Meaning in life and the future of humanity;
Exploring the role of the future of humanity for a meaningful life
and the relation to our (in)actions to care for it
Coco Veldhuijsen Student number 10197184 MA Philosophy - University of Amsterdam July 2018 Under supervision of dhr. prof. dr. M.D. Davidson Second reader dhr. dr. H.W.J.M. Wijsbek Wordcount (Introduction - Conclusion): 21577
Abstract
It has been suggested within philosophy that living a meaningful life requires the outlook on a flourishing future of humanity. As humans strive to live a meaningful life, this perspective provides good reasons to care for the future of humanity. With Death and the Afterlife (2013), Samuel
Scheffler has reopened the debate on this topic by suggesting that the future of humanity matters to us more than our own survival. However, our actions do not seem to align with this insight,
considering for example the case of climate change; by emitting greenhouse gases we in fact pose a threat to humanity. The value of a flourishing future on the one hand and our destructive behavior on the other do not seem compatible and ask for a deeper understanding of their relationship. How can we explain, if the future of humanity constitutes meaning to us today, that we do not do a better job at taking care of it? Meaning in life will be defined as an independent good that can function as an internal motivation to guide one’s actions. It requires meeting a subjective as well as an objective element and therefore, a feeling of active engagement with projects of worth. The arguments by Scheffler and several other philosophers subsequently show in which specific ways the future of humanity constitutes meaning; through enabling the experience of self-transcendence, a healthy mental life and providing purpose to our life-projects. Therefore, the future of humanity is
theoretically of interest to everyone alive today. However, this theory may be flawed, as it is possible to imagine scenarios where meaning is found without the perspective on a future of humanity, undermining its constitutive value. Nonetheless good reasons remain to transfer Scheffler’s insight to our actions. To understand why we do not manage to do so several other challenging factors have been found. Firstly, the threat of climate change possesses specific traits impeding our motivation to act. Additionally, societal influences shape us in ways that can weaken our concern to care for the future of humanity, mainly by inducing feelings of alienation or individualism. But also, psychological tendencies offer defense mechanisms that do not cohere smoothly with a clear view on the value of the future of humanity. Lastly, as meaning in life is an intrinsic motivator, misaligning our actions from what is best for us may be best explained through the intrinsic impediment of weakness of will – with which many of the other challenges discussed converge. It is concluded that a complex mix of
competing factors challenge our care for the future, even though good reasons and potential to overcome them remain throughout.
Table of contents
Introduction 1
Part 1 Meaning in life and the future of humanity 3
Chapter 1. What is a meaningful life and why is it relevant? 3
1.1 Meaning in life 3
1.2 Theories of meaning in life 5
Chapter 2: How does the future of humanity relate to meaning in life? 8 2.1 Can caring for the future of humanity be considered meaningful? 8 2.2 General argumentation on how the future of humanity constitutes meaning 9 2.3 Specific ways in which the future of humanity constitutes meaning 12
2.3.1
Precondition for self-transcendence 122.3.2
Precondition for a healthy mental life 142.3.3
Precondition for our projects to have purpose 16Part 2 Why do we not take better care of the future of humanity? 18
Chapter 3 – Argumentation reasons 19
3.1 Alternative afterlife conjectures 19
3.2 Gap theory and action 23
Chapter 4 – Impediments to caring for the future 26 4.1 Impediments based on the nature of the climate problem 26 4.2 Societal impediments weakening our self-transcending concern 29 4.2.1 Corrupted self-transcendence 29 4.2.2 Societal influences on our mentality 30
4.3 Psychological impediments 33
4.4 Weakness of will – Akrasia 34
Conclusion 38
1
Introduction
In 2013 Samuel Scheffler published his work Death and the Afterlife, posing the future of humanity as constituting value for everyone alive today. By analyzing the characteristics of human valuing and the reactions we are likely to hold towards the prospect of humanity’s end, Scheffler shows that the future of humanity matters to us in itself, and in fact, that it matters more to us than our own survival. This insight is what Scheffler calls the ‘afterlife conjecture’. The future of humanity as a precondition for meaning has a hidden character, and with the afterlife conjecture Scheffler has brought this insight to light again. Yet, the topic has been of interest within philosophy for longer and there have been others proposing that living a value-laden life may in many - often invisible - ways depend on the prospect of humanity continuing. As living a life in which value holds place is
something generally desired and perceived as a strong motivational force to guide one’s actions, we could expect – based on the theory – that we would make significant effort for the flourishing future of humanity. Intriguing then, is the come-together of this debate within philosophy and
simultaneously the increasing pressure on the issue of climate change through which we are in fact posing a threat to humanity. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, established under the United Nations to provide an objective view on climate change and its impacts, shares that since the 1950s an unambiguous warming of the climate system and sea level rise has been observed as effects of climate change and that anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions, leading to unprecedented levels of carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere, are “extremely likely to have been the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century” (p.4, IPCC, 2014). Moreover, the observed effects will continue for hundreds of years, even in the hypothetical situation that greenhouse gas emission would stop entirely, but our (in)actions will determine whether and how much the risks, irreversibility and magnitude of the effects will increase. Lastly, the effects of climate change are unevenly
distributed, and the effects are “generally greater for disadvantaged people and communities in countries at all levels of development” (p.13, IPCC, 2014). Taking all of this together, makes the problem of climate change a case out spanning nations as well as generations. Considering the widespread impact of climate problem and our active contribution to it, as well as the debate on human valuing related to a flourishing future, this thesis aims to investigate how these observations interact. Do we have good reasons to care for the future of humanity from the perspective of living a meaningful life? And if so, why does this not show in our actions?
As the question has a twofold character, the thesis will similarly consist of two parts. In the first part, I will focus on how exactly the future of humanity constitutes meaning. In order to do so, chapter 1 aim to define meaning in life, followed by an elaboration on why it is important and how it can function as a motivational force. I will end with a theory on meaning that will be used throughout the rest of the thesis, setting a framework for thinking about a meaningful life. Then, in chapter 2, meaning in life and how it relates to the future of humanity will be explored in more detail. I will summarize Scheffler’s work and place it in wider literature by bringing up several other philosophers who made valuable contributions to the discussion. The chapter will end with specific ways in which meaning in our lives depends on the future of humanity.
In the second part of the thesis I will explore more extensively why we do not necessarily act on the insight that a flourishing future is so meaningful to us. Chapter 3 will present a critical lens to the theory proposed. What if there are flaws in Scheffler’s argumentation, and meaning could be found without the future of humanity? This would take away the constitutive value of the future as well as our motivational reasons to care for it. However, it will become clear that good reasons
2 remain to care for the future of humanity. Chapter 4 will therefore consider the different factors that may challenge us to do so. They will stem from the specific nature of climate change and societal as well as psychological influences. The impediments presented are selected on their relevance in relation to the theories posed in the first part of this thesis and aim to provide an overview on the complexity of the matter. This thesis will then be concluded with a focused discussion on weakness of will as a final explanation for our impeded concern towards making the future flourish.
