Security Council on Resolution 1973
Explaining the case with Neoclassical Realism and Social Constructivism
Master Thesis
Melanie Marjanović
s4351746
Index
Table of contents p. 2
List of tables and figures p. 3
Chapter I: Introduction p. 4
1.1. Responsibility to Protect (R2P): a seminal concept p. 4
1.2. The puzzle of Germany’s abstention from voting on Resolution 1973 p. 6
1.3. Choice of theories p. 10
1.4. Scientific and societal relevance p. 13
1.5. Overview of the thesis p. 14
Chapter II: Theoretical outline p. 15
2.1. Different strands of Realism and their shortcomings p. 15
2.2. Neoclassical realism p. 17
2.2.1. Underlying assumptions of Neoclassical realism p. 17
2.2.2. Neoclassical realism, national interest and (military) intervention p. 20 2.3. Implications for Germany’s voting behavior and hypotheses p. 23
2.4. Social constructivism p. 26
2.4.1. Underlying assumptions of Social constructivism p. 27
2.4.2. Finnemore & Sikkink’s norm ‘life-cycle’ p. 29
2.4.3. Mechanism of socialization p. 32
2.5. Implications for the norm R2P and hypotheses p. 34
2.6. Assessing and falsifying theories p. 36
Chapter III: Methodology p. 38
3.1. Research design and case selection p. 38
3.2. Process tracing: a classic qualitative tool p. 40
3.3. Operationalization of key concepts p. 41
3.3.1. National interest, the perception of elites and governmental sensitivity p. 41
3.3.2. Socialization and framing p. 43
3.4. Employed sources and their reliability p. 46
Chapter IV: The Libyan crisis and the vote on Resolution 1973 p. 47 4.1. Background on Germany’s foreign policy in the past and the political
system of Germany p. 47
4.2. Germany and its national interest regarding the intervention in Libya p. 49
4.3. Answering the hypotheses of Neoclassical realism p. 57
4.4. Background on Germany’s position regarding the norm R2P p. 61 4.5. Germany and the role of R2P regarding the intervention in Libya p. 63
4.6. Answering the hypotheses of Social constructivism p. 68
Chapter V: Conclusion p. 72
Appendices p. 77
Table 1. Responsibility to Protect as outlined in the Outcome Document
of the World Summit 2005 p. 77
Table 2. International Interventions with R2P References in United
Nations Security Council Resolutions from 2005 to 2011 p. 78
Table 3. Different Stages of the Norm ‘life-cycle’ p. 32
Table 4. Different types of Case Studies based on the Categories of Stake
(1995) and Yin (2003) p. 39
Figure 1. Neoclassical realist model with all chosen variables p. 23 Figure 2. The process of interactions based on the assumptions of social
The Libyan Intervention
-Germany’s voting behavior in the United Nations Security Council on
Resolution 1973
Explaining the case with neoclassical realism and social constructivism
Master thesis written by Melanie MarjanovićAbstract
The issue of military intervention on humanitarian grounds has generated one of the most heated debates in the field of International Relations. This thesis takes a closer look at one of the most highly controversial interventions in the last few years: the intervention in Libya. The problem this paper is addressing revolves around the puzzle that many theorists and practitioners had in reference to the intervention: Why exactly did Germany abstain from voting in the UNSC? As the intervention was established within the framework of the concept Responsibility to Protect, it seems useful to take a closer look within the concept and the theory that provides the theoretical background for it: social constructivism. However, the question could be answered by looking into the national and strategic interests of Germany as well. Therefore, the theory of neoclassical realism will be used in order to explain the cause of the decision, by taking domestic factors into consideration, which could be useful for the research. This paper ultimately compares the two theories and their ability to explain the divergent behavior of Germany concerning the intervention in Libya. The analysis will show that social constructivism holds no explanatory power in this research puzzle in contrast to neoclassical realism.
Chapter I: Introduction
1.1. Responsibility to Protect (R2P): a seminal concept
Sudan, Kosovo, Syria: humanitarian crises all over the world have always stirred up the international community. The reactions of the states to each and every case of human rights violations have been a continuing struggle to respond appropriately and effectively to crises in the last few decades. Furthermore, it seems that interventions are driven by national interests rather than genuine humanitarian concerns. Secretary – General Kofi Annan urged the international society of states to build consensus on how best to respond to such occurrences after persistent inconsistencies and failures to react. At the World Summit in 2005, more than
150 states agreed to the principle of Responsibility to Protect as an appropriate solution to humanitarian crises and it was incorporated into the Outcome Document in the paragraphs 138 and 139 (see Appendix Table 1). It is based on the idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’; it implies to respect sovereignty of other states and to protect human rights of citizens within a state (Bellamy, 2010, p. 143). The duty to prevent genocide lies first and foremost with the state as described in the three pillars of the Outcome Document (see Appendix Table 1). However, the international community is in charge if the state fails to provide a safe environment and can be held accountable for the welfare of the people (The Responsibility to Protect, n.d.). Hence, for the protection of individuals or groups against genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, the international community agreed and encompassed the concept which links humanitarian interventions and the principle of when states can militarily intervene (Brosig, 2012, p. 2).
The difficulty after recognizing such a new doctrine is its practical implementation on various levels. Germany was one of the first European states that chose to support the concept at its national level. In 2006, Germany reaffirmed its commitment to R2P by publishing several documents and press releases to address the implementation. Moreover, since 2005 there have been several international interventions that referred to the R2P concept by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). From missions in Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Germany chose to support every international action regarding R2P situations financially and with German personnel. However, the European state did not vote in favor of an intervention in Libya in March 2011, which is seen as an example of applied R2P principles by the international community1 (Brozus, 2012, p. 57; International
Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), n.d.). It chose to abstain from voting on the UNSC resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011, which had been perceived as a ‘no’ to the intervention by the allies of Germany in the UNSC (Fröhlich & Tröller, 2014, p. 23; see also Footnote 8). How can the difference in Germany’s reaction from earlier humanitarian crises, which are categorized as R2P cases, to the Libyan conflict be explained?
1 The assumption that resolution 1973 and therefore the Libyan intervention is an
implementation of R2P has been tested by German scientists of international law (see Merkel, 2011a, 2011b; Pradetto, 2014). However, scholars of international and humanitarian law disagree about whether R2P is a legally binding right, a soft law or an emerging norm, which ultimately has legal consequences for the concept of R2P and its (political and legal)
interpretation (see also Schoch, 2013). Therefore, I will base my analysis on the assumption on the broad understanding and interpretation of the resolution 1973 as seen by the
international community, which is that the Libyan intervention can be seen as an implementation of R2P.
