Maarten de Leeuw S1977911
mdeleeuw@fgga.leidenuniv.nl
Leiden The Hague University Master thesis
Crisis and Security Management
Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs Supervisor: Daan Weggemans
15-01-2019
Word count: 20.342
The ultimate step of anti-colonialism?
‘There are no borders in this struggle to the death. We cannot be indifferent to what happens anywhere in the world, because a victory by any country over imperialism is our victory, just
as any country's defeat is a defeat for all of us.’1
- Ernesto Guevara, 1965.
‘Do not think the war that we are waging is the Islamic State’s war alone. Rather, it is the Muslims’ war altogether. It is the war of every Muslim in every place, and the Islamic State is merely the spearhead in this war. It is but the war of the people of faith against the people
of disbelief...’2
- Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, 2015.
1 C. Guevara, ‘At the Afro-Asian Conference in Algeria.’ Marxists.org. (24-02-1965) https://www.marxists.org/archive/guevara/1965/02/24.htm (24-12-2018).
2 H. Saul, ‘Isis leader resurfaces with vitriolic demand in chilling audio message to supporters.’ The
Independent. (2015): https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/isis-leader-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-resurfaces-in-audio-urging-supporters-to-join-terror-group-10251955.html (24-12-2018).
Abstract
The debate on what drives Muslim anger towards the West has been lingering on since the 1970’s. After September 11th, 2001, this debate gained unprecedented attention. Various
arguments have been made and considered. Up until now the options of anti-colonialism and anti-oppression have remained out of the spotlights. Several dimensions of anti-colonialism and anti-oppression have been adduced by academics as a driver, but they have never been studied from the viewpoint of a comprehensive framework.
Such a framework for the study of anti-colonial discourse has been described by George Sefa Dei and Ali Asgharzadeh (2001). They attribute the power to propel people to action and purpose for legitimization to the anti-colonial discourse. Using the anti-colonial discursive framework, this thesis studies the presence and use of anti-colonial discourse in ISIL propaganda. In addition to the anti-colonial framework I propose the addition of a new, sixth dimension to the existing framework: anger caused by Western ‘crimes’ as an instrument in the struggle against colonialism. The ISIL propaganda studied for the manifest content analysis consists of the organisation’s official magazine Dabiq. Ultimately, I maintain that anti-colonial discourse is present in ISIL propaganda and that it acts as an important component of ISIL’s rhetoric. Besides Dabiq, the latent content analysis uses also other propaganda items from ISIL. Here the various possible roles of anti-colonial discourse are also considered. Finally, I argue that anti-colonialism is an important aspect of the narrative of ISIL.
Table of Contents
Abstract
1. Introduction. p.1
1.1 Research question and goal. p.2
1.2 Academic relevance. p.2
1.3 Anti-colonialism and extremism. p.3
1.4 Reader’s guide. p.5
2. Narratives in Jihadi propaganda. p.6
2.1 Origins of Jihadism. p.6
2.2 Al-Qaeda, ideology and propaganda. p.7
2.3 The emerge of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. p.9
2.4 Narratives in ISIL propaganda. p.11
2.5 Conclusion: Jihadism and anti-colonialism? p.15
3. The anti-colonial discursive framework. p.16
3.1 On postcolonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. p.16
3.2 On anti-colonial discourse. p.17
3.3 Six dimensions of the anti-colonial discursive framework. p.18 3.4 Conclusion: Anti-colonial discourse as a means to assess ISIL propaganda. p.24
4. Methodology. p.26
4.1 Research methods. p.26
4.1.1 Manifest content analysis. p.27
4.1.2 Latent content analysis. p.27
4.2 Operationalisation. p.27
4.3 Source selection. p.28
5. ISIL and anti-colonial discourse. p.31
5.1 Manifest analysis of anti-colonial discourse. p.31
5.2 Latent analysis of anti-colonial discourse. p.33
5.2.1 Empowerment of the colonized. p.33
5.2.2 Continuity of colonialism. p.34
5.2.3 Race and racism. p.44
5.2.4 Marxist rhetoric. p.48
5.2.5 Feminism and sexuality. p.50
5.2.6 Anger because of Western crimes. p.55
6. Conclusion. p.59
6.1 The ultimate step of anti-colonialism. p.59
6.2 Implications and further research. p.60
7. Bibliography. p.62
7.1 Literature. p.62
7.2 Primary sources. p.65
8. Appendix. p.67
8.1 Coding scheme. p.67
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1. Introduction.
‘Why do they hate us?’ was the question posed by the Dutch talk show host Jeroen Pauw after the terrorist attacks in Brussels on the 22nd of March 2016. The responses from the guests at
the table ranged from Western involvement in the Syrian war to the failed multicultural society in Western countries, but Pauw concluded that a satisfying answer was still missing. Ironically, the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) itself has answered the same question in its official magazine Dabiq. In the final edition of the magazine they published a column titled ‘Why we hate you and why we fight you’. Among other things they mentioned Western involvement in the Middle East. As ISIL puts it:
‘We hate you for invading our lands and fight you to repel you and drive you out. As long as there is an inch of territory left for us to reclaim, jihad will continue to be a personal obligation on every single Muslim.’ 3
This quote demonstrates colonialism in a very traditional, territorial sense. It resembles the rhetoric used by anti-colonial leaders in the years after World War II. Anti-colonialism was born during the struggle for independence in colonies of European countries. Even after gaining independence, the leaders of the postcolonial countries continued to express their anti-colonial sentiments. They voiced their support for countries or groups still overshadowed by colonialism. Over time, anti-colonialism evolved into the fight against all forms of oppression and domination.4 This anti-colonial perspective has largely been absent from the on-going
academic debate on why ISIL, and Muslim extremists in general, holds a grudge against the Western world. Apart from ISIL’s own views, the academic debate has suggested several theories. The frontrunner in this discussion was Bernard Lewis. In his article ‘The roots of Muslim rage’ from 1990 Lewis rejects the idea that racism and imperialism are at the base of the resentment of Muslims against the West. Rather, he argues that Islamic fundamentalists are at war with secularism and modernism.5 At the time Lewis faced heavy criticisms for his
orientalist and generalising views, especially by Edward Said.6 His hypothesis, however,
3 Dabiq, ‘Break the Cross’ 15 (2016) 30.
4 G. Sefa Dei and A. Asgharzadeh. ‘The power of social theory: The anti-colonial discursive framework.’ The Journal of Educational Thought (JET)/Revue de la Pensée Educative 35 3 (2001) 307-308.
5 B. Lewis, ‘The roots of Muslim rage.’ The Atlantic Monthly 266 3 (1990) 60.
6 Lewis his dispute with Edward Said began in the seventies, when the latter characterised Lewis as a prime example of Orientalism in his like-named book. The debate continued into the 2000’s.
