Public acceptance of renewable energy : the case of wind energy in Germany and the Netherlands (1990-2013)

Public acceptance of renewable energy

The case of wind energy in Germany and the Netherlands

(1990-2013)

Aron Woonink

aron.woonink@student.uva.nl

University of Amsterdam

Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences

BSc Political Science, International Relations

Bachelor Thesis

Research Project: Energy and Geopolitics in China and the European Union

Supervisor: Dr. Mehdi P. Amineh

- 2 - Abstract

Due to issues of energy security and the urge to decrease CO2 emissions, renewable energy has

be-come a serious alternative to fossil fuels, especially to Western countries without abundant fossil reserves. Wind energy is one of these promising alternatives: it is a fossil fuel-free way of producing

energy without CO2 emission, the risk of nuclear radiation and acid rain. Yet, the implementation of

wind energy policy hasn't been successful in every country. Germany is a leading wind energy pro-ducing country in the world, while wind energy deployment in the Netherlands has stagnated. Many factors may form impediments or incentives to increasing the share of wind energy. One of these factors is the public acceptance of renewable energy, which can be composed of two indicators: an idealist attitude towards renewable energy and the presence of lobby groups advocating the use of renewable energy. This thesis first shows that only the last few years, a divergence of public opinion towards energy issues can be observed. Secondly, in Germany, there is, historically, a higher degree of deeply-rooted sense of environmentalism than in the Netherlands. The third main finding is that the renewable energy lobby of Germany and the Netherlands are similar; however, the Dutch lag behind the Germans on this area. Finally, this thesis shows that the German "green" party has had a significant larger share of the parliamentary votes, and more government participation than its Dutch counterpart.

- 3 - Acknowledgements

I would like to express my gratitude to Dr. Mehdi P. Amineh for the helpful guidance and interesting insights he has provided throughout the whole process that has led to this thesis. Also, I would like to thank my fellow group members for the useful exchanges of thoughts, which helped to put me on the right track. Furthermore, I owe gratefulness to Dr. Daniel Scholten of Delft University of Technol-ogy, who provided me with relevant literature and helped me specify my research. Last, but not least, I want to thank Bas de Bruin for his creative contribution on the cover of this work.

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Table of contents

Map of the Federal Republic of Germany... 5

Map of the Kingdom of the Netherlands... 6

List of tables and figures... 7

List of abbreviations... 8

Chapter one: Introduction and theory

1.2 Research objectives... 10

1.3 Problem statement and hypotheses... 10

1.4 Research method... 11

1.5 Theoretical framework... 12

1.5.1 The ecological modernization theory... 13

1.5.2 Technological innovation systems... 13

1.5.3 Public acceptance of renewable energy... 15

1.6 Structure of the thesis... 16

Chapter two: energy situations, energy policy and wind energy

2.2 Wind energy in the world... 17

2.3 The German energy situation and energy policy... 17

2.3.1 Energy situation... 17

2.3.2 Energy policy... 19

2.3.3 Wind energy policy and implementation... 20

2.4 The Dutch energy situation and energy policy... 21

2.4.1 Energy situation... 21

2.4.2 Energy policy... 22

2.4.3 Wind energy policy and implementation... 23

2.5 Conclusion... 24

Chapter three: public acceptance of renewable energy

3.2 Idealist public attitude... 27

3.3 Lobby groups... 20

3.4 Conclusion... 32

Concluding remarks... 34

- 5 - Country maps

- 6 -

- 7 - List of tables and figures

Table 1.1 Summary of theory and the role of public p. 15

acceptance of renewable energy (marked red).

Figure 2.1 Schematic overview of Germany's electricity p. 18

generation in 2010.

Figure 2.2 Schematic overview of the Netherlands' electricity p. 21

generation in 2010.

Figure 2.3 Installed wind energy capacity of Germany and the p. 24

Netherlands, 1990-2010.

Figure 2.4 Installed wind energy capacity as % of total p. 24

generated electricity in Germany and the Netherlands, 1990-2010.

Figure 3.1 Total share of votes (as % of total) for Bündnis p. 32

90/Die Grünen (in the German Bundestag) and for

- 8 - List of abbreviations

CO2 Carbon dioxide

EEG Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz (Renewable Energy Law)

EM Ecological Modernization

EREC European Renewable Energy Council

EU European Union

EWEA European Wind Energy Association

GW Gigawatt (one billion watts)

GWh Gigawatt hour (product of hours and gigawatts)

IEA International Energy Agency

IRENA International Renewable Energy Agency

kWh Kilowatt hour (product of hours and kilowatts)

MTOE Million Tons of Oil Equivalent

MW Megawatt (one million watts)

NIMBY Not In My Backyard

NWEA Nederlandse Wind Energie Associatie (Dutch Wind Energy Association)

R&D Research & Development

REB Regulerende Energiebelasting (Regulatory Energy Tax)

TIS Technological Innovation Systems

TNO Nederlandse Organisatie voor toegepast-natuurwetenschappelijk onderzoek

(Dutch Organization for applied scientific research)

TW Terawatt (one trillion watts)

TWh Terawatt hour (product of hours and terawatts)

UK United Kingdom

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Chapter one: introduction and theory

1.1 Introduction

Due to issues of energy security and the urge to decrease CO2 emissions, renewable energy has

be-come a considerable replacement for fossil fuels. Wind energy is one of these renewables. Despite some disadvantages, such as intermittency of electricity generation and expensive deployment, its benefits are numerous: it does not cause acid rain, it does not harm nature, its supply is relatively

stable on the long term, it doesn´t produce CO2, it saves fossil fuels, it doesn´t cause radiation and it

is relatively independent from foreign developments. Windmills were invented as source of electrici-ty, without polluting the air, which is a consequence of combusting fossil fuels (Dincer 2011:5137). For example, a 3 MW onshore wind turbine generates about 6.5 GWh per year, providing enough energy for over 2000 homes, annually (NWEA.nl).

One large-sized country that has successfully implemented a significant share of wind energy, is Germany; and one country that has, relatively speaking, failed to do this, is the Netherlands. The aim of this thesis is to compare the experiences of these two countries, for the period between 1990 and 2013. It will present a comprehensive set of factors that could have contributed to the German success and the Dutch relative failure, and elaborate on one of them: public acceptance of renewable energy.

A lot has been written about the implementation of wind energy in Germany and the Nether-lands. Scholars have studied the cases along dimensions such as the role of companies, interest groups and political parties, the problem of electricity intermittency, technical issues with different types of wind mills and grid configurations, and so on. However, a thorough and specific study of the effect of public acceptance of renewable energy on the success of wind energy in Germany and its relative failure in the Netherlands, has not been researched until now.

The subject of this thesis is socially relevant, both to policymakers and the general public.

