Green Flavour in the European Council
A quantitative analysis of the attention towards environmental issues and the rotating Presidency of the European Council
Annabel van Holst Bachelor project: 6
Supervised by: Dr. Leticia Elias
Internationale Betrekkingen en Organisaties Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences Leiden University
June 2nd, 2020
2
Table of contents
Abstract ... 3
1. Introduction ... 3
2. The European Council in the EU’s institutional framework and the role of the rotating Presidency ... 5
3. Issue prominence on the European Council agenda ... 7
4. Literature review ... 10
4.1. Agenda-setting in the European Council ... 11
4.2 The disputed power of the rotating Presidency ... 12
5. Theoretical scope ... 14
6. Methodology ... 15
6.1. The data: the Conclusions ... 16
6.3. Statistical method and model ... 19
7. Analysis ... 20
7.1 Data preparation ... 20
7.3. Results ... 23
7.4. Limitations ... 26
3 Abstract
From 1975 until 2009, the rotating Presidency of the European Council provided a Presidential chair of six months for European heads of state or government. The power of the rotating Presidency of the European Council has long been debated in existing literature. Following theories of agenda-structuring and by using quantitative analysis, in this thesis the relation between the notion of the rotating Presidency and the amount of attention towards environmental issues in the European Council is researched. The results show that although the rotating Presidency might seem to be an opportunity to highlight issues on the agenda of the European Council, this does not necessarily mean the opportunity is seized. The OLS-analysis yielded a significant link between EU-member states and the relative amount of attention given towards environmental issues, however no empirical evidence is found that the specific Presidential terms influence the European Council agenda.
keywords: European Union, European Council, Environmental Policy European Council Presidency, agenda-setting, agenda-structuring, European Green Parties, Chapel Hill Expert Survey, OLS-regression.
1. Introduction
On the first of July 2009 Fredrik Reinfeldt, the then prime minister of Sweden, urged the European Council to take more action to combat climate change. He wanted to unify the European Union’s (EU) voice against giant polluters such as China and the United States (European Council, 2009). Reinfeldt was the last European political leader to occupy the seat of the rotating Presidency of the European Council. The European Council is according to Alexandrova et al., the highest political body, the main venue for agenda-setting, and the highest policy-making venue in the EU (Alexandrova, Carammia & Timmermans, 2014, p. 317). Hence, it is relevant to understand the agenda-setting and institutional dynamics of the European Council and its contributions to the EU agenda (Alexandrova et al., 2014, p. 154). In 2009 the rotating Presidency in the European Council changed into a standing Presidency
4 with the Treaty of Lisbon1. In existing literature, there is a belief that Reinfeldt played a significant role in reaching a strategic agreement on sustainable environmental development in the EU during this Presidential term of Sweden (Bjurulf, 2003, p. 144). This notion creates the question whether influence by the rotating Presidency was an exception, or rather more common practice.
Nowadays ‘the President of the European Council shall not hold a national office’ (Consolidated Treaty of the European Union, 2012). However, as shown by the example of Fredrik Reinfeldt, before 2009 the rotating Presidency was occupied by a political leader of an EU member state. The notion the Presidency is neutral is, therefore, interesting to investigate. It is currently unclear whether the rotating Presidency could have influenced the European Council agenda and therefore if it mattered which EU-member state was in charge. Existing literature largely disputes whether the position of the rotating Presidency provided the power to influence the European Council agenda. Although previous research shows the rotating Presidency provided no institutional advantages to project a domestic agenda onto the European policy agenda, there were opportunities to introduce or emphasise issues (Alexandrova & Timmermans, 2013, p. 331). Determining the extent of this influence can have implications for the justification of the fact that the rotating Presidency does not exist anymore in the European Council. Moreover, it can determine the retrospective value of a rotating Presidency compared to a standing Presidency.
To further explore the dynamics of the rotating Presidency and the European Council agenda, the focus of this research lies on the specific policy area of environment. The EU expressed the hope to pose a leading position on the international stage by being a frontrunner in environmental policy and climate change (Motaal, 2010, p. 210). Studying agenda-setting in the EU in relation to environmental policy is a relevant area since it is an established and comprehensive policy area (Princen, 2009, p. 45). Therefore, to gain a deeper understanding of environmental policy-making in the EU, it is important to study the intra-EU agenda-setting dynamics. This puzzle leads to the research question: ‘To what extent did the rotating Presidency of the European Council influence the prominence of environmental issues on the agenda of the European Council?’
1 The European Council had a rotating Presidency from 1975 until 2009 with a term of six months. In 2009,
Herman van Rompuy was elected as the first standing president with a renewable term of 2.5 years (European Council, 2020). The rotating Presidency of the European Council should not be confused with the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, this exists to this day.
5 To answer this question, it is examined whether the rotating Presidency influenced the prominence of environmental issues on the European Council agenda. Issue prominence is not simply a matter of issues being ‘on’ or ‘off’ the agenda, rather being ‘high’ or ‘low’ (Princen, 2009, p. 45). Hence, the influence on the agenda is not measured through the notion of presence on the agenda but through the notion of prominence, ergo, in relative relation to the whole agenda. Using theoretical concepts of agenda-setting theories, the notion of agenda-structuring (Tallberg, 2003) is tested using quantitative methods.
This thesis is structured as follows: in chapter 2 a brief overview shows the institutional characteristics of the European Council and the rotating Presidency. Chapter 3 covers the agenda composition of the European Council and the space that environmental issues occupy on the agenda. Chapter 4 provides the disputing views of scholars of the agenda-setting powers of the rotating Presidency. Chapter 5 presents the theoretical scope, with a focus on agenda-structuring theories by Tallberg (2003), relevant for this research. Ins chapter 6 the methodology is presented, covering the data collection and the OLS-method. Subsequently, chapter 7 presents the data preparation, the analysis, and the discussion of the results. Chapter 8 concludes that although the prominence of environmental issues on the European Council agenda is different when a different EU-member is holding the Presidency, this research shows no statistically significant evidence that specific rotating Presidential terms influenced the composition of the European Council agenda.
2. The European Council in the EU’s institutional framework and the role of the rotating Presidency
To understand the possible influence of the rotating European Council Presidency, it is important to explore the context of this rotating Presidency and the implications the European Council has for the overall agenda of the EU. Therefore, this chapter covers the characteristics of these institutions and connects the characteristics to the specifics of this research. Moreover, the agenda-setting contribution of the European Council within the EU, the tasks of the European Council President, and the characteristics of the rotating Presidency are presented. The intra-agenda-setting dynamics of the European Council and the possible agenda determinants are discussed in the literature review.
6 The European Council is an EU institution that comprises of the heads of state or government from all EU-member states (Werts, 1992, p. 26). With a predecessor in the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Council was informally established in 1974 and formally established with the Treaty of Lisbon in 20092 (European Council, 2020a). Historically designed as an informal arbiter to settle issues among member states (Richardson, 2015, p. 159), it later developed into an agenda-setter and policy coordinator of its own (Werts, 2008, p. 61). The role of the European Council within the EU polity is ‘to define the general political direction and priorities of the EU’ (European Council, 2020b). Unity amongst its members is one of the core values (Werts, 1992, p. 63). Furthermore, the European Council expresses the common interest of the EU-member states and provides impetus to the policy of the EU (de Schoutheete, 2012, p. 12). Hence, studying the role of the European Council is relevant to further grasp the agenda-setting and policy-making dynamics in the EU.