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remained of influence. After the attacks of September 11th, 2001 Lewis’ work rose to
unpreceded heights in academic as well as societal discussions. By the end of the zeros, the West seemed to get a hold of the Jihadist threat. But, as the United States began to withdraw their troops from Iraq, ISIL arose. From that moment on, the question on the reasons for the hatred against the West returned. A group of Dutch academics and publicists tried to answer the same question in 2018 in a bundle of essays titled after Pauw’s quote: Waarom haten ze
ons eigenlijk? The answers varied from anti-modernism to the hateful nature of Islam and from
a religious-cultural clash to even Western self-hate.7 The possibility of anti-colonialism and
oppression remained in the dark yet again.
1.1 Research question and goal.
As noted above, anti-colonialism is the main absentee from the discussion on the roots of Muslim anger. Consequently, the question I seek to answer in this thesis is ‘to what extent is anti-colonial discourse present in ISIL propaganda and what goal does it serve?’ This research thereby aims to gain in-depth insight in the elements of its propaganda, as well as ISIL’s ideology and motives.
1.2 Academic relevance.
Foremost, this research offers insight in to what extent anti-colonial discourse is applicable to ISIL propaganda and what function it serves. As discussed above it relates to the question: ‘why do they hate us?’ It offers a new perspective on Bernard Lewis’ hypothesis that racism and imperialism are not at the base of Muslim rage. Besides the debate on Muslim anger, there are also other academic debates this thesis feeds into. First is the debate what exactly ISIL is. Some authors argue ISIL is (post-)modern creation, whereas other academics and most world leaders think of ISIL as a medieval construct.8 ISIL has rarely been studied from an
anti-colonial and postanti-colonial perspective. There has been discussion on how the anti-colonial
After 9/11, Said described the political climate as ‘the clash of ignorance’, a critique of Samuel Huntington’s ‘Clash of Civilizations’. Huntington’s theory was heavily influenced by Lewis: E. Said, ‘The clash of ignorance.’ The Nation 22 10 (2001) 1.
7 Frits Bosch (red.), Waarom haten ze ons eigenlijk? (2018) 17-22.
8 Amongst others: P. Mishra, ‘How to think about Islamic State.’ The Guardian (2015) 24; K. McDonald, ‘Isis Jihadis Aren’t Medieval—They Are Shaped by Modern Western Philosophy.’ The Guardian (2014) and; G. Wood, ‘What ISIS really wants.’ The Atlantic 315 2 (2015) 78-94.
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Picot borders have impacted the conflict in the Middle East and the rise of ISIL.9 Some authors
have pointed to ISIL’s benefit of racism and xenophobia in other countries or laws against Muslim veils.10 However, these analyses did not link ISIL’s struggle against colonial borders
and Western racism to anti-colonialism. This thesis seeks to provide a new insight into this debate, presenting ISIL as an anti-colonial entity.
There is also a vast and growing body of academic research into narratives and discourses in ISIL propaganda. So far the literature has mainly focussed on Islamist discourse and recruitment narratives. Only certain elements of anti-colonial discourse have been researched in ISIL propaganda, again for the most part on the Sykes-Picot agreement. Laurence Bindner has researched Jihadist colonial grievances against France, but did not link to a larger framework of anti-colonialism as proposed in this thesis.11
1.3 Scholars on anti-colonialism and extremism.
Research has previously suggested that historical and anti-colonial grievances can play a role in the radicalisation process.12 Githens-Mazer states that Islamists and Islamic extremists use a
‘religious-historical’ prism to justify their acts of violence.13 Historical grievances do not only
play a role in legitimization. A French survey in 2017 asked jailed French extremists to rate the influence of radicalization drivers in their radicalization process. Interestingly enough the nationalist extremists (ETA, FLNC, IK) valued ‘anti-imperialism’ and ‘historical references’ as two of the most important cognitive factors. This shows that anti-colonial and historical grievances can have an impact on the radicalization process. To the Jihadists these two drivers were reported to have less influence than most other factors. The comparable ‘political references’ did however receive a high rating by the Jihadists.14 Despite the low rating of
‘anti-imperialism’ the authors note that all the individuals exert strong anti-imperialist inclinations.15
9 J. T. Gordon, ‘ISIS’desire to erase Sykes-Picot is rooted in fiction, not history.’ The National Interest 10 (2014) 29.
10 S. Masoom, ‘A Colonial Catalyst: Reverberations of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the Rise of ISIS.’ Inquiries Journal 8 11 (2016) http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1494/a-colonial-catalyst-reverberations-of-the-sykes-picot-agreement-in-the-rise-of-isis (10-12-2018)
11 L. Bindner, ‘The Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France.’ The International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague 8 7 (2018).
12 J. Githens-Mazer, ‘Islamic radicalisation among North Africans in Britain.’ British journal of politics and international relations, 10 4 (2008), 553.
13 Githens-Mazer, ‘Islamic radicalisation among North Africans in Britain’10 4 (2008), 550. 14 X. Crettiez, and S. Romain. Saisir les mécanismes de la radicalisation violente: pour une analyse processuelle et biographique des engagements violents Rapport de recherche pour la Mission de recherche Droit et Justice. Diss. Mission de Recherche Droit et Justice, (2017) 85-88.
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The authors however did not interview any Jihadists related to al-Qaeda and only a few individuals connected to ISIL.16 The results are shown in the table below.
Key factors in the radicalisation process Ab b el Pau l Fah im Mic h el C h o u k ri Ach ir Ib ra Gh ass an L o b ri Om ar E lie Nass er Total Historical references 2 2 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 1 15 Political references 3 3 1 3 2 3 3 0 0 3 3 2 32 Anti-imperialism related 3 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3 3 1 20 Object of hate 3 2 0 0 2 0 1 1 1 3 2 1 21 Justification of terrorism 3 2 0 0 1 3 3 0 0 2 3 1 24 Importance of (religious) texts 3 3 1 2 1 3 3 3 3 2 3 2 32 Importance of social media 3 3 1 2 3 3 3 0 0 1 3 3 32 Mythification of the war/jihadism 3 3 0 0 2 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 15
Key factors in the radicalisation process Tx
o m in Pip o Mik el Ar izo l Ped ro An d ré Sav ier u Total IK ETA FLNC Historical references 2 3 3 3 2 1 1 15 Political references 2 1 3 2 2 1 1 12 Anti-imperialism related 2 1 2 2 3 0 0 10 Object of hate 2 1 3 3 3 1 2 15
Discours of justification of terrorism 1 1 3 2 3 1 2 13
Importance of (religious) texts 1 2 3 2 2 0 0 10
Importance of social media 2 3 2 1 2 0 0 10
Mythification of the war/jihadism 3 3 3 3 3 1 1 17
Figure 1 Key factors in the radicalization process of violent Jihadists (above) and violent nationalist (under).17
16 Crettiez, Saisir les mécanismes de la radicalisation violente, 7. 17 Ibidem, 86 & 88.
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1.4 Reader’s guide.
