The responsibility to protect : a study of the doctrine’s compatibility with the EU’s security identity

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University of Amsterdam

Graduate School of Social Sciences

MSc Thesis in Political Science

The Responsibility to Protect: a study of the doctrine’s

compatibility with the EU’s security identity

Megan Black

11364645

Supervisor: Mr Rocco Bellanova Second Marker: Dr Dimitris Bouris

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Abstract

In a world with disintegrating borders and increasing state interdependence, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) appears to be a natural progression in international security policy. The concept was first adopted in 2001 by the ICISS Report on the Responsibility to Protect as a response to the long list of humanitarian atrocities which plague the conscience of the international community. Such a commitment to protect all individuals subject to genocide or starvation is in line with the rhetoric of both the UN and the EU and has been accepted by every Member State of the UN, including its special observer state; the EU. However, the EU’s capacity to fulfil the obligations which occur as a result of its acceptance is in question. This is because it has created and projected a security identity which is based upon the principles of normative power.

Accordingly, this thesis will examine the EU’s normative security identity and address the EU’s obligations under the Responsibility to Protect in order to determine to what extent they are coherent. To do so, Manners’ Normative Power Europe theory will be used alongside careful analysis of EU legislation, policy documents and obligations provided by the UN Charter and the UN’s security policy.

In doing so, this thesis will demonstrate that the EU has created a highly normative security identity which acts as a legitimising mechanism for its external action, and that this identity cannot be maintained whilst fulfilling the duties R2P demands of its members. Thus, the EU’s struggle between fulfilling its R2P duties and maintaining its security identity creates a risk of diminishing its legitimacy.

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1. Introduction

1.1 The Responsibility to Protect

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is a UN endorsed concept which has been universally acknowledged since the 2005 World Summit and is on its way to becoming a component of customary international law (Eaton, 2011 p766). R2P was first endorsed in 2001 in the Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on The Responsibility to Protect (ICISS Report)1_{but it only achieved international acceptance} through the Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit (UN General Assembly, 15th September 2005). The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document states that:

“We are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organisations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleaning and crimes against humanity” (World Summit Outcome Document 2005, para 139).

This binding declaration marked a universal commitment by states and regional organisations to intervene when a state fails to protect its people, thus marking the transformation of international law into a normative framework centred around protecting common human and community interests. R2P is a particularly interesting concept to study because it addresses the relationship, power disparity and power overlap between the EU, the UN and NATO (Zyberi and Mason, 2016, p457). Because the doctrine finds its authority in the UN Charter and the UN World Summit Outcome Document, the UN is the founder, guardian and commander of the doctrine. The EU, however, has been at the forefront of the promotion and execution of the duties administered by R2P. It has done so through effective use of its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) which consistently adheres to the international humanitarian laws prescribed by the UN.

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1.2 The EU’s R2P Implementation Mechanisms

Every EU Member State and the EU as a collective body has acknowledged the importance of and their support for R2P. The EU first endorsed the doctrine at the point of its inception at the UN World Summit in 2005 and further expressed its commitment to its promotion in the European Consensus on Development in 2005 (European Commission, 2005), in the European Security Strategy in 2003 (Council of European Union, 2003) and the Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy in 2008.

The ratification of the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 created the capacity for the creation of the CFSP. The CFSP is a framework, upon which the EU builds common principles and guidelines on security issues, undertakes joint actions and commits to common strategic approaches. The European Council heads the decision-making process of the CFSP and is in control of the identification of strategic interests and objectives for the EU’s external action (Devuyst, 2012, p330). This is a logical organisation of power as the European Council is composed of the heads of state of each of the EU Member States (Devuyst, 2012, p327). Seeking to play a more active role in global security, the Lisbon Treaty harnessed this power to establish the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy (Lisbon Treaty, art 9A). This Representative is the head of the Foreign Affairs Council and the European External Action Service, and therefore responsible for the implementation and representation of CFSP decisions. The CFSP was expanded through the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which is integrated into the CFSP and covers defence, military and civilian crisis management aspects of EU policy. It gives the EU the power to intervene outside the EU for civilian and military crisis management missions and operations, aimed at peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening of international security (Wessel and Sari, 2013, p126). Although the CSDP possesses military elements, it is essential to note that in practice, most CSDP missions have been civilian in nature. These are the mechanisms through which the EU exercises its humanitarian intervention obligations, and is, therefore, intrinsic to discussion of the EU’s interaction with R2P.

1.3 Research Problem

R2P’s workability has come under much scrutiny in the past and the inaction of the Security Council has been criticised time and time again (Hehir, 2013). Debate surrounding the doctrine has further intensified in recent years in response to Security Council deadlocks over

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the Syrian conflict (Adams, 2015). Such deadlocks are proof of the unworkability of the current UN system and this has raised the question of what role regional organisations could play in aiding the smooth implementation of the doctrine into international security policy (Kabau, 2012). In 1993, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, noted that “regional action as a matter of decentralization, delegation and cooperation with the United Nations effort” had the potential to ease some of the burden on the UN (An Agenda for Peace, 1992 No. A/47/277). The EU’s capacity to integrate R2P is, therefore, integral to any debate on the doctrine. A responsibility to protect grounded upon humanitarian concern and with the aim of protecting human rights would appear to be in accordance with the EU’s founding principles because its normative character has the capacity to render it the ideal actor to fully operationalise R2P (Evans, 2008). However, its lack of concrete commitment to the norm suggests that the EU is, in fact, not well suited to the implementation of such a norm.

The security identity the EU has established for itself finds its roots in normative power theory (Manners, 2002). This theory establishes the EU as an ideational actor who enjoys ‘power over opinion’ through the attractiveness of its norms (Ibid., p239). This theorisation of the EU as a normative power will be fully explained in the theory chapter. It will be relied upon throughout the research to show how the EU’s normative actorness EU disallows it from engaging in policy which is diffused by coercive means. Because the EU has portrayed itself in such a normative manner, its legitimacy relies upon maintaining an approach which is in accordance with its normative identity. Thus, when this principle is breached, the EU risks becoming a militarised institution and its identity, and legitimacy are lost (Diez, 2013). This calls into question the EU’s capacity to operationalise R2P.