The composition of the European Council varies as the executives in member states change, that is why the members change often. The European Council does not have a fixed office or a set term, it only emerges when its members come together during the European Council summits (Bulmer & Wessels, 1979, p. 11). The summits were organised twice to three times a year until the 1990’s and four times a year since then (Werts, 2008, p. 21). During these regular meetings, the ‘Conclusions’ are produced, which are the topical summaries of the issues discussed at the summits (Puetter, 2014, p. 9). The Conclusions have important implications for EU policy-making since they are passed on to other EU-institutions that are competent to develop policy objectives (European Council, 2020c). The Conclusions have been issued since the first meeting in March 1975 and consist of statements, policy initiatives, evaluations, or progress of ongoing policies (European Council, 2020b). The draft of the Conclusions is prepared in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) and is influenced by ideas from member states (Werts, 1992, p. 78). Nowadays, the drafts are additionally deliberated in the General Affairs Council before the final version of the Conclusions is discussed at the European Council summit (European Council, 2020c).
The President of the European Council is responsible for ‘facilitating cohesion and consensus’ (European Council, 2020b). Furthermore, the President is responsible for the logistical organisation and chairing of the ordinary meetings, where a variety of issues within
2 The 1952 Paris Treaty established the ECSC which creates a common market for coal and steel. The Lisbon Treaty formally recognises the
7 different policy domains are discussed (Werts, 2008, p. 61). The President is also the responsible for the formulation of the Conclusions (Werts, 2008, p. 61). In addition to agenda-logistics of the regular meetings, the President can convene additional extraordinary, informal, or thematic meetings to discuss pressing issues such as climate change (de Schoutheete, 2012 p. 44). During these past special occasions, no official Conclusions were produced. With the Treaty of Lisbon, ratified in December 2009, a permanent President was appointed with a renewable term of 2,5 years (European Union, 2009). Before, a rotating chair of six months was occupied by a political leader of an EU-member state (Werts, 2008, p. 61). The position of the rotating Presidency of the European Council corresponded with the Presidency of the Council of the EU, which still exists today. Described as an honourable position (Werts, 2008, p. 61), the rotating Presidency provided an auspicious position for small countries, to prepare the agenda for meetings for the larger European level. In principle, the position provided a chair for all EU-member states to help formulate the agenda and address topics that they considered to be important (Alexandrova & Timmermans, 2013, p. 16). Whether holding the responsibilities of the Presidency was also an opportunity to exert influence, is debated. To conclude, Chapter 2 shows us the functioning of the rotating Presidency and the large influence of the European Council on the EU-agenda in general. Disputed views on the influence of the rotating Presidency are covered further in the literature review in chapter 4. The following section covers the agenda composition of the European Council and the space that environmental issues occupy on the agenda.
3. Issue prominence on the European Council agenda
Considering that the European Council is an important agenda-setter in the EU (Princen & Rhinard, 2006; Eggermont, 2012; Nugent, 2011; Werts, 2008) and considering the notion that the EU has shown willingness to become an environmental frontrunner (Motaal, 2010, p. 210), it is important to understand the agenda-setting characteristics of environmental issues. To measure the influence of the rotating Presidency on the agenda-setting dynamics in the EU, environmental policy is chosen to function as an exemplary policy field.
The prominence of environmental issues on the European Council agenda is presented in table 1. The attention distribution to specific policy fields in table 1 is a reconstruction of the results of an analysis by Alexandrova, Carammia, and Timmermans on the content of the
8 Conclusions, i.e. the agenda of the European Council (2012, p. 30)3. The aggregated attention towards environmental issues between 1975-20124 was 4.09%, while the three most important issues in the Conclusions were international affairs (23.76%), macroeconomics (14.78), and Governance (10.76%) (2012, p. 30).
Table 1: Aggregated attention to policy fields in the Conclusions between 1975-2012
Policy Field Percentage
International affairs 23.76%
Macroeconomics 14.78%
Governance and government operations 10.76%
Defence 7.57%
Banking, finance and internal trade 6.44%
Employment 4.22%
Law and crime 4.13%
Environment 4.09%
Civil rights and liberties 3.47%
Immigration 3.41%
Remaining 11 policy fields (less than 3% each)
17.37%
All topics 100%
It is clear that environment is not a prominent topic on the European Council agenda. This is due to the characteristics of environment as an issue category and the nature of the European
3 The Conclusions are elaborated on in the methodology chapter
4 Note that the research by Alexandrova et al. covered a time period between 1975-2012. This research covers the agenda of the European Council between 1975-2009.
9 Council. The nature of the European Council determines the prominence of different types of issues. Issues of common and collective coordination, such as international affairs and macroeconomics are, according to Princen, more likely to be discussed (2009, p. 24). The European Council considers ‘high politics’ issues more often than ‘low politics’ issues (Werts, 1992, p. 63). High politics are the political issues that are ‘vital to the survival of the state’, whereas low politics are the ‘non-vital’ political issues (Nye & Keohane, 1971, p. 722). Environmental issues are herein categorised as ‘low politics’, while ‘high politics’ issues such as security and geostrategic issues are considered to be more pressing (Motaal, 2010, p. 99). Furthermore, following the notion of ‘low politics’ as mentioned before, non-core issues receive less attention. Environmental issues were among the issues that had to be sacrificed for other matters (Alexandrova et. al, 2012, p. 79). This means that issues regarded as important, condition the amount of attention towards other issues. Environmental issues can be topics of debate in international arenas, but only if there is room left besides larger geopolitical issues (Princen, 2009, p. 24).
Nevertheless, in time, a shift can be seen of environmental issues being treated as high politics more frequently, especially after the Copenhagen International Climate Change Conference (CICCC) in 2009 (Motaal, 2010, p. 99). Classifying environmental issues as ‘high politics’ more frequently, can have implications for possible attention towards environmental issues in the future.
Environmental issues are increasingly more considered for policy-making in the EU (Princen, 2009, p. 45)5. This increase does not necessarily mean that environmental issues also are becoming more prominent. Nonetheless, there is a clear increase in attention towards environment. To show the increase in attention with empirical data, figure 1 shows a scatterplot representing the variation in the relative attention towards environment on the European Council agenda (Alexandrova et. al, 2014)6. A significant increase in attention is noticeable between 1975 and 2009, indicating that environment has become a more prominent issue compared to the overall agenda of the European Council.
5 Princen based his argument on research by McCormick (2001: 63–4), on EU environmental legislation. The number of environmental laws adopted each year between 1958 and 1999 shows a strong rise.
10 Figure 1: scatterplot of relative attention toward environment issues in the
European Council between 1975-2009
This research aims to further explore this trend and to determine whether the rotating Presidency could have contributed to the increase of attention towards environment on the European Council agenda.