Due to issues of energy security and scarcity on the one hand, and decreasing CO2 emissions on the

other hand, enlarging the share of renewable energy has become increasingly important to policy-makers in specific and broad society in general. Renewable energy has, in most Western countries, a high place on the political agenda. The "learning-effects" that can be distinguished from the compari-son of wind energy policy in Germany and the Netherlands, suit as a possible policy advise for the Dutch authorities if they want to implement a higher share of wind energy. Finally, (the quality of) policies are vital for the development of renewable energy. In energy studies, policy is often regard-ed as a given. This study goes beyond that proposition, exploring how policy is realizregard-ed. Rather than regarding policy as a given, this research analyze it as a product of different kinds of social forces.

- 10 - 1.2 Research objectives

Public acceptance is certainly not the only defining factor of the success or failure of wind energy policy. There are many other factors, or preconditions, that deserve attention as well. These factors will be theoretically outlined, combining the characteristics of "identity EM" presented in Toke's ver-sion of the ecological modernization (EM) theory and functions of technological change set out in the Technological Innovation Systems (TIS) theory. Following, it will be argued that public acceptance of renewable energy is a fundamental determinant of wind energy success; and that it is therefore the subject of this study.

To conduct the research of this thesis, the following main question has been formulated:

How did public acceptance of renewable energy, or the lack of it, contribute to the success of wind energy policy in Germany and its relative failure in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2013?

To be able to answer these questions in a thorough manner, the following sub-questions are envisioned necessary:

S1: How have wind energy policy and implementation in Germany and the Netherlands developed

between 1990 and 2013?

S2: Why can wind energy policy and its implementation in Germany be regarded as a relative success,

and in the Netherlands as a relative failure?

S3: What was the role of "idealism towards renewable energy" in Germany and the Netherlands

be-tween 1990 and 2013?

S4: What was the role of "creation of legitimacy/counteract resistance to change" in Germany and

the Netherlands between 1990 and 2013?

The specific details on these two indicators (S3 and S4) will be discussed in the theory section.

1.3 Problem statement and hypothesis

The specific concepts and variables will be outlined in this section, resulting in a set of hypotheses. First of all, to find out how public acceptance of renewable energy contributed to the success of wind energy in Germany, the meaning of "success of wind energy" has to be defined. This concept, which, in this thesis, serves as the dependent variable, entails the widespread use of wind energy in Germa-ny, compared to other countries. Obviously, the analysis for the Netherlands has the relative failure of wind energy in the Netherlands as its dependent variable. The independent variables are factors which cause the deployment of wind energy to be successful or unsuccessful. These variables will be approached similarly to renewable energy in general. Five of them stem from Toke's (2011) version of the EM theory; seven are derived from the TIS theory.

For this thesis, there will be an analysis of one, important factor, rather than a study of all of them. Studying one section (in this case, one factor) of the causal mechanism described above allows

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to delve much deeper into the data, offering more accurate and specific conclusions, rather than superficially studying all of the factors mentioned earlier. The independent variable that will be used for the actual analysis is, therefore, public acceptance of renewable energy, which will be defined more specifically later on.

Both ecological modernization (EM) theory and technological innovation systems (TIS) theory provide indicators that can be used to measure public acceptance of renewable energy. EM theory presents the concept of "idealism" in support of particular renewable energy technologies, which can be epitomized by activists operating from "non-material" motives. However, because this description is rather vague, idealism from the population itself will also, most likely, serve as an explanatory indi-cator. Hekkert et al. (2011:10) have created an accessible research manual for scholars who have the aim to analyze functions of TIS theory. For the variable relevant to this thesis, "counteract resistance to change/legitimacy creation", they have formulated an indicator asking the question how long a certain project has been worked on, and if there has been resistance forming a barrier. Because this indicator would consume a lot of time to perform research on, and because it is too specific in the context of this research, the indicator for this variable will be provided by Hekkert et al.'s earlier work (2007:425). Here, they state that "this function [counteract resistance to change/legitimacy creation] can be analyzed by mapping the rise and growth of interest groups and their lobby actions".

Having stated the two variables of this research, public acceptance of renewable energy (in-dependent) and the success and relative failure of wind energy in Germany and the Netherlands (de-pendent) respectively; and the two indicators for the independent variable (idealist attitude of the population; presence and activity of activist groups), the following hypotheses can be distinguished: 1) an idealist attitude of the general public towards renewable energy and the presence of lobby

groups advocating the use of renewable energy have caused wind energy policy to be successful in Germany; and 2) a skeptical attitude of the general public towards renewable energy and the absence or passiveness of lobby groups advocating the use of renewable energy have caused wind energy policy to be relatively unsuccessful in the Netherlands.

1.4 Research method

This research consists of both qualitative and quantitative components. It is qualitative in the sense that the acceptance of renewable energy will be examined thoroughly, assessing whether it has in fact contributed to the success of wind energy in Germany. It is quantitative in the sense that some components of this variable will be evaluated by using quantitative data.

The qualitative parts of this research will be conducted by looking at case studies from the past, (government) reports, policy reports, information provided by energy research agencies and, where applicable, reliable news sources. The quantitative components will be researched by looking

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at (government) reports, statistics provided by (energy) research agencies (e.g. IEA, Eurostat, Eurobarometer), and previous research by other scholars. Both types of data will also be used to outline the energy situations of the two countries under investigation, to assess whether German and Dutch wind energy policies have been successful and unsuccessful, respectively.

The reason for the choice to also include qualitative data is both of a practical and technical nature. Practically, the available quantitative data doesn't cover the whole period of analysis (1990-2013), and it is impossible to, for instance, take surveys or interviews from respondents in the past. Therefore, it is necessary to include any data source possible for the period that can't be analyzed by quantitative data. Technically, one will acquire far more in-depth knowledge by doing a case study to wind energy, because there are only two countries under investigation (Germany and the Nether-lands), using all the information that can be acquired, both qualitative and quantitative.

1.5 Theoretical framework

In this section, the different fundamental theories which will be used in this thesis, will be outlined. It is important to apply a certain structure when two different results (success and failure) of a similar phenomenon (wind energy policy) are under examination. The theories that will be used, have the starting point that nations pursue the best energy security position possible, at an affordable price

(Yergin 2006:70-71). Mainly due to demand-induced and supply-induced resource scarcity1, countries

have come to realize that investing in alternative resources is necessary. Renewables are among

the-se alternatives. Additionally, targets have been the-set for the reduction of CO2 emissions. For example,

the European Union (EU) envisions that its member countries should sustain a more efficient energy use and develop better alternatives to fossil fuels to be able to meet the Kyoto requirements (Euro-pean Commission 2006: 5-6).

This theory section will provide a comprehensive set of factors which cause renewable ener-gy - or one of its types - to be a success or a failure. First, a possible path of the development of re-newable resources will be presented, by using the five factors of Toke's ecological modernization (EM) theory. Following, another theory, technological innovation systems (TIS), will provide a differ-ent set of factors, which more or less overlap with EM factors. After presdiffer-enting the outline of these possible factors causing wind energy policy to be successful or unsuccessful, the focus of this thesis will be shifted towards one highly important factor: public acceptance of renewable energy.

