Populism and Fascism

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An evaluation of their similarities and differences

MA Thesis in Philosophy

University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Humanities

Titus Vreeke

Student number: 10171169

Supervisor: Dr. Robin Celikates

Date: 04-08-2017

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Introduction

In recent years, populism has been a popular and highly debated topic. With the electoral successes of populist leaders and parties all around the world, the media as well as the scientific community have jumped on the subject to analyse its role and place in Western democracies. In some of the discussions in the media, populism is being discussed alongside fascism. The opinions on the subject are diverse. Some of the articles highlight similarities between populism and fascism, arguing that populism is a new, modern form of fascism. A column in the Dutch newspaper ‘De Volkskrant’ (Huseman 2017) for example, warns for the extreme polarization in politics. The author argues that this polarization is partially caused by the rising populist parties and compares this situation to the 1930’s, when the European fascist leaders started their rise to power. Another Dutch article in newspaper ‘Vrij Nederland’ (Broer 2017) points out several similarities between populism and fascism, using observations on fascism from an article by political scientist Robert Paxton (2004). The discussed similarities between populism and fascism include the creation of a common enemy, taking on the role of the victim and emphasizing a commonly felt social crisis.

There are however, also plenty of newspaper articles and columns that defend populism from these accusations and attempt to correct them by pointing out differences between populism and fascism. An article in another Dutch Newspaper ‘Trouw’ (Klijn and Te Sla 2010), states that the common assimilation of populism and fascism distorts the discussion surrounding populism by focusing on the wrong attributes of populism. Populism, the authors claim, is much less extreme than fascism and has no true ideological standpoints as fascism is known to have. We would be better off discussing populism and its standpoints separately rather than merely making comparisons with the extremist ideology of fascism.

I do not agree with this last statement. I believe the debate that is stirred up by these comparisons is an interesting one and it is why I explore it more thoroughly in this thesis. The various authors seem to prioritize and interpret features of populism and fascism differently. There is no denying that there are some characteristics of contemporary populism that are reminiscent of fascism, but are they the same? Or are they so minutely similar that a comparison quickly becomes an exaggeration of the similarities. In this paper I investigate populism and fascism alongside each other. Ultimately, I aim to distil whether an assimilation of populism to fascism is justifiable and on what features this assimilation holds or falters. I discuss the ideologies over the course of two chapters that address the ideology and practice of populism and fascism. I will introduce the specific contents of the chapters in detail in the respective introductions but I will start with a more general overview here.

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The first chapter contains a discussion of the ideological differences and similarities between populism and fascism. Both ideologies are difficult to typify as ideologies for their own separate reasons. Populism is generally understood as a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde 2004: 544), which means that the ideology does not carry a complete idea of how society should be organized. Instead populism relies on an attachment to other, full ideologies such as conservatism, liberalism or socialism (Freeden 1998: 752) to answer these questions. The result of this is that populism comes in many forms, depending on what ideology it attaches to. Nevertheless, the populist ‘shell’ has very distinct ideological properties which lend themselves to a comparison with fascism. Fascism as an ideology is somewhat problematic because of the strong historical connotations attached to the ideology. Although fascism should be understood as a full ideology (Eatwell 2013, Griffin 1991, Pinto 1986, Sternhell 2008), there is little literature that discusses the ideology as a concept detached from the historical reality. Most literature discusses the concept in tandem with German and Italian fascism, thereby clouding the general features of fascist ideology with details that might be relevant to the specific example, but not necessarily for fascism in general. For these two reasons, the difference in ‘fullness’ of the ideology and the historical connotations of fascism, populism and fascism as ideologies are not as straightforward to compare as it might seem.

To work around the difficulties of populism being such a diverse ideology, I focus my discussion on Western European wing populism. Western Europe is starting to develop a rich tradition of right-wing populism as virtually all Western European countries are home to a successful populist party or movement (Johansson 2014). Furthermore, most of these parties share a great deal of features. They generally rely on strong leadership, they are anti-immigration and they oppose globalizing trends and institutions like the European Union. By centring the ideological discussion on European populism I am able to provide a clear, concise overview of a common populist ideology. However, this means that my conclusions are not universally applicable. Although some of my observations regarding populism address general features of the ideology and could be indicative of more general trends I will not attempt to generalize my conclusions. My research is centred around West European populism specifically and as such I have no grounds to make claims beyond that scope.

The common practice of relating fascism to history when discussing the ideology, is difficult to circumvent. I want to clarify that I do not wish to write a historical account of populism and fascism, nor relate them historically. I compare the ideologies without considering their genesis or historical relation. I therefore distil from the literatures those features of fascism that are commonly found in all or most fascist regimes that have existed, and that have come to be understood as general features of fascism. Nevertheless, I will at times make use of historical examples to clarify the features I describe. On the same

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note, I will make references to recent events and debates surrounding populists to strengthen my arguments. It must be clear however, that the goal of these examples is not to define the ideologies, but to indicate and visualize their general features.

The first chapter consists of three sections. I will introduce them shortly here, a more detailed overview can be found in the introduction of the chapter. The first section contains a general description of populism and fascism as ideologies. I introduce the key components of the ideologies and I discuss the important concepts that I will use throughout the rest of the chapter. In the second section I address the importance of dichotomies in populist and fascist ideology. Especially populist ideology is characterized by its Manichean world view. Using theory on inclusion and exclusion by West European populists I discern and discuss several populist dichotomies, like the people versus the elite and producers versus parasites, and I show to what extent these dichotomies play a role in fascist ideology. The third section addresses the role of culture and nationalism. I argue that whereas culture is the central reference point for populists, the nation is what matters most for fascists. In the fourth and final section I discuss the relation of populism and fascism to the state and their role in security, specifically focusing on the role of violence in the ideologies. The preferred form of the state differs between populist and fascist ideology. Although populism stands in a complicated relationship to representative democracy, it does not advocate totalitarianism like fascist ideology does. Furthermore, both ideologies highly value security and law and order, but this has different implications when it comes to the use of violence. Fascism idealizes the active use of violence and often attributes therapeutic value to it. Populism, like all the common ideologies in contemporary Western democracies, condones violence as a means of providing security. However, populists do not actively pursue or encourage the use of violence.

As a general conclusion to this chapter, I argue that the assimilation of populism and fascism on the basis of ideology is understandable, but cannot be justified. Because of the similarities that exist, it is not surprising that the two ideologies are often compared to each other. However, when taking a closer look at these similarities one will find that there are large differences in what the ideologies prioritize in their relation to culture, state and society.

