The framing of violent right-wing extremism in Germany and the Netherlands: a comparative analysis

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The framing of violent right-wing extremism in Germany

and the Netherlands: a comparative analysis

Name: Felix Pieter Alkema Student number: s1520059

Supervisor: Daan Weggemans, MSc Second Reader: Dr. Bart Schuurman

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Abstract

Violent right-wing extremism is on the rise across Europe. The acts of violence vary from assault to terrorist attacks. Nevertheless, the framing of violent right-wing extremism differs per state. Both Germany and the Netherlands have seen violent right-wing extremism in the past years. This thesis aims to answer the following question: How is violent right-wing extremism framed in the policies of Germany and the Netherlands between 2000 and 2017, and how can this be explained? To analyse and answer this question, the annual reports of the ‘Algemene Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst’ and the ‘Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’ are subject to a two-way analysis. First, the dimension of the problem is displayed with the usage of a content analysis. Violent right-wing extremism and other related terms are used to picture out this very dimension. Consequently, a discourse analysis is conducted to find out which frames are constructed. Based on the results from the research it is safe to say that there are major differences in how violent right-wing extremism is framed in the Netherlands and Germany. In Germany, frames like recruitment, violence, and terrorism can be found. In the Netherlands frames like ‘Lonsdale jongeren’ and terrorism are found. The most important reason for this difference is that violent right-wing extremism is a much bigger problem in Germany than it is in the Netherlands. Since the number of cases is limited, there is room for further research by expanding the research to other interesting cases such as Sweden, the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and Greece.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Introduction

Recently, Alexander Gauland, party leader of the ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ (AFD) called the German Nazi regime ‘Ein Volgeschiss in 1000 Jahre Deutsche Geschichte’ (Welt, 2018); a minor issue in the German history. Yet the terrorist attacks in Bologna, Munich, Christchurch, Enschede, Oklahoma City, Oslo, and Utøya show that violent right-wing extremism is not merely a minor issue, but a threat that spreads murder and mayhem. Moreover, the so-called ‘National Sozialistischer Untergrund’ (NSU), formed by Uwe Böhnhardt, Uwe Mundlos, and Beate Zschäpe, was able to murder random foreigners, terrorize and rob unabated across Germany for more than 15 years (Busch, 2013, 227-233; Koehler, 2014, 48).

Nonetheless, terrorism is not the only way in which violent right-wing extremism manifests itself. During the 1990s, Germany, in particular, saw a sudden surge of violent right-wing extremism. In cities as Rostock and Hoyerswerda, right-extremist mobs walked around the city and randomly attacked foreigners in the streets and in their houses (Butterwegge, 2003, 398). In Rostock, the public order was disturbed in 1992. About a thousand violent right-wing extremists protested against a new refugee centre. For days, riots went on and eventually a block where about a thousand Vietnamese people were sheltered was set on fire. No-one was killed but the potential catastrophe is of a massive scale (HAZ, 2018). One year earlier similar protests took place in Hoyerswerda (Butterwegge, 2003, 398; Krenz, 2016). Foreigners were only able to flee after heavily armed policemen came to evacuate them. In the city of Mölln, things escalated even more in 1992. Two Neo-Nazis threw Molotov cocktails against houses. The houses of the Aslan and Yilmaz family caught fire, killing two girls and their grandmother, while the rest of their family sustained serious injuries and long-term psychological damage (NDR, 2017).

When the refugee crisis hit Europe in 2014, violent right-wing extremism spiked in Europe (Koehler, 2016). People were dissatisfied with the influx of thousands of refugees. Subsequently, some of them organised themselves into organisations like PEGIDA (Thran & Boehnke, 2015) while others decided to make their voices heard with other means. In Germany, numerous refugee centres and refugees have been attacked by violent right-wing extremists (Koehler, 2016). The Netherlands encountered a similar situation, with both non-violent and

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violent protests against the arrival of refugees. The most violent act committed was an attack on a Mosque in Enschede, which the district attorney called an act of terror (Algemeen Dagblad, 2018).

However, the political reaction to these developments was, in contrast with Jihadist terrorism, rather mild. After most Jihadist terrorist attacks, politicians demanded and made new laws to counter the threat. Sometimes, this has even led to wars such as the ongoing war in Afghanistan. When it comes to violent right-wing extremism politicians seem to be reserved. This is partly caused by the way these crimes are treated. Since, violent right-wing extremists and violent right-wing terrorists are often treated as minor criminals, whose criminal offenses are often downplayed in court (Koehler, 2019, 11-12). Hence, violent right-wing extremists seem to get away with milder sentences than for instance Jihadis that were planning an attack (Koehler, 2019).

1.2 Research question and research goal

One way to explain the attention for certain issues is through the lens of policy-framing. Framing occurs when individuals, media or politicians are trying to make sense of a certain issue (Chong & Druckman, 2007, 106). As such, framing can be seen as how individuals perceive their social reality. In connection with violent right-wing extremism, framing is thus a way to define the concept as either an issue or a non-issue. Policy-framing, then, revolves around the question of how policymakers and governments create their frames on certain issues and how they are trying to convince the general public of such frames (Rein & Schön, 1996). Subsequently, violent right-wing extremism can be seen through numerous lenses, which will be the main focus of this thesis. Therefore, the research question for this thesis is as follows: How is violent right-wing extremism framed in the policies of Germany and the Netherlands between 2000 and 2017, and how can this be explained?

In order to answer this question, a mixed-methods design and a comparative case study will be used. Germany and the Netherlands have been chosen as cases because these states are, according to Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2011), fruitful grounds for violent right-wing extremism. Heitmeyer argues that right-wing extremists are not represented in parliament, which makes it more likely to turn to violence as a means of expression or representation. Therefore, chapter five will count terms associated with violent right-wing extremism in the annual reports of the intelligence services in both the Netherlands and Germany. This, to provide a clear overview of the extent of violent right-wing extremism in both states. In chapter six a discourse analysis

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will get into more detail on how violent right-wing extremism is framed by the intelligence services. There is no explicit policy framing but the intelligence services findings can serve as a prelude to actual policies. Hence, policy framing is the main theory that will be used to analyse the findings of the intelligence services.

1.3 Researching policy frames and right-wing extremism

In general, terrorism has been extensively researched since the 9/11 attacks in New York (Schuurman, 2019). Bart Schuurman (2019, 14) argues that the field of terrorism research is dominated by research into Jihadist terrorism. Consequentially, scholarship on other forms of terrorism remains underdeveloped. Schuurman (2014, 8) shows that between 2007 and 2016 almost 75% of terrorism research is focused on Jihadist terrorism; terrorist attacks carried out by right-wing extremists only accounts for 1,9% of the research. Hence, it is not surprising that Jacob Ravndal (2016, 4) notes that the field of right-wing extremism is only marginally represented in academic literature. Daniel Koehler (2019, 3) builds forth on this assumption and argues that right-wing extremism is actually a significantly larger problem than as it is portrayed at the moment. In fact, of all terrorist attacks in the United States (US) between 2010 and 2017 the majority were carried out by right-wing extremists (Serwer, 2018).