1.2. The puzzle of Germany’s abstention from voting on Resolution 1973
The inapprehensible tragedies of the First and Second World War triggered the international community to implement several human rights conventions. The protection of civilians has been the main purpose of treaties such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The international community quickly adopted them; the implementation has suffered however from a lack of a concise response. Human rights violations continued throughout the last decades but they did not generate any reactions as it has been foreseen in the UN human rights domain (Brosig, 2012, p. 2). By looking at historical cases, one can assess that the implementation of the prevention and containment of human rights violations has been very malleable. “Humanitarian interventions have always been controversial both when it happens, and when it has failed to happen” (International Coalition of on Intervention and State Sovereignty Report (ICISS Report), 2001, p. 7). A constant critique on the exclusive selection on humanitarian interventions throughout the history has accompanied every crisis (Chandler, 2009, p. 34).
The debate about the implementation of human rights norms had been intensified after the failure of the international community to act in the massacres of Rwanda and Srebrenica. They considered new strategies and appropriate guidelines to react to such mass atrocity cases and eventually the result was the concept of R2P. R2P was unanimously adopted at the World Summit 2005, leaving room for further interpretation in practice, however (Hehir, 2011b, p. 1333). The General Assembly approved the document with a very vague perception of the principle; especially the explicit suggestions for criteria on interventions were not included in the Outcome Document (Chandler, 2009, p. 35). The focus of R2P is not military intervention, which is seen as the last resort to a humanitarian crisis, but the prevention of human suffering and thus the responsibility for each state “to use non-violent tools to prevent such suffering from happening, and, where it did happen, to rebuild polities and societies afterwards” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 621). The UN General Assembly’s adoption of the R2P principle has been reaffirmed in several statements published by the Secretary-General. Germany has been active in promoting the notion of R2P on international and national levels. The European state joined the informal Group of Friends on Responsibility to Protect to raise its voice and articulate its interests on the further implementation of the concept in a broader
newly appointed Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect for further consultations. Germany has laid its focus on the preventive aspects of R2P following the first and second pillar of the concept and the need for more investment in the prevention of genocides and conflicts. The state fully supported the report of the Secretary General in 2009 named Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, as it issued criteria and guidelines for the completion of humanitarian violations regarding military intervention, which had been left out in the Outcome Document of 2005 (Brozus, 2012, pp. 56-57).
Since the adoption of the concept in 2005 there have been several UNSC resolutions that referred to the concept of R2P regarding an intervention. Especially in the cases of Sudan, Côte d’Ivoire and the DRC, military action was used to prevent further suffering of the civilian population. Germany has taken several factors into consideration before deciding on any military intervention. The most important criteria for Germany will be further outlined in order to lead to the research question why the European state chose not to vote in favor of the intervention in Libya while supporting other interventions, which happened under similar circumstances. Germany made it clear in its statement in the beginning of its fifth term in the UNSC (2011/2012), that prevention is the most important part to confront crises and human suffering, reemphasizing its political culture of military restraint (Westerwelle, 2011). This is in line with the ICISS Report that states that military intervention is the absolute last resort. The approach of Germany to international politics since World War II is its “preference for peace building rather than war fighting, which resonates deeply with the German general public” (Brozus, 2012, p. 54). It prefers peaceful conflict solutions and policies such as sanctions that avoid and halt crimes of human suffering. However, despite its culture of military restraint, Germany chose to intervene quite frequently in the last years especially under the guidance of R2P. Therefore, more principles have to be considered by the German government. Another criterion has been the right intention of the military intervention. The just cause “would be met if the primary purpose of the intervention were the protection of civilians from grave and systematic violations of human rights” (Gärtner, 2011, p. 6). For Germany, humanitarian reasons are the decisive factor for any military intervention. A further important criterion has been the right authority to intervene in such conflicts (Massingham, 2009, p. 807). According to Germany, the emphasis should first and foremost lie in the respective governments. If those governments fail to protect its population, regional organizations in cooperation with the international community should intervene in the conflict (Westerwelle, 2011).
The question remains why Germany chose to intervene in other R2P cases but not in Libya if those criteria had been taken into consideration beforehand and the circumstances in these conflicts had been similar. Therefore a brief overview of similar conflicts in the context of R2P will be outlined to explain why Germany’s voting behavior puzzled many politicians and researchers.
In 2003 a conflict between different ethnic nomadic tribes in the region of Darfur, Sudan escalated. Rebel movements took up arms against the Sudanese government that led to one of the worst humanitarian crisis in the last decades. The conflict has cost over 300,000 lives and millions of people had to flee to neighboring countries. A new military offensive of the Sudanese government in 2006 brought about a military intervention from the international community. In Resolution 1706 the UNSC decided to take measures against forces in Sudan that were accused of human rights violations (Auswärtiges Amt, 2012). The Resolution was the first one with an R2P reference and Germany fully supported the peacekeeping mission named African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which was later replaced with the United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) (see Appendix Table 2). Additionally, Germany provided personnel and financial means to the European Union Force (EUFOR) to foster peace in the region, which was established at the request of the African Union (EU Factsheet, n.d.). As the government failed in its responsibility and regional organizations were overwhelmed by the conflict, the international community took military action to halt the suffering of the population. It led to a decline of casualties, which drove the German government to announce that, the “accords have already largely been achieved in their objectives” (Auswärtiges Amt, 2011a), and therefore did not employ anymore troops in the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) but chose to contribute to the on-going mission by financial means (Brozus, 2012, p. 60).
The situation in Côte d’Ivoire had been similar as forces and militias from the government launched several attacks on civilians before the presidential elections in 2010. As forces from the opposition were failing to protect the civilians and Ivoirians had to flee from their homes, the UN decided to step into the conflict and support the electoral process in the African country. The Special Advisers stated, “urgent steps should be taken, in line with the responsibility to protect, to avert the risk of genocide” (ICRtoP, 2012). In cooperation with the AU, the UN sent troops and the German Government actively supported the resolution to bring an end to the suffering (Auswärtiges Amt, 2011b; see Appendix Table 2). “UN forces therefore undertook a limited military operation whose sole purpose was to protect innocent
Since the First Congo War in 1998, different forces in the DRC have continually committed human rights abuses. The conflict has arisen from violence between government forces and several rebel factions. Sanctions have been introduced but have been proven ineffective. Systematic rape and wanton murder have created a humanitarian crisis in the region (ICRtoP, n.d.). The continuous struggle of the DRC government to effectively protect its citizens led the Security Council to announce the United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). “The new mission was authorized to use all necessary means to carry out its mandate” (UN MONUSCO, n.d.), relating to the protection of civilians and humanitarian personnel. In the conflict of the DRC, Germany even took the leadership in the mission with Special Representative of the Secretary-General Martin Kobler (UN Missions, 2013; see Appendix Table 2).