4. Literature review
The rotating Presidency is only one facet of a variety of determinants that can contribute to the agenda of the European Council. It is important to understand the broader research that is done on the intra-agenda-setting context in the European Council first before the impact of the rotating Presidency can be determined. Therefore, this section entails a literature review that facilitates ongoing debates on the agenda-setting dynamics within the European Council. Moreover, it covers existing empirical research on the influence of the rotating Presidency on the agenda of the European Council.
11 4.1. Agenda-setting in the European Council
Agenda-setting is a crucial part of policy-making in the EU since it determines which issues will be considered for policy-making (Princen, 2009, p.1). The European Council is, according to Alexandrova et al., the highest political body, the main venue for agenda-setting and the highest policy-making venue in the EU (2014, p. 317). However, little is known about the dynamics behind the agenda composition of the European Council (Alexandrova, 2014, p.2). According to Alexandrova, agenda-setting dynamics in the European Council are different compared to national political systems since the European Council holds a more flexible position in determining space on the agenda and there is no annual presentation (2014, p. 21). Princen and Rhinard (2006) define two routes of agenda-setting in the EU: the first being a ‘creeping’ route, where issue emergence takes place from the inside of institutions. The second route is a ‘high politics’ route, where issues ‘crash’ onto the EU’s agenda from above through heads of state. Agenda-setting in the European Council takes place through the latter since its summits bring together the heads of state or government and dominantly deals with issues of high politics.
In addition to the described role in agenda-setting, the European Council is a crucial informal player within the EU, also regarding the possibility of arranging informal meetings. De Schoutheete and Wallace (2002, p. 44) state that ‘the agenda-setting- and decision-making powers of the European Council are mostly informal and self-designed’. The European Council is an obscure object to study because the meetings take place behind closed doors (Alexandrova et al., 2014, p. 154). Furthermore, the European Council is barely influenced by interest groups, media, or the general public, according to Alexandrova (2014, p. 10). Finally, since the European Council does not have any legislative responsibilities, it is less targeted for lobby (Klüver, 2013. p. 37). According to Tallberg (2008, p. 686), these characteristics and the lack of transparency prevent access, and this is why agenda-setting studies in the EU largely ignore the European Council.
As seen in chapter 3, environmental issues are often classified as ‘low politics’. The European Council is the ‘high politics’ route, because the rotating Presidency is held by the political leaders of EU-member states. Therefore, this research focusses on the agenda-setting of a ‘low politics’ issue (environment) on the ‘high politics’ route (the European Council). Following the idea that the agenda-setting powers of the President are self-designed, and that
12 the agenda is not largely influenced by other factors, this creates room for the Presidency to influence the agenda. This research focusses on the possibilities that the rotating Presidency can be one of the determinants of the agenda composition of the European Council. The next section presents an overview of existing literature on the influence of the rotating Presidency.
4.2 The disputed power of the rotating Presidency
The agenda-setting powers of the rotating Presidency of the European Council are widely disputed in the existing literature. Two groups can be distinguished: the scholars who believe the Presidency could significantly influence the agenda (e.g. Metcalfe, 1998; Tallberg, 2003) and those who believe the opposite (e.g. Quaglia & Moxon-Browne, 2006; Niemann & Mak, 2010). The Presidential chair is described as ‘une responsabilité sans pouvoir’ (‘a responsibility without power’, Jean-Louis Dewost, 1984). Previous empirical research on national policy agendas and the European Council Conclusions concluded that the Presidency does not provide an institutional advantage to push its policy motivation to the European Council's agenda (Alexandrova & Timmermans, 2013, p. 331).
An aspect that might limit the influence of the rotating Presidency, is the neutrality aspect. As mentioned earlier the statement in the Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union states that ‘the President of the European Council shall not hold a national position’ (2012). This indicates that neutrality is expected from the Presidency. During the time of the rotating Presidency, each President of the European Council was also a political leader of an EU-member state. Also at that time, the neutrality norm was laid down in the Presidency Handbook of the Council Secretariat (General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union). Although according to Elgström (2003, p. 1) the President, by definition, must suppress his national interests, the idea of the rotating Presidency of the European Council to be a neutral position, is largely disputed in existing literature. It is argued that in practice, the Presidency can influence the agenda.
In contrast to the findings mentioned above, it is also possible that the Presidency could be ‘une position puissante’ (‘a powerful position’). For instance, the agenda-setting power of the Presidency is defined by Tsebelis as ‘the ability to make proposals that are difficult to amend’ (1996, p. 346). Werts (2008, p. 61) argues that the President has a prestigious, key role
13 in the responsibility for preparing the physical agenda and the summits. Interpreting the role as prestigious leaves the possibility for the President to show leadership and moderation, also in the process of formulating the Conclusions (Werts, 2008, p. 61). Wurzel (1996) argues that the agenda-setting powers of the Presidency are underestimated and that the Presidency holds the power to execute a different agenda-setting strategy, namely to emphasise existing issues, instead of introducing new issues. Holding the chair entails the theoretical possibility of influencing the agenda (Elgström, 2003, p. 3). Metcalfe (1998, p. 414) argues in his research on the leadership abilities of the Presidency, that as the Presidency is rotating, the influence is only short term. Wessels and Traguth (2010, p. 301) argue that the rotating Presidency was an opportunity ‘to hoist the national flag’. These scholars agree that there is a theoretical opportunity, but whether the opportunity is seized, is debated. Examples of the influence of the rotating Presidency are found in existing research. Bengtsson, Elgström, and Tallberg (2004, p. 312) argue that the rotating Presidency has proven to be an amplifier of national interests in the case of Nordic countries. According to Bjurulf (2003, p.144) environment is a ‘true priority’ of Sweden. Countries that are often defined as environmental leaders, tend to set an example and influence policy (Bengtsson et al., 2004, p. 312). Research by Tallberg shows that environmental leaders such as Germany and Sweden are more likely to stimulate the EU’s environmental policy (2003, p. 9). An example is shown by Bjurulf, who argues that Sweden’s Presidency managed to achieve an agreement on sustainable development and environmental stability at the Götenborg Summit in 2001 (2003, p. 144). According to Tallberg (2003, p. 2), existing literature on agenda-setting has underestimated the means of the rotating Presidency to influence EU policy. He argues that the focus on the power of the Presidency is generally studied through a narrow agenda-setting framework (2003, p. 2). Hence, Tallberg (2003, p. 5) calls for following alternative forms of agenda influence. He distinguishes three agenda-setting theories:
1) agenda-setting, a process of new issues being introduced onto the agenda,
2) agenda-structuring, a process where existing issues are emphasised or re-defined, and 3) agenda-exclusion, a deliberate motive to exclude certain issues of the agenda.
When analysing the power of the rotating Presidency in this research, the focus does not lay on the introduction of new issues (agenda-setting), but rather on the prominence of existing ones. Hence, agenda-setting is not appropriate for this research. Moreover, agenda-exclusion is not applicable in this research since the issues that are on the agenda are measured, not those
14 that are not. The following section elaborates on this choice and explains the appropriateness of the agenda-structuring theory for this specific research.
