Political Conditionality as a Peacebuilding Tool
in Contested Countries:
Observing the Statebuilding Practices of the United Nations and the
European Union in Kosovo
A thesis submitted by Nita Prekazi
MSc: Political Science (Political Economy), Faculty of Social and Behavioural Sciences, University of Amsterdam
Research Project: The UN and Peacebuilding Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Jana Krause Second Reader: Dr. Dimitris Bouris
Student number: 11264659 Word Count: 22,792
Abstract
Peacebuilding and statebuilding operations have been increasingly using political conditionality as an instrument to instil democracy, rule of law and liberal economic values in their target societies. Nevertheless, coupled with contested statehood of some of these territories, the implementation of these policies become obstructed. By using a multiple case study of conditional policymaking of the United Nations and the European Union in Kosovo, this research paper seeks to further contribute to the debate on the effects of contested sovereignty on the external statebuilders as well as policymaking in post-conflict societies. Building on a conceptual framework of statebuilding, contested sovereignty and political conditionality, the research particularly analyses UNMIK’s ‘Standards before Status’ policy and the EU’s Stabilisations Association Agreement with Kosovo. The findings show that contested sovereignty, accompanied with political ambiguity, impedes policies based on conditionality and compromises their progress as well as the leverage that external statebuilders have on reforms and policy outcomes.
Key Words: peacebuilding, statebuilding, the United Nations, UNMIK, the European Union,
List of Abbreviations
BiH Bosnia and Hercegovina
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy CSDP Common Security and Defence Policy EEAS European External Action Service ERA European Reform Agenda
EUEA European Union External Action EU European Union
EULEX European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo
HRVP High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy /
Vice-President of the Commission
ICJ International Court of Justice
INTERPOL The International Criminal Police Organization
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe PISG Provisional Institutions of Self Government
SAA Stabilization Association Agreement SAP Stabilisation Association Process UN United Nations
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNSRSG United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General UNTAET UN Transitional Administration in East Timor
Table of Contents ABSTRACT ... 2 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ... 3 LIST OF FIGURES ... 6 LIST OF TABLES ... 6 CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ... 7
1.1. PROJECT OBJECTIVES,RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND ARGUMENT ... 8
1.2. SCIENTIFIC RELEVANCE ... 10
1.3. OUTLINE ... 10
CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW ... 12
2.1.PEACEBUILDING,STATEBUILDING AND POLICYMAKING IN CONTESTED TERRITORIES ... 12
2.2.POLITICS OF CONDITIONALITY USED IN PEACEBUILDING ... 13
2.2.1. United Nations’ Use of Benchmarks as Politics of Conditionality in Kosovo ... 14
2.2.2. European Union and Peacebuilding in Kosovo ... 16
2.3.THE GAP IN THE LITERATURE ... 18
CHAPTER 3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK ... 20
INTRODUCTION ... 20
3.1.THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE EMERGING STATES ... 20
3.2.STATEBUILDING IN POST-CONFLICT SOCIETIES ... 22
3.3.CONCEPTUALIZING POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY AS A PEACEBUILDING TOOL ... 24
3.3.1. The use of liberal framework standards as benchmarks in United Nation’s statebuilding operations... 25
3.3.2. Political Conditionality in European Union’s External Relations ... 26
3.4.CONCLUSION:THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS ... 28
CHAPTER 4. METHODOLOGY ... 30
4.1.RESEARCH DESIGN ... 30
4.1.1. Case Selection and Justification ... 31
4.2.DATA COLLECTION ... 31
4.2.1. Document analysis ... 31
4.2.2. Interviews ... 32
4.3.LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND ETHICAL ISSUES ... 33
CHAPTER 5. BRIEF HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF KOSOVO CONFLICT ... 35
CHAPTER 6. CASE I ANALYSIS: UNITED NATIONS INTERIM ADMINISTRATION IN KOSOVO (UNMIK); 1999-PRESENT ... 37
INTRODUCTION ... 37
6.1.UN AND ITS POST-CONFLICT INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO ... 37
6.1.1. The Resolution 1244 (1999) ... 39
6.3.THE MARCH RIOTS AND ITS AFTERMATH ... 46
6.4.CHAPTER CONCLUSION ... 48
CHAPTER 7 - CASE II ANALYSIS: THE EUROPEAN UNION STATEBUILDING INVOLVEMENT IN KOSOVO; 2008-PRESENT ... 49
INTRODUCTION ... 49
7.1.THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE EU’S ESTABLISHMENT IN CONTESTED KOSOVO ... 49
7.1.1. The European Union Rule of Law Mission (EULEX) ... 50
7.1.2. Kosovo’s Limited Internal Sovereignty ... 52
7.2.THE EU-KOSOVO STABILIZATION ASSOCIATION AGREEMENT (SAA) ... 53
7.2.1. The Road to Stabilization Association Process (SAP) ... 53
7.2.2. The Obstacles of Stabilization Association Agreement (SAA) ... 54
7.2.3. Normalization of Kosovo-Serbia Relations ... 59
7.3.CHAPTER CONCLUSION ... 61
8. CONCLUSION ... 63
8.1.SUMMARY OF THE ANALYSIS RESULTS ... 63
8.2.ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSION OF THE FINDINGS ...65
8.3.IMPLICATIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND RELEVANCE TO OTHER STUDIES ...67
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...68
APPENDIX I ...81
List of Figures
Figure 1. Typology of Political Conditionality, Source: Koch (2015) ... 24 Figure 2. Structure of UNMIK in 2001, Source: Zaum (2007, p. 140) ... 38 Figure 3. Map of 2018 Geo-ethnic Composition in Kosovo, Source: European Parliamentary Research Service (2019) ... 52
List of Tables
Table 1. Williams’ Definition of six elements of ‘Earned Sovereignty’. Source: Williams, 2003, p.388-389). ... 21
Chapter 1. Introduction
Over the last decades, peacebuilding missions have been continuously challenged by distinct conflicts worldwide. As a result, the need for effective responses to such challenges was a top priority for prominent actors of peacebuilding, namely the United Nations and the European Union (Paris, 2018). A particular challenge has also been peacebuilding in contested territories. With the aim of providing stability and peace in the region, both of these peacebuilding entities have provided political, civilian and military interventions in contested countries such as in East Timor, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Palestine, Kosovo, Western Sahara, Somaliland, Abkhazia, Northern Cyprus (Paris, 2004; Zaum, 2007; Chesterman, 2008; Kyris, 2018; Noucheva, 2018; Bouris, 2019)1. Out of these cases, Kosovo has received an extensive
attention in the political science literature, mainly due to its post-conflict legacies and high international involvement in the territory. In order to consolidate long-term peace and establish democratic governing institutions, both the UN and the EU have been involved in extensive statebuilding intervention in Kosovo. After the NATO bombing campaign in March 1999, the armed conflict between Serbian forces and Kosovo Albanians ended with the establishment of the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The mission was granted full governing authority in the territory of Kosovo. UNMIK was based on Security Council Resolution 1244, which recognized both the territorial sovereignty of Serbia and the right to self-determination of Kosovar Albanians (Zaum, 2007, pg. 131). This ambiguity of the mission’s political perspective has paved the way for many difficulties over the course of this mission (Ibid.). After nearly nine years, the United Nations handed over the ‘Kosovo project’ to European Union in 2008, which was only able to operate in Kosovo based on the Resolution 1244. The EU established the Rule of Law mission (EULEX) and EU Special Representative Office, and later became even more prominent with Stabilization Association Process (SAP), which will be discussed in the following sections.