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Part 1 – Meaning in life and the future of humanity
Chapter 1. What is a meaningful life and why is it relevant?
The search for meaning in life has a far reaching historical as well as culturally interest and is generally considered something desirable (Metz & Zalta, 2013). To start with the investigation of how and why this is the case, some common psychological perspectives on meaning in life will be touched upon in this chapter. Subsequently, it can be wondered what it entails to ask for meaning in life and how one can conceive it philosophically. To find an appropriate philosophical framework for meaning here, I will use the method of reflective equilibrium as coined by John Rawls (1971) in his search for the principles of justice, which aims to find a coherent balance between our judgements and the theoretical principles and requires reflection and potential adjustment of both. Therefore, some common intuitions about meaning will be highlighted first, to bring them into decent coherence with the theoretical framework afterwards. In this chapter, the analysis of meaning in life will be narrowed down to the main philosophical structures that have been developed in the 20th century, although these frameworks of thought are rooted in centuries of philosophical thinking.
1.1 Meaning in life
Why is meaning in life important?
Psychologists as well as philosophers have suggested that experiencing meaning in life is a
fundamental aspect of human nature, which is closely tied to human behavior and emotions and that therefore “the problem of meaning is an urgent question in human existence” (p.3, Debats, 1996). In psychology for example, experiencing meaning is included in Maslow’s (1971) five-stage model of hierarchy of needs which is still referred to when thinking about the functioning of human
motivation. It poses that one first has to satisfy the basic needs or deficiency needs, before one can get engaged with the higher-level needs such as self-actualization, including being aware of meaning in life and personal purpose. Once these are met however, they form strong motivational force for the individual to guide their actions and experience fulfillment, and it becomes just as important for the individual to meet them as meeting the basic needs such as “sunlight, calcium or love” (p.206), without which one simply malfunctions (Maslow, 1962). Yalom (1980) argues similarly for the inevitable need to experience meaning, in his case to be able to deal with life’s given yet confronting end which can induce high levels of anxiety of nihilism and meaninglessness; “the human being seems to require meaning. To live without meaning, goals, values or ideals seems to provoke considerable distress. In severe form it may lead to the decision to end one’s life" (p.422, Yalom, 1980). Meaninglessness, most psychological frameworks seem to agree on, leads to consequences that we univocally long to prevent such as depression and persistent feelings of apathy and boredom, as well as a loss of motivation to act and the ability to stir one’s actions (Maddi, 1967). And in a similar way, experiencing meaning provides senses of satisfaction, fulfillment and purpose, as well as it encourages motivation to act, pursue valuable ends and guide behavioral decisions (Debats, 1996). These fundamental arguments from psychology seem to provide good reason to assume that
meaning in life is a basic human need and something to strive for as well as a direct candidate to provide motivational force to guide people’s behavior. Before moving on to the relation between
4 meaning in life and the future of humanity, let us first investigate from a philosophical point of view what a meaningful life is and how we can think about looking for meaning.
What does it mean to ask for meaning?
Within philosophy, meaning is often interchanged with significance or importance, and a meaningful life is also referred to as the good life. To demarcate what these concepts have in common it is helpful to consider what the question to meaning does not implicate. For example, two concepts closely related but to be carefully distinguished are happiness and morality. Robert Nozick’s experience machine, which poses the choice of entering a machine which guarantees to provide happy experiences without realizing one is in a machine after entering, infamously managed to highlight that for many people, meaning in life is about more than plain happy experiences (Nozick, 1974). Also Susan Wolf in Meaning in Life and Why it Matters (2010) starts off by clearly stating that we can “understand[ing] meaningfulness as an attribute lives can have that is not reducible to or subsumable under either happiness, as it is ordinarily understood, or morality” (p.3), and she specifically notes that meaning is precisely what is often left out in philosophical inquiry to how one should or would want to live. What is moral is often regarded as meaningful and what is meaningful may
grant happiness, yet there are plenty examples of considered meaningful activities that lie outside the realm of morality (e.g. making great works of art) as well as outside the realm of happiness as ordinarily understood (e.g. sacrificing self-interests to accomplish a meaningful project). Therefore, the search for meaning can be considered as standing independent from the quest to happiness and morality.
What are our intuitions about meaning in life?
In Philosophical Explanations (1981) Robert Nozick compares the question about meaning in life to asking for the meaning of a word, which usually refers to either another word or an object in the physical world, just as asking for meaning implies asking how it “connects up to what is outside it” (p.601). This represents an intuitive idea that meaning is found through connecting to a ‘bigger’, or perhaps more appropriate, ‘other’ value than oneself, such as contributing to a project that may enhance the lives of people and causes beyond one’s direct self-interest. This notion has also been referred to as self-transcendence, the need for individuals to connect to something outside one’s self. The term comes back in psychological literature as well, and Maslow (1971) added the term in later works to his pyramid of needs recognizing self-transcendence as the motivation to be selfless and to help other things and persons to flourish. Henry Frankfurt (1971) introduced the ‘Wanton’ to illustrate a similar point: as humans, we are not merely seeking an accumulation of satisfying our ‘wants’ but gain meaning from transcending our immediate desires for longer term purposes, to become different from what we are right now or to do good. Additional to this going beyond the self, reigns the insight that this ‘other’ than self might have to be a good kind of other; thinking about a meaningful life, we would most likely find it easier to imagine someone like Mother Theresa than someone like Adolf Hitler, although both devoted their life to something other than themselves1.
Lastly, it seems just as intuitive that a life devoted to merely aspects beyond one’s self-interest is not meaningful either. If for example mother Theresa would dedicate her life to helping
1There are philosophical theories arguing against this intuition, such as Henry Frankfurt’s defense of
5 others without in any way feeling connected to this activity for herself or an internal motivation to pursue it, it creates the impression that some meaning is lost for her. It is therefore not unimaginable that there are certain goods internal to a person (e.g. autonomy or integrity) which are prima facie considered good “candidates for meaning” (p.146. Metz 2001). Intuitively then, it seems that both a life solely focused on one’s self-interest as well as a life merely dedicated to external values would not be able to constitute a meaningful life, and that both are relevant in evaluating one’s meaning in life. To find the reflective equilibrium, let us now explore the theories which could coincide with these insights.