5. Theoretical scope
This theoretical scope focusses on the theory of agenda-structuring by Tallberg (2003). First, the idea of agenda-structuring and the theoretical application to the European Council is explained. Second, how Presidencies can structure the agenda is elaborated on. As seen in the literature review, Tallberg calls for a more elaborate approach when studying agenda-setting (2003, p. 8). The theoretical appropriateness of applying agenda-structuring to this research is twofold.
First, the relevance of agenda-structuring stems from the idea that it takes a substantial amount of time from the moment an issue occurs on the agenda, and the moment an actual decision on policy is made. This is the case in the EU because, according to Tallberg, the EU has ‘intricate and cumbersome legislative processes’ (2003, p. 8).
Second, agenda-structuring applies to the characteristics of the European Council agenda, as Wessels states that ‘the items on the European Council agenda do not change to a significant degree’ (2008, p. 20). Also, Alexandrova et al. conclude that the ‘European Council agenda shows little change over time’ (2012, p. 810). Furthermore, few issues on the agenda are entirely new because the majority of issues are reconsidered after policy-making, and issues rarely disappear from the agenda (Tallberg, 2003, p. 5-8). This idea is endorsed by Alexandrova, et al. who argue that the agenda of the European Council is often pre-defined by earlier summits (2012, p. 75). Elias (2019, p. 152) shows that these policy inheritances are an important element in this process since they determine the consideration of current policy commitments. Tallberg (2008, p. 9) argues that the Presidency is determined by previous terms and that Presidents inherit parts of policy programs set out by earlier Presidents. According to Tallberg (2003, p. 5), the Presidency mostly turns to issues that are already on the agenda. Often, the only option for Presidents is to emphasise existing issues (Wurzel, 1996).
The way Presidencies structure the agenda is referred to as ‘the true power of the Presidential chair’ (Tallberg, 2003, p.8). Tallberg (2003, p. 9) refers to the possibility of emphasising certain issues as adding a ‘flavour’ to a Presidency. This flavour is best described
15 as the outcome of agenda-structuring processes of emphasising or de-emphasising certain issues. The motives by means of which Presidencies emphasise certain issues can be traced back to the issues that the holder of the Presidency (i.e. an EU-member state) regards important. Presidencies can achieve decision outcomes close to their preferences (Thomson, 2008, p. 594). When according to Tallberg, Presidents give more priority to the specific socio-economic priorities of their EU- member state these preferences will be reflected in the Presidency (Tallberg 2003, p. 9). Hence the attention allocation in the European Council will be influenced by this (Tallberg, 2003, p. 9). Thus, the central idea is that the possibility of the Presidency to exert influence during a term is by means of giving ‘flavour’ to the Presidency.
Since this research focusses on the attention towards environmental issues, the According to Bjurulf (2003, p.144) environment is a ‘true priority’ of Sweden. This research tries to find an answer to the research question by determining whether the rotating Presidency was able to influence the agenda of the European Council by adding a ‘green’ flavour to the Presidency. The following methodology chapter elaborates on this notion of a ‘green flavour’ and explains the method of this research, which consists of two approaches based on the individual member states and the specific presidential terms.
6. Methodology
This research employs a quantitative study to investigate to what extent the rotating Presidency influenced the agenda of the European Council. According to Alexandrova et al. a quantitative study is effective to understand the interaction of issues and political attention on the EU agenda (2014). As stated by Wessels (2008, p.51) there is a lack of ‘systematic analyses of periods of time’ on the European Council agenda. Besides, studying the agenda over a vast amount of time allows for the understanding of underlying agenda-dynamics (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993).
To measure the impact of the rotating Presidency on the prominence of environmental issues on the European Council agenda, two approaches are used. The first approach is to determine whether an EU-member state can influence the amount of environmental topics discussed on the European Council agenda. The second approach studies the same relation, but from a more detailed perspective. In the second approach, the specific Presidential terms are assigned a score for their ‘greenness’ based on data from the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES,
16 2016), which will be described in depth below. Investigating the association between the ‘greenness’ of a Presidency and the amount of attention towards environment on the agenda allows for an investigation of whether a green Presidency can add a ‘green flavour ‘ to the agenda of the European Council.
To measure attention, the content of the Conclusions is used, for which the European Council Conclusions dataset developed by Alexandrova et al. (2014) is used. The greenness of a Presidency is assigned based on CHES data. Both the dependent variable (Conclusions) and the independent variable (greenness score) will be explained in the following section. A novel dataset was created to code and combine data from the CHES (2016) and the dataset of the European Council Presidency Conclusions. The construction of this merged dataset and the accessory variables are explained in the following section.
6.1. The data: the Conclusions
To study the impact of the rotating Presidency on the political attention and therefore, prominence of environmental issues on the agenda of the European Council, the Conclusions. of the complete period of the rotating Presidency (i.e. between 1975 and 2009) are used as empirical material. In this research, the Conclusions are defined similarly to previous research by Alexandrova & Timmermans as the agenda of the European Council (2013, p. 319). The Conclusions are decided upon through consensus (Alexandrova, 2014, p. 23). The Conclusions, although a rich source of attention towards policy issues, are not a direct reflection of what is discussed and the Presidency sometimes seizes the opportunity to highlight political wishes in the Conclusions (Werts, 2008, p. 62). The Conclusions receive a relatively small amount of attention in existing research according to van Grinsven (2003, p.12), he questions the implications of the Conclusions for the EU agenda and recommends further research on what happens after they are formulated. As stated by Alexandrova (2014, p. 153), research should place a strong emphasis on the Conclusions in agenda formation studies.
To concisely study the influence of a specific Presidential term, this study is conducted based on semesters, as the rotation of Presidencies was every 6 months. As Schout and Vanhoonacker (2006, p. 1073) note, assessments of single Presidential terms often are ‘strongly influenced by the heat of the moment’. Therefore, it is relevant to study a great number of terms to eliminate particular circumstances and to support this with systematic empirical data. Where
17 previous quantitative research on the influence of the rotating Presidency was limited to five member states and 25 presidencies (Alexandrova & Timmermans, 2013, p. 323), this research covers all EU-member states and 68 of the 70 Presidenciesbetween the period 1975 and 2009. Two of the 70 presidencies are excluded since no Conclusions were produced during the summits.
Thus, the dependent variable is the accumulation of the Conclusions, that were produced during all regular meetings, except for the 1983 Athens summit and the 1987 Copenhagen summit. To determine the attention towards environmental issues, the analysis was conducted on the textual content of the Conclusions. To collect the data of this content, the accumulation of the content of the Conclusions was retrieved from the European Council Conclusions dataset by Alexandrova et al. (2014). This dataset confines a retrospective reconstruction of the European Council meetings between 1975 -2012 with all available Conclusions produced at the meetings. For this dataset, a standardized coding system was used at the quasi-sentence level which allows for the study of specific topics. For this analysis, the relevant issues are selected from the Alexandrova et al. (2014) codebook at the main topic level, namely all the issues that fall under main code 7 ‘environment’7 .
