Faculty of Humanities
M.A. Media Studies: Television and Cross-Media Culture
Master Thesis
Redefining the Narrative: An Exploration of the Palestinian Citizens of
Israel and the Reconstruction of Identity through Filmmaking
Dina Maria Farag Student Number: 12431168
Supervisor: Emiel Martens Second Reader: Reza Kartosen-Wong
Table of Contents
1. INTRODUCTION 3
1.1 Culture as a Matter of Media 3
1.2 Historical Context –The Nakba & the Palestinian citizens of Israel 6
2. THE PALESTINIAN MINORITY: OTHERING AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY 10
2.1 Israel–A Contradictory State 10
2.2 The ‘Trapped Minority’ 13
2.3 Otherness of Palestinians: Orientalism 15
2.4 The Collective Memory of the Palestinian Minority 19 2.5 Israeli Media Strategies & Palestinian Identity Construction 23
3. PALESTINIAN FILMMAKING: TAKING CHARGE OF THE NARRATIVE 27
3.1 In Between – An Overview 28
3.1.1 Behind the Scenes: The Funding and Production 29
3.1.2 Three Palestinians in Tel Aviv 36
3.2 Junction 48 –– An Overview 44
3.2.1 Behind the Scenes: The Funding and Production 46 3.2.2 Palestinian Resistance: Separate but Equal 49
3.2.3 Reception in Israel and Palestine 54
Abstract
The Palestinian citizens of Israel are an indigenous minority living within Israeli territory. Succeeding the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and the resulting immigration of Jews, the Palestinians living within the newly set borders of Israel were reduced to a minority. While there are various fiction and documentary films produced on the general issue of the Israeli-Palestinian contention, the Palestinian minority and their ongoing struggles to coexist within a hegemonic host state are often neglected. As the hegemonic state, Israel developed systematic policies to discipline Arab society and indoctrinate the minority with a Jewish worldview. One of the policies includes the reconstruction of media into central socializing mechanisms seeking to control the Palestinian collective identity and memory. As the role of media is detrimental in shaping the ways in which people view their own social and political reality, this thesis examines the how the minority uses alternative media as their own tool to resist Israeli oppression. By analyzing the funding, production, content and reception of the films In Between and Junction 48, this research concludes that the minority uses alternative filmmaking to regain control of their narrative and redefine their collective identity.
Keywords: geopolitics, ethnic minority media, Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Nakba, Palestinian minority, Palestinian citizens of Israel, Israeli media, identity construction, collective Arab memory, Palestinian filmmaking, Junction 48, In Between
1.INTRODUCTION
1.1 Culture as a Matter of Media
The decades-long Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most widely discussed and emotionally charged political issues in the world. While there is a great deal of information on the overall Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Palestinians living in Israeli territory and their ongoing struggles to coexist as a minority are often neglected. These Palestinian citizens are a minority living amongst Jewish-Israelis in Israeli territory. As such, Israel has actively utilized ideological mechanisms to impose the hegemonic Jewish worldview amongst its citizens of Israel, including the Palestinian indigenous minority (Jamal 2009, 573). Since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948 (also referred to as the ‘Nakba, or ‘catastrophe’ in Arabic), the Israeli state has succeeded in dominating the Palestinian political and economic ecosystem. Unwelcome within the newly established Israel, the state aimed at taking control of the collective identity and memory of the Palestinians that remained within its borders. As such, the Israeli state “attempted to discipline Arab society by colonizing the Arab mind” after it had successfully dominated the Arab economy and political system (Jamal 2009, 573). The state systematically attempted to indoctrinate a hegemonic Jewish worldview within the Arab indigenous community. One of the most impactful expressions of this attempt is through the takeover of the existing Palestinian media landscape. As such, the use of media became a prevalent tool in order to cultivate the “preferred image of the Israeli Arab" (Jamal 2009, 573).
Similarly, since dominant media are used to cultivate the ‘Israeli Arab’, alternative media are also becoming increasingly important tools for the minority to reconstruct the Palestinian identity, culture, and sense of community. As such, “(...) media by and for ethnics in a host country with content in ethnic languages”, was coined the term ethnic minority media (Shi 2009, 599). Therefore, alternative media by and for minorities help stabilize the minority’s original identity and its affiliation with the former homeland (...)” (Caspi & Elias 2011, 63). In addition to serving as a foundation for maintaining the minorities’ cultural and collective identity, ethnic minority media also serve as an alternative to dominant mainstream media. It challenges the minority’s stereotyped representation commonly found in dominant
media and provides viewers with a more layered depiction of them as a people (Caspi & Elias 2011, 63).
In this thesis, I will analyze how the Palestinian minority in Israel uses alternative filmmaking as a tool to regain control of their narrative and redefine their collective identity as a way to resist Israel’s attempt to cultivate the submissive ‘Israeli Arab’. By taking charge of their own narrative, I argue that Palestinian citizens of Israel are utilizing alternative filmmaking to combat the perpetual and oppressive attempts of the Israeli state to control the collective memory and identity of an entire minority. I will do so, by analysing the two films In Between and Junction 48 and argue that these productions provide the minority with the opportunity to take charge of their own identity construction. I will also argue that the funding structures, productions, storylines and reception of the films portray symbolic meaning relating to the struggle of the Palestinian minority living in Israel. Within my analysis, I also examine the intentions and perspectives of those involved in the films (mainly directors, producers and leading actors), and explore how they regard their own identity as a part of a minority that uses filmmaking as a tool to reconstruct their collective identity. As such, a part of my analysis will include commentary I personally obtained in interviews with Maysaloun Hamoud, the director of In Between, as well as Samar Qupty, the leading actress in Junction 48. Both Hamoud and Qupty are members of the Palestinian minority in Israel, and can, therefore, contribute firsthand to certain details of each film, as well as examine how the films function in regards to their own identities as Palestinian citizens of Israel.
Additionally, while the number of films revolving around the Palestinian people in the West Bank is growing, films produced by and starring Palestinian citizens of Israel are scarce. In Between and Junction 48 are amongst the most prominent films that earned international acclaim while also being produced by the minority. Tackling themes unique to them, both films employ Arab actors and actresses, producers and directors who are active members of the Palestinian minority. Addionally, the films are significant to this research due to their credible representations of the Palestinian minority and their interactions with Jewish-Israeli characters. Naturally films amplify and exaggerate certain depictions, however, the two films selected (as was stated numerous times in interviews with the directors and cast members and will be addressed in the analysis), aimed at portraying realistic representations of the Palestinian minority for the screen. In order to analyze the symbolic meaning of the films,
relating to the real struggle of the Palestinian minority living in Israel, a degree of authenticity must be met.