1

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1.5.1 The ecological modernization theory

One possible view of the development of alternatives to fossil fuels, is the ecological modernization (EM) theory. This theory is heavily directed towards trust in market mechanisms to overcome envi-ronmental and energy problems. It is outlined and revised by Toke, who sets up a set of characteris-tics of EM (regarded from the so-called "identity" perspective, which is relevant for renewable ener-gy). These characteristics can be used to analyze any form of renewable energy in a given country, because they measure the degree of, and type of, commitment to "identity" EM. Toke states that "we cannot compare different cases without using a common method of measuring them" (Toke 2011:39). He addresses the following characteristics:

1) Significant contribution of idealism in support of renewable energy, for example displayed by the presence of activist groups;

2) Financial support systems for renewable energy (e.g. feed-in tariffs);

3) Presence of independent, publicly active trade associations representing renewable energy tech-nologies;

4) Coalitions these trade associations form with environmental groups to campaign in favor of re-newable energy;

5) Deployment of renewable energy, done by companies independent of large electricity companies. Toke's version of the EM theory presents a pathway along which renewable energy is (being) developed. This pathway results in these five factors, which all contribute, in varying degree, to the success of renewable energy or one of its types.

1.5.2 Technological innovation systems

Because renewable energy policy in general, and wind energy policy in specific, can't avoid to deal with technological issues, it is useful to approach factors of success or failure of these policies from a

more technological perspective.2 The term technological innovation systems (TIS) describes the

de-velopment of new technologies, also referred to as technological change. Since the 1990's, a lot of research has been conducted on subjects related to this domain. In this thesis, similarly to Hekkert et al. (2007:413-414), TIS theory will be used to describe the "development of a technology in interac-tion with the system in which the technology is embedded", rather than the development of a tech-nology in the narrow sense. Because the theory itself will only have a supplementary, and not a pri-mary role in this thesis, it suffices to state that there are a lot of configurations of TIS theory and of

2

Please note that some parts of the TIS-theory are primary applicable to infant industries. Wind turbines are, at the moment, in a relatively high development stage. Therefore, analysis of knowledge development (function 2), for example, is not very relevant in this thesis.

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its "functions", which will be explained below. Bergek et al. (2008:436) provide a convenient sche-matic review of different studies (and their "functions") on TIS.

In order to analyze dynamics of technological change, scholars have thought of "functions" that take place in innovation systems, resulting in technological change. In this thesis, the TIS version of Hekkert et al. (2007:421) will be used to describe these functions, which are somewhat similar to the EM factors mentioned earlier.

Function 1: entrepreneurial activities. Entrepreneurs are essential for a well-functioning

inno-vation system. They turn the potential of new knowledge, networks and markets into concrete ac-tions to generate new opportunities, which they also take advantage of.

Function 2: knowledge development. The mechanisms of learning described above are at the

core of innovation processes. "Research & development" (R&D) and knowledge development are required within the innovation system, and comprehend "learning by searching" as well as "learning by doing."

Function 3: knowledge diffusion through networks. In a heterogeneous context, where R&D

meets government, competitors and market, the exchange of information is essential. Policy should be adjusted to the latest technological standards and R&D agendas should be influenced by changing norms and values. This paves the way for "learning by interacting" and, when producers are involved, "learning by using."

Function 4: guidance of the search. Due to the limited availability of most resources, specific

focus points out of many technological options have to be chosen for further investments. This func-tion can be fulfilled by actors such as governments, industries and/or the market. Moreover, strong preferences from within society affect R&D priority setting as well, emphasizing that technological change is not an autonomous process. In other words, function 4 can be described as the "process of selection."

Function 5: market formation. New technologies often have trouble to compete with existing

technologies, because, in the initial phase of recognition, they are usually crude and inefficient. Therefore, it is important to create protected space for new technologies. Examples of this are the formation of niche markets and favorable tax regimes or consumption quotes.

Function 6: resources mobilization. Resources of financial and human capital are a necessary

basic input to all activities in the innovation system. For specific technologies, the allocation of suffi-cient resources is essential to make the production of knowledge (function 2) possible.

Function 7: creation of legitimacy/counteract resistance to change. For successful

develop-ment of a new technology, it "has to become part of an incumbent regime, or it even has to over-throw it". Parties who have vested interests in "old" technologies are likely to be opposed to this form of "creative destruction". In that case, advocacy networks (e.g. lobby groups) can act as

cata-- 15 cata--

lysts; they put new technologies on the agenda (function 4), they lobby for resources (function 6) and they advocate favorable tax regimes (function 5). By doing this, they also provide legitimacy for a new technological trajectory. If advocacy coalitions are successful, they will grow in size and in influ-ence, to such an extent that they become powerful enough to instigate "the spirit of creative de-struction" (Hekkert et al. 2007: 421-425).

1.5.3 Public acceptance of renewable energy

In the theories outlined above it has been shown, to sum up, which factors influence the process of implementing a higher share of renewable energy. Defectiveness of one or more factors may cause renewable energy implementation to be a failure, whereas a high score on all factors would make successful implementation likely. For an overview of these factors, see table 1.1 below.

Ecological modernization factors (Toke 2011) Technological Innovation Systems functions (Hekkert et al. 2007)

Idealism towards renewable energy Entrepreneurial activities

Financial support systems Knowledge development

Independent, publicly active trade associations advo-cating renewable energy technologies

Knowledge diffusion through networks

Coalitions of trade associations and environmental groups

Guidance of the search

Deployment of renewable energy independent of large electricity companies

Market formation

Resources mobilization

Creation of legitimacy/counteract re-sistance to change

Table 1.1: Summary of theoretical factors contributing to the success or failure of renewable energy implemen-tation, with the role of public acceptance of renewable energy marked red.

Germany and the Netherlands have, as will be shown later on, performed differently when it comes to the implementation of one kind of renewable resources: wind energy. One of the features EM theory and TIS theory have in common, is that they point to something that can be defined as "public acceptance of renewable energy". EM theory emphasizes idealism (EM factor 1), and TIS the-ory stresses the counteracting of resistance and the creation of legitimacy (TIS function 7). This factor is interesting because it does not exclusively concern governments, but mainly end users of energy and activist groups. Moreover, in the democratic environment of Western nations, policy requires a certain degree of public support, or legitimacy. One major impediment for any kind of policy is strong resistance from the population. Finally, as has been demonstrated earlier, function 7 of the TIS

theo-- 16 theo--

ry comprehends many other functions in Hekkert et al.'s framework. For example, activist groups can put certain alternatives on the agenda, or they can lobby for resources and favorable tax regimes.

1.6 Structure of the thesis

In this section, the set-up of the remainder of this thesis will be outlined. Chapter two will advance with some short basic principles of how wind energy actually works, and what its role in the global energy structure is. Then, there will be an overview of the backgrounds of the two countries which are going to be analyzed, including their relative energy situations and energy policies. Finally, it will explain why wind energy policy can be regarded as a success in Germany and as a relative failure in the Netherlands. The third chapter will be dedicated to an analysis of public acceptance, with respect to the success of wind energy in Germany and, again, its relative failure in the Netherlands.