The Libyan case can be seen as similar to the cases presented above as government forces attacked civilians. Germany acknowledged the upcoming humanitarian crisis in Libya and pushed for sanctions against the Libyan government and especially against the president Al Gaddafi. The situation began to escalate as government forces started massacres on Libyan citizens (Brozus, 2012, pp. 60 – 62). The intention of the resolution was to halt the suffering of the Libyan population, as sanctions had been proven ineffective. Regional organizations played ‘gatekeepers’ in the case of Libya, which was similar to the case of Côte d’Ivoire, and ultimately the Arab League endorsed the resolution and eventually the UNSC adopted the Resolution 1973 on 17 March 2011 (Bellamy & Williams, 2011, p. 846). Germany abstained from voting and stated that it would not support any military intervention despite Gaddafi’s threat to kill Libyan citizens (see Appendix Table 2). The European state disagreed with its allies to support the Libyan opposition forces by a deployment of ground troops. Germany thus showed diverging reactions in R2P cases with similar circumstances. It seems that a differentiation on humanitarian interventions even after the implementation of the R2P concept is still prevalent. Thus, the conflicting and unexpected voting behavior of Germany in the case of Libya puzzled many observers.
The theoretical literature that investigates the causal factors behind any humanitarian intervention has come mainly from the theory of social constructivism. Advocates of social constructivism postulate, “considerations related to moral legitimacy have given rise to a new and evolving norm of humanitarian intervention” (Abdel-Aty, 2007, p. 1; see also Finnemore, 1996). As proponents of social constructivism point out, there is an increasing number of interventions in the last few decades without a clear strategic or economic interest behind it.
Social constructivists presume that norms are the driving force behind a states’ action as they shape state behavior and subsequent actions (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 905; see also Finnemore, 1996; Jemczyk, 2005). Advocates of the theory claim that foreign policy behavior is driven by shared norms, and expectations about appropriate behavior are established within the international system. Social constructivists assume that actors, who comply with a norm, follow the Logic of Appropriateness and behave accordingly to the respective norm. The predicted behavior hence is that norm followers act in compliance with that norm. In the case researched in this paper, R2P is seen as an ‘emerging norm’ or a ‘strong political commitment’ which is based on preexisting international humanitarian norms. Universally, scholars address R2P in the context of an international humanitarian norm as outlined in the ICISS Report (Bakke, Drinkall & Martin, 2008, p. 2; see also Bellamy, 2013; Evans, 2009; ICISS Report, 2001). Germany fully supported R2P with all its principles from the beginning. Therefore the expected behavior according to social constructivists should have been an engagement in the humanitarian intervention in Libya. Not only did the country intervene before in R2P situations, but there were also clear violations of human rights in Libya, which had been an important argument for Germany’s military engagement in humanitarian interventions in the past. Furthermore, if norm evolution is a cumulative process, then later cases should show a “more normative impetus for humanitarian action than earlier cases” (Abdel-Aty, 2007, p.1). Thus, Germany’s behavior in the case of the Libyan intervention contradicts the expectation of the constructivist approach and left not just its allies puzzled but researchers as well.
1.3. Choice of theories
There are several mainstream theories that seem appropriate to examine Germany’s voting behavior. In the following, realism, neoclassical realism and the social constructivist approach will be shortly outlined in order to argue which theories will be considered for the research. Realists define the political sphere in terms of power and interest or particularly “interest defined as power” (Morgenthau, 1985, p. 5). According to advocates of realism, national interests prevail in the decision to intervene in a foreign state and to interfere in its sovereignty. As Wheeler (2000) pointed out, a state does not intervene purely or primarily for humanitarian reasons but due to considerations of its national interest (p.30). Vital national
altruism in international relations. Altruism has not been a primary motivator for humanitarian intervention, but only plays a subordinate role to national interest maximization. Realists conclude that even after the adoption of R2P, a state’s response to violation of human rights would not change and that any military intervention is based on considerations regarding the costs and opportunities of a given strategy (Krieg, 2013, pp. 40-41). It is important to note that realists have been largely absent from the work on the R2P principle conducted by the ICISS (Fiott, 2013, p. 777). They hold on to concepts such as the national interest and survival, even though they acknowledged, “to say that states are sovereign is not to say that they can do as they please, that they are free of others’ influence” (Waltz, 1979, p. 96). It seems plausible then to examine Germany’s divergent behavior through the lens of Realism, because researchers of the theory would expect to see that a state chooses not to intervene because the intervention would not serve national interests and this argument could explain Germany’s decision regarding the intervention in Libya.
Neoclassical realists such as Rose (1998) and Taliaferro (2006) stand in the tradition of Realist approaches, yet they claim that foreign policy theories have been neglected by traditional Realist strands. Their interest is to conduct research on the foreign policy behavior of a state and hence offer a framework in which a state’s foreign policy decisions can be explained. The theory is based on the assumption that great powers choose to intervene in a conflict when there are national interests at stake. Researchers of the neoclassical realist strand do not aim to create a general theory regarding international politics but they take a closer look at factors influencing any foreign policy behavior (Rose, 1998, p. 164). The explanatory power of the approach to explain humanitarian intervention derives from its framework that combines the pressure exerted by the international system as well as domestic considerations. By taking domestic factors into account, the theory can explain changes in patterns of a state’s foreign policy behavior at the same time. Neoclassical realism seems therefore suited to explain a particular foreign policy decision of a state (see also chapter 2.1.). Hence, the approach could be taken to examine why Germany abstained from voting in the UNSC.
Social constructivism is in trouble determining why Germany abstained from voting as outlined in chapter 1.2. However, considering that R2P is a norm and the Libyan intervention has been conducted within the context of R2P, and following the constructivist argument that norms do play a role in international politics, neglecting constructivism would seem
ill-conceived for this research. It is therefore necessary to take a closer look into the social constructivist approach.
The theory could still explain variance in Germany’s behavior by investigating if the Libyan intervention can be seen as an implementation of the norm in the first place. It is possible that Germany did not see the conflict in terms of an R2P situation and therefore the norm is not even perceived to be applicable in this case. Moreover, Germany could have a different interpretation of the norm than the other states, which chose to intervene in the conflict. Hence, the theory could add to the research by explicating when and how the norm of R2P matters in international conflicts and humanitarian crises.