Considering land and geography are at the heart of the Israel-Palestine contention, this thesis research falls under the scope of geopolitics. As the name suggests, the term geopolitics refers to the relationship between geographic discourses and the ‘political’ (Toal 2005, 65). Toal (2005) specifies that geopolitics can be regarded as the dynamic between geographic entities (such as rivers, mountains, locations or climate), and political and societal structures of states and communities (65). In other words, identifying and attributing meaning to geography is in itself already a political process (Toal 2005, 65). Dittmer (2010) argues that today, geography refers to the different ways meaning is inscribed into places and as such “dividing the world up into spaces with which we associate value” (11). As such, classic geopolitics is rooted in the analysis of ‘how the world is’ (Dittmer 2010, 11). In terms of perceiving ‘how the world is’, media are one of the greatest influences. In that sense, “television, newspapers, books, the Internet and cinema act as mediators of people’s experience of places” (Zimmermann 2007, 59). In terms of Israel and Palestine as well as the Palestinian minority in Israel, the issue of geography, space and location are extremely complex and emotionally charged. Since land and geography (or the loss) of it are at the heart of the Israel-Palestine conflict, the specifics are rarely fully understood by the international community. These reasons amplify the importance of visual mass media plays in contemporary society, and therefore suitable ways of analyzing mass media’s impact are required. As visual media “re-present and re-construct specific ways of seeing which carry with them historic baggage”, film are especially powerful tools for shaping viewpoints and identity formation (Zimmermann 2007, 60). For the Palestinian minority in Israel, the use of film does not only provide the international community with a glimpse of their situation as an oppressed and marginalized minority, but also allows a people traumatized by loss to reconstruct their own collective identity.
In order to set a foundation for a more in-depth analysis, I will first provide historical context regarding the conflict between Israel and Palestine. Subsequently, as the Palestinian minority in Israel is the focal point of this research, I will discuss the state of Israel’s political structure, which serves as the framework for understanding the Palestinian minority’s position within it. Within my theoretical framework, I will conduct a critical discourse analysis including
Edward Said’s (1979) Orientalism and Dan Rabinowitz’s (2001) ‘Oriental Othering’ and ‘Trapped Minority’ theories that serve as the framework for understanding political and social circumstances the minority is greatly affected by. Additionally, I will include a discussion of the formation of collective memories and identities and draw on Durkheim’s (1995) and Halbwachs’s (1980) introduction to group identity. I then relate the theories of collective identity formation to the case of the Palestinian citizens of Israel and outline the evolution of the specific cornerstones of Palestinian collective identity. The last section of the theoretical framework will examine the policies and strategies of Israel’s dominant media toward the Palestinian minority living in Israel since 1948. Herein, I will also explore the means Israeli media utilized to accommodate the process of constructing a collective Palestinian memory void of their cultural environment and historical past. After examining how the Israeli media attempts to cultivate the image of the ‘submissive Israeli-Arabs’, I will focus on how the Palestinian minority challenges or copes with the identity and collective memory forced upon them. In the first section of my analysis, argue that the Palestinian minority, as a response, have taken innovative approaches through film production to express their own cultural and historical identities. The in-depth analysis of the funding, production, content and reception of In Between and Junction 48 will also display the obstacles the minority is faced with when attempting to express their Palestinian identity. As such, by taking charge of their own narratives, I will argue that Palestinians are utilizing alternative filmmaking to redefine their collective memory amongst themselves as well as to the global community.
1.2 Historical Context –The Nakba & the Palestinian citizens of Israel
The territory known today as the state of Israel is perceived by the globally dispersed Palestinian population as their own ancestral homeland (Rabinowitz 2001, 68). The establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 on around 78 percent of the disputed territory is known as a national calamity for Palestinians worldwide (Arab. ‘Nakba’). Most of the 800,000 Palestinians who lived in these regions now included in the state of Israel before 1948, were driven out or relocated as refugees to neighbouring countries (Rabinowitz 2001, 68). As such, approximately five to seven million Palestinians are dispersed in Israel and the West Bank, as well as in the neighbouring countries Jordan, Lebanon and Syria (Rabinowitz 2001, 68). This massive dismantlement of Palestine and the following ethnic cleansing of the
Palestinian people from their homeland is regarded as the Nakba, or ‘catastrophe’ within the Palestinian community. Referring to how central the Nakba is to Palestinian history, Palestinian scholar Dajani notes:
The Nakba is the experience that has perhaps most defined Palestinian history. For the Palestinian, it is not merely a political event – the establishment of the state of Israel on 78 percent of the territory of the Palestine Mandate, or even, primarily a humanitarian one – the creation of the modern world’s most enduring refugee problem. The Nakba is of existential significance to Palestinians, representing both the shattering of the Palestinian community in Palestine and the consolidation of a shared national consciousness. (Masalha 2012, 8)
The historical Nakba plays a crucial role in understanding the intricate dynamic between the Palestinian and Israeli public sphere. In addition, the Nakba itself remains an existential cornerstone of Palestinian collective memory and identity. As indicated, 1948 was “the year of rupture in Palestinian modern history. The Palestinian national being was shattered...and Palestine as a political and physical entity disappeared from the map” (Rouhana & Sabbagh-Khoury 2019, 5). While the Palestinians consider 1948 the year of the ‘catastrophe’, Israel regards it as the year of the War of Independence (Bar 2008, 1). The complexity of this conflict is marked by the immense divide between the Palestinian and some of the Israeli stances regarding the Nakba. As such, Israeli prime minister Golda Meir in 1969 denied the existence of the Palestinian people as a whole. According to Meir, “there was no such thing as a Palestinian people. It was not as though there was a Palestinian people considering itself as a Palestinian people, and we threw them out and took their country away from them. They did not exist” (Masalha 2012, 3).