In the second chapter I turn to a discussion of the practice of populists and fascists. Some clarifications are in order. With practice, I do not mean the practical undertakings of various historical regimes or movements. As explained earlier, I do not intend to write a historical account addressing specific historical events. Instead, what I mean by practice is the general and visible conduct of populist and fascist parties or movements in the public sphere. Things like propaganda usage and interaction with the media and the electorate are topics that will be given considerable attention. To accomplish a

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description of practice without solely relying on historical examples, I reference the works of several important critical theorists. Theodor Adorno, Leo Lowenthal, Norbert Guterman and Franz Neumann have analysed fascist leadership, propaganda and other techniques from a historically neutral perspective. This makes their work an excellent tool for my purposes. It allows me to describe the workings of fascism without directly describing historical realities. However, as is the case in the first chapter, I will at times reference examples from history to clarify and validate the arguments I make.

The second chapter consists of three related sections. The first section contains a discussion of the organizational structures of populist and fascist parties and movements. I structure this discussion around three themes: organization, factionalism and leadership. Especially leadership is of key importance for understanding the structures of the parties and movements. Both the organization and the degree of factionalism are strongly affected by the importance of the leader. Leadership itself plays a similar role for populism and fascism. Leaders are a key part of creating a bond between the masses and the movements they represent. There are differences however. The bond between leader and followers for populism is one sided, flowing from the electorate towards the leader. In fascism, the bond exists between leader and followers, but also amongst the members of the mass who identify with each other through their love of the leader. In the second section I discuss the role of media and propaganda for populism and fascism. I argue that the current state of the media and the existence of social media allow populists to engage with their audience in a manner that resembles fascist propaganda. Sensationalist media with a preference for negative news enable populists to highlight and validate their discontent with certain societal problems. Both populism and fascism strive under this general state of discontent. Finally, in the third section I address the role of emotion in populism and fascism by discussing resentment and anxiety. Resentment plays an important role in creating the common enemy that is pivotal for both populism and fascism. Anxiety in the population creates the conditions in which populism and fascism can operate. When faced with anxiety, people tend to look to a strong leader for redemption.

Altogether, the sections lead me to conclude that populism and fascism are highly similar in practice. There are some minor discrepancies, but in every discussed aspect the general mechanisms and practices are comparable. However, the question that remains is whether this means populism can be assimilated to fascism. I believe we cannot draw this conclusion. Instead it is fascism that relies on populist practices. Populism being a thin-centred ideology, influenced the fascist practices by attaching itself to the ideology. This is a possible explanation for the frequent comparisons between populism and fascism. They look and feel the same, but it is not populism that is modelled after fascism. Instead populism has always been present in fascism and as such they are easily associated with each other.

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This conclusion for a large part informs the general conclusion of this paper. On an ideological level, populism and fascism show some similarities but not enough to fully equate them with each other. Some parts of the ideology, like the idealization of violence, are too far apart to warrant this comparison. However, because of the similarities in practice as well as some smaller ideological similarities, the comparison is understandable. As mentioned, the question is whether this is because of populism modelling after fascism or because of fascism inherently carrying populist attributes. From my research I conclude that it is the latter. The thin-centred nature of populist ideology allows attachment to other ideologies, as it did to fascism. Fascist leaders made use of populist techniques and rhetoric, but this does not mean that contemporary populists are fascist because they use these same techniques and rhetoric. In the case of contemporary Western European populists, the thin-centred ideology has not attached itself to fascist ideology as the discrepancy between what these populists stand for and what fascism stands for is too large.

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1. Ideology

1.1 Introduction

In this chapter I discuss what similarities and differences exist between populism and fascism on an ideological level. Both ideologies are difficult to capture in their own way. Populism is a thin-centred ideology, meaning its shape depends for a large part on the ideology it attaches itself to. Fascism is a full ideology, however the interpretations of fascism are highly diverse and often depend on what historical period or regime the concept is related to. In order to investigate populism as a specific ideology, I have limited myself to investigating the ideology of Western European right-wing populism. The dominant form of populism in Western Europe has a great deal of features that are ideological in their own right which allows me to treat European populism as a specific ideology. As for fascism, I remain as historically neutral as possible but I will at times make references to National Socialism and Italian fascism. It has been argued that these two regimes are the only truly fascist regimes that have existed in Europe (Payne 1980: 4). There were many fascist movements and parties throughout the rest of Europe, but none of them rose to power. Because of this, nearly all literature on fascism discusses the ideology using historical facts that often refer to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. I distil from these literatures those points that are general for fascist ideology but I cannot avoid the use of historical examples to clarify these points.

I discuss and compare populist and fascist ideology over the course of four sections. In the first section I address populism and fascism separately from each other. I explain the difference between thin-centred and full ideologies and introduce some of the key concepts that I use in the remainder of this chapter. Introducing them beforehand allows me to make comparisons without continuously having to clarify the concepts making the remaining sections more concise and to the point. In the second section I address the inherent dichotomies that are present in both populism and fascism. Making use of theory of inclusion and exclusion I go over several dimensions that shape the way populism in particular creates and upholds sharp oppositions between groups in society. I relate these oppositions to a variety of theoretical claims concerning fascism.

The third section contains a discussion of the role of culture and nationalism in populist and fascist ideology. Culture is a key concept for populism especially; much of the Western European populist rhetoric revolves around the protection of culture. Using an example from Dutch politics, I argue that culture is the most important value in populist ideology. In fascism this is less clear, there the nation is the single most important entity and culture is only part of this nation. Culture is valuable for fascism, but the main difference between populism and fascism in regards to culture, is that populism tries to preserve an

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existing culture whilst fascism idealizes a previous culture and tries to restore it to its former glory. The fourth and final section contains a discussion of populism’s and fascism’s ideas on the form and role of the state. Populism stands in a complex relation towards liberal representative democracy as it relies on it to some degree, but at the same time undermines some of its principles. The populist rhetoric and emphasis on the existence of a general will enables ‘representation without participation’ (Müller 2014: 487) which slightly pushes the ideology towards a totalitarian outlook on the state and society. The differences to fascism are still large however. Fascism does away with any pretence of representation and takes the elite to be more capable of deciding what is good for society. As for the role of the state I have chosen to discuss one topic in particular. Both fascism and populism strongly emphasise the importance of law and order and security, for this reason a comparison regarding the way security is treated becomes interesting. This is especially true when considering the role of violence in providing security and stability for a nation. Here we find a final important difference between populist and fascist ideology. Fascism often attributes some kind of therapeutic value to physical violence and thus promotes usage of violence for the good of the nation. Populism, like all other dominant ideologies in Western European democracies, condone reactive violence for the sake of security, but cannot be said to promote active engagement in violence for its therapeutic value, nor for the accomplishment of political goals.