Right-wing extremism does, however, appear in academic literature when there have been major incidents that resulted in large numbers of casualties. One of these exceptions were the attacks in Oslo and Utøya, where Anders Behring Breivik killed and wounded more than 100 people. The specific research is, however, focused mainly on uncovering when and why attacks occur and how someone turns into a right-extremist terrorist (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2018, 1). There is, however, much less attention for the public and political perception of violent right-wing extremism.

Subsequently, questions like ‘what is the public perception of violent right-wing extremism?' or 'what does this mean for political connotations?’ deserve to be highlighted. These questions remain largely absent in academic research and therefore underline the necessity, hence relevance, to study this field more closely. This thesis will start to attempt to fill this knowledge gap. The answers to the aforementioned research question, then, show how the intelligence services define the problem and eventually what policies are used to counter the violent right-wing extremist threat. Consequently, this thesis will provide wider insight into the dynamics that are involved in the framing of violent right-wing extremism.

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1.4 Reading guide

The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapters two and three are the theoretical framework of this thesis. Chapter two will revolve around the concepts of framing and policy framing. Chapter three will elaborate on the meaning and the history of violent right-wing extremism and address the relevant policies. The aforementioned chapter will be concluded with an expectation that helps answer the research question. Chapter four is reserved for the methodology. The first section of this chapter elaborates on the research method used, thereafter the case selection and the methods of data collection will be discussed. The chapter will be concluded with the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the main concept. Chapter five will portray the results of the content analysis while chapter six is reserved for the results of the discourse analysis. Chapter seven will answer the research question and propose avenues for future research in the field of violent right-wing extremism.

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Chapter 2: From framing to framing theory

2.1 Introduction

This chapter will start with an explanation of framing. Framing theory is particularly interesting because it shows how individuals and Organisations engage in the definition and solving of problems. Framing is a concept that is essentially contested and is thus viewed from different angles (Chong & Druckman, 2007, 106). Dennis Chong and James Druckman (2007, 106) argue that framing refers to the process by which people, policymakers, and media develop a specific conceptualisation of an issue and if needed reorient their thinking. Hence, framing theory can be used to explain how violent right-wing extremism is framed by the intelligence services in the Netherlands and Germany.

First, the emergence and the use of framing in various disciplines will be discussed. Later, the leap from framing to the study of policies is made. This part on policy framing is of vital importance to understand the analysis of this thesis since the policy framing process in both the Netherlands and Germany will be analysed. The chapter will end with a section that will amplify how this chapter relates to the research question and what theory will be used in the analysis of the data.

2.2 The history of framing

The idea of framing dates back to the 1950s when ecologist Gregory Bateson observed monkeys biting each other (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2011, 3). Bateson argued that the monkeys bit each other for two reasons, they were either fighting or playing. Subsequently, Bateson argued that the monkeys had to use some way of communicating their intentions, this is what Bateson called framing – i.e., differentiating between fighting and playing frames (in van Hulst & Yanow, 2011, 3). This notion of framing was then appropriated by other scholars in the 1970s. Erving Goffman (1974, 10) is one of the scholars who further developed the concept of framing. Goffman (1974, 10) argued that framing is how individuals perceive, interpret, and portray their social reality to others (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2011, 4).

Subsequently, this notion of framing was picked up by scholars who studied the development of social movements. These scholars were particularly interested in the way how some movements were able to attract more attention than others (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2011, 4).

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These social movements, then, strategically altered their positions towards certain frames to enhance the creation of coalitions with other movements on certain frames (Benford & Snow, 2000, 623-626). A frequently used example is the West-German movement against the establishment of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). In order to attract more attention and new members, they sought coalitions with movements for peace and ecology (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). Therefore, these different groups aligned their frames to reach their goals (Gerhards & Rucht, 1992). Nancy Fraser (2007, 89), on the other hand, uses framing to describe how globalization has had an impact on justice. Fraser argues that the state-centric frame has become undermined by millions of individual frames that seek justice in a globalized world. Hence, it is evident that framing is present in almost every academic field of research. Consequently, framing can be used to research violent right-wing extremism.

2.3 Framing and policy

Theorists such as Goffman(1974) and Donald Schön and Martin Rein (1996) started to roll out framing theory in the area of policy studies. Rein and Schön (1996, 88-91) identify four ways to look at frames. The first way is to look at a frame as an underlying structure. Rein and Schön (1996, 88) argue that as a house, the frame is not visible, but it is the underlying structure of the construct. In this sense, the structure is the core idea of a frame, which does imply that there is a sense of inadaptability.

The second way to look at a frame corresponds with the views of Goffman. Who states that there is a stream of events and information, which may be stopped for analysis anytime. The selected segment of the stream of information and events is then framed to analyse what happened in this segment (Rein & Schön, 1996, 89). The third way to look at a frame is by seeing it as a scheme of interpretation. Individuals label events that affect their living space or the world. If these events are deemed meaningful, frames start to function and guide appropriate actions (Rein & Schön, 1996, 89). Finally, one can regard frames as strong and generic narratives, which guide both analysis and action (Rein & Schön, 1996, 89). This means that both the analysis of the problem and the possible ways to resolve it are part of the frame (Rein & Schön, 1996, 89). The strength of seeing frames as a generic narrative is that a narrative is able to flexibly absorb changes in its timeline. It is, therefore, possible to add events or change the timeline significantly without the frame being changed.

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2.4 Policy Frames

Rein and Schön (1996, 89-91) argue that the first two options are not suitable for the framing of policy, because these two options are unable to cope with change. The schema of interpretation and the frames as narrative, on the other hand, are capable to deal with changes in the storyline, which makes them useful for the framing of policy (Rein & Schön, 1996, 91). Policy frames, however, are not constructed by themselves. It is therefore important to note that policy frames need to be constructed. Constructing a frame can be prone to ambiguity because one problem can be solved in different ways (Rein & Schön, 1996, 90).

To circumvent the problem of ambiguity, Rein and Schön (1996) propose to distinguish between the two main players in the policy debate. On the one hand, there are policy critics or frame sponsors which can be placed into the rhetorical frame (Rein & Schön, 1996, 90). The policy practitioners, on the other hand, are the ones who practice policy. In other words, they design and implement policies. Rein and Schön (1996, 91) call this group the action frame. In addition, it is crucial to understand that the difference of the frames is not based on the reference to action. Instead, Rein and Schön (1996, 91) argue that the main difference lies in the evidence on which a frame is constructed.