For analyzing Germany’s decision to abstain from voting on the resolution, the norm ‘life-cycle’ will be outlined and used for testing the constructivist hypotheses. The framework of the norm ‘life-cycle’ can contribute to the understanding about the origins of international norms, the processes through which norms influence state and non-state behavior and which norms will matter and under what conditions. As such, the explanatory power of the social constructivist approach derives from its notion that states, which adopt a norm and refer to it ultimately internalized it and are influenced by the norm. It proves a valuable tool for analyzing the extent to which a humanitarian norm can influence state behavior. Furthermore, even when countries endorse the concept of R2P, there can be significant differences in the underlying motivations for its support and affects ultimately foreign policy outcomes. Thus, using the ‘life-cycle’ of norms, the behavior of states and their underlying motivations regarding interventions can be researched. The framework could show that the R2P-norm is still in the early stages of socialization and therefore social constructivism could still explain Germany’s divergent behavior by investigating that the European state chose not to intervene because the norm has not been internalized yet by Germany and therefore Germany did not act accordingly to the norm
The general research question therefore is
Which theory, social constructivism or neoclassical realism is better able to explain why Germany abstained from voting on resolution 1973 regarding an intervention in Libya? Is
social constructivism with its focus on the R2P norm indeed unable to explain Germany’s divergent behavior, and is neoclassical realism, focusing on the government’s perception of
1.4. Scientific and societal relevance
The decision of Germany to abstain from voting on the Libyan intervention puzzled not only Germany’s allies and politicians around the world but researchers as well. In the field of International Relations has been a debate around Germany’s decision and hence there have been some publications since March 2011 that examine the decision especially under the lens of the norm R2P. Many of those detailed descriptions lack however a comprehensive answer to the question why Germany acted that way eventually and just portray the process prior to the voting in the UNSC (see Greiner, 2012; Katsioulis, 2012 and Seibel, 2012). Hence this paper places the decision not only in context of R2P but also investigates the influence of power politics in Germany’s foreign policy behavior. Furthermore by taking a closer look at neoclassical realism, this paper is valuable as it allows a more thorough understanding of factors influencing the German foreign policy debate by answering the why question.
This paper seeks to contribute to the existing literature on states’ intentions regarding humanitarian interventions by taking a closer look within one country and its foreign policy actions in the case of the military intervention in Libya. The role of emerging and existent middle powers is increasingly becoming important on the international level. They shape the global agenda and have influence on norm-construction as well as norm-socialization processes. Hence, the paper can explore which influence a global middle power has on the agenda and how the international system has an impact on such states.
Uncovering causal patterns can be useful for further research on foreign policy analysis within the strand of neoclassical realism as well as in constructivism. The link of foreign policy analysis and constructivism has been scarcely investigated (Checkel, 2008a, p. 72) and thus, the paper adds scientific value by diminishing the gap of the linkage of constructivism and foreign policy analysis. The contradiction in Germany’s behavior regarding humanitarian crises allows taking a closer look at domestic politics and factors that are influencing foreign policy behavior of states in times of crises. Eventually, the research findings can indicate for which purposes humanitarian interventions are utilized.
Moreover, by unraveling domestic factors, the findings can be used for further research into humanitarian interventions. It contributes to the understanding of how states respond to crises which is useful for preventing upcoming conflicts and protect citizens in the
future of suffering due to violent conflicts, war, genocide and mass atrocities. The in-depth examination of a striking action can lead to recommendations for prospective practical implications on the use of R2P.
1.5. Overview of the thesis
In the first part of the research paper, an elaborate explanation of the theories used is required. It will contain the arguments and basic concepts on states’ behavior and their motivations to intervene in a humanitarian crisis. The explanatory power of the theories towards the foreign policy analysis of states will be further elaborated as well as how they are embedded in the broader theoretical debate. Moreover, the scope and limitations of the theories have to be considered. The chapter will end with the hypotheses for each theory respectively.
The following chapter entails the methodology of this research paper. The concepts of each theory have to be operationalized with a detailed explanation of factors underlying state behavior. Additionally, a further elaboration on the methods chosen for the empirical research will be pursued with a thorough explication of the case used in this research.
Chapter four will contain the actual testing of the hypotheses formulated in the theoretical framework by investigating the case and Germany’s behavior respectively. It will consist of a careful analysis of the Libyan intervention and the state’s motivation to abstain from the voting on Resolution 1973 by investigating the factors suggested by the theories.
The conclusion will reflect upon the empirical analysis and will answer the research question by stating which theory has more explanatory power to explain the behavior of Germany. Furthermore, recommendations for future research of R2P and the implications for the development of the norm will be given.
Chapter II: Theoretical outline
In this chapter, the two theories and their causal mechanisms used in this research paper will be broadly examined in order to present a clear concept. The subsequent analysis will resolve around the underlying assumptions of both theories and their implications for understanding the expected behavior of Germany. It is followed by a formulation of hypotheses.
2.1. Different strands of Realism and their shortcomings
The realist approach has been dominant for more than half a century and has been leading the debates in international relations theory. It can be traced back till the fifth century Greek historian Thucydides and has developed several strands within the approach, notwithstanding extensive criticism over the years. The strand used here in this paper is the neoclassical realism approach as noted in chapter 1.3. To define the strength of it, there will be first a brief introduction to the realist tradition and an explication why neoclassical realism is suitable in explaining foreign policy. Then, there will be a short outline of the shortcomings of traditional Realist approaches and how neoclassical realism tries to overcome these limitations in order to explain divergent state behavior.
Classical realism is seen as a philosophical disposition rather than an international relations theory. Realism “is founded on a pessimism regarding moral progress and human possibilities” (Gilpin, 1984, p. 290). Dating back to Thucydides, Machiavelli and Hobbes, realism has entered the realm of international relations theory with authors such as E. H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau. Both can be seen as the founding fathers of the discipline derived from the opposition to idealism. Morgenthau based his theory of traditional or classical realism on the unchanging human nature and its drive to live, reproduce and dominate (Williams, 2004, p. 634; see also Morgenthau, 1960). Neoclassical realists focus especially on one theoretical axiom of the classical realist tradition, which is unit-level explanations regarding a state’s behavior. They have a bottom-up interpretation of foreign policy and they highly differentiate the unit-level. Classical scholars look at the history of the state and its diplomatic traditions in its foreign policy analysis. The causal logic therefore is that internal factors drive the decisions of a state. Neoclassical realists draw upon that assumption but do not omit systemic incentives (Rose, 1998, p. 149).