The next chapter contains an overview of narratives in Jihadi propaganda. In order to understand the concept of narratives Jihadi propaganda it is necessary to acknowledge its origins. The chapter therefore takes off with a description of the origins of Jihadism and the first prevalent and dominant narratives in Jihadi propaganda. The chapter describes how the narratives have changed over time and ends with a review of the multiple narratives in ISIL propaganda. The third chapter is dedicated to the six dimensions of anti-colonial discourse and where anti-colonialism stands as an academic concept. The choice for the term anti-colonialism over postcolonialism and anti-imperialism is explained too. Chapter four follows to set out the methodology of this thesis. In this chapter the research methods and goals are presented, alongside with the validity and limitations of these methods. It further contains the operationalisation of the anti-colonial discursive framework into quantifiable, measurable indicators. In the fifth chapter, I analyse the quantitative and qualitative results of this research. Firstly, I will set out a manifest content analysis to demonstrate the quantitative presence of anti-colonial discourse in ISIL propaganda. After that, the latent content analysis discusses the functions of anti-colonial discourse. This analysis is divided by the six dimension and 16 subdimensions of the anti-colonial discourse. In the final chapter I reflect on the findings of this research and place them in context of the academic debates and previous chapters. This chapter will open up suggestions for further research and bring a definitive answer to the research question.
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2. Narratives in Jihadi propaganda.
In the second chapter, I will provide a short historical overview of Jihadi propaganda and the ongoing discussion on narratives in the works of Jihadists. Firstly, the origins and the ideology of twentieth century Jihadism are explored, with a focus on the narratives and ideologies regarding dominating powers. Early Jihadi scholars Qutb and Azzam are key in this analysis. From there on I will briefly discuss the ideology and propaganda of important Islamic groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Afghan Mujahedeen. Subsequently, the ideology and narratives of al-Qaeda are discussed. Al-Qaeda is of importance because they took global terrorism to a renewed prominence and professionalised their propaganda output. This paragraph describes how their ideology signified a shift away from those of earlier Jihadi organisations. Then in August 2014 the Caliphate of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant was proclaimed. Under ISIL Jihadist propaganda and ideology rose to new heights. The ideology of ISIL too implied a new wind in Jihadism. In closing, I set out the academic debate on narratives in ISIL propaganda, presenting the context in which this thesis is positioned.
2.1 Origins of Jihadism
The modern concept of jihad can be traced back to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood that was founded ‘in response to the rise of Western imperialism and the associated decline of Islam in public life’.18 Sayyid Qutb was the Brotherhood’s most famous exponent in the early twentieth
century. His works and ideas, mainly that of the The New Jahilliyah, developed the current notion of disbelieving and the fight against disbelievers. Jahilliyah meaning the pre-Islam period in Arabia, and the ignorance of the people living in that era. The concept of Jahilliyah is one of the few notions of Qutb adopted by ISIL.19 Just as important was Qutbs formulation
of the concept of the ‘near enemy’. Qutb regarded the dictatorial regimes in the Middle East as apostate and the largest enemy to the Muslims. Therefore, the Muslims should first overthrow their own rulers. Qutb became an influential figure in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood. His philosophies directly endangered his former friend Gamal Abdel Nasser, the second Egyptian
18 C. Bunzel, From Paper State to Caliphate: The Ideology of the Islamic State. Washington, D.C.: Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings (2015) 7.
19 J. Ingram, ‘An analysis of Islamic State’s Dabiq magazine.’ Australian Journal of Political Science 51 3 (2016) 461.
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president and prominent Third World leader. He was sentenced to death for his part in a conspiracy to assassinate the Egyptian president and was executed in 1966.
In the wake of Qutb’s legacy the first Islamist and Jihadi organisations arose, but the first real surge of jihadism came in Afghanistan 1979. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan thousands of Muslims worldwide were called upon to join the Jihad and fight against the Soviet military in Afghanistan. This call was made public through propaganda films on videotape and short magazines. These were handed out at mosques or via mail.20 The
rhetoric of a ‘defensive jihad’ that surrounded the Afghan war was fostered by the Palestinian Sheikh Abdullah Azzam. After the Soviet invasion, Azzam issued a fatwa, calling upon fellow Muslims to repel the Soviet threat from Afghanistan.21 In his vision, the Ummah (the Muslim
community) is one and Muslims are obliged to join the fight when a part of the Ummah is threatened.22 Thousands of Muslims from all over the world joined the Afghan Muhadjeen in
their battle against the Soviets. Amongst them was a young Saudi Arabian: Usama Bin Laden. The Afghan-Soviet war offered political Islamists all over the world, amongst others Azzam, the opportunity to exercise their ideology and gain attention on the world stage. Azzam himself was assassinated shortly before the end of the war in 1989. Ultimately, owing to American support, the Muhadjeen ousted the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan and several years later the socialist government of Najibullah followed.
2.2 Al-Qaeda, ideology and propaganda.
In the aftermath of the Afghan-Soviet war several Jihadi groups were founded, most notably al-Qaeda, Arabic for ‘the basis’ in 1988. From the start, al-Qaeda was ideologically more extreme than the Muhadjeen, some of whom were now in the new Afghan government. Meanwhile, Usama Bin-Laden had become al-Qaeda’s charismatic leader. During the war he had barely participated in the fighting, but he was highly regarded for transforming the Muhadjeen into a functioning organisation. Under Bin Laden’s leadership al-Qaeda moved away from Qutb’s notion that the ‘near enemy’ was the problem. Having studied the breakdown of the Warsaw pact after the demise of the Soviet Union Bin Laden envisioned a similar scenario for the Muslim world.23 After the paternalism of the Soviet Union diminished,
20 J. Stern and J. Berger. ISIS: The State of Terror. (2015) 127. 21 A. Azzam, Defense of the Muslim lands. (1984) 9.
22Azzam, Defense of the Muslim lands, 9.
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dictators in many Warsaw pact countries were overthrown by revolutions or democratic elections. The United States were the paternalists of the apostate regimes in the Middle East, in Bin Ladens eyes.24 Thus, defeating the ‘far enemy’ would ultimately lead to the fall of the
‘near enemy’. Influenced by Zawahiri, Bin Laden also disagreed with Azzam’s notion of ‘defensive jihad’.25 The United States oppressed the Ummah through local regimes that
betrayed the Muslims. His vision broadened the definition of ‘defensive jihad’.26 Thus, the
United States became the ‘main enemy’ for al-Qaeda. In the first years the organisation was more or less able to operate freely in Afghanistan and later in Sudan. From 1996 on, when the Taliban captured the Afghan capital of Kabul, the al-Qaeda leadership re-established itself in Afghanistan. The Taliban resisted the growing international call to bring Usama bin Laden to justice after the American embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya of 1998. The Taliban were unwilling to deliver Bin Laden to the United States or Saudi-Arabia and provided the al-Qaeda organisation safety and security. From inside Afghanistan al-al-Qaeda could grow into the most dangerous terrorist group of the 1990’s and 2000’s.