In this sense, Rein and Schön (1996, 90-91) argue that rhetorical frames subtract their evidence from policy-relevant texts that are pivotal in the policy discourse. The context of the discourse is often dominated by debate, persuasion or justification (Rein & Schön, 1996, 91). These labels can only be found in texts, which may be speeches or essays written by politicians, policy intellectuals and advocates. The next question, according to Rein & Schön (1996, 91) is to uncover how the writer – and thus the criticaster – or the policymaker makes the normative leap from what is to what ought to be? To do so, the language used in the text is of vital importance (Rein & Schön, 1996).

Contrarily, action frames are constructed in a different way. Here the observation of patterns takes centre stage. The main question that is posed is: what gives these patterns their coherence (Rein & Schön, 1996, 91)? Important features that determine the outcome of this question are the policy objects and the behaviour through which practitioners enact policies (Rein & Schön, 1996).

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2.5 Policy framing

Despite the pledge of Rein and Schön (1996) that their model is able to cope with such dynamics, other authors argue that this is not the case. Merlijn van Hulst and Dvora Yanow (2009, 8;2016) argue that the approach of Rein and Schön was not dynamic enough since it did not take the human factors that contribute to policy framing into account. Therefore, Van Hulst and Yanow propose to add some concepts that make policy framing more dynamic such as naming, selecting, sense-making, and storytelling.

Van Hulst and Yanow (2016, 98) argue that the framing of a situation or issue automatically leads to a stage of sense-making. In a broader sense, this relates to what Rein and Schön call the ‘normative leap’, which means that a frame is being constructed. In other words, a situation occurred and people within the frame ask themselves what has happened and what ought to be (Rein & Schön, 1996; Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). The difference that Van Hulst and Yanow make is that the sense-making stage is characterized by intersubjectivity instead of individual sense-making. The essence of this intersubjectivity is that policymakers engage is some kind of conversation with the situation (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, 98). As such, language, certain events, actors and objects are vital to the construction of a frame. Sense-making is thus the way how and why policymakers interpret a situation.

The second step in a more dynamic way of policy framing is called selecting, naming and categorizing. Naming was already introduced by Rein and Schön and refers to the process of naming what is to be framed (Van Hulst &Yanow, 2016, 99). Van Hulst and Yanow (2016, 99) also modify this practice by adding selecting and categorizing. To illustrate, Van Hulst and Yanow (2016, 99) use the example of migration policy in western Europe. This topic encompasses all three concepts. It selects the issues that the framer wants to address being migration. It names what is to be framed being migration policy and it categorizes the area being western Europe. With these three features, policymakers are able to establish patterns that guide the course of action (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, 100).

The third and last step is to add a more dynamic approach to policy framing is storytelling. Storytelling usually consists of three steps. First, the audience needs to be made aware of a problem that occurred. Second, the ‘framer’ explains what will be done to address this problem. Lastly, the framer has to shed light on what an ideal situation would look like in their eyes. Storytelling, thus, stresses the timeline in the policy process by addressing past, present, and future (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, 101). Yet, the model presented by Rein and Schön remains

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restricted to language as such, not incorporating notions of storytelling, which binds language together into a frame (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016, 100-101).

Accordingly, policy framing is conducted with the tools of selecting, naming, categorizing, storytelling and sensemaking. Of vital importance for framing still remains the policy issue at hand and their meaning for various issue-relevant stakeholders (Van Hulst & Yanow, 2016). However, these issue-relevant stake holders can also get into conflict with each other. This may be based on ideology or cultural issues, but possible solutions are marginalized or exempted in this line of thought. To create solutions, willingness to look at the issue together is needed. If this is successful, reframing can take place and the policy process can be revived (Van Hulst & Yanow, 1996, 102)

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that framing mostly deals with how individuals perceive and interpret their social reality. Later, Benford and Snow (2000) argued that the study of framing was also applicable to the question why some social movements gathered more attention than others. This spilled over to the area of policy studies. Policy framing relies on framing and reasoning devices. On the whole, it addresses the question what the problem is and how a problem should be dealt with. Van Hulst and Yanow(2016) build upon this idea. They developed a schema of steps that should be followed to create a policy frame. This schema is, in particular, useful if there is a frame at play that is not easy to identify. This is mostly the case with violent right-wing extremism because this problem is either not framed at all or very hard to detect in policy frames.

The model of Van Hulst and Yanow (2016) describes three steps that are essential in the process of policy framing. First, the audience needs to be made aware of a problem that occurred. This is done in front of an audience because the speaker is trying to convince others of his frame. Second, the ‘framer’ explains what needs to be done. Lastly, the framer has to shed light on how the ideal situation looks like. Storytelling, thus, stresses the timeline in the policy process by addressing past, present and, future (Van Hulst & Yanow, 101).

This three-step process will be the starting point for chapter six to find out how violent right-wing extremism is framed in the Netherlands and in Germany. It is used to analyse and map how policy framing is taking place in the annual reports of the intelligence services in the Netherlands and Germany. Ultimately, the results from the analysis will help to answer the research question. Naming, categorizing and selecting are not part of this process because this

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step has already been taken. Violent right-wing extremism is named as a problem while it is categorized and selected into the cases of Germany and the Netherlands. Similarly, sense-making is not included in the analysis because it is nearly the same as the first step of storytelling.

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Chapter 3: Violent right-wing extremism

3.1 Introduction

This chapter aims to clarify some issues that are related to violent right-wing extremism. First, the differences between right-wing extremism and violent right-wing extremism will be explored. Moreover, a definition of violent right-wing extremism will be proposed. The second part of this chapter will provide an overview of the multifaceted nature of violent right-wing extremism and how the use of violence has changed over time. The third part of the chapter will discuss the dynamics of the radicalisation process. This is of vital importance because it provides an insight into the dynamics and motivations that are part of the process to become a violent right-wing extremist. The fourth part of the chapter will provide an overview of policies that are dealing with violent right-wing extremism. This is of importance because it provides an overview of policies that are already in play. Ultimately, a conclusion will summarize the chapter and point out what is important for the analysis.

3.2 How are right-wing extremism and violent right-wing extremism defined

Right-wing extremism and violent right-wing extremism are both concepts that are contested amongst different scholars. Hence there is a debate on the actual meaning and scope of wing extremism and violent wing extremism. Pia Knigge (1998, 249) argues that right-wing extremism can be divided into two streams. The individual approach focuses on the individual belief system. Right-wing extremists reject pluralism, parliamentarianism, and egalitarianism. As such, the ever-growing multicultural society is something that right-wing extremist cannot accept. People that, for instance, do not match with the predominantly Christian society are considered to be unequal. Furthermore, Knigge (1998, 249), argues that right-wing extremists are in favour of a nationalist state that has a clear hierarchy that puts the minorities in the last place. Peter Sitzer and Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2008, 169) expand on this and argue that right-wing extremism is about the ‘devaluation’ of ethical and social minorities. Next to the individual approach, there is also a political approach. According to Knigge (1998, 249), this approach is mainly focussed on the political parties that have tendencies towards right-wing extremist foundations. This conceptualisation is, however, disputable because scholars cannot agree on when a political party is to be classified as right-wing extremist. Piero Ignazi (1992) argued that looking at the manifesto of a party and their political ideology could determine whether or not a party is right-wing extremist. Knigge (1998, 251) rejects this approach as insufficient.