1.2 Theories about the meaning in life
Sisyphus; an introduction to different views on meaningAn influential work questioning meaning and highlighting some relevant aspects is Richard
Taylor’s Good and Evil (1970) discussion of Sisyphus. Taylor’s (1970) approach to identify the core of meaning is to search for its opposite; an epitome of a meaningless life. The myth, originally used by Camus (1942) to describe the absurdity of the human condition, goes that Sisyphus is doomed to a life of rolling big heavy rocks up a hill, only for it to roll down and having to do it again; an endless, difficult and pointless act. According to Taylor, the fact that the task is difficult and endless is not what makes it meaningless: even if the task would become easy and have an end it would lack meaning. The reason it portrays meaninglessness is the pointless-ness specifically; the task amounts or contributes to nothing. In turn, if it is imagined that the work would amount to something (e.g. an important and beautiful monument on top of the hill) the task and Sisyphus’ life would regain its meaning. Taylor here continues to compare human life to the case of Sisyphus and argues that we human beings repetitively live our lives which, both on the individual and grander scheme of things, are not directed at and do not amount to anything at all. Another way to insert meaning to this story is to imagine Sisyphus filled with a grand desire to roll rocks up a hill for no further reason, if we imagine that Sisyphus would desire nothing more than that, his life may feel “filled with mission and meaning” (p.24, Taylor, 2010). This is according to Taylor an irrational or perverted meaning that does not in fact make Sisyphus’ life meaningful but at least is a way to create a sense of meaning from within, which Taylor suggests is the only thing we can do as humans.
Subjective view on meaning
With Sisyphus, we already touched upon two different potential approaches as to what provides meaning; a subjectivist approach, which holds that meaning depends on the specific individual and her mental states, and the objectivist approach, suggesting there to be invariant conditions that are inherently meaningful independent of whether the individual believes that to be the
case. The pure subjectivist would agree with Taylor that if it truly was Sisyphus’ desire to roll up rocks, his life would be meaningful. Henry Frankfurt (2002) for example argues that someone’s life is
meaningful for oneself (note again the distinction from morality) to the extent that this person cares about something, as caring or loving “possesses intrinsic value” to the individual independent of the object being cared for (p.246). Additionally, subjectivist philosophers suggest that a meaningful life is one closely connected to expressing one’s deepest self and that a meaningful life is bound to be an authentic one, “affirmed and supported by one’s deepest level of reflection and feeling, naturally different for every individual” (p.239, Frankfurt, 2002). For example, Christine Korsgaard (1996)
6 explains this true self, or deep identity, to be “the description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking” (p.102). And Bernard Williams will view this expression of deepest self as “the condition for one’s having an interest in going on at all” (p.197, Calhoun, 2008).
Objective view on meaning
This approach is criticized on its ability to include cases where one’s interests or activities are, despite being in line with one’s desires, regarded as pointless, trivial or even harmful; if someone cares about activities or objects that harm others it is argued relevant to make distinction between what is worthy of love and what is not (Wolf, 2002). Therefore, objectivists would not consider Sisyphus’ life
meaningful even if it was his deepest desire to do what he was condemned to do, because rolling rocks up a hill has no objective value. Mind that the objectivist approach does not necessarily exclude the value of subjective experiences but does not consider them sufficient for meaning. Therefore, this view searches for objective conditions independent of the specific agent constituting meaning. For example, it has been considered objectively meaningful to pursue inherently meaningful ends such as beauty, creativity or friendship (Railton, 1984, Taylor, 1987), to measure meaning to the extent it brings forth beneficial consequences on others (Singer, 1996) or to connect to values beyond one’s own limits of value (Nozick, 1981). The objectivist view however has again trouble overarching all activities, states and experiences that make a life meaningful, and specifying which ends are objectively meaningful for anyone has been an unresolved attempt (Metz, 2001).
Hybrid view on meaning
Considering the complications of both the subjective as well as the objectivist account, some philosophers consider it more plausible to hold a less distinct subjectivist or objectivist view on a meaningful life and a rather ‘hybrid’ view that recognizes both. Susan Wolf (2010) observes the value of both a subjective and objective element in finding meaning when she comes to say that “meaning arises from loving objects worthy of love and engaging with them in a positive way” (p.8). She claims that acts out of love cannot be captured under rational egoism or practical reasons, which Wolf (2010) identifies to be the dichotomy in philosophical models of human psychology, yet they play a “distinctive and important role in our lives” (p.6). At the same time, this condition does not suffice, and therefore Sisyphus who loves to roll rocks does not suddenly live a meaningful life. One also needs to connect to something outside oneself, beyond direct personal interest, that is worthy of love and has value outside of the subject, which is where the objectivist view comes in. The view is best summarized when Wolf (2010) suggests that “meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective attractiveness” (p.9). This way, meaning can be summarized to consists of two elements matching two popular general views on living a meaningful life (in italics):
1. An internal (or subjective) element - related to the common notion that in a meaningful life, one needs to feel to some extent connected to oneself. Wolf calls this the “fulfillment view”. Do what you love.
2. An external (or objective) element - related to the common notion that in a meaningful life we contribute to something other than ourselves. Wolf’s calls this the “fitting fulfillment view”. Contribute to something worthwhile.
7 The remaining challenge is to identify whether or how the objective element of the theory could be judged, and the hybrid view is far from bulletproof. Yet, it roughly captures the two intuitive ideas about meaning in life mentioned earlier and provides a good framework to refer to the leading lines of philosophical thinking about meaning that I have tried to capture.
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Chapter 2: How does the future of humanity relate to meaning in
life?
Thus far we have explored the strong human need to live a meaningful life, from a psychological as well as a philosophical point of view. Additionally, a sense of what a meaningful life is as well as a framework of thinking about meaning has been provided based on philosophical literature on the topic. The attempt was to bring the theory in line with common intuitions about a meaningful life and it has been concluded that there seem good reasons to view a meaningful life to consist of a
subjective as well as an objective element. Bridging these insights thus far to the problem of climate change, I aim to briefly touch upon whether caring for the future can be considered meaningful, to then investigate if, and in what ways, the future is constitutive of meaning.
2.1 Can caring for the future of humanity be considered meaningful?
Based on the abovementioned framework of meaning, the first challenge in answering this question is judging whether the activity can be regarded as being objectively worthwhile, as there has been no consensus on how to do so and there may simply not be a singular view on what provides meaning. Therefore, Metz (2001) has suggested that rather than discarding them altogether, the values may more appropriately be found through family resemblances. If we take together the several intuitions about what is objectively of value, even if the elements separately are not all-encompassing, we may find good reason to consider caring for the future as objectively worthy. Wolf (2010) herself mentions several of these intuitions about the objective value, such as activities that are considered useful, challenging, or that involve “engagement with social or political causes” (p.37). She concludes that what seems to be the minimal requirement is that the project or activity needs to have, at least partly, a source of value outside oneself in order to exclude activities purely focused on self-interest which cannot inspire meaning. The future of humanity and the well-being of the planet seems to be a fitting candidate for such a source of value. The activity of caring for the future clearly amounts to something independent of one’s individual attitudes towards it; it will enhance the well-being of future people and the planet. This way, comparing the project of caring for the future to the story of Sisyphus, the activity contributes to something other than the self. Whether this ‘other’ is valuable is still challenging to determine and the requirement may be too minimal. Yet, considering that what we would be contributing to is the well-being of many people over time seems to make the project quite worthy of love; many people benefit from it, even if we do not know them yet.