1.2 Populism and fascism as ideologies

Populism and fascism are both concepts that have been interpreted in various ways. In the media and the public debate, the term populism is often used to describe either demagogism, opportunism or a mix of both (Mudde 2004: 542). A column in Dutch newspaper ‘Algemeen Dagblad’ for example, lists ‘short term thinking, strong language and cheap sentiment’ (De Jong 2017) as the defining qualities of populism. Although demagogism and opportunism are often present within populist movements, in academic literature they are not taken as the defining qualities of populist ideology. Recently, a number of media seem to have picked up on this, dedicating articles (NOS.nl 2017, Giebels 2017) to explaining what the academic understanding of populism is, which might indicate a shift in the common understanding of populism.

Fascism, as explained in my introduction, is often discussed as a form of rule rather than as a distinct ideology. When discussed in this manner the concept is usually related to historical regimes and periods, most commonly the fascist regimes that emerged before and during the Second World War (Neumann 2009; Payne 1980; Renton 1999). Interpreting Fascism as a form of rule however, undermines

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the potential for a fruitful comparison to populism. Populism is not a regime and comparing ideology to practice would be pointless. Fascism however, might also be interpreted as an ideology. One that might well be applicable to various regimes or political movements, but is only connected to, rather than entangled with them. In the coming paragraphs I clarify how I interpret and define both populism and fascism for the sake of their comparison. In tandem, I introduce several of the key components of both ideologies that will be discussed over the course of this paper.

The dominant interpretations of populism as demagogy or opportunism refer to several features that are commonly present in populist parties. Certainly, populist parties are often demagogical. Their leaders tend to employ simplistic language and appeal to emotions to win people over (Mudde 2004: 542). On the same note, opportunism is a property that is far from uncommon amongst populist parties. The term is used to describe policies or promises that aim to quickly please the electorate. Rather than rationally considering the best options for society, an appeal is made to what people would want most (Mudde 2004: 542). Populists thereby disregard the costs or problems attached to these wishes. These features however, are not integral to populism as an ideology. Instead they are tactics or strategies commonly employed by populists to navigate the political arena. I will pay closer attention to them in the second chapter where I discuss and compare the practice of populism and fascism.

A very clear and usable definition of populism as an ideology has been provided by political scientist Cas Mudde. He defines populism as ‘An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated

into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people’ (Mudde

2004: 543, italics in original). There are two aspects of this definition that stand out. First and foremost, populism is highly Manichean, it takes society to be filled with polar opposites. The pure people stand in direct opposition to the corrupt elite, there is no room for fluidity or compromise in this ‘with us or against us’ mentality. I would like to point out that the people versus elite dichotomy is not the only antagonism affiliated with populism. Producerism is a rhetoric closely attached to American populism but in the past decades it has gained traction in European populism as well. This rhetoric divides society into a group of producers that is weighed down by a group of ‘parasites’ who feed off their labour (Jamin, 2011: 27). Producerism is particularly interesting as it provides populist with an opportunity to circumvent racism whilst still targeting specific groups of outsiders. I come back to producerism in the next section where I discuss the material dimension of populist exclusionism towards groups of outsiders. Secondly, there is an emphasis on the general will that is reminiscent of Rousseau’s political theory. It is unclear where this general will comes from. Yet according to populist parties, the general will exists and the populist leaders

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claim to be its representatives. This claim to knowledge of the general will puts populism in a strange relationship to liberal, representative democracy (Müller 2014). As I will explain in the final section of this chapter, it allows for ‘representation without participation’ which is at awe with an important principle of liberal democracy.

There is one final remark on populism made by Mudde that is key to understanding the concept as an ideology. According to Mudde, populism is only a ‘thin-centred ideology’ (Mudde 2004: 544). Thin-centred ideologies exhibit a ‘restricted core attached to a narrower range of political concepts’ (Freeden 1998: 750). Thin-centred ideologies are incapable of providing their own answers to grand societal questions that you would expect from full ideologies. Instead, they attach themselves to other, full ideologies in order to fill these gaps. In the case of populism, ‘the people’ are the core of the ideology. All other important aspects of populism flow from this core concept: the elite are the people’s polar opposite and the general will emerges from the people. This strong focus on the people however, does not provide populism with a way to fully answer questions of social justice, distribution of resources and society wide conflict management. To answer these questions, thin-centred ideologies need a ‘host’. They can attach themselves to a wide variety of other, full or thin-centred, ideologies in order to find the answers they need. This means that populism can come in many different shapes and sizes. Depending on what other ideologies it is paired with, the outlook of populist parties can differ greatly. It is one of the reasons why there are so many different types of populism. Left-wing populism, right-wing populism, or even green populism are all very real outings of the populist mind-set, though their ideas when it comes to organizing society often differ greatly. Any connection made by the media between populism and fascism has always revolved around extreme right-wing populism. For this reason my discussion of populism will address this type of populism in Europe specifically.

Fascism is typically understood as a full ideology (Eatwell 2013, Griffin 1991, Pinto 1986, Sternhell 2008). Nonetheless there seems to be little consensus over what exactly constitutes fascist ideology. In most literature the ideology is discussed in tandem with historical events, pointing towards specific examples found in National Socialism or Italian fascism to describe its ideology. This results in a concept that has different meanings depending on what specific example it is referring to rather than a singular definition that would help in the historically neutral comparison I intend to make. There are however several distinct features that are present in all types of fascism and they can provide some insight into what could be seen as the core of fascist ideology. At its core, fascism is made up of three overlapping, yet distinct themes (Eatwell 2013: 595). The first is ‘the new man’, the second is fascism’s holistic nationalism

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and the third is its quest for a Third Way. I will introduce them here and explore them more thoroughly in the coming sections where I relate them to common features of populism.