6.2. Chapel Hill Expert Survey
To determine whether a Presidency added a green flavour to the agenda, the independent variable in the second approach is defined as the extent to which a specific Presidential term is considered to be ‘green’. This notion of the ‘greenness’ of a specific presidential term is based on the classification of CHES. The CHES positions parties in Europe on a variety of policy rankings. According to the description in the codebook (CHES, 2016), the estimates of the party positions are based on the extent to which a national party endorsed environmental policy. The values range from 1: ‘strongly opposes’ to 7: strongly favours’. Accordingly, a score of 1 is ‘least green’ and 7 ‘most green’. Consequently, the allocated scores for every individual governmental party of the specific member state holding the Presidency were combined with
7 The subtopics that fall under main code 7 are: 1) environment drinking water safety, 2) water pollution and conservation, 3) water supply, 4) waste disposal,5) indoor environmental hazards, 6) forest, species and biodiversity protection,7) land and water conservation, 8) environmental technological risks, 9) transport of hazardous waste, 10) radioactive waste and regulation of dangerous chemicals, 11) pesticides, 12) air and noise pollution, 13) global warming and 14) research and development
18 equal weight8 into an average score for each government and therefore, the corresponding Presidential term. This results in a ‘greenness’ score for each Presidential term, ranging on a scale from 1: least green’ to 7: ‘most green’. To illustrate the construction of the survey average, here follows an example: The Netherlands held the Presidency from July until December in 2004. During this time, the coalition of the government of Balkenende II consisted of the Christian Democratic Appeal (CDA), Democrats 66 (D66), and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD). According to the CHES Codebook, on the scale 1: ‘strongly opposes’ to 7: strongly favours’ environmental policy, CDA was estimated with a 5.4, D66 a 6.2 and the VVD a 3.7. These individual allocated scores were combined into one survey average of 5.1 for that specific Presidential term. Accordingly, all Presidential terms from 1975 until 2009 were allocated a survey average representing the extent of ‘greenness’ of a Presidency (see Appendix 1). The summary statistics are described in the data preparation in chapter 7.
For clarity, table 2 shows a summary of all variables used in the analysis. It provides a comprehensive overview of the variables discussed above, the definitions, and the sources. The variable ‘relative attention’ is based on data from the European Council Conclusions dataset by Alexandrova et al. (2014). The variable ‘greenness presidency’ is constructed as described above. ‘Relative environment’ is the outcome variable, representing the allocated attention towards environment in the Conclusions. ‘EU-member states’ represent the aggregate of Presidencies for each EU-member state.
Table 2. variable definitions
Variable Definition Source
Relative environment
The relative amount of attention scaled to the overall content of the European Council Conclusions
Alexandrova et al. (2014)
EU member states Aggregated Presidential terms per EU-member state
Alexandrova et al. (2014) Greenness
Presidency
Average of allocated ‘green’ scores per Presidential term
CHES9
8 This research did not account for the weight in governmental seats. There was no weight added to the allocated score. Each party in government was therefore, weighed equally in the survey average.
19 6.3. Statistical method and model
The impact of the rotating Presidency (independent variable) on the relative amount of attention towards environment on the European Council agenda is measured with a linear regression using the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method. Because the independent and dependent variables are continuous, the OLS-regression method is a versatile and appropriate method to analyse a relation between the two variables (Field, 2018, p. 501). The estimation models below are constructed following a linear formula.
In the first part of the analysis, the outcome variable is relative attention to environment, reflecting the relative attention to environment scaled to the overall content of the Conclusions. 𝛼 is the value of the outcome when the predictor variable is zero. The predictor variable 𝐸𝑈𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 for each specific EU-member state. To avoid the ‘dummy trap’ of perfect multicollinearity, not every EU-EU-member state can be included as a dummy variable. Hence, one EU-member state (Austria) is randomly selected to be omitted from the equation. This is reflected in the summation symbol ∑17𝑖=1 . Time-fixed effects 𝜇𝑡 controls for all common shocks in the time as measured in years.
The error is expressed in 𝜀𝑖𝑡. These elements are reflected in the following estimation model:
𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑎𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑡𝑜 𝑒𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑟𝑜𝑛𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0+ ∑17𝑖=1𝛽𝑖 𝐸𝑈𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖 + 𝜇𝑡+ 𝜀𝑖𝑡
In the second part of the analysis, a similar regression is run, only now the predictor variable is changed to a specific Presidency. Following the variable constructed mentioned in the methodology, each Presidency received a score of ‘greenness’. The outcome variable remains the relative attention to environment. 𝛼 is the value of the outcome when the predictor variable is zero. The predictor variable 𝐺𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a specific presidential term. 𝛿1 Is the coefficient in this model. Again, time-fixed effects 𝜇𝑡 control for all common shocks
in the time as measured in years. An error is expressed in 𝜀𝑖𝑡. This is reflected in the estimation model:
20 Given the two models described above, a statistically significant effect of 𝛽𝑖 and 𝛿1would provide evidence that the Presidency can assert influence on the agenda. This would provide support for the research question. Model 1 estimates the specific coefficient of each member state which are added as dummy variables in the model. Significant coefficients of EU-member states would provide preliminary evidence of influence. Although the sole association of attention towards environment and the specific EU-member state that is holding the Presidency is relevant, is it not conclusive evidence. Therefore, the second model entails the ‘greenness’ of the Presidency, since this expresses the priorities a Presidency can emphasise by adding a ‘green flavour’ to the agenda. In this research, any relation with a p-value <0.05 is considered to be statistically significant. Therefore 𝛽𝑖 with a p-value <0.05 implies that it matters which EU-member state is holding the Presidency concerning the amount of attention towards environment, whereas 𝛿1with a p-value <0.05 suggests that the ‘greenness’ of Presidencies can influence the amount of attention towards environment.
7. Analysis
This analysis chapter consists of two parts. The meaning of the first part is to provide the necessary preparation and summary statistics for the OLS-analyses. The second part of this chapter consists of the analyses and presentation, interpretation, and discussion of the results.
7.1 Data preparation
To execute a concise OLS- analysis, it is important to first present the appropriateness of the data. Therefore, the next section covers the data preparation and summary statistics.
Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the variables used in analysis. The value ranges of the variables are as follows: the average amount of attention towards environment is 4.09% of the total European Council agenda. The minimum amount of attention is 0, the maximum is 20.33% with a standard deviation of 3.9%. The greenness of the Presidency as described above, ranges from 1: (‘least green’) to 7: (‘most green’), with a minimum of 3.1, a maximum of 6.7, and an average score of 5.39 (see Appendix A). The standard deviation is 0.83. The 68 observations of the variable that reflect the amount of attention, namely every Presidential term except for Greece in 1983 and Denmark in 1987 because during these Presidencies, no Conclusions were
21 produced during the summits. The number of observations in the survey averages is 59, causal to the 9 missing values of parties that were not included in the codebook (Chapel Hill Expert Survey, 2016).