But, even if we assume caring for the future of humanity as objectively worthwhile, the subjective element of meaning is not automatically met as a consequence. Of course, it could be imagined that someone feels connected to the climate problem and internally longs to take care of the planet and the future of humanity. That scenario would provide a perfect fit for meaning matching the fitting fulfillment view and shows that caring for the future of humanity could be considered a meaningful project. However, it could also be imagined that someone does not experience the subjective attraction towards caring for the future specifically. What if, for example, someone loves to perform classical music enjoyed by many people; this is an entirely different project that could provide meaning to the individual by meeting both conditions. Such an example seems to show that as long as we do not assume that everyone loves caring for the future of humanity, that even though doing so would be a candidate for providing meaning, it is not necessary for meaning. So far then, we cannot claim that meaning in life will provide deeply rooted motivation to care for the
9 environment. It could simply be the case that for the plurality of humans the subjective element of meaning is found elsewhere.
What are preconditions for meaning?
On the other hand, there may be pre-conditions that allow the experience of meaning in the first place, and therefore, relevant for everyone. Just as in Maslow’s pyramid one cannot reach the level of self-actualization if one does not have access to the first level of basic needs, there may be certain conditions without which one cannot achieve a meaningful life. An example of such a condition often discussed in the philosophical debate is our own mortality. A way to investigate whether this
condition is constitutive of meaning is to wonder whether we could live a meaningful life without it, say, if we were immortal. If it is concluded an immortal life is a meaningless one, that implies that we
need mortality for meaning, and can consider it a pre-condition for the good life2.
In a similar vein to the meaning of mortality, we could wonder whether the future of humanity is constitutive for meaning as well, by trying to imagine whether human beings could live meaningful lives without the perspective of an ongoing humanity. If the conclusion would be that we cannot, it seems automatically implied that everyone, in order to be able to experience meaning which we continue to regard as desirable, needs the future of humanity, or in other words: that the perspective of an ongoing humanity is constitutive for meaning. There are several philosophers that have taken exactly this approach, and in order to understand better the relation between a
meaningful life and caring for the future, their work will be analyzed in depth in the next section.
2.2 General argumentation on how the future of humanity constitutes
meaning
The theory that the perspective of an ongoing humanity is constitutive for a meaningful life has been suggested very directly by Samuel Scheffler in Death and the Afterlife (2013). Scheffler’s approach was to inquire what happens to our values and experienced meaning if we imagine that the
perspective on an ongoing humanity is taken away. The book was received as rather groundbreaking and opened a new debate within philosophical discourse, recognizing the usually hidden importance of the future of humanity for us to experience meaning. However, the topic has been touched upon by others before Scheffler, and I will include two of them because even though these works used different starting points and terms, the common ideas neatly overlap or complement Scheffler. These two works are Why care about the future? (1980) by Ernest Partridge and Self-Transcendence and
Vicarious immortality (1992) by David Heyd. I will first summarize the argumentation for the value of
the perspective of an ongoing humanity for a meaningful life by these three authors, to then distill three specific ways in which according to the literature, the meaning in life hangs from this
perspective.
2This approach is taken by Bernard Williams in The Makropulos Case: Reflections on the Tedium of Immortality
(1973). But this is not the only perspective. For example, John Fischer argues in Why Immortality is Not So Bad (1994) for the possibility of a meaningful, yet immortal, life.
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Partridge
In Why care about the future? (1980) Partridge argues that we can, and after applying Rawls’ principle of stability, ought to care for future generations. With this, Partridge’s starting point is the meaning for us to act upon caring for the future, rather than inquiring the constitutive-ness of the perspective of a future for meaning. This is what makes Partridge’s text specifically interesting for our discussion in part 2, but he also brings forth the importance of the future of humanity for meaning. Most importantly, Partridge states that we severely impoverish our lives if we do not care for future generations. Partridge recognizes caring for future generations as a form of expressing
self-transcendence, a way to extend oneself over time through valuing and contributing to projects that lie outside oneself, which he considers a fundamental aspect of a meaningful human life. Inherent to the concept of self-transcendence lies the hope for these projects and values to continue after one’s own death and such self-transcendence is based on the implicit assumption that humanity will continue after one’s death. To make this argumentation apparent, Partridge suggests a thought experiment of the world vanishing in a 100 years’ time and argues that most of us would be majorly affected by the idea even though it would not affect us or even our children directly. Therefore, caring for the future according to Partridge is not some abstract rule that ought to be followed, rather, is a natural consequence of any meaningful human life. This is reflected through what he calls the law of
import transference; if something matters to a person (which follows from the human need for
self-transcendence), one will perceive that thing as objectively valuable as well (transfer importance to it), and longs to care for it. Partridge strengthens his argumentation for the value of self-transcendence by showing that one would lose meaning in life if transcendence is lacking; without
self-transcendence, a person will not be able to live a meaningful human life and either come to suffer from alienation or from narcissism. This is also called the paradox of morality: it is good for me, to care for more than myself. In short, Partridge illuminates that we are not only morally obliged to care for future generations, but also need it in order to experience personal well-being; if humanity would cease to exist, self-transcendence would be made impossible, and our efforts would become
pointless and our lives impoverished.
Heyd
In Self-Transcendence and Vicarious Immortality (1992) Heyd takes a different starting point when asking the metaphysical question ‘what is the value of value’? Heyd takes on a person-affecting view, holding that unless we rely on a grander framework than life itself which can value human existence from an external point of view (such as a divine force), we cannot say there is value of human beings, rather, there may be ways to create value for human beings which Heyd poses to be
self-transcendence. He presents two ways to give self-transcendence expression, either through procreation or though partaking in life-exceeding activities. Both of which are forms of vicarious immortality: outliving oneself through someone, or something else and creating value “in the sense of making the world a place in which value is at all applicable” (p.213, Heyd, 1992). It is of value for human beings then to both sustain a generation chain, the procreation of preconditions of value (human beings), as well as to feel part of a chain of generations, “an awareness of the temporal extension as a precondition for the meaning of human life” (p.222, Heyd, 1992). Thus, the perspective on an ongoing humanity as well as actively engaging in sustaining that, allows for meaning in our lives, even if the lives of human beings all together may not have meaning.
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Scheffler
In Death and the Afterlife (2013) Scheffler refers to the afterlife as the notion that humanity will continue after we die. The first part inquires what the role of the afterlife is for meaning in our lives today. In order to bring forth the value of this afterlife, Scheffler conducts a thought experiment what would happen to our lives without the perspective on an ongoing humanity, consisting of three doom-scenarios.
Doom- scenario 1: humanity ceases to exist 30 years after our own death.
As it is expected that most of us would be, with understatement, negatively affected by this scenario Scheffler highlights human valuing to be:
1. nonexperientialist (independent of our own experiences)
2. nonconsequentialist (independent of the sum of good/bad consequences) 3. conservative (we long to sustain what matters to us)
Considering these dimensions, Scheffler concludes the afterlife to matter to us in its own right.
Doom-scenario 2: only our loved ones die 30 years after our own death.
The second scenario rather highlights how the afterlife matter for us. The strong emotional reactions we would have confirm the conservative dimension of valuing, but also that we long to personalize our relation to the future through relations with the people that outlive us.