The contested nature of Kosovo’s sovereignty has left both the UN and the EU interventions in need of constantly finding creative solutions for statebuilding, while the international community remains divided to this day. Due to the veto threat from Russia and China who continue to support Serbia’s claim over Kosovo, the Security Council still remains deadlocked. This reality has left the UN mission in Kosovo in an ‘existential crisis’ even after the declaration of Kosovo’s independence in 2008 (Tansey and Zaum, 2009, p.13). To deal
1 For an overview of current United Nations and European Union political, civilian and military missions, refer
with this situation, the UN decided to reconfigure the mission and provide guidance to local institutions (Visoka and Bolton, 2011). On the other hand, the EU statebuilding involvement is also currently facing difficulties due to territory’s contested sovereignty (Bieber, 2011).
The literature has provided various observations on the UN and EU involvement in Kosovo. In order to assure long-lasting peace and stability, these organizations included statebuilding as a key aspect within their framework, which is based on the principles of liberal peacebuilding (Chesteman, 2004; Zaum, 2007; Candler, 2010; Yabangi, 2016). Moreover, these statebuilding interventions in Kosovo are characterized by using certain benchmarks in order to enforce democratic values and good-governance in exchange of certain benefits. In the case of the UN, this is noticed on the “Standards before Status” policy, whereas in the case of the EU through Stabilization Association Process (SAP). Williams (2003) characterized the “Standards before Status” benchmarks set by the UNMIK as a means of implementing ‘earned sovereignty’ in the region. Authors describe the benchmarks as being based on liberal peacebuilding framework (Williams, 2003; Knoll, 2005; Zaum, 2007). Authors who studied the relationship between UNMIK and Kosovo such as Zaum and Knoll, while acknowledging the importance and the objectives of the standards, criticized their applicability in the Kosovar local dynamics. Furthermore, with regards to EU statebuilding, the literature is mainly focused on the Rule of Law (EULEX) mission in Kosovo, and report obstructions on the nature of the mission due to Kosovo’s contested sovereignty (Bieber, 2011; Papadimitriou and Petrov, 2012). As such, there seems to be a deficiency of recent academic articles that focus towards the politics of conditionality applied by the EU in Kosovo through the SAP. This topic is marginally observed by Yabangi (2016) who observed the legitimacy of the EU involvement in Kosovo, as well as by Van Elsuwege (2017) who observed the Stabilization Association Agreement (SAA) in comparison with Serbia. As such, in order to contribute to this debate, this research project will analyze the statebuilding policies of the UN and the EU and the implications on peacebuilding resulting from contested territorial sovereignty. More specifically, the research seeks to address the gap in the literature and observe the conditional policymaking by external statebuilders in Kosovo. The identified gap in the literature will be elaborated more in the next chapter.
1.1. Project Objectives, Research Questions and Argument
The contested sovereignty of Kosovo has surely created a complex environment for the external statebuilders to work in. Being a multidimensional peacebuilding case, it allows many
political scientists to analyze it from different theoretical assumptions and interpret them from different perspectives. As such, applying the concept of political conditionality as state-building tool in the context of Kosovo’s contested sovereignty and analyzing the process is the main goal of this research project. In this regard, aiming to also contribute to the gap in literature on political conditionality used in statebuilding operations, this research project will seek to answer the following research question and sub-questions:
How does contested sovereignty of emerging states impact the peacebuilding efforts and the policymaking in the statebuilding operations of the United Nations and the European Union?
• How did the contested sovereignty of Kosovo impact the politics of conditionality
implemented by the UN mission in Kosovo?
• How does contested sovereignty of Kosovo impact the politics of conditionality
implemented by the European Union in Kosovo?
Using a multiple case study method, this research project will focus on two statebuilding cases in Kosovo, the UN and the EU. With regard to the first case on UNMIK, the “Standards for Kosovo” (or “Standards before Status”) policy will be analyzed in retrospect with the aim of exploring and explaining how and why it came to be regarded as an unfit policy for Kosovo. Similarly, with regard to European Union which is currently a very active statebuilding agent in Kosovo, I will focus on the Stabilization Association Agreement (SAA) and the implementation of European policies by EU Office in Kosovo/EU Special Representative in Kosovo.
The main argument of this thesis is that the continued contestation of Kosovo’s sovereignty has caused implications on the policymaking outcomes of both UN and EU peacebuilding missions. More specifically, I argue that contested sovereignty accompanied with political ambiguity impedes policies based on conditionality and compromises their progress and the leverage that external statebuilders have on reforms and policy outcomes. While many authors in the literature argue similarly that the contested statehood impede the strategies and certain aspects in the process of the statebuilding and peacebuilding missions (Zaum, 2007; Bieber, 2011; Visoka and Bolton, 2011; Yabangi, 2016; Bouris and Kyris, 2017), I seek to add a new
dimension to this argument by focusing specifically on the policies implemented based on conditionality and linking them to contested sovereignty.
1.2. Scientific Relevance
Through analyzing statebuilding activities of the UN and the EU in Kosovo, this research study seeks to identify implications derived from applying the politics of conditionality as a peacebuilding tool in contested post-conflict territories such as in Kosovo. By looking deeply into the selected cases, the research will try to explore the process and outcomes derived from the implementation of benchmarks set by these institutions. On a broader sense, this thesis seeks to contribute to the current political and civilian missions of the UN and the EU. That is, by analyzing the policymaking in Kosovo, the results may contribute to understanding certain issues and consequences of conditional policymaking in other contested countries or where political sensitivity constrains the work of external statebuilders. Moreover, this research project could also serve as a tool to extract practical lessons learned and reflect on them by comparing to other operations. In order to contribute to the existing literature, the analysis of the first case on UNMIK offers new insights from primary data collected, whereas on the second case of the EU, the analysis offers the most recent development that can be used for reflection in the ongoing EU’s statebuilding involvement in Kosovo. Ultimately, the aim is to add further insights on the external dimension of statebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction in peacebuilding interventions.