Neoclassical realists assume that systemic factors also play a role in a foreign policy decision. There is one “single, dominant factor shaping the broad pattern of nation’s foreign policies over time, [which] is their relative material power vis-à-vis the rest of the international system” (Rose, 1998, p. 150). This is in line with the assumption of neorealists, who focus on the international structure and how systemic incentives drive systemic level outcomes while the structure constrains the choices of states2. Anarchy defines the system and
the international system creates the same basic incentives for all great powers. Neorealists therefore focus on the systemic level rather than the unit-level as they assume that the structure of the international system forces states to pursue power (Mearsheimer, 2013, p. 78; see also Waltz, 1979).
However, neorealists remained weak in explaining change in the international system and the role domestic factors can play within foreign policy. Neorealism and neoclassical realism therefore differ from each other on the dependent variable. Neorealism seeks to explain repeating patterns regarding foreign policy decisions while neoclassical realism investigates variation in international outcomes of the same state over time (Taliaferro et al., 2009, pp. 20 – 21). Thus, neoclassical realism does not simply refine Waltz’s balance of power theory or plainly try to smuggle in unit-level variables into its framework to analyze irregularities but the theory tries to explain variation in a state’s foreign policy over time or across different states with similar external constraints. Furthermore, neorealists ignore diversities among states regarding culture or regime type (Mearsheimer, 2013, p. 78). Neoclassical realists, however, assume that domestic factors do play a role as intervening variables on the foreign policy outcome. Hence, neoclassical realists draw upon neorealism by including the systemic level, but eventually creating a multi-level approach to explain change in a state’s behavior. Rose, one of the main neoclassical scholars, states
“that the scope and ambition of a country’s foreign policy is driven first and foremost by its place in the international system and specifically by its relative material power capabilities. This is why they are realists. They argue further, however, that the impact 2 Waltz repeatedly argued that systemic theories are not theories of foreign policy.
Neorealism is characterized by the goal to explain state interactions such as balancing, the probability of a war or a general disposition to competitive relations between states. Critics argue, however, that those interactions are either foreign policies or a direct (if sometimes unintended) result of foreign policies. This research paper follows the assumption that even though both neoclassical realism and neorealism fall into a broader realist research program and proceed from the same core assumptions, they still differ from each other on the
of such power capabilities on foreign policy is indirect and complex, because systemic pressures must be translated through intervening variables at the unit level. This is why they are neoclassical” (Rose, 1998, p. 146).
Advocates promote the idea that a good theory of foreign policy should first investigate the effect of the international system on national behavior, because the relative position of a state in the international system is the most important characteristic of a state. Additionally, the researcher should not ignore effects of other levels in international politics. Hence, the final focus should lie on selected variables such as domestic regimes, elite perceptions or statesmen (Zakaria, 1992, p. 197). Therefore the neoclassical realism approach overcomes the shortcomings of other realist strands by using a multi-level approach because a one-level framework is often inaccurate and oversimplified to explain certain foreign policy behavior (Rose, 1998, p. 150).
2.2. Neoclassical realism
The following chapter includes the basic assumptions of neoclassical realism and explicates the causal model of the theory. Furthermore, an outline of the intervening variables used in this paper is followed by the hypotheses for the analysis.
2.2.1 Underlying assumptions of Neoclassical realism
One main assumption is the condition of anarchy in the international system. The anarchic environment cannot be overcome; hence states will continue to strive after influence, (material) capabilities, security and scarce resources (Schweller, 2003, p. 329). Neoclassical realists put more emphasis on the classical tradition of realism; focusing not just on security, but also on the possibilities actors have in such an environment. Moreover, actors can shape the anarchy they are living in. Neoclassical realists argue that actors seek to control their environment (Taliaferro et al., 2009, p. 28). The most important actor is the state. However, Zakaria (1998) emphasizes that “nations do not formulate and implement foreign policy and extract resources to those ends; governments do” (p. 187). And in these governments, statesmen are the primary actors. Hence, anarchy is what governments make of it.
Neoclassical realism endorses the concept of a diverse actor at the domestic level. Its focus lies on explaining behavior of states over time with states being the most important
actors in international politics (Taliaferro et al., 2009, p. 16, p. 24). One important assumption is that states seek to maximize their influence. They are impelled by the system’s imperative that generates an influence-maximizing3 behavior (Zakaria, 1992, p. 194). The imperative
deriving from the state therefore influences the state: any state will try to seek more influence and the stronger a state gets, the more influence it wants eventually (Zakaria, 1992, p. 194; see also Rose, 1998, p. 152). Neoclassical realism therefore predicts that the “relative amount of material power resources countries possess will shape the magnitude and ambition…of their foreign policies” (Rose, 1998, p. 152).
The international system is seen as central in the theory because its characteristics mediate intensively between the action of states and their ultimate international outcome (Rose, 1998, p. 188). According to neoclassical realists, the system is defined by states that use power to influence their external environment and at the same time react to changes in its relative power position in the system. In the end it is not power they strive for, but external influence by the means of power (Lynn-Jones, 1998, p. 169).
Another important question that should be answered for the case investigated in this paper is the conception of interests and ideas in neoclassical realism. Are interests of states endogenous or exogenous to the system? Kitchen remarks that constructivism can help to understand that interests and ideas are endogenous to the system structure, yet overruling the importance of material capabilities3. Structural realists on the other hand claim that identities
and interests are exogenous and are treated as given (Waltz, 1986, pp. 323-325). The consequence is that neither approach seems to fully embrace how ideas and interests can play a role in a state’s foreign policy. Therefore, neoclassical realists answer the question as following: “Neoclassical realists assume that there is indeed something like an objective reality of relative power…They do not assume, however, that states necessarily apprehend that reality accurately” (Rose, 1998, pp. 152 – 153). The approach can be seen as a middle ground between realist and constructivist thinking4. Ultimately, neoclassical realism assume
3 Italics by author, not in the original citation.
33 More on the concept of ideas and interests of social constructivism will be explained in
chapter 2.4.
4 Neoclassical realism therefore can be seen as bridge-building between two paradigms. This assumption leads to the interparadigm debate among realism, liberalism and other ‘grand theories’ of international politics. Neoclassical realists argue that their approach constitutes a progressive research agenda; derived from mutual learning among theorists rather than a debate between the different theories. Criticis (i.a. Legro and Moravcsik) accuse the theory of theoretical degeneration and inconsistency. They argue that the result is a minimal realism,
that foreign policy is the interaction of objective and subjective factors and policy processes are driven by international power dynamics (Rynning & Guzzini, 2001, p. 16).