It is apparent that the EU faces a dilemma between its commitment to its identity as a normative actor and its desire to be a global security actor which plays an influential role in international crises (Zwolksi, 2012). Subsequently, the intention of this research is to analyse the relationship the EU has with R2P and how it balances its identity as a non-military actor with the duties the doctrine demands. More specifically, its purpose is to determine the extent to which R2P is compatible with the EU’s security identity. This will be done by asking the following research question:

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‘To what extent does the EU’s security identity allow it to fulfil its Responsibility to Protect obligations?’

1.4 Structure of Research

In order to effectively answer this question, the research will be split into four sections. The first section will provide a methodological and a theoretical background as well as a brief analysis of the scientific literature which is closely associated with the debate. Within this, Normative Power Europe (NPE) will be thoroughly discussed in order to set the stage for the first empirical chapter which evaluates the EU’s security identity. This discussion of a European security identity provides insight into what the EU is capable of achieving in terms of international security policy and the importance of remaining true to its security identity. The next chapter will address the normative capacity of R2P so that the qualities of the doctrine and the security identity established in the previous chapter can be compared in order to determine whether they are compatible. The third and final empirical chapter addresses what R2P obligations the UN has entrusted the EU with and what obligations the EU has suitably integrated into its security policy. The results of the data analysed in this chapter will correspond with the capacities identified in the two preceding empirical chapters, and ultimately show that the EU has incorporated neither strict, nor comprehensive R2P obligations into its security policy because its security identity does not allow it to do so.

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2. State of the Art

Because this research question is multifaceted in that it deals with both EU security and an international humanitarian doctrine, the literature base which must be addressed is broad. Accordingly, this chapter will discuss key contributions from EU studies as well as from international law works. To make the analysis of the literature more digestible, it has been organised into themes, each of which overlap to a greater or lesser extent. The analysis will begin by discussing the unworkability of the doctrine, then literature on the EU’s security identity will be addressed. This will be followed by addressing the role of the EU in the international order through a normative power perspective. These themes are connected in that they each relate to the role of the EU in the global order. The discussion of the following literature will set the stage for clarifications and expansions required later in the thesis.

2.1 The Unworkability of the Responsibility to Protect

A large proportion of R2P literature focuses on the reasons why the doctrine has not been incorporated into international security policy at the rate predicted at the time of its inception. This new wave of analysis surrounding the unworkability of R2P is a step forward in its study of R2P which was solely interested in the normative and legal grounding of the doctrine in the past (Bain, 2010). Whilst the normative understanding of R2P is of great importance, the doctrine’s unworkability is of particular importance because it is upon the belief that R2P’s implementation has not been successful that this research is founded. Accordingly, the following section will discuss key international security contributions which addresses its unworkability.

Roland Paris (2014) acknowledges the importance of normative and legal analysis of R2P but stresses that the practicalities surrounding its implementation have not been adequately addressed. He argues that the structural problems of humanitarian intervention make such military operations too difficult to fully implement R2P. He identifies the mixed motives problem, the counterfactual problem, the conspicuous harm problem, the end-state problem and the inconsistency problem as composing the structural difficulties faced by the doctrine.

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The mixed motives problem explains how decisions to use military force almost always involve a range of motives, including self-interest (Paris, 2014, p573). The counterfactual problem is based on the idea that it is very difficult to determine whether a preventive humanitarian intervention has succeeded. Because of this difficulty, intervening parties rely on ‘counterfactual’ reasoning about what damage may have occurred if the intervention had not taken place. The ‘conspicuous harm problem’ addresses the collateral damage which occurs as a result of military intervention (Ibid., p576). The clarity of the damage caused by an intervention means that they are often judged more by the damage they cause than by the harm they prevent. The ‘end-state problem’ addresses the intervention objective problem which was heavily debated after the 2011 Libya mission. Knowing when to disengage military forces in a crisis zone is nearly impossible and can be a more difficult undertaking than that of protecting the population from mass atrocities (Ibid., p577). The inconsistency problem highlights the disparity in responses to crises. Such disparity can occur as a result of differing perceptions of the urgency, nature or degree of the threat, thus resulting in international disunity on whether to intervene (Ibid., p578). He concludes that these structural problems cannot be definitely resolved and so reliance upon R2P is likely to backfire on the interveners and on the doctrine’s legitimacy (Ibid., p593).

Aidan Hehir (2013) further demonstrates the unworkability explained by Paris (2014) in his article ‘The permanence of inconsistency: Libya, the Security Council, and the Responsibility to Protect’ (Hehir, 2013). In this article, he analyses the 2011 decision to launch a humanitarian intervention mission in Libya in order to demonstrate that R2P is unworkable because of the lack of unity among the permanent members of the Security Council (Ibid., p137). Whilst acknowledging that Resolution 1973, which was adopted by the Security Council in 2011 in order to save the Libyan population from the wrath of Colonel Gaddafi, is a solid example of R2P in action, Hehir argues that it occurred as a result of a rare “confluence of interests” (Ibid., p137). The formulation of R2P prescribed by the World Summit Outcome Document 2005 provides that there is no obligation for collective action except when the permanent five members of the Security Council deem it to appropriate to act. As Hehir notes, “the application of R2P is, therefore, ultimately dependent on whether the members of the P5 have a collective interest in- or are at least not opposed to- halting a particular looming or actual mass atrocity.” (Ibid., p152) Because states’ national interests change with great frequency, the likelihood that R2P is always invoked as a result of normative pressure is slim (Ibid., p152). Hehir further explains the predominance of state

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interests over normative pressure in arguing that there has been no case where states have intervened when there were no vital interests at stake (Ibid., p157). This suggests that states will never be able to make an impartial decision which is purely based upon good humanitarian will.