1.3. Outline
This research project is structured in the following way. First, a literature review is provided discussing peacebuilding, statebuilding and conditionality used in these contexts, and narrowing the focus down to the debates made on the policies used from the UN and the EU statebuilding interventions in Kosovo. The next chapter focuses on outlining the theoretical framework, which defines the main concepts that the analysis is based on, including statebuilding, sovereignty and politics of conditionality. In this section, the conditionality policy is also defined and elaborated in the context of the UN and the EU. After explaining my research design and the selected methods used for analyzing the cases, I provide a brief background on the conflict of Kosovo. In the analysis chapters, I will examine the statebuilding cases of UN and EU in Kosovo, by focusing particularly on the conditionality policies they
used. Lastly, the conclusion chapter will provide a cross case discussion on the findings and provide concluding remarks.
Chapter 2. Literature Review
2.1. Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and Policymaking in Contested Territories
Considering that this thesis is focused on both UN and EU peacebuilding in Kosovo, in order to have a better grasp of the topic, the literature review will first focus on the broader observation on studies and debates on the peacebuilding, statebuilding and the policymaking of these missions in contested states, and then narrow down on the prominent studies focusing on peacebuilding in Kosovo. As such, this section will first look at peacebuilding and statebuilding practices in post-conflict areas.
To begin with, although peacekeeping missions were growing in number by the end of the Cold War, it was Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s ‘Agenda for Peace’ report which solidified peacebuilding as an extended peace operation far beyond a mere cessation of violence (UN, 1992). This report highlighted the need for “identifying and supporting structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict” (Ibid, p.960). This provided a shifted focus on delivering sustainable peace with an objective of building robust local institutions. Nevertheless, after several unsatisfactory UN interventions such as the one in Bosnia and Hercegovina, Somalia and the inaction in the unfortunate genocide in Rwanda, a ‘supplement’ to the ‘Agenda for Peace’ was added in order to address specific issues for both preventive and post-conflict missions that required special attention in the future (Chesterman, 2013). These specific issues included measures that would “improve police and judicial systems, monitor human rights, electoral reforms and social and economic development” in order to provide “the institutionalization of peace” (UN, 1995). In the same way, the UN also introduced the “No Exit Without Strategy” principle in 2001, which acknowledged the need for more extensive peacebuilding approaches that focused on building or solidifying state institutions, later addressed as ‘statebuilding’ (Paris, 2010, p.342).
As an OECD (2010) report explains it, peacebuilding and statebuilding can be considered distinct processes, but they certainly do overlap (p.22). While both of these processes serve a common purpose of establishing a well-functioning state with an accountable government in a peaceful environment, according to the OECD report the distinction lies in the fact that:
“Peacebuilding emphasizes helping states and societies move from situations of great peril to relatively greater safety. The emphasis within statebuilding is on helping in the transition from lawlessness or arbitrary authoritarian rule to government based on law about which there is general consent (p.23)”.
Both United Nations and European Union had the occasion of engaging in peacebuilding and statebuilding missions on territories that are disputed, went through a civil conflict, lack sovereignty or their statehood is contested (Chesterman, 2004; Paris, 2004; Bouris and Kyris, 2017; Chandler, 2010; Paris and Sisk, 2009; Chandler, 2007; Fukuyama, 2005). After several years of trial and error on peacebuilding, UN established that concluding the mission on fair and democratic elections did not mean that sustainable peace is achieved, as it was the case with some of its missions in Angola, Cambodia, or Mozambique (Mulaj 2011; Paris, 2018). With the dissolution of Yugoslavia in the 90ties, UN was engaged in peacebuilding in emerging and contested territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. In addition to these territories, together with the mission in East Timor, the UN was faced with unprecedented executive authority of being accountable for governing and providing post-conflict reconstruction (Zaum, 2007).
On another note, Papadimitriou and Petrov (2012) contributed to the study of EU’s relationship with contested states, focusing highly on the problems faced by European policymakers on their Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). Papadimitriou and Petrov identified a number of cases dealing with conflicts over territorial sovereignty that the EU sought to address. These cases included Cyprus as an important case within the Union, then Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia as a part of the EU’s enlargement program as well as countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, and Palestine as a part of their European Neighborhood Policy (ibid, p.747). Moreover, authors observed some of the main tools used by EU to handle their foreign policy on contested territories, such as providing mediation through Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) High Representative, EU aid programs with various policy initiatives, promising a prospect within EU in order to resolve conflicts, and deploy EU missions with executive powers in contested states (ibid, p.751).
2.2. Politics of Conditionality Used in Peacebuilding
Focusing on the peace conditionality in Bosnia, Boyce writes about using conditionality on providing aid for consolidating peace in post-conflict territories (2002, p.1026). Boyce argues that this is an effective instrument in peacebuilding, however he states that this is often inhibited due to the fact that “not all parties to the peace accord are committed unequivocally to the consolidation of peace” (Ibid.). Nevertheless, this study focused entirely on politics of conditionality used in providing aid to war-torn countries by donors that include various international institutions and organizations. Among others, these include Worlds Bank, IMF,
and UNDP. Considering that this article highly stresses the importance of politics of conditionality in peacebuilding of post-conflict societies, it falls short on capturing another dimension of this politics, such as its usage as statebuilding tool by prominent peacebuilding entities such as UN and EU. Nevertheless, this article also served as one of the incentives for this thesis with regards to looking deeper at the conditionality in peacebuilding from a dimension other than just aid donor and assistance.
In the same way, Goodhand and Sedra (2007) also contributed to the literature on politics of conditionality in peacebuilding where they explored aid conditionality in Afghanistan. They explore the conditionality enforced not only to state institutions but other non-state actors as well. What is important in this article is that Goodhand and Sedra (2007) stress the need for a re-conceptualization of peace conditionalities beyond aid, focusing on different policy instruments to consolidate peace (p. 58).
Most of the studies in the literature focus on the EU’s politics of conditionality. While EU is active with its engagement in contested territories such as in Palestine and Northern Cyprus by providing stability and “Europeanisation” (see Bouris and Kyris, 2017), one of its key instruments of consolidating stability, peace and democracy in Europe is EU membership or enlargement. Freyburg and Richter (2010) studied political conditionality in Western Balkan and they stated that it is uncertain to assume that EU will have the same rate of success in Western Balkan with politics of conditionality as they had in South eastern Europe (p.276). Being an incentive-based approach, by using the Croatia case study they argue that conditionality is significantly hindered when there are legacies of ethnic conflict fueled by national identity (Ibid.). Nevertheless, while this rationale can be applied to other Balkan countries, considering that the EU membership provides countless benefits to other candidate countries, implications mentioned in this study seem likely to resolve over the course of time. Furthermore, in his study on EU conditionality used as a statebuilding instrument, Bieber (2011) explains that there is often a blurred line “between the lack of will and the lack of capacity” of the domestic elites to implement the benchmarks (p.1790). If it is the first one, then the EU officials have to reflect whether they provide enough leverage on the targeted community, and if it is the later, then an evaluation of the criteria should be done (Ibid.).