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Chapter two: energy situations, energy policy and wind energy

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to answer the first three sub-questions that were introduced in chap-ter 1. First, it will outline the basic principles of wind energy and its role in world energy supply. This will put the findings of this thesis in a bigger perspective. Then, there will be an overview of the cur-rent energy situations of Germany and the Netherlands, aiming to illustrate why diffecur-rent types of energy sources play which role. Following, there will be a general overview of energy policies that these two countries have adopted between 1990 and 2013, including wind energy policy. These two components are necessary to answer the question why wind energy policy has been successful for the Germans and unsuccessful for the Dutch. The answer to this question is essential for the remain-der of this thesis, because the German success and the Dutch relative failure of wind energy policy serve as the operationalized dependent variables of the actual analysis performed in chapter 3.

2.2 Wind energy in the world

Wind energy is a growing source of energy, on a worldwide scale. It is one of the most widely used forms of alternative, renewable energy, with countries like Denmark, Spain, Germany, the United States and India as main users. Wind power has many advantages: it does not cause acid rain, it is

relatively stable on the long term, it emits no CO2, it saves fossil fuels, it causes no radiation and it is

relatively independent from external factors. Windmills were invented as source of electricity, with-out polluting the air as a consequence of combusting fossil fuels (Dincer 2011:5137). Their turbines generally range from 2 to 3 MW. A 3 MW onshore wind turbine generates about 6.5 GWh per year, providing enough energy for over 2000 homes, annually. Plans have been made to apply 5 MW or even more powerful wind turbines in the coming years (NWEA.nl).

2.3 The German energy situation and energy policy 2.3.1 Energy situation

According to Eurostat, Germany's energy mix is dominated by fossil fuels; the country is mostly reli-ant on crude oil and petroleum products. Germany grossly consumed a total of 336.09 MTOE in 2010. 78.7% of the total consumption consisted of fossil fuels, and renewables (not taking nuclear energy into account) contributed 9.7%. The total amount of electricity generated by the Germans was 627.92 TWh. Most of the electricity production consisted of hard coal (42.4%). But on the other hand, renewable resources accounted for a higher percentage (17.8%) than natural gas (15.6%). For an overview, see figure 2.1 (Eurostat 2011a). In 2010, Germany's total energy production of 132 MTOE consisted of solid fuels (45.1 MTOE, 34.2%), nuclear energy (36.3 MTOE, 27.5%), renewables

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(32.7 MTOE, 24.8%) and natural gas (9.7 MTOE, 7.4%). Germany is a net importer of energy. In 2010, the country's import (241.9 MTOE) well exceeded its export (39.3 MTOE), resulting in a net import of 202.6 MTOE. Germany is reliant on imports for all types of energy, some of them even surpassing the 90%. The total energy import dependency was, in 2010, almost 60% (European Commission 2012a:32-36).

Figure 2.1: Schematic overview of Germany's electricity generation in 2010 (Eurostat 2011a).

The data described above are a resemblance of the current situation. Because this thesis aims to answer the research question for the period between 1990 and 2013, it is useful to outline developments in the energy situation from 1990 onwards. The data provided by Eurostat reach back to that year, and they show that Germany has decreased its total energy consumption since 1990, when it was 356.7 MTOE. Of course, this decrease can be due to many factors: a decreasing popula-tion, more energy efficiency, less energy use per capita and so on. But it is still interesting to look at the share of renewable energy resources. It is clear that renewables have, since 1990, gradually ac-counted for a far higher share in the total consumption picture. In 1990, only 5.3 MTOE (1.49%) of the total energy consumption was made up of renewables, whereas in 2010, this was 32.6 MTOE (9.7%). Net imports increased from 167.2 MTOE in 1990 to 202.6 MTOE in 2010. This change is main-ly due to the dramatic decrease of the production of solid fuels (from 121.8 MTOE in 1990 to 45.1 MTOE in 2010). Import dependency of the German energy system increased, from 46.6% in 1990 to almost 60% in 2010 (European Commission 2012a:32-36).

Solid fuels; 42,40% Nuclear; 22,70% Natural gas; 15,60% Renewables; 17,80% Other; 1%

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2.3.2 Energy policy

One could say that Germany's renewable energy policy started after the first oil crisis of 1974. Until around 1990, the year of the German unification, this policy mainly consisted of the promotion of research. This is reflected in government spending: in 1974,   only   €10   million   was   intended   for  

re-newable energy3. The 1986 Chernobyl nuclear disaster had a huge impact in Germany. Public opinion

was divided approximately equally about the use of nuclear energy between 1976 and 1985, but the accident in Ukraine changed this dramatically. Only 10% of the population was in support of nuclear energy, two years after the disaster. This, together with the fear of a natural disaster to be caused by global warming, ensured that there was "general agreement that energy use had to be profoundly changed" (Lauber & Mez 2004:1-2).

This led to the progressive development of renewable resources. Since 1990, the Germans have sustained so-called feed-in tariffs. These were designed to give investors considerable financial incentives to invest in renewables (Lauber & Mez 2004:3). The most recent comprehensive energy strategy outline, called the "Energy Concept" was adopted in 2010. This program entailed that Ger-many's renewable energy sector should be the cornerstone of the country's energy supply by 2050. It contained more ambitious goals than the successful 2007 Energy and Climate Programme, and it aims for Germany to become the world's most energy-efficient and environment friendly economies, while at the same time to maintain affordable energy prices and a high level of economic prosperity (IEA 2013a:9).

The dramatic Fukushima nuclear incident of 2011 accelerated the phase-out of Germany's nuclear fleet by the government, starting with the immediate closure of some of the oldest reactors. This decision, together with an additional political urge to progress towards a low carbon energy sector, had major impact on the German energy management, resulting in a new energy package, commonly known as the Energiewende ("shift of energy") (IEA 2013a:9).

Germany is well on its track to meet the Kyoto target. In the context of meeting the targets of the Energiewende, the German government has set the goal of 40% greenhouse gas reduction by 2020, 55% by 2030, 70% by 2040 and 80% to 95% by 2050, all with respect to the 1990 levels. Apart from promoting energy efficiency, the large-scale deployment of renewable energy is at the heart of the Energiewende. Since the EEG of 2000, renewable energy policy has proven to be very effective; especially on the domains of biomass, wind energy and solar energy. For example: the recent de-crease of feed-in tariffs on solar cells, due to rapid growth, is a clear indication that this technology is a huge success (IEA 2013a:9-10).