Brockmeier, Kurtz and Junk (Brockmeier et al, 2014) embark upon a new approach to analysing the unworkability of R2P in acknowledging the importance of the EU and its Member States. Their article argues that the divergent security cultures and political goals of Member States is the reason why the EU has failed to fully integrate R2P into its policy. The article analyses the security positions of France, Germany and the United Kingdom as well as the collective position of the EU’s institutions in regard to R2P. In analysing the differing positions, it is made apparent that R2P’s interpretation by Member States are in conflict. France and the United Kingdom support a broader interpretation of R2P than Germany and the EU (Ibid., p451). This shows that whilst European governments and the EU as a united body have a positive attitude towards R2P, they have never had a unified interpretation of its functions. Brockmeier et al acknowledge that the EU has been the only major power to unambiguously support and place emphasis upon the EU’s position at the forefront of debate surrounding the doctrine (Ibid., p430). This, in turn, highlights the gap in the literature where there ought to be more research on the EU’s relationship with R2P.

The above pieces of literature reveal a gap in the literature regarding the role of regional organisations in aiding the integration of R2P. These contributions also highlight a scepticism of R2P which will be harnessed for this research. It will, however, be applied to the context of Europe and identity, rather than political will and state interests.

2.2 European Security Identity

Now that the frequently acknowledged problems surrounding the implementation of R2P have been identified, it is necessary to address the EU’s identity and what it facilitates it to do. In order to answer the research question, the literary debate on European identity must be adequately addressed. These streams of research identify the purposes of identity, how identity is constructed and what kind of identity the EU maintains.

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McDonagh (2014) tackles the question of the EU’s security identity in his article ‘Talking the Talk or Walking the Walk’: Understanding the EU’s Security Identity. In this work, he asks himself how EU security practices construct an identity narrative of the EU as a global actor and provides a convincing argument for security practices being used as an identity formulation tool (McDonagh, 2014). The article begins by acknowledging that identities are not naturally occurring, but are constructed, as “even when based upon ‘brute facts’ as markers of identity, the content and significance or identities only emerge through social interaction” (Ibid., p629). He identifies the ‘corporate identity’ which one projects to the rest of the world and the ‘social identity’ which is dependent on how others perceive us (Ibid., p629). This idea of ‘social identity’ is particularly useful for analysing the EU’s external practices as it allows us to address how the wider world regards the EU. McDonagh utilises examples of missions such as European Union Force (EUFOR) Tchad, EUFOR Althea and European Union Naval Force (EUNAVFOR) Atalanta to fully examine how the EU reveals its security identity through its strategic culture (Ibid., p632). Particular reference is made to the European Security Strategy (ESS) to examine this strategic culture. Identity narratives are identified (Ibid., p633) in the ESS as being ‘Europe as Zone of Peace’ which emphasises the EU’s success in ensuring peace within Europe; ‘Europe as Risk Manager’ which is based on the notion of threat of invasion and explains that the EU is required to ensure its power abroad in order to prevent security threats from developing; and ‘Military Power Europe’ which argues for advancement of both military and political capabilities in order to take effective action when European interests are at risk. An important point made in the article which this research will draw upon is the notion that identities “legitimate or make possible certain course of action or argument while excluding others” (Ibid., p630). This notion of creating and maintaining an identity is furthered by Simmons (2009) who explains that democracies are likely to accept human rights treaties without hesitation because their content reflects the values of equality and protection of fundamental rights, which these democracies are generally based on (Simmons, 2009, p65). Goodman and Jinks (2004) support this in arguing that refusal to accept a norm of such similarity to an organisation’s own principles would be inconsistent with its identity (Goodman & Jinks, 2004, p655).

The emphasis placed upon the idea of a self-made identity being used to legitimate the EU’s security policy practices will be fully explained in the theory chapter and will be relied upon throughout the work.

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Kamil Zwolski (2012) notes the contradiction between the EU’s ‘holistic’ identity and its post- Lisbon security direction. It assesses the friction between the apolitical character of the EU’s external action and its pursuit of a holistic and strategic international security policy. The article emphasises the role of the EU’s strategic direction which was previously discussed by McDonagh (McDonagh, 2014). The Lisbon Treaty created the European External Action Service (EEAS), which brought different powers and assets of the EU under one authority (Zwolski, 2012, p989). This allows the EU to ensure consistency and increased strategy in its international security practices, thus allowing for the development of the holistic approach discussed throughout the article. A holistic approach involves the use of all policy instruments at the EU’s disposal in order to fully pursue a policy objective (Ibid., p992). A holistic approach to security policy therefore, includes the use of military power to achieve the EU’s objectives. Zwolski refers to this attitude to policy formation as the incorporation of military as well as civilian and development policy instruments and notes that it has become a dominant approach (Ibid., p994) This approach is in conflict with the values and principles of the EU, as is noted in the first half of the article which assesses the role of values, principles and norms in European foreign policy and touches upon Manners’ (2006) advocacy of the important role of norms. Zwolski notes that principles are normative propositions which transition values into constitutional standards for policy action (Ibid., p990). It is this emphasis upon the constitutional effect of norms and principles which this research will draw upon to analyse the EU’s security identity.

This article is of particular relevance because it addresses the conflict the EU faces between maintaining its normative identity and furthering its power as a security actor which increasingly appears to demand the use of military power. The tension between the normative foundation of the EU and the changing role of the EU as a security actor is the central focus of this research.

2.3 The role of the EU’s norms in the international order

The literature discussed in the preceding European security identity section touched upon the notion that the EU’s identity has normative roots. Whilst there has been a substantial quantity of literature produced which addresses the levels of integration displayed by the EU and the doctrine’s role in the sovereignty debate, little time has been dedicated to its effect on

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normative governance method which is founded upon soft diffusion of norms. This section will, therefore, examine literature which addresses the EU’s normative grounding and its role in the international order. The notion of an EU founded on normative roots plays a significant role in the research question, so will be expanded upon here and wholly addressed in the theory chapter.