The term ‘the new man’ refers mainly to the inherent aim of creating a new type of leadership and a ‘true-racial community’ thereby uniting the people (Eatwell 2013: 603). This aim dominated fascist ideology when it entered the European scene at the start of the 20th_{century (Eatwell 2013: 602). The quest}

for new leadership was somewhat paradoxical however. On the one hand it was elitist, picturing a new elite or a ‘leader of genius’ that should rule the people. Hitler himself even claimed that ‘the parliamentary principle of majority rule sins against the basic aristocratic principle of Nature’ (Hitler 1977: 73-74). Yet on the other hand, it was a strong move against the established elite who relied upon this majority rule. The goal to create new leadership thus meant installing a new elite to replace the establishment and rid of democratic majority rule.

Holistic nationalism is a form of nationalism that is based on an ethnic conception of the nation (Eatwell 2000: 413). It stresses the opposition of the more important national people towards the ‘Other’ and defends a traditional conception of community. Holistic nationalism takes different forms in the fascist regimes that have existed. In Nazism, holistic nationalism took shape as biological racism and a total opposition of the producing national people against the ‘parasitic’ Jewish community (Eatwell 2013: 604). Mussolini took a more cultural approach and had a strong belief in the usage of myth to stress the ethnic roots of Italians and create a national unity. The Italian state created myths like the cult of Romanità, which told Italians that they were proud descendants of ancient Rome. These myths served a dual purpose. They unified the often divided Italians and taught them lessons on the importance of duty and great leaders (Eatwell 2013: 605). Race certainly played its part in Italian fascism but it was not as dominant as in its German counterpart. The main strand of racial thinking in Italy revolved around Europeanism. Mussolini’s colonial ambitions are often portrayed as an attempt at achieving the military power that he deemed necessary for the defence of Italian and European culture which was allegedly threatened by ‘other coloured races’ (Griffin 1995: 59).

The Third Way refers to the economic dimension of fascist ideology. Naming it the ‘Third Way’ is a reference to the goal of finding a middle ground between the two dominant strands of economic thought in the early and mid-20th_{century. Prominent Fascist thinkers aimed to develop an economic system}

between capitalism and socialism (Eatwell 2013: 606). They emphasised the need for socio-economic equality but wanted to maintain private property. This essentially resulted in an authoritarian welfare state that lacked the liberal freedoms we associate with most welfare states today (Eatwell 2013: 607). The promises made by liberal democracies regarding these freedoms were generally viewed as illusions, false

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promises made by the rich to maintain their economic positions. This distrust opened the path for an economically totalitarian state that disregarded a distinction between state and civil society and legitimized its own meddling in private spheres by referring to the national interest (Eatwell 2013: 608). These three general facets of fascism provide important grip for the discussions to come as they allow me to discuss fascism as historically neutral as possible. In the next section I use them to compare the most common dichotomies of populist ideology to those of fascist ideology.

1.3 The Dichotomies of Populism and Fascism

As explained in the previous section, populism is an ideology of oppositions. Populist parties continuously stress the differences and perceived struggles between ‘the people’ and other groups like the elite or immigrants. In this section I explore in more detail what dichotomies are typical of the populist ideology and identify to what extent these dichotomies exist in fascist ideology. An article by Cas Mudde and Cristobal Kaltwasser (2013) assesses populism on the basis of inclusion and exclusion of certain groups in society. These concepts of inclusion and exclusion are excellent tools to assess the dichotomies of populism as it is through inclusion and exclusion that opposing groups are created by populists. I therefore use their assessments of contemporary European populism as a foundation for identifying which dichotomies are created through inclusion or exclusion and to what extent these dichotomies can be found in fascist ideology.

‘The pure people’ is a concept that is central to virtually all populism in the world, yet who is included in this group and how populists intend to treat this group varies. Much of these differences are determined by how inclusionary or exclusionary the populist party in question is. In Latin-America for example, populism tends to be more inclusionary whilst European right-wing populism is known for its exclusionary approach (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013). Exclusionary and inclusionary approaches have three dimensions: material, political and symbolic. The stances populist parties take on these dimensions determine who are a part of ‘the people’ and how they intend to treat those who are included or excluded from this group.

The degree of exclusionism or inclusionism on the material dimension is determined by the distribution of monetary and non-monetary state resources to specific groups in society (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 158). Exclusionary policy excludes specific groups from access to these resources. Conversely, inclusionary policy provides greater access to these resources for specific groups. On the political dimension, exclusion and inclusion refer to the possibility for and degree of political participation

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and public contestation for specific groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 161). Much like on the material dimension, exclusion on the political dimension means that specific groups are denied participation and are deliberately excluded from arenas of public contestation. Political inclusion targets specific groups to increase their participation and representation. Finally, the symbolic dimension is what sets the boundaries of who is included in ‘the people’, who is considered ‘the elite’ and who belongs to neither of these categories. Much of this is determined by rhetoric (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 164). By referring to ‘we’ or ‘us’ when referring to specific groups, they are implicitly included in ‘the people’. Referring to elites, immigrants or other groups as ‘them’ or ‘they’, automatically excludes them from the group that the populists try to represent. European right-wing populism has a specific position for each of these dimensions and they relate to fascism in their own way.

Material exclusion/inclusion

On the material dimension European populists are generally exclusive (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 160). European societies tend to be relatively egalitarian. Socio-economic differences exist, but even members of the economically weakest groups in society can usually rely on a welfare state that provides them with stable conditions to lead autonomous lives. The prime focus of European populists is to protect these conditions, which are allegedly threatened by outside forces. Immigrants and refugees are said to feed off the generous welfare programs which leaves less resources for the native people who should be protected, rather than exploited for the good of outsiders. Populists present the effect of immigration on welfare as a zero-sum game: whatever benefits the outsider, burdens the natives. This narrative has often been called welfare chauvinism. Welfare is strongly supported, but non-native groups are to be excluded from any welfare policy (Karapin 1998: 221).

Welfare chauvinism is comparable, though not identical, to the rhetoric of producerism. Producerism divides society into two antagonistic groups of ‘parasites’ and ‘producers’ whose interests oppose each other. Parasites exploit the wealth produced by the producers but do not participate in the production of this wealth. The group of parasites can be subdivided into two categories: ‘parasites from above’ and ‘parasites from below’. Parasites from above generally correspond to the elite. Politicians, globalists and bankers have all been made out to be parasitic by various populist leaders (Jamin 2011: 28). Parasites from below are a group of lazy people, unwilling to contribute to society and its wealth. Typically they are the unemployed, welfare recipients, immigrants, but also those that benefit from state resources like subsidized artists. Strangely enough it has been shown that high unemployment rates have a positive effect on the electoral success of right-wing populist parties (Givens 2005: 78). It seems that even though

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the producerist rhetoric employed by populist condemns the unemployed, they still feel attracted to populist parties. The most common explanation for this is captured by the losers of globalization thesis. Unemployment of the native population is blamed by populists on increasing globalization and immigrants taking jobs. For the unemployed, this provides a convenient explanation for their economic situation. Since populist parties attack this globalization and immigration, it is not surprising that the unemployed ‘losers of globalization’ choose to vote for them. In their minds, they are not parasites but victims of a globalizing world.