2.2.1. United Nations’ Use of Benchmarks as Politics of Conditionality in Kosovo
While the use of conditionality policies as a means to influence democratic practices and good governance on emerging countries has been usually attributed to European Union’s foreign
policy, this type of politics has been used as a similar tool by UN’s peacebuilding missions as well. In this regard, many scholars have observed the UN peacebuilding case in Kosovo and the literature contains several observations made in terms of the statebuilding policies that UNMIK chose to implement in the contested nature of Kosovo’s territory. Gardner (2008) focused on the international standards imposed on sub-state actors who are claimant to self-determination. By comparing Kosovo Albanians and Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians’ quest for self-determination, Gardner argued that international actors empowered such groups whenever they “internalize human rights and democratic ideals” (2008, p.532). By ‘empowering’ Gardner means supporting a particular claim of self-determination in the international arena. However, whenever this is not achieved, these values are incorporated in their statebuilding efforts as standards to be achieved by local institutions (Ibid). As a consequence, she argues that these standards become a precondition to achieving statehood and international support such as in the case of Kosovo (Ibid). The international community’s liberal ideals consisted of multi-ethnic democratic institutions with high respect of minority’s rights corresponded to the standards set forth by UNMIK in Kosovo (Gardner, 2009, p. 531). Gardner points out that there needs to be more studies examining the framework of intervention by international institutions that are involved in self-determination claims as well as on the stability of the institutions that were derived from conditionality requirements.
Zaum (2009) is another author who studied the case of Kosovo in terms of the impact of the normative framework applied by UNMIK in concluding their statebuilding efforts in Kosovo. According to him, the “Kosovo Standards2” which included several democratic and
good governance benchmarks, was considered to be the main eventual exit mechanism for UNMIK. As such, Zaum delineates how in order to manage the issue of final status as well as to build functioning local institutions, “making the resolution of Kosovo’s status conditional upon the attainment of a comprehensive list of governance standards” became the main politics of UNMIK in Kosovo (p.201). Nevertheless, Zaum explains that the riots that took place in March 2004 as a result of the rising dissatisfaction among Kosovo Albanians with ambiguity of the final status contributed to the conclusion of the UN Secretary-General Special Envoy Kai Eide that the “Standards before Status” policy is no longer appropriate for Kosovo (2009, p. 202). While Zaum’s analysis establishes that the politics of conditionality applied in the contested nature of Kosovo did not yield the desired results, it does not fully explain which
2 In the literature and UNMIK reports, the “Kosovo Standards” framework is interchangeably used with the
factors contributed to this result as it was mostly focusing on the outcome of UNMIK’s delay on exit caused by final status impediments.
Moreover, using an interactionist perspective, Holohan (2016) examined the dynamics between external organizations and local actors by focusing on the security and peacebuilding challenges of UNMIK. Holohan states that looking back at the UNMIK intervention in Kosovo, the unavailability to handle inter-ethnic tensions and the political uncertainty of Kosovo’s final status were some of the main reasons why UNMIK’s legitimacy eroded in the eyes of the locals (2016, p.336). In the same way, according to Holohan the reasons stated above made it nearly impossible for Kosovo Albanians to accomplish the benchmarks set forth by internationals (Ibid.). Holohan certainly contributed to the study of UNMIK civil administration in Kosovo by adding participant observation data and incorporating interviews that had not been shared before. Nevertheless, the study does not further explore the details of the “Standards for Kosovo” policy and its detriments.
2.2.2. European Union and Peacebuilding in Kosovo
Another focus of this thesis is the peacebuilding efforts of the European Union in Kosovo. Although their statements and publications rarely explicitly refer to their activities as peacebuilding, the European Union has declared that it highly prioritizes the prevention of violence, post-conflict reconstruction, and crisis management in the region and beyond (Council of EU, 2003). According to Fukuyama (2005), all of the countries of the EU agreed that conflicts in the Balkan’s region were sending strong waves of destabilization in Europe, hence it is mostly EU’s responsibility to provide assistance and establish long-lasting peace in the region (p.158).
Currently, European Union is present in Kosovo through two important operating bodies: European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) and the European Union Office in Kosovo / European Special Representative in Kosovo (EUSR) (EULEX Kosovo, 2019). The article by Papadimitriou and Petrov (2012) provides a valuable observation on the obstacles that external statebuilders face when there is ambiguity with regards to the political status of a host country. Authors argue that when dealing with contested territories, EU should account for the nature of contestation, “domestic legitimacy of the governing authorities” and the administrative capacity of the locals to implement the benchmarks prescribed by the EU (Papadimitriou and Petrov, 2012, p.761). The article successfully demonstrated how contested statehood in the context of Kosovo case can instigate challenges for the EU actorness.
Nevertheless, while the article carefully observes the framework of the statebuilding mission, it falls short on depicting a full picture of the local dynamics and elaborating on the outcomes of EULEX mission with respect to its objectives. This can also be noticed when examining the conducted interviews which relied heavily on the insights of the Council of European Union and EULEX officials.
Yabangi (2016), on the other hand, observed the EU legitimacy and statebuilding in relation to multiple local agents and she demonstrates how EU is increasingly associating its “enlargement conditionality policy to statebuilding and conflict resolution in the Balkans” (p. 345-346). This also became the focus of the EU statebuilding involvement in Kosovo when the Stabilization Association Agreement came into force (Ibid.) Yabangi reveals that EU is not able to generate the required local support and there is an ever-growing distrust from Kosovar institutions and local population towards EU’s statebuilding instruments in Kosovo (ibid, p. 346). As such, in order to foster support and increase the consent of the domestic stakeholders, external statebuilders should pay close attention to the output of their policies and make sure to stay true to their commitments and obligations (Mersiades, 2005; Yabangi, 2016). Yabanci also concludes that the results of external statebuilder’s policymaking are also highly dependent on different stakeholders of the domestic political arena:
“What we have also seen is that while the EU remains convinced that pressure of integration is the best way to convince Kosovo’s political elite to undertake further reforms for state building and conflict resolution, the efficiency of this strategy is highly open to questioning when the hybridity of local agency is considered” (p.364).
This leads us to believe that, if they want to see sustainable peace taking place, the EU should have constructive discussions with local institutions as well as continually rewire its statebuilding strategies depending on the necessities of a host country.