Doom-scenario 3: the infertility scenario, everyone becomes infertile
The last scenario strengthens again the value of the afterlife in its own right, by showing that even without the horror of the sudden disappearance of humanity or the premature dying of people we love, we would still be negatively affected by the perspective. Scheffler (2013) expects that “people would lose confidence in the value of many sorts of activities, would cease to see reason to engage in many familiar sorts of pursuits, and would become emotionally detached from many of those
activities and pursuits” (p.153). Rather than explaining why this happens, Scheffler emphasizes that the likelihood that it happens tells us something about the value of the afterlife. Whether this is justified as well as why these reactions would be triggered is something we will return to.
At this point in the book, Scheffler introduces the Afterlife Conjecture, capturing his main conclusion; the afterlife grants meaning to our lives, to such an extent, that it matters more to us than our own survival. In the following chapter Scheffler elaborates on how the existence of the afterlife forms a fundamental framework that allows for value to have a place; valuing depends on the afterlife through our confidence in the afterlife, the actual existence of the afterlife and the justification to judge things of their value depending on the afterlife. It is concluded when thinking about
dependency of future generations on us, that in fact: “what is salient, is not their [future generations] dependence on us but rather our dependence on them” (p.79). To experience meaning therefore, we may need the perspective of an ongoing humanity, now, rather than that the ongoing humanity needs us, later.
The last part of the book concerns the importance of our own death for the meaning in life and argues that the temporal dimension of our individual life is another precondition to experience value. Mortality allows for our lives to have stages, to which we relate most of our successes and failures, and a life without concepts related to death would be inconceivable. He concludes that it is
12 therefore not unreasonable to fear death (it ends our meaningful life) and to simultaneously realize that death is a precondition for a meaningful life (a precondition for value to exist).
Bringing these insights together makes for a paradoxical insight; our own death threatens the meaning in life much less than the end of humanity. In fact, our own death makes life meaningful, whereas the absence of the afterlife would make all meaning disappear. Yet, we seem to fear our own death much more than the end of humanity. Scheffler argues that it is therefore not unreasonable that we fear death (even though it is a necessary condition for a meaningful life), but it is
unreasonable that we do not fear the end of humanity as such.
2.3 Specific ways in which the future of humanity constitutes meaning
Scheffler seems to identify two main ways in which the perspective of an ongoing humanity constitutes meaning in life. First, without the perspective on an ongoing humanity our attitudes to many things change for the worse. This is the attitudinal dependency thesis, stating that the attitude of confidence in the afterlife constitutes our attitudes in general. Secondly, without the perspective on an ongoing humanity many things simpliciter lose value. It seems that the worth of much of what we do and care about actually depends on the existence of the afterlife, therefore calls the evaluative
dependency thesis and Scheffler argues that we have good reasons to do so (the justificatory
dependency thesis). Comparing this analysis to the general framework of meaning earlier discussed, it
seems that the perspective on an ongoing humanity is necessary for both the subjective element (things may no longer matter to us) and the objective element (thing might no longer matter simpliciter) of meaning. Below I will outline the three major ways in which these elements are affected without the perspective of an ongoing humanity.
2.3.1 Precondition for self-transcendence
We have seen that a meaningful life requires human beings to connect to something ‘other than self’ such that lives purely focused on self-interest and momentary pleasures of Frankfurt’s ‘Wanton’ are excluded. Similarly, the literature arguing for the importance of an ongoing humanity recognizes that precisely what is threatened without the perspective on an ongoing humanity is the possibility of self-transcendence. Let us therefore analyze the concept of self-transcendence and how it is affected by the perspective on an ongoing humanity a little further.
Partridge (1980) defines self-transcendence as the basic human need to “identify with, and seek to further the well-being, preservation, and endurance of communities, locations, causes, artifacts, institutions, ideals, etc., which are outside themselves and which they hope will flourish beyond their own lifetimes” (p.78). Heyd (1992) refers to self-transcendence as the “capacity to choose conversions or voluntarily undergo gradual changes in our personality, that is to say the power to go beyond what we are, albeit on the basis of what we actually are” (p.214). The latter definition is less clearly related to outspanning one’s lifetime or caring for something beyond the self, although later in his text this does seem to be implied. For example, when the first expression of self-transcendence, begetting children, is discussed, Heyd (1992) speaks of self-expansion as “an attempt to extend one's existence, a guarantee for a kind of continuity of the self beyond its individual-biological bounds” (p.213). Additionally, when describing the second way to give expression to self-transcendence through partaking in life-exceeding activities, Heyd (1992) states that “first-person
13 identity is constructed through the mediation of collective values and goals, which involve both communal and temporal extensions” (p.219).
From these two text, it appears that caring for something that is not oneself, can take place in two ‘directions’:
• Sideways-driven self-transcendence: caring for something that is not oneself in the present time, often during one’s own lifespan.
• Forward-driven self-transcendence: caring for something that is not oneself over time, including beyond one’s own lifespan.
It is clear, that without the perspective on an ongoing humanity, the forward driven
self-transcendence is made impossible; what we care about and long to sustain beyond our own lifespan will be devoid of perspective. One could wonder whether the sideways driven form of
self-transcendence would remain stable as we could imagine to still care about things other than ourselves in our current lives. However, by illuminating the conservative dimension of valuing Scheffler shows that we generally long to sustain what we care about. Additionally, upon describing the law of import transference, Partridge observes that if something matters to a person, the person will also feel that this something matters intrinsically and long for it to flourish as well as endure over time. With these arguments, it seems to be implied that caring for something other than self during one’s lifespan, automatically implies caring for this something over time and beyond one’s lifespan. Therefore, perhaps the two directions of self-transcendence cannot be strictly separated, in which case the perspective of an ongoing humanity is a precondition for self-transcendence in general, without which our lives become devoid of meaning.
It can be observed, that both Partridge and Heyd use self-transcendence as a starting point to argue for the importance of an ongoing humanity, whereas Scheffler rather comes to conclude it. In Scheffler’s (2013) words, the doomsday scenarios reveal “our willingness to harness the resources of instrumental rationality to pursue goals whose achievement will occur only after we are gone” (p.27). ‘Willingness’ is of course quite a different attitude than viewing self-transcendence as a basic human need to experience meaning, yet, Scheffler implies throughout his book that this going beyond one’s lifespan is most certainly a precondition for meaning. Scheffler does not deny that sideways-driven way of expressing self-transcendence can be meaningful by itself, but under the doomsday scenarios - in which theoretically only the forward-driven self-transcendence vanishes - Scheffler suspects the sideways-driven self-transcendence to be affected as well. He expects that the “imminent
disappearance of human life would exert a generally depressive effect on people’s motivations and on their confidence in the value of their activities” (p.43, Scheffler, 2013) and wonders what would be left to for us to value in our current lives without the perspective on an ongoing humanity.