Interestingly, the producerism rhetoric maintains the idea that parasites from above and below share a bond or some form of tacit agreement (Jamin 2011: 28). The elite that aspires to globalism, open borders and the free movement of people share interests with the refugees and immigrants that are accused of feeding off Western nations’ wealth. Producerism is a powerful discourse for populists because it does not challenge people for what they are, like traditional racism would. Instead it attacks people’s actions and pushes the principle of ‘those who work should be better rewarded’ (Jamin 2011: 28), which is much easier to accept by an electorate. Furthermore the narrative allows for a simultaneous attack on the elite as well as on groups of ‘outsiders’ based on the same grounds, further accentuating ‘the people’ as a homogeneous and exploited group.

Aspects of producerism can also be found in fascist ideology, but they are more dispersed and unconnected than in the producerist rhetoric that is typical of populist ideology. There is no notion of a bond between the elite and other parasitic groups, yet aversion to the elite as well as to parasitic groups is present separately from each other. Two elements of populist producerism are present in fascist ideology. However, their meaning differs significantly in fascist ideology from their populist counterparts. The first element is the producer versus parasite dichotomy, but instead being defined solely on the basis of economic criteria, parasites are defined in terms of race. Hitler for example described the Jews as ‘parasites’. Not only because they were feeding off the labour of hardworking Germans, but also because he believed they saw themselves as the master race and were involved in a plot to undermine the German state from within (Eatwell 2013: 604). The second element is the aversion to the established elite. Fascism’s anti-elitism is not as widespread as populism’s however. In fascist ideology, the elite are still attributed major political roles. I will discuss this in more detail in the next part of this section where I address political exclusion and inclusion.

Populism thus involves dichotomies that were also present in fascism, but defines the opposing groups differently and expresses the dichotomies as a more complete narrative. Populism stitches together the aversion against the elite and non-native groups and turns it into a rhetoric that allows for an

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attack against both groups simultaneously. Furthermore, materialist considerations are far less individualist in fascist ideology. Fascist regimes were battling against capitalism and communism simultaneously which resulted in authoritarian welfare states which were hardly concerned with guaranteeing individual well-being (Eatwell 2013: 608). In Western European countries individual economic situations are a primary concern and an easy way for populist parties to rally ‘the people’ behind them.

Political exclusion/inclusion

On the political dimension, European right-wing populism has both exclusive and inclusive properties (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 162). Depending on the group, European populist parties take a different stance. To its national people, they tend to be inclusive. Many populists have propagated various forms of direct democracy. They often favour referendums and call for citizen initiatives to circumvent the traditional political arenas that are dominated by the elite. Populists thereby claim to give a voice to a ‘silent majority’ that cannot effectively voice their concerns and opinions in political arenas. It must be noted however, that the populist ideology actually stands in opposition to direct democracy (Müller 2014: 484). Populists claim to represent the people who are uniform in their wants and needs, opposed only by illegitimate intruders into our politics. Because of this, any outcome of direct democracy is predefined in the eyes of the populist. If the outcome does not correspond to the general will, the intruders are to blame. This paradoxical stance towards direct democracy also applies to representative democracy, I will discuss it in more detail in the third section of this chapter where I address the relation of populism and fascism to democratic institutions. Promoting direct democracy however, is a useful tool for showing your trust in the native people and correspondingly your distrust in the political elite. When it comes to ‘aliens’, most populist parties are much less enthusiastic about granting political rights. They generally strive for a nativist democracy, where the native people are the ones steering the state (Mudde 2007: 151).

A mantra often employed by Marine Le Pen, leader of the French right-wing populist party Front National (FN), perfectly captures both sides of this political in- and exclusion. The slogan ‘return the word to the people’ (rendre la parole au peuple), contains an emphasis on political inclusion of the people, as well as on the perceived political dominance of the elite. In the populist discourse employed by Le Pen, the people are the native, common people of France. Immigrants and the political elite are symbolically excluded from this group. This slogan thus implies that the word is currently not with the French people and must be returned to them by Le Pen. She is thus politically inclusive towards ‘the people’ whilst being politically exclusive to those who do not belong to this group. These outsiders are essentially the political

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elite and any ‘aliens’. This attitude is typical of European right-wing populism. Geert Wilders, the leader of the Dutch populist party ‘Party for Freedom’ (PVV), campaigned with the slogan ‘make the Netherlands ours again’ (Nederland weer van ons). Although this slogan is more culturally focused than Le Pens, the implicated antagonism of the native people versus the elite and outsiders is the same. Both slogans are clear examples of how populists make use of dichotomies to gain support. By stressing that the common man has little influence over political affairs or is losing their native culture, the groups of antagonists are automatically formed.

Fascist ideology diametrically opposes populism when it comes to the inclusion of the people in politics. The concern of fascist regimes with the creation of a ‘new man’ was primarily aimed at establishing a new type of leadership (Eatwell 2013: 602). As much as this aim was anti-establishment in the sense that it targeted the dominant political elite, it was not anti-elitist. No fascist regime expected the new form of leadership to arise from the people. Rather, the people were portrayed as a mob in need of ruling as they themselves were incapable of understanding complex societal problems. Fascist ideology does not celebrate the common sense of the people like populist ideology does, nor does it aim to include them in political decision making. On the contrary, fascism aims to break down majority rule and takes on aristocratic ideals of a small, competent elite that makes all decisions. Nearly all fascist parties and movements rely on strong leadership by an unelected elite who gather around a single, highly dominant leader (Payne 1980: 13). As such, political exclusion stretched across every part of the population and the distinction between native people and outsiders that is so important for the political in- and exclusionism of populism loses its significance.