Nevertheless, contrary to most of the authors in the literature, Ker-Lindsay and Economides (2012) argued that Kosovo’s contested sovereignty does not pose a serious barrier between Kosovo and EU’s relationship, because Kosovo is very far from achieving even the most basic necessities on EU’s formal integration checklist. In other words, while acknowledging that there are certain difficulties that Kosovo has to face when dealing with the EU, the lack of a unanimous stance towards Kosovo’s independence from EU members is not
the main problem that Kosovo should be focusing on. According to the European Commission, the fact that five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo does not hamper EU’s “substantial engagement” in Kosovo (Ker-Lindsay and Economides, 2012, p.82). As such, authors delineate that EU’s statebuilding involvement in Kosovo is imperative for a “fully functioning and democratic institutions supported by the rule of law and a functioning market economy” (Ibid.). Contrary to this argument, Hoogenboom (2011) states that the lack of a final consensus by the EU Member States on Kosovo’s statehood is significantly impeding EU’s effectiveness in Kosovo, while at the same time it is constantly losing credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the locals. Moreover, Hoogenboom states that “each decision on, and implementation of, EU foreign policy regarding Kosovo is hampered because Kosovo’s status is always in the background” (2011, p.8). Nevertheless, both arguments have significance in current circumstances of EU’s statebuilding involvement in Kosovo since its contested sovereignty continues to be a complication that needs to be dealt with eventually. However, as to how much and in what way this disputed political status of Kosovo is impacting the Kosovo-EU relations and EU’s statebuilding involvement, there needs to be continuous assessment of recent developments. This is why in order to better evaluate these arguments, updated observations and studies on EU’s statebuilding instruments in Kosovo should be made to acquire better assessment of the situation.
2.3. The Gap in the Literature
The literature and the previous studies done show that contested sovereignty of Kosovo has had an extensive effect on the policymaking of external peacebuilding missions. It was also established that statebuilding is one of the main parts of peacebuilding missions in post-conflict societies, especially in the case of Kosovo, where governance institutions were inexistent before UNMIK stepped in. It is noticed that one of the main statebuilding tools that both the UN and the EU have chosen was the politics of conditionality. Thus, this thesis will also try to address how the contested sovereignty of Kosovo has impacted this statebuilding approach.
Considering that the problem and topic which this thesis seeks to elaborate entails an intersection of different concepts such as peacebuilding, statebuilding, contested sovereignty and politics of conditionality, there seems to be a lack of recent studies for Kosovo that include the beforementioned elements. As such, some of the articles chosen from the literature that are relevant to the topic may not all be recently published. However, they provide valuable findings, insights and discussions that are still relevant and applicable to current circumstances
and scope of this research. While the literature review revealed that politics of conditionality is used by both UNMIK (during 2003-2004) and the EU, it does not explicitly explain the course of their development and their outcome when observed parallelly with developments resulted from Kosovo’s contested sovereignty. Consequently, the consulted studies were not sufficient to explain the proposed research question in this study. Ultimately, this research project seeks to address the gap in the literature and explain how the contested sovereignty of emerging states affect the United Nations and the European Union’s policymaking based on conditionally in their respective peacebuilding efforts. Moreover, while the consulted texts provide a valuable contribution to analyzing various international-led statebuilding in their peacebuilding operations, there seems to be a lack of thorough analysis of the policymaking of statebuilding missions. While this thesis seeks to contribute to this discussion, it also seeks to lay out the foundation for a more thorough examination of the results and effectiveness of statebuilding missions relying on politics of conditionality. In addition, the current literature is mainly focused on aid conditionality, its effectiveness and consequences in peacebuilding missions. At the same time, conditionality is not usually attributed to UN missions, as it is merely seen as a tool used by the EU’s foreign policy. In this regard, apart from analyzing the EU conditionality, this research will also elaborate on benchmarks and standards used by the UN and add more insight to the discussion of liberal framework implemented by the UN interventions.
Chapter 3. Theoretical Framework
Introduction
The purpose of this theoretical framework is to provide understanding and definitions of the main concepts and models that constitutes the research question and the arguments provided. Particular importance is given to defining concepts such as sovereignty and its contested nature, post-conflict statebuilding, and politics of conditionality in the context of peacebuilding. These concepts constitute the building blocks of peacebuilding and statebuilding not just in Kosovo, but in different past and present civilian missions of the United Nations and the European Union. This chapter also includes theoretical assumptions on conditionality policies used by the UN and EU which this thesis will observe in the analysis of the selected cases. As such, these concepts will be first theoretically discussed and then empirically analyzed in the following chapters.
3.1. The Concept of Sovereignty and its Relevance to the Emerging States
When disintegrating main components of the research queastion, we can see that sovereignty is one of the important concepts that needs elaboration for the purpose of better understanding the selected statebuilding cases. In general, Noutcheva (2018) characterizes contested states in three categories: having limited internal sovereignty but “consolidated external sovereignty”, having limited external sovereignty but “consolidates internal sovereignty”, and territories that have both internal and external limited sovereignty (p. 7).
Moreover, the sovereignty of emerging new states was traditionally acknowledged with the acceptance and diplomatic recognition by other “existing sovereign states”, however with the growing prominence and influence of regional and supranational organizations, state recognition is now also under the scrutiny of international organizations and institutions (Newman and Visoka, 2018, p.763). In this sense, the acceptance of a state by institutions such as the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, OSCE and more, constitutes a crucial stepping stone to achieve worldwide recognition. For instance, Geldenhuys (2009, p.22) categorizes the membership of new states to UN as a ‘collective de jure recognition’, while on the other hand Newman and Visoka (2018, p.763-764) explain how a ‘deliberate exclusion of a state from UN membership amounts to collective non-recognition’. In this sense, Kosovo is still not a member of the United Nations, European Union, NATO or OSCE and it still has a long way to go.
On another note, there are several cases where sovereignty-based conflicts prompted the need for a more extended classification of this concept. These cases include but are not limited to territories such as East Timor, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine, and Western Sahara (William and Pecci, 2004, p.357-360). William and Pecci (2004) comprise a general definition of the “sovereignty first” as a traditional approach of solving conflicts, by stating: “A core attribute of sovereignty is the exclusive jurisdiction of a state to exercise political power and authority within its own borders and to exercise all rights necessary to preserve its territorial integrity from external and internal threats” (p.352). On the other hand, the other approach in the international law is the successionist practices of “self-determinations first”, where a certain people are able to determine their own political fate (Ibid. p. 353). However, as Williams (2003) puts it, these two approaches in the international law were not sufficient in solving conflicts that dated back for years between the state and the sub-state entity (p. 388). This brought forward the concept of “earned sovereignty”, which Williams refers to as a middle ground of the beforementioned approaches providing a process for the sub-state to transition to an either independent state or being given “heightened autonomy” (Ibid. p.351). The table below comprises the six core and optimal elements of earned sovereignty as categorized by Williams:
Table 1. Williams’ Definition of six elements of ‘Earned Sovereignty’. Source: Williams, 2003, p.388-389).
Core Elements
1.Shared Sovereignty
“In each case of earned sovereignty the state and sub-state entity may both exercise sovereign authority and functions over a defined territory. In some instances, international institutions may also exercise sovereign authority and functions in addition to or in lieu of the parent state”.