Ian Manners’ 2002, 2006 and 2013 works must be addressed as they are the basis of this research’s understanding of the EU’s role in global governance. His work will be discussed in more depth in the theory chapter which will follow, so this section is merely an introduction to his work in order to provide a background for the subsequent discussion of the EU’s role in global security.

In his 2002 seminal work ‘Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?’, Manners builds upon the concept of Europe as a civilian power (proposed by Duchêne, 1972) to create a theory whereby the EU is portrayed as a promoter of norms which displace the state as the centre of concern (Manners, 2002, p236). Indeed, Manners notes that “the EU has evolved into a hybrid of supranational and international forms of governance which transcends Westphalian norms” (Manners, 2002, p20). This special status is a result of its unique capacity to diffuse norms through the ‘power over opinion’ (Manners, 2002, p239). Contagion, informational diffusion, procedural diffusion, transference, and overt diffusion are identified as the methods of the EU’s norm diffusion (Manners, 2002, p245). Contagion is the unintentional diffusion of the EU’s ideas to other political actors. Informational diffusion occurs because of a wide range of strategic communications. Procedural diffusion occurs as a result of the institutionalisation of a relationship between the EU and a third party. Transference takes place when the EU exchanges goods, trade, aid or technical assistance through substantive or financial means. These means of norm diffusion show the importance of the EU’s role in global governance and the tools available to it to define what passes for normal. Manners defines this ability as “the greatest power of all” (Manners, 2002, p253).

In his 2006 article, European Union Normative Power and the security challenge, Manners responds to challenges to the status of the EU as a normative power in relation to the security challenge which has increased since the commencement of the war on terror. In doing so, he argues that the EU should apply its own normative principles to the security challenge in order to ensure the survival of democracy (Manners, 2006, p405). He acknowledges how the

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EU’s normative identity results in it being perceived as “benign, peaceful, and predominantly non-threatening in character” (Ibid., p407). Whilst this proves the strength of its normative character, it undermines its capacity to provide sufficient security to tackle the current security challenge. Its normative nature has resulted in a desecuritising effect across Europe in the past (Ibid.). There is fear that the increased insertion of military security policy, which has occurred in recent years, is having a negative effect on the legitimacy and perception of the EU as a normative power (Ibid., p409). The CFSP approach of prioritising strategic security over development aid challenges the EU’s human security approach to security (Ibid., p412). This is a concern because “allowing the total war on terror to predetermine the EU’s security challenge will, in the words of Kofi Annan, ensure that in the cases of development, security and human rights, ‘none will succeed’.” (Ibid., p416) Instead, the EU’s normative principles could provide more rounded human security approach to addressing the war on terror.

Manners provides even further insight into the EU’s role in the international community in his 2013 article, European Security Union: Bordering and Governing a Secure Europe in a Better World?. In this article, he examines how security becomes discursively related to borders and governance in EU policy agendas in order to illustrate the unavoidable consequences of ensuring Europe’s security (Manners, 2013, p400). He uses the dimensions of broadening, deepening, thickening, practice and being to demonstrate how the EU’s security policy has related to border and governance processes. This article is of particular interest to the research because of the attention it pays to the ESS when arguing that the EU broadened its security approach in the 2000s to cover both internal and external security concerns (Ibid., p402). It also marks the development with reference to a move towards human security interests (Ibid., p404). The work is so relevant to this research because it highlights the multifaceted nature of EU security questions and how susceptible to change EU security policy is.

In their article Cavatorta and Tonra (2007) argue that in order for the EU to be viewed as a normative power there must be evidence of its influence and successful norm export. The question is explored through the careful evaluation of the EU’s normative impact in the Israeli Palestinian conflict. They note that the EU is dedicated to promoting three core values in its work with the Palestinian Authority: democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights” (Cavatorta and Tonra, 2007, p358). Moreover, they show that “the EU does rely

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heavily on the values it was founded on and the norms it developed over time to devise its foreign policy in the region” (Ibid., p356). Thus, the EU’s foreign policy is driven by fundamentally normative values and the policies deriving from the internalisation of norms may be identity driven (Ibid., p361). This clearly undermines the rationalist approach and strengthens the shift towards a constructivist one. Constructivist approaches are more concerned with ideas, norms, culture and socially constructed matter in general (Ibid., p349). This approach has seen the EU become increasingly labelled as a normative actor rather than a rational one (Ibid., p350). Cavatorta and Tonra accept this approach and emphasise the importance of the means by which norms are exported. Soft export of norms is the EU’s most significant power but it has demonstrated hard export in its Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy (Ibid., p350) through the use of political declarations, sanctions, trade and aid deals, peacekeeping missions and diplomatic intervention. The article also notes the difficulty in analysing the EU’s role as an international actor, as because it is not a traditional international organisation or a state (Ibid., p351) there is no direct comparison available against which to measure the EU’s international capacity.

2.4 Conclusion

The scientific literature which has been discussed in this section provides an insight into the multidimensional nature of any international security question. Because the research question deals with the operationalisation of an international norm by a regional organisation, works which address each dimension were included. The research will thus, draw upon each of the themes which were addressed in this State of the Art. Of particular importance to this research are the security identity and normative power works which will shape each stage of the analysis.

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3. Theoretical Framework

This thesis examines the extent to which the EU’s security identity is compatible with the requirements of the Responsibility to Protect. In accordance with the previously discussed scientific literature, the research will be carried out through a Normative Power lens (Manners, 2002). To begin this theoretical discussion, it is essential to begin by analysing the international community’s shift from a state centric approach to security to the current dedication to human security focused policy (Den Bowe and de Wilde, 2008, p10). From here, the chapter will provide an understanding of normative power theory (Manners, 2002) by discussing its emergence as well as the various interpretations and criticism which have been developed since the theory’s inception (Ibid.). In doing so, the chapter will clarify the appropriateness of Normative Power Europe (NPE) and set the stage for the evaluation of the EU’s normative security identity which will follow.