Table 3: Summary statistics of variables used in analysis
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
Relative attention1 4.09% 3.9% 0 20.33% 68
Greenness
President2 5.39 0.83 3.1 6.7 59
1. Relative attention in percentages scaled to the content of the European Council Conclusions 2. Average ‘green score’ on a scale of 1-7
To show the variance in data before analysis, Table 4 (next page) shows the amount of attention that is allocated towards environment by each EU-member state. The Presidential terms are aggregated into an average percentage and therefore table 4 does not show discrepancies between specific Presidential terms. At first sight, it seems to matter what EU-member state is holding the Presidency when it comes to the relative amount of attention towards the environment. An example is the comparison between Sweden and Belgium. When Sweden is holding the rotating Presidency, an average of 14.95% of the European Council agenda is dedicated to environmental issues. This is in contrast to Belgium, which allocates less than 0.5% of attention towards environmental issues during the Belgian Presidencies. It is not possible to draw conclusions from this information that contributes to answering the research question since the variance in attention does not mean influence. The next section analyses this relation using statistical methods.
22 𝐓𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞 𝟒: 𝐀𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐚𝐠𝐞 𝐫𝐞𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐯𝐞 𝐚𝐦𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭 𝐨𝐟 𝐚𝐭𝐭𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧 𝐭𝐨𝐰𝐚𝐫𝐝𝐬 𝐞𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭 𝐩𝐞𝐫 𝐄𝐔 − 𝐦𝐞𝐦𝐛𝐞𝐫 𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞𝟏
Member state Number of Presidential
terms Percentage Austria 2 3.40% Belgium 5 0.46% Czech Republic 1 5.12% Denmark 4 1.96% Finland 2 2.52% France 6 3.11% Germany 3 4.76% Greece 3 6.08% Ireland 6 3.65% Italy 6 1.80% Luxembourg 6 2.13% Netherlands 6 1.72% Portugal 3 4.29% Slovenia 1 7.24% Spain 3 6.07% Sweden 2 14.95% United Kingdom 6 2.14% West Germany 3 1.78% Total 68 4.09%
23 7.3. Results
This section discusses the results of the two approaches. Table 5 (next page) shows the outcome of the linear regression of the relation between EU-member states and the relative attention towards environment. This model measures the effect of each EU-member state on the amount of attention towards environment during its Presidential terms. There are significant relations found. For example, when Sweden is holding the Presidency, there are 7.7 percentage points more attention towards environment compared to when Austria is holding the Presidency (i.e. Austria is the omitted dummy variable). This relation is significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, when the Czech Republic is holding the Presidency, the attention towards environment is 7.5 percentage points less compared to Austria. There seems to be some association between the EU-member that is holding the Presidency. Other significant relations are found in the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Spain at the 1% level, France and West-Germany at the 5% level and Ireland at the 10% level. Interpreting this relation with reference to the research question suggests that since several coefficients (𝛽𝑖) are significant and therefore, preliminary
evidence points to the notion that the rotating Presidency can influence the agenda. Furthermore, the explanatory power measured in adjusted Adj. R2 increases with 34 percentage points to 47% when the dummy variables of the EU-member states are added in the second estimation in table 5. In short, some EU-members are significantly associated with more (or less) attention towards environment The explanatory power increases when the EU-member state that is holding the Presidency is added to the model compared to the model that only estimated the relation based on year dummies. This would be contradictory to earlier research that argued that there was no influence of the Presidency on the agenda (Alexandrova, et al, 2014) Therefore, this first analysis yields evidence that it matters which specific EU-member state is holding the Presidency. To further investigate the influence of the Presidency and the reflection of ‘green’ priorities of the Presidency , the second model entails the notion of giving a ‘green’ flavour.
24 Table 5. Linear regression of EU-member states and relative attention towards environment Relative amount of attention Relative amount of attention (Constant) 1.60e-14 -3.968 (0.00) (-0.95) Austria 0 (.) Belgium -0.617 (-0.35) Czech Republic -7.505*** (-4.21) Denmark -0.944 (-0.48) Finland 0.752 (0.52) Germany 2.091 (1.14) Greece 2.910 (1.11) Ireland 6.456* (1.81) Italy 1.479 (0.46) Luxembourg 1.353 (0.62) Netherlands 2.216 (0.96) Portugal 1.640 (0.91) Slovenia 9.902*** (3.62) Spain 7.886*** (3.06) Sweden 7.707***
25 (4.32) United Kingdom 0.0433 (0.03) West Germany -5.237** (-2.22)
Year dummies Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.131 0.468
N 68 68
Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses *Indicates significance at * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
For the second part of the analysis, the specific Presidential terms are considered. Table 6 (next page) shows the outcome of the second OLS-regression with the ‘greenness’ of the Presidency and the relative attention towards environment. As evidenced by the insignificant coefficients (𝛿1) of the greenness of the Presidency, this research does not find evidence that the greenness of a Presidency influences the relative attention towards environment.
The direction of the coefficient moves as expected, namely if the ‘greenness’ score increases with one point, the relative percentage of attention increases with 1.08 percentages point. Considering that the coefficients of these relations are not significantly different than 0, this research produces no evidence that the greenness of a Presidency affects the relative amount of attention toward environmental issues. Following these results, specific Presidential terms do not influence the prominence of environmental issues on the European Council agenda.
26 Table 6. Linear regression of the Presidency’s ‘greenness’
and the relative attention towards environmental issues
Relative attention environment (Constant) -5.539 (-1.05) Greenness Presidency 1.081 (1.05)
Year dummies Yes
adj. R2 0.030
N 59
Note: Ordinary Least Squares regression estimates. Standard errors in parentheses *Indicates significance at
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
7.4. Limitations
Although the use of the CHES data has the advantage of accurate party positioning of national European parties (Bakker et al., 2015), the CHES-survey question on environmental policy endorsement does not allow for the inclusion of the fluctuation of party positions and environmental ideology over time. There is a consistent link found by Lester, between party ideology, party identification, and environmentalism (1995, p. 148). Therefore, the consideration is made that if a party endorses environmental policy in the present, it is assumed it has done the same in the past. Future research could control for specific fluctuations in party position or policy change. Also, the number of observations in the second estimation model is lower than in the first estimation model. This possibly has an impact on the significance of the relation. The method using the ‘greenness’ yielded no statistically significant results. More sophisticated measures for determining the greenness of a Presidency or specific member-state could be used in future research. It is also possible to control for other factors, such as natural disasters, the occurrence of International Climate summits, or focusing events.
27 8. Conclusion
The purpose of this research was to empirically strengthen the idea of a possible influence of the rotating Presidency on the agenda of the European Council, with the example of attention towards environmental issues between 1975-2009. The research shows that although the rotating Presidency might seem to be an opportunity to highlight issues on the agenda of the European Council, this does not necessarily mean the opportunity is seized.