3 _{In contrast: the budget  for  renewable  energy  R&D  was  €1.9  billion  between  2006  and  2009,  and  it  was}

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2.3.3 Wind energy policy and implementation

Wind energy is one of the renewable energy sources that the German government envisions neces-sary and suitable to deploy extensively. The first feed-in law mentioned earlier regulated the pur-chase and price of energy generated from renewable sources, such as wind energy. This, together with other measures ("100/250 MW program" and subsidies) provided significant incentives to inves-tors in renewable energy projects. After several earlier adjustments, the EEG was amended in 2009, increasing the initial tariff for both onshore and offshore wind energy. The German government stat-ed in the 2010 Energy Concept that renewable energy implementation, including that of wind

ener-gy, had to be accelerated (IRENA 2013:68-70).4

The question is, then, can German wind energy policy be regarded as a success? The installed capacity increased from 48 MW to 27209 MW (16.6% of the total installed electric capacity) between 1990 and 2010 (European Commission 2012a:32-36). However, recent reports indicate that this per-centage has increased even more to 31308 MW in 2012 (IRENA 2013:68). One can clearly see that this percentage rises, and probably will keep rising in the coming decades. Comparing Germany to other countries in Europe strengthens this idea: Germany is the leading nation concerning wind en-ergy. The country contributes 30% to the total share of installed wind power in Europe, with Spain following at 23% (22796 MW) and the UK at 8% (8445 MW) (EWEA 2013:4, 11). When looking at in-stalled capacity in the year 2012, Germany also tops the list with 20%, having inin-stalled turbines ac-counting for an extra 2415 MW. The United Kingdom is second with 16% (+1897 MW) and Italy third with 11% (+1273 MW) (EWEA 2013:5, 11).

On a worldwide scale, the total capacity of onshore and offshore wind energy was 282 GW in 2012. Germany, therefore, accounted for 11.1% of that total. Only China (75.7 GW) and the United States (58.8 GW) had a higher capacity in that year. The percentages of wind energy share in the total electricity generation, were in favor of Germany in 2012. The country has, as was stated above, four European countries above itself, but well outnumbers the other top wind energy producing na-tions, such as the United States (3.5%), India (2.7%) and China (2%) (IEA 2013b:9, 11). On the list of wind power share of the total electricity consumption, Germany ranks fifth (7.7%), placed below Denmark (33.7%), Portugal (20%), Spain (17.8%) and Ireland (14.5%) (IEA 2013b:11). These figures suggest that Germany is one of the most successful countries on a worldwide scale, when it comes to the implementation of wind energy policy. For a schematic comparison of German and Dutch wind energy deployment, see figures 2.3 and 2.4 on page 24.

4 _{For an extensive description of Germany's wind energy policy instruments, see IRENA 2013:68-70 and IEA}

- 21 - 2.4 The Dutch energy situation and energy policy 2.4.1 Energy situation

In 2010, the energy mix of the Netherlands mainly consisted of fossil fuels. The country grossly con-sumed a total of 86.92 MTOE in 2010, with fossil fuels accounting for more than 95%; renewables contributed 3.4%. The total amount of generated electricity was 118.14 TWh in the same year. Natu-ral gas contributed the lion share with 65.5%. The rest was supplied by solid fuels (19.1%), nuclear energy (3.4%), crude oil and petroleum products (1.1%) and renewables (9.5%). For an overview of the share of different energy sources in the total electricity production, see figure 2.2 below (Euro-stat 2011b). In 2010, the total Dutch energy production was 70.1 MTOE. This was mainly made up of natural gas (63.5 MTOE, 90.6%),supplemented by renewables (2.9 MTOE, 4.1%) and petroleum products (1.9 MTOE, 2.7%). The Netherlands was a net importer of energy in 2010, with an import of 183.2 MTOE and an export of 152.3 MTOE, resulting in a net import of 30.9 MTOE. The country is, however, a net exporter of large amounts of natural gas: 24.2 MTOE. In 2010, the Netherlands had a final import dependency of 30.7%; however, there are extremes in some types of energy. For in-stance, import dependency of solid fuels was 121.5%, where natural gas shows the opposite: -61.6%. These figures indicates that the Netherlands is, also when it comes to energy, a nation of trade, be-cause large amounts of energy are imported (for instance 139.7 MTOE of petroleum products), which largely exceed the country's domestic demand; and because the country is a net exporter of natural gas, and still imported 18.5 MTOE of natural gas in 2010 (European Commission 2012a:110-115).

Figure 2.2: Schematic overview of the Netherlands' electricity generation in 2010 (Eurostat 2011b).

The twenty years before 2010, the Netherlands shows a growing energy consumption pat-tern. In 1990, the country grossly consumed 67 MTOE of energy. After that, there has been steady

Natural gas; 65,50% Solid fuels; 19,10% Renewables; 9,50%

Nuclear; 3,40% Crude oil and petroleum

products; 1,10% Other; 1,50%

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growth to the 2010 level of 86.9 MTOE. This, again, can be due to many factors: a growing popula-tion, limited improvement of efficiency, a growing per capita income and so forth. Renewables have, gradually, settled in Dutch energy consumption. In 1990, their use was stuck at 0.7 MTOE (1.04% of the total consumption); and increased to grow to the level of 3 MTOE (3.45%) in 2010. Total net im-ports have increased from 17.5 MTOE in 1990 to 30.9 MTOE in 2010. This was almost exclusively due to the increased import of petroleum products. Import dependency has fluctuated in this period, but increased with 8%-points over these 20 years (from 22.4% to 30.7%) (European Commission 2012a:110-115).

2.4.2 Energy policy

In the Netherlands, debates about the limited energy supply began in the 1970's, after the first oil crisis. Environmental concerns were increasingly raised and a number of environment friendly tech-nologies, such as solar and wind energy, were put on the agenda, although in a very early stage of development. As consumption grew, public and political pressure led to the first generation of envi-ronmental policies and energy saving measures. At the end of the 1980's, the Dutch energy system became unstable, due to economic decline, rising energy prices and a "diminishing capability and authority of the state and top-down policies". Despite several measures since then, the Dutch energy structure hasn't been changed much, and is still dominated by fossil fuels (TNO 2010:3).

In 1996, the Regulatory Energy Tax (REB) was adopted, which entailed a small tax on electrici-ty and gas consumption. Renewables were partly exempted. In 2001, the Dutch adopted a system of Green Certificates trading, which verified if demand for renewable energy would be met, and facili-tated a separate market for renewable energy in the form of certificates. From 2001 to 2005, the Dutch implemented incentive-policies, such as an Energy Premium (2001), Environmental Quality of Electricity (2003) and an Energy Tax Regime (2005), but these programs were all ended. In 2006, the Dutch government formulated a comprehensive program, called Energy Transition. It was meant as a strategic plan of sustainable energy supply, with targets for the year 2050. It was argued that by that year, energy efficiency should improve 1.5-2% a year; that there should be substantial use of raw green materials and renewable energy; that there should be reduction of CO2 emission; and that there should be a stronger position for Dutch business (IEA 2014b).

The 2007 Clean & Efficient program more or less entailed similar points, which were also in line with European targets. In 2008, the most important document was the Energy Report, which included the government's strategy until 2011, and a long-term vision to 2050. It called for a "clean, affordable and reliable energy system. It also sees a major role for the Netherlands as a hub for the import of natural gas (IEA 2008:20-22). The renewed Energy Report of 2011 included a yearly  €1.4   billion investment in the promotion of renewable energy products (Energierapport 2011:3-4).