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Hence, violent right-wing extremism builds forth on the definition of the individual approach. Right-wing extremists use protest marches and the public debate to bring across their message. In order to define violent right-wing extremism Daniel Koehler (2017,85) argues that a distinction between violent and non-violent crimes should be made. Right-wing extremist crimes are crimes that are motivated by ideological beliefs. Examples include the use of Nazi symbols, which are forbidden in Germany, and propaganda delicts (Koehler, 2017, 85). Violent right-wing extremist crimes, on the other hand, are committed with a right-wing extremist motivation that involves the use of violence. Hence, violent right-wing extremism involves the use of violence together with the right-wing extremist ideology (Koehler, 2017, 85-86). This violence manifests itself in crimes that range from assault to murder (Koehler, 2016; Falk & Zweimüller, 2005, 2).

3.3 Different forms of violent right-wing extremism.

Violent right-wing extremism consists of a broad scale of violence ranging from smaller violent crimes to terrorism. Koehler (2016, 92) argues that waves of violent right-wing extremism are discernible throughout history. Until the 1990s violent right-wing extremism manifested itself in roughly two forms. Smaller groups or cells carried out neatly planned bombings that were aimed to create chaos and attract attention for their cause (Koehler, 2016, 92). Next to bomb attacks, these groups or cells were also involved in targeted assassinations on politicians and civil servants (Koehler, 2016, 92). After the 1990s, the level of organisation within violent right-wing extremist groups declined, yet more individuals were involved with right-wing extremist activities as individual beings (Koehler 2016). In addition, the range of violent crimes gets broader as well. Koehler (2016, 93-95) notes that bombings and targeted assassinations made room for crimes like kidnapping, aggravated assault, and arson attacks. Moreover, these crimes do not only target people but also target objects that do not match with the right-wing extremist world view. Hence, especially mosques, refugees and refugee centres were attacked (Koehler, 2016).

Jakob Ravndal (2015, 21) attempts to create a typology of the most severe form of right-extremist violence: terrorism. Ravndal (2015, 21) differentiates between three groups: elite-sponsored groups, subcultural networks, and lone actors. Elite-elite-sponsored groups are characterized by a hierarchy and centralized leadership (Ravndal, 2015, 22). These groups emerged between the 1960s and the 1980s and were mostly engaged in international terrorism since migration was yet to become an issue (Ravndal, 2015). The name elite-sponsored already

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reveals what the main goal of these groups were. The campaigns were mostly aimed to reinstate authoritarian regimes and to make sure that their leftist counterparts would not get any political power (Ravndal, 2015, 22). Examples of these kind of right-extremist terror include the Wehrsportgruppe Hoffmann (WHS) which was behind one of the deadliest attacks conducted by right-extremists. In 1980 WHS bombed the Octoberfest in Munich which killed thirteen people and wounded over 200 people (Ravndal, 2015, 22). In the same year, the train station in Bologna was ravaged by a bomb that killed 85 people and left 200 people injured (Ravndal, 2015, 22). In both attacks, the aim was to prevent leftist groups from taking power or to overthrow them (Ravndal, 2015, 22).

Second, Ravndal (2015, 23) identifies subcultural networks, which followed in the wake of the elite-sponsored groups. In the late 1980s and the 1990s, (western) Europe experienced a large influx of migrants, which contributed to the rise of a violent skinhead culture across Europe. The difference between elite-sponsored groups and subcultural networks lies in the amount of support they receive. Where the former can receive widespread general support, the latter receive relatively little support beyond the bounds of their own networks (Ravndal, 2015, 23). Moreover, subcultural networks are mostly oriented at national events which means that they are rarely involved in international terrorism. Subcultural networks, therefore, aim their campaigns against migrants and their (extreme) left archenemy (Ravndal, 2015). In Germany, for instance, skinhead groups developed rapidly in the early nineties (McLaren, 1999, 166-169). Skinheads deliberately terrorized migrant neighbourhoods and their inhabitants. The acts escalated even further when migrant housing facilities were targeted with firebombs which lead to deaths and refugees were left with psychological and physical damage for the rest of their lives (McLaren, 1999, 166-170).

Ruud Koopmans (1996) identifies two generations of subcultural networks. The first generation fits into what McLaren described as blunt violence towards migrants. The bottom line of this first generation is characterized by mobs of skinheads that had only an small interest in ideology, with no overarching strategy (Koopmans, 1996; Ravndal, 205, 24). Alternatively, the second generation of subcultural networks was more organized but still lacked leadership. Their attacks were not only aimed towards migrants but also against the far-left and government targets (Ravndal, 2015, 24).

The third type of right-wing terrorism that Ravndal (2015, 24) describes are lone actors, meaning that attacks are planned and staged by a single person. Their motivation and

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inspiration, however, is triggered by already existing (political) movements and social networks. Examples of lone actors that committed right-extremist terror attacks are Timothy McVeigh, Anders Breivik and David Ali Sonboly (Langman, 2017, 12; Nesser, 2012, 61). McVeigh solely planned and carried out the attack on the FBI building in Oklahoma City in 1995 (Nesser, 2012). Breivik is responsible for the largest terrorist attack to happen in Norway. He first set-off a bomb in the centre of Oslo before moving on to Utøya where he killed 77 children who were part of the youth wing of a leftist party (Nesser, 2012). David Ali Sonboly was inspired by Breivik and to a lesser extent also by McVeigh (Langman, 2017). In 2016 Sonboly killed nine people in Munich of which seven had a non-German background (Langman, 2017).

3.4 How does one become a violent right-wing extremist?

Several authors have tried to answer the question of right-wing radicalisation. Wilhelm Heitmeyer (2011, 146) argued that political under-representation is a likely contributor to the emergence of violent right-wing extremism. Accordingly, right-wing extremists are looking for another way to bring across their opinion. One of these means is the use of violence (Heitmeyer, 2011).

Tore Bjørgo (2008, 31) applies a much more individual approach to the question why someone becomes a violent right-wing extremist. Hence, Bjørgo (2008) argues that political under-representation may contribute to the process of radicalisation but the motivation to join a violent right-wing extremist group can be explained with more individual and psychological factors. Most importantly, Bjørgo (2008, 33) argues that most people are looking for a sense of belonging because they have troubled relationships with their family. Hence, these individuals look for acceptance and friendship, within the violent wing extremist scene. The right-wing extremist scene is generally forthcoming to these individuals because they are easy to manipulate. Consequently, these individuals are useful means to the group’s ends (Bjørgo, 2008, 32).