The theoretical concepts that were used were the agenda-structuring possibilities of emphasising (or de-emphasising) and giving a ‘flavour’ to the Presidential term (Tallberg, 2013). Existing literature argues that a national flavour can be added to the Presidency (Bengtsson, et al., 2004, p.312). This research found no empirical evidence that the attention towards environment on the European Council agenda can be influenced by the rotating Presidency. Although a significant relation is found between specific EU-member states and the relative amount of attention given towards environmental issues, the analysis using the ‘greenness’ of specific Presidential terms, yields no significant relation. This result, therefore, does not suffice as evidence to support the expectation that the rotating Presidency can influence the European Council agenda. In line with existing literature on the inability of the Presidency to influence the agenda of the European Council, this research yields no evidence to counter these arguments. The attention towards environmental issues differs when some EU-members hold the Presidency (e.g. Sweden, Ireland), therefore the possibility of Presidential influence cannot be fully excluded based on this research.
To understand agenda-setting in the European Council and the agenda-setting of environmental issues in general, further research could benefit from qualitative elements to further grasp an understanding of the notions of ‘flavour’ based on national socio-economic priorities. Furthermore, specific national influences on environmental policy are worth studying, following the example of the Presidential terms of Sweden. In this research, the influence of the rotating Presidency is solely questioned in the European Council. Another societal implication would be to investigate the influence of the rotating Presidency in the Council of the EU since the rotating Presidency in the Council of the EU exists to this day. Furthermore, the Council of the EU has a specific Environmental Council (ENV) and therefore it would be interesting to investigate the powers of the rotating Presidency in a specific policy
28 council. Finally, it may be fruitful to conduct empirical studies on high politics issues (i.e. that take up a larger part of the agenda) in the European Council.
29 9. Bibliography
Alexandrova, P., Carammia, M., & Timmermans, A. (2012). Policy Punctuations and Issue Diversity on the European Council Agenda. Policy Studies Journal, 40(1), 69-88.
Alexandrova, P., Carammia, M., Princen, S., & Timmermans, A. (2014). Measuring the
European Council agenda: Introducing a new approach and dataset. European Union Politics, 15(1), 152-167.
Alexandrova, P., & Timmermans, A. (2013). National interest versus the common good: The Presidency in European Council agenda setting. European Journal of Political Research, 52(3), 316-338.
Bakker R., de Vries C., Edwards E., Hooghe L., Jolly S. (2015). Measuring party
positions in Europe: The Chapel Hill Expert Survey trend file, 1999–2010. Party Politics 21(1), pp. 143–152.
Baumgartner, F and Jones, B. (1993). Agendas and Instability in American Politics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Bengtsson, R., Elgström, O., & Tallberg, J. (2004). Silencer or Amplifier? The European Union Presidency and the Nordic Countries. Scandinavian Political Studies, 27(3), 311-334.
Bjurulf, B. (2003). The Swedish Presidency of 2001. A Reflection of Swedish Identity. In O. Elgström (Ed.), European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Perspective, 138-154. London: Routledge.
Bulmer, S. and Wessels, W. (1989). The European Council: decision-making in European politics. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
30 Consolidated Version of the Treaty of the European Union (2012). Official Journal C 326, 26
October, pp.13-45.
de Schoutheete, P. (2012). The European Council and the Community Method. Brussels: Notre Europe.
de Schoutheete, P., & Wallace, H. (2002). Study on the European Council. Brussels: Notre Europe.
Elias, L. (2019). Agenda dynamics in the European Union: The interaction between the European Council and the European Commission in the policy domain of organized crime [Dissertation, Leiden University]. Retrieved from
https://openaccess.leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/78558.
Elgström, O. (2003). European Union Council Presidencies. A Comparative Perspective, 138-154. London: Routledge.
European Council a (website) History. [Online]
https:www.consilium.europa.eu/en/history/?filters=2031, accessed in May 2020
European Council b (website) European Council Conclusions. [Online]
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/nl/european-council/conclusions//, accessed in April 2020.
European Council c (website) Charles Michel, President of the European Council. [Online] https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/european-council/president/, accessed in May 2020.
31 European Council. (2009, July 15). Sweden’s Presidency of the EU: climate change,
economic crisis, Lisbon Treaty [press release]. [Online] https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/.
Field, A. (2018). Discovering Statistics Using IBM SPSS Statistics. Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union. (1997). Council Guide. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Community.
Klüver, H. (2013). Lobbying in the European Union: Interest groups, lobbying coalitions, and policy change. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Lester, J. (1995). Environmental Politics and Policy: Theories and Evidence. Durham: Duke University Press.
McCormick, J. (2001). Environmental Policy in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Metcalfe, D. (1998). ‘Leadership in European Union negotiations: The Presidency of the Council’, International Negotiation, 3: 413–434.
Motaal, D. (2010). The Shift from "Low Politics" to "High Politics": Climate Change. Environmental Policy and Law, 40(3), 98-109.
Niemann, A. & Mak, J. (2010). (How) do norms guide Presidency behaviour in EU negotiations? Journal of European Public Policy, 17(5): 727–742.
Nye, J., & Keohane, R. (1971). Transnational Relations and World Politics: A Conclusion. International Organization, 25(3), 721-748.
Richardson, J. (2006). European Union: Power and policy-making (3rd ed., Routledge research in European public policy). Abingdon: Routledge.
32 Schout, A., & Vanhoonacker, S. (2006). Evaluating Presidencies of the Council of the EU:
Revisiting Nice. Journal of Common Market Studies, 44(5), 1051-1077.
Tallberg, J. (2003). The Agenda-shaping powers of the Council Presidency. In O. Elgström (ed.), European Union Council Presidencies: A comparative perspective. London: Routledge.
Tallberg, J. (2008). Bargaining Power in the European Council. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(3), 685-70.
Thomson, R. (2008). The Council Presidency in the European Union: Responsibility with Power. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 46(3), 593-61.
Tsebelis, G., & Garrett, G. (1996). Agenda setting power, power indices, and decision making in the European Union. International Review of Law & Economics, 16(3), 345-361.
Princen, S. (2009). Agenda-Setting in the European Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
Princen, S. & Rhinard, M. (2006). Crashing and creeping: Agenda-setting dynamics in the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 13(7), 1119–1132.
Puetter, U. (2014). The European Council and the Council: new intergovernmentalism and institutional change. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford
University Press.
Quaglia, L. & Moxon-Browne, E. (2006). What makes a good EU Presidency? Italy and Ireland compared. Journal of Common Market Studies 44(2), 349–368.
Grinsven, P. (2003). The European Council Under Construction: EU Top Level Decision Making at the Beginning of a New Century. The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations Clingendael.
33 Werts, J. (1992). The European Council. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science.
Werts, J. (2008). The European Council. London: John Harper.
Wessels, W. (2008). The European Council: A Bigger Club, a Similar Role? In E. Best, T. Christiansen & P. Settembri (Eds.), The Institutions of the Enlarged European Union: Continuity and Change (pp. 16-33). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Wessels, W. & Traguth, T. (2010). 'Der hauptamtliche Präsident des Europäischen Rates: “Herr” oder “Diener” im Haus Europa?', Integration, 33(4), 297–311.
