‘Much more of this and the only people in a diesel will be the ones wearing the jeans’ (The London Times, September 23).
Another difference between the news media was that The New York Times used more new frames in their articles than the other news media outlets. The articles provided a broad range of new types of frames, like corporate culture, ethics, and need for clarification (See table 11, Appendix C).
Corporate framing
Like the news media, VW also uses the news frames conflict, economic, human
interest, and responsibility. The corporate frames include frames from the denial crisis
response strategy (attack the accuser, denial, and scapegoat), the diminish strategy (excuse), the rebuild strategy (apology), and frames from the bolstering strategy (reminder and
ingratiation). Other frames that could be subtracted from the corporate crisis communication
were promises frame (which includes the sub frames promise to clarify and promise to act),
reassurance, and trust. In general, it can be said that the press releases contain a continuously
use of the sub frames promise to clarify and promise to act.
Conclusion
The research question was: How is the VW crisis framed by the news media and by
VW and how does this framing differ over time and for different stakeholders? Through a
qualitative content analysis this question could be answered. The results showed that the news media used the generic news frames and frames that are mentioned in the primary and secondary crisis response strategies. These frames are; apology, attack the accuser,
reminder, responsibility, and scapegoat. There could also be other frames identified in the
news media about the VW crisis. For example, corporate culture, greenwashing, promises,
ramifications, and trust.
The news media framing changed from human interest framing to different ways of framing over time (See Appendix C). De Volkskrant had a continuous use of the conflict frame, and the human interest frame disappeared after approximately two weeks and got replaced by a ramifications frame. DPA initially placed the crisis in a human interest frame. DPA also used the ramifications and economic frame from the start and continued to use these two frames for the following two months. After circa two weeks, DPA used more different frames, like trust and promises. The London Times had a constant use of the
economic and conflict frame. After the apologies at the beginning, the focus here shifted on to
the ramifications of the crisis, like in the other news media outlets, and then ended again with mainly the conflict and economic frame. In The New York Times, the news articles also started with the human interest frame and the corporate culture frame. Later on, there were more different frames used, like deny, excuse, attack the accuser, followed by frames like
greenwashing and compensation. The corporate culture frame however, was constantly used
in the American newspaper. The other frames could be found randomly across time and appear repeatedly during the two months.
The results showed that the framing of VW’s crisis communication towards employees and customers is different. In general, VW used the reminder and ingratiation frame to address the employees. These frames were often used together to express the importance of the workforce for the achieved success of the organization. On the other hand, the customers were addresses by using the promises, reassurance, and trust frame. The difference between the framing towards customers and employees showed that VW clearly differentiated in their communication towards these two types of stakeholders, which could lead to more effective crisis communication (Coombs, 2007b; Frandsen & Johansen, 2011; Ulmer et al., 2007).
Discussion
As mentioned before, this case study contributes to previous findings in the literature about framing of corporate communication in case of crises. This research about the framing of a corporate greenwashing crisis shows that the used frames in the VW case are more elaborate than the literature suggests. The generic news frames (De Vreese, Peter & Semetko, 2001; Liu, 2014; Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000) and the corporate frames (Coombs, 2007b)
mentioned before, are not sufficient enough to describe the framing of the VW crisis. This study provides a number of different new frames (See Table 1, Appendix C). An interesting new frame that appeared in the news media is the ramifications frame. This frame is used to describe the multiple ways the VW crisis affects different aspects of society. This frame can also be considered as an umbrella frame, since all new media frames are in a way a
consequence of the crisis. For example; health, criminal, and trust frames can also be treated as the consequences of the crisis, and therefore could be considered as sub frames of the
ramifications frame. This shows the indispensability of the ramifications frame in the
literature about news media framing.