Other, less psychological, factors that make people join violent right-wing extremist groups go more in the direction of thrill-seeking and anger. Some individuals join violent right-wing extremist groups to test their own limits (Bjørgo, 2008, 32). Anger is another motive to join violent right-wing extremist groups. Individuals are either angered by the behaviour of for instance immigrant groups or the perceived mistreatment by the government (Bjørgo, 2008, 32).

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3.5 Policies dealing with violent right-wing extremism

As mentioned previously, Daniel Koehler (2019, 1-4) argues that policy-wise, right-wing extremism is an under-researched topic. Furthermore, violent right-wing extremism is mostly misunderstood and deemed as a minor threat compared to Islamic terrorism that has been the centre of attention since the 9/11 attacks in New York. Koehler emphasizes this by pointing out that there are generally no policies that are aimed towards the prevention of violent right-wing extremism. This is what Koehler (2019, 11) describes as the double standard in dealing with political violence. Often, violent right-wing extremists can get away with their crimes. Right-wing terrorists are often not labelled and prosecuted as terrorists which effectively downplays the problem. Additionally, Koehler (2019, 11-12) proposes a whole new set of measures to counter violent right-wing extremism. These measures include the funding of research and the establishment of enhanced judicial measures to effectively prosecute violent right-wing extremist criminals. The Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) (2019) also laments that there are almost no policies that specifically target violent right-wing extremists. To mitigate this problem, the RAN network proposes a proper classification of violent right-wing extremist crimes and the involvement of local governments to counter radicalisation.

Existing policies dealing with violent right-wing extremism are often solely focused on an exit from the violent right-wing extremist scene. These so-called EXIT-programs are specifically targeted at people that want to leave the scene but need help. Several European states employ such EXIT-Programs (Demant, Stootman, Buijs & Tillie, 2008, 151). In some of the states, like Norway, the help extends also to families which can receive support to deal with the situation at hand (Demant et al., 2008, 150-158). In Sweden, on the other hand, the program is restricted to violent right-wing extremists. Apart from helping them out, the Swedish program also helps them to make new friends, find a job or restart their education. In addition, a contact person remains available, even when the program is not active anymore (Demant et al. 2008, 154). In Germany, there are multiple EXIT-programs that vary in size and scope (Demant et al., 2008, 156). Most of the programs are aimed at low-tier members of several groups. The only obligation that the leavers have, is to approach the exit-programs themselves. The degree of help varies from merely the basics required for an exit, to the holistic approaches as implemented in Norway and Sweden (Demant et al., 2008, 156). Germany, however, differs in one point. Unlike with lower-tier members, the security services actively approach leaders of

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groups to persuade them to leave because they are in danger when their expectations are not met (Demant et al., 2008, 156). The previous section has shown that there are some policies that try to deal with violent right-wing extremism. Most of these policies are, nevertheless, aimed at leavers that want to get out. Koehler (2019) and the RAN network (2019) emphasize that there are almost no policies aimed at preventing people from joining violent right-wing extremist groups in the first place. Hence, for the analysis, it is important to look for signs that indicate preventive policies or policies aimed at leaving.

3.6 Expectation

There are no real starting points in this chapter that may explain why there may be a difference in how violent right-wing extremism is framed. Some scholars made assumptions that the scale and scope of an attack or act of brutal violence has a positive effect on the (political) reaction (Overgaard, 1994; Sadler, Lineberger, Correll & Park, 2005). Therefore, the following expectation is drafted: it is expected that the scale and scope of violent right-wing extremism on a national level does influence the policy framing of violent right-wing extremism.

3.7 Conclusion

This chapter introduced what violent right-wing extremism is and how it manifests itself. Additionally, the chapter shed light on how one becomes involved with violent right-wing extremism and, what policies are in play in the field of violent right-wing extremism. The first part was devoted to defining violent right-wing extremism. Hence, violent right-wing extremism is a violent form of right-wing extremism where violence is used to make statements or where violent crimes are committed with a right-wing extremist background. The second part of this chapter shed light on how the use of violence changed over time. Before the 1990s, bombings and targeted assassinations of political rivals were the main modus operandi. Later violence was also used against objects that did not fit into the worldview of violent right-wing extremists. In addition, the range of violence was clarified, from assault to terrorism. This serves to narrow down the focus of the analysis. Hence, only violent right-wing extremist crimes that use violence are considered as violent right-wing extremism.

The last part emphasized how individuals turn into violent right-wing extremists and the policies that are in place to deal with violent right-wing extremists. Mostly, young people become violent right-wing extremists because of family related problems or pure anger at the system. What also plays an important role is that violent right-wing extremist groups use the uncertainty of possible recruits to win their trust by giving them a sense of belonging. On the

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entry side of the spectrum, there are almost no policies in place aimed to prevent potential extremists from joining in general.

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Chapter 4: Methodology

4.1 Introduction

The methodology section is the heart of every thesis. This is the part where the research method, research design, conceptualisation, and operationalisation lay the foundation for the analysis in chapters five and six. The chapter is divided into four sections that each have their own purpose. The first section revolves around the research method, which clarifies how which methods will be used to analyse the data. The second section revolves around the case selection where the choice for Germany and the Netherlands is outlined more detailed. The third section will go into more detail on how the data are collected and used. The final section is reserved for the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the main concept of this thesis.

4.2 Research method and strategy

The research method is mixed since there is both a quantitative and a qualitative element to this research. Adam Bryman (2015, 629) defines mixed research methods as methods where both quantitative and qualitative research methods cross the research strategies. In addition, the combination of both research methods should both contribute to the research in the sense that both methods lead to concrete findings (Bryman, 2015, 629).

In this thesis, chapter five will be reserved for the quantitative part. Here, the explicit mentioning of the term right-extremist violence in policy documents will be counted. Which means that this chapter is reserved for content analysis since content analysis revolves around the counting of specific terms (Bryman, 2012). The documents that will be collected for the analysis range from 2000 until 2017. 2000 was chosen since this marks the beginning of a new century. 2017 was chosen because the annual report for 2018 is not yet available for Germany, the report is however available for the Netherlands, but its inclusion would mean that the amount of collected data is not evenly distributed, possibly yielding a skewed outcome. The policy documents will consist of annual reports that are written by government agencies which are responsible for the monitoring of threats in their respective countries – i.e., Germany and The Netherlands. The results will be discussed and presented in a table which will provide a clear overview of the presence of right-wing extremist violence in Germany and the Netherlands. As such, the suppliers of the data need to be identified.