Symbolic exclusion/inclusion

On the symbolic dimension, European right-wing populism mainly focusses on the exclusion of non-native groups. The symbolic exclusion of these groups is almost always centred on cultural elements and excludes any group that is not part of the ethnic people. Illegal aliens, legal non-citizens, citizens of foreign decent and ethnic minorities are all spoken of as though they are in opposition to the native groups (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013: 166). This exclusion happens predominantly through the use of language. There are many examples of outings by populist leaders that are indicative of this separation. Perhaps one of the most famous and exemplary ones from Dutch politics is an outing done by Geert Wilders in 2006. Roughly two years after a horrific tsunami struck the coastlines of the Indian Oceans, Wilders gave an interview in which he warned Dutch politicians and citizens for a ‘tsunami of Islamization’ (tsunami van Islamisering) that would strike the Netherlands. In the same interview, Wilders addressed criminality in the Netherlands and

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stated that there is a direct link between the behaviour of Moroccan ‘street terrorists’ (straatterroristen) and their religion and culture (Ten Hoove and Du Pré 2006).

The symbolic strength of these statements is evident. The natural disaster in the Indian Ocean was still fresh in everyone’s mind and the Netherlands is a country with a past of flood related disasters. Additionally, the word terrorist obviously evokes negative associations. By binding together in a couple of sentences natural disaster, Islam, terrorists and Moroccan culture, Wilders symbolically attacks the whole of Islam and poses it as a threat to Dutch culture. Whether or not a Muslim belongs to the group of criminal, street terrorizing Moroccans, the association made with their religion and culture makes it that any Muslim becomes part of the attacked group. This is both an example of symbolic exclusionism as well as of speech techniques employed by populist leaders. As a means of symbolic exclusionism, using charged language to attack certain groups clearly excludes them from the group the populist parties are claiming to represent. The example above is an obvious one, but as explained near the start of this section, symbolic exclusionism can also be more subtle. The for populists common way of referring to Muslims and non-natives as ‘them’ or ‘they’, whilst addressing native groups as ‘we’ or ‘us’ already implies a strict and exclusionary separation.

This symbolic forming of a national group posed against any excluded group, is also an important facet of fascist ideology. Propaganda played a crucial role in virtually all fascist regimes and its purpose was often to create national unity. I will pay more attention to fascist propaganda in the second chapter as it is one of the most important techniques employed by fascist regimes. The aim of the propaganda is ideological however. An important feature of fascist ideology is its holistic nationalism. The nation is the single most important entity in any fascist regime and its foundation is the ethnic, national people. In some cases, like in Nazi Germany, this national unity was formed racially in opposition to the Jews. Others, like fascist Italy, relied more on myths of a national people. The commonality however, is that the national people were always intentionally created through the use of symbols, myths or stories about the people and their enemies. Fascist regimes place a large emphasis on meetings, marches, ceremonies and visual symbols to create a rigorous national community (Payne 1980: 11).

To a certain extent, most right-wing European populist parties can also be classified under the banner of holistic nationalism. Although perhaps these parties make less of an effort to actively construct a national people, they do appeal to this group in the majority of their arguments. Furthermore they make a strict separation between this group and groups of ‘Others’, often through the use of symbolic language. Thus in terms of symbolic exclusion and inclusion populism and fascism share several characteristic. There is a subtle difference however. For fascist ideology the symbolic inclusion and even creation of the national

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people is of a greater concern than the exclusion of other groups. Symbolic exclusion of the ‘Other’ is obviously a part of this, but it happens in name of creating national unity through a common enemy. For populism, symbolic exclusion has priority over inclusion. Populist parties generally aim to exclude certain groups. Whomever feels represented by the populist leader becomes part of the people he claims to represent. The emphasis in populism is more on the other groups with a national people as a result, whereas fascism focusses on the national people and uses these groups of outsiders as a tool for unification. In the next section I discuss holistic nationalism and its role for populism and fascism in more detail. For now it is important to realize that it is the foundation of most, if not all, symbolic exclusion and inclusion for both ideologies.

1.4 Culture and Nationalism in Populism and Fascism

Although I already touched on nationalism and the role of culture in the previous section I would like to address them more thoroughly. In the coming paragraphs I discuss the importance of culture and nationalism for populist and fascist ideology. Culture is a particularly elusive concept as its meaning differs for populism and fascism. Instead of providing universal definition I discuss the meaning and role of culture for specifically populist and fascist ideology. It has an important place in both ideologies, but there are significant differences. Populist parties stress the importance of national culture and claim it needs protecting from outside forces. Fascist regimes on the other hand, put more emphasis on the nation as a ‘higher’ power. Culture in fascist ideology is both a part of the nation, and a tool for creating a unified national people. Furthermore, populism stresses the protection of an existing, national culture that is in a process of rapid deterioration, whilst fascism idealizes a previously existing culture that has already been corrupted by the elite and needs reinstating to unite the nation.

Culture is a central theme in the rhetoric of the right-wing populist parties in Western Europe. A popular explanation for the relatively high amount of support for populist by the working class argues that this support stems from an aversion to or fear of non-native culture and its effect upon the native culture (Oesch 2008: 369). Populist parties treat the culture of their respective nation as being under threat from outside forces. This argument is directed against two groups of ‘intruders’, those from ‘within’ and those from ‘outside’ (Oesch 2008: 352). Intruders from within are immigrants, guest-workers, refugees or any other group on the territory that does not belong a nations ethnic group. Intruders from outside are supranational political institutions like the European Union or the United Nations. Populist parties aggress against both these types of intruders on the basis of them interfering or changing the nation’s culture.

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Culture in the populist sense refers to some form of national identity that is shared amongst the original inhabitants of a country. Because of this, it becomes a very broad and rather vague term. It includes the national people’s norms, values, customs, traditions and cultural symbols (Tonkers et al. 2008: 7). As mentioned, populists claim it to be under threat from groups of outsiders and in need of protecting. To indicate the meaning and importance of culture for populist parties I would like to dedicate a few paragraphs to a recent example of a cultural debate in the Netherlands and the reaction of the Dutch populist party PVV. The debate concerning ‘Black Pete’ (Zwarte Piet) has kept the Netherlands in its grip for several years to date. The controversy surrounding Black Pete existed for quite some time before, but the discussion really picked up in 2013 and has since then been a hot topic in the Netherlands. It gained international traction in 2015 when the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination published a report urging the Netherlands to rid of Black Pete (Sengupta 2015). Before I discuss the populist reaction to this discussion I will shortly introduce the debate.

A popular Dutch holiday celebrates a good Samaritan named Sinterklaas who is comparable, though not identical, to the internationally more well-known Santa Claus. Sinterklaas has a large group of black helpers, Black Petes, who aid him in the distribution of presents and candy. In the festivities surrounding the Sinterklaas holiday, people dress up as Black Pete for the amusement of children. They do so by painting their faces black and wearing black afro wigs and golden earrings. The aforementioned United Nations report stated that ‘the character of Black Pete is sometimes portrayed in a manner that reflects negative stereotypes of people of African descent and is experienced by many people of African descent as a vestige of slavery’ (CERD 2015: 4).