While Meir’s statement is considered a classic case of ‘Nakba denial’, many Israeli historians such as Avi Shlaim consider the dismantling of Palestinians people in 1948 a form of war crime (Masalha 2012, 3). Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2019) argue that despite the gravity of the situation at hand, the collective and “personal traumatic experiences and their impact on memory and political consciousness have, in general, received much less attention” (5). Rouhana and Sabbagh-Khoury (2019) continue to argue that the Nakba as a traumatic
human experience and the “loss of home and homeland, with all its human ramifications, were marginalized in public discourse” (5). Within academic discussion on the Nakba, many historians are referring to a ‘temporal feature’ as the cornerstone of the Nakba. Although the Nakba marks the traumatic events of 1948, it is important to note that the Nakba also marks the line between two conflicting periods, namely before and after 1948. For that reason, Palestinians consider the Nakba as a continuing occurrence as their occupation by the Israeli state is still ongoing (Masalha 2012, 7). Sayigh (2013) expands on the notion of the Nakba being an ongoing tragedy by noting that “the Nakba is not merely a traumatic memory, but continually generates new disasters, voiding the present of any sense of security, and blacking out the future altogether. The Palestinian coinage ‘ongoing Nakba‘ (al-nakba al-mustamirrah) expresses this specific temporal feature” (56). While the cultural and historic importance that the Nakba holds for the Palestinian community is clear, the year 1948 has a very different meaning for the Jewish community. For the Jewish community, the creation of the state of Israel marked the date of the return to their homeland and the introduction to an age of Jewish independence (Lipshitz 1998, 1). Between 1948 and 1995, “roughly 2.4 million people immigrated to Israel (…) At the time of independence in 1948, Israel had a Jewish population of 717,000; the wave of immigration in the 1950s more than doubled the figure” (Lipshitz 1998, 1). While the international Jewish community was migrating to newly established Israel, the Palestinian people were evacuated. Rogan and Shlaim (2001) clarify:
More than half of the nearly 1.4 million Palestinian Arabs were driven from or fled their homes. Those Palestinians who did not flee the conquered areas were reduced to a small minority within the new state of Israel. At the end of the fighting, Jordan took over the areas of Palestine controlled by its army west of the Jordan River, while the Egyptian army administered the strip it retained around Gaza, adjacent to its borders. In the wake of the catastrophe the Palestinians found themselves living under a variety of alien regimes, were dispossessed of the vast bulk of their property, and had lost control over most aspects of their lives. (12)
As indicated, after the war of 1948, the majority of Palestinians who did not live in what is currently known as the West Bank or Gaza, but remained in the regions now included in the
state of Israel, were then under Israeli control and forced to accept Israeli citizenship as Palestinians (Ghanem 1998, 430). A group of Israeli scholars contend that there was “a mixture of policy orders, some of which were to encourage the population to leave some areas. They claim that some Palestinians left by choice and others out of fear of being in a war zone” (Jamal 2009, 19). Historical evidence, however, supports the argument that the evacuation of the Palestinian people should be considered ethnic cleansing. This general consensus of the international community has a heavy impact on the collective consciousness of Palestinians outside and inside Israeli borders. Jamal argues that “growing evidence of the 1948 war and of the repressive political and cultural regime that followed that war has been a strong factor nourishing the endeavour of the Palestinian population in Israel to reconnect with its cultural and national environment” (Jamal 2009, 19). The approximately 160,000 Palestinians who remained in Israeli territory were mostly farmers and villagers from more remote areas, who considered leaving more detrimental than staying. As such, the educated, urban middle class who had the means to seek opportunity elsewhere almost completely disappeared from newly established Israel (Rabinowitz 2001, 68). The state of Israel is therefore composed of two central national groups, namely the Jewish majority which makes up around 82-83 percent of the population who have settled in Israel through several waves of migration, and the second group comprised of Arabs with Israeli citizenship, making up around 17-18 percent of the population in Israeli territory (Ghanem 1998, 430). Ghanem (1998) points out some differences in terminology when referring to this Arab minority. At times this minority is referred to as ‘Israeli Arabs’, ‘Arab Israelis’ or ‘Palestinian citizens of Israel’ (430). In this thesis, this minority will be referred to as the ‘Palestinian citizens of Israel’ or the abbreviated version of ‘Palestinian citizens’ in order to emphasize, following Ghanem (1998, 430), that “this group is historically and culturally part of the Palestinian people who live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Palestinian Diaspora”. Although these Palestinian citizens hold Israeli citizenship, Ghanem (1998) argues that the state was established as a home to the Jewish people, who are oblivious to the existence of the Palestinian minority (432).
Additionally, the exclusion of the Palestinian citizens does not only exist symbolically but on a clear and intricate structural level. Methods of segregation include the exclusion of Arabs from the political decision-making centres, exemption from mandatory military service, non-employment of Palestinian citizens in senior professional positions, the
establishment of special institutions solely for Palestinian citizens and, last but not least, the discrimination against Palestinian citizens in Israeli broadcast media (Ghanem 1998, 433-434). As such, as Rouhana (1998) highlights, “the policy and practice of preferring one group of citizens over another group according to the ethnic affiliation of each group is only a derivative of the constitutional structure and ethnic exclusivity that are enacted as the embodiment of the state’ s ideology” (281). These strategic political policies discriminating and excluding Palestinian citizens from all corners of the public sphere, calls for a discussion on the nature of Israel’s political structure.
2. THE PALESTINIAN MINORITY: OTHERING AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
2.1 Israel–A Contradictory State
The political environment the minority of Palestinian citizens in Israel finds themselves in impacts the status and resulting collective identity of the minority. Generally, Jewish-Israel considers its political construct and climate to be a Jewish democratic state (Rabinowitz 2001,79). Among contemporary Zionist academics and scholars, Israel is essentially considered a liberal democracy that is burdened with unique circumstances (Rabinowitz 2001, 79). These assertions are “premised on the forgiving claim (…) that Israel is essentially a liberal democracy overburdened by external and internal security and social pressures which force it to temporarily forgo some liberal tenets... Given time and reasonable progress in Israel’s relations with the Arabs, these anomalies will disappear” (Rabinowitz 2001, 79). Rabinowitz (2001) challenges this line of thought and argues that the mere indication of Israel as “Jewish democratic” is a contradiction within itself, for, “once assigned with a restrictive ethnic adjective (in this case ‘Jewish’), a state can no longer claim to be inclusive of and even-handed towards all its citizens. Rather, the term exposes the real nature of the state: an exclusive ethnoterritorial project which serves the hegemonic group at the expense of others” (Rabinowitz 2001 p. 79). Ghanem (1998) takes a similar approach and contends that Israel is one of the prime examples of an ethnic state that utilizes cultivated policies and agendas of “exclusion and discrimination towards the Arab minority” (429). He highlights that while in theory, Israel welcomes its Palestinian citizens of Israel to “participate in its life; but under no
circumstances does it offer them equality, it maintains Jewish superiority in all fields and grants them preference symbolically, structurally and practically” (Ghanem 1998, 429).
While Israel does base its relations between its citizens on ethnicity rather than on civil affiliations, it is different from intolerant ethnic states such as Iraq or Iran. Although “it does offer restricted rights to members of minority groups and integrates them to a limited degree in its politics, society, economy and media”, the state does conduct sophisticated policies of systematic exclusion (Ghanem 1998, 431). Palestinian citizens of Israel are permitted to general rights such as “the right to vote for and be elected to legislative bodies, freedom of expression, and freedom of movement and organization. At the same time, however, it follows policies of domination and control that guarantee continued Jewish hegemony and Arab marginality in all fields” (Ghanem 1998, 431). This duality is derived from the difficulty the state of Israel is tasked with. According to Yonah (2005), Israel is burdened with recognizing and implementing the Palestinian citizens’ right to cultural autonomy, while simultaneously maintaining its Jewish character (102).