At first al-Qaeda mostly reached out to its followers in the West through pamphlets, magazines, books, or so-called handbooks. However, the attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington were arguably their largest propaganda deed by that time. In June 2001 al-Qaeda released its first video production online. Its main focus was on the suffering of Palestinians and portrayed the American government as infiltrated by Jews, therefore complicit in the Palestinian suffering.27 After 9/11 al-Qaeda expanded the
distribution of videotapes as a new way to spread their message amongst their audience. The grainy and sketchy videos often contained a message or fatwa from Usama bin Laden. They were carefully distributed with multiple middlemen and published irregularly. The precarious distribution process limited the audience and frequency of the videos. The outreach depended on television channels to broadcast the tapes. Three weeks after 9/11, Bin Laden appeared on a video, broadcasted on Al Jazeera, stating that ‘what America is tasting now is something insignificant to compared to what we have tasted for scores of years. The Islamic world has been tasting this humiliation and this degradation for 80 years.’28 Peter Bergen claims that the
belief that the Muslim world has been humiliated and suppressed for decades by Western
24 Bergen, The Longest War, 24.
25 F. Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global (2009) 135. 26 Gerges, The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went, 145.
27 Bergen, The Longest War, 33. 28 Ibidem, 27.
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powers drives the al-Qaeda leaders and their followers.29 In 2003 Bin Laden referred once
again to Western colonial history, comparing the Bush-Blair axis that attacked Iraq to the Sykes-Picot agreement of Britain and France.30 Bin Laden clearly criticised colonial history
and the American foreign policy in the Middle East. Western presence in the Middle East was what Bin Laden mainly fought against, as is also revealed by what Bin Laden did not mention of the West. Bergen points to the fact that Bin Laden rarely or never criticised certain aspects of Western and American culture, such as pornography produced in the United States, drug and alcohol consumption or tolerance for homosexuality.31
Near the end of the 2000’s al-Qaeda changed its media strategy. Its first online magazine was published by Qaeda’s in Yemen (AQY) in 2008. Its editor was Nayif al-Qahtani, a young AQY-member from Saudi-Arabia. The magazine had been approved by the emir of AQY upon its release. In January 2008 it was published with the title Sada al-Malahim (The Echo of Battles). Even though the magazine was only available in Arabic its contents where heavily debated and lauded on online fora. The success of The Echo of Battles set the tone for al-Qaeda’s next step and aspirations to reach a larger audience. In July 2010 the first edition of Inspire, the magazine of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was released.
Inspire was a revolutionary in several ways. For one, Inspire was al-Qaeda’s first English
online magazine.32 It generated a large amount of media attention for al-Qaeda and the first
time a jihadi magazine came to the attention of the Western public in this way. Thomas Hegghammer suggests Inspire was not that ground-breaking and that the large amount of media attention it received was unjustified. He states that Inspire was of relatively poor quality, Jihadi propaganda videos had been available in English for a longer time, the Western audience is not that big and the content and message of Inspire were not that revolutionary. Many articles had been recycled from Arabic magazines.33 Revolutionary or not, Inspire quickly became a
professional magazine and a forefront media output for al-Qaeda. In total 16 editions of Inspire were published, the last one in November 2016.
29 Bergen, The Longest War, 27. 30 Ibidem, 27.
31 Ibidem, 27.
32 Inspire is often named the first online English Jihadi magazine. This is incorrect. Thomas Hegghammer points to the existence of other English Jihadi magazines such as Jihad Recollections: T. Hegghammer, ‘Jihad
Recollections’ Jihadica (7 April 2009) http://www.jihadica.com/jihad-recollections/ (27-12-2018)
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2.3 The emerge of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.
By 2016 al-Qaeda had a new competitor on the Jihadist front: the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant. ISIL started out as Jamāʻat al-Tawḥīd wa-al-Jihād (literally ‘The Organisation of Monotheism and Jihad’) and was founded in 1999 by the Jordanian jihadist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. After the American invasion of Iraq, the group joined forces with al-Qaeda in 2004 and became known under the banner of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Already under al-Zarqawi cracks were visible in the relationship with the Qaeda leadership. The leadership ordered al-Zarqawi to reduce the amount of violence and the strict enforcement of the sharia law.34
Al-Zarqawi was killed by a American airstrike in June 2006. His successor, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi arranged the merger of multiple Sunni groups on the 12th of October 2006 to form
the Mutayibeen Coalition. A day later the Mutayibeen Coalition declared the establishment of the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI). ISI did not fare well in the beginning and by 2010 the United States declared that most of its leaders had been killed, including Abu Omar Al-Baghdadi.35
He was succeeded by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi on the 16th of May 2010. When al-Baghdadi
arrived, the organization was in a serious state of disrepair. This gave the new leader the chance to rebuild the organization according to his own vision. Bolstered by the renewed oppression of Sunnis under Iraq’s Shi’a prime minister Nouri al-Maliki, al-Baghdadi fetched high former Ba’ath officials and many Sunni tribes of Iraq.36 The new blood in the organization fostered
the growth of ISI, but the real catalyst came from abroad.
In the chaotic aftermath of the Arab spring ISI saw the opportunity to intervene in what had become the Syrian civil war. It conquered large parts of the East Syrian desert. Ideologically ISI conflicted with al-Qaeda again and its Syrian affiliate: Jahbat al-Nusra. The conflict led to a schism as ISI alienated itself from Jahbat al-Nusra and al-Qaeda. By January 2014 ISI ousted Jahbat al-Nusra from Raqqa, a provincial town with 300.00 inhabitants. Raqqa soon became the unofficial capital of the terrorist group.
Meanwhile the tides had also turned in Iraq. Profiting from the discrimination of Sunnis by the Maliki government ISI managed to capture vast amounts of land in Iraq. In January 2014 ISI advanced to the cities of Ramadi and Fallujah. The biggest success came in June 2014 when the Iraqi military abandoned the country’s second largest city Mosul. ISI members moved into
34 A. Zelin, ‘The war between ISIS and al-Qaeda for supremacy of the global jihadist movement.’ The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 20 1 (2014) 1-11.
35 Bergen, The Longest War, 32.
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the city on trucks and with black flags. On the 29th of June 2014 ISI released a video with
al-Baghdadi declaring the establishment of the caliphate. The name changed from ISI to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). Several days later on the 4th of July during the
Friday prayers Al-Baghdadi ascended the minbar in the Al-Nuri mosque and spoke to Muslims all over the world. In this more official statement Al-Baghdadi once more proclaimed the establishment of the caliphate, renamed himself ‘caliph Ibrahim’ and demanded all the Muslims to obey him as the caliph.37 The content of his speech did not receive as much attention
as the establishment of the caliphate or his watch did. Policy advisor Ed Husain notes that his sermon was mainly focussed at Muslims, not a critique of the Western culture and politics.38 It
was full of Islamic symbolism intended to portray Al-Baghdadi as a pious Muslim.
The extreme violence, terrorist attacks and violations of human rights committed by ISIL urged the West to act against the Caliphate. In September 2014 the ‘Global Coalition against Daesh’ was established. More than seventy countries worldwide participated in the fight against the terror group. ISIL quickly began to lose ground. First, its Iraqi capital Mosul was liberated by the Iraqi army and the popular mobilization troops in July 2017. Several months later the Syrian headquarters Raqqa fell after a year-long battle between ISIL and troops of the Syrian Democratic Forces supported by the Global Coalition. As of 2019 ISIL controls virtually no territory anymore except for several villages in Syria along the Euphrates river.