When in 2013 similar accusations first gained significant attention from Dutch media, a part of the Dutch community was outraged. A Dutch Facebook group named ‘Pietition’ (Pietitie) received over a million likes within a day. The arguments against Black Pete were felt by many as an attack on Dutch culture and tradition and a significant portion of the defenders of Black Pete perceived immigration and the multi-cultural society as major contributors to this attack. In the eyes of the defenders of Black Pete, the holiday had never been problematic. Thus why should it suddenly be so, if not for the influx of uninformed outsiders? This is a classic ‘us against them’ argument that is commonly found in populist rhetoric and the PVV did not hesitate to join the debate. In 2014 the PVV proposed the ‘Black Pete law’ (Zwarte Piet-wet) (Tweede Kamer 2014) which according to the party should be installed to safeguard the cultural tradition of the Sinterklaas holiday. In the proposal, PVV leader Geert Wilders and his partisan Martin Bosma stressed the importance of Black Pete for the Dutch cultural traditions and the Dutch identity. Changing

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anything about the Sinterklaas holiday in favour of ‘a small group of people’ (Tweede Kamer 2014) directly impedes upon Dutch culture and sweeps away the Dutch identity.

This reaction is exemplary of the strong emphasis on culture that is typical of populist ideology. It shows how identity and culture are tightly entangled in the populist rhetoric and how they are supposedly threatened by groups that do not share this identity. The example is even more striking because it also shows the perception that culture is under threat from intruders from outside as well as outsiders from inside. The involvement of the UN provided the perfect opportunity for the PVV to aggress against the UN for interfering with Dutch culture and traditions (Wilders 2013), whilst the heated debate provided the PVV with opportunities to blame a small group of ‘anti-racists’ for a campaign against Dutch culture (Duk and Den Hartog 2017). It is important to stress that although populist leaders generally view culture as being in the process of changing, they do not label it as already completely corrupted. National culture, embodied by traditions like Sinterklaas, needs some degree of restoring, but it still exists by virtue of the native people and should be cherished and protected (Tonkers et al. 2008: 4). Although this culture is under constant attack from multiculturalist influences, it has not yet been overrun completely.

In fascist ideology, the concept of culture takes a different form. As opposed to culture defining the national identity like in populism, nationhood is the primary collective identity in fascist ideology (Bayraktar 2002: 28). During the rule of both Nazism and Italian fascism, cultural forms were used to promote the nationalist ideologies of these regimes. In Nazism, there was a strong emphasis on the folk culture which was perceived to be the essence of the nation (McWilliam 2008: 417). In Italy, Mussolini idealized Roman culture and history as the ‘guiding star’ for the Italian nation (Gentile 1990: 245). Culture was comprised of the stories, songs and other artistic outings describing culturally better times. These stories portrayed the nation and made it a lively and bonding entity in the minds of the people. In short, the cultural sphere was ‘a weapon in promoting a nationalist ideology’ (McWilliam 2008: 414).

This attitude towards culture also indicates the inherent discontent of fascism with existing culture. The idealizing of past cultures is a way of expressing discontent with the dominant culture. Fascism believes there to be a ´true´ culture that is suppressed by the current one and it needs to be promoted to ultimately take over the dominant, but corrupted culture. ‘Fascism is a genus of modern politics which aspires to bring about a total revolution in the political and social culture of a particular national or ethnic community. (…) Generic fascism draws its internal cohesion and affective driving force from a core myth that a period of perceived decadence and degeneracy is imminently or eventually to give away to one of rebirth and rejuvenation in a post-liberal new order’ (Griffin 2002: 24). The emphasis placed on rebirth in

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this citation is particularly important. It confirms my observations regarding the fascist idea that there was once a better culture that needs to be revived, which explains the emphasis on tales of previous cultures.

Culture thus plays a prominent role in both populist and fascist ideology, both ideologies understand culture to be an essential aspect of society and they both stress its importance. There are two important differences however. First of all, whereas populism tries to protect and to a lesser degree restore an existing culture perceiving it to be under threat (Tonkers et al. 2008: 4), fascism aims for a total rebirth of culture (Griffin 2002: 24). Instead of protecting the existing culture, it claims it to be corrupted and aims to replace it with an idealized culture of the past. Secondly, culture for populists is not a weapon in forging the nation like it is for fascists. Stressing the threat to the national culture is a way to gain support from the electorate, but generally populists are not trying to forge a national unity. In fascism, the nation is stressed much more vigorously. To consolidate power, fascism creates myths of the nation that aim to transform the masses into an organized community that can be morally steered by those in power (Gentile 1990: 241). This is a crucial element in the formation of a people that religiously stand behind a nation (Gentile 1990: 242). In his discussion of the role of nationalism in fascism, Roger Griffin brands it ultra-nationalism, which he associates with ‘a concept of the nation as a ‘higher’, racial, historical, spiritual or organic reality which embraces all the members of the ethical community who belong to it.’ (Griffin 1999: 45). Populism does not have this ‘ultra-nationalism’, but is more moderate in its nationalism as culture takes a more central role than the nation. In essence, both ideologies are holistically nationalist, regarding the ethnic community as ethically superior and under threat from outside forces. The difference however, is that populism does so in reference to culture. Fascism takes the nation itself as the defining aspect with culture as an element that shapes this nation.

1.5 The Form of the State and its Role in Security

Like in most political ideologies, the state has a central place in fascism and populism. There are however, major differences in the proposed form and role of the state. Western European populism is generally found in representative democracies and populist parties rarely criticize this democratic basis. Fascism, being a full ideology, has its own ideals of how the state should be organized and what its function is. These fundamental differences between the ideologies in their relation to the state translate to their ultimate outlook on its desired form and role. Although its relationship to democracy is somewhat paradoxical, populism condones and, to a certain extent relies, on the democratic form of the state. Fascism on the other hand propagates a militaristic, totalitarian state that has full power and attributes

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only a very limited role to the people when it comes to state affairs. In terms of the envisioned role of the state however, there are some similarities. Both ideologies idealize law and order and in extension of this they highly value security for the national people and take this to be a prime responsibility of the state. The similarities quickly fade when we consider the extremity of measures however. The idealization of physical violence as a means of providing security is a crucial part of fascist ideology, which cannot be said of populism.