Due to differing political inclinations, there is much debate on how Israel should approach this twofold issue. Some scholars, including Yonah (2005) suggest that the establishment of Israel as a bi-national, or at least multi-ethnic state would offer a “‘historical understanding’ according to which the birth of Israel and the Palestinian tragedy are not two separate events, but one and the same” (102). However, Yonah (2005) also recognizes that such a bi-national arrangement is extremely complex to realize, as from a demographic standpoint, it is highly difficult to “secure either a Jewish homogeneous nation-state or a Palestinian homogeneous nation-state due to the existence of sizeable Palestinian national minority living within Israel’s 1948 borders and due to the increase in the number of Jewish settlements and settlers in occupied territories (especially in the West Bank)” (Yonah 2005, 102-103). In addition to this demographic factor, Palestinian society is heavily reliant on Israel’s economic system, in the way that they share the same labour market (Yonah 2005, 103). By contrast, Rouhana (1998) completely eliminates the option of a multi-ethnic state as a solution, arguing that “many multi-ethnic states provide a national home to the dominant ethnic group only and are defined as ethnic states” (278). By definition, an ethnic state is therefore incompatible with the framework of a democratic state, as within an ethnic state, “access to power, government, resources and state identity is limited to various degrees, not to the state’s citizens, but to members of one ethnic group” (Rouhana 1998, 278). Even though
Israel defines itself as a democratic state according to its constitution, and the majority of Jewish citizens within the state fully regard themselves as part of a democratic system, it is apparent that this same state encourages the systematic segmentation of Arab society (Rouhana 1998, 282).
As Israeli-Palestinian relations have a complex and constantly changing dynamic, recent occurrences regarding Israel’s political climate contribute to the formation of the collective memory and identity of Palestinians. In July of 2018, Israel’s government passed a new law that officially defines Israel as the “national homeland of the Jewish people and asserts that the realization of the right to national self-determination in Israel is unique to the Jewish people” (Landau & Lis 2018). Referred to as the ‘Nation-State Bill” or ‘Nationality Bill’, the new law is largely symbolic of what has been a reality for most Palestinian citizens of Israel already. Naturally, this law was met with much criticism from the international community as well as by some Israeli celebrities. As a response to Israeli actress Rotem Sela criticizing the Nation-State Bill on social media, Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu responds via his own Instagram account, noting “Israel is not a state of all its citizens. According to the basic nationality law we passed, Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people – and only it” (France-Presse 2019).
Therefore, when it comes to the Palestinian citizens, the enforced segregation and discrimination by the state strengthened their status as an isolated minority, which solidified itself within their collective memory and identity (Rouhana 1998, 286). According to Litvak (2009), Palestinians citizens of Israel developed a sense of alienation from and hostility toward the Israeli regime who were marginalizing them, as well as other Arab nations who failed to support their fight for independence (4). Regarding the evolution of the Palestinian collective identity, Litvak (2009) sets Palestinians apart from other groups of people:
What sets the Palestinians apart are the more recent developments...The... evolution of a particular identity as a result of a conflict between two groups over territory;... ‘the frequency, intensity and duration of wars between rival policies is itself a significant factor in crystallizing ethnic sentiments among an affected population’. Confrontation with an “other” always leads to enhancement of the “self”– in this case, a distinct Palestinian identity. (11)
As iterated by Litvak (2009), the case of Palestinian citizens’ identity is among other things, a result of the agonizing ‘confrontation with an ‘other’ over a lengthy period of time (11). This antagonistic dynamic plays a major determining factor in regards to the Palestinian collective identity. Therefore, due to the complexity of this dynamic, there are several concepts that are most commonly used in the discourse about Palestinian collective identity and memory. How did the confrontation with an ‘Other’ impact the evolution of the Palestinian citizen’s identity and collective memory as a people?
2.2 The ‘Trapped Minority’
One prominent concept that describes the Palestinian citizens of Israel’s collective memory and identity is a notion called ‘trapped minority’. Within the concept of ‘trapped minority,’ there are elements that characterize the realities and struggles of the Palestinian citizens of Israel. Developed by Dan Rabinowitz, the concept refers to a “segment of a larger group spread across at least two states. Citizens of a state hegemonized by others, its members are alienated from political power. Unable to influence the definition of public goods or enjoy them, its members are at the same time marginal within their mother nation abroad” (Rabinowitz 2001, 64). Additionally, a trapped minority is prone to have severe difficulties assimilating, and in most cases remain non-assimilating. While this is also surely a result of the subjective choice of the individual and many purely do not have any interest in assimilation, the hosting state often reinforces political agendas to actively isolate these minorities as the ‘others’, treating them as second class citizens and less than equal (Rabinowitz 2001, 73).
Trapped minorities, or groups who live in territories they consider their primordial homeland, are also referred to as ‘homeland minorities’ (Rabinowitz 2001, 72). One reason for this relates to the current entrapment by their host state as well as their mother nation (Rabinowitz 2001, 73). In this case, the host state is Israel, whose population is comprised of around twenty percent Palestinians, and the mother nation is Palestine or the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian citizens of Israel who remained in the newly founded state of Israel after 1948,
found their homeland dramatically transformed, falling under the control of Zionist Israel. The Palestinians in it were soon granted formal citizenship and economic and administrative mercy of a regime they never chose. Relations with their people...living outside the borders and outside of control of Israel were almost completely severed [due to their different experiences of the occupation]. (Rabinowitz 2001, 73)
As such, another characteristic of a trapped minority refers to the minorities’ status in their homeland, in this case, the West Bank and Gaza. While it is clear that Palestinian citizens of Israel are treated as second class within Israel, their status in their home country is also devalued. According to Rabinowitz (2001, 74), “their residence, acculturation and formal citizenship in a state dominated by an alien hegemony implicates them. Thus, the Palestinian citizens of Israel (…) are equally suspect for Palestinians and Arabs abroad due to their citizenship of and general association with Israel.” Palestinians in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza view Palestinian citizens of Israel as being in a favourable position with the benefit of Israeli rights and citizenship, while they, who are outside of the borders of Israel, suffer from being under true occupation. For that reason, the loyalty to the Palestinian nation and their cause for freedom is questioned by Palestinians outside of Israel, and the Palestinian citizens of Israel are thus seen as a “self-seeking, spoilt collective, collaborating with the Zionist occupation of the homeland” (Rabinowitz 2001, 74).
Rabinowitz (2001) therefore describes the Palestinian citizens of Israel trapped in a “dual marginality” who are held between opposite “centres of political gravity” (74). These centres contain two “conflicting national narratives” (74). Rabinowitz (2001) also notes that the Palestinian citizens of Israel are quite aware of their role within a painful situation between their national homeland of Palestine and their current host country, Israel (74). This awareness naturally has a great impact on the collective memory of the minority as a whole, as trapped minorities are especially expected to struggle with the traumatic process or event that caused their homeland being seized by an external power (Rabinowitz 2001, 74). The experience is described as the following:
The memory is often vivid, leaning on personal experiences, enmeshed in close familial history. The double bind in which they live, however, may arrest the development of a coherent version of history as a collective experience...And while memories of personal and local tragedies are rife, a vocabulary that conceptualizes and memorializes the disaster seldom develops. (Rabinowitz 2001, 74).