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To sum up, the Dutch did make renewable energy policies, but they were of a more vague nature than the German policies. Moreover, Dutch policy tended to vary over time, which is dis-played by the use of feed-in tariffs, for example. A feed-in premium installed in 2003 was abolished

in 2006. However, in 2007, new regulations on feed-in tariffs were adopted (EREC 2009:2-3).5 This is

an example of inconsistent policy, which, together with other factors, caused the attempt to imple-ment larger shares of renewable energy, to be relatively unsuccessful.

2.4.3 Wind energy policy and implementation

The latest, comprehensive Energy Report of 2011 doesn't include specific details on wind energy policy. The Dutch government states that, from a European perspective, it would be logical that wind energy should be applied in areas with much, constant wind, and solar energy in areas with a lot of sun (Energierapport 2011:22, 38). The Netherlands does, however, state that wind energy is an im-portant option, both on and offshore. The government states that it will take "concrete measures for a suitable spatial integration of wind power", and that it will appoint its preferred places for wind parks. Offshore is an option for the longer term (Energierapport 2011:23-25).

The most recent policies and the past ones didn't prove to be very effective. According to Eurostat data, the total capacity of the Dutch wind sector increased from 50 MW in 1990 to 2237 MW (7.94% of the total installed electric capacity) in 2010 (European Commission 2012a:110-115). According to more recent sources, the current share of Dutch wind energy is 2391 MW in 2012. Comparing the Netherlands to other European member states indicates that the country is currently ranked 10th, when it comes to wind capacity, with a 2% market share. The Netherlands doesn't make it to the top list either regarding installed capacity in the year 2012, having installed only 119 extra

MW (EWEA 2013:4, 11). Looking at the (relatively) outdated6 figures of 2010, the Netherlands is in

13th place (4%) regarding the share of wind energy to the total electricity consumption, performing well below the EU-wide average (7%) (EWEA 2013:11). These data indicate that the Netherlands lags behind, when it comes to the implementation of wind energy policy. Ambitious, mostly roughly-sketched plans are formed, but practically, there hasn't been much progress over the last two dec-ades. It might be too soon to call Dutch wind policy a failure, but the term "relative failure" can cer-tainly be applied, especially when one compares the results of Germany and the Netherlands (figures 2.3 and 2.4).

5

These "stop-and-go policies" are more thoroughly described in Negro et al. 2012:3840

6 _{The Netherlands did not feature in the IEA report that provided the information on Germany's wind power}

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Figure 2.3: Installed wind energy capacity of Germany and the Netherlands, 1990-2010 (European Commission 2012a:32-36, 110-115).

Figure 2.4: Installed wind energy capacity as % of total generated electricity in Germany and the Netherlands, 1990-2010 (European Commission 2012a:32-36, 110-115).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter was aimed at answering the first two sub-questions that were presented in chapter 1. It started off with an overview of wind energy in the world. Then, it analyzed the energy situation,

en-0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000

Germany: installed wind capacity (MW) Netherlands: installed wind capacity (MW)

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Germany: installed wind capacity (% of total) Netherlands: installed wind capacity (% of total)

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ergy policy and wind energy policy of Germany and the Netherlands. It became clear that, while per-haps the Dutch policy did not lack the ambition of the German policy, the implementation has been relatively unsuccessful, until now.

German wind energy policy has been, and still is, a large success, reflected by the top posi-tions the Germans occupy on the worldwide wind energy lists. The causes of these differences of success may be due to any of the factors that were listed in the theories section. The Dutch govern-ment itself might be to blame, the entrepreneurial activities might be limited in the Netherlands or the presence of gas reserves in its territory might be an impediment. The next chapter will assess one, fundamentally important factor: public acceptance of renewable energy.

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Chapter three: public acceptance of renewable energy

3.1 Introduction

Chapter three is aimed at answering the research question: How did public acceptance of renewable energy, or the lack of it, contribute to the success of wind energy policy in Germany and its relative failure in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2013? As stated in paragraph 1.2, the research question consists of two sub-questions (S3 and S4), which will be assessed separately in this chapter. The hy-potheses for the main question (and thus, the two mentioned sub-questions) were also introduced in chapter 1, and expected that an idealist attitude of the general German public towards renewable energy and the presence of German lobby groups advocating the use of renewable energy caused wind energy policy to be successful in Germany; and that the lack of an idealist attitude (skepticism) towards renewable energy and the absence or passiveness of lobby groups advocating the use of renewable energy caused wind energy policy to be a relative failure in the Netherlands. This hypoth-esis will be tested by using the data presented in chapter 2 and supplementary qualitative and quan-titative data.

As was shown in figure 2.4, the divergence between German and Dutch wind capacity (as % of total electric capacity) started around the turn of the millennium, which makes it more applicable to analyze public acceptance from there on. Furthermore, the availability of data before this period is limited. For example, the Eurobarometers of public opinion reports only contain surveyed attitudes towards energy since 2009. Therefore, this assessment will mostly be about the past five years. Addi-tional research presents observations of the period before 2009 as well. Case studies will provide information on the period between 2000 and the present.

The idealist public attitude towards renewable energy and the presence and activity of lobby groups must be regarded as two sides of the same coin. In this thesis, these two concepts account for the independent variable (public acceptance of renewable energy), whereas the success or failure of wind energy policy serve as the dependent variables. In this chapter, there will first be attention for the first component, the idealist public attitude. After that, the presence and activity of lobby groups in Germany and the Netherlands will be assessed.

3.2 Idealist public attitude

As was demonstrated in paragraph 1.3, "activists operating from 'non-material' motives" is a relative-ly vague definition of an idealist public attitude. Therefore, the indicator "idealism of the population towards renewable energy" will be applied. This can be studied by looking at the results of recent Eurobarometer surveys, which consist of data collected from all over Europe. Subjects on energy have been thoroughly assessed since the Eurobarometer of 2009. Before that, the word "energy"

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was barely mentioned in the Eurobarometers. The closest to energy issues were questions of wheth-er respondents would prefwheth-er a national or a European environmental policy. Moreovwheth-er, the re-searchers of the Eurobarometer make adjustments to their surveys every year. Therefore, for each specific year, "idealism towards renewable energy", must be assessed and interpreted in a different way. Only the spring editions of each year will be covered.

In 2009, the question "And personally, what are the two most important issues you are facing

at the moment?" (question A)7 was asked. Respondents could chose from 14 categories, with

"ener-gy" being one of them. In this year, there was not much difference between the German (4%) and Dutch (3%) respondents. The EU average was 3%. They were also asked what they thought were the two most important issues facing their country (question B). Again, the difference in percentages between Germany (2%) and the Netherlands (2%) was insignificant, and they were in line with the European average of 2% (European Commission 2009:27, 61).