An interesting new frame in corporate crisis communication is the promises frame; this frame is divided in the sub frames promise to act and promise to clarify. VW used this frame regularly in the press releases. This means that the frame can be considered as an addition to the crisis response strategies and frames mentioned in previous research (Coombs, 2007b). The analysis also shows other results worth mentioning; the news media and VW both use the new frames promises, reassurance, and trust. This could mean that there is a certain amount of interplay between both agendas (Carroll & Coombs, 2003; Duhé & Zoch, 1994; Froehlich & Rüdiger, 2005). Regarding the use of the promises frame by the news media, this frame could only be found in DPA. This result can be explained by the fact that the DPA is not a newspaper, but a press agency that basically only gathers and spreads news. Especially the use of the human interest frame and the apology frame by both the news media and VW in the first week of the crisis, suggests that there is interplay between the two
agendas.
Regarding the greenwashing frame, The London Times and The New York Times used this frame, which basically represents the act that brought VW in a crisis. The use of the
greenwashing frame means that the VW crisis has also been recognized by the news media as
a greenwashing crisis. This false claim of being social responsible, and the recognition of VW’s greenwashing by the news media, can cause damage to VW’s reputation (Brown et al., 2010; Chen & Chang, 2012).
With regard to the type of crisis, the analysis shows that the VW crisis fits into the
preventable cluster of the SCCT (Coombs, 2007b). The crisis is perceived to be caused
intentionally by the organization and therefore the organizations is held responsible. The organization also admits and accepts responsibility. VW admitted that the deceit was not an accident, and that the devices were intentionally placed in the diesel cars to trick the emission testing. This could mean that VW faces serious reputational damage. Since there were no
physical damages caused by the crisis, this crisis falls into the following three crisis types in the preventable cluster; Human-error product harm, which caused the 11 million cars to be recalled; Organizational misdeed with no injuries, this crisis type refers to the deception of stakeholders; Organizational misdeed management misconduct, this refers to the violations of law and regulations, which is proven in this case by the massive and global legal action from customers and competition.
With reference to the need for differentiation of crisis communication towards different stakeholders (Coombs, 2007a; Frandsen & Johansen, 2011; Ulmer et al., 2007), the results show that VW differentiates between the stakeholders. In the press releases, there is a clear use of promises, reassurance, and trust frame towards customers and the reminder and
ingratiation frame towards the employees. This use of different framing towards employees
and customers is in line with the findings of previous research that shows that differentiation between stakeholders can result in effective crisis communication. This in turn can positively influence the relationship between the organization and its stakeholders during and after a crisis.
Limitations and future research
This study has a few limitations. With regard to the damage of greenwashing on the organizational reputation mentioned before, this research shows that the news media perceive the crisis as a greenwashing crisis. Nonetheless, it cannot be established to what extend this greenwashing has influenced and/or damaged the corporate reputation. The results also revealed that VW often promised to clarify and to take action to resolve the situation, by using the promises frame. On the other hand, the news media showed that there’s a clear need for clarification, information, and action from the organization. These incongruent results in relation to the promises, can lead to skepticism or uncertainty with stakeholders. It would be interesting to conduct a follow-up study where stakeholders, like customers and employees, would be integrated in the research by measuring how they perceive the organization and to what extend the greenwashing crisis influenced the corporate reputation.
The different news media showed an unequal distribution of the amount of relevant articles. The most relevant articles were found in The London Times (39) and The New York Times (25). The least amount of relevant articles was from DPA (5) and De Volkskrant (8). The press releases consisted of 25 units. This difference could have influenced the results. Especially, for the news media with less units. The more articles available, the better it can be established how the crisis communication is framed. Another limitation is the fact that the
sample is spread over a period of only two months. This is a relatively short period to research the crisis communication of an event that continues for a longer period. It would be useful to do a longitudinal research to be able to make more valid and elaborate statements about the case.
Since the news media in this research provided different results for each news media outlet, it can also be interesting to study the news media in a cross-cultural context, and take into account the cultural and national differences between different countries. Another suggestion for future research is to expand the analysis of the crisis communication with social media. Messages on social media like Facebook, and Twitter in particular, are shorter and more divers. This could give a broader view on the VW crisis, also because stakeholders’ and the public’s opinion can be included.