3.1 Human Security

The end of the Cold War saw a transition to a world where territorial integrity was less at risk and has accordingly resulted a shift away from reliance upon Westphalian sovereignty to debates led by human security concerns (Owen, 2004, p377). This new approach to security policy has evolved in both practice and in international relations theory (Newman, 2009). Owen acknowledges human security’s status as an analytic, theoretical tool and as a security mandate (Owen, 2004, p376). Its acceptance by both the academic community and international organisations has resulted in state-centred views of security losing their importance and the citizen becoming the source of interest instead (Owen, 2004, p374). The move towards the citizen as the source of concern is of particular relevance to this thesis because normative power is the product of a lasting commitment to human security approach.

The term ‘human security’ was popularised by the UN Development Programme in its 1994 Human Development Report (Human Development Report 1994). The UN Human Development Report is the primary point of reference for defining human security. It defines it as “the security of people through development not arms; through cooperation, not confrontation; through peace not war” (Human Development Report 1994, p6). The core of the concept is therefore, that the object of security should be individuals rather than the state. Chapter 1 of the report ‘Human Security Now’ reaffirmed human security as the goal “to

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protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfilment” (Human Security Now Report 2003, p4). It is this idea of human protection which provides the capacity for R2P to be internationally accepted. Such emphasis on human rights and fundamental freedoms also renders human security “a normative proposition that challenges conventional assumptions about security” (Newman 2016, p1165). Because of the normative nature of human security, it creates a humanitarian responsibility to bring security practices in line with international standards of human rights protection. Human security, normative power and R2P are, thus, all interlinked concepts.

Another result of placing individuals at the core of security interests is that the importance of territorial security is reduced. Consequently, a lack of emphasis upon territory reduces the distinction between domestic and international security (King and Murray, 2001, p588). King and Murray have noted this in their description of the rise of human security as a “unifying event” (Ibid., p589) because it rids the international community of the state-centric definitions of security that have previously hindered multi-party cooperation. According to these researchers (Ibid.), it represents a move towards collectively decided ethical standards which overrule domestic laws and principles and the collective acknowledgement that human security is the international community’s responsibility. It is this unified approach and popularisation of collective action for the maintenance of peace and protection of human rights which found the UN and EU, and which foster concepts like R2P.

The concept of human security has made a considerable contribution to debates around humanitarian intervention and domestic security matters as it contributes to a broader reconceptualization of security. It offers universal protection of individuals, so is in tune with the humanitarian norms provided by international law, and as explained by Jackson and Sorensen (2010), questions of human rights and intervention are normative in nature. Thus, R2P and normative power are intertwined with the concept of human security. It is, therefore, an umbrella concept, under which other concepts can lie, and will be considered throughout the thesis.

In conclusion, because the core of human security is protection of individuals, the approach is the basis of both normative power discussions and the source of R2P’s moral foundation. R2P is, therefore, an intrinsic part of the human security debate.

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3.2 Manners’ Normative Power Europe

The notion of a Normative Power Europe (NPE) was first proposed by Ian Manners in his seminal work of 2002 (Manners, 2002) which took the debate out of the narrow confines of military and civilian power (Duchêne 1972). He defines normative power as the following:

“The notion of a normative power Europe is located in a discussion of ‘the power over opinion’… and the desire to move beyond the debate over state-like features through an understanding of the EU’s international identity” (Manners, 2002, p239)

In this context, ‘normative’ means the power of logic and provides a standard of ‘appropriateness’, rendering the EU with the ability to set the global standard of normality with complete absence of force. According to Manners, this ability “to define what passes for ‘normal’ is ultimately, the greatest power of all” (Manners 2002, p253). In this article Manners (2002) uses the EU’s historical background, hybrid polity and political-legal constitution to explain its normative character. Reference to the EU’s distinct historical context stems from the fact that the EU was created in the aftermath of World War II in a time which rejected nationalism and embraced advances in human rights and anti-genocide protections (Ibid., p240). It is this war-torn history which gives the norms such binding force and which provides moral pressure for actors to adopt the EU’s founding norms (Ibid., p241). This unique image is furthered by the more multidimensional model of global politics the EU provides. It does so through its historical context, hybrid polity and its political-legal constitution. Such hybrid polity is shown through the EU’s role as a supranational, international and domestic actor. The third normative aspect of the EU is its political-legal constitution. Because the EU’s constitution has largely occurred as a treaty based legal order, its constitutional norms play a significant role in forming its international identity (Ibid., p241). These three aspects of the EU’s normative character are of particular importance because they stress that the EU is a unique institution which can neither be compared to a state, nor to other international organisations. Failure to acknowledge this unique status has been the downfall in many theorisations of the EU (McKay, 2005)

The content of the previously discussed political-legal constitution is also intrinsic in Manners’ development of a normative identity. He states that the EU’s projection of a normative self is constructed around five core norms; peace, liberty, rule of law, democracy

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and human rights (Manners 2002, p242) whose promotion have remained at the centre of the European agenda since the EU’s inception (Treaty of Amsterdam, Art 6). Manners makes reference to the Copenhagen Criteria (Maastricht Treaty, art 49) to demonstrate the normative “constitution and practices of the EU” (Manners, 2002, p242). The Copenhagen Criteria are the conditions and principles which must be adhered to in order for a state to gain accession to the EU. They demand the possession of institutions which guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities. The previously identified humanitarian norms are thus, present in the EU’s integration policy too. A constitution based upon such humanitarian norms and their continual promotion gives the EU a normatively different basis for its relations with the world (Ibid., p252). It promotes the EU as a liberal ‘force for good’ and has been fundamental in its reputation and integration policy for the past twenty years. The humanitarian nature of the norms creates a moral pressure for others to follow its lead, thus allowing the EU to diffuse its soft power through its identity rather than through its actions.