One year later, in 2010, the same two questions were asked. For question A, "energy" was selected by 6% of the respondents throughout Europe, and by 10% in Germany. The Dutch respond-ents selected this option significantly less frequent (4%). Question B showed results similar to those of question A: 5% of the German respondents mentioned "energy", while only 2% of the Dutch re-sponded the same way. The European average was, in this instance, 3% (European Commission 2010:38, 89).

The 2011 Eurobarometer asked a slightly different question (question C). The researchers asked: "What do you think are the two most important issues facing the EU at the moment?", from which the respondents could choose from 13 values; one of them being "Energy supply". The Ger-man respondents selected this value a lot more frequently (12%) than their Dutch counterparts (4%) and the EU-citizens altogether (7%) (European Commission 2011:25).

In 2012, the Eurobarometer was adjusted again. The creators returned to questions A and B, but they created a new value: "The environment, climate and energy issues", again accompanied by 12 other values. Question A worked out similarly for the German (10%) and Dutch (9%) respondents, well above the European average (5%). The European average score on this value for question B was 4%, which was also displayed by the Dutch respondents. Of the German interviewees, a massive 14% selected this value, joint second-highest with the Danes (only below the Swedes who accounted for 20%). Question C was posed as well, but with the old answering scheme (with the value "energy sup-ply"). 7% Of the German respondents mentioned this value, while only 2% of the Dutch selected it, significantly below the EU-average of 4% (European Commission 2012b:16, 41, 44).

7 _{For the purpose of this thesis, Eurobarometer questions are given a capital letter (A, B, C), which makes it}

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The most recent spring Eurobarometer is the one of 2013. The set-up of this edition was simi-lar to that of the year before, featuring questions A, B and C. For question A, the European average was 5%. The German respondents were, again, well above this with 9%; the Dutch showed 10%. For question B, 10% of the German respondents took the issue of "the environment, climate and energy issues" into account, whereas 5% of the Dutch did the same. The EU average for this was 4%. Ques-tion C was, again, provided with the value of "energy supply". 3% Of the Europeans, in general, took this issue into account. The Dutch were level with the EU average, while the Germans respondents selected this value a little more frequently (4%) (European Commission 2013: 18, 48, 52).

German citizens are, according to research of a more qualitative nature, strongly in favor of renewable resources. They show "strong sentiment against conventional energy sources, most strongly nuclear power" and they are prepared to protest on the street against the transportation of nuclear waste or lowering feed-in tariffs. Moreover, German energy policy has enabled private per-sons to actively play a role in the Energiewende, by producing a share of renewable energy by them-selves. More than half of the current renewable energy capacity is owned by private citizens and farmers. Recent polls indicates that the Germans are broadly in favor of the Energiewende, and that they are willing to pay for it. 94% Of the German public are proponents of an accelerated develop-ment  of  renewable  energy  sources,  and  80%  think  the  costs  (about  €10  per  household  per  month)   are "adequate" or even "too low" (Bosman 2012a:16).

Looking at wind energy more specifically, Breukers & Wolsink argue that environmentalism was rooted in German society to a greater extent than in Dutch society. "The German corporatist system opened up to environmental groups from the 1980's onwards and enabled environmental groups to provide their expertise as input in the policy process." The environmental policy domain itself had been institutionalized, also helped by the early rise of the Green party. "This has been of major significance for the acceptance of wind power in society and in politics. The support for wind power fitted in well with the ecological modernisation [sic] drive, as both economic and ecological aims were pursued." Compared to the Netherlands, environmental awareness was rooted in German society and politics early on. "The anti-nuclear and environmental movement converted its criticism into the search for alternatives like wind power". The Dutch anti-nuclear and environmental move-ment was of a similar nature, but it was less widespread and it lacked sufficient "political clout" to instigate a higher commitment towards wind power (Breukers & Wolsink 2007:2745).

A 2004 article contends that, in comparison with other EU member states, local resistance against onshore wind projects is very low in Germany. This fact is quite peculiar, because, as of then, already more than 13000 MW of wind capacity had been installed. The reason for this limited re-sistance is twofold. First, in the beginning, the German wind energy sector was closely connected with associated companies, with sometimes high involvement in the local population. This reduced

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the NIMBY8 effect. Second, municipalities have decisive power over the spatial planning of wind

in-stallations, which reduces local resistance because they can appoint a feasible place for wind mills by themselves; rather than having to accept a top-down decision by a central government (Bechberger & Reiche 2004:56). In the Netherlands, the spatial planning system does not encourage a collabora-tive planning process, or a broader involvement of the community. A site for wind farms, for exam-ple, is selected in advance, after which top-down planning is started. "Consultation after a plan has been announced is more a trigger for opposition than an incentive for the proper design of accepta-ble projects. The 'public hostility' that sometimes emerges is mostly triggered by those top-down processes" (Wolsink 2007:1204:1205). National planning and project development approaches do not pay sufficient attention to relevant stakeholders, such as municipalities and interest groups (Breukers and Wolsink 2007:2743).

3.3 Lobby groups

In paragraph 1.3, Hekkert et al.'s description of "counteract resistance to change/legitimacy creation" was adjusted to make it less vague. This entails, that in this paragraph, the "rise and growth of inter-est groups and their lobby actions" will be under invinter-estigation. Because it is difficult to obtain quanti-tative data sources on this issue, let alone draw conclusions from them, this part will be assessed in a predominantly qualitative way.

In Germany, environmental activist groups managed to convince a large share of the public that renewable energy sources were feasible and in many ways beneficial for both the environment and the market. They argued that, when one includes external costs, the deployment of renewable energy is cheaper than that of conventional (fossil fuels) energy, and that it leads to more employ-ment. As renewable energy gradually developed, organizations such as the Bundesverband

Solarwirtschaft¸ the Bundesverband Wind Energie, and the umbrella organization Bundesverband Erneuerbare Energien began to play a more important role in the German policymaking process. Also,

the Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau (German Engineering Federation) joined this coalition in 1997, because it figured that developing renewable energy would provide a lot of jobs for its members. In 2011, Siemens, a major engineering company, started participating as well. After the Fukushima incident, it announced that it would withdraw from nuclear projects. In 2010, the total German investments in renewable energy were €26.6  billion.  Therefore,  the  associations  mentioned   above play an important role in the German economy. In addition to various universities and re-search centers, new institutions affiliated with the German government have been founded to pro-vide scientific support. As Bosman puts it: "Together these actors cover a broad range of German

8

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society and because of their growing importance and influence, a more decentralized energy system based predominantly on renewable energy sources is increasingly viewed as a viable alternative to the current centralized conventional energy system by the general public as well." He calls the part-nership mentioned above a "renewable energy advocacy coalition" (Bosman 2012b:2-3). Also part of this advocacy coalition are unexpected players such as farmers and churches (Bosman & Diercks 2013:2).