It seems therefore that for Scheffler self-transcendence depends entirely on the existence of the afterlife. Rather than self-transcendence in itself directly providing meaning, such
as Partridge and Heyd describe, self-transcendence is the hidden umbrella under which much of what provides meaning to our lives exists, including activities and projects that theoretically could provide meaning within our own lifespan only (e.g. listening to a music performance or engaging in
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2.3.2 Precondition for a healthy mental life
So far it has been argued that without a perspective on an ongoing humanity, we lose the ability to experience and express self-transcendence and with that, meaning in life. Partridge takes the
consequences a step further, and argues that without experiencing or expressing self-transcendence, we impoverish our lives and affect our mental health, resulting in either alienation or narcissism. He argues that a well-functioning human being is expected to feel a natural need to sustain and ensure the well-being of what one loves through to the law of import transference. Similarly, Scheffler highlights through the doom scenarios that we do not go unaffected, under conditions of good mental health, by the faith of things and people we care about. Partridge (1980) writes this
experiencing and expressing of self-transcendence to be “as important for mental health, as exercise is for physical health” (p.81), it leads to our ability to connect our inner world (feelings of care, meaning, love) to the external world (ideas, projects, people we want to sustain). According to Partridge, experiencing self-transcendence should automatically make us act on caring for the future of humanity, by making us active builders of the world, and wanting to be active builders of the world. Note that a bridge from the perspective of an ongoing humanity to acting upon caring for it is touched upon, which is why we will come back to this argumentation in part 2 as well.
Alienation
A first consequence of lacking the experience of self-transcendence and meaning in life posed by Partridge is alienation. Alienation comes with no longer feeling oneself to be the active creator of one’s life, experiencing a lack of control over one’s life, and a loss of connection to one’s own unique self. Partridge gives the example of a factory worker who is controlled by machines and systems that show no relation to his personality, skills or values, and who is treated as a small part in a bigger chain that he can only obey. In such a case “there is no feeling of a personal contribution to grand projects” (p.84, Partridge, 1980) and with that, alienation is the direct counterpart of self-transcendence. For our mental health it is important to feel connected to one’s self, to experience a kind of ‘whole-ness’ which leads to commitment and purpose. Just as love is described by Erich Fromm as “the union with someone, or something, outside oneself, under the condition of retaining the separateness and integrity of one’s own self” (p.85, Partridge, 1980), it seems to be argued here that one cannot engage with the world in a meaningful way if the sense, or integrity, of the self is lost.
Alienation portrays again why meaning should be kept separate from for example morality, as Wolf (2015) emphasizes that in the case of alienation one can still be performing worthwhile activities but does not feel actively engaged. Therefore, she argues that living a meaningful life “is not just a matter of having projects (broadly construed) and actively and somewhat successfully getting through them. The projects must engage the person whose life it is” (p.9, Wolf, 2015). This reminds us of the previously discussed need for a subjective element; to feel connected to oneself as well as to something outside of oneself. In Losing one’s self (2008) Cheshire Calhoun points out that not every part of one’s identity is equally important, but that there are fundamental parts of our identity that provide us the motivational force to go on. This fundamental or deep-identity is described by Christine Korsgaard (1996) as the "description under which you value yourself, a description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking" (p.102). Calhoun (2008) illuminates that the expression of this fundamental part of ourselves needs
background conditions, and if those are disrupted, one may “lose the only self one wishes to have” (p.202) and with that, the willingness to go on. If we feel alienated and disconnected from this true or
15 deep self, we lose the subjective element of a meaningful life and the ability to meaningfully engage with the world as a consequence.
Narcissism
Whereas the alienated feel detached from their inner self and lose interest in connecting to
something other than self through apathy, the narcissist cares but only about the self. The narcissist lacks the ability to relate outwards (to express self-transcendence) and experiences a deep sense of emptiness, therefore the narcissist needs external factors for acknowledgment and lives an “almost parasitic existence” (p.85, Partridge, 1980). The narcissist does not properly ‘transfer import’ from the inner world to the world around her. A consequence is that the idea of one’s own death or degradation of one’s life can reach unbearable heights. The inability to relate out will cause death to feel as true annihilation which cannot be soothed by the vicarious immortality of the self over time and physical locus. Whereas Partridge (1980) describes alienation as a potential result of external factors, narcissism seems to be a cause by itself, and with that, the “essence of all severe psychic pathology” (p.85). Yet, it is also described by an attitude of “living for ourselves” without a sense of historical continuity (p.86, Partridge, 1980), and it could be wondered if in a less psychopathological form this experience may be enhanced by, or at least related to, external factors such as the
individualistic culture we live in. Without the ability to relate out, the objective element of meaning gets lost as one only lives for her own interest, and a second way to lose meaningful engagement for the world.
The text makes apparent that self-transcendence is constitutive for meaning in life, and the lack of it relates to either a lost sense of whole-ness and connected-ness to self (alienation), or a lost sense of connection to others and things outside oneself (narcissism). It is unclear in what order things take place. Whether feelings of alienation or narcissism, or the loss of self-transcendence, also take away our reasons to care for the future is something we will come back to in part 2.
Fear of death
A third way in which the absence of the perspective on an ongoing humanity may greatly affect our mental health is by the inability to relieve our fear of death. There are many theories on why people fear death, such as fear of the experience of being dead or of the process of dying. But one of the main sources may be the disappearance of the very ‘I’, the person having feelings, thoughts and fears in the first place (Scheffler, 2013, Williams, 1973). ‘Nothingness’ of death induces a sort of fear or panic that cannot be compared to any other fear we know during our lifetimes. This may be as understandable as perplexing, because if one is no longer exists, the person including all her fears will be gone, so why would we fear an experience that we cannot even be part of? Epicurus captured this point clearly when he stated that “as long as we exist, death is not with us, but when death comes, we do not exist. It does not then concern either the living of the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more” (p.84, Scheffler, 2013). This observation is still considered the starting point for the discussion of and the fear thereof for many philosophers. Yet, many people experience the fear of death to be immensely strong and cannot be calmed by Epicurus’ statement.
What may relieve this fear instead, as the literature discussed suggests, is to create a sense of immortality through self-transcendence. If one dies but lives on in the memory of people still living, in ongoing or finished projects left behind or by his or her values to continue through a community, the fear of annihilation can be decreased. Scheffler specifically explains this effect under the notion
16 of “personalizing one’s relation to the future” (p.35), making sure the future is a not an alien place, but rather one where one can still be imagined and where one’s values and relationships live
on. Heyd adds to this point by proposing the generation chain, the sustenance of the preconditions of value through begetting children, as the first form of vicarious immortality. There is something Darwinian about his approach; we create value in our lives by ensuring the survival of either our genes or our values, and ideally, both. Additionally, the continuation of humanity may relieve fear of death by providing the possibility to feel that one’s life has mattered through the eyes of others. Without the perspective on the afterlife and the ability to become, even vicariously, immortal, or feel that one’s life mattered, it could be expected that besides the effects of the impossibility to create value, the fear of death may rise to previously unknown extends.