It is this discussion of the EU’s identity which forms the starting point for a discussion of the EU’s capacity to promote R2P. As can be seen, normative power draws upon the broader strain of progressive thought which promotes the demise of national sovereignty towards a more individual oriented, liberal outlook. This progression towards a more global outlook, rather than the past’s state-centred approach is also where Human Security theory finds its roots.

3.3 Variations of Normative Power Europe

Since 2002 there has been a great deal of work published which attempt to provide clarity to NPE theory. The contributions made by Diez, Birchfield and Forsberg will be addressed in order to decipher the understanding of NPE which will be developed through the research. These variations of normative power have been chosen because they make reference to legitimacy which will be discussed in the identity formation section of this chapter and because of the reference made to multilevel governance which is present in R2P mandated missions.

Diez (2005) develops Manners’ conceptualisation of a uniquely normative Europe by arguing that the formulation of the theory constructs a divide between the EU and the rest of the

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international community. It does so by creating an ‘other’ which is normatively inferior to the EU and ought to be following its example. Diez says that normative power can go alongside other forms of power such as economic and military power but normative power must be irreducible to economic or military power if it is to be a viable theory (Diez 2005, p616). This provides more room for policy manoeuvre than Manners’ original description and would allow for the EU to continue to develop its military power so long as normative action remains the overarching power. Whilst this is arguably a more realistic interpretation of NPE and takes into account the progression of the EU’s policy areas, it has the capacity to allow the EU to move away from its initial mandate.

In Birchfield’s work addressing Normative Power Europe she claims that normative power does not mean that the EU must always act in a normative way, nor that the norms it promotes must always be consistent with its own internal principles (Birchfield 2013). Forsberg continues this less strict conceptualisation by arguing that in order to be a normative power it is sufficient to merely obey international law and rules such as multilateralism (Forsberg 2011, p1193). This would allow for the construction of the military dimension of the EU and suggests that it can act in way which is incompatible with its founding principles but still maintain its normative identity. Such an interpretation of the concept renders the EU subject to the same standards as any other state or international institution which abides by international law. Whilst NPE is focused on what the EU is, rather than what the EU does, actions have a significant impact on what an actor is and actions which contradict a normative identity delegitimise the identity. These interpretations are, therefore, too lenient and are not compatible with the idea of normative power as a legitimation tool.

3.4 Normative Power as Identity Formation

The previous sections of the theory chapter have demonstrated how normative power is not a just a measure of the EU’s actions, but a measure of what it is. It is important not to look at how effective the EU’s security and defence policy is, but to examine how the EU’s security practices create an identity narrative instead. Scholars who support the relevance of a European identity emphasise the links between identity, legitimacy and integration (Camia, 2010, p109). Accordingly, this section offers an analysis of the EU’s formation of a normative identity and the legitimising effect this act has had.

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The normative power rhetoric broadcast by the EU is so strong that an image of the EU as a moral force for good has been accepted by external actors. Because the previously discussed humanitarian norms are established in the founding documents of the EU and are what form the rhetoric of the EU, a normative identity has been formed. As was noted in the first section of this chapter, the EU is a unique institution which has forged an equally unique identity. The uniqueness of the EU’s identity also results from the context of its creation. The European identity emerged as a means of ensuring peace after WWII and was further cemented during the turmoil of the Cold War in order to forge a safe international community. Wæver affirms this context driven identity creation in arguing that the EU has constructed its identity in relation to its own violent past (Wæver, 1996). Its normative identity is thus, a reflexive attempt at conscious identity creation. Bickerton presents this conscious identity formation as a ‘search for meaning’ and notes that foreign policy is a means of aiding identity formation (Bickerton, 2011, p73). The normative identity formation, therefore, acts as a method of creating a new status for the EU through its international role.

The new status given by this conscious identity formation acts as a legitimation tool for the EU’s existence and also for its future policy formulation. Identities are a product of political practices but also act as a constraint on such political practices. They legitimate or make possible certain courses of action whilst excluding others (Milliken 1999, p230). An identity based on morality and the protection of human rights eases the transition from policy formation to execution of objectives. Normative power has therefore, been consciously used as a means of legitimising the EU’s policy, and in particular, its foreign and security policy. Bickerton emphasises this use of Normative Power Europe as a tool to legitimise the EU’s foreign policy in saying that “it is only when the EU can act in the name of an abstract universal humanity that it can escape the charge of bias and hypocrisy” (Bickerton 2011, p32). Whilst the legitimising effect of the EU’s identity formation is beneficial for its foreign and security policy development, it also binds the EU to behave in a normative manner at all times. If EU action is not consistently normative, the EU becomes illegitimate. It is this idea of legitimacy through the projection of a normative power image that will be drawn upon and used to highlight the precarious position of the EU’s foreign policy identity throughout the research.

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Whilst the above arguments show that there are aspects of the EU and its policy which behave in a normative manner, there are valid points which discredit this. Accordingly, this section will provide insight into the critiques of NPE provided by Sjursen (2006).

The normative conceptualisation provides a very idealistic view which disregards the ambition of Member States. Sjursen notes this with her rejection of the idea of a normative power Europe on the basis that it is impossible to come to a rational agreement on accepted norms amongst such culturally diverse states (Sjursen, 2006, p247). Each EU Member State has its own unique domestic political environment and its own political interests. It is, therefore, unlikely that they can make all their EU decisions based purely on normative reasoning. This is perhaps the reason why a great deal of the EU’s policy is no longer related to the initial fundamental rights based norms, but are about trade agreements, the environment and security. Its key policy domains of trade and development, environment and European security strategy suggest that the EU is no longer solely interested in the spread of protection of fundamental rights.

However, whilst the above criticism is well founded, it is important to note that, as previously explained, the EU’s identity is founded upon the rest of the international community’s perception of the EU. Therefore, so long as its self-portrayal is consistent, this rationalist limit is less important.