Practical implications
The goal of this case study was to answer the question of how the VW’s crisis is framed by the news media and by the organization, and therefore how the organizational crisis is portrayed in the media. This media image and media framing can influence stakeholders’ perception and the corporate reputation. The results can be relevant for organizations in the auto industry, but also for organizations in general to get insight in the way that framing can best be used by crisis managers to maintain important stakeholder relationships. For example, the necessity for organizations to follow up on their promises, when using a promises frame for example. One of the results in this research showed that the news media pay attention to these promises to see if the organization keeps their word. This case study can be exemplary for other organizations when it comes to claiming CSR and the necessity to be honest and cautious to prevent a greenwashing crisis. This all shows the importance for organizations to be transparent and accurate in their crisis communication towards the public and their stakeholders. Then it can be possible for organizations to overcome a crisis.
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Appendix A. SCCT and CRS Table 1.
SCCT crisis types by crisis clusters
Victim cluster: In these crisis types, the organization is also a victim of the crisis. (Weak attributions of crisis responsibility = Mild reputational threat)
Natural disaster: Acts of nature damage an organization such as an earthquake. Rumor: False and damaging information about an organization is being circulated. Workplace violence: Current or former employee attacks current employees onsite. Product tampering / malevolence: External agent causes damage to an organization.
Accidental cluster: In these crisis types, the organizational actions leading to the crisis were unintentional.
(Minimal attributions of crisis responsibility = Moderate reputational threat)
Challenges: Stakeholders claim an organization is operating in an inappropriate manner.
Technical-error accidents: A technology or equipment failure causes an industrial accident.
Technical-error product harm: A technology or equipment failure causes a product to be recalled.
Preventable cluster: In these crisis types, the organization knowingly placed people at risk, took inappropriate actions or violated a law/regulation.
(Strong attributions of crisis responsibility = Severe reputational threat) Human-error accidents: Human error causes an industrial accident. Human-error product harm: Human error causes a product to be recalled.
Organizational misdeed with no injuries: Stakeholders are deceived without injury. Organizational misdeed management misconduct: Laws or regulations are violated by management.
Organizational misdeed with injuries: Stakeholders are placed at risk by management and injuries occur.
Table 2.
Crisis response strategies / Frames Primary crisis response strategies
1. Deny
Attack the accuser: Crisis manager confronts the person or group claiming something is wrong with the organization.
Denial: Crisis manager asserts that there is no crisis.
Scapegoat: Crisis manager blames some person or group outside of the organization for the crisis.
2. Diminish
Excuse: Crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm and/o claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis.
Justification: Crisis manager minimizes the perceived damage caused by the crisis.
3. Rebuild
Compensation: Crisis manager offers money or other gifts to victim.
Apology: Crisis manager indicates the organization takes full responsibility for the crisis and asks
stakeholders for forgiveness.
Secondary crisis response strategies
4. Bolstering
Reminder: Tell stakeholders about the past good work of the organization.
Ingratiation: Crisis manager praises stakeholders and/or reminds them of past good works by the organization.
Victimage: Crisis manager reminds stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too. (Coombs, 2007b)
Appendix B. Table 1.