The double bind referred to above makes it extremely difficult for the Palestinian nation as a whole to form a coherent, collective memory due to the vastly differing experiences between the minority population and Palestinians outside of Israel. While there is a clear sense of solidarity for their mother nation, Palestinian citizens of Israel, as the trapped minority, are prone to feel “excluded from the thrust of national revival if and when it does commence abroad” (Rabinowitz 2001, 75). In the case of the Palestinian citizens of Israel, one must recognize that this trapped minority is a resulting condition of the decades-long Palestinian-Israeli conflict that put them at the crossfire between two nations. All these factors play a crucial role in the physical and psychological entrapment of the Palestinian citizens of Israel that shape the minorities collective memory and identity. In the next chapter, I will expand on the concepts of Othering and Orientalism, which are among the commonly used notions in the discourse about Palestinian collective identity and memory.
2.3 Otherness of Palestinians: Orientalism
Palestinian collective memory and identity are very much linked to the relationship between Palestine and Israel and their political history, the Nakba and the resulting fragmentation of Palestinian society. The concepts of Othering and Orientalism provide a contextual understanding of Palestinian collective memory and its formation. As such, Othering is a direct consequence of the minority’s status as a trapped social group within both the host state and their homeland. On the other hand, Orientalism is not necessarily a consequence of the group’s status as a trapped minority, but rather a form of Othering, that refers to the minority’s general position as Arabs living in the Middle East. While these are concepts that do not exclusively apply to only Palestinians, but also to other marginalized ethnic groups, the ideas behind the concepts highlight an essential cornerstone of Palestinian collective memory.
On that note, Gandolfo (2016) connects the establishment of the Israeli-Palestinian Wall and the mobilization of certain checkpoints within the West Bank to the ideology of security (260). As such, at the core,
Security includes an element of fear and mostly commonly fear of another, or, the Other...Othering enacts a fear of that which is known – or unknown – and manifests on a larger scale through open conflict, as well as through the nuanced, yet pervasive, acts of differentiation, such as promulgation of negative stereotypes, discrimination and racism...Otherness ‘projects the imaginary figure of an alien or external collective ‘other’, who becomes ‘fantastic’ as a threatening double, or an essential enemy. (Gandolfo 2016, 260)
This notion of the ‘other’ functions not only on individual or personal fear, but also on national fear. The collective identity of an entire nation is partially defined through the perceived ‘influence’ of the ‘other’. This ‘influence of the other’ is perceived as threats to the nation, its authenticity and its independence (Gandolfo 2016, 261). Farber (2014) points out that it is entirely possible and common for Jewish- Israeli citizens to pass an entire lifetime without meeting a single Palestinian, which in return, allows suspicions and distrust of the unfamiliar ‘other’ to remain (Gandolfo 2016, 261). In this case, increased communication and interaction between Israelis and Palestinians “establish new frameworks of understanding, while ideological and physical barriers consolidate difference” (Gandolfo 2016, 261). As such, Gandolfo (2016) also remarks that on an individual level ‘otherness’ is a result of minimal contact, while on a national level the perceived ‘otherness’ is also practised by the governing apparatus (261). In the case of Israel and Palestine, the concrete wall separating the West Bank from Israel acts as a powerful, visual symbol underlining the ‘otherness’ and a clear distinction between the two communities. Newman (2006) contends how the separation wall has an esthetic and functional duality, strengthening the perceived threat of the ‘other’ within Israeli culture and public space (p.151).
One of the ways the process of Othering becomes apparent within everyday life in Israel and the West Bank, is through travel. In order to travel throughout the West Bank and in some cases past the concrete Wall, countless checkpoints have been set up by the Israeli
government to control the transit of Palestinians. Gandolfo (2016) calls this process the ‘transition zone’, where the side of the wall facing Israel is camouflaged to establish limited visual disruption for Israeli residents (261). The ‘transition zone’ is therefore defined as a place where the Palestinians in transit who are concealed but still engaged within a power struggle. This power struggle is described as the following:
The person in transit undergoes a process of acclimatization and acculturation as he/she moves through the zone of transition, so that the shock of meeting the ‘other’ is not as great as he/she feared (…) the subjects who are concealed, yet still engaged, in the power struggle in the transition zone as they become the protagonists in the narrative of the Other, as well as embodiments of the stereotypes and representations in the wider conflict discourse. (Gandolfo 2016, 261)
These images are what is observed by Jewish-Israeli when they pass these zones without difficulty and have become part of daily experiences for Palestinian citizens. This visual experience influences the construction of Palestinian collective memory, heavily impacting their sense of belonging and identity within their community. Similarly, Said (1979) suggests that, unlike the Jewish-Israelis, the majority of the Palestinians are fully aware of them as the Other being a “concrete political reality with which they must live in the future” (174).
Adding to the previous comment by Said, another concept widely circulated within the discourse of Palestinian collective memory and consciousness is that of Orientalism. Coined by Said, Orientalism does not only apply to the Palestinian people. While Said (1978) proposes a theory in which he argues that the Western world has composed and continuously maintained a collective fantasy of the Orient (Said 1978, 357). Throughout this line of argumentation, Said (1978) contends that “the Orient is depicted as all the West is not: feminized where the West is masculine; weak where the West is strong; corrupt where the West is righteous; inscrutable where the West is rational; tradition-bound, where the West is progressive” (357). As such, this power dynamic serves to paint a negative image of the Orient, while constructing the West as the positive counterpart, ultimately constructing a dynamic where the Orient is the West’s Other (Said 1978, 357). Orientalism is a form of Othering. Therefore the two concepts are intrinsically linked, as Othering constitutes fear
based acts of differentiation, resulting in the development of stereotypes or prejudices about the Orient. While the concept of Othering has been outlined above, Orientalism in terms of Israel’s relationship to Palestine plays a separate role in the identity construction process of the Palestinian minority. Although Orientalism pertains to the “political, economic, cultural and social domination of the West” and Israel is geographically located in the Middle East, I will argue, following Said, that within the framework of Orientalism, Israel is indeed part of the Western sphere (Said 1979, 357). Firstly, many of Israel’s Jewish citizens have never travelled within Middle Eastern countries or even the West Bank, due to acute security measures and perpetual warnings propagated by the Israeli state and media, developing a severe unfamiliarity and fear of the Orient. Additionally, the unique nature of Israel’s establishment, with millions of European Jews migrating to Israel after 1948 and the subsequent eruption of violence, combined with a deep-seated fear of the Palestinians who are clearly constructed as the Other, justifies the logic that Israel is within this framework, part of the Western sphere (Rabinowitz 2001, 79).