2.4 Narratives in ISIL propaganda
Despite the loss of virtually all its territory, the ideology of ISIL has not been defeated. The ideology can remain influential longer after the caliphate. It was revolutionary for several reasons. According to Fawaz Gerges, ISIL’s ideology represents a new stage of Jihadism, a so-called third wave of Jihadism.39 One aspect of this third wave is the return of the battle against
the ‘near enemy’, but this time more balanced with struggle against the ‘far enemy’. The ‘near enemy’ encompasses in ISIL’s view not only the dictators from apostate regime, but also the
37 H. Strange, ‘Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi addresses Muslims in Mosul’ The Telegraph (5 July 2014) https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iraq/10948480/Islamic-State-leader-Abu-Bakr-al-Baghdadi-addresses-Muslims-in-Mosul.html (27-12-2018)
38 E. Husain, ‘How 'Caliph' Baghdadi Aimed His Sermon at the Muslim Devout’ Institute for Global Change (14 July 2014) https://institute.global/insight/co-existence/how-caliph-baghdadi-aimed-his-sermon-muslim-devout (27-12-2018)
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Shias, as fifth column within Islam.40 Not only the ideology of ISIL was revolutionary on the
Jihadi front, so was its communications strategy.
As ISIL’s territory and allure grew fast the propaganda had to live up to the new status. In July 2014 the first issue of Dabiq was published. From the beginning Dabiq distinguished itself from Inspire and other Jihadi magazines by several characteristics. The magazine features more brutal and violent images than other magazines do, and its layout is streamlined and professional.41 Several authors also argue that Dabiq focusses on both the rational choice
messaging and identity-choice messaging in its calls to action. On the contrary, Inspire relies mostly on identity-choice messaging for its recruitment.42 The anti-colonial discourse fits well
into this balance that ISIL is trying to create between the rational choice and identity-choice messaging. The anti-colonial discourse namely emphasizes the concept of a common identity, but also potential successes, which is an argument for a rational choice.
The 15th and last Dabiq was published on the 31st of July 2016. After the reconquest of
the town of Dabiq, Syria by Kurdish forces in 2016 ISIL changed the name of the magazine to
Rumiyah, meaning ‘Rome’ in Arabic. Rome symbolizes the home of the Western crusaders
and infidels, and Rumiyah refers to the prophecy of the fall of Rome. Up until 2018, 13 versions of Rumiyah have been published. The new magazine has failed to reach as much attention as
Dabiq, but it remains one of ISIL’s most important media outlets.
There is wide body of research on the narratives and themes in Dabiq. Gartenstein-Ross, Barr and Moreng identify nine core narratives in ISIL propaganda. The first narrative is that of the ‘Winner’s message’. ISIL attempts to create an image of invincibility of itself by projecting an image of strength and concealing weaknesses.43 By portraying itself as the victor
ISIL distinguishes itself from other extremist organisations such as al-Qaeda that derive legitimacy for their actions from their status of victimhood.
Secondly, ISIL discredits the competition in the Jihadist scene through delegitimization of rival jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda and the Taliban.44 Fracturing of the Jihadi
competition creates growth opportunities for ISIL. It accuses other organisations of deviation
40 Gerges, ‘ISIS and the Third Wave of Jihadism.’, 341.
41 C. Vallee, ‘Digital Jihad: Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Dabiq vs. Inspire.’ International Institute for Counter-Terrorism (2015) 3-4.
42 J. Ingram, ‘An analysis of Inspire and Dabiq: Lessons from AQAP and Islamic State's propaganda war.’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40.5 (2017) 364-365.
43 D. Gartenstein-Ross, et al. The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy, ICCT, International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2016) 15.
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from the right religious and methodical path and tries to establish a Sunni-Shi’a division within the Jihadi world that formerly was non-existent.45
The third narrative that follows points to the illegitimacy of political Islamists. In this case ISIL criticizes the Muslim Brotherhood among others for their ineffective methodology.46
According to ISIL democracy is an un-Islamic form of government and can therefore not be used to promote Islam.47 Nevertheless ISIL itself employs Islamist discourse in their
propaganda. Mahood and Rane identify the Jahilliyah and crusader narratives as part of an Islamist master narrative that is present in Dabiq magazine. The narrative of the crusaders concerns the invaders that occupy the Muslim land and must be expelled. This narrative tries to justify the use of violence against disbelievers and Westerners.48 The crusader narrative is
used as proof of the West’s long-standing hatred against Islam.49 However, ISIL is highly
selective in their usage of Islamists narratives, barely mentioning most of important battles of Islam, the year 1924 and the Palestinian Nakbha of 1949.50
The fourth narrative seeks to diffuse the Syrian battlefield by ‘sowing discord within enemy ranks through spreading misinformation in an effort to highlight, exacerbate, or create fissures within the ranks of rival groups, ISIL attempts to threaten the unity and viability of rival groups.51 The greater diffusion on the Syrian battlefield gives ISIL a military advantage.
The fifth narrative also seeks to sow discord, but on a larger level. This narrative seeks to exploit existing sectarian tensions. It fuels conflict between Sunni and Shia, often with the intent of forcing Sunnis to seek IS’ protection.52 This partly explains the selective usage of
Islamist discourse. According to Mahood and Raine ISIL, for example, does not mention the Battle of Karbala because of its importance to Shiite Muslims.53
Sixth, in its propaganda ISIL presents the caliphate as an Islamic utopia: The caliphate is a pious, harmonious and successful Islamic state. As goes for the first narrative, success is an important factor in ISIL’s attractivity and legitimacy. Charlie Winter found that the narrative of Islamic utopia featured in almost half of the ISIL propaganda.54 Among the highlights of
45 Gartenstein-Ross, The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy, 17. 46 Ibidem, 19.
47 Ibidem, 19.
48 S. Mahood and H. Rane, ‘Islamist narratives in ISIS recruitment propaganda.’ The Journal of International Communication 23 1 (2017): 16.
49 Mahood and Rane, ‘Islamist narratives in ISIS recruitment propaganda’, 31. 50 Ibidem, 15-35.
51 Gartenstein-Ross, The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy, 19. 52 Ibidem, 20.
53 Mahood and Rane, ‘Islamist narratives in ISIS recruitment propaganda’, 32. 54 C. Winter, Documenting the Virtual Caliphate Quilliam Foundation (2015)
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success of ISIL are its good governance and thriving economy. Many propaganda videos for example include shots of markets full of fruit and vegetables.
The seventh narrative is that adventure and camaraderie. ISIL does not only glorify its state itself. It glorifies the Jihad as an adventure and chance to experience comradery.