News media articles
Date (2015) Title article
De Volkskrant
1. September 23 Volkswagenschandaal dijt uit
2. September 24 Debacle Volkswagen, Duitslands noodlot
3. September 25 In de stad van Volkswagen staat de toekomst stil 4. September 28 VW, logisch, maar blijf af van de club
5. October 6 Het ging net zo lekker allemaal
6. October 7 VW bereidt personeel voor op zware tijden 7. October 27 Merkel moet vooral haar eigen partij vrezen 8. November 7 Het kantelende zelfbeeld van Duitsland
DPA
1. September 21 VW shares plunge after carmaker admits cheating in US emissions tests
2. October 1 VW finance chief to take over as board
3. October 7 VW board draws up emissions crisis plan; US chief to apologize 4. October 16 Anxiety at South Africa VW plant ahead of German state leader visit 5. November 13 Top VW managers promise massive savings, but not job cuts
The London Times
1. September 22 VW ‘cheated’ in car emission test
2. September 23 Caught cheating; The scandal engulfing Volkswagen will reverberate through the global economy. European regulators must seize the moment to ensure it clears the air in our cities
3. September 23 The wolves of Wolfsburg are running scared 4. September 23 New testing could be the death of diesel
5. September 23 Volkswagen in meltdown after faked diesel tests; Drivers face mass recall as share price crashes. Thousands of British motorists face recall 6. September 23 Troubled German giant engineers its own downfall
7. September 24 Two men at the wheel of 50-year family feud 8. September 24 Carmakers accused of shopping for soft tests
9. September 24 Car firms braced for new fake-test crisis; scandal could spread across the industry
10. September 24 Capitalism must throw the book at its culprits; Volkswagen has abused the trust consumers put in western free enterprise. Bosses must pay the price to restore it
11. September 25 This undermines Heathrow plan, says Boris
12. September 25 BMW and Mercedes hit as fraud scandal spreads; Doubts over emissions in wake of VW crisis. Evidence ignored for a year by UK ministers. BMW dragged into controversy
13. September 25 City people 14. September 25 Need to know
15. September 25 VW’s bank hits trouble as investors dump bonds; Cost of insurance on group debt more than trebles
16. September 26 Companies must clean up their act or the scandal will continue; Business must engage with societal demands, write the former BP chief John Browne and Tommy Stadlen
17. September 26 Different drivers
18. September 28 Beer drinkers should be feeling queasy about the creation of a monster brewer.
19. September 30 VW recalls 11m cars to remove rogue software
20. October 1 Biggest recall in British history will hit 1,2m owners of VW cars 21. October 7 We must make cuts as bill is still rising, VW boss tells staff
22. October 9 Need to know
23. October 9 VW admits it knew about cheat device early in 2014
24. October 12 A few own goals but it would be unwise to write off Deutschland AG 25. October 14 DiCaprio to make film of VW scandal
26. October 14 VW to go electric after diesel scandal delivers £750m shock 27. October 16 VW to recall 8,5m cars in Europe over cheat device
28. October 17 VW loses royal warrant over emissions scandal
29. October 19 French police raid Volkswagen office over emission scandal 30. October 26 VW funds pro-diesel health research
31. October 27 Toyota overtakes VW for No 1 spot 32. October 29 Volkswagen counts cost of cheating 33. October 30 VW faces paying £600m to car owners
34. November 4 Petrol vehicles are sucked into VW emissions scandal 35. November 5 VW petrol drivers face higher bills
36. November 6 Volkswagen sales in slow lane after emissions scandal 37. November 13 Volkswagen appeals for whistleblowers to aid inquiry 38. November 14 Falling sales increase pressure on Volkswagen after scandal 39. November 18 Prosecutions threat as VW’s European sales go into reverse
The New York Times
1. September 23 In the Vortex of the storm
2. September 24 Rigged testing by Volkswagen fells its CEO 3. September 24 A car scandal shoves Berlin off high ground
4. September 24 Volkswagen could use a bank-style clawback of pay
5. September 25 Volkswagen expected to name CEO as pressure mounts on company 6. September 26 VW selects Porsche chief for post-scandal overhaul
7. September 27 As VW pushed to be No. 1, ambitions fueled a scandal 8. September 28 VW’s pitch to Americans relied on fun and fantasy
9. September 29 Morning agenda: commodity fears add to pressure on shares 10. October 1 For VW, costs of emissions-test cheating will outweigh gains 11. October 2 In the driver’s seat
12. October 5 VW engine-rigging scheme to have begun in 2008 13. October 5 Finance ministers to discuss Greek bailout
14. October 7 VW’s new chief says scandal will cost it more than expected 15. October 8 In U.S., VW was aware of ‘possible’ problem
16. October 9 VW need to come clean, now
17. October 13 Volkswagen executive says diesel fix will differ in Europe and U.S. 18. October 18 Former VW chief to vacate top post at holding company
19. October 24 3 Directors say VW hid deceit from the board
20. October 27 VW loses its sales crown, even before diesel scandal bites 21. November 4 VW reveals it misstated emissions of gas cars
22. November 9 VW announcement, a strike planned in Greece and retail data 23. November 10 Volkswagen to initiate talks with labor on cost-cutting
24. November 11 Volkswagen, hitting it will move ahead, hires Apple expert on self-driving cars
25. November 19 Volkswagen faces major spending cuts and deadlines on compliance plans
Table 2.