Furthermore, a cornerstone of Orientalism is its connection to the field of geography, “given its inherently spatial argument. The notion that human societies typically form place-based identities wherein the ‘others’ are ‘over there’, while ‘we’ are ‘here’, along with the understanding of places and knowledge about them as ideological constructions, rather than straightforward facts” (Said 1979, 357). As already discussed above, the spatial argument wherein the West is ‘here’ and the East is ‘there’ is highlighted especially when a literal concrete Wall serves as a symbolic and corporeal separation between the ‘here’ and ‘there’, as is the case between Israel and the West Bank. In the same vein, Gandolfo (2016) notes how “living in the shadow of the wall” is an essential dimension of the spatial power dynamic between the communities on either side (262). Similarly, Gandolfo (2016) refers to Anderson (1996) who describes the spatial power dynamic and its connection to the formation of a collective identity of a people:
Frontier narratives contribute “indispensable elements of the construction of national culture” (1996, pp. 1–3), while on a tangible level, “national narratives of belonging and identity […] are continually reproduced in the processes of spatial socialization” (Paasi 2012, p. 2306) and are co-opted to promote
sentiments of belonging and identity. However, this is for a select audience, as Palestinians and Israelis invoke claims to the land and the land shapes their respective identities. The result is a perpetuation of Shalit’s concept of the schism between “‘I’ and ‘Him’ or ‘Us’ and ‘Them’” (1987, p. 369) that is realized through the physicality of the Wall and the bodies of the protagonists, as the boundaries rise and shift, and the community, family and individual is relocated, paused, diverted and spatially redefined according to political and cartographical developments. (Gandolfo 2016, 262-263)
As declared above, spatial power dynamics is one of the essential components shaping national narratives of belonging and identity. Generally, while the concepts trapped minority, Othering and Orientalism carry separate significance in outlining the construction of the collective Palestinian minority identity, these three concepts are also intrinsically linked. Orientalism is not necessarily a repercussion of a group’s status as a trapped minority, but rather a form of Othering, that refers to the minority’s overall status as Arabs living in what the West considers the ‘Orient’. These concepts work together to illustrate and describe the foundation of Palestinian identity construction. Building on that foundation of Palestinian identity construction, the consequent section pertains to the fundamental characteristics of Palestinian collective memory.
2.4 The Collective Memory of the Palestinian Minority
The concept of collective memory first took shape when Durkheim noted that “societies require continuity and connection with the past to preserve social unity and cohesion” (Taffal 2016, 208). In order for collective thought to be established within a group, individuals are required to physically come together to create a shared experience (Taffal 2016, 208). As with every group identity, memory exists at its core, and what is ultimately remembered by a community is defined by the culturally assumed identity that group bestows on itself (Litvak 2009, 1). As such, “every group develops the memory of its own past and so highlights its unique identity vis-à-vis, other groups. These reconstructed images of the past provide the group with an account of its origin and development and thus allow it to develop a historical identity” (Litvak 2009, 1). While this process of identity formation is the widely accepted
approach to understanding collective memory studies today, the field was initially explored through a biological framework. The attempts to perceive collective memory in biological terms as inheritable or in terms of ‘racial memory’, was first dismissed by Halbwachs (1980), a student of Durkheim, who established that collective memory is a result of socialization, customs and culture (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, 125). Halbwachs (1980) also divides the concept of collective memory into the realms of communicative memory and cultural memory. Communicative memory is exclusively based on everyday communications and pertains to human interactions. Hence, communicative memory encompasses everyday situations such as a joke between friends, listening to gossip or sitting in a waiting room. These interactions have rules that regulate this exchange.
There is a ‘household’ within the confines of which this communication takes place...Through this manner of communication, each individual composes a memory which as Halbwachs has shown, is (a) socially mediated and (b) relates to a group. Every individual memory constitutes itself in communication with others. These ‘others’ however, are not just any set of people, rather they are groups who conceive their unity and peculiarity through a common image of their past. (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, 127)
These ‘groups’ Halbwachs (1980) is referring to include “families, neighbourhoods, professional groups, political parties, associations, etc., up to and including nations” (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, 127). As such, every individual belongs to many of these groups and thus accommodates many collective self-images and memories (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, 127). While communicative memory is a daily form of collective memory that is characterized by its “proximity to the everyday, cultural memory is characterized by its distance from the everyday” (Assmann & Czaplicka 1995, 128-129). Therefore, Halbwachs (1980) argues that cultural memory has a kind of fixed horizon that will not change by time passing. For nations, these fixed points are often historical defeats (Litvak 2009, 1). Litvak (2009) argues that suffering together unifies more than joy and that these historical defeats play more of a role in regards to shaping the self-perception and culture of a people (1). While this is true for all cultures, this notion especially rings true for the Palestinian people. As covered in the section on historical context, the Nakba or ‘catastrophe’ of 1948 marked
the most detrimental event in Palestinian history and as such had the most significant impact on which Palestinian identity now stands (Litvak 2009, 3).
The evolution of Palestinian collective memory serves as a foundation of Palestinian national identity. While the Nakba is in no way the only detrimental tragedy Palestinians suffered, it has symbolic value and represents the loss of their homeland and the beginning of the systematic destruction of their culture (Sorek 2011, 467). Generally, regarding the Palestinian people as a whole, it can be said that the impact the Nakba has on their collective memory was intensified due to the international community’s lack of response when opposing Israel. On this note, Said clarifies,
the Palestinians have never received even the slightest official acknowledgement of the massive injustice that was done to them, much less the possibility of staking material claims against Israel for the property taken, the people killed, the houses demolished, the water taken, the prisoners held, and so forth. (in Abu-Lughod, Heacock & Nashef 1999, 11-12)
The lack of support from the international community and the devastation of the Nakba are symbolic themes that connect collective memories with national identifications (Sorek 2011, 476). Therefore, the collective memories of the Nakba and other detrimental experiences resulted in the formation of an identity characterized by trauma and victimhood for the Palestinian people (Sorek 2011, 476). In this sense, Sorek (2011) speaks to the importance of balancing experiences of both triumph and loss, by noting, “while both victimhood and triumphal myths are important for mobilizing national identification, their co-appearance is especially valuable” (476). Sorek continues to emphasize that in the case of Palestinians, this balance is especially challenging as their experiences of triumph are scarce, and instead have been overwhelmed with memories of tragedy and loss (Sorek 2011, 476).