3.6 Conclusion

In summary, Normative Power Europe is of particular importance to this research because of its explanatory power regarding the EU’s place in the global order and its interactions with other international organisations. Assessing the research question through a normative power lens allows us to discern whether R2P can implement a coercive norm like R2P. The discussion of the different approaches to Manners’ seminal work show the breadth of the theory and highlights the scope it gives for the coming research. Because NPE stems from Human Security theory they will both be utilised throughout the work. It can be inferred from the above discussion is that the EU relies heavily upon its self-made normative image as a means of legitimising its power. It is this notion of identity which will be relied upon but unlike the previously discussed approaches, this research comes from the standpoint that such an identity is judged by both what the EU is and what it does. By applying this interpretation

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of NPE to the R2P and the EU’s CFSP it will be possible to create a more balanced picture of the EU’s capabilities as a security actor.

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4. Methodology

4.1 A Qualitative Approach

Because of the construction of the research question the entirety of the research will be qualitative in nature. Qualitative research is described as ‘a source of well-grounded, rich description and explanation of human processes’ (Miles et al 2013, p4). Bryman echoes this in his description of qualitative research as a “strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of data” (Bryman 2012, p380). This explanatory approach is essential in order to address a socially nuanced humanitarian issue such as the Responsibility to Protect. Its discursive nature also allows for theoretical discussion to be appropriately addressed. This qualitative approach will be operationalized through document analysis and secondary literature analysis. This chapter will explain the reasoning behind the decision to use these methods, and more specifically, why the chosen documents.

4.2 Document Analysis

A study of how European foreign policies are composed in relation to the EU’s security identity will allow us to best understand the EU’s capacity to successfully implement its R2P obligations. For this reason, the research will principally rely upon textual interpretation of policy documents and legislation. Document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents. Its operationalization involves the examination and interpretation of data in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical knowledge (Corbin & Strauss 2008). Glenn Bowen describes document analysis as “a systematic procedure for reviewing or evaluating documents—both printed and electronic (computer-based and Internet-transmitted) material” (Bowen, 2009, p27). Thus, from careful and systematic analysis of the documents detailed below, data will be gathered to present answers to the sub questions provided in each empirical chapter.

This thesis carries out analysis on eleven documents which are detailed in the chart below. The documents are split into groups according to the theme being addressed in each of the three empirical chapters of the thesis. Accordingly, different content will be sought in each

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group of documents. Software is not used to aid data gathering or analysis in this piece of research because of the small number of documents subject to analysis. Instead, a combination of treaties, policy and strategy documents, and declarations are manually analysed. To ensure that the process of document analysis is effective and remains both analytical and empirical in nature, a broad overview ought to be taken where general themes are identified, then any noticeable pattern in the texts should be recorded upon further analysis.

4.3 Table of documents

The following table shows the analysed documents (organised in chronological order) and in what chapter they will be addressed:

Document Name Year Document Type Abbreviation Chapter

Charter of the United Nations (United

Nations, New York) 1945 UN Charter UN Charter 6, 7

The Treaty of Maastricht (Council of the

European Communities, Maastricht) 1993 EU Treaty Maastricht Treaty 5

Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty on the Responsibility to Protect (ICISS, Ottawa)

2001 Report ICISS Report 6

A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, Brussels)

2003 Strategy Document ESS 5, 7

2005 World Summit Outcome (A/60/L.1) 2005 UN Outcome

Document

World Summit

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The Charter of the United Nations, 1945 (UN Charter)

The Charter of the United Nations was signed in San Francisco in 1945 as a foundational treaty for the United Nations following the failure of the League of Nations to prevent World The Treaty of Lisbon: Amending the

Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the European Community (2007/ C 306/01)

2007 EU Reform Treaty Lisbon Treaty 5

Joint Statement on UN-EU Cooperation in Crisis Management (Council of the European Union, Brussels)

2007 EU Press Statement UN-EU Cooperation

Statement 7

Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy- Providing Security in a Changing World (S407/08)

2008 EU Report ESS Implementation

Report 5, 7

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary- General (A/63/677)

2009 UN Report R2P Implementation

Report 7

The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary- General (A/65/877-

S/2011/393) 2011 UN Report Regional Arrangements Report 7

Shared Vision, Common Action: A Stronger Europe- A Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (Concil of the European Union, Brussels)

2016 EU Strategy Document

Global Strategy

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War II. The document set out the principles and purposes of the UN whilst establishing the organisation’s bodies, thus conferring international legal personality upon it. The Charter has now been ratified by almost all of the world’s states and its provisions apply universally. Because of its global reach and role as the principal source of international law, it is considered to be more than a Treaty but less than a global constitution (Fassbender, 2009, p166). Its capacity to provide international law is what makes it of particular relevance for questions relating to R2P.

The Treaty of Maastricht, 1993 (Maastricht Treaty)

The first document of interest is the Maastricht Treaty whose entry into force on November 1st, 1993 established the EU and bound Member States to a process of European integration. Its ratification marked the end of the Cold War and the beginning of a more liberal and integrated international community. It created the three-pillar structure of the EU; the European Community, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Justice and Home Affairs pillar, thus committing Member States to the implementation of a common foreign and security policy. These pillars provided more competences for the EU and allowed for greater integration. The Maastricht Treaty is of particular importance because it confers the limits and powers and the objectives, within which the EU’s security capabilities must remain (Maastricht, TITLE II art 3b). Hence, it is the original source of the EU’s security identity.

ICISS Report on the Responsibility to Protect, 2001

The ICISS was an ad hoc commission which was founded under the authority of the Canadian Government and composed of members of the UN General Assembly. In 2001 the commission wrote the Report with the aim of increasing acceptance of humanitarian intervention by introducing the term ‘the Responsibility to Protect’. It is thus the original source of the doctrine as it is understood today, so must be considered in order to successfully determine the obligations bestowed upon states and organisations by R2P.