The relation of populist ideology to representative democracy is complicated. On the one hand, populist parties rely on being chosen by the electorate to consolidate any form of power. There are few cases of populist parties entering government, but they generally thrive when they are in opposition because it allows them to be critical towards the elite. Contrary to popular perception, it is possible and by their own logic coherent for populist parties to govern (Müller 2014: 484). On the other hand, populists denigrate the elite who were chosen by the same electorate. What this means is that populists are not against the principle of representation. They do however want different representatives and importantly, a relationship between the represented and the representatives that differs from what liberal democracy offers (Müller 2014: 484).

Populists endorse representation, but the twist is that populists make a pseudo-Rousseauian claim to knowledge of the common good. This means that in the eye of the populist, representation is only justified if the representatives follow this common good, which the elite do not. Populists are thus not against representation as such, but they demand representation by people they consider morally pure and knowledgeable of the common good (Müller 2014: 487). The important difference between the common good of populism and that of Rousseau, is that in Rousseau’s theory the common good is in need of constant political participation by the people to give their consent to newly formed laws (Müller 2014: 487). The populist claim to the common good does not need popular support or participation because their knowledge of the common good exists without feedback from the people. Populist present themselves as possessive of a popular mandate and their policies as corresponsive to an established general will, when in fact there are no factual grounds for these claims. In their picture of the world, there is only one group of people with homogenous and morally just demands. All demands that deviate from this norm come from groups of illegitimate intruders and selfish elites. In short, by populist logic ‘representation without participation’ is entirely coherent.

The result of this is that populism opposes a fundamental feature of liberal democracy, namely the possibility of legitimate opposition (Müller 2014: 487). Populists consistently deny the legitimacy of anyone that does not agree with them. After all, they are the only true representatives of the general will

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and anyone opposing this will is considered an illegitimate intruder. This total unification of the people under the populist banner is strikingly reminiscent of the kind of totalitarianism found in fascism (Müller 2014: 488). Evidently, Western European right-wing populists are not demanding a totalitarian state, but a supposed monopoly on legitimacy is as much a feature of fascism as it is of populism.

Of course, this does not mean that populist and fascist outlooks on the form of the state are the same. Even though participation is not strictly necessary for legitimacy claims of populists, fascism does away with any form of representation. The key difference is that where populists claim they represent the will of the people which coincidentally is what is best for nation, fascist regimes did not rely on this claim. The decisions made by these regimes were not based on some vague conception of the common will. Even though it was claimed that the policies reflected the common good, no real effort was made to claim that they were also in line with what the people wanted. Unlike populism, fascism makes no claim to representation. Although fascist leaders and regimes claimed their policies to be best for the nation, the community and the ethnic population (Fernandes 2006: 25) they did not rely on a pseudo-Rousseauian claim to the general will. In fact, Hitler spoke of ‘making the mob understand’ since they could not possible comprehend the complexity of problems that the state was facing (Eatwell 2013: 602). The elite thus carried the burden of decision making and they were, from a Darwinist viewpoint of human beings, free to impose their will upon other humans as they were perceived as superior (Eatwell 2013: 604). Fascism goes as far as seeking the destruction of any democratic legitimacy (Pinto 1986: 480). Which is a much stronger and more apparent negative stance towards liberal democratic ideals. Although in principle populists do not rely on participation, they still make claims to democracy and even call for forms of direct democracy to legitimize themselves.

When it comes to the role of the state there is one area that I would like to highlight specifically since on this topic that populism and fascism show some overlap. Both ideologies put a lot of emphasis on security with similar arguments. Populists claim to represent and service the people. Promising their security and protection is a way of showing their allegiance to the people. Furthermore, since populism makes constant references to outside threats like terrorism, the emphasis on security comes naturally. This same line of argument applies to fascism, only it is the nation as a whole that needs protecting. The people are of course part of what makes the nation, but as was the case with culture, the nation is the central entity of which the people are just a part. The difference between populism and fascism in this regard however, is how they choose to promote security. Populists do so in reference to law and order, arguing for extra police and surveillance (Mudde 2007: 146). Law and order is important for fascism too, but fascists are more extreme in their measures of providing security. Pro-active violence as a means of

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maintaining security is legitimized and even idealized in fascism. In fascist ideology, war is seen as an endemic in the international system and promoting violence as a central act of bonding in paramilitary groups prepares and motivates men to fight effectively (Eatwell 2013: 603). In general fascist ideology has ‘a positive evaluation and use of, or willingness to use, violence’ (Payne 1980: 7). Violence in fascist ideology is more than just an act. Some fascist movements evaluated violence as possessing a certain therapeutic value in and of itself. In their eyes, a continuous violent struggle was necessary to secure the continued health of national society (Payne 1980: 12). Populist ideology does not share this view of violence. Under populist ideology, violence is condoned on the basis of law and order when it is needed for the sake of security, but it is not actively promoted for its therapeutic value.

1.6 Conclusion

To a certain extent, the assimilation of populism to fascism in various media is understandable. There are several features of populist ideology that are reminiscent of and similar to aspects of fascist ideology. However, the assimilation cannot be fully justified on the basis of ideology. The similarities only exist on a basic level. When looked at more closely one will find that although these similarities exist, there are large differences in what is considered important by the ideologies and how they relate to the nation, culture and society. Furthermore, there are some aspects of the ideologies that even directly oppose each other.

Dichotomies are an important aspect of both populist and fascist ideology and the dichotomies that play a role are for a large part similar. Both ideologies emphasize a distance between the elite and the people and between producers and parasites. Nevertheless, there are differences in the interpretation of these dichotomies. Populism for example, has a highly negative stance towards the elite and claims that moral righteousness lies with the people. Fascists are anti-establishment, but not necessarily negative towards the elite. In fact, fascism has a Darwinist viewpoint of human beings (Eatwell 2013: 604), which means fascists accept that some people, namely the elite, are better fit to rule and make important decisions. Although fascists claim to make these decisions in favour of the people, they do not rely on their judgment or input. The producer versus parasite, or producerist rhetoric, also shows differences between the two ideologies. Whereas for populisms producers and parasites are defined on the basis of economic criteria, fascism uses racial criteria to brand parasites. Furthermore, the populist producerist rhetoric maintains the idea that there is a bond between parasites from above and parasites from below, which is not the case for the fascist producerist rhetoric. It makes the populist rhetoric more elaborate as it allows

Populism and Fascism - An evaluation of their similarities and differences