VW’s press releases
Date (2015) Title press release
1. September, 20 Statement of Prof. Dr. Martin Winterkorn, CEO of Volkswagen AG: 2. September, 22 Volkswagen AG has issued the following information:
3. September, 23 Statement by Prof. Dr. Winterkorn
4. September, 23 Statement from the Executive Committee of Volkswagen AG's Supervisory Board
5. September, 25 Matthias Müller appointed CEO of the Volkswagen Group 6. September, 25 Statement by the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen AG
7. September, 25 Dr. Herbert Diess, CEO of the Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand, explains: "We are working at full speed on a solution."
8. September, 29 Volkswagen AG announces action plan to update diesel vehicles with EA 189 EU5 engines
9. October, 1 Statement from the Executive Committee of Volkswagen AG's Supervisory Board following its meeting on September 30, 2015 10. October, 6 Matthias Müller: "We will overcome this crisis"
11. October, 7 Statement from the Supervisory Board of Volkswagen AG
12. October, 13 Volkswagen Brand Board of Management takes strategic decisions 13. October, 15 Federal Motor Transport Authority (KBA) decides on recall for
affected EA 189 diesel vehicles
Wolfsburg
15. October, 22 Volkswagen confirms: EA288 engines designed for EU5 and EU6 are not affected
16. October, 28 Volkswagen Group generates operating profit before special items of EUR 10.2 billion (EUR 9.4 billion) by the end of September
17. October, 28 Matthias Müller unveils next steps for the Volkswagen Group 18. October, 29 Volkswagen reaffirms investments in Chattanooga
19. November, 2 Statement on the announcement by the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
20. November, 3 Statement of the Supervisory Board on irregularities in CO2 levels 21. November, 3 Clarification moving forward: internal investigations at Volkswagen
identify irregularities in CO2 levels
22. November, 9 Group Board of Management and Works Council agree on joint steps 23. November, 13 Volkswagen Passenger Cars brand delivers 4.84 million vehicles in
period to October
24. November, 13 Next step in clarifying the CO2 issue 25. November, 20 Volkswagen Group reduces level of capex
Appendix C. Results.
Table 1.
Existing and new frames
Existing frames from previous research New frames
News media frames Corporate frames News media frames Corporate frames
Conflict Apology Corporate culture
Economic Compensation Criminal
Human interest Ingratiation Ethical
Remedy Reminder Greenwashing
Responsibility Victimage Health
Attack the accuser Historical
Denial Need for clarification
Scapegoat Promises Promises
Excuse Promise to act Promise to act Justification Promise to clarify Promise to clarify
Ramifications
Reassurance Reassurance
Trust Trust
Table 2.
Frames in press releases
Frame Sub frame Examples
Apology I personally am deeply sorry that we have broken the trust of our customers and the public.
Economic Müller made it clear that "apart from the enormous financial damage which it is still not possible to quantify as of today…".
Human interest I have always been driven by my desire to serve this company.
Ingratiation Our most important task will therefore be to win back the trust we have lost – with our customers, partners, investors and the general public.
Promises
Promise to clarify
The Group will inform the public on the further progress of the investigations constantly and transparently.
Promise to act
The company will leave no stone unturned in getting to the bottom of this, will call those responsible to account, and take the necessary actions.
Reassurance The Group CEO also emphasized that all vehicles are technically safe and roadworthy.
Reminder Time and again, the Volkswagen team has proved it stands united and is fully focused on shaping the future, particularly when times are tough.
Responsibility Volkswagen will do everything that must be done in order to re-establish the trust that so many people have placed in us, and we will do everything necessary in order to reverse the damage this has caused
Trust To cover the necessary service measures and other efforts to win back the trust of our customers.
Table 3.
Frames in press releases over time Apology Economic Economic Human interest Responsibility Ingratiation Ingratiation Reminder Reminder
Promises Promises Promises
Reassurance
Trust Trust
September 20, 2015. November 20, 2015.
Table 4.
Frames towards employees and customers