While collective memories characterized by loss, resistance and trauma impact all Palestinians, a distinction regarding the Palestinian citizens of Israel exists. As expressed in the section on trapped minorities, the case of Palestinian citizens of Israel shows how their political memory and identity is being shaped by both the state of Israel as well as their ethnonational motherland of Palestine (Sorek 2011, 467). The Palestinians who remained in newly
established Israeli territory as of the 1948 Nakba, have been granted Israeli citizenship. More than just a document, the imposing of Israeli citizenship has established itself as a cultural, political and socio-economic framework for the Palestinian community in Israel (Yiftachel 1997, 292). As such, nearly all Palestinians within Israel are bilingual, speaking Arabic and Hebrew. They “consume Israeli media and culture, and most professional Arabs attend Israeli universities. Repeated surveys show that even if an independent Palestinian state was established in the territories, the vast majority of the Arab minority (80-95 percent) would prefer to stay in Israel” (Yiftachel 1999, 292). While it is questionable whether the same survey would garner a similar response among Palestinians today, it is undoubtedly the case that Palestinian citizens of Israel are fully tied to the norms and regulations of Israeli society. This is mostly due to Palestinian citizens of Israel being “extremely limited in their ability to develop independent institutions” since they lost a substantial percentage of their “urban elite” during the Nakba and were subjected to military rule until 1966 (Sorek 2011, 467). Additionally, scholars who in fact are Palestinian citizens of Israel such as Rouhana (1997) strongly contend that the Israeli part of their identity is void of any kind of emotional bond to Israel (Yiftachel 1999, 292). However, Palestinians citizens of Israel are arguably also lacking an emotional bond with their homeland and as such with the Palestinians outside of Israeli borders:
The two Palestinian uprisings against Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (the first Intifadafrom 1987–91 and the second Intifada from 2000–4) gained much sympathy and solidarity among Palestinians inside Israel, but with the exception of a few days in the fall of 2000, they did not actively join the uprisings. At the same time, these revolts were incorporated as heroic milestones in the collective Palestinian narrative, including among Palestinians in Israel. (Sorek 2011, 468)
As the decades passed subsequent to 1948, it became clear that the Israeli state would remain. Therefore, the Palestinian citizens of Israel “gradually turned to the Israeli political sphere to cope with their predicament” (Sorek 2011, 468). As a direct result, Sorek (2011) notes that surveys conducted by Smooha (1999) between 1976 and 1995 among the Palestinians in Israel show that the ratio of the people who view themselves as both Palestinians and Israeli, tripled.
At the same time, however, the same publication containing the survey by Smooha (1999), also reads,
As an indigenous population, they feel firmly attached to the land and have strong claims to the country (…)They differ from the Jewish majority in language, religion, nation, culture, and ethnic descent. They do not wish to assimilate into Jewish majority, and the Jews do not want to assimilate them. They have separate schools, communities and institutions. They keep their own identity and struggle to remain separate but equal. (Smooha 1999, 9-10)
The struggle of the Palestinian citizens of Israel remains a complex issue as they continue to face their predicament of living as a trapped minority. Sorek (2011) summarizes their unique circumstance by observing, “while their Arab-Palestinian identity places them in the position of ‘an enemy within’ for the Jewish majority, they are simultaneously considered suspicious – ‘Israelified Arabs’ – by Palestinians outside Israel” (468). Feeling like they belong nor here nor there, their identity as Arab-Palestinians contradict their geographical location and their official identity as Israeli citizens.
2.5 Israeli Media Strategies & Palestinian Identity Construction
As the Arab minority within Israel fell under Israeli control succeeding 1948, the Israeli government utilized disciplining policies to normalize the daily life of its Jewish citizens (Jamal 2009, 20). The Palestinians who remained within Israel were framed as a military threat which justified subsequent policies established towards them and their treatment as a potential danger (Jamal 2009, 20). One crucial measure taken to ensure the safety of the Israeli state and further solidify the Palestinians’ role as the intruder was through the implementation of media policies. The structure of Israel’s media system and its policies towards its Arab minority demonstrate how a minority living in a hegemonic state has responded to the complex circumstances that construct their existence and collective identity. Before the specific media policies of the Israeli state towards the Arab minority are examined, I will convey contextual information to gain a solid understanding on the role these policies had in influencing the collective identity formation of the minority.
Mass media’s power lies in its ability to conceptualize and transmit political notions and emphasize hegemonic orders, therefore also constructing individual and societal worldviews (Zimmermann 2007, 59). In addition to playing a pivotal role in shaping the construction of people’s worldview regarding foreign places, visual mass media also influence identity formation on different levels (Zimmermann 2007, 59). As such, the impact different media, such as newspapers, television or radio, have on socio-culturally diverse populations such as Israel is “key to understanding political dynamics in multicultural societies” (Jamal 2009, 2). As I will be examining media policies implemented after the Nakba of 1948, this section will focus on media strategies pertaining to newspapers, which was the leading information medium of the time. Similar to other hegemonic regimes intending to exert control over their minorities, Israel’s media policies were also intended to control and (re)socialize the Palestinian community (Jamal 2009, 29). The justification of the media policies towards the Palestinian minority is based on the notion that the creation of the state of Israel calls for a new “category in the history of the region, that should be accommodated and accepted” (Jamal 2009, 29). The occurrence of the Nakba introduced the suspension of Palestinian history, and as such, space was created for the Israeli government to create a new historical image of the Palestinians, as well as a government-controlled reality for the Arab citizens (Jamal 2009, 29). Most importantly and at the forefront of these efforts lies the intention of inculcating awareness and acceptance of this new imagined reality throughout the Arab population, for the purpose of suppressing any form of resistance or opposition (Jamal 2009, 30). In essence, the Israeli media policies towards the Palestinian minority
attempted to construct an Arab collective memory divorced from its cultural environment and historical past. Moreover, this policy aimed at extolling the cultural supremacy of Jewish society, while implying the cultural, economic and social backwardness of Arab society. All these ploys were contrived to justify the cultural, political, and military colonization of Arab society and its geographic space. (Jamal 2009, 30)
The impact the new Israeli media policies had on the Arab population was especially effective since the Palestinians lost control over all their established cultural institutions after 1948. As
a result of the war, the majority of the Palestinian cultural, political and cultural elite was exiled, in addition to all Arab urban centres destroyed and seized by force of the Israeli army (Jamal 2009, 30). As described, this led to the destruction of all of Arab public institutions, including Arab mass communication structures and systems already established within Palestine prior to 1948 (Jamal 2009, 30). Jamal describes that conditions during the 1948 war created a “deep cultural and communication vacuum (…)that severed the local population from Palestinians and Arabs living in neighbouring countries, as well as from the surrounding Arab landscape. This isolation intensified the population’s sense of crisis and powerlessness” (Jamal 2009, 30). As a result of this communication vacuum and perceived sense of helplessness, complete dependency on information distributed by the Israeli ‘propaganda machine’ became the new status quo for Palestinians (Jamal 2009, 31). Therefore, one major policy implemented was the establishment of information organs and new newspapers by Israeli institutions, which were specifically tailored to reach Israel’s Palestinian population (Jamal 2009, 31). The most notable information organ was Al-Yom, a daily newspaper that acted as a major propaganda tool to further Israeli attempts to discipline its Arab population. The daily newspaper issued not only a daily version for adults but also two biweeklies for children called Al-Yom for Our Children, in an effort to control the contents that shaped the Palestinian youth (Jamal 2009, 32). Instead of acting as an informative organ, the central aim was mostly psychological, wherein the implementation of news organs such as Al-Yom intended to demonstrate “that the newly established state could not be defeated and that ‘good Arabs’ have a better chance to live in peace and prosperity than ‘troublemakers’” (Jamal 2009, 31). As a general contention, Avraham (2003) argues that media commonly tend to distort the image of minority groups, and include “the use of stereotypes and generalizations, the faulting of the groups for their situation, the depiction of their members as a threat to the natural order, and the differentiation of society into ‘them’ pitted against ‘us’ with ‘them’ being inherently different from ‘us’” (1). Similarly to the notion of Othering discussed earlier, the collective identity of an entire minority group is somewhat defined through the perceived ‘influence’ of the ‘other’, which in turn, is perceived as a threat to the hegemonic nation and its independence (Gandolfo 2016, 261).