2.3.3 Precondition for our projects to have purpose
Besides the effects on our subjective experience of meaning when the perspective on an ongoing humanity is dismissed, there are also ways in which the things we do in fact, or simpliciter, lose meaning. Any project, community, institution or tradition that has goals and expectations beyond one’s own lifetime, which are precisely the kind of things we long to contribute due to the human need for self-transcendence, would lose their purpose without the prospect of such a future. Think for example of performing scientific research, planning a city’s infrastructure or building a community around a sport. As such endeavors would lose the prospect of reaching their goal, even though this goal may be achieved very far in the future, Scheffler (2013) notes three possible consequences (p.22-23). We might:
1. lose reason to engage in the project
2. start to feel emotional detached from the project 3. lose our belief that they are worthwhile in the first place
Even projects that do not seem to be directly goal-oriented, for example scholarly or creative projects, would lose their value according to Scheffler, because such projects are usually still undertaken with an imagined future audience in mind. One could say that this is wrong, and that such projects should derive meaning purely from the experience of conducting them in the present lifetimes. Instead, Scheffler suggests, the likelihood that we would be affected, even when we are engaged with not purely goal-directed projects, should be taken as an indication of the strong influence of the perspective on an ongoing humanity for any of our projects.
What about ‘life projects’ such as friendship, or love? Again, rather than finding ways in which the future of humanity may not matter as much, Scheffler highlights how almost everything of value to us is implicitly dependent on the afterlife. He describes that friendships for example “are normally nourished by the engagement of each of the
participants with valued activities, interests, and pursuits outside of the friendship itself” (p.54, Scheffler, 2013) and are usually viewed as “having a certain place in a human life as a whole” which includes the future of humanity (p.55, Scheffler, 2013). Viewing human life as a whole includes the “implicit understanding of such a life as itself occupying a place in an ongoing human history, in a temporally extended chain of lives and generations” (p.43, Scheffler, 2013). Heyd makes a similar observation that human life as a whole does not stop at the edge of one’s lifespan but is always embedded in a future and a past when he brings forth his chain of generations. Human beings look
17 for meaning not through reaching immediate pleasure, but pursue higher order ends such as art, science and virtue which typically require a cumulative effort and, as Heyd (1992) quotes Edmund Burke, a partnership "between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born" (p.220).
Additionally, the lack of a perspective on an ongoing humanity is likely to affect the objective value of procreation, Heyd’s first form of vicarious immortality. Making sure one’s values survive and to create the conditions for value through sustaining the generation chain, seems to lose purpose without a perspective of an ongoing future. Externally, there may be no better or worse in humanity ceasing to exist, but from the human point of view, the objective value of creating value by getting children, will be lost. Lastly, Scheffler argues that even remaining meaningful activities theoretically independent of the afterlife such as “the enjoyment of nature; the appreciation of literature, music, and the visual arts; the achievement of knowledge and understanding; and the appetitive pleasures of food, drink, and sex” (p.42, Scheffler, 2013) would be threatened under the doomsday scenarios. Just as Heyd (1992) predicts that the end of humanity would “cast a grave shadow on the ability of the last generation to invest its life with meaning” (p.221). There may remain certain things
objectively valuable and not dependent on the afterlife, such as the alleviation of pain. Yet, it seems that what is left to continue to matter without the perspective of an ongoing humanity, is to say the least, insufficient to live a value-laden life.
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Part 2 – Why do we not take better care of the future of
humanity?
In search for what might motivate us to care for the future of humanity, specifically in relation to the climate problem, we have investigated the potential role that meaning in life might play as such a motivational force. Meaning in life has been observed as a basic human need that is generally
something to strive for. It has been established as a good independent of morality and happiness that consists of a subjective as well as an objective element. Caring for the future, from this perspective, could be considered a meaningful activity but not a necessary one to experience meaning. However, even if individuals do not feel subjective attraction to caring for the environment, the second chapter has presented philosophical argumentation on why and how the perspective on an ongoing humanity is constitutive for meaning. A flourishing future of humanity allows for self-transcendence, for a healthy mental life and for our projects to have purpose. From this argumentation, it can be
concluded that everyone needs the perspective on an ongoing humanity to enable the possibility to live a meaningful life.
In order to investigate why, then, this does not necessarily show in our behavior, I will first view the argumentation thus far through a critical lens in chapter 3. If it turns out that the value of the afterlife is not as constitutive for meaning as argued by Scheffler, this would have direct
consequences for why we do not feel motivated to care for it. However, even if good reasons to care for the future may remain, it is not granted that the transfer from theory to our actions takes place, and Chapter 4 will provide an overview of factors impeding this transfer.
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Chapter 3 – Argumentation reasons
If ‘alternative afterlife conjectures’ could be imagined under which we can find meaning despite the knowledge that humanity will end in the near-by future, this would drastically take away the
foundation to claim that the future of humanity is essential for meaning. It could still be the case that the doomsday scenarios would change the things we value and that meaning would have to (partly) be found in new ways, but they may not impoverish meaning altogether. At the same time, our current value system – including an outlook on the future – might function best to sustain meaning as we know it, and therefore we may still hold good reasons to protect and sustain it and to bridge the gap between theory and action. This chapter will consider both these lines of thought.
3.1 Alternative afterlife conjectures
Could different reactions be imagined when performing Scheffler’s thought experiment?
Scheffler’s method is based on an analysis of our intuitions about the doomsday scenarios. Without these intuitions, the subsequent conclusions about the constitutive value of the perspective on an ongoing humanity cannot be drawn. Additionally, Scheffler explains “our” to represent his own attitudes “and the attitudes of any other people who share them”, and presumably “common enough to be of interest” (p.18, 2013). So, even though Scheffler’s line of thought is not hard to relate to when reading, within this thought experiment different reactions could be imagined as well and when one does so, attitudes differing from Scheffler’s could plausibly be found. Note that such alternative thoughts can equally not be claimed as proof. The problem of predicting human behavior through thought experiments remains challenging, specifically considering a topic so far from our real-world experiences. Wolf (2013) specifically points how “ill-equipped we are to make reliable judgments about this” (p.114). Yet, as the result of the thought experiment directly relates to status of the constitutive value of an ongoing humanity, I consider it valuable to investigate other – for some more likely – reactions we might have to the doomsday scenarios.
A story that relates to such an alternative while reading Scheffler’s lectures comes from the book Veronika Decides to Die (1998) by Paulo Coelho. The plot concerns a young girl who has everything generally desired in life but nevertheless does not feel the point of it all and attempts suicide. However, the attempt fails and she is saved, waking up to a psychiatric hospital, where she is told she will die within a week because of the damage her attempt has caused. While in the mental institution, Veronika realizes she no longer has anything to lose, as she is going to die soon and is surrounded by ‘crazy people’ anyway. This perspective liberates her from fears concerning what people think of her, from being criticized or having to behave a certain way that does not feel worthwhile or real to her. As a consequence she starts to feel deeply rooted emotions like love and hatred and experiences a new type of internal freedom. Paradoxically, she starts to feel alive. By the end of the week it becomes clear that her doctor was performing an experiment on her; Veronika is not going to die and is perfectly healthy, but he shook her back to life by giving her the conviction that death was imminent. The bottom-line of the story converges well into the popular quote that “communal madness is called sanity”.