The European Security Strategy, 2003 (ESS)

The ESS was adopted by the European Council on 12th_{December 2003 and is the source of} the CFSP’s conceptual framework. The strategy document defined shared foreign policy priorities and made a vow to promote cooperative external action. Because it was drafted as part of the process of defining the external role of the EU it is very relevant in the evaluation of the EU’s international security identity.

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World Summit Outcome Document, 2005 (World Summit Outcome Document)

The 2005 UN World Summit Outcome Document reiterated the ICISS Report’s message and marked the unanimous acceptance of R2P by the international community. This was a crucial moment as it showed global unity on a principle which had previously struggled to gain momentum. It is essential for the analysis of the obligations provided by the doctrine because the definition provided in this document is the one which was universally agreed upon.

The Treaty of Lisbon, 2007 (Lisbon Treaty)

The Treaty of Lisbon which was initially known as the Reform Treaty, was ratified on 13th December 2007. It amended the Maastricht Treaty and provided mechanisms for increasing consistency and coherence of the EU’s external actions. It provided the capacity for the EU to become a security actor and is, therefore, crucial in determining the EU’s security identity.

Joint Statement on EU-UN Cooperation in Crisis Management, 2007 (UN-EU Cooperation Statement)

This statement was made by the Council of the European Union in Brussels on 7th June 2007. It is a declaration of the UN and EU’s mutual commitment to multilateralism and intention to work together in the area of crisis management. Whilst it is a joint statement, it can be regarded as a declaration of the EU’s undertaking of obligations relating to international security and, therefore, R2P. This makes it invaluable for the analysis provided in the third empirical chapter.

Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 2008 (ESS Implementation Report)

The Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy was published in 2008 and is a supplement to the ESS which was released in 2003. The report acknowledges new challenges faced by the EU since the ESS was released and examines what more needs to be done since 2003. Because the report acts as a reinforcement of the ESS it is essential that they are examined in tandem.

Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General, 2009 (R2P Implementation Report)

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The UN’s Report on the implementation of R2P was published as a conclusion of the outcomes of UN conferences and summits which were held after the creation of R2P at the 2005 World Summit. The report acts as an affirmation of UN Member States’ commitment to R2P and it expands on the expectations the doctrine has for participating states. It addresses both coercive and non-coercive action which should be taken for the successful operationalisation of R2P so is highly relevant for the third empirical chapter.

The Role of Regional and Sub-Regional Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Report of the Secretary General, 2011 (Regional Arrangements Report)

Two years after the previously detailed R2P Implementation Report was created, it was supplemented by the Regional Arrangements Report. This was also published by the Secretary- General and acts as a consensus of Member States’ conclusions from the preceding summits and conferences. This report is of particular interest in the third empirical chapter because it makes specific reference to the obligations placed upon regional organisations.

Global Strategy for the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy, 2016 (Global Strategy Document)

This strategy document was concluded in June 2016 with the intention of transitioning the EU’s global vision into common action. It defines the EU’s core interests and principles for its external relations and sets the EU’s direction for future policy making. It includes the EU’s commitments and priorities for security policy so is also intrinsic to the third empirical chapter.

These documents will be used to reveal the construction of a normative identity as well as contradictory content such as militarising rhetoric in the first empirical chapter. The second empirical chapter is split into the principles and process of R2P and will use the documents to find content which reveals normativity and militarising capacity. The third, and last, empirical chapter provides an analysis of the EU’s international security responsibilities. The relevant documents will, therefore, be used to find obligations placed upon the EU by the UN and what responsibilities it places upon itself. This will provide insight into whether the EU has more demanding obligations than other regional organisations and whether the EU is capable of fulfilling them based upon the identity analysis determined by the preceding chapter. Such analysis provides insight into both the extent to which the doctrine has been integrated and the EU’s capacity to integrate it.

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4.4 Secondary Literature

Secondary literature is also instrumental to furthering our understanding of normative power Europe and its corresponding security identity. The main purpose of the academic literature is to gain thorough knowledge of the EU’s identity on the world stage. Without this knowledge, the analysis of the previously noted documents is incomplete. Because there is a wealth of literature on this, it would be unwise not to include it in a reasoned discussion.

4.5 Nature of the Analysis

It is important to note that the research is interdisciplinary in approach as aspects of international law as well as EU security policy are being addressed. The term ‘legal’ refers to the binding nature and enforcement of law whereas ‘political’ refers to the outcome of policies or the debates surrounding policies. Because law is often the outcome of policy and its corresponding discussion the two are interlinked. Accordingly, treaties and international customary law play a substantial role in the field of EU security policy. Moreover, R2P is a political norm with the goal of becoming a legal norm. In order for the research question to be answered, it is necessary to analyse the nature of the obligations placed upon the EU by the UN and the EU’s normative undertaking. If such a legal method of analysis is not included, the research will be incomplete. The content, technicalities and impact of international legal documents are, therefore, intrinsic to the research. Therefore, a substantial quantity of both the research content and debate is legal. Such a method of legal analysis renders the document analysis predominantly content based, rather than rhetoric focused. Whilst it is the case that an element of legal analysis is required, the emphasis of the research will remain political. This is because R2P is a political and a humanitarian concept which is enshrined in policy and political rhetoric.

4.6 Conclusion

This chapter has provided justification for each of the methods chosen for the research that will follow. It is, however, essential to note the limits of the chosen methods. Because the primary method of research is document analysis there is the risk of bias. The analysis is

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subject to the researcher’s interpretation, so it is important to maintain research transparency so the reader can determine whether they would reach the same conclusion when reading the data. Furthermore, as can be seen from the above list of documents, the time frame which has been used is somewhat extensive. It had originally been planned to limit the time frame to actions occurring after the Lisbon Treaty. However, preliminary research showed that the vast majority of the data which forms the EU’s security identity is found in the Treaty of Maastricht which predates the Treaty of Lisbon. In summary, document analysis is the primary method used to answer the research question. Because of the multidimensional nature of the research question, a broad range of policy and strategy documents, reports and statements, as well as treaties have had to be used to obtain the data required to address the question in its entirety.