In order to carry out this information policy, the establishment of new, state-controlled, Arabic newspapers calls for as the recruitment of Arab speaking journalists. As such, another media policy refers to the active recruitment of the Israeli government to
find Arabic speaking Jews who immigrated to the newly established state, who are experienced within the field of journalism (Jamal 2009, 32). Arabic speaking intellectuals, journalists and other media specialists were integrated into various newspapers, press houses, information centres, the Arabic department of the Voice of Israel Radio as well as later, into the Israeli television networks (Jamal 2009, 33). Jamal notes, that for many years following 1948, these Arabic speaking media professionals gained the trust of the Palestinian minority and as such greatly shaped the character of the Israeli Arabic media environment (Jamal 2009, 33). One influential contributor was Nissim Ragwan, who was a writer for Al-Yom and who also became its editor at a later point, and is considered a significant figure of what Jamal (2009) calls the “state propaganda machine” (33). The Israeli government directly recruited intellectuals like Ragwan who are well versed in Arabic culture and as such quickly became influential parts of the Israeli-Arab media sphere. Their central aim was to convey information “in Arab society that aimed at reconstructing its collective imagination and reshaping its historical memory” (Jamal 2009, 34). In many cases, journalists were strongly animated, “or even pushed to write against the spirit of critical opinions...concerning governmental policies toward the Arab population. Columns (...) aimed at presenting daily social issues in a creative form that counterbalanced criticism expressed by Arab journalists or politicians in other Arab sources” (Jamal 2009, 34). Generally, the content created for the Palestinian population of Israel always aimed at portraying Israel as a tolerant and rational state that welcomes criticism and debate, while simultaneously promoting the state as one that must be feared and respected (Jamal 2009, 34). A large part of the content also presented the efforts and intentions of the Israeli state to enhance Palestinian living conditions. Moreover, Jamal (2009) adds that both the contents of these Israeli controlled, Arabic newspaper, in addition to “evidence provided by people who operated it (...) sought to propagate a frame of mind that accepts Israel as a fait accompli that cannot be overturned and should be feared, lest it be forced to adopt fierce policies” (34).
In addition to the establishment of information organs by the Israeli government to target the Palestinian minority as well as recruitment of Jewish, Arabic speaking media professionals, another strategic media policy pertains to the distribution of the media content. To maximize the potential audience reach, newspapers employed several strategies to strengthen their readership among Palestinians. Firstly, newspapers such as Al-Yom, were distributed free of
charge in all large Palestinian residential areas and villages (Jamal 2009, 35). Additionally, those running these newspapers also used
connections that functionaries in the newspaper had with officials in various governmental ministries to put pressure on Arabs, who needed various permits from the ministries, to read the newspaper on a daily basis. Another method used was to approach different government functionaries, seeking to get their sympathy to financially support segments of Arab society in order to facilitate abonnement. Another method was to look for potential readers among the Arab educated elite. For instance, the manager of the newspaper approached the Hebrew University asking for the names of Arab students, in order to contact them and encourage them to read the newspaper. (Jamal 2009, 35-36)
The implementation of Palestinian targeted news organs, the recruitment of Jewish Arabic speakers or the free circulation of content are just a few examples of the means utilized to create consent among Palestinians. Historically, Israeli media is a close collaborator of the Israeli government, ultimately working together to gain control of the collective Palestinian memory and delegitimize the role of the Palestinian minority (Khalil 2007, 149).
3. PALESTINIAN FILMMAKING: TAKING CHARGE OF THE NARRATIVE
In this section, I will analyze the two films In Between and Junction 48. Both films show Palestinian citizens of Israel interacting with the Jewish-Israeli counterpart. While the social-realist narrative and aesthetic depict the marginalized treatment of the Palestinian minority within Israel, the production and reception, funding and filmmakers commentary provide even more insight on how popular culture texts can serve as vehicles for the Palestinian minority to take charge of their collective identity. Additionally, I will argue that films like these raise awareness regarding the realities this trapped minority is faced with.
As discussed in the previous section, media are an essential tool for the Israeli government to silence and control the Palestinian minority and their sense of belonging and identity. For the minority, alternative filmmaking proves to be especially important due not only to their status as a minority within Israel, but also due to constant and perpetual attempts
by the Israeli government to dominate and control Palestinian identity and culture. As such, the Palestinian minority within Israel “have developed a hybrid identity as Israeli citizens who identify with cultural and political centres outside of Israel” (Caspi & Elias 2011, 65). In that sense, as will become evident throughout the analysis of the films In Between and Junction 48, alternative filmmaking can be a powerful tool for the minority to redefine their collective identity and voice their cultural, political, economic and everyday needs (Shi 2009, 599).
3.1 In Between – An Overview
The film Bar Bahar(English version: In Between), which translates from Arabic to ‘Land and Sea’, follows the story of three Palestinian women sharing an apartment in Tel Aviv. It depicts how they cope with the inequality of Israeli society and their roles as Arabs living in Israel. Although Tel Aviv is deemed one of Israel’s most liberal and open-minded cities for Jewish Israelis and Palestinian citizens of Israel alike, the film unravels the complexity of coexistence between the two cultures. As Palestinian citizens of Israel, these three young women, of which one is Christian and two Muslim, seem at first glance to be faced with very different challenges. Laila is a criminal defence lawyer, originally from Nazareth. She is also an independent, chain-smoking party girl who values her freedom as a woman over all else. Generally, with a strong disregard for any form of convention, she deliberately opposes all forms of conservative tradition as well as any kind of discriminatory treatment by Jewish-Israeli citizens. The second flatmate, Salma, is a bohemian and closeted lesbian who aspires to become a DJ. She barely manages to pay her bills through waitressing and kitchen work. After telling her traditionally Christian family from Nazareth that she is a lesbian, she is abandoned by them and struggles to make ends meet. She goes from job to job while simultaneously discovering her sexuality as a lesbian within a fairly conservative environment. Both Salma and Laila are part of the Palestinian underground party scene of Tel Aviv which includes alcohol, drugs and sex. Lastly, the third flatmate Nour, is a religious computer science student from the conservative Muslim town of Umm al-Fahm. She moves in with Salma and Leila through a distant relative and is unaware of their differences in lifestyle, beliefs and conduct. As a very quiet and reserved hijabi, she is highly alarmed and disgusted by her sexually open, boozing and drug-using flatmates.
