Table of contents
- Preface……….3.
- Introduction………..3-5.
- Chapter 1: The European Neighbourhood………...………...….6-15.
- Chapter 2: Russia and the Eastern Partnership…...15-26.
- Chapter 3: Moldova: between Scylla and Charybdis?...26-42.
- Conclusion………42-46.
- Bibliography……….47-55.
List of Abbreviations
AA Association Agreement
AEI Alliance for European Integration
CEE Central Eastern European
CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
DCFTA Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements
EaP Eastern Partnership
EP European Parliament
EU European Union
HR Human Rights
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation PCA Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
Preface
This thesis is intended to reveal and analyse geopolitical interests and objectives of the EU and Russia concerning the Eastern Partnership countries in which I have given special consideration to Moldova. My thesis is part of the Master Governing Europe which is a continuation of European studies at the University of Amsterdam. I would like to express my sincere appreciation and gratitude to all my lecturers at the UvA whom have inspired and encouraged me over the years and have truly made me into a better person. With regard to my thesis, I want to give special thanks to my supervisor Dr Michael Kemper who’s assistance and feedback proved to be very helpful. In advance, I also want to thank my second reader Dr Menno Spiering for putting in the time to read my thesis.
Introduction
With the ‘big-bang’ EU enlargement and the subsequent creation of European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004, EU-Russia relations have deteriorated as a consequence of incompatibility in objectives that continue to persist between these two major geopolitical actors. Ambitions that the EU and Russia have are often divergent and contradictory which causes conflict of interest to occur which consequently strains the relationship. One of the regions where EU and Russian interests collide is in the newly independent post-Soviet states or in what Russia calls: ‘the near abroad’, which refers to the Baltic states, the Central Asian states, the East Slavic states, the Transcaucasian states and the Republic of Moldova. Once part of the Soviet Union, the Republic of Moldova is a country that struggles to cope with its Soviet legacy which still dominates the domestic political climate in many respects. However, since Moldova signed the 1994 Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU, the nation has been divided in deciding its destiny as the country has become virtually split between pro-Russian and pro-European factions. Moldova’s political divide has not gone unnoticed by the EU and Russia whom actively support their preferred side, often irrespective of their misconducts. Moldova has become a location where EU and Russian (geopolitical) interests collide which has sparked fierce geopolitical competition that weighs heavily on Moldova.
Since 2009, Moldova has been part of the EU Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative which is an extension of European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that aims to “prevent the
emergence of a new dividing line between the enlarged EU and its neighbours”.1 At first
glance, it seems like a good initiative to prevent dividing lines between EaP countries and the EU. However, where the EU attempted to prevent dividing lines with its neighbours, EaP policy was perceived by Russia as an intrusion into its ‘sphere of influence’ which has caused an aggravation of EU-Russia relations and has complicated matters for EaP countries whom are now faced with the dilemma to either align with the EU, Russia or to walk the thin line in between. During the progression of this thesis, I will illustrate that Russian and EU policies towards the EaP countries can impair political stability when both actors attempt to impose their preferred policy onto the EaP countries. The rivalry for influence in the near abroad has led to a substantial deterioration in EU-Russia relations and has increased competition for influence in the post-Soviet space.2
My intention is to convey a profound understanding of the recent resurgence of tensions in EU-Russia relations and investigate to what extent the Eastern Partnership played a part in this. I will use and analyse Moldova as a case study as it represents an interesting case of EaP complications. I am pursuing this topic because I have a profound interest in EU-Russia relations and worry about its future. The future of EU-EU-Russia relations are closely related to the Eastern Partnership countries whom are of strategic importance for both the EU and Russia. The Eastern Partnership has challenged traditional Russian hegemony in the region which has generated tensions as Russia is reluctant to lose influence. EaP countries seem to be on a precarious balance as when they attempt to move closer to the EU, Russia acts increasingly antagonized as it considers its near abroad to be of imperative strategical importance.3 Examples of this are the annexation of Crimea, the fighting of a proxy war in
Eastern Ukraine, the meddling in elections and domestic affairs, the massive distribution of misleading information and the inciting of Russian nationalists all over the near abroad. By analysing EU and Russian goals and objectives, I aim to show how and why Moldova has gotten caught up in this geopolitical competition between the EU and Russia. I have chosen Moldova as it represents an interesting case of EaP efficacy and implications which has contributed to the creation of a wedge between domestic pro-European and pro-Russian factions. I will be analysing EaP matters like; deficient political dialogue, multilateral 1 European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy”, EC, 2003 [online] Available at:
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2004/july/tradoc_117717.pdf, [accessed 12-5-18].
2 Nizhnikau, R. (2016). “When Goliath meets Goliath: how Russia and the EU created a vicious circle of instability in Moldova”, Global Affairs 2:2 (2016), 203-215.
3 Rywkin, M. “Russia and the Near Abroad Under Putin”, American Foreign Policy Interests 37:4 (2015), 230-233.
cooperation, intensified geopolitical competition, efficacy of EU policy and policy implementation and harmonization processes. I aim to convey a comprehensive insight into what consequences EU and Russian involvement in Eastern Partnership countries has. Key questions that I will be answering are:
1. What is the Eastern Partnership and what is its relevance for Moldova, the EU and Russia?
2. What are Russian and EU interests in the Eastern Partnership countries, and why do they collide?
3. What are the implications of working with Eastern Partnership country Moldova for EU-Russia relations?
My expectations towards this thesis are based on various elements. Firstly, I hope to clarify the contemporary importance of the subject by analysing the context and hereby unravelling the problems at hand. I expect to see that the Eastern Partnership bears some form of responsibility for the increased pressure on Moldova and on EU-Russia relations. However, I expect that Russia bears responsibility for the lion’s share of the problem as it is no secret that Russia actively pursues geopolitical goals in the near abroad and attempts to keep post-Soviet states in ‘Moscow’s orbit’. In order to adequately answer these research questions, I will conduct my research through the use of the UvA (online) library, subject specific professional websites, journal databases and newspaper databases. Through the use of academic books, scientific journals, think-tank reports, newspapers, news websites, EU reports, EU legislation and EU texts I aspire to create insightful and comprehensive answers to the posed questions. In my first chapter, I will discuss and analyse European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership, and the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with regard to why they were created, how they function and how they have heightened tensions in EU-Russia relations. In my second chapter, I will examine and discuss the strategic importance of the EaP for Russia and why Russia feel threatened by the EaP and in what ways this generates tensions. In my last chapter, I will analyse Moldova’s precarious position between East and West, Russian and EU involvement in Moldova, Russian pressure on Moldova, Moldova’s geopolitical importance and the role of corrupted Moldovan elites.
The European Neighbourhood
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, sweeping changes surged throughout the former Soviet space which brought about a sense of uncertainty as the political status-quo on the world stage was changing rapidly. In the EU, the uncertainty derived from a sense that in order for the EU to be secure, adjacent countries have to be well-functioning, preferably democratic, stable and prosperous. To accomplish these goals, the Eastern Partnership (EaP) was constructed to establish and maintain a single and coherent policy framework amongst the EaP countries.4
The in 2009 inaugurated EaP is part of a readjustment of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and has the ambition to strengthen and deepen relations between the EU, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Belarus, Azerbaijan and Armenia. In order to comprehend the EaP, I have to first examine the EU-Moldova Partnership and Cooperation Agreement of 1994 (PCA) and the EaP’s predecessor the ENP.
Since 1994, Moldova has concluded a PCA with the EU which aims to strengthen Moldova’s democracy and develop its economy through cooperation on a wide range of fields. PCA’s are treaties between the EU, its Member States and a non-EU third party. The EU has PCA’s in place with Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, the Philippines, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Russia. The general aims of PCA’s are to; 1) “Provide a suitable framework for political dialogue; 2) support the efforts made by countries to strengthen their democracies and develop their economies; 3) accompany their transition to a market economy; 4) encourage trade and investment; 5) provide a basis for economic, legislative cultural, social, financial, scientific and technological cooperation.”5 Moldova’s relationship with Russia has been deteriorating since its relation
with the EU ameliorated with the signing of the PCA. The deterioration intensified with Moldova’s accession to the ENP in 2003 and the EaP in 2009.
The ENP was launched in 2004 as a way to encourage political and economic integration with neighbouring EU countries. The ENP aims to reform neighbouring countries through for example financial aid, council and technical assistance in such a manner that it leads towards political and economic harmonisation with EU standards and values. At the 4 General Secretariat of the Council, “Joint Declaration of the Eastern Partnership Summit”, Council of the European Union, 2017 [online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31758/final-statement-st14821en17.pdf, [accessed 19-1-18].
5 EUR-Lex, “Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs): Russia, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia”, 2010 [online] Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM %3Ar17002, [Accessed: 19-6-18].
outset, the creation of the ENP was motivated by the wish to stabilize the European periphery while creating a foreign policy that could go beyond enlargement.6 Thus, the ENP was
motivated by the stabilization of adjacent European countries while laying the foundation of a more unified EU foreign policy. Through setting terms of conditionality, which I will elucidate later, the EU has attempted to foster stability and peace in its neighbourhood by transfer of its internal model without offering a defined moment of future EU membership. This gives the EU meagre leverage as it is unclear when the reward of membership for complying with EU standards will be granted. The EaP was created out of a desire to regionalise ENP instruments and programs but also due to geopolitical considerations from some EU Members to curb Russian influence in the former Soviet space.7 However, the
effectiveness of the EaP has been questioned by academics who claim that to little incentive is offered by the EU to sufficiently encourage EaP countries into comprehensive domestic reform.8 The ENP basically offers three incentives to partner countries through bilateral
contracts which can be summed up in ‘three Ms’; Markets (access to single market), Mobility (visa simplification) and Money (loans and financial aid).9
The EaP was erected in order to bring the six EaP countries closer to the EU’s acquis
communautaire. The acquis communautaire is the central body for EU obligations and
common rights that apply to all EU Member States. Thus, the acquis confines accession criteria to the EU whom were devised in order to bind all EU Member States to a common set of rights and obligations, these include: EU Treaties in all its principles, content and objectives, EU legislation that stems from Treaties or the Court of Justice, resolutions and declarations that are adopted by the EU, Foreign and Security policy instruments, and bilateral and multilateral agreements concluded by the EU and Member States.10 Aspirant Member
States must accept and adapt to the acquis in order to become eligible for EU membership and thus must integrate EU law in national legislation.11 Within this framework, the EU aspires to
build a common zone of shared stability, prosperity, democracy and cooperation. The intention is that the Eastern Partnership strengthens the EU and its partners to be able to better
6 Cadier, D, “Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU-Russia Competition in the shared Neighbourhood and the Ukrainian Crisis”, Global Policy 5 (2014), 77.
7 Ibidem, 77.
8 Kandyuk, O. (2016). Foreign policy of European Union: Eurasian Agenda, CES Working Papers, 8(3), p.349. 9 Cadier, D, “Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU-Russia Competition in the shared Neighbourhood and the Ukrainian Crisis”, Global Policy 5 (2014), 78.
10European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations and Acquis”, [online] Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en, [14-6-18].
deal with external and internal problems. At this point in time, several EaP countries endure structural problems which often stem from corruption and social and economic disparities between regions, whom are often historically, culturally and religiously divided. Although the EaP knows many problems, seven key structural challenges seem to persist according to the Brussels based think tank CEPS. 1) The EaP does not take its neighbours interests sufficiently in account. There is discussion over whether Russia should be more involved in the EaP and if they should be asked to participate in trilateral talks. If not, chances are that EaP countries will suffer under increasing Russian pressure; 2) The EaP is not useful for short-term crisis management as it is designed to accomplish long-term effects and lacks a solid security dimension; 3) How can the EU ensure that Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements (DCFTA) are properly implemented? This poses a serious challenge for the EaP as it oftentimes takes to little national preferences and specification of domestic structures in account. But I will come back at this later. Furthermore, it is uncertain that EaP countries will fully implement the DCFTA’s as EaP countries sometimes act like they are complying but don’t actually implement the suggested reforms which is called ‘fake compliance’;12 4)
Another problem arises with how to reward countries that do comply. For example, irrespective of offers and appeals the EU has made to Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Belarus these countries are lagging behind with EaP policy implementation compared to Moldova and Georgia which leads into undesirable disparities; 5) It is important to maintain unity within diversity. All EaP members but Belarus face security problems with Russia whom challenges their sovereignty. A level of unity between the EaP countries can help in tackling transcending challenges such as immigration, environmental and security related issues; 6) The EU attempts to promote its acquis communautaire in order to harmonize EaP countries with EU values and standards. For the EaP countries, the partnership is mainly important because it can provide support in overcoming geopolitical challenges through increased multilateral cooperation and EU backing. EaP countries perceive EU Association Agreements (AA) and DCFTA as a preparation stage towards accession to the EU. However, due to EU enlargement fatigue and contemporary incompatibility with the EU acquis, a real prospect of accession for the EaP countries does not exist yet. The EU Council has confirmed that the agreements do not represent a final step towards accession as EU Member States remain divided on the issue; 7) Another serious issue arises with the importance that EU Member States give to the EaP. For example, Swedes, Balts and Poles see great merit in the EaP while 12 Blockmans, S, “Seven Challenges to the Eastern Partnership”, CEPS, 2014, [online] Available at:
Spain, France and Italy don’t. This results into an unequal effort by Member States to make the project successful which does not help the cause as Members can have discordant interests.13 The Commission has proposed to provide extra assistance for EaP partners trough;
EU expertise on administrative tasks, regional development programmes in the areas of human capital, infrastructural improvements, addressing local problems, amelioration of direct cooperation with EU Member States through existing transnational programmes and extended cross-border cooperation.14
Every other year, heads of governments from both EU Member States and EaP countries gather to meet in so called ‘Eastern Partnership Summits’ to discuss and evaluate policy and progress.15 At the 2009 Prague summit, European Heads of State and government
representatives came together in an attempt to lift their relationship to a higher level through a joint declaration. In a nutshell, the EaP aspires ambitious partnerships between the EU and its Eastern Neighbours. All participants at the Prague Summit had agreed that the EaP will be based on “commitments to the principles of international law and to fundamental values, including democracy, the rule of law and the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as to, market economy, sustainable development and good governance.”16
An important EaP goal is to establish conditions in which political association and political will between Member States can be improved so that further economic integration can occur. The EaP strives for good governance, grow of the financial sector and promotion of regional development with the aim to diminish socioeconomic disparities. The Prague Summit joint declaration of 2009 stated that:
“The participants of the Prague Summit share the wish to deepen and to intensify bilateral relations between the EU and the partner countries, taking into account the specific situation and ambition of each partner country and respecting existing bilateral relations between the EU and the respective partner country.”17
13 Ibid.
14 Commission of the European Communities. (2008). Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council: Eastern Partnership. [online] Available at:
ttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2009_2014/documents/nest/dv/nest_20110503_12/nest_20110503_12en .pdf. [21-1-18].
15 European External Action Service, “Eastern Partnership”, EEAS, 2016 [online] Available at:
https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/419/eastern-partnership_en. [20-1-18, [accessed 20-1-18].
16 Council of the European Union, “Joint declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, Consilium, 2009 [online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009_eap_declaration.pdf, [accessed 24-3-18].
This taking into account of specific national preferences can be criticized for being a ‘one size fits all’ policy that, for example, oversimplifies matters as demographics and geographical differences between EaP countries. This flaw is remarkable as EU policymakers early on recognized the limitations on imposing a single regulatory framework across two continents which is why the EaP was devised out of the ENP in the first place. According to Thomas de Waal, a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace: “The EU casts the partnership as a bureaucratic and economic project, without sufficiently mapping out the politics to prepare for certain contingencies.” 18 Thus, perhaps the EaP needs to focus on
building political relations first before economic and political organization can successfully occur. The EaP is designed to provide AA’s for countries that have made significant progress towards harmonization with EU values and principles. However, EU AA’s are currently constructed in a way that it impedes EaP countries from partaking in Russian economic integration projects.This can encumber EaP countries as they are pressured into choosing allegiances. This reinforces Moscow’s belief that the EaP counteracts Russian interests as EaP members are increasingly drawn from the Russian sphere of influence.19 Whereas the EU
strongly underscores the right of EaP countries to decide over their own destiny, Russia is mostly preoccupied with projecting and accomplishing its foreign policy goals.20 It is
reasonable for Russia to protect its foreign policy interests, however it is unacceptable that this goes at the expense of smaller sovereign nations who do not have the ability to fend Russia of. Therefore, Russia must stop acting like the EaP area is a zero-sum game and accept EU-Russia interdependence in which the EaP can play a mutually beneficial role.
In the concluding remarks of the Joint Declaration of the Eastern Prague Summit the following was stated:
“The participants of the Prague Summit are confident that the results of the Prague Summit and the establishment of the Eastern Partnership will advance the cause of democracy, strengthen stability and prosperity, bringing lasting and palpable benefits to citizens of all participating states. The participants of the Prague Summit will work closely to achieve the objectives envisaged by this Joint Declaration.”21
18 Council on Foreign Relations. (2014). The European Union’s Eastern Partnership. [online] Available at:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/european-unions-eastern-partnership. [30-5-18].
19 Council on Foreign Relations. (2014). The European Union’s Eastern Partnership. [online] Available at:
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/european-unions-eastern-partnership. [30-5-18].
20 EUR-Lex, “Pressure exerted by Russia on Eastern Partnership countries”, 2016 [online] Available at:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-ontent/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52013IP0383, [Accessed 26-6-18].
21 Council of the European Union, “Joint declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit”, Consilium, 2009 [online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/31797/2009_eap_declaration.pdf, [accessed 28-3-18].
This statement, which originates from the 2009 Prague Summit, has a certain determination and miscalculation surrounding it when considering the current situation in Moldova where stability has demised, democracy is faulty, corruption is rampant and prosperity has diminished while palpable benefits to Moldovan citizens are limited on which I will elaborate more later. During the EaP Summit in Riga in 2015, EU Members and EaP partners had set out to reach a multitude of goals by 2020. The first goal was to create stronger economies through pursuing and stimulating economic growth, market opportunities, higher levels of employment and higher incomes. Secondly, in order to achieve societal resilience, which is the ability of social actors to cope with adversities but also their ability to learn from past experiences and their capacity to set up institutions that fosters sustainable societal sturdiness towards future crisis,22 and economic growth, it is crucial for institutions to function properly
and this can only occur through stronger governance. A third main goal is to obtain stronger connectivity, which is the ability of EaP countries to interconnect with each other,23 so that
EaP countries can combat climate change and become more efficient economically wise, whilst at the same time becoming more resilient to the impact of climate change through better communications and coherence in policy. The fourth goal was to create a stronger society by enabling and encouraging more cultural and economic exchanges between European citizens in creating social cohesion and developing civil society.24
These goals are tremendously challenging. Perhaps through the process of “failing forwards”, which is a process of intergovernmental bargaining that results in incompleteness as it coerces states with disparities in preferences to settle on the lowest common denominator solutions, it can be done.25 Although EU institutions that support the EaP work to a certain
extent, they often preside over insufficient authority to properly function as they have been given little competence due to the implications of multilateral negotiations. This incompleteness can incite institutional dysfunctionality which in turn can lead to the collapse of an institution which threatens the progression of the European integration process. As EU leaders want to protect progress made, they will allow new reforms that are thought of as 22 Keck, M. Sakdapolrak, P. “What is Social Resilience? Lessons learned and Ways Forward”, Erdkunde 67:1 (2013), 5-19.
23 Cambridge Dictionary, “connectivity”, Cambridge, [online] Available at:
https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/connectivity, [accessed 14-6-18].
24 European Commission, “Eastern Partnership Implementation Report”, EC, 2015 [online] Available at:
https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/enp-regional-report-eastern_partnership_en.pdf, [accessed 19-1-18].
25 Jones, E. Kelemen, D. Meunier, S. “Failing Forward? The Euro Crisis and the Incomplete Nature of European Integration”, Comparative Political Studies 49:7 (2016), 1010.
necessary to strengthen institutions in order for them to survive. Because the reforms are mostly minimal, chances are that crisis will occur which will set off another round and reform.26 Thus, in the short term, failing forward might enhance EaP institutions and
capabilities as EU leaders will presumably keep compromising in order to solve crises and thus keep failing forward. On the long term however, failing forward is unlikely to become successful as perpetual crisis resolving makes the EU appear like a unworkable project which can undermine support and credibility for the project. So, chances are that failing forward will gradually turn the EaP into a success, or, that failing forward will fracture trust of EaP citizens which could lead EaP countries astray from the European project.27 If fracture of trust is to be
avoided, EU Member State leader must increase their effort in preventing upcoming crises by initially creating comprehensive policy instead of dealing with crisis after crisis.
Whether EaP ambitions are in compliance with reality is yet to be determined as the EaP faces various unresolved obstacles. Since the EaP has started, serious challenges have kept the EEAS (European External Action Force) and other EU institutions quite preoccupied. Challenges have occurred with issues like democratization in EaP countries, energy security, deficient political dialogue and multilateral cooperation.28 EaP and EU countries have
expressed the desire to increase economic and legislative cooperation which has pressured EU-Russia relations as Russia fears the EU is increasingly extending its influence over the post-Soviet space. EU enlargement policy has worried Russia ever since NATO’s advance eastwards. These worries are understandable as, from a legal perspective, NATO has violated the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe which stated that no Central Eastern European (CEE) country would be allowed to join NATO.29 Because NATO had broken its
promise by expanding into the post-Soviet space, Russia became increasingly weary of NATO’s and the EU’s advance eastward as this could come at the expense of Russia’s influence and power over post-Soviet countries. NATO’s enlargement has come at a significant price as it has deepened Russian suspicions towards the West which subsequently has given rise to nationalist sentiment in Russia.30 Affairs like the NATO and EU enlargement 26 Ibid, 1010-1011.
27 Jones, E. Kelemen, D. Meunier, S. “Is Europe failing, or is it ‘failing forward’”?, The Washington Post, 2016 [online] Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/05/is-europe-failing-or-is-it-failing-forward/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.8e5c656ceac5, [accessed 29-5-18].
28 Musiyenko, S. “New Challenges for the European Neighbourhood Policy: Key Aspects of Cooperation Between the EU and Eastern Partnership Countries”, University of Economic in Prague (2016), 406-407.
29 Tumanov, S. Gasparishvili, A. Romanova, E. “How the Russians Really View the EU”, Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27:2 (2011), 120-127.
30 Kyd, A. “Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement”, International Organization 55:4 (2001), 821.
have incited geo-political competition between the EU and Russia as Russia endeavours to maintain hegemony over its near abroad.
The EU has encountered many problems; the rise of populism, migration, democratic deficiency and various economic predicaments that came forth out of the European debt crisis. However, the most significant challenge has arisen due to a revitalized Russia that annexed the Crimean peninsula and actively supports Ukrainian separatists in Eastern-Ukraine since 2014. The security crisis that followed was complicated for the EU to coherently respond to as Member States preside over different political views concerning Russia. Exceptionally though, all EU Member States were able to find consensus on imposing sanctions against Russia on 31 July 2014 for Russia’s role in the destabilization of Ukraine which is decided upon on a basis of unanimity.31 That these sanctions have been strengthened
in September 2014 and have last been extended in March 2018 till 15 September 201832 is
remarkable and admirable to say at least as EU foreign policy is a complex and delicate matter that lays at the heart of nation state sovereignty. Therefore, it remains tricky for the EU to decide over foreign policy as it is a shared competence under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The aim of the CFSP is to strengthen the EU’s ability to act on external developments by developing military and civilian capabilities in crisis management and conflict prevention.33 The CFSP is limited in its capabilities to formulate and demand
foreign policy due to the EU’s intergovernmental character which has traditionally left the defence of foreign affairs interests to the Member States. According to Carnegie Europe, the EU’s notion of diplomacy is less engaged with strategic Member State interests as it perceives it be in the realm of hard power and state geopolitics which is traditionally the prerogative of individual Member States.34 In general, the EU’s lacking foreign policy unity and soft power
stance has emboldened Russia to apply hard power whereas the EU is reluctant and divided when it comes to hard power measures. The absence of EU hard power in the EaP countries has allowed Russian influence to remain and progress as the EU does little to counterbalance Russia’s hard power which “reflects the general tendency of the EU to play down issues of 31 Lehne, S. “Is There Hope for EU Foreign Policy?”, Carnegie Europe, 2017 [online] Available at:
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2017/12/05/is-there-hope-for-eu-foreign-policy-pub-74909 [accessed 25-6-18].
32 European Council, “EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine”, Consilium, 2016 [online] Available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/sanctions/ukraine-crisis/, [accessed 24-6-18]. 33 European External Action Service. (2016). Common Foreign and Security Policy. [online] Available at:
file:///Users/Joris/Downloads/eeas_-_european_external_action_service_-_common_foreign_and_security_policy_cfsp_-_2017-07-25.pdf.[accessed 24-6-18].
34 Vimont, P. “The Strategic Interests of the European Union”, Carnegie Europe, 2016 [online] Available at:
hard security and geopolitics and pursue economic integration as an instrument for enhancing stability and peace.”35 For example, when Russia threatens to exert hard power measures on
EaP countries the EU can do little to nothing in the realm of hard power to protect the EaP countries. This has resulted in loss of credibility in the EaP project as the EU is not able to sufficiently defend EaP countries against Russian hard power. The EU is more preoccupied with matters as humanitarian principles and the rule of law which represent the foundation of EU unity. Involvement by the Commission with foreign policy is limited to trade agreements, humanitarian aid, human rights protection and development aid. Although these are important matters, especially making trade agreements, the Commission’s competence on foreign policy is limited in a way that it cannot ensure coherence in European geopolitical strategy or foreign policy.36 Thus, the EU lacks a single coherent geopolitical strategy and vision for the Eastern
Partnership countries, and therefore, has to carefully avoids issues regarding EU-Russia relations. After failing to help Armenia, whom was targeted by retaliating measures by Russia for cooperating and growing closer to the EU, the first real sign of coherence in foreign policy came after the annexation of Crimea as the annexation of Crimea was followed by a series of restrictive EU measures. 37
On the other side, Russia has set clear geopolitical goals for itself, certainly when contrasted against the EU, who senior researcher and professor Stefano Guzzini claims to be ‘post-geopolitical’: “The EU has staked its reputation on being an anti-geopolitical unit … a peace organization, a civilian or normative power, aimed precisely at overcoming militarism and nationalism, historically associated with classical geopolitical thought.”38 Even though
Guzzini’s statement is correct to a large extent, the EU is a geopolitical unit although without a clear and unified geopolitical vision. Whether the EU and Guzzini admit it or not, the EU is a geopolitical actor as it influences adjacent countries through ENP and EaP policy. Furthermore, the ENP and EaP are EU policies that have a certain geopolitical vision which entail a particular ideas of how countries next to its borders should be ordered according to
35 Raik, K. “Eastern Partnership as Differentiated Integration: The challenges of EaP Association Agreements”,
The Eastern Partnership Review 15:1 (2013), 22.
36 Vimont, P. “The Strategic Interests of the European Union”, Carnegie Europe, 2016 [online] Available at:
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/04/20/strategic-interests-of-european-union-pub-63448. [accessed 24-6-18].
37 European Union Newsroom, “EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis”, Europa.EU, 2017 [online] Available at: https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en, [accessed 14-6-18].
38 Guzzini, S. The framework of analysis: Geopolitics meets foreign policy identity crisis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 45-58.
EU normative preferences and standards.39 Thus, EU geopolitics has not disappeared but
merely transformed. From a classical point of view, geopolitics was underlined trough a Westphalian emphasis on sovereignty and the balance of power, resources, geographical domination and was mostly perceived as a zero-sum game. The transformation did not erase these concepts, it merely decreased their significance as the emphasises shifted to market logics and globalisation instead of classical geopolitical objectives. Thus, EU geopolitics has not vanished but the importance of geography is losing significance to geo-economics and a focus on markets.40
Russia and the Eastern Partnership
Brussels invited the Russian Federation to join the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2003 but Russia declined as they felt the ENP was countering Russian interests in the near abroad, which translated to blizhneye zarubezhye in Russian. The term near abroad is a frequently heard notion in today’s world as it deals with Russia’s relations with post-Soviet Republics. The term was introduced in the English language after the fall of the USSR and was used by politicians of the Russian Federation in order to describe and distinguish post-Soviet Republics from the rest of the world. According to Paul Goble of the Carnegie Endowment, the term was rather used politically than demographically or geographically in Russian political circles who had difficulty considering and accepting the post-Soviet states as full sovereign entities. The term carries an embedded claim that Russia has certain rights in the region that transcends conventional diplomacy.41 Nevertheless, Russia’s term near abroad is
not the only term that has an embedded claim to it. The notion “European Neighbourhood” similarly carries a claim to hegemony in the region as the term implies a belt of European states that are friendly towards the EU. Thus, the term alone sufficed to confront Moscow’s hegemony in the former-Soviet space. Because of Russia’s decline to the ENP invitation, and Western suspicion and contempt towards autocracy, the EU did not feel inclined, nor was it willing, to offer Russia an invitation for the EaP initiative in 2009. The economic, military and technological might of the EU and NATO makes Russia perceive the EaP not as “without Russia” (this is how the EaP is sold by the EU) but “against Russia”. Russia’s reaction towards the EaP was rather negative mostly because of Moscow’s concerns about the EU
39 Browning, S. C, “Geostrategies, geopolitics and ontological security in the Eastern Neighbourhood: The European Union and the new Cold War”, Political Geography 62 (2018), 108.
40 Ibid.
41 Safire, W. “On language; The Near Abroad”, New York Times, 1994 [online] Available at:
creating a sphere of influence into what the Russian government perceives to be their sphere of influence.42 Since the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargement, the EU has expanded with Cyprus,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic in 2004 and Bulgaria and Romania in 2007. Many of these countries were former-Soviet Republics which must feel like a thorn in Russia’s side. Russia generally perceives the ENP and EaP as an extension of Western European political integration and economic structures which raised suspicion in Moscow as they perceive the EaP to be in an area of Russia’s ‘privileged interests’43 and worry about Russia’s future role in the world. In the
words of former Russian president Dmitri Medvedev:
"Russia, just like other countries in the world, has regions where it has its privileged interests. In these regions, there are countries with which we have traditionally had friendly cordial relations, historically special relations. We will work very attentively in these regions and develop these friendly relations with these states, with our close neighbours."44
Medvedev basically states here that Russia has its own sphere of influence on account of a historical and special relations. Thus, Medvedev’s notion of ‘privileged interests’ is merely a synonym for sphere of influence which has an inherent geopolitical connotation to it as it claims a certain area outside national borders to be under their influence. It is understandable why Medvedev, who was Putin’s presidential placeholder during 2008-2012,45 would try to
avoid using the phrase sphere of influence as it has a negative connotation to it due to the suffering it generated in 19th and 20th century Europe in which competing world powers
clashed over inevitably overlapping spheres of influence. These conditions eventually proved to be fertile ground for two devastating World Wars.46
Russia considers the ENP and EaP as a threat to its position on the world stage as ENP and EaP policy is embedded with EU norms and values whom can lead to spill-over effects in EaP countries. This can counteract Russian interests countries as EaP countries are drawn to 42 Alexandrova, N. “A Russian view on the Eastern Partnership”, Clingendael Magazine, 2016, [online] Available at: https://www.clingendael.org/publication/russian-view-eastern-partnership, [accessed 3-5-18].
43 Reynolds, P. “New Russian world order: the five principles”, BBC, 2008 [online] Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm, [accessed 1-6-18]. 44 Ibidem.
45 Casula, P, “Sovereign Democracy, Populism, and Depoliticization in Russia: Power and Discourse During Putin’s Firs Presidency”, Problems of Post-Communism, 60:3 (2013), 3.
46 Rubin, J. “Why ‘spheres of influence’ bring war closer”, Washington Post, 2017 [online] Available at:
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/02/07/why-spheres-of-influence-bring-war-closer/? utm_term=.16c4ac3ee211, [accessed 1-6-18].
the EU’s normative power and will increasingly act accordingly to the EU’s norms and standards.47 According to professor and EU expert Ian Manners: “The EU has been, is, and
always will be a normative power in world politics”48 by this he means that “the EU promotes
a series of normative principles that are generally acknowledged within the United Nations system, to be universally applicable.” 49 Thus, the EU’s normative power is in line with that of
the UN which is founded on the same kind of principles as for example freedom, human rights (HR), democracy, the rule of law, social solidarity, good governance, peace and social solidarity. Although Russia formally claims to abide UN norms, in practice it turns out that Russia quite frequently violates UN norms or distorts the truth when confronted with violations. Freedoms in Russia are limited with for example freedom of speech and freedom of association, HR are violated, and democracy is deficient. The spread of the EU’s normative power troubles Russia as the EU and Russia reside in open battle over norms of international conduct. The struggle has become a clash in a multipolar world were different centres of power compete for hegemony, in this case a clash between authoritarian statism and liberal universalism.50 Russia’s support for European anti-EU populist leaders like Marie Le Penn
from the Front National and Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, indicates Russia’s willingness to fight against liberal universalism and defend its state centric worldview by attempting to rescue the dictator from popular rebellion. The Russian attempt to save the Syrian ‘strongman’ indicates that Putin is weary and fearful of popular rebellion against authoritative leaders as he might be victim himself one day. His fear of poplar rebellion derives from his own experiences when he was a 37-year-old junior KGB agent working in Dresden Germany. On the fifth of December 1989, the Berlin Wall had fallen and an angry mob had gathered in front of the local USSR intelligence headquarters where Putin was stationed. When Putin called in Moscow for help, the answer replied “you’re on your own”.51 In Putin’s eyes, the fall
of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent demise of the USSR represented the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century”52 through which he had learned a lesson about the
strength and ability of a popular uprising. Something he would never forget. For Putin’s 47 Casier, T, Debardeleben, J. (2018). EU-Russia Relations in Crisis: Understanding Diverging Perceptions (New York, Routledge, 2018). 20.
48 Manners, I. “The Normative Ethics of the European Union”, International Affairs, 84:1 (2008), 45. 49 Ibidem, 46.
50 Liik, K. “Winning the normative war with Russia: An EU-Russia Power Audit”, ECFR, 2018 [online] Available at:
http://www.ecfr.eu/publications/summary/winning_the_normative_war_with_russia_an_eu_russia_power_audit. [Accessed 1-6-18].
51 Escobedo, T. “Putin’s rise to power”, CNN, 2017 [online] Available at:
authoritarian statism, EU norms and values represent danger as they promote freedoms that are limited in Russia in order to protect the survival of the regime.
Russia treasures its sovereignty, and would go to extreme lengths to protect it, and although many across the EU call for increased Member State sovereignty, the EU propagates a supranational vision of shared sovereignty which inevitably collides with Russia’s principle of sovereign democracy. The term sovereign democracy was coined by Putin in order to describe the quasi-democratic Russian political system which is subdue to significant levels of government control. Sovereign democracy basically assumes that the world is a lawless, dangerous place, which is structured around ruthless competition.53 Valerii Zorkin, head of the
Russian constitutional court, said the following about this: “In this sense, we really found ourselves in a chaotic world in which everything has become unpredictable. In this anomic global chaos there is only one law – the law of the strong and aggressive: the superpowers, dictators, and leaders of mafia-like and terrorist groups.”54 This definition suits Putin as it
legitimizes the use of hard power and enforces state power. Thus, Russia’s concept of sovereign democracy is more like a veil for autocracy than an actual democracy, it is an euphemism for an authoritative regime. According to Jaun J. Linz democracy is defined by the following:
“Democracy is defined by free and developed civil and political society (including freedom of speech, freedom to organize, and free elections), state apparatus (including well-functioning and impartial bureaucracy, and rational-legal norms), rule of law (including constitutionalism), and economic society (including an institutionalized free market).”55
Russia under Putin’s leadership barely fulfils any of these criteria and does not live up to the true meaning of the word. The word democracy translates from Greek to rule by the people,56
but in order to truly rule in the name of the people, a government must at least be able to comply with most elements of Linz’s definition. Russia’s one party rule by United Russia, 52 Editors of the BBC, “Putin’s rise to power”, BBC, 2005, [online] Available at:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4480745.stm, [accessed 15-6-18].
53 Casula, P, “Sovereign Democracy, Populism, and Depoliticization in Russia: Power and Discourse During Putin’s Firs Presidency”, Problems of Post-Communism, 60:3 (2013), 6.
54 Zorkin, V. “In defence of the Westphalian System”, Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 2006 [online] Available at:
https://rg.ru/2006/08/22/zorjkin-statjya.html, [accessed 2-6-18].
55 Linz, J, J, Stepan, A. Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1996).
56 Dahl, A. D, “Britannica. Democracy” Ensyclopedia Britannica, 2018 [online] Available at:
whom holds a two-third majority in Russia’s parliament the Duma, is ostensibly fulfilling the function that the Communist party once did as Putin’s power is as far reaching that he is in the position to directly elect regional governors. This power is significant as regional governors understand that they would only be elected if they align with Putin and United Russia which facilitated Putin’s consolidation of political dominance. In the 90’s under Yeltsin’s rule a brief period of relative media independency existed. However, the media was owned by oligarchs such as Boris Berzovsky and Vladimir Gusinsky whom had illegally received media assets from Yeltsin. In order for the Oligarchs to maintain their privileges after Yeltsin resignation in 1999, they had to adhere to Putin’s demands as Putin had leverage over the Oligarchs for their illegal acquirement of media assets. This helped Putin in consolidating state media as the oligarchs dreaded losing their privileged positions.57 As independent media is virtually
non-existent in Russia, there cannot be independent elections as Russian voters are not objectively informed over the candidates. Additionally opposition candidates do not get a fair share of the coverage, making competing against Putin nearly impossible. The Duma has become a mere façade, as it has become subordinated to Putin’s will. Furthermore, the principle security agency, the FSB, only answers to the president while former KGB agents dominate the state bureaucracy.58
Whereas most Western nations opt for, and promote liberal universalism and the unipolarity of Europe, Russia opposes such an order dominated by Western liberal values and desires a multipolar world. This is the idea of a world where there are multiple political, cultural and economic centres.59 Or in the words of former Russian president Medvedev: "The world should be multi-polar. Unipolarity is unacceptable, domination is impermissible. We cannot accept a world order in which all decisions are taken by one country, even such a serious and authoritative country as the United States of America. This kind of world is unstable and fraught with conflict."60
The multipolar world view opens up the possibility for normative pluralism in the international arena which suits Russia as it allows them to counterbalance western hegemony in the near abroad.61 When in the mid 1990’s, America came close in consolidating global
hegemony, Russia, China and other powers reacted by reviving the concept of multipolarity in 57 Hlouskova, R. Rosefielde, S. “Why Russia is Not a Democracy”, Comparative Strategy 26:3 (2007), 216. 58 Ibidem, 222-223.
59 Chebankova, E, “Russia’s idea of the multipolar world order: origins and main dimensions”, Post-Soviet
Affairs, 33:3 (2017), 217.
60 Reynolds, P. “New Russian world order: the five principles”, BBC, 2008 [online] Available at:
order to counterpoise the Western dominated balance of power. Multipolarity offered an alternative model to liberal universalism in whichRussian intellectuals embraced the classical idea of state sovereignty which served as a mean to preserve political and cultural distinctiveness in the world. Academic and Russia expert Elena Chebankova, has closely examined political and philosophical debates in Russia which reveal that Russia is an ardent defender of a multipolar world order in both the domestic and the global sphere.62 Although
the multipolar world view originates from Western philosophy, Russian politicians and intellectuals have contributed to the debate by advocating such an order while stressing the importance of cultural particularity and intra-civilizational dialogue amongst the communities of the world.63 Thus, Russia is able to represent an alternative world view to liberal
universalism by promoting the multipolar world order through which Russia can propagate its civilizational particularity that is ingrained with preferences like socialism, autocracy and nationalistic conservatism. Russia’s emphasis on the multipolar world allows them to reduce Western influence in EaP countries as it offers Russia a way to reject liberal values and legitimize their behaviour.
It is hard to accurately pinpoint Russia’s contemporary ideological matrix as it has its roots in history and has been evolving over hundreds of years. In 1832, Count Sergey Uvarov, minister of education under Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855), coined the slogan pravoslaviye,
samaderzhaviye, I narodnost, which means orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality in Russian.64
This slogan became a guiding principle for the imperial government at the time who relied on militarism, religion and self-isolation. Historically, the Orthodox Russian church played a significant part for Russia’s ideology except for during the Soviet era.65 Russia has
experimented with several ideologies in the past that all have been discredited due to their eventual failure; autocratic Tsarism from 1440 to 1917, communism from 1917 to 1991 and liberal democracy under Yeltsin in the 1990’s up till Putin’s presidential accession in 2000. Putin realized that both political and secular ideologies had failed and that the Russian Orthodox Christian church was one of the most significant sources of national pride left in 61 Chebankova, E, “Russia’s idea of the multipolar world order: origins and main dimensions”, Post-Soviet
Affairs, 33:3 (2017), 217.
62 Ibidem, 217-218.
63 Chebankova, E, “Russia’s idea of the multipolar world order: origins and main dimensions”, Post-Soviet
Affairs, 33:3 (2017), 222.
64 The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, “Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality”, Encyclopaedia
Britannica, [online] Available at: https://www.britannica.com/topic/Orthodoxy-Autocracy-and-Nationality, [accessed 4-6-18].
Russia. Therefore, Putin uses the Russian Orthodox church to support and legitimize his reign.In 2016, Putin stated that patriotism was to become a fundamental element of Russia’s national idea although this new ideological trend already kicked in after the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and the Russian involvement in south-eastern Ukraine that followed. Putin had realized that military action helped him to create greater domestic social cohesion due to spiked domestic approval ratings after the annexation of Crimea which was looked upon with favour in Russian public opinion. Russia’s religion, past and patriotism have increasingly become tools of legitimacy for the regime in order to accumulate social unity and support for the establishment. The use of patriotism as a underpinning characteristic of the Russian state has given history the job to legitimise the regime. This political use of memory is applied by Putin in order to provide a link throughout Russian history which emphasises national unity and reconciliation of different ethnicities that reside in Russia. At the same time however, Putin’s political use of memory stays clear of critically reflecting on the past as it filled with governmental misconduct and hardship.66 According to Steven Fish, professor of political
science at the University of California-Berkeley, Russia has got an ideology which is named ‘Putinism’. Fish defines Putinism as the following: “Putinism is a form of autocracy that is conservative, populist and personalistic”.67 Succinctly said, it is conservative because Putin in
general prioritizes the preservation of the status-quo while demonstrating resilience and aggression towards possible sources of instability and transformation. Putin’s conservatism is overlapped by populist elements such as his stance towards the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bi, Transsexual) community which is portrayed by state media as a decadent liberal phenomenon. The last main element of Putinism exists out of personalist autocracy. This is Putin’s virtually unrestrained one-man reign which is responsible for the hollowing out of institutions, political parties and individuals.68 Putinism inherently clashes with EU norms and values as they strive
to respect HR and human dignity, democracy, freedom, the rule of law and equality. Because HR are not fully uphold in Russia, political protesters and opponents are jailed, homosexuals and women are discriminated against and freedom of speech and information is curtailed.69
Thus, Russia and the EU have a very different approach to politics and to what is important for the state. Where Putinism is all about the power and prestige of the state and its leader, the 66 Lezina, E. “The revival of ideology in Russia”, Eurozine, 2017 [Online] Available at:
https://www.eurozine.com/the-revival-of-ideology/ [accessed 12-6-2016].
67 Fish, S. “The Kremlin Emboldened: What is Putinism?”, Journal of Democracy 28:4 (2017), 61.
68 Fish, S. “The Kremlin Emboldened: What is Putinism?”, Journal of Democracy 28:4 (2017), 61-62.
69 Shemetov, M. Russia, Events of 2017. HRW, 2017 [online] Available at https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/russia, [accessed 12-6-2016].
EU strives for promotion of HR and economic prosperity. These disparities became clearly visible when analysing the way that both actors act in the EaP countries.
The EU’s positon towards the EaP countries has invoked a considerable response by Russia whom started pressuring EaP countries through economic and political means to prevent national consensus on a pro-European course. Whereas EU incentives mostly have long term effects (for example economic growth and protection of human rights), actions taken by Russia can have a more direct effect because Putin can bypass lengthy bureaucratic procedures that the EU does need to undertake for the same issues (for example economic sanctions and visa limitations) due to its autocratic system. For this reason, the possibility exists that EU instruments and policy will be outplayed by Russian economic and political pragmatism.70 According to the EU, the EaP was not designed to be a geopolitical tool but as
a way to create a safe environment on Europe’s Eastern border. Still, there exists a popularized notion that EaP policy is an element of the ongoing geopolitical skirmish between Russia and the EU71 whereas others perceive EaP policy as a continuation of security and
enlargement policy.72 The new geopolitical reality, aggravated by the Ukrainian conflict, has
raised the need for the EaP to alter its outline with additional security content. A significant problem for the EU is represented by Russia’s actions in Europe as Russia is continuously attempting to create a wedge between EU Member States and its allies. Russia has different means to achieve this, one of them is that Russia only partakes in bilateral relations with EU Member States which weakens the EU as a whole due to consequent fragmentation in policy unity towards Russia. But also through other means as for example the false spreading of information and by giving support to anti-liberal and anti-EU populists all over Europe.73
EaP countries have traditionally been of strategic importance for Russia with a small intermezzo in the 1990’s when Russia was preoccupied with its own transitional problems as a consequence of the demise of the USSR. This was an important reason why the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) did not become a success as Russia’s attention at the time was mainly devoted to itself.74 Nevertheless, since 2000 Russia is seeking to regain a
high level of influence in the region through reinforcing its strategic position. NATO’s
70 Kandyuk, O. “Foreign policy of European Union: Eurasian Agenda”, CES Working Papers 8:3 (2016), 358.
71 Haukkala, H. “Explaining Russian reactions to the European Neighbourhood Policy”, University of
Nottingham, 2007 [online] Available at: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/shared/shared_icmcr/Docs/Haukkala.pdf, [accessed 10/03/2016].
72 Kandyuk, O. “Foreign policy of European Union: Eurasian Agenda”, CES Working Papers 8:3 (2016), 348. 73 Ibidem, p.359.
74 Cadier, D, “Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU-Russia Competition in the shared Neighbourhood and the Ukrainian Crisis”, Global Policy 5 (2014), 79.
intervention in Kosovo in 1999 made it painfully obvious for the Russians that they had lost their sway over Eastern European events, as Russia opposed the intervention firmly and was subsequently ignored. Some even went as far as saying that “Russia, for the first time in 250 years, had ceased to be a power in Europe”.75 This feeling was strengthened by the 2004
Orange Revolution in Ukraine which was portrayed by the Russian government as a Western coup designed to weaken Russia’s interests in its near abroad. These developments lead Russia to consolidate its influence in the near abroad by using for example the energy instrument which provides Russia with leverage over import energy dependent countries. Russia’s fierce reaction towards the EaP initiative in 2009 resembled old-school Cold War rhetoric as foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated that: "We are accused of having spheres of influence. But what is the Eastern Partnership, if not an attempt to extend the EU's sphere of influence."76 This reaction is striking because the EaP is mostly a moderate bureaucratic
initiative mainly designed to regionalize instruments that already existed in ENP framework.77
Georgian minister of reintegration Temuri Yakobashvili interpreted Lavrov’s words as the following: “Mr Lavrov just confirmed that whatever choices Eastern European countries make, be it NATO or EU, they are not acceptable to Russia. Thus, Moscow continues to see the Euro-Atlantic aspirations of these countries as an attempt to leave its sphere of influence.”78
But what are exactly Russia’s interests in the region? Political analyst and historian to the Carnegie Centre in Moscow, Dmitri Trenin, distinguished three sorts of interest for Russia; economic (energy, trade, labour), politico-military (achieving diplomatic support in the region, having military bases in strategic locations) and societal (minority ‘protection’ and language).79 Ostensibly, the politico-military aspect is of the highest importance which is
derivable through the Russian annexation of Crimea which allowed Russia to secure its naval base in Sevastopol. Russia feels threatened as their buffer zone has diminished severely since the fall of the Berlin wall and the consequent breakaway by the Soviet Republics and the
75 Trenin, D. “Russia’s Spheres of Interest, not Influence”, The Washington Quarterly 32:4 (2009), 8-12. 76 Valentina, P. “EU expanding its ‘sphere of influence,’ Russia says”, EUOBSERVER, 2009 [online] Available at: https://euobserver.com/foreign/27827. [accessed 17-6-2018].
77 Cadier, D, “Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU-Russia Competition in the shared Neighbourhood and the Ukrainian Crisis”, Global Policy 5 (2014), 79.
78 Valentina, P. “EU expanding its ‘sphere of influence,’ Russia says”, EUOBSERVER, 2009 [online] Available at: https://euobserver.com/foreign/27827. [accessed 17-6-2018].
dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. With NATO’s Baltic expansion in 2004,80 Russia has
increasingly become apprehensive as NATO now also borders Russia at Estonia and Latvia which means an significant increase in the border region that Russia has to protect which will spread its troops thinner. NATO now shares a 1215 kilometre border with Russia and with the US coveting Georgia and Ukraine to join the alliance Russia has accused NATO of trying to encircle them.81 And although with the expansion of Estonia and Latvia NATO’s
‘encirclement’ became more elaborate, this claim is debunked by Russia’s sheer geographical size as Russia has over 20,000 kilometres of border which makes 1215 kilometres merely one-sixteenth that borders NATO.82 Although EaP countries are closely situated to Russia the
latter is not the principal reason why they feel threatened by the EaP. The EaP is feared for other reasons as it is perceived as a threat to Russia for it societal and economic interests. Russia’s fierce reaction to the EaP indicates that they fear the transformative and structural power of the EU which has the potential to align EaP countries with the EU on the long-term.83 Structural power, as defined by prominent British academic Susan Strange, is the:
“power to shape and determine the structures of the political economy within which other states, their political institutions and their economic enterprise have to operate”.84 The EU is
slowly transforming Moldova (and others) through the process of harmonization. This happens through the creation of modernisation agreements with Moldova in which Moldova is ought to synchronise with EU norms and standards.
The EU’s structural power has the potential to ‘Westernize’ Eastern European systems and institutions which would come at a expense of Russia’s position as Russia opposes Westernization and propagates their own ideology. Since the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, Russia felt the need to legitimize their interference in the post-Soviet space and they aim to achieve this by rebranding itself. This legitimization process is supported through contesting, and reformulating international norms in order to push back Western style of diplomacy.85 This does not mean that Russia has given up on traditional hard power, they
have merely combined it with some degree of soft power. This hybrid combination of soft and 80 NATO, “NATO on the map”, NATO, 2018 [online] Available at:
https://www.nato.int/nato-on-the-map/#lat=53.42868026171152&lon=23.547847483159103&zoom=1&layer-4, [accessed 3-5-18].
81 Klubmann, U. “Ukraine and Georgia want in”, Der Spiegel, 2008 [online] Available at:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/russia-wary-of-nato-expansion-ukraine-and-georgia-want-in-a-544176.html, [Accessed 17-6-2018].
82 NATO, “NATO-Russia relations; the facts”, NATO, 2018 [online] Available at:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_111767.htm, [accessed 17-6-2018].
83 Cadier, D, “Eastern Partnership vs Eurasian Union? The EU-Russia Competition in the shared Neighbourhood and the Ukrainian Crisis”, Global Policy 5 (2014), 79.
hard power is intended to raise Russia’s global appeal and to intimidate countries so that it can regain its prominent position on the world stage. Russia and EU expert Cristian Nitoiu argues that the conflict in Ukraine has further increased tensions in EU-Russia relations which mainly stems from three matters:
“The first emphasizes divisions between member states and their impact on coagulating a common EU approach towards Russia; the second (geopolitical) tension highlights the almost mutually exclusive way in which the EU and Russia’s security interests have developed in the post-Soviet space; finally, the third contends that a clash of values and worldviews between the EU and Russia makes conflict between them virtually unavoidable.”86
Matters like these, have preserved tensions between Russia and the EU which have been intensifying since Putin became Prime Minister in 1999 and have not been sufficiently addressed in a coherent way by both sides. Arising tensions and conflicts in the EaP countries has increased friction which has led to an aggravation of EU-Russia relations as both sides attempt to strengthen their position. This ostensible resurgence of Cold War tensions might lead to serious conflicts in other relations or areas which are sensitive for global security issues. Tensions are often sustained by differentiating individual foreign policies of EU Member States concerning their policy towards Russia. Western sanctions after the annexation of Crimea by Russia has made the situation even more volatile and unlikely to be resolved any time soon by the creation of a common foreign policy.87 Sanctions included;
diplomatic measures (exclusion Russia from G8), restrictive measures (asset freezes and visa bans) and economic restrictions specifically targeted against Crimea, Sevastopol and Russia in general.88 The diversity in reactions by EU Member States towards Russia has made it
improbable for the EU to achieve common foreign policy goals concerning Russia, as there is insufficient unity between Member States. For instance, Germany was cautious during the Ukraine crisis to pursue a tough stance towards Russia and kept lines of dialogue open which bore resemblance with traditional Cold War Ostpolitik, while Central and Eastern European Member States felt threatened by the annexation of Crimea and consequently supplicated to NATO and the US to increase its military presence in the region. This is just one illustration 85 Makarychev, A. S. “Rebranding Russia: Norms, Politics and Power” CEPS, 2008 [online] Available at:
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/book/1608.pdf, [accessed 17-6-18].
86 Nitoiu, C. “Towards conflict or cooperation? The Ukraine crisis and EU-Russia relations”, Southeast
European and Black Sea Studies 16:3 (2016), 376.
87 Ibidem, 387.
88 European Union Newsroom, “EU sanctions against Russia over Ukraine crisis”, Europa.EU, 2017 [online] Available at: https://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu-sanctions-against-russia-over-ukraine-crisis_en, [accessed 14-6-18].