Similar coalitions have recently come into existence in the Netherlands. Major energy related companies, such as Shell, Eneco, Dong Energy and Natuur en Milieu (Foundation for Nature and the Environment) lobbied for a new coal tax, which heavily frustrated the major energy companies who have coal plants. Consumer associations such as Vereniging Eigen Huis (Homeowners Association) and the Consumentenbond (Consumers' Federation) are also in favor of renewable energy alterna-tives. But, whereas Germans exploit the opportunities the new types of players mentioned above offer, the Dutch tend to look at the major electricity companies who, the Dutch think, can realize the energy targets. The difference with the past, however, is that the Netherlands now has the "political and social support", with more and more unusual coalitions that serve a common interest (Bosman & Diercks 2013:2). A lot of resistance still remains from the electricity companies mentioned above, who prefer to stick to using natural gas as energy source, and argue that "no energy diversification is needed" (Negro et al. 2012:3842). At the end of the 1990's, the German major energy companies also lobbied against renewables, especially wind energy. However, when their lobby actions didn't prove to be successful, they took legal action, both in Germany itself and at the European court. The renewable energy movement protested against the abolishing of feed-in tariffs. This "game" contin-ued the following decade. The fact that renewable energy shares have increased in such a great ex-tent, is exclusively due to the strength of the new coalitions mentioned earlier. There is a "battle" between major energy companies who want to stick to traditional resources on the one side, and a broad social movement advocating renewables (Bosman and Diercks 2013:2).

The lobbying structure for the opposition of wind power is more or less the same in Germany and the Netherlands. Both countries have citizen based groups opposing wind power projects. These groups are, however, more set up for protection of the environment rather than protection of land-scapes (Toke et al. 2008:1137). Therefore, they can be seen as "conditional supporters" of wind en-ergy projects (Breukers and Wolsink 2007:2747).

Another indicator for lobbying activity can be offered by studying "green" political parties, in both in the Bundestag of Germany and the Tweede Kamer of the Netherlands. What stands out, is that the German Bündnis 90/Die Grünen party has had a share of the votes than the Dutch

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period, there were 7 elections in Germany and 8 in the Netherlands. For the complete results, see figure 3.1.

Figure 3.1: Total share of votes (as % of total) for Bündnis 90/Die Grünen (in the German Bundestag) and for GroenLinks (in the Dutch Tweede Kamer), 1989-2013 (European Election Database).

Moreover, after the 1998 Bundestag elections, the Bündnis 90/Die Grünen party joined the federal government for the first time, in the so-called "Red-Green" coalition together with the Ger-man social democrats. This coalition was continued after the 2002 elections. Although they lost their place in the government after 2005, the comparison to the situation of GroenLinks in the Nether-lands is striking, because this party has never been part of any national government (European

Greens 2014a; European Greens 2014b). This signals a relatively moderate amount of influence, also

because the Dutch political environment is known to be very volatile and opportunistic (Krouwel 2012).

Of course, these results are far from representative for the whole structure of German and Dutch renewable energy lobbying, but because these two parties are both in favor of alternative energy, they indicate something about this specific lobby sector in these two countries.

3.4 Conclusion

This chapter consisted of an analysis of the influence of public acceptance of renewable energy on the success of wind energy in Germany and its relative failure in the Netherlands. Public acceptance has been divided in two parts: idealist attitude of the population towards renewable energy (derived from EM theory) and presence of lobby groups advocating the use of renewable energy (derived

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

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from TIS theory). Although data were hard to find, it can be said that the German public has, espe-cially over the past few years, had a more positive attitude towards renewable energy than the Dutch public. According to the qualitative Eurobarometers, the German citizens have been more favorable towards renewables in 2010, 2011 and 2012 than Dutch citizens. Following the more quantitative sources, Germans have a deeper rooted environmental consciousness than the Dutch. Furthermore, in Germany, the more inclusive approach at the planning stage, offers less grounds for protest, be-cause objections can be made in advance. The Dutch, however, tend to apply more top-down meth-ods of implementation, which instigate more resistance among the general public.

In this chapter, it was also argued that the German environmental lobby is further ahead in their creation of a "renewables advocacy coalition" than the Dutch lobby. The Dutch are, especially recently, certainly developing a structure similar to the one of their neighbors, but they still expect the large electricity companies to take the lead, while in Germany, a whole new array of new actors take the initiative. Finally, both countries have a "green" party in their national parliament. The Ger-man Bündnis 90/Die Grünen has had a slightly larger share of parliamentary votes than its Dutch counterpart, GroenLinks, between 1990 and 2013. Also, the German green party has been part of government coalitions for seven years, while its Dutch equivalent has never served in an administra-tion. However, this indicator only has limited explanatory value, because it shows only a small frag-ment of a broad lobbying system.

- 34 - Concluding remarks

In this thesis, we saw that countries, mainly due to issues of energy scarcity and the urge to decrease

CO2 emissions, try to enlarge the share of renewable energy in their total energy picture. One of

the-se alternative sources is wind energy. Countries perform differently when it comes to wind energy: Germany is one of the most successful countries, with a large share of wind energy; whereas the Netherlands, despite several renewable energy policies, seems to lag behind.

This thesis identified many possible factors that could have contributed to the success of wind energy in Germany and its relative failure in the Netherlands, and it elaborated on one of them: public acceptance of renewable energy. This factor is important because it lies at the core of political decision making. If the general public is against renewable energy, implementation of wind energy is very likely to slow down. Of course, the quality of policy is the main determinant of the success or failure of wind energy. Yet, public acceptance tells us something about the way policies are formed.

The purpose of this thesis was, therefore, to answer the following research question: How did public acceptance of renewable energy, or the lack of it, contribute to the success of wind energy policy in Germany and its relative failure in the Netherlands between 1990 and 2013? Public ac-ceptance of renewable energy can, according to ecological modernization theory and technological innovation systems theory, be divided in two branches: idealist attitude of the general public towards renewable energy and the presence of lobby groups advocating the use of renewable energy.

First of all, this thesis showed that only the last few years, a divergence of the public opinion between Germany and the Netherlands, regarding renewable energy, can be observed. Secondly, the Germans have, historically speaking a higher degree of deeply-rooted environmentalism than the Dutch. The third finding was that the renewable energy lobby in Germany and the Netherlands are similar. However, the Dutch lobby sector does lag behind its German counterpart. The third main finding is that the renewable energy lobby of Germany and the Netherlands are similar; however, the Dutch lag behind the Germans on this area. Finally, this thesis shows that the German "green" party has had a significant larger share of the parliamentary votes, and more government participation than its Dutch counterpart. Finally, it has been shown that the German Bündnis 90/Die Grünen have had a larger share of parliamentary votes and more government participations than the Dutch equiv-alent: GroenLinks.

Therefore, hypothesis 1, stated in paragraph 1.3, can be accepted, because there was cer-tainly a high level of public idealism towards the use of renewable energy; and because lobby groups were present to advocate renewables. Hypothesis 2 can only be accepted conditionally, because there certainly was a certain degree of environmental consciousness in the minds of Dutch citizens; and because the lobby system is more or less structured like it is in Germany. However, the German environmentalism was, as stated before, rooted more deeply in society; and the Dutch lobby system