Transferring this line of thought to the doomsday scenarios, perhaps a similar chain of events can be imagined. Considering Veronika’s reaction, admittedly also an imagined scenario that may be no more ‘proof’ than Scheffler’s proposal, we could conceptualize a world where people would stop feeling inhibited by worries and activities that do not truly provide meaning to them, and are able to
20 surrender to everything that is left and still worth living for. As Scheffler mentions, there are certain projects that would lose value (specifically goal-directed projects), but what about the category of activities and values that are less directly dependent on the afterlife, such as creative and scholarly projects, relationships, appreciation of music or nature? Scheffler categorizes these as affected, either because they implicitly do depend on the future (e.g. future audiences) or because the doomsday scenario “exert[s] a generally depressive effect on people’s motivations and on their confidence in the value of their activities—that it would reduce their capacity for enthusiasm and for wholehearted and joyful activity across a very wide front” (p.43, 2013). Yet, it is not really clear how this reaction precisely arises, except for the fact that knowledge about the end of the world would naturally be shocking.
I propose two alternative ways in which this could be imagined. In the first place, as mentioned, perhaps people could still find meaning in their lives, or even feel enhanced meaning, under the doomsday scenarios, may it be in different forms than before. Secondly, Scheffler may underestimate the human ability to adjust to new – however dramatic – situations. Let me shortly elaborate on both.
Could meaning upsurge in times of despair?
As Veronika’s story suggests, on an individual level there is potential for meaning to wave in times of despair. This general thought can be recognized as well in the reflections upon our own individual deaths. As Scheffler highlights, awareness of one’s own end “exerts a profound and pervasive influence on their other attitudes and motives” (p.83, 2013). Specifically, temporal scarcity of individual lives functions as a “circumstance of value” without which human valuing ceases to exist (p.99, 2013). Scheffler notes that this phenomenon cannot hold for the mortality of humanity, so to speak, as humanity is not a unified individual that receives value from temporal scarcity. What is not considered however, is the possibility for individuals to find meaning, may it be in other ways, under the doomsday scenario. The four commentators of the book - Susan Wolf, Henry Frankfurt, Seana Shiffrin, and Niko Kolodny - whether it be to different lengths, point to this possibility as well.
Most elaborately, Wolf (2013) suggests the possibility that we gain an awareness of being “all in this together” leading to a motivation to care and comfort each other, in similar ways that “we have shown ourselves so ready to lavish on our dying or despairing relatives and friends” (p.122). As we would have no lack of resources because we are the last generation[s] on the planet, we could invest everything into helping each other reconnect to the beauty of life, and with that, help ourselves. Wolf (2013) specifies, that indeed this may not generally be considered a happy life, but that it could still be a meaningful one, and that “the very idea that things matter relies on a valuing community (of more than one), but that community need not have a future—that it have a past and a present would be enough” (p.124). Similarly, Frankfurt (2013) is skeptical about Scheffler’s notion that all human valuing is dependent on the afterlife. Some things, he writes, “are important to us in virtue of what is intrinsic to them, or inherent in them, and their importance to us does not depend on anything either spatially or temporally outside themselves” (p.133). Frankfurt has in mind not just alleviation from pain, as Scheffler mentions, but also music, art, intellectual activity and friendship.
Comparable to Veronika’s story, Frankfurt (2013) also coins the possibility that some things might matter to us more than before: “faced with a global catastrophe [..] we might very well be moved to stop wasting the time left to us, and to repair certain patterns of behavior into which we had lapsed when we thought we had plenty of time left” (p. 135). Jason Gray (2017), upon reflecting on Scheffler, sees the possibility of heightened meaning as well, just as “seeing someone for the last
21 time before they are likely to die enhances the value of your visit with them”, some aspects of life such as appreciating beauty and a feeling of togetherness, may only become stronger (p.644). Additionally, humans tend to generally crave bringing things to a good end (Johansson, 2015). Rather than becoming detached from projects, it is plausible that “[we] would be anxious to make sure that they get a reasonably good ending” (p. 190) and that “it is hard to see why we would not largely be caught up in trying to give them [the things we care about] a good ending. Indeed, this might be considered an engaging project in itself” (p.191, Johansson, 2015). It could be argued then, that despite the inhibition of forward driven self-transcendence, the sideways-driven self-transcendence could still account for meaning, and that that the loss of the former does not guarantee the loss of the latter.
These suggestions do not deny that part of what we value will change, and that something like finding a cure for cancer may no longer provide enough meaning. Therefore, to claim that what we value stays intact seems rather extreme3. Yet, it may be another extreme to claim that meaning will disappear altogether, and in Scheffler’s proposal it may be underestimated how malleable human valuing can be.
Could people adjust more than expected to drastic changes?
Losing the perspective on a future will affect us, as we can no longer feel we are “builders of the future” (p.79, Partridge, 1980) or part of an “ongoing stream” (p.120, Wolf, 2013). In Wolf’s words, this perspective would “profoundly shift our understanding of what we have been doing; it would shake the foundations on which the meaningfulness and value of these activities rested” (p.120, 2013). Yet, Wolf also notes that this unsettlement may not be permanent, and we may be able to adjust to and eventually come to accept our new faith. Within psychology, the “human ability to adapt in the face of tragedy, trauma, adversity, hardship, and ongoing significant life stressors” is a well-known phenomenon usually referred to as resilience (p.227, Newman, 2005). The ability to thrive despite negatively impactful events, has been shown to be a universal concept that almost everybody can adopt when faced with a challenging situation. Additionally, there is a considerable amount of body highlighting the human tendency to evaluate the future and the past overly
optimistic, rather than accurately or dwelling on negative aspects. This is known as the optimism bias, and considered “one of the most consistent, prevalent, and robust biases documented in psychology and behavioral economics” (p.944, Sharot, 2011).
In line with these psychological insights, it seems possible that despite the horror of the knowledge that the world will end, humans may be able to move on and make an effort to make the best out of it, just like we are capable upon individual deaths. Indeed, Blumenthal-Barby (2016) states that in line with Wolf and Frankfurt, humans have “resilient psychological immune systems. Things depress us, but we eventually get over it, move on, and return to baseline—this is the case even for tragic things such as the looming deaths of ourselves, our loved ones, or all of humanity” (p.90, Blumenthal-Barby, 2016). So, is not unlikely that upon re-establishing oneself after the shock of the doomsday scenario, what provides meaning might change. We have already seen Wolf’s suggestion, for redirecting project to the comfort and care of others. Gray (2017) also expects our projects to change and proposes that trying to combat the end of humanity is probably the most valuable and
3 This is something Frankfurt argues when suggesting that even goal-oriented activities, such as trying to find a
cure for cancer, may stay valuable, as they involve processes that to some may be rewarding in and off themselves