Research has shown that the message of comradery plays an important role in recruitment as it appeals to both men and women.55
The eighth narrative seeks to implement the seeds of polarisation into Western societies. Polarisation and feelings of being left out are considered important factors in the radicalisation process. Gartenstein-Ross and Daveed call this ‘Driving a wedge between Muslims and the West: Inflaming tensions between Muslims living in the West and their societies in order to galvanise Muslims to support the caliphate.’56 ISIL calls this ‘the extinction of the grey zone’
as if there is no alternative between being a kuffar or to what ISIL considers to be a good Muslims.57
The last narrative is more explicitly aimed at recruitment. By stating that it is an obligation to join the caliphate ISIL pressures Muslims to join or align with the caliphate.58
Looking from the perspective of recruitment one can find additional narratives, aimed at the individual. ISIL employs a special narrative for recruitment that consists of four recurring elements as demonstrated by Kevin Braddock and John Horgan.59 The four themes in the
recruitment narrative focus on the identity and personality of ISIL recruits. The first theme is ‘pre-ISIS normalcy’: ISIS soldiers can come from normal backgrounds. The second is ‘Everyday Life—Islam Contradiction: Apathy toward aspects of one’s life that hurt Muslims is an affront to Islam itself. Thirdly, ISIL members show a ‘Group Need—Individual Skill Synthesis’: ISIS will welcome and find a place for anyone with any talents. Last is the ‘Glory of Martyrdom’: Facing death in support of ISIS is a heroic endeavour for which you will be rewarded.60
However, none of the authors mention the possibility of anti-colonial discourse in ISIL propaganda. Laurence Bindner discusses the presence of historical grievances narratives in
Dabiq. He sees the historical and colonial references as part of ISIL’s strategy to enforce
55 Gartenstein-Ross, The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy, 23. 56 Ibidem, 23.
57 Dabiq, ‘From Hypocrisy to Apostasy: The Extinction of the Grayzone.’ Dabiq 7 (2015) 54. 58 Gartenstein-Ross, The Islamic State's Global Propaganda Strategy.
59 K. Braddock and J. Horgan, ‘Towards a guide for constructing and disseminating counternarratives to reduce support for terrorism.’ Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 39 5 (2016) 16.
60 Braddock and Horgan ‘Towards a guide for constructing and disseminating counternarratives to reduce support for terrorism.’, 16.
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polarisation.61 While referring to the colonial past and present ISIL tries to show that Islam
cannot co-exist with and in the French society. Bindner does not see the use of colonial history as a direct call to action, but rather as another tool for polarisation. He also does not pay attention to other aspects of anti-colonial sentiments than the historical grievances. Other authors have studied elements of anti-colonial discourse, but have not linked to the larger picture of oppression and anti-colonialism. Hooshang Amirhadi has argued that ISIL aims to ‘dispel the demonizing humiliation that Muslims have suffered at the hands of the foreign powers and local dictators.’62 The humiliation is a consequence of the oppression of Muslims.
Amirhadi focusses mainly on the neo-colonial dimension of oppression and refrains from studying anti-colonial discourse in ISIL propaganda in depth. Sumaia Masoom calls colonialism a ‘catalyst’ for the rise of ISIL.63 Besides the legacy of colonialism, Masoom also
notes that ISIL ‘deracializes and denationalizes the religious mission’, whilst acknowledging that alienation of Muslim women in Western countries can push them towards radicalization.64
She concludes that Dabiq contains an anti-colonial emphasis.65
2.5 Conclusion: Jihadism and anti-colonialism?
The formulation of anti-colonialism and fight against oppression has been present throughout the history of Jihadism. Jihad from the beginning exhibited flashes of colonialism and anti-oppression. Under Qutb the oppressors of the Islamic faith were the apostate regimes in the Middle East, who protected the interests of Western regimes. The regimes were referred to as the ‘near enemy’. Bin Laden moved the focus of Jihadism away from the ‘near enemy’ to the ‘far enemy’. The Western states were regarded by Bin Laden as the guardians of the oppressors of Muslims in the Middle East and should therefore be targeted. The notice of anti-colonialism and anti-oppression was however lost by scholars when ISIL emerged in the wake of the Arab spring. ISIL’s ideology and strategy was revolutionary on many fronts. Scholars and academics have uncovered numerous new narratives in Dabiq and other ISIL propaganda, but did not study anti-colonial discourse. This thesis seeks to find if anti-colonial and anti-oppression discourses are also present in ISIL propaganda.
61 Bindner, ‘The Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France’, 12-14.
62 H. Amirahmadi, ‘ISIS is the Product of Muslim Humiliation and the New Geopolitics of the Middle East’ Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs (7 April 2015)
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles_papers_reports/729 (21-12-2018)
63Masoom, ‘A Colonial Catalyst: Reverberations of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in the Rise of ISIS.’ 64 Ibidem.
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3. The anti-colonial discursive framework.
This chapter seeks to explain the concept of anti-colonial discourse and its place in postcolonial thinking. Several terms need explaining. First and foremost, the preference of the term anti-colonial over anti-imperialist/post-anti-colonial. In this thesis, I will use the term anti-anti-colonial to indicate the sentiments in the discourse, because it is closest to the anti-colonial discursive framework, focusses on the struggle against all oppressive and dominating factors and because the precise definition and term was used by the Third World leaders after World War II. The first paragraph positions anti-colonialism in the academic debates of postmodernism and postcolonialism. After having established its position, I explore the meaning and impact of anti-colonial discourse. Subsequently the anti-colonial discourse is operationalised along the lines of the anti-colonial discursive framework of George Sefa Dei and Ali Asgharzadeh. This thesis includes one extra dimension- the rhetoric on Western/colonial crimes. The anti-colonial discursive framework is also clarified by the addition of historical quotes from anti-colonial leaders and thinkers. Lastly, the use of anti-colonial discourse to analyse ISIL propaganda is reconsidered.
3.1 On postcolonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism.
Postcolonialism is at a crossroad of concepts. Many scholars have regarded postcolonialism as a part of the larger postmodern movement since the 1980’s.66 However, the post- and
anti-colonial discourses differ significantly from postmodern language, that is as good as non-existent in Jihadi propaganda. Postcolonialism, however, originated years before postmodernism did. Postcolonialism came up as a school of thought in the sixties and sought to research the cultural legacy and human consequences of the control and exploitation of colonized people through colonialism and imperialism.67 Thus, post-colonialists study the
relation between social and political power and colonialism. The reason that postcolonialism is regarded as part of the postmodern movement is that both paid more attention to marginalized groups.
The term ‘postcolonialism’ is disputed. As reasoned by Ato Quayson, it is not even possible to speak of a postcolonial world, despite almost all the former colonies being
66 A. Quayson, ‘Postcolonialism’ Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998) https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/postcolonialism/v-1. (27-12-2018) 67 A. Quayson, ‘Postcolonialism’.
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independent.68 The colonial relations may not exist anymore in territorial terms, but still do
through economic domination and cultural imperialism. Also, their independence has not granted most of the former colonies significantly more power and influence on the stage of global politics.69 The definition ‘anti-imperialism’ is an adverse reaction to the economic and
cultural activities of Western countries overseas. Although a historical phenomenon, anti-imperialism is often seen in the light of the struggle against contemporary overseas activities by Western countries. Moreover, anti-imperialism concentrates on the territorial and economical exploitation rather than the oppression as a larger mechanism.