34 10. Appendices
Appendix A
Generated list of Presidential terms, the composition of parties and the allocated survey averages allocated by CHES10
Year Term MS President Coalition
National Parties
Survey average
1975 January - June Ireland Liam Cosgrave
Governmen t of the 20th Dáil Fine Gael, Labour Party 5.15 1975 July -
December Italy Aldo Moro
Organic Centre Left
PSI, PSDI,
CCD 5.1
1976 January - June Luxembourg Gaston Thorn Thorn CSV, DP -
1976
July -
December Netherlands Joop den Uyl Den Uyl
PvdA, KVP, ARP, PPr,
D'66 6
1977 January - June
United
Kingdom James Callaghan Callaghan Labour 5.8
1977
July -
December Belgium Leo Tindemans
Tindemans II
CVP/PSC, BSP/PSB,
VU, FDF 5.5
1978 January - June Denmark Anker Jørgensen
Jörgensen II
Social
Democrats 6.6
35 1978 July-December
West
Germany Helmut Schmidt Schmidt II SPD, FDP 6.1
1979 January - June France
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing Valéry Giscard d'Estaing PR, (UMP) 4.8 1979 July - December Ireland
Jack Lynch (from 11 december
Charles Haughey) 20th Dáil
Fianna Fáil,
Labour Party 5.18
1980 January - June Italy Francesco Cossiga Cossiga
PSI, PSDI,
PRI, PLI 5.4
1980
July -
December Luxembourg Pierre Werner Werner IV CSV, LSAP -
1981 January - June Netherlands Dries van Agt van Agt I CDA, VVD 4.55
1981
July - December
United
Kingdom Margaret Thatcher First
Thatcher Conservative 3.1
1982 January - June Belgium Wilfried Martens Martens I
CVP/PSC, BSP, PS, FDF 5.7 1982 July-December Denmark Anker Jørgensen (Poul Schlütler from 10 September) Schlütler I CPP, Venstre, Centre Democrats, Christian Dem 6.35 1983 January - June West
Germany Helmut Kohl Kohl II
CDU, FDP, CSU 5.85 1983 July – December Greece Andreas Papandreou Papandreou I PASOK 6.5
36 1984
July -
December Ireland Garret FitzGerald 24th Dáil
Fine Gael,
Labour Party 5.2
1985 January - June Italy Bettino Craxi Craxi PSI -
1985
July -
December Luxembourg Jacques Santer Santer CSP -
1986 January - June Netherlands Ruud Lubbers Lubbers CDA, VVD 4.55
1986
July - December
United
Kingdom Margaret Thatcher
Third
Thatcher Conservative 3.1
1987 January - June Belgium Wilfried Martens Martens VI
CVP/PSC,
PVV/PRL 5.15
1988
July –
December Denmark Poul Schlütler Schlütler II
CPP, Ventstre, Centre D, Christian D 6.35 1988 January - June West
Germany Helmut Kohl Kohl V
CDU, FDP, CSU 5.85 1988 July - December Greece Andreas Papandreou Papandreou ii PASOK 6.5
1989 January - June Spain Felipe González
Gonzálex
II PSOE 5.8
1989
July -
December France Francois Mitterand Mitterand PS 5.5
1990 January - June Ireland Charles Haughey
Governmen t of the 26th Dáil Fianna Fáil, Progressive Democrats 4.6
37 1990
July -
December Italy Giulio Andreotti
Andreotti VI
DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI,
PLI 4.83
1991 January - June Luxembourg Jacques Santer Santer CSP -
1991
July -
December Netherlands Ruud Lubbers Lubbers III CDA, PvdA 5.65
1992 January - June Portugal Aníbal Cavaco Cavacao PSD 6.7
1992
July - December
United
Kingdom John Major
Second
Major Conservative 3.2
1993 January - June Denmark
Poul Schlüter (Poul Nyrup Rasmussen from 25 january) Rasmussen I SD, CD, DSLP, CD 6.65 1993 July -
December Belgium Jean-Luc Dehaene Dehaene I
CVP, PSC,
SP, PS 5.7
1994 January - June Greece
Andreas Papandreou Papandreou III PASOK 6.5 1994 July -
December Germany Helmut Kohl Kohl V
CDU, FDP,
CSU 5.5
1995 January - June France
Francois Mitterand (Jacques Chirac
from 17 May) Mitterand SP 4.7
1995
July -
December Spain Felipe González
González
38 1996 January - June Italy
Lamberto Dini (From 17 may Romano Prodi) Dini Cabinet Independent - 1996 July -
December Ireland John Bruton
Governmen t of the 27th Dáil Fine Gael, Labour Party, Democratic Left 5.2
1997 January - June Netherlands Wim Kok Kok I
PvdA, VVD, D66 5.3 1997 July - December Luxembourg Jean-Claude
Juncker Juncker I CSV, LSAP -
1998 January - June
United
Kingdom Tony Blair First Blair Labour 5.8
1998
July -
December Austria Viktor Klima Klima SPÖ, ÖVP 5.4
1999 January - June Germany Gerhard Schröder Schröder I
CDU/CSU,
FDP 5.55
1999
July -
December Finland Paavo Lipponen Lipponen I
SDP, KOK, RKP, VAS,
VIHR 6.4
2000 January - June Portugal António Guterres XIII PS 5.8
2000
July -
December France Jacques Chirac
Jacques
Chirac RPR 4.6
39 2001
July -
December Belgium Guy Verhofstadt
Verhofstadt I
VLD, PRL, SP, PS,
Agalev, Ecolo 5.76
2002 January - June Spain José María Aznar Aznar II PP, CC 5.2
2002 July - December Denmark Anders Fogh Rasmussen Rasmussen I Venstre, Conservative People's Party 6.3
2003 January - June Greece Costas Simitis Simitis III PASOK 6.5
2003
July -
December Italy Silvio Berlusconi
Berlusconi III
FI, AN, LN, CCD, CDU,
NPSI, PRI 3.9
2004 January - June Ireland Bertie Ahern
Governmen t of the 29th Dáil Fianna Faïl, Progressive Democrats 4.6 2004 July - December Netherlands Jan Peter Balkenende Balkenende II CDA, VVD, D66 5.1
2005 January - June Luxembourg
Jean- Claude
Juncker Juncker III CSV, LSAP -
2005
July - December
United
Kingdom Tony Blair
Second
Blair Labour 5.8
2006 January - June Austria
Wolfgang
Schüssel Schussel II
ÖVP, FPÖ,
BZÖ 5.5
2006 July-December Finland Matti VanHanen
VanHanen II
KESK, KOK,
RKP, VIHR 6
2007 January - June Germany Angela Merkel Merkel I
CDU, SPD,
40 2007
July -
December Portugal José Sócrates Sócrates PS 5.3
2008 January - June Slovenia Janez Jansa
8th Governmen t SDS, NSI, SLS, DeSUS 4.9 2008 July -
December France Nicolas Sarkozy
President Sarkozy UMP 4.8 2009 January - June Czech Republic Mirek Topolánek (From 8 May Jan Fischer) Mirek Toploánek Second Cabinet ODS, KDU-CSL, SZ 4 2009 July -
December Sweden Fredrik Reinfeldt
Red-Greens
Social Democrats,