2.Institution Building
“Sub-state entity, frequently with the assistance of the
international community, undertakes to construct institutions for self-government and to build institutions capable of exercising increasing sovereign authority and functions”.
3.Determination of the final status
“Eventual determination of the final status of the sub-state entity and its relationship to the state. In many instances the status will be determined by a referendum, while in others it
may involve a negotiated settlement between the state and sub-state entity, often with international mediation”.
Optimal Elements
1.Phased Sovereignty
“Entails the accumulation by the sub-state entity of increasing sovereign authority and functions over a specified period of time prior to the determination of final status”.
2. Conditional Sovereignty
“Applied to the accumulation of increasing sovereign authority and functions by the sub-state entity, or it may be applied to the determination of the sub-state entity's final status. In either case the sub-state entity is required to meet certain benchmarks”.
3.Constrained Sovereignty
“Involves continued limitations on the sovereign authority and functions of the new state, such as continued international administrative and/or military presence, and limits on the right
of the state to undertake territorial association with other states”.
If we consider the framework of many peacebuilding interventions in contested post-conflict territories, earned sovereignty can be seen as an approach used by them for conflict management. This is also the approach that the United Nations based their involvement in Kosovo, which will be further discussed in the analysis part of this paper.
3.2. Statebuilding in Post-Conflict Societies
Considering that this thesis is focusing on the policymaking of statebuilding operations in Kosovo, it is important to further explore the concept of statebuilding along with several contradictions that might arise. According to Paris and Sisk (2009), statebuilding “is not synonymous with peacebuilding” (p.14). With regards to post-conflict territories, they define statebuilding as “strengthening or construction of legitimate governmental institutions in countries that are emerging from conflicts” (Ibid.). Similarly, Chesterman (2013) also defines state-building as an extended effort of peacebuilding intervention, which increases the international mission’s scope of involvement with an additional responsibility of “constructing or reconstructing institutions of governance capable of providing citizens with physical and economic security” (p. 4). Also, Paris and Sisk note that statebuilding is an important element of peacebuilding, where the later focuses on taking comprehensive measures to create conditions for sustainable peace so that the society does not relapse back to conflict (Ibid.). As such, considering that these authors consider that long-lasting peace is dependent on legitimate and efficient governmental institutions, statebuilding becomes a crucial component of peacebuilding missions in post-conflict societies. The statebuilding becomes even more challenging when state structures are absent to begin with, such as the case on peacebuilding missions in East Timor, Afghanistan, Namibia and Kosovo (Chesterman, 2004).
Going back to Paris and Sisk (2009), they present several contradictions and dilemmas faced by external statebuilders that emerge during their involvement. For instance, there seems to be a paradox when it comes to promoting local ownership. According to Paris and Sisk, there is often an outside direction provided in terms of “identifying who the local ‘owners’ should be… [which] necessarily involves decisions and actions that will favor some parties over others, thereby defying the principle of local ownership itself” (2009, p.305). In turn, this situation raises questions in terms of the legitimacy of the selected domestic actors (Ibid.). However, at the same time, without this interference, how would local ownership be established in the first place? In the same way, Narten (2009) points out the struggle that the external statebuilders often face when having to select and empower a certain group of local
actors, while always having the risk of the emergence of spoilers. In addition, there is the contradiction of statebuilders instilling universal values, such as those of liberal framework, within the system of the host society (Ibid. p.305). As a consequence, this might provide a shock to the domestic community and take a longer time to adjust to the newly introduced concepts and democratic values. It is important to stress that statebuilding policies should be feasible and they have to make sense for both external statebuilders and local community (Paris and Sisk, 2009, p. 306).
On another note, Paris and Sisk explore the dilemma of dependency in statebuilding operations. While it is evident that the locals need supervision and guidance to build effective and self-sustaining institutions, continued assistance from the outside might undermine the ultimate goal of achieving “self-governance” (Ibid., p.308). In the words of Paris and Sisk:
“Large flows of outside assistance and the ‘hands on’ role of international actors in implementation of peace settlements can create new political and economic patterns in the host society that rely on a continuation of large-scale external aid and guidance (p.308)”.
Another important point presented by Paris and Sisk is the duration dilemma, which entails complications deriving from leaving too soon or extending too much the peacebuilding mission in a host country. While it is important to stay present in the statebuilding processes until there are noticeable indications that there are conditions for sustainable peace, it is also important to note that “prolonged or open-ended missions” may create several implications (2009, p.307). These implications include the growing irritation and hostility of the local population towards powerful interveners, which ultimately undermines the assistance provided by the internationals (Ibid., p.307). On the other hand, concluding the mission too early might leave behind unstable state institutions. There are several implications that arise from statebuilding practices in post-conflict societies and it falls upon the external statebuilders to acquire the best strategy that coincides with local dynamics and anticipate required solutions. The dilemmas discussed above resonate highly with both of the selected statebuilding cases in Kosovo. Also, as this project tackles the statebuilding policies based on conditionality, the following section will explore the concept of political conditionality in order to apply it in the context of peacebuilding.
3.3. Conceptualizing Political Conditionality as a Peacebuilding Tool
Koch (2015) is one of the authors who contributed to the debate on political conditionality by addressing the theoretical gap of this instrument across different policy fields. He suggested that there is a need for an updated conceptualization of political conditionality beyond foreign aid, as well as to characterize different conditionality instruments (p.97). Koch provides his definition as follows:
“In the broadest terms, conditionality describes an incentive instrument in the relationship between two actors, in which one actor aims at changing the behavior of the other by setting up conditions for the relationship and by manipulating its cost-benefit calculation by using (positive and negative) incentives. In the case of political conditionality, the behavior that is sought to be changed relates to democratic development and the protection and promotion…of human rights (2015, p. 99).”
Looking back at it from the peacebuilding perspective, Boyce defines peace conditionalities as “the use of formal performance criteria and informal policy dialogue to encourage the implementation of peace accords and the consolidation of peace” (2002, p.1026). Furthermore, building upon the typology from previous studies, Koch (2015) distinguishes several dimensions of conditionality, such as those based on leverage mechanisms of negative conditionality which can be retributive, and positive conditionality which can be “rewarding or incentivizing” (p. 99).
Figure 1. Typology of Political Conditionality, Source: Koch (2015)
The figure above put together by Koch is useful for visualizing different types of conditionalities used across policy fields. For this thesis project, a particular interest rests on positive ex-ante and ex-post conditionality. As such, ex-ante conditionality means that certain conditions need to be fulfilled before entering a certain relationship in order to enjoy the
benefits (Ibid., p.99). On the other hand, ex-post conditionality takes place when additional conditions are set over an ongoing relationship (Ibid.).