In Germany, the so-called ‘Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz’ (BfV), which translates into ‘federal constitution protection service’, is responsible for the collection of intelligence on a

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domestic level (Maaßen, 2017, 431). As former BfV director Hans-Georg Maaßen (2017) argues, the BfV is a vital spider in the web of the German security architecture. On an international level, Germany has the ‘Bundesnachrichtendienst’ (BND) and the ‘Militarischerabschirmdienst’ (MaD) which are responsible for the collection and analysis of intelligence that might pose a foreign threat to Germany. The only similarity they share is the absence of executive power, which means that they are not allowed to arrest and detain people of interest (Maaßen, 2017, 431).

By law, the BfV is tasked with defending the ‘Freiheitliche Demokratsiche Grundordnung’ which safeguards the democratic principles and the rule of law in the Federal Republic of Germany (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2019). In short, the ‘Freiheitliche Demokratische Grundordnung’ safeguards human rights, the right to vote, the separation of powers, the absence of violence in any form and also prevents the creation of an authoritarian state (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, 2019). Since violent right-wing extremism is aimed to destroy current political structures and to reinstate the Third Reich by means of violence (Heitmeyer, 2011), the BfV is tasked to stop them which makes their annual reports of vital importance for this research (Maaßen, 2017).

In the Netherlands, the security architecture is a bit different. Just like Germany, the Netherlands also had a foreign intelligence service and a domestic intelligence service. In 2002, both services were merged and the ‘Algemene Inlichtingen – en Veiligheidsdienst’(AIVD) was born (AIVD, 2019a). With this merger, the AIVD was tasked with both international and domestic intelligence gathering (AIVD, 2019b). As such, the AIVD is responsible for gathering intelligence concerning third states and the surveillance of extremist individuals and groups in the Netherlands (AIVD, 2019b).

Chapter six will go into more detail and will revolve around the question what discourse is used to frame violent right-wing extremism in the policy documents. As Van Hulst and Yanow (2009; 2016) already noted, discourse, or what they call storytelling, is of vital importance to constructing frames. Subsequently, the use of language is central in the sixth chapter which makes this the qualitative part of this thesis research.

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4.3 Case selection

The present analysis takes the form of a comparative case study. This means that selection has been undertaken based on the “theoretical prominence of a given case” (Seawright & Gerring, 2008, 295), rather than random sampling. Heitmeyer (2011) argued that right-extremists are more likely to turn violent when electoral success and representation are missing. Accordingly, some states are more prone to this development than others. Heitmeyer (2011, 14) argues that states with pluralist electoral systems especially fit because their nature prevents the extreme right from being represented. Hence, Heitmeyer’s argument is the starting point for the selection of the cases.

In Germany, the extreme far-right has had no political success or representation since the Second World War. The ‘Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands’ (NPD) is the ideological offspring of the NSDAP. The party never had any electoral success on a federal level (Ellian, Molier & Rijpkema, 2017, 1279). In fact, the constitutional court of Germany considered banning of the NPD because it was violating the ‘Freiheitliche Demokratische Grundordnung’ (Ellian et al., 2017). The constitutional court ruled that the NPD was unconstitutional but that it was highly unlikely that the NPD was able to carry out their plans and was therefore not forbidden. In addition, Germany has an active past with violent right-wing extremism.

The Netherlands finds itself in a similar situation. The PVV, the most right-wing party in parliament, made clear that violence is not a way to achieve political goals (Rodrigues & Wagenaar, 2010, 63). Violent right-wing extremists are thus not represented in parliament. Therefore, the Netherlands is likely to be prone to violent right-wing extremism according to Heitmeyer’s logic.

4.4 Data collection

According to Bryman (2015), interviews, content analysis, and discourse analysis are the most appropriate ways to collect data in a comparative case study. For the reliability and validity of the present analysis, it is of vital importance that the cases are subject to scrutiny in a more or less similar time frame (Bryman, 2012, 73-77; Rohlfing, 2013, 12). Moreover, the method of data collection should be the same so that other researchers are able to reproduce the study and get the same results (Bryman, 2012). Ingo Rohlfing (2013, 200) argues that case-studies should

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not aim to generalize to the complete population. Rather a case-study should aim to generalize to similar cases that fit into the research.

The problem with interviews is the uncertainty of response, although it would be an ideal way to see how frames are constructed since language is the most important way to frame something. The subject is however quite sensitive and persons of interest often work with classified information which they cannot share. Non-response from either or both the Netherlands and Germany is thus likely to occur which can lead to skewed data (Bryman, 2012). In addition, time is needed to conduct interviews properly. The time for this thesis is however limited, which makes the use of interviews nearly impossible. Therefore, interviews will not be used in this research.

Content analysis

Content analysis only looks for themes in certain texts, and not how these themes are constructed (Bryman, 2012, 559; Krippendorf, 2018, 404). In this research, content analysis is used to provide context on violent right-wing extremism in Germany and the Netherlands. Since content analysis is only aimed at identifying themes in texts, it is not usable for the analysing of how frames are constructed.

The overarching theme in this thesis is violent right-wing extremism. Hence, the primary search term that will be used is ‘violent right-wing extremism’. There are, however, several other terms that came up whilst reading the BfV and AIVD annual reports. According to Barabara Downe-Warmboldt (1992, 318), there is a difference between latent and manifest content analysis. In a latent content analysis, the researcher is looking at the underlying meaning of each text passage. In terms of coding, the underlying essence is coded (Downe-Warmboldt, 1992, 318). Manifest content analysis is aimed at the directly visible, which is then coded accordingly (Downe-Warmboldt, 1992, 318). Since chapter five is aimed at providing context, a manifest content analysis was conducted.

The coding in content analyses is either deductive or inductive. When using deductive coding, the coding is done before the data are gathered. When using inductive coding, on the other hand, the coding emerges from the data that are collected (Epstein & Martin, 2004, 2). In this specific research, there is a mix of deductive and inductive coding. The term violent right-wing extremism is the overarching search term which has been chosen before the data are gathered. While reading, other terms emerged that were of relevance, which then are the search terms

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that are coded inductively. Hence, the following terms, next to violent right-wing extremism, are part of the content analysis:

Table 1: Counting scheme

German Dutch English translation

Rechtsextremistische (r) Gewalt (taten)

Rechtsextremistisch geweld Violent right-wing extremism

Rechtsextremismus Rechtsextremisme Right-wing extremism

(Anders) Breivik (Anders) Breivik Breivik

Terrorismus Terrorisme Terrorism

NSU NSU NSU

Right-wing extremism, Breivik, right-wing terrorism, and NSU are the inductive search terms that came up while reading the report. Right-wing extremism has been chosen because the term is very useful to illustrate the size of violent right-wing extremism in both cases. Terrorism has been chosen because it is the most severe form of violent right-wing extremism. Moreover, the term terrorism is chosen deliberately because the reports only mentioned this term and not right-wing terrorism specifically. Hence, every hit for the word terrorism in the respective chapters on right-wing extremism has been closely examined to determine whether or not it concerned right-wing terrorism. Breivik and the NSU are part of the search terms because they both reoccurred in several reports which can be related to the major outreach that these groups and individuals had. Terms like Hitler and McVeigh are also very useful terms but they both fall out of the time span of the research and were not mentioned in the reports.