As mentioned earlier it is the system’s imperative that drives states’ behavior. However, the question remains how states respond to their external environment. Neoclassical realists assume that the researcher initially has to analyze systemic pressures and how these are transmitted through intervening variables at the unit-level. They argue that the ‘transmission belt’ between the system structure and a state’s behavior, as claimed by the structural theorists, is not smoothly functioning (Rose, 1998, p. 158). Systemic imperatives can be unclear and hence it is important to mention that structural changes are not easy to quantify (Dueck, 2009, p. 149; see also chapter 2.2.2). It is important to investigate the right variables, which have an influence on the foreign policy behavior.
The relative distribution of power prompts the behavior of a state by influencing the choices state officials make and therefore the researcher has to investigate in detail how a state’s policymaker understands the situation (Rose, 1998, p. 158). After evaluating what effect the international system has on a state’s behavior, unit-level variables must be discussed in order to explain a state’s foreign policy. Therefore, to explain state behavior or a specific foreign policy outcome, one has to investigate first the relative power distribution in the international system and then a chosen domestic variable. Those intervening unit-level variables are analyzed later as a “state’s foreign policy that cannot transcend the limits and opportunities thrown up by the international environment” (Rose, 1998, p. 151).
Neoclassical realism offers a wide range of intervening unit-level variables, because many domestic political factors can influence the process to the ultimate foreign policy outcome (Dueck, 2009, p. 146). Advocates of the approach are driven by questions rather than method and hence, they choose between different variables such as perception of elites, domestic regimes or statesmen (Zakaria, 1992, p. 197). The theory displays a clear connection between a state’s relative power and its foreign policy outcome, where intervening variables “channel, mediate and (re)direct” (Schweller, 2004, p. 164) pressures from the system. However, those unit-level variables such as decision-makers’ perceptions are constrained by realists, however, the theory is not reductionist because it uses internal characteristics of states as a guide to national responses to systemic constraints, which could be helpful in the
examination of this case study as well (Jones, Menon & Weatherill, 2012, p. 6, Taliaferro et al., 2009, pp. 21-22; see also Carr, 2001; Legro & Moravcsik, 1999; Vasquez, 1997; Wendt, 1992).
both international and domestic politics. Therefore, the researcher must take domestic constraints into account when analyzing a case with neoclassical realism. Yet again, it depends on the researcher and the investigated foreign policy behavior which kinds of constraints influence the foreign policy outcome.
There are widely accepted unit-level variables in neoclassical realism that are used to examine foreign policy behavior. In this paper two specific intervening variables, which will be further outlined in the upcoming chapter, will be used. Furthermore the concept of national interest and (military) interventions in neoclassical realism will be introduced in order to formulate hypotheses for the foreign policy decision of Germany in the case of Libya.
2.2.2. Neoclassical realism, national interest and (military) intervention
The following variables derive from an article written by Colin Dueck, who describes in his paper the societal forces, which affect foreign policy, and the decision of a state to militarily intervene in the case of the United States (US). Despite fundamental differences between the American and the German political system, leaders in any state have distinctive, internalized ideas which shape the decision for intervening in a state militarily and that is why the article is still applicable to this case study (see more in chapter 4.1.).
Neoclassical realism contends that at the beginning of every dispute of statesmen whether to intervene stands a thorough analysis of a state’s national interest. An intervention must benefit the intervening nation in either maintaining or changing a state’s stand in the international system (Cook, 2008, p. 4). A military interference is the ultimate consequence of the incentives deriving from the international realm and in the end states use that tool to influence their environment (Dueck, 2009, p. 140). However, structural imperatives are not easily quantifiable. It is difficult to assess a threat if the capabilities of a state not only possess material elements, but also non-material ones. Political leaders have to make calculations of their own relative power as well as other states’ intentions (Schweller, 2003, pp. 337 – 338). So it is important to notice that according to neoclassical realism, states could be objectively inefficient. Quantifiable resources such as economic, social or military resources can change in times of threats (Taliaferro, 2006, p. 485). The global system is very uncertain: “International anarchy…is rather murky and difficult to read (Rose, 1998, p. 152).
process of identifying the national interest will hence start with the decision-makers’ perception of national interest. All foreign policy choices are conducted by the elite, which includes the head of the government and the official statesmen being in charge of making foreign policy (Ripsman, 2009, p. 171). Therefore, the perception of elites is the first intervening variable this paper will examine on the case study. Rose (1998) introduced the variable as one of the most important factors through which systemic threats are filtered. It is the elites’ perception of relative power that is of importance, not relative quantities of physical resources (p .147). The process then leads to the conception of national interest that state officials hold when facing interesting developments in the external environment. Statesmen consider how best to put an intervention into effect, if the perceived threat to vital interests requires an intervention (Dueck, 2009, p. 148). As mentioned before, the ‘transmission belt’ linking material capabilities to foreign policy behavior, can be misleading. The international distribution of power drives a state’s behavior only by influencing the perception of state officials. Therefore any researcher on foreign policy has to examine the phenomenon in detail, which often can be rough and volatile (Rose, 1998, p. 158).
When state officials pursue an intervention, they consider their intention in the light of domestic political incentives and constraints. These constraints lead state officials to implement the precise conduct, framing and timing of the intervention, which may seem contradictive to other theoretical approaches such as neorealism. In this sense, domestic politics matters, not as a primary cause of intervention, but rather as a powerful influence on it (Dueck, 2009, p. 139). Moreover, state officials face a difficult choice when deciding upon an intervention. State leaders do have distinctive ideas and convictions on matters of national security and these convictions ultimately shape the foreign policy behavior. The military intervention seems to follow the elite’s perception of national interest, as they somehow have to react to an external threat. Statesmen have to extract and mobilize resources from the domestic society and maintain the support of interest groups and the public (Taliaferro et al., 2009, p. 7) if they choose to intervene militarily in a conflict.