3.2 The anti-colonial discursive framework.
Anti-colonialism is related to postcolonialism and anti-imperialism, but is not synonymous to the two. Historically anti-colonialism means the struggle against imperialism and colonialism in overseas territories.70 This struggle originated in the 19th century, but the theoretical side of
anti-colonialism only arrived in the 1950’s. As more African and Asian countries gained independence their political leaders kept expressing their concerns over colonialism and oppression. Moving away from the historical definition, the definition of anti-colonialism includes ‘all forms of dominating and oppressive relationships that emerge from structures of power and privilege inherent and embedded in contemporary social relations’.71 This rhetoric
of the anti-colonial leaders has been conceptualized in the anti-colonial discursive framework by George Sefa Dei and Ali Asgharzadeh. The anti-colonial discursive framework is ‘an epistemology of the colonized, anchored in the indigenous sense of collective and common colonial consciousness’, Sefa Dei states.72 It is a critique of ‘wholesale denigration,
disparagement, and discard of tradition and culture in the name of modernity and global space’ in order to counter the repressive presence of colonial oppression.73 Anti-colonial discourse
differs from post-colonial discourse in the sense that it offers more perspectives than just the victimization of the colonized and hatred of the former colonizers.74 Therefore I prefer
68 A. Quayson, ‘Problems with the term ‘postcolonialism’ in: Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy (1998) https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/postcolonialism/v-1/sections/problems-with-the-term-postcolonialism (27-12-2018)
69 J. Sartre, On colonialism and neocolonialism (1964) 40.
70 J. Elam, ‘Anticolonialism’ University of Virginia (27-12-2017) https://globalsouthstudies.as.virginia.edu/key-concepts/anticolonialism (27-12-2018)
71 Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh. The power of social theory.’, 308. 72 Ibidem, 300.
73 Ibidem, 301. 74 Ibidem, 300-301.
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colonial over postcolonial in the light of ISIL propaganda. However, I will incorporate these two postcolonial factors in this research as an addition to the anti-colonial framework under the dimension of Anger because of Western crimes. Although the discussion on anti-colonialism is still relevant and ongoing, there are very few frameworks to analyse the discourse. The most notable one is presented by George Sefa Dei and Alireza Asgharzadeh. They list five recurring dimensions in anti-colonial discourse. However, I will incorporate the two postcolonial factors of victimization and hatred in this research as an addition to the anti-colonial framework under the dimension of Western crimes. Besides the fact that anti-anti-colonial leaders also remembered Western crimes, these statements have the power to mobilize people and propel them to action. Just as the aim of the anti-colonial framework is. Moreover, the demonstration of Western crimes serves as a critique of an oppressive method. For these reasons I propose the addition of a sixth dimension to the anti-colonial framework: Anger because of Western crimes. I will clarify the dimensions with excerpts from famous anti-colonial speeches and works such as Patrice Lumumba’s Congolese independence speech, Kwame Nkrumah’s speech on neocolonialism and Sukarno’s opening speech at the Bandung conference of 1955.
3.3 Six dimensions of the anti-colonial discursive framework
1. Empowerment of the colonized.
The first dimension of anti-colonial discourse seeks to empower and identify the colonized people and celebrate their strategic significance in the world.75 This empowerment drags the
colonized out of the inferior position and strengthens the belief in their capabilities. The colonized were long denied their own identity and authenticity, but the anti-colonial discourse gives them exactly that. In the revolutions leading to independence many colonized people were unified under the banner of nationalism. Nationalism however soon became problematic in the eyes of the anti-colonialists. The difficult relation between nationalism and the postcolonial identity has been described by amongst others Franz Fanon. He described nationalism as a doubled-edged sword. On the one side nationalism can unify the people of a country against colonialism. On the other side it limits the struggle for liberation to a country’s
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borders, in a fight where international solidarity is needed.76 The greater goal was not national
liberation, but international consciousness of the colonised people:
‘It is national liberation which leads the nation to play its part on the stage of history. It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows.’ 77
Fanon did foresee an important role for nationalism, but saw it as a means of establishing international consciousness. Also the postcolonial elite was aware of the problem of nationalism in the struggle against (neo)colonialism and fostered cooperation with neighbouring countries. Asian-African countries worked together to emphasize their common identity through education, cultural promotion and by ‘ideologies’, Arabism and Pan-Africanism for example.78
2. The continuity of colonialism
Second is the continuity of colonialism and colonial relations. Anti-colonial theory emphasizes that with the process of decolonization, the legacy and presence of colonialism has not come to an end.79 Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh mainly argue that the ‘post’ of colonialism is misplaced
because many relations of domination and oppression are not dubbed colonial, but solely European colonialism was.80 This thesis however chooses to focus on the other reason
colonialism is regarded as remaining: the persistence and new means of colonial relations, termed neo-colonialism. The disruption that postcolonialism assumes has not occurred. The colonial relations still hold for millions of people and dozens of countries.81 The relations of
power and domination between the West and the colonized countries have not yet perished. The former colonies may be free from direct political rule, but modern imperialism and colonialism manifests itself also in different forms. Western states still hold a large amount of influence over the Third World through financial, economic, cultural and even political means. Indonesian president Sukarno stated that the leaders should be aware of this new form:
76 F. Fanon, ‘Reciprocal Bases of National Culture and the Fight for Freedom’ Marxists.org (Date of Publication unknown) https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/fanon/national-culture.htm (27-12-2018)
77 Fanon, ‘Reciprocal Bases of National Culture and the Fight for Freedom’.
78 G. Sefa Dei, ‘Reclaiming our Africanness in the disaporized context: The challenge of asserting a critical African personality.’ The Journal of Pan African Studies 4 10 (2012) 48.
79 Sefa Dei, ‘The power of social theory’, 304. 80 Ibidem, 307-308.
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‘And, I beg of you do not think of colonialism only in the classic form which we of Indonesia, and our brothers in different parts of Asia and Africa, knew. Colonialism has also its modern dress, in the form of economic control, intellectual control, actual physical control by a small but alien community within a nation. It is a skilful and determined enemy, and it appears in many guises. It does not give up its loot easily. Wherever, whenever and however it appears, colonialism is an evil thing, and one which must be eradicated from the earth’.82
Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah even states that neo-colonialism might go as far as the garrison of troops on the territory of an independent country.83 In his book Neo-colonialism:
the last stage of imperialism Nkrumah lists the mechanisms of military and economic
neo-colonialism. Besides the garrison of Western troops Nkrumah mentions the use of aircraft and the involvement of security services.84 Jack Woddis states that neo-colonialism is also practiced
through the dominance of Western culture and political alliances in postcolonial states.85
Laurence Binder points towards the remaining French influence -both politically and economically- in Muslim lands as a source of grievances towards the former colonial power.86
The fact that many of the dictators in the Middle East were supported by Western states is also seen as prolonged Western imperialism. Support for the so-called ‘apostate regimes’ and ‘puppets’ is in the eyes of many Jihadist nothing more than a way for the West to maintain political influence in the Middle East countries.87 A mention to the words ‘apostate regime’
and ‘puppets’ therefore already carries some reference towards the continuity of colonial presence.