The results of the counting will be compared with each other, which already gives away the design: a comparative case study since the results from each case are compared with each other. Furthermore, Robert K. Yin (2003, 5-7) argues that a case study is very useful to answer the research questions that seek explanations of behaviour or phenomena between one or a number of cases. A comparative case study, then, seeks to find explanations for differences between two or more cases (Bryman, 2012, 72-76). Moreover, the researcher is able to analyse and account for different causal mechanisms in the cases. Subsequently, it is possible to show where

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the two cases show differences in observations (Bryman, 2012, 74-74). Therefore, this research method is ideal to find the differences in the policy framing of right-extremist violence. Discourse analysis

Rosalind Gill (2000, 172) describes discourse analysis as a way to study the use of language. In other words, discourse analysis is used to uncover what the use of certain words has accomplished (Gill, 2000, 174). This fits well into one of the essential parts of framing, namely storytelling. Van Hulst and Yanow (2016) argue that storytelling consists of three questions which can be used to analyse the construction of specific frames. The first question is aimed at explaining the situation; the second question is aimed at possible solutions; while the third question deals with what an ideal situation looks like. The analysis in chapter six will be conducted with these questions as a starting point. The language that is used in the annual reports of the BfV and the AIVD is used to analyse how the two states construct their frames and thus answer these questions.

4.5 Conceptualisation and operationalisation Conceptualisation

The main concept that requires some form of conceptualisation is violent right-wing extremism. In chapter three, a first attempt at this conceptualisation was made. The line between violent right-wing extremism and right-wing extremism is extremely thin. Knigge’s individual approach (1998, 248-253) states that right-wing extremism is characterized by a strong sense of nationalism and the rejection of pluralism. Right-wing extremists glorify a state with a strong hierarchy that puts everyone who does not match with the superior Christian society in the last place. This definition is also used by Sitzer and Heitmeyer (2011) who argue that right-wing extremism is about the social devaluation of minorities. Most right-wing extremists express their opinion in protest marches, but some people resort to violence to make their point. Koehler (2017) argues that the difference between violent right-wing extremism and right-wing extremism is mainly found here. Accordingly, violent right-wing extremism is a combination of right-wing extremist thoughts and the (structural) use of violence.

Operationalisation

As the use of violence is an important prerequisite for violent right-wing extremism the operationalisation should revolve around the use of violence. The use of violence is illegal

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which means that violent right-wing extremism is criminal as well. The BfV (2018, 25) argues that violent right-wing extremist crimes are only violent crimes when violence is involved. Consequently, crimes like propaganda, damage to property, incitement of the masses, intimidation, and violation of a grave are not considered as violent crimes (BfV, 2018, 22-25). In Table two, a distinction between violent and non-violent right-wing extremist crimes according to the BfV is presented (2001, 20-25).

Table 2: Distinction between violent and non-violent crimes

Violent crimes Non-violent crimes

(Attempted) murder and manslaughter, aggravated assault, arson, causing an explosive blast, kidnapping, robbery, extortion, sexual assault, disturbing the peace, and resistance offenses

Violation of a grave, incitement of the masses, propaganda delicts, intimidation, damage to property

For the remainder of the thesis, violent crimes are of interest. Non-violent crimes are still crimes under the law but it is unlikely that most of these crimes will cause a reaction in the policy arena. This is mostly related to the expectation that the scale and scope of violent right-wing extremist acts are of influence for the framing of policy. As such, violent crimes are prioritized in this research.

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Chapter 5: The frequency of violent right-wing extremism in policy

documents

5.1 Introduction

This chapter is aimed to provide some context on the issue of violent right-wing extremism in both Germany and the Netherlands. To be more specific, the frequency of the term violent right-wing extremism and related concepts like right-right-wing extremism, ‘Breivik ’ and the ‘NSU’ were counted in the reports of the BfV and the AIVD. The number of hits gives an idea of how violent right-wing extremism is situated in the annual reports of the intelligence services. This provides the context for the next chapter where the framing of violent right-wing extremism is the main focus of attention. This contextual background will be the starting point for the sixth chapter.

5.2 Germany

The BfV is required to present their findings on an annual basis. These reports describe the activities of the BfV. Consequently, the report is a summary of the threat assessment that the BfV developed for each year. In addition to the search term, the BfV reports detail the number of violent right-wing extremist crimes that have been committed per year. These crime statistics will be used to illustrate certain findings from the counting procedure.

Table 31: Number of violent right-wing extremist crimes in Germany

Year Number of violent right-wing crimes

2000 998 2001 709 2002 772 2003 759 2004 776 2005 958

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2006 1047 2007 980 2008 1042 2009 891 2010 762 2011 755 2012 802 2013 801 2014 990 2015 1408 2016 1600 2017 1054

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Table 4: the frequency of the word violent right-wing extremism and the number of violent right-wing crimes in Germany 2

Year

Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewalt(taten) Rechtsextremismus Terror(ismus) Breivik NSU

2000 3 29 0 0 0 2001 2 35 0 0 0 2002 2 18 2 0 0 2003 1 22 1 0 0 2004 1 27 10 0 0 2005 2 29 16 0 0 2006 1 22 6 0 0 2007 1 15 3 0 0 2008 1 23 3 0 0 2009 1 30 2 0 0 2010 2 28 1 0 0 2011 2 82** 24 5^ 35 2012 3 95** 34 0 32 2013 1 66 ** 27 0 20 2014 4 53** 1 0 3 2015 4 63 ** 12 0 2 2016 6 48** 15# 1^ 1 2017 2 43** 22 0 0 Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewal(taten)

The term ‘Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewalt(taten)’ appears in a fairly consistent way throughout all of the reports. Mostly, ‘Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewalt(taten)’ is mentioned between one and three times per year in Germany. The only exceptions are found in the years 2014, 2015 and 2016, when ‘Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewalt(taten)’ is mentioned between four and six times. Additionally, this is in line with the number of violent right-wing extremist crimes that is documented for the same time frame. According to the BfV (2015; 2016;2017), this increase in hits for the term ‘Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewalt(taten)’ and the increase in crimes are tied to one main event that occurred during these years: the refugee crisis (BfV, 2015, 33; Bundesamt für Flüchtlinge und Migration, 2015, 73). In this three years, about 1,1 million

2_{Source: Adapted from the annual reports of the Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz from 2000-2017}

** Rechtsextremismus is on every page as a header which resulted in unwanted hits, these hits have not been administered. To do so the number of pages affected have been subtracted from the total number of hits. ^Breivik is mentioned one more time in the register section, these hits have been omitted.