Koch distinguishes these two by stating that “in ex-post political conditionality, democratic governance and respect for human rights are objectives, whereas in ex-ante conditionality they represent a precondition” (Ibid.). For example, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) state that “EU conditionality is a bargaining strategy of reinforcement by reward, under which the EU provides external incentives for a target government to comply with its conditions” (p. 662). As such, Koch categorizes EU conditionality as positive ex-ante conditionality (2015, p.99). Many characterize positive ex-ante as “traditional conditionality” (Fierro, 2003, p.131), since they are set forth before entering any relationship or agreement and benefits are granted afterward (Koch, 2015). The underlying premise of Koch is that the logic of these distinctive types of conditionalities can be easily applied to different external policies that are based on different leverage mechanisms (Ibid., p. 105). In this regard, the following sections try to capture this logic and present forms that political conditionality takes shape in the context of the UN and the EU statebuilding component of their peacebuilding interventions.
3.3.1. The use of liberal framework standards as benchmarks in United Nation’s statebuilding operations
Considering that the scope of this research is focusing on the statebuilding policies based on conditionality, this section will build upon certain concepts and observations by Dominik Zaum, who explored the standards and benchmarks used in UN statebuilding missions. Based on the UN statebuilding operations such as those in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Kosovo, Zaum demonstrates how the fulfillment of certain benchmarks become the ultimate checklist of the mission in order to initiate the exit procedures. Zaum defines exit as ‘the transition of political authority from international to legitimate local institutions’ where “exit requires reasonably legitimate institutions to which power can be transferred, and it should be understood as a process and not a single event” (p.193). This is usually why statebuilding missions require several years for the consolidation of long-lasting peace and instilling democratic governance institutions. As such, the fulfillment of the benchmarks by the local authorities which were set by the external institution could be considered as a stepping stone to achieving the ultimate reward. This reward encloses being acknowledged by statebuilders as sovereign, self-sufficient and democratic institutions.
By the end of the Cold War, the United Nations have commonly pursued a liberal peacebuilding framework in their statebuilding interventions (Zaum, 2010, p.193). As such, it is imperative that the necessary governance standards are achieved by the local counterparts in peacebuilding missions in order to evaluate the progress made and successfully conclude the statebuilding component in their operations (ibid.). The fulfillment of these standards would allow the handover of authority to domestic control and earn what Zaum refers to as “sovereignty as responsibility” (p.194). Zaum comprises these standards into five main elements of the normative framework of liberal statebuilding including: “democratic government, promotion and protection of human rights, upholding the rule of law, economic liberalization and an effective government” (ibid, p.194).
These benchmarks are usually established at the beginning of the UN operations and they contain certain standards that are carefully reviewed by the Security Council and the Secretary-General (Zaum, 2010, p. 196). A downside of this process according to Zaum is that the set targets may not reflect the actual needs of the host country, or not take into account certain political and local constraints. Nevertheless, considering that there is usually not enough time to prepare a thorough strategy that fully corresponds to the local needs, using liberal framework standards that have worked on previous missions seems to be a convenient solution. Also, while all of the standards and expectations that the UN has set for their recipients in the host country could be seen as conditionalities for fully acknowledging their effective, righteous and democratic governance, the compilation of the UN standards by Zaum provide a good starting point for analyzing the standards and benchmarks that UN explicitly drafted and implemented in Kosovo as a conditionality of Kosovo’s future status.
3.3.2. Political Conditionality in European Union’s External Relations
The European Union is an active player in foreign affairs, especially on assuring peace through its statebuilding instruments. Political conditionality only began to be used systematically by EU’s development programs after the Cold War, and it increasingly became a part of their external relations (Portela, 2010). It is noticed that the EU often interconnects its statebuilding practices with that of enlargement if the targeted country is singled out as a potential EU member candidate. As such, the EU sets out the well-known accession conditions called
Copenhagen Criteria that includes values and principles that every new member must conform
to (TEU, Article 49, Article 6). Schimmelfennig (2008) states that one of the key conditions for the success of EU political conditionality is the effective interaction between EU and
domestic actors (p.920). Also, Schimmelfennig points out that targeted states need to be rewarded after accomplishing the set criteria over the course of the roadmap to the EU in order for the process to be credible and promising (2008, p.920). At the same time, it should also become clear by the EU institutions that non-compliance results in exclusion (Ibid.). In the same way, Bieber (2011) agrees that the lack of substantial clarity on conditions for EU accession, and “discrepancies between broad declarative conditions and specific requirements undermine the effectiveness of statebuilding” (p.1800). Pawelec and Grimm (2014) compare the EU conditionality and its effectiveness on a simple cost-benefit argument by implying that: “external incentives induce compliance if the benefits exceed the domestic costs of compliance, particularly if an EU membership perspective is offered” (p.1291). In other words, domestic actors would be able to better manage local dissatisfactions if in turn they can show off the benefitted rewards and argue that the road towards the EU membership is slowly but surely being paved. Similarly, Richter notes that compliance highly depends on the robustness of incentives:
“Governments comply with the EU’s criteria if the political costs of adjustment are not higher than the expected benefits (in this case EU accession is most important). However, if the incentive potential of an external actor does not correspond with the transformation state’s sensitivity towards these incentives, conditionality will prove ineffective. According to rational logic, the recipient must subjectively assess if the benefits of a reward or the costs of a sanction are high enough to compensate for the efforts required for change” (2012, p.514).
Also, building on the work of Freyburg and Richter (2010) mentioned in the previous chapter, national identity is a factor that should be considered when evaluating the effectiveness of the EU conditionality of instilling European values and democratization. The authors suggest that “if conditionality criteria contradict a nation’s self-conception, states will not comply or – in case of identity conflict – do so only inconsistently” (Ibid., p. 276). For this matter, in order to distinguish whether national identity is contributing to non-compliance to the EU requirements, particular attention should be given to identify such beliefs on “public governmental statements or official declarations” (Ibid., p.268).
Moreover, the European Union has different instruments of conditionality for providing stability and influencing European values in particular regions. One of them is the Stabilization
and Association Agreement, a framework establishing relations between European Union and the Western Balkan (European Commission, 2019). This agreement includes the implementation of Stabilization Association Process (SAP), which includes liberal economic and political reforms, regional cooperation, and trade agreements that lay the foundation of the roadmap for the EU accession (Ibid.). This agreement had been signed between Kosovo and EU in 2015, further increasing the EU involvement in Kosovo. As such, the second case of this thesis will analyze the SAP in Kosovo and investigate current developments in order to find answers for the proposed research questions.
3.4. Conclusion: Theoretical Assumptions
The main purpose of the theoretical framework presented above was to define and understand different concepts relevant to answering the research questions. As a result, the analysis will be a cross-examination of the proposed concepts and models, namely sovereignty and its relevance to emerging countries, statebuilding in post-conflict societies and politics of conditionality used in peacebuilding. In this way, the theoretical framework will serve to set the boundaries and the scope of focus for analyzing the selected case studies. In addition to that, it also makes it possible to relate the study to a broader context other than the focus of the cases under observation.