82 Sukarno. ‘Opening Address given by Sukarno at the Bandung Conference’ CVCE.EU (18 April 1955) www.cvce.eu/s/3o (21-03-2018)
83 K. Nkrumah, ‘Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism.’ Marxists.org (1965)
https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nkrumah/neo-colonialism/introduction.htm (27-12-2018) 84 Nrkumah, ‘Neo-Colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism.’
85 J. Woddis, An introduction to neo-colonialism. (1967) 61-62. 86 Bindner, ‘The Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France.’, 5. 87 Ibidem, 5.
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3. Race and racism
Third is the anti-colonialist emphasis on race, racism and xenophobia.88 The anti-colonial
discursive framework argues that race as a social fact has a massive impact on life and this negative impact needs to be countered. The problem was mainly addressed, but racism is also countered and equality is advocated. The anti-colonial discourse emphasizes how the colonists exercised racism in the colonies, but also mentions racism in Western societies. During his Congolese independence speech Lumumba famously pointed at the Belgian racism by stating
‘that the black was addressed as "tu", not because he was a friend, but because the polite "vous" was reserved for the white man?’89 The anti-racist discourse was meant to unify
people and together join the fight against racial oppression. It showed to the people of oppressed races that they were fighting the same struggle. They had to stand together in that fight.
4. Marxist rhetoric
Fourth is the discourse of class oppression and Marxism in anti-colonial thought. The working class is being oppressed by the capitalist system, according to Marxist theory. In common with Marxist ideology, anti-colonialism recognizes the necessity of solidarity for the collective struggle against colonial oppression.90 Another aspect of the Marxist discourse is the claim that
the new independent postcolonial state will guarantee a better socio-economic future for all their citizens. The postcolonial leaders rarely mentioned Marx or other Communist academics. Despite this Marxist rhetoric postcolonial leaders at first often publicly distanced themselves from the communist bloc, claiming to be non-aligned in the Cold War. They did however, aspire to provide goods and services to all their people and claim to serve social justice. An example of this can be found in Lumumba’s independence speech and Soekarno’s opening speech at the Bandung conference. Lumumba told the audience that ‘together we shall establish
social justice and ensure for every man a fair remuneration for his labour.’91 Also note the use
of the word ‘together’. Emphasizing the group identity and the strength of a nation with a unified people is an important aspect of Marxist discourse.
88 Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh, ‘The power of social theory.’308.
89 P. Lumumba, ‘Speech at the ceremony of the proclamation of the Congo’s independence’ (30-06-1960) https://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/lumumba/1960/06/independence.htm (21-03-2018)
90 Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh, ‘The Power of Social Theory.’, 312.
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5. Feminism and sexuality
Fifth, the concern of the anti-colonialists with feminism, sexual morals, LBGT-rights and family roles. Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh argue that besides being women and LGBT-minorities being the oppressed groups, Western feminism and sexual ideologies can be viewed as oppressive by others. Anti-colonialism opposes the western feminist insensitivity to the needs and experiences of non-white and non-western women.92 Non-western countries view upon
western feminism and emancipation as a form of patriarchy and domination. As recent as 2014 the Iranian ayatollah Khamenei caused controversy over the Western views and his views on feminism, stating that Western feminism is a ‘Zionist complot’ to undermine the non-Western
societies. He claimed that although women and men are equal, Western feminism has led to the ‘collapse and humiliate’ their primary roles of women as housewives and mothers.’93
Criticism of Western feminism was not a regular habit of anti-colonial leaders, but the preservation of family traditions was a bigger concern. The difference between the Western vision and the anti-colonial vison on the role of women and family becomes clear in the African Charter on Human Rights and People Rights (ACHPR) from 1981. There the family is described as the ‘natural unit and basis of society’.94 One unique aspect of the African Charter
is that every individual has duties, in contrast to the universal and European charters on Human Rights. The first article of chapter II. Duties states that ‘every individual shall have duties towards his family and society’.95 Behind this idea of duties towards the family shelters the
longing of anti-colonialists for more traditional family roles. To illustrate, these duties embrace ‘to preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family; to respect his parents at all times, to maintain them in case of need.’96
In a broader definition of feminism in the anti-colonial discursive framework Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh also array the struggle of women against male dominance, patriarchy and paternalist dominance. According to the authors ‘not only global imperialistic tendencies are to be resisted and combated, but equally important, colonialist and paternalist approaches within one's own country, town, and community are to be challenged and subverted’ by those
92 Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh, ‘The Power of Social Theory.’, 315.
93 L. Dearden, ‘Iran’s Supreme Leader claims gender equality is 'Zionist plot' aiming to corrupt role of women in society.’ The Independent (21-3-2017) http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/iran-supreme-leader-ayatollah-khamenei-gender-equality-women-zionist-plot-society-role-islamic-a7641041.html (21-03-2018)
94 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.’ Achpr.org (1987) http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/ (27-12-2018) 6.
95 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, ‘African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.’, 8. 96 Ibidem, 8.
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who use the anti-colonial discourse to propel people to action.97 Therefore the anti-colonial
discourse is also used by those who strive for women’s emancipation. This of course seems odd in the context of ISIL. However, after a closer examination it is not, as explained in the fifth chapter of this thesis.
6. Anger because of Western crimes
Furthermore, anti-colonialists also refer to the crimes committed by the Western nations during the occupation of the colonial territories. This kind of framing of history can be used by groups to foster (ethnic) conflict, as explained by Vamik Volkan in his book Blood lines. Volkan states that history fuels agony towards other parties.98 Anti-colonial leaders often pointed to the
suffering under Western colonisation. In his independence speech reminded the audience of the pain suffered under the Belgian regime: ‘
We have experienced the atrocious sufferings, being persecuted for political convictions and religious beliefs, and exiled from our native land: our lot was worse than death itself.’99
Therefore, I add Volkan’s theory on the uses of history as a fuel for conflict to the anti-colonial framework provided Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh. Colonial policies were not only criticised by the postcolonial leaders, but also by thinkers of the time and still by extremists nowadays. Laurence Bindner argues that ‘France’s colonial past is regularly recalled with bitterness, thus feeding grievances among the children of non-Western immigrants’.100 He quotes an audio
release of al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri that can instil grievance among non-western immigrants:
‘The same French [person] who had killed your forefathers, occupied your lands, and tortured your ancestors. Teach [them] a lesson whose bitterness and pain they will narrate for generations to come”.101
97 Sefa Dei and Asgharzadeh, ‘The Power of Social Theory.’, 316.
98 V. Volkan, Blood Lines: from ethnic pride to ethnic terrorism (1998) 280.
99 Lumumba, ‘Speech at the ceremony of the proclamation of the Congo’s independence’. 100 Bindner, ‘Jihadists’ Grievance Narratives against France’, 5.