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refugees applied for asylum in Germany, with an absolute record of applications in 2015 when 441399 asylum applications were recorded (Bundesamt für Flüchtlinge und Migration, 2016, 91; Bundesminesterium des Inneren, für Bau und Heimat, 2016; Süddeutsche, 2016).

According to the BfV the sharp increase in both the mentioning of the term ‘Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewalt(taten)’ and the number of violent right-wing extremist crimes can be explained by the core values of right-wing extremism. In Germany, the right-wing extremist scene is mostly busy with keeping an image of a German state that is preliminary white and Christian (BfV, 2015). Since most of these refugees are culturally different from the white Christians who are the original inhabitants of Germany they are seen as enemies by (violent) right-wing extremists. These (violent) right-wing extremists prefer a state where there is one culture and ethnicity (BfV, 2015, 35). Therefore, the refugees are seen as an imminent threat to this worldview. As such violence is used by means of communication, and thus to express their discontent over current asylum laws (BfV, 2015, 33-37).

Rechtsextremismus

Just like ‘Rechtsextremistische(-r) Gewalt(taten)’, ‘Rechtsextremismus ’ occurs in a more or less constant way for the first eleven years of the research. After that, the number of hits increased by almost 50%. 2011 is the year where this change is documented for the first time. In July 2011, Anders Breivik was arrested on the Norwegian island of Utøya where he killed 69 people. A couple of hours earlier, he detonated an improvised explosive device in the government district of Oslo that killed an additional eight people (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2018, 164). Later that year, in November, a botched bank heist turned out to be a terrorist plot that had been going on for a decade at that time. Uwe Böhnhardt, Uwe Mundlos, and Beate Zschäpe turned out to be a terrorist trio that is held responsible for numerous murders, robberies and bank heists across Germany (Meerhoek, 2014, 24).

These events had such an impact that the years after 2011 also show an increased number of hits for the term ‘Rechtsextremismus.’ The expectation in this thesis argues that the scope and the scale of events have an effect on the amount of attention that is devoted to it. The scope of these events was of such a scale that it also dominated the reports in the years after 2011. Almost directly thereafter, the refugee crisis started, and violent right-wing crimes increased from 2013 onwards. As mentioned before, these refugees do not comply with the worldview of right-wing extremists, which led to an increase in violence and crimes. As such, violent right-wing extremism is more present on the agenda of the security services than before 2011.

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Terror(ismus)

Terrorism is the most severe form of violence (Imbusch, 2003). Terrorism is mostly related to jihadism in the past two decades (Silke, 2009; Schuurman, 2019), but this does not mean that there are no other forms of terrorism (Koehler, 2016). Some violent right-wing extremists see terrorism as a way to reach their goals or as a way to support their cause. In Germany, right-wing extremist terrorism in the 21st century can be divided into roughly three periods that stand out over the other time-frames. The three periods are from 2004 till 2005, from 2011 till 2013 and from 2015 onwards.

Right-wing extremist terrorism does not end up in a report without a reason. In the first period, from 2004 until 2005, two smaller groups were arrested when they were in the planning stages of terrorist plots (BfV, 2005, 33-37). In Bavaria, the ‘Kameradschaft Süd’ was on the brink of committing a terrorist attack on a Jewish community centre in Munich (Backes, 2008, 13). At the same time, a group of young men committed several attacks in Brandenburg. Subsequently, these acts caught the attention of the BfV (2005, 33-37) and ended up in the report. Therefore, the BfV had to investigate if there were not any further terrorist plots developing in Germany. In 2005, the first terrorists that were apprehended were tried and convicted.

The years that followed were relatively quiet in terms of ‘Terror(ismus)’, with the term just mentioned once to describe the absence of right-wing extremist terrorism. This changed in 2011 when the terms ‘Breivik’ and ‘NSU’ entered the policy arena. The BfV was suddenly very aware of the possibility that terror attacks can be carried out by people that are not on the radar of the security services. In 2014 the situation seemed to be on the same level as in 2010 but from 2015 onwards the number of hits increased again. There was no specific threat in 2015 and 2016. In 2017, the BfV (2018, 47) discovered a new terrorist group called the Old School Society (OSS), of which at least four of the group’s members have been arrested and are convicted on various terrorism charges.

Breivik

The term Breivik only became relevant in 2011, when ‘Breivik’ carried out his attack in Norway (Hemmingby & Bjørgo, 2018, 164). The realisation settled in that right-wing extremists are also capable of carrying out devastating lone wolf attacks. As such, it is not surprising that the term accounts for five hits in 2011. In 2016, ‘Breivik’ accounts for one more hit. Here, ‘Breivik’

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is used to describe the fact that right-wing extremists are able to radicalise themselves without the use of internet or mentors.

NSU

Just as the term Breivik, the tern ‘NSU’ only appears from 2011 onwards since this is the year that the ‘NSU’ crimes came to light. In November, a bank heist that went wrong turned out to be a terrorist plot that has been going on for a decade at that time (Meerhoek, 2014, 24). Subsequently, the BfV reported on this issue because the BfV did not recognize this network before. In the following years, the BfV (2013; 2014) mostly discussed the progress that was made in their internal investigations. Moreover, new laws were proposed and invoked to prevent such an incident from happening again.

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5.3 The Netherlands

In the Netherlands, the AIVD, like its German counterpart, publishes reports on a yearly basis on the security situation in the Netherlands. To ensure that the content analysis for both cases is conducted the same way, the search terms have not been changed, just translated. Unfortunately, the AIVD does not provide any crime statistics that can be used to illustrate the content analysis.

Table 5: The frequency of the word violent right-wing extremism in Dutch policy documents 3

Year

Rechtsextremistisch geweld/gewelddadig rechtsextremisme

Rechts (-)

extremisme Terrorisme Breivik NSU

2000 0 0 0 0 0 2001 0 0 0 0 0 2002 0 0 0 0 0 2003 0 0 0 0 0 2004 0 1 0 0 0 2005 0 7 0 0 0 2006 0 9 1 0 0 2007 0 13 1 0 0 2008 0 3 1 0 0 2009 0 8 0 0 0 2010 0 6 0 0 0 2011 0 6 0 6 2 2012 0 5 0 0 0 2013 0 5 0 0 0 2014 0 3 0 0 0 2015 0 2 0 0 0 2016 0 0 0 0 0 2017 0 5 0 0 0

Table 6 shows that ‘geweldadig rechtsextremisme’ does not appear in any of the AIVD reports. Hence, considering the Netherlands, this term will be disregarded.

Rechts(-)extremisme

The term ‘rechts(-)extremisme’ appears in waves of hits. From 2000 until 2003 and in 2016, for example, the term does not account for any hits. After that, the term appears in waves with

The framing of violent right-wing extremism in Germany and the Netherlands: a comparative analysis