There are good reasons to believe that states or state officials are reluctant to intervene for certain domestic conditions. As in any democracy, statesmen are confronted with public opinion, electoral pressure, interest groups and legislative prerogatives when facing any foreign policy decision (Dueck, 2009, p. 146). Especially the political system in Germany with the two chambers exemplifies the pressure on a weak coalition-government (see also chapter 4.1. on the German political system). The second intervening variable in this case study is therefore an important domestic constraint: governmental sensitivity. When
governmental sensitivity increases, e.g. due to upcoming elections, a government is more likely to be more sensitive to domestic actors that prefer not to intervene (Alons, 2010, p. 36; see also Van der Vleuten, 2001). Shortly after the Libyan resolution, six federal elections in March and the forthcoming months were set to take place in nearly half of the Bundesländer in Germany. Dueck (2009) states that during election campaigns, presidents of the US were very unlikely to campaign on a pro-war platform. “Instead, the are more likely to stress the ways in which they seek to avoid war, precisely because they understand the electoral advantages of such a public stance” (Dueck, 2009, p. 144). Additionally, an intervention, which turns out to be very costly and prolonged, could lead to a declining support and will eventually affect the domestic political standing. Given the uncertainties around military interventions, an already weak coalition-government will think twice about intervening. Moreover, if the public believes that the state officials only pursue a narrow self-interest instead of counteracting an immediate threat, the government will eventually suffer politically (Dueck, 2009, pp. 143 – 147). If a government is already in an unstable position and is facing national elections, it will be more sensitive to domestic actors and their stance on interventions (Alons, 2010, p. 36). This could be the case for Germany as well. The government had been under electoral pressure due to falling poll numbers for the coalition-government in the months prior to the Libyan intervention (Spiegel Online, 21.12.2010). Moreover, allies of Germany speculated that the upcoming federal elections had an effect on the decision of the intervention (Jones, 2011, p. 55). Therefore, the case study has to examine if the immediate prospect of elections pushed the government away from a possible intervention in Libya. The question one has to answer is then whether upcoming elections played a part in Germany’s decision not to intervene in Libya.
A neoclassical realist model of the outlined theoretical framework and all chosen variables regarding the case study researched in this paper is given below.
2.3. Implications for Germany’s voting behavior and hypotheses
In order to formulate hypotheses, the expectations of neoclassical realism must be assigned to the case study in this paper. Firstly, it is important to address whether neoclassical realism is still suitable for explaining Germany’s foreign policy behavior in the case of Libya. Neoclassical realism aims at investigating foreign policy outcomes with a multi-level framework that includes different factors at all levels. As advocates of neoclassical realism pointed out, there is foreign policy behavior that cannot be accounted for by a neorealist explanation or a purely Innenpolitik theory (see Taliaferro et al. 2009, p. 2). The explanatory leverage of neoclassical realism over other theories therefore can help to explain the foreign policy behavior of Germany on the vote of the Libyan intervention resolution that puzzled so many scholars and politicians. Additionally, the theory can contribute to the research and solve the issue of Germany’s diverging behavior by introducing domestic variables in the wider structural argument. The comprehension of those variables makes the theory more accurate and more exhaustive than other theories and therefore contributes to a better understanding of foreign policy.
Secondly, the goal of this paper is to explain why Germany chose not to intervene in Libya. Based on that fact, one can assume two different possibilities. The first possibility is that the perception of German state officials at that time had been that national interest would not have been served by taking part in the intervention. As Dueck (2009) claims, the
immediate cause of intervention in many cases is the “perception of vital national interests on the part of leading state officials” (p. 150). Therefore it is important to investigate if the conception of national interest led to the foreign policy outcome at hand. It could be possible that Germany did not have the perception that its national interest was affected by the conflict in Libya in the first place or that no vital interests stood in question. The calculation of the threat based on the perceptions of the elites led to the decision that Germany should not intervene because there are no nations’ interests at stake. The second possibility is that the conception of national interest did show that nations’ interests are at stake. However, elites were taking domestic conditions into consideration, due to the upcoming elections and the therefore higher governmental sensitivity. As there were upcoming elections in Germany, the elites – especially decision-makers in the coalition-government - were constrained in their actions and chose not to intervene because of domestic politics rather than pursuing what they believe is a deliberately foreign policy course based on their perceptions. State officials do not just neglect but also anticipate the impact of intervening somewhere in their domestic politics. The consequence of the interventionist behavior could be a downfall of the government, especially facing upcoming elections that could weaken the coalition-government, which could be the case in Germany. Therefore, the second possibility could show that the expected assumption of neoclassical realism that domestic conditions constrain actions and hence national politics matter, is correct.
The general hypotheses deriving from those two possibilities then are following:
General Hypothesis I: If the conception of national interest based on decision-makers’ perceptions leads to the notion that national interests are not served by an intervention, then the state will not vote in favor of the intervention.
General Hypothesis II: If national interests based on decision-makers’ perceptions are served by an intervention but governmental sensitivity is high and domestic actors prefer not to intervene, then the state will not vote in favor of the intervention.
This research paper investigates a specific case; therefore the general hypotheses must be adapted to it. As mentioned above, there are two possibilities of explaining Germany’s foreign policy behavior. The first hypothesis of this thesis hence is:
Hypothesis I: If the conception of Germany’s national interest based on decision-makers’ perceptions leads to the notion that national interests are not served by an intervention in Libya, then Germany will choose not to vote in favor of the intervention.
If the hypothesis is true, the empirical analysis will find evidence that state officials chose not to intervene due to the perception of them that there were no vital national interests such as economic or geostrategic issues touched by the conflict in Libya.
Hypothesis II: If German national interests based on decision-makers’ perceptions are served by an intervention but governmental sensitivity is high and domestic actors prefer not to intervene, then Germany will choose not to vote in favor of the intervention.
If the hypothesis is true, the empirical analysis will find evidence that important politicians in Germany such as the head of the government, Angela Merkel, or foreign minister Guido Westerwelle found it important to take the prospective federal elections and the public opinion on intervention into consideration although there were perceived national interests involved in the conflict in Libya.
If the research shows that Germany’s foreign policy decision can be explained by the conception of national interest based on state officials’ perceptions or additionally by the intervening variable of governmental sensitivity, then the theory is corroborated.
2.4. Social constructivism
Social constructivism with its focus on norms seems suitable to use in the research design laid out in this paper. The broad literature on constructivism has grown in recent years, and the result is an increasingly complex differentiation of many strands of constructivism. Onuf (1989) argues that constructivism is not a theory but rather an approach to study social relations (p.1). Using the concept of constructivism, it has to be clear then to which line of argumentation this research is referring to. Constructivism endorses the ‘middle ground’ between rationalists and poststructuralist approaches to international relations that share a critique on the static assumptions of (neo)realism and (neo)liberalism theories (Fierke, 2010, pp. 193 – 195). Constructivists therefore distance themselves from the two extreme poles, which can vary greatly (Christiansen, 1999, p. 536). With a growing distinction within the approach, scholars have made the differentiation between a modern, conventional constructivism (which represents the ‘middle ground’) and a more postmodern, critical variation (see Adler, 1997; Campbell, 1998; Hopf, 1998). This paper focuses on the conventional approach, which is based on a positivist science and as such does not differ in its epistemological assumptions, but rather the ontological ones. However, for the sake of clarity, a short outline of the constructivist debate about epistemology and ontology is followed by a further elaboration on the strand of social constructivism used in this paper. Eventually, the hypotheses will be presented based on the theoretical framework of Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm ‘life-cycle’.
Rationalists endorse an individualist ontology that argues that the unit of analysis is the individual – either a human or a state. Constructivists questioned this emphasis and specified their ontology in social terms. As Ruggie (1998) describes, in constructivism “international reality is ideational as well as material and…the meaning and significance of ideational factors are not independent of time and place” (p. 33). Individuals are not fully formed, as the rationalists would argue, but they are shaped by their surrounding and cannot be strictly separated from it (Fierke, 2010, p. 190). Arguing on a social ontological basis that encompasses ideational factors, constructivists hence focus on norms and shared understandings (Christiansen, 1999, p. 530). The constructivist approach used in this paper endorses the intersubjective ontology, which emphasizes norms, social agents and a mutual constitution of identity, which has implications for the epistemology. The analytical means are based on a positivist epistemology that includes hypotheses testing, causality and
explanations (Fierke, 2010, p. 195). Thus, there are no great differences concerning methodology that divides the rationalists and the constructivists (Wendt, 1998, p. 116). 2.4.1. Underlying assumptions of Social constructivism
According to constructivists, the international system “is a set of ideas, a body of thought, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at a particular time and place” (Jackson & Sorensen, 2003, p. 162). Social phenomena, such as states, are the product of human interaction in a social world (Fierke, 2010, p. 199). Thus, social constructivism depicts the international system as a society (Dixon, 2013, p. 135); a society of states, that include institutions and a set of rules and norms that are commonly accepted by states (Ruggie, 1998, p. 11).
A central assumption of constructivism is that the relationship between actors and structure is not fixed but rather a process of interactions. The structure is defined in terms of social relationships and collective meanings and as such leaves more room for agency (Dixon, 2013, pp. 135 – 136). Wendt (1992) characterizes the structure in that way, that “it is through reciprocal interaction that we create and instantiate the relatively enduring social structures in terms of which we define our identities and interests” (p. 402). A social structure enables the individual to influence one’s environment as well as to be influenced by it. Rather than emphasizing how structures constrain, constructivists focus on shared understandings and norms and investigate how subjects of international politics interact and change in their environment (Fierke, 2010, p. 191; see also Wendt, 1987). Structure and agency are hence mutually constitutive. Agents are seized by interacting with the structure and therefore delineate social reality by making choices in the process of interacting (Wendt, 1992, p. 397). Thus, the international system is ‘socially constructed’ and does not exist independently of human action. Like Wendt (1992) puts it: “Anarchy is what states make of it” (p. 391). The environment agents are acting within affects the behavior of a state but also the character of a state – the identity. The actors are endogenous to the environment, domestically as well as internationally. Actor identities are not just taken for granted; the property of an actor is dependent upon a specific social context. The concept of identity is an important link between environmental structures and interests (Finnemore, 1996, pp. 157 – 159). State identities and the idea of it develop in world society; nations construct their own identity and project it upon others (Katzenstein, 1996, pp. 17 – 18). One has to distinguish between identities that are
intrinsic to an actor and one that is only defined by the virtue of a relation within a social structure, such as sovereignty. Within that process of interaction in international relations, identities can be changed (Jepperson, Wendt & Katzenstein, 1996, p. 47).
“Identities both generate and shape interests. Many interests depend on a particular construction of self-identity in relation to the conceived identity of others” (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 60). States therefore develop interests through their identity. The perception of self and other generates specific commitments and as such constitutes policy behavior of states (Katzenstein, 1996, p. 18). Constancy in identity can explain regularities in national interest and policy, whereas a change in identity is followed by a change in interests and therefore a change in the behavior of states (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 53).
Behavior is thus dictated by norms and identities. Norms are expectations about proper behavior for a given identity. They can act like rules that constitute an identity, e.g. defining expectations about the scope of an identity and as such specify the actions. On the other hand, they can regulate and operate as standards of behaviors. Hence, norms have a quasi-causal impact on outcomes in international politics (Labonte, 2013, pp. 4 - 5). Especially in the realm of humanitarian interventions, norms have always accompanied the purpose of states whether to use force or not. Legitimate behavior in social constructivism is guided by a Logic of appropriateness (LoA). Following shared values and norms, actions based on that logic are norm-governed (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998, p. 897). Actors consider their behavior in terms of normative and ideational concerns and try to make appropriate choices. They follow appropriate behavior rather than act in an instrumental rational way by maximizing their preferences or calculating their benefits (Labonte, 2013, p. 5). A social constructivist model on the process of interactions is given below.
Figure 2. The process of interactions based on the assumptions of social constructivism.
In the debate of changing identities and interests, social constructivists introduced not only the institutionalization and diffusion of norms, but also the socialization of it. Those descriptions can be elaborated further in a more practical way by turning to the theoretical framework of the norm ‘life-cycle’.
2.4.2. Finnemore & Sikkink’s norm ‘life-cycle’
The recent standard of humanitarian interventions stirs up discussions about what interests states might pursue. Constructivists dispute that “the pattern of humanitarian intervention cannot be understood apart from the changing normative context in which it occurs” (Finnemore, 1996, p. 154). Shifts in intervention behavior correlate with changes in normative standards. They dismiss the rationalist assumption that policy elites make decisions about intervening in mass atrocity cases just based on self-interest. They do not state how the nature of interests changes but why and when decision-makers include humanitarian norms in their consideration to intervene, which is especially outlined in the framework of Finnemore and Sikkink (Jepperson et al., 1996, p. 45; see also Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Thus, the normative context is important to consider because it has an impact on interests and ultimately on the outcome in international politics. The norm ‘life-cycle’ therefore can be used to investigate why Germany abstained from the vote in the UNSC and chose not to intervene despite the fact that the international community largely views the intervention as an implementation of the R2P norm. The mechanism of socialization is useful to examine the behavior of Germany. Socialization particularly plays a part in the first two stages of the model and therefore the focus of the outline will be on those two phases.
The state society is essential for allowing processes of socialization among states and other (inter)national actors to occur. Likewise, it is necessary for the promotion of human rights principles. Socialization can be defined as the “induction of new member into the ways of behavior that are preferred in a society” (Risse & Sikkink, 1999, p. 11). The goal of socialization is to internalize norms in the national and international realm by states. The contributions of norm entrepreneurs to the socializations of human rights principles consists of their input into the establishment of norms. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) suggest that this has been crucial to the widespread acceptance of human rights principles in the international community.