From the overall observed concepts and models, it can be expected that the lack of external or internal sovereignty of a contested territory does not keep the external statebuilders from deploying and engaging in statebuilding interventions. Moreover, how political conditionality in peacebuilding is assumed to function is that external statebuilders impose positive and negative incentives in order to change the behavior of the target society and instill liberal and democratic values. With regards to the UN, peacebuilding missions consider certain benchmarks that the host country has to fulfill as an exit strategy. With regards to the EU’s enlargement policy, which can be considered as a prominent tool used to impose European values in the systems of potential EU members, factors such as ‘local hybridity’, national identity and the relevance of the benefits received seem to play an important role in the success of this policy. Both of these approaches will be observed in the analysis. However, it must be noted that there is a need for further theoretical viewpoints concerning the relationship of external statebuilding and contested sovereignty.
Furthermore, external statebuilders such as the UN and the EU both use liberal framework values in the benchmarks and standards that they impose to local stakeholders that
they often identify themselves. Also, it is suggested that it takes time for the targeted society to fully integrate such values. At the same time, it is suggested that long missions and open-ended mandates can create dependencies and contribute to growing hostility from the local population. This aspect will also be observed. In overall, through the lens of the external statebuilding efforts, the analysis of the selected cases will observe the circumstances and the outcome of engaging conditionality policies in the overall peacebuilding effort in a contested territory.
Chapter 4. Methodology
4.1. Research Design
For my research project I have chosen to conduct a qualitative research based on multiple case study design. According to Bryman, qualitative research provides “an epistemological position described as interpretivist, meaning that…the stress is on the understanding of the social world through an examination of the interpretation of that world by its participants” (2012, p. 380). In addition, qualitative research study allows researchers to understand how and why a particular phenomenon under the study occurs (Yin, 2003). Focusing on this type of qualitative research, Gerring defines case studies as “an intensive study of a single case or a small set of cases with an aim to generalize across a larger set of cases of the same general type” (2007, p. 65). As such, choosing a case study design allows a more in-depth analysis of the chosen specific cases and test the relevance and applicability of the concepts, debates and theories proposed by different scholars (Bryman, 2012).
Generally, when there is more than one case study chosen to investigate a problem, then a multiple case study approach is applied (Baxter and Jack, 2008). It allows the researcher to investigate “within and between cases” (Ibid., p.548). As such, individual cases are thoroughly explored and investigated in order to independently confirm or explain certain constructs. Yin (2003) specifies that the individual cases under study must be carefully selected in order to either “predict similar results (a literal replication) or predict contrasting results but for anticipatable reasons” (p.43). In other words, how the logic replication works is that the cases are selected by anticipating similar results. Going back to the focus of this research project, two individual cases are chosen to be analyzed which are identified by common themes and elements. Both of the selected cases are a part of peacebuilding interventions in Kosovo. Because it is both unique and a complex post-conflict contested country, it provides avenues for identifying various elements with relevance to a broader scientific community. For the scope of this research, the focus will be on analyzing the implications of the UN and the EU’s statebuilding efforts as a part of their peacebuilding intervention in contested Kosovo. The selected cases will be examined in terms of their policy approach based on conditionality in their efforts to consolidate peace, democracy and good governance.
4.1.1. Case Selection and Justification
Two cases below are chosen with the assumption that similar results will be attained. This selection of cases is based on the replication design suggested by Yin (2003). In multiple case studies using replication, the outcome of the cases is relatively anticipated, however the aim of the individual analysis of cases is to explore and explain as to how and why a certain phenomenon has come to that outcome. In turn, combining the insights and similar results from the two cases contributes to a stronger external validity. The results will later be addressed in the conclusion section. The main focus of this research is analyzing political conditionality used as peacebuilding tool by the UN and the EU in Kosovo. Both of these cases used this type of policymaking in their statebuilding interventions. With regards to the first case, the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) which directly administered Kosovo through 1999 until 2008, was prominent with its “Standards before Status” policy. With regards to the second case of the European Union involvement in Kosovo as the main external statebuilders since 2008, the framework of Stabilization Association Agreement (SAA) and important aspects before and during this policy was in force will be analyzed. Moreover, Kosovo’s contested territorial sovereignty is present as a notable factor throughout the involvement of both of these statebuilding operations. As a result, going back to the main argument made, it is expected that the results will show the contested sovereignty having negatively affected the conditional policy outcomes of both interventions.
4.2. Data Collection 4.2.1. Document analysis
The sources that will be used in the analysis section will be drawn from primary and secondary data. These data are gathered from the official UN and EU reports, such as UN Security Council reports and resolutions, European Commission Progress Reports, Stabilization Association Agreements, Council of Europe reports, treaties and court decisions. In addition to these official reports and documents, data analysis will also be drawn from previous empirical studies on the topic that have a similar focus as this thesis, academic articles, and local monitoring reports and assessments. Furthermore, articles from international and local media are used to provide a better depiction of the situation for the observed timeframe and extract statements
that have been made by the local elites. An important segment of data collection includes the primary data gathered through the interviews conducted in Kosovo.
4.2.2. Interviews
An important supplement to the research data will also be the fieldwork in Kosovo, where semi-structured interviews were conducted with relevant experts of the field, past and present officials of relevant institutions in order to collect their insights, perceptions, experiences and their empirical knowledge on the subject. One of the main reasons for choosing this method as supplementary to other primary and secondary data gathering is to acquire information from the interviewees that might otherwise be overlooked. According to Bryman (2012), unstructured interviewing is most common in case studies, as they enable “the generation of an intensive, detailed examination of a case” (pg. 68). Before contacting the interviewees, a comprehensive information sheet was devised and attached to the informed consent form. This document included an introduction of the topic and the research questions, the conditions to the interview such as the request for recording and transcribing the interview, a detailed description of how the information provided by the respondent will be used, who will have access to it, and where will it be published. The document also included a set of preliminary questions in order for the respondents to have a better idea of what the interview will entail. In order to ensure that the prepared interview questions were pertinent to the interviewees, a background check was initially conducted. The responders were identified during the preliminary research period as their names were noticed on several reports and articles, and some of them were also proposed by individuals who were initially considered for the interview but redirected me to others with better empirical knowledge.
The interviewees are mostly officials that were/are directly related to the statebuilding process of both selected cases. In order to avoid bias and influencing the responses of the interviewees, the questions are drafted as open-ended, where they maintain the focus of the research while at the same time allowing the interviewees to add their expertise and empirical knowledge on the topic. The interview questions are semi-structured, and one of the main reasons for this choice of interview style was the idea that this would allow the interviews to add relevant information on the topic, which otherwise may have not been included if the questions were of specific focus and within a confined scope of interest. When reviewing the transcripts, an importance was given to analyzing whether there are reoccurring statements among the respondents, as well as whether they correspond to the scope of the